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Arctic, Europe

Norway Faces a New Era of Russian Realpolitik in the Arctic

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By Daniel Thomassen

Germany’s assault on neutral Norway in April 1940 was swift and surprising. A great power was contemplating a smaller state with strategic importance, but without any significant defense capability and no credible allies. Fortress Norway ensured all-year access to the Atlantic for the Kriegsmarine, as well as iron ore transport for the German war industry. Extending the frontline to a secondary northern front put pressure on the crumbling British and French resistance on the European continent. The invasion of Norway was an act of brutal realism, where the comparative power of states and alliances within an anarchic international system is decisive for strategic decision making.

This writing discusses the deteriorating strategic environment that will challenge Norwegian security again in the coming decades, and the necessary responses to them. The Norwegian National Security Strategy must address these challenges by refocusing NATO, enhancing bilateral partnerships, and strengthening the Norwegian Armed Forces.

A New Dawn on the Arctic

Four reverberant strategic trends are converging to increase pressure on Russian neighbor Norway and NATO’s Arctic flank. First, climate change will gradually melt Arctic ice, opening a new ocean for shipping and competition for natural resources. Secondly, Russia will continue its confrontational line with the West, while strengthening its global power status through commercial and military activities in the High North and strategic cooperation with new Asian partners. The Russian loss of confidence in diplomacy and international law is a dangerous trajectory converging with increased Arctic competition. Third, the balancing power of the U.S. is gradually shifting its effort to the Asia-Pacific, while fiscal challenges necessitate a reduced footprint elsewhere. Finally, NATO is becoming relatively weaker because of decreasing European defense spending, American reluctance to cover the expenses, as well as divergent national interests and conflicting views on Article 5 collective response scenarios.

The world’s attention is now increasingly on the Arctic, where melting polar ice ensures access to new areas faster than previously expected. Global commercial shipping will gradually utilize new shipping lanes in the Arctic, which also holds an abundance of petroleum, gas, minerals, and important fish stocks. The leading nations of the world will increase their presence in the region and emphasize its access and security as a global maritime commons. The Northern Sea Route on the Russian coast is already open through July to December and normally ice-free in September and October. 71 vessels from 11 different nations used the passage in 2013. The travel between Western Europe and East-Asia can be reduced by two weeks when choosing this route. The Northwest-passage as well as the transpolar route will also become seasonally accessible in the 2020-2030 period.[2]

northernsearoute
The Northern Sea Route, shown above, is increasingly accessible thanks to receding sea ice. (Institute of the North)

Studies suggest that a third of the world’s undiscovered natural gas is in the Arctic – mostly in the Russian sector.[3] Then, there are vast amounts of oil and minerals[4] with an estimated 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil resources and $2 trillion worth of important minerals like iron ore, zinc, nickel, gold, and uranium in the Russian sector. Even if the accessibility and technology have been unavailable to extract these resources safely and economically, such constraints are gradually overcome. Russia started oil production from the first Arctic field of Prirazlomnaya in December 2013[5] and recently increased its output. Exxon and Russian state-owned oil-company Rosneft only saw their cooperative effort to start production in the Kara-Sea interrupted because of sanctions on the Russian energy industry.

The Arctic nations are now racing for ownership of the valuable Arctic seabed. Russia and Denmark have already submitted overlapping claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and Canada is preparing to do the same. However, the Commission does not hold authority to decide ownership. Its statements will be the basis of bilateral negotiations, like the 2010 Barents Sea Treaty, which settled the delimitation between Russia and Norway. Significant Asian nations are also focusing their attention to the polar region. China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore were all accepted as observer-nations in the Arctic Council in 2013. China is actively negotiating extensive commercial relations with the Arctic nations – with favorable export deals in return for Chinese investment and technology.

The interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty from 1920 and international law in adjacent maritime zones will become increasingly disputed as multinational activity in the Arctic increases. The most pressing concern will be threefold: whether Norway enjoys sovereign rights to resources buried in the continental shelf, whether it can claim taxes from other nations’ commercial activity, and finally whether the signatories have equal rights to extract these seabed resources.[6] Furthermore, Norwegian regulation on fishing as well as restrictions on drilling, extraction, and shipping for environmental protection will be challenged. Even if the other Arctic nations and the EU share Norway’s concern for responsible and sustainable activity, they will each weigh conflicting commercial and environmental interests separately.

Russia’s Rise and Requital

According to its strategies and doctrines, Russia is a major global power that must regain its temporarily lost historic and natural place as a counterbalance to the U.S. and the West in the international system. The Russian Federation regards the unipolar system with the U.S. solitary superpower as a serious threat to itself and other states with divergent forms of government and values. Russia has lost confidence in international law and cooperation in the international environment because of what they conceive as independent actions of U.S.-led coalitions without United Nations assent. So even if Russia presumably prefers agreements based on common interests with its competitors and claims to adhere to treaties and international bodies[8] – the official documents clearly express that they do not believe that western countries will respect these standards and make fair concessions.

The Russians have experienced that realism is the decisive international model over the last 30 years, where the relative power of the states is what matters. They believe weak states run the risk of forced regime change if they stand up to American pressure. Russian strategic documents state that Western subversion has corrupted the former Soviet republics during Russia’s period of weakness after the Cold War. Some of these have been adopted into NATO and the EU, while the Russian demand for friendly buffer states has been disregarded. Thus, Russian leadership believes it is under attack by the West and wants to look strong to its domestic audience. Their biggest fear is western influence on the younger Russian population, which could potentially spark opposition to the central government. This results in the portrayal of NATO – with its eastwards expansion and global mission sets – as the main threat to Russia and its regional allies. Russia must consequently reestablish a position of strength in order to uphold stability in its proclaimed sphere of exclusive interest.

Recent updates to Russian military and maritime doctrine were published in December 2014 and July 2015. They describe how the use of force in conflicts and international competition is intensified, while international relations are becoming more complicated and unfair.[10] Russia makes it clear that they will protect their vital national interests with all means necessary. The new doctrines reflect the growing global ambition of Russia and particularly in the Arctic – which is its most important region for military purposes and for strengthening its long term economy by exploiting natural resources. The strategic priorities towards 2020 are transforming Russia to a world power, raising the living standards of its people, ensuring economic growth, achieving a balanced multipolar international system through strategic partnerships, and retaining  strategic deterrence by modernizing its armed forces.[11]

Russian national identity is complex, but remains more of a European than an Asian one. Ties to Europe have been bolstered by growing economic interdependence in energy trade. Russia made recent investments in renewed and diversified infrastructure to continue exporting energy to the EU into the future. However, conflicts with the West over Syria, Kosovo, NATO-expansion, Ukraine, and the dismissal of former president Medvedev’s proposal to replace NATO with Russian-European security cooperation[12] have led the Russians to look towards other partnerships. The worsening relationship between Russia and western countries coincides with a shifting of the world’s economic center of gravity and future vital markets to Asia. Therefore, Russia is presently engaged in forming strategic partnerships with China, India, and Iran where their shared interests are the suspicion of the West. Such interests include energy supply, mutual understanding of security challenges, and diminishing the role of the U.S. in global order.

The Union State with Belarus is Russia’s most formal alliance. This country is strategically located as a buffer zone to NATO and only 150 miles from the encircled province of Kaliningrad. Then, there is the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which was formed in 1992 in response to NATO. The members are Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while Afghanistan and Serbia are observers and Iran is touted as a possible candidate. But the most important in the future, is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This political, economic and military cooperation was formed in 1996 and has seen substantial developments since then. Russia and China have been the most important members since the beginning, with India and Pakistan included in July 2015. Increasing military cooperation on exercises, arms trade, and intelligence has developed over the last years as well as continuing negotiations of a free-trade agreement within the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Union.[14]   

The Russian economy is struggling and has been in decline since 2013. Governmental spending was recently slashed by 10% and most sectors had to be reduced, except the defense budget. Reports are suggesting that 60 out of Russia’s 83 different regions are in a state of crisis. The lingering effects of the 2008-09 financial crisis, plummeting oil prices and Western sanctions have been devastating. As a result, the reinstating of the superpower has slowed down and internal unrest is increasing. This is a worrisome development which causes Russia to become less predictable and more aggressive in its foreign relations, especially with its neighbors. Still, Putin’s popularity is at record levels,[16] nationalism is growing stronger, and the people accept the narrative that Russia is the victim of a Western conspiracy. Eventually though, the Russian economy needs to be adequately healthy in order to uphold this loyalty.

Russian energy company Gazprom has a lucrative thirty year contract with the PRC. (Sergey Porter / Vedomosti)
Russian energy company Gazprom has a lucrative thirty year contract with the PRC. (Sergey Porter / Vedomosti)

Russia and its allies are the world’s leading energy producers, exporting oil, natural gas and uranium on a grand scale. The EU estimates a 27% worldwide increase in energy consumption by 2030,[17] while the U.S. expects a 56% increase by 2040.[18] The export of oil and gas amounted to 70% of Russian foreign sales in 2012 and more than half of total state income.[19] The Russian economy is dependent on energy exports for the foreseeable future and the competition for ownership of natural resources is emphasized in its National Security Strategy. The Russian economy is bound to profit from increasing sales of energy to meet rising Asian need. Oil and gas exports from the Arctic region, Siberia, the Caspian Sea, and Eastern Russia are now targeting this new market. China is itself a world-class energy producer, but has seen substantially growing consumption due to demographics and industrialization. 2007 saw China become a net importer of natural gas and the demand is strong for gas to replace polluting coal power plants. The infrastructure for large gas imports from Russia is now under construction. Sizable gas deals between state owned companies Gazprom and CNBC were completed in November 2014 and May 2015 for at least 68 billion cubic meters per annum. These deals will make China the largest customer of Russian gas for a thirty-year period from 2018 and are valued at $900 billion.[21]

The importance of European trade will eventually become less significant to Russia – even if new infrastructure is still being built for Europe.[22] Eighty percent of Russian energy sales went to the EU as late as 2012, but the EU is diversifying its energy sources and no longer wishes to depend on Russia as the dominant provider.[23] The current dependency denies the EU any significant soft power leverage, and the economic sanctions towards Russia have been painful for the EU as well. The Russians have also shut down the gas flow for political purpose on several occasions.[24] Thus, the EU is looking for other partners to bolster their energy security and Russia responds by looking to alternatives and potentially larger rewards in emerging markets.

Russia will effectively remain the single great power in the Arctic for the near future. Until now, the Russians have been alone in considering the High North as vitally important, but there is growing interest and competitiveness from other major powers and the Arctic nations. Russia is leading the line in an inevitable militarization of the Arctic region while protesting military presence of any other nation in general, and NATO in particular. The establishment of the Russian Arctic Military Command and the Armed Forces modernization program[25] included renewing their strategic submarine fleet, strengthening homeland defense, and building military infrastructure in the Arctic. Their new doctrine emphasize the importance of both nuclear and conventional deterrence, as well as an increased presence of the Northern Fleet in the Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. An expert group, advising the Norwegian Secretary of Defense, recently published a report describing how these measures are providing better protection for nuclear-armed submarines, as well as the ability to conduct sea-denial and sea-control operations off the coast of Norway.[26]

The Russians would like to retain the upper hand in the High North to avoid interference with their vital military and commercial activity, and to solidify their claims in potential negotiations over international or disputed areas. Also, Russia wants to be in a predisposed position, aimed at calling out a provocative act for an increased Western military presence. Neighboring Norway will remain a representative of the collective western protagonist and will be challenged by Russian activity and its competitive approach in the Arctic region. The geopolitical focus will take priority over regional bilateral relations and cooperation in the Arctic Council.

Norway and the Western Allies

The Norwegian Security Strategy is founded upon the NATO collective defense concept and the national ambition of protecting sovereign rights, dealing with incidents and crises, as well as enabling allied military action on national territory.[27] The absence of any serious threats since the Cold War, combined with the expectancy of proper warning time of an emerging conflict, along with the military supremacy of the NATO alliance, have reduced the national requirements for a significant war prevention capability. The requirements for higher readiness for counterterrorism and contributions to international operations have resulted in more professional forces with quicker reaction time. For this purpose and because of cuts in defense spending the Armed Forces have been transformed from a relatively large and robust mobilization force into a small, balanced and capable readiness force. However, the deteriorating strategic security environment recently led the Norwegian Chief of Defense to advise the Government to increase budgets by $5 billion for the next planning cycle running through 2020. There is a need to bolster territorial defense capability since there are no permanent allied forces stationed in Norway.[28] Failing to do so, he warns, would endanger the ability to sustain a first line of defense long enough to receive allied reinforcements. If Norway has already fallen, NATO would face a tougher task and decision to retake the territory instead of reinforcing it.

The problem, however, is that NATO is not the sustainable and unwavering organization it aims to be. It is becoming increasingly difficult to reach unanimous decisions among member states, which have substantially different security concerns. For example, there is speculation about whether allies are willing to risk a major conflict in the case of any Russian intrusion in the Baltics.[29] Even if Russia’s illegitimate actions in Ukraine sparked a renewed political commitment at the Wales summit to the unity, capability, and relevance of the alliance, the allied nations continue to be unwilling to fund the stated ambitions. The NATO nations committed to invest 2% of their GDP on defense in 2006, but the general will to actually respect the agreement is frail and the alliance is weakening as a consequence. Collective defense spending in NATO has dropped by $76 billion since 2013.[30] Only five out of the 28 nations are spending the required 2% or more in 2015: the U.S., Great Britain, Poland, Greece, and Estonia. Six nations are now shouldering 90% of NATO’s expenses. The American share has grown from about half during the Cold War to 75% currently.[31]

There is a growing frustration in the U.S. with the lack of European will to take responsibility for its own security.[32] The American defense budget is also in decline[33] and the U.S. considers Asia to be its most important future theater.[34] Repeatedly over the years, Washington warned that NATO must avoid becoming irrelevant if the U.S. is going to continue its commitment on the same level.[35] The high-end response capabilities of NATO were gradually reduced over the last 20 years, due to reduced budgets and transformation towards lighter, professional forces of smaller numbers. The military capabilities of the most significant European NATO powers (UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy) are now reduced to levels which provide inadequate means to address all the strategic concerns of the alliance.[36] The Norwegian northern flank is thus given a low priority, compared to the eastern and southern regions of NATO. And of course, Russia is more than happy to put pressure on the cohesion of NATO and test its willingness to stand its ground in the periphery towards the Russian borders. Frequent warnings are coming from the Kremlin for NATO to avoid “provocations” in the shape of exercises, shared Ballistic Missile Defense, and allied presence in Eastern-Europe and the Arctic. As a result, Norway must increasingly rely on its National Armed Forces to stand up to Russian aggression before the alliance can mobilize the political will and military strength to respond.

The new American maritime strategy gives guidance for its Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to increase their presence in the Asia-Pacific region to 60% of deployed ships within 2020, as well as strengthening their numbers in the Middle-East from 30 to 40 ships.[37] Consequently, other regions will be less prioritized even if this depends somewhat on the situation. The White House recently announced an increased budget for the European Reassurance Initiative in 2017,[38] but it is still not enough to reverse the long term trend of reduced U.S. commitment to Europe. The backbone of the maritime commitment to the European theater will be the four BMD-capable destroyers[39] operating from Rota in Spain, rotational deployments of the USMC ARG/MEU, and participation in NATO’s Standing Naval Forces. There is growing attention on the Arctic, but the U.S. is unable to commit necessary resources to increase its activity in the region and finds itself way behind Russia.[41] The American Arctic strategy is thus far reluctant and its presidency of the Arctic Council until 2017 is aimed at promoting peaceful cooperation in the High North. Simultaneously, the Russian military posture in the northern region is now being described as the second Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) challenge, next to the Chinese island disputes. But for the foreseeable future, the U.S. Navy’s activity in the Arctic will primarily revolve around occasional submarine patrols, Coast Guard cutters, and one to two ice-breaking vessels.[42]

Going Forward

Norway is a small state which must adapt to a changing global security environment. It will experience growing political and military pressure from a surge in international activity in the increasingly more important Arctic region. This new attention on the Arctic will result in competition and a more cynical relationship between states, partners, and alliances based on political realism. This changed behavior will challenge regional cooperation and commitment to demilitarization. Russia’s prioritization of the Arctic is currently unprecedented because of the importance of the region for an improved Russian economy and nuclear deterrence. The only superpower in the High North is Russia. The other Arctic NATO-nations are starting to contemplate the increased importance of this region. But there is little effort to converge security strategies apart from agreed adherence to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, cooperative environmental protection, and shared climate research.

European NATO nations must increase burden sharing with the U.S. or face diminishing relevance of the transatlantic alliance. Norway will be less reassured by its traditional alliances as the U.S. reduces it European footprint and European unity and prioritization on defense-spending spirals downwards. Even if Norway will always have an asymmetrical relationship to its Russian neighbor, its national defense must be bolstered to uphold a substantial war-preventing threshold and to enable allied reinforcement before it would be too late. Norway must also have a capable military in order to be conceived as a responsible strategic supplier of energy to Europe. The Norwegian Government is obliged to mitigate the weakening of the NATO northern flank by increasing its investment in defense to the agreed 2% level of the GDP. Since 1990, the defense budget dropped from 2.5% of GDP to its current 1.4%, and the armed forces were severely reduced in numbers.[43] The Army shrank from six operational brigades to one in this period, and the reserves were cut by 90%. The Air Force and Navy likewise took big cuts, and there is now debate on the number of new fighter jets, as well as whether to uphold aging capabilities such as maritime patrol aircraft and submarines. Defense experts have been warning about the defense structures balancing on the edge of “critical mass” for the last decade. If Norway remains unwilling to increase its effort to maintain a capable and balanced national defense, it should devote itself increasingly to shared Smart Defense initiatives in order to achieve value for money. This is, however, an increasingly risky strategy when considering the negative trends in the alliance.

Norwegian security policy remains committed to NATO, but contingencies must be developed. In order to uphold commitment from its allies and mitigate the waning focus on the Arctic within NATO, Norway must be a committed member of NATO itself and be seen as willing to take its share of responsibilities and investment. Hosting major NATO events, like the upcoming high visibility exercise in 2018, are wise initiatives that seek to draw attention and resources towards the High North. Further, strengthening bilateral and multilateral partnerships based on long-term shared interests and security concerns within the North Sea region, the European Union, and the United States is of great importance. The U.S. is Norway’s primary ally, and continuing the shared sponsorship of the U.S. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program in Norway is vital. Nordic Defense Cooperation[44] must be developed into full spectrum defense cooperation and Norway should continue to commit forces to the Nordic Battle Group, [45] which is a rotational EU readiness force element. Norway must continue the balanced policy – adopted since long ago – towards Russia. Firm sovereign authority and deterrence through active alliances go hand in hand with acting predictably and avoiding unnecessary provocations on the border. Dialogue and mutual understanding should be nurtured when possible by maintaining active diplomatic relations, seeking cooperation in shared regional interests, and respecting Russian rights to commercial and military activity. However, Russia has chosen to upset the balance by its aggressive behavior and military pressure. Unless Norway and its allies respond by increasing its deterrent capabilities and presence, they signal weakness which invites Russia to adopt an even more dominant posture in the High North.

Conclusion

The Russian-Norwegian relationship is affected by geopolitical developments and crises in other regions, where currently the conflict in Ukraine is reverberating into the Arctic. Norway must consequently respond in a predictable manner in order to regain its balanced approach towards Russia and avoid being a weak link in a strategically vital region. A proper response includes strengthening the Armed Forces, inviting more allied presence on Norwegian territory, and increasing Arctic presence and capabilities. Norway’s best contribution to NATO is to emphasize national defense over foreign deployments, and to raise awareness among its allies of the increasing challenges on the northern flank. Hesitant and overloaded allies and partners must see a committed national effort by Norway before they can be expected to contribute to an increased deterrent posture in Norway and the Arctic.

Commander Daniel Thomassen is a Surface Warfare Officer in the Royal Norwegian Navy.  He served as the Commanding Officer of a Fast Patrol Boat from 2005 to 2007. His last assignment was as the Executive Officer of HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (FFGH) 2012-14. He participated in operations UNIFIL in 2006 and 2007 and RECSYR (Removal of Chemical Weapons from Syria) in 2014. He is currently an International Fellow at the United States Naval War College.

[1] “Northern Sea Route Information Office,” http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_ice.

[2] John Greenert, ”The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030,” Chief of Naval Operations, February 2014, 11.

[3] Donald L. Gautier, ”Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science Vol 324 (2009).

[4] Steve Hargreaves, ”Oil: Only part of the Arctic’s massive resources” , CNN, 19 July 2012.

[5] Martin Katusa, ”The Colder War,” Wiley & Casey Research (2015): 96.

[6] Sarah Wolf, “Svalbard’s Maritime Zones, their Status under International Law and Current and Future Disputes Scenarios, ”Working Paper FG 2, 2013/Nr. 02, January 2013, 37.

[7] See Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” March 18, 2014,  http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. (NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 1999 and the second Iraq-war 2003 are considered illegitimate by the Russians and were used by Putin as examples of western double standards when annexing Crimea.)

[8] President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” December 2014.

[9] U.S. House Armed Services Committee: “Understanding and Deterring Russia: U.S. Policies and Strategies,” February 2016, https://youtu.be/Th9vNtNReMw.

[10] President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” December 2014.

[11] President of the Russian Federation, ”National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020,” May 2009.

[12] Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, ”Russia Unveils Proposal For European Security Treaty,” November 2009.

[13] See “China hosts largest ever military drill with Russia, other SCO nations,” August 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/182400-sco-military-drills-china.

[14] Daria Chernyshova, “India must speed up talks on free trade zone with Eurasian Economic Union,” Sputnik International: (2015).

[15] Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Conversation: Russia’s Perfect Economic Storm,” August 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/.

[16] Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Rankin and George Arnett, “Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at record levels,” The Guardian, July 2015.

[17] European Commission, “European Energy Security Strategy,” May 2015.

[18] Ray Maybus, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” Department of the Navy, March 2015, 60.

[19] Alan Neuhauser, and Paul D. Shinkman, “Europe, Russia Ensnared in ‘Energy Cold War,’ Experts Say,” U.S. News, April 2014.

[20] U.S. Energy Information, “International Energy Statistics” http://www.eia.gov/.

[21] Kenneth Rapoza, Russian Government Ratifies Huge China Gas Pipeline Deal”, Forbes, May 2015.

[22] See Stephen F. Szabo, “Germany, Russia, and the rise of Geo-Economics,” Bloomsbury, 2015. The oil terminal Ust-Luga in the Baltics, as well as gas pipelines North-Stream (Baltic Sea) and South Stream (Black Sea).

[23] See European Commission, “European Energy Security Strategy,” May 2015. (The Russian market share of EU gas was 39% in 2013. The Norwegian was 20%.)

[24] Adam Withnall, “Putin’s gas threat: What happens if Russia cuts the gas to Europe?,” The Independent, February 2015.

[25] See Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy, ”Unified Effort,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2015, 18-19. (The ”GPV-2020” program is spending $3500 billion to modernize the Russian Armed Forces and strengthen the Military-Industrial Complex.)

[26] Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy, ”Unified Effort,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2015, 20.

[27] Defense Long Term Proposition (2013-2016) ver 13.0, “Et Forsvar for Vår Tid,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, December 2014, 25-27.

[28] Haakon Bruun-Hansen, “Norwegian Armed Forces in Transition: Strategic Defence Review by the Norwegian Chief of Defence,” Norwegian Armed Forces, 2015.

[29] Jarno Limnell, ”Will NATO Protect All Members Equally?,” Breaking Defense, September 2014.

[30] Kedar Pavgi, ”NATO Members’ Defense Spending, in Two Charts,” Defense One, June 2015.

[31] Jorge Benitez, ”Will the U.S.‘Rebalance’ Its Contribution to NATO?” Defense One, October 2013.

[32] BBC, “US diplomat warns Europe of dangerous defence spending cuts,” March 2015.

[33] Andrew Tilghman, “Lawmakers: Sequestration is here to stay,” Military Times, March 2015.

[34] Robert Burns, “Ash Carter says U.S. is opening new phase of Asia pivot,” Associated Press, April, 2015.

[35] Ted G. Carpenter, “NATO, European Spending and US Grievances,” CATO Institute, May 2015.

[36] Gary J. Schmitt, “A Hard Look At Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners,” Strategic Studies Institute and Army War College Press, July 2015, ch. 4, 10, 15.

[37] Ray Maybus, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” Secretary of the Navy, March 2015, 11.

[38] White House Press Release, “FACT SHEET: The FY2017 European Reassurance Initiative Budget Request,” Office of the Press Secretary, February 2016.

[39] Arleigh Burke-class destroyers deployed for Ballistic Missile Defense.

[40] US Marine Corps Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit: See http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Amphibious%20Ready%20Group%20And%20Marine%20Expeditionary%20Unit%20Overview.pdf.

[41] Steven L. Myers, “U.S. Is Playing Catch-Up With Russia in Scramble for the Arctic,” New York Times, August 2015.

[42] Joseph R. Fonseca, ”Seawolf Completes Arctic Deployment,” Marinelink.com: (2015).

[43] Diesen og Narum, “Norsk forsvarsevne – en varslet avvikling,” Aftenposten, May 2015.

[44] NORDEFCO, http://www.nordefco.org/the-basics-about-nordefco.

[45] Elizabeth Braw, “The Nordic Battlegroup, Ready and Willing,” World Affairs: (2015).

Global Analysis

The Canadian Armed Forces and the Arctic: Maintaining a Suitable and Sustainable Role

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This piece was originally published by the Conference for Defense Associations Institute. It may be read in its original form here.

In this new CDA Institute Analysis, Adam MacDonald looks at the military requirements for Canada in the Arctic, concluding that the capabilities need to be suitable for the security environment and financially sustainable given other defence commitments. The following is an excerpt of the Analysis.

rsz macdonald analysis may 2016coverDue to its increasing accessibility resulting from climate change, the Arctic could become a contested and militarized arena in which states within the region and beyond attempt to secure and gain access to lucrative shipping routes and resources. Such an eventuality poses particular challenges to Canadian sovereignty and security. Stemming from such a characterization, the Harper government had long prioritized the Arctic as a defence issue, raising the spectre that Canadian sovereignty in the North could be irrevocably compromised – we either ‘use it or lose it.’

While silent on which potential adversaries were threatening to usurp Canadian ownership, the Harper government sought to restore a military presence in the Arctic by “placing more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-in-the-sky.” In his 2005 campaign, in particular, Harper promised a litany of Arctic-specific defence projects to rectify the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) dearth of presence and operational experience in the region. The promotion of the ‘sovereignty at risk’ narrative seemed to justify the construction of a robust and permanent military presence in the Arctic. In reality, however, Canada requires a different type of military presence and capability suite than commonly perceived (or advocated).

Canada’s security challenges in the North do not emanate from a military threat but are rather largely constabulary in nature. Defending sovereignty is the perennial duty of the military but in the Arctic there is no credible, state-based threat capable of challenging Canadian ownership of its waters and territories, with a few exceptions which are well managed. Despite its sometimes fiery rhetoric, the former Conservative government’s various Arctic policy documents reflected such an appreciation of the threat environment. With the near absence of state-based threats, military requirement in the Arctic need to be suitable for this particular security environment and sustainable given the operating challenges of the region, as well as other competing military priorities.

At present, the military is focusing their Arctic efforts on increasing domain awareness via surveillance and maintaining a light regional footprint to facilitate Northern operations and, when required, support the deployment of southern based-units which are increasingly training in the North, often in conjunction with other security agencies and regional partners. Deploying large contingents of combat capable forces is ill-advised given the nature of the threat, prohibitively expensive given the harsh operating environment (especially the High Arctic), and potentially compromising other missions and mandates by drawing resources away.

The Arctic Security Environment

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of the Arctic diminished significantly allowing for the construction of regional forums dedicated towards common interests, specifically climate research. Rapidly changing environmental conditions, however, are transforming the Arctic landscape by increasing accessibility to human activity to an unprecedented level. Amongst this uncertainty, issues of ownership and access have fueled the development of a narrative of the Arctic as moving away from a politically stable region to one of high geopolitical importance characterized by growing complexity, competition, and perhaps even rivalry. In such a narrative, the current regional architecture is simply unable to adjust and accommodate the expected scramble for resources and political influence.

Not surprisingly, a popular theme has been the growing ‘militarization’ of the Arctic over the past decade. There is no denying that all Arctic states are augmenting their military capabilities in their northern territories, including the stationing of combat-capable units. As one commentator has remarked, “we may be entering the first stages of an Arctic arms race, in which competition and conflict may overwhelm our desires and rhetoric to have a cooperative régime for the developing circumpolar world.” The augmenting presence, capability development, and employment of military forces in the Arctic is an emerging reality, but their use is, by and large, within recognized national borders and waters.

Moreover, they are largely focused on exercising sovereign control to ensure compliance with state laws, border control, and search and rescue. Retaining combat forces to defend against state-based threats in the Arctic is a marginal requirement at this time. Arctic countries are more concerned about increasing their domain awareness in parts of their jurisdictions characterized by large geographic areas, small and sparse populations, and a lack of infrastructure, surveillance, and response capacities.

The flurry of recent Russian military projects in the Arctic, including icebreaker construction and the re-activation of air and army bases on their northern islands, are in part aimed at establishing unquestioned ownership of the Northern Sea Route, regardless of legal objections by the US that the waters constitute an international strait. This is not to suggest that developing a war-fighting capacity in the Arctic is not an objective of Moscow. However, domestic political calculations and constabulary requirements have heavily shaped the makeup and operational nature of military developments thus far in the region. Some military developments in the Arctic, furthermore, are based on larger, extra-regional factors. Modernization of the Russian Northern Fleet, for instance, is designed to upgrade their nuclear submarine deterrent and for global operations. Similarly, the US ground-based interceptors in Alaska are meant to counter a missile attack from a rogue state, specifically North Korea.

Most commentators are quick to assert that militarization is becoming a dominant force driving regional politics, but are at a loss in not only providing an operational definition (e.g., what does ‘militarization’ mean?) but also in explaining how this process will contribute to the destabilization of the region beyond simplistic narratives (Russia versus NATO; non-Arctic states versus Arctic states). There are no territorial disputes in the Arctic, with the exception of the relatively benign dispute over Hans Island between Canada and Denmark, and there is no evidence to suggest Russia or any other Arctic nation is moving to employ military forces over contested Extended Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) or to gain unobstructed access to polar shipping routes.

Click here to read the rest of the CDA Institute Analysis.

Adam P. MacDonald is an academic based in Halifax, Nova Scotia specializing in geopolitical developments in the Arctic and East Asia. He is a regular contributor to the Canadian Naval Review, East Asia Forum and Frontline Defence.

Featured Image: Canadian Coast Guard Icebreaker. Photo: Lucie Lefrancois. 

Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: May 2016 Part One

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to part one of the May 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past two weeks CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including the complexities associated with improving U.S. missile defense, the continued modernization of Chinese missile forces, the North Korean nuclear threat, China’s response to U.S. laser based weapons, and finally, defense spending concerns within the NATO alliance.

Beginning the roundup at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Bryan Clark with CSBA colleague Mark Gunzinger provide a comprehensive report discussing the necessity for the U.S. to rebalance and restructure the military’s air and missile defense systems. The report explains that the DoD’s emphasis on long-range surface-to-air interceptors used to defeat a small salvo of anti-ship cruise missiles or a handful of ballistic missiles launched by rogue states have failed to provide the capacity to defend theater forces against large salvos of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Mr. Clark highlights that the layered missile defense approach favored by U.S. forces, focused on countering incoming threats as far away as possible, lacks the resources to sustain operations against multiple strikes – meaning U.S. defenses could become quickly exhausted in notional conflict where missile threats are frequent and continuous.

Harry Kazianis, for The National Interest, discusses the Chinese DF-26 ballistic missile, noting how analyses of the capabilities and regional implications of the anti-ship variant were not adequately included in the Pentagon’s annual China military report. Mr. Kazianis highlights that the 2500-mile range of the missile should be a serious concern for regional U.S. surface combatants, particularly if combined with the more reliable DF-21Ds and other anti-ship cruise missiles launched from air, land or maritime platforms as part of a large saturation strike. He explains how this capability may allow for China to develop an extremely effective anti-access strategy beyond the first-island chain, thereby severely restricting U.S. ability to conduct operations uncontested near or in support of its regional allies.

Ankit Panda, for The Diplomat, provides an analysis on an upcoming trilateral missile defense exercise being conducted by the U.S., Japan and South Korea. All three navies will participate in the exercise using Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers, focusing on a response to a notional ballistic missile attack from North Korea. Mr. Panda explains that although recent Japanese-South Korean bilateral relations have been characterized as difficult, the increasingly dangerous North Korean security threat combined with Washington acting as a mediator and leader in trilateral operations has contributed to a steady improvement in cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo.

In a second article at The Diplomat, Mr. Panda examines the development of Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy by focusing on Kim Jong-un’s latest iteration of the country’s nuclear use policies at the 7th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The article suggests that outlining a concrete North Korean nuclear strategy is highly problematic considering several unknown strategic variables, including Pyongyang’s conception of sovereignty violation, positions on first use and the role of second or first strike capabilities surrounding regime security objectives.

To conclude the roundup, Kyle Mizokami for Popular Mechanics discusses the deployment of the Norwegian-designed Naval Strike Missile to the USS Freedom Littoral Combat Ship. The weapon system will provide the small ship with an increased surface-to-surface combat capacity while additional deployments of the missile to other vessels are likely to follow – supporting the U.S. Navy’s interest in implementing the distributed lethality concept across the fleet.

In a second article at Popular Mechanics, Mr. Mizokami describes the development of smoke screen technologies by the Chinese military’s Chemical Corps., primarily to be used as shields against increasingly capable U.S. laser systems, such as the already active laser on the USS Ponce in addition to planned lasers on gunships, fighters, and surface ships.

A Naval Strike Missile (NSM) anti-ship missile is launched from HNoMS Roald Amundsen (Picture: Royal Norwegian Navy)
A Naval Strike Missile (NSM) anti-ship missile is launched from HNoMS Roald Amundsen (Picture: Royal Norwegian Navy)

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the first part of May:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies, international law, and defense policy.

Arctic

Designate the 9th National Security Cutter an Arctic Flagship

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This article was originally posted by The Arctic Institute. It can be read in its original form here.

By Ryan Uljua

Following a sly piece of last-minute legislative maneuvering, the US Congress is now widely expected to fund a ninth National Security Cutter (NSC) for the Coast Guard. The ninth NSC will join the originally planned eight ships, six of which have already been built. Unlike Congress, President Obama’s Office of Management and Budget has deemed the 9th NSC an “unnecessary” luxury. However, now that funding for the ship is all but guaranteed, the Administration should work with Congress and the Coast Guard to transform the so-called “luxury” ship into a vital national asset in the US Arctic. 

While the Coast Guard’s icebreaker deficiency consumes most of the headlines, the service is also facing a looming shortage of capable, versatile cutters in the Arctic that can perform more traditional Coast Guard missions. Today, the Coast Guard’s permanent major cutter presence in the vast Alaska-Bering Sea-Arctic region (the Coast Guard 17th District) consists of the Hamilton-class high endurance cutter Munro and the medium endurance cutter Alex Haley, both homeported in Kodiak, Alaska. Although capable vessels, the two ships are 45 years old apiece  even ―older than the Coast Guard’s sole aging heavy icebreaker Polar Star―and are due for retirement. Most concerning, the Munro, the nation’s sole high endurance cutter homeported north of Seattle, Washington, is slated to be retired with no clear replacement in the works. The injection of a fresh, reliable, and highly capable Coast Guard cutter is sorely needed in the vast 17th District. With a few simple measures, the newly funded 9th NSC can be modified to meet the pressing need for a modern, year-round flagship in the American Arctic.

Homeport in Kodiak, Alaska

At least three current NSCs―USCGCs Bertholf, Waesche, and Stratton―have conducted long-range seasonal patrols in Alaska and the Arctic in recent years as part of annual Arctic Shield exercises. During these seasonal patrols, the ships have exceeded nearly all performance expectations, especially in terms of their Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. A single NSC is said to have more C4ISR abilities than every other Coast Guard asset in the 17th District combined. The NSC also far outclasses the US heavy icebreaker Polar Star and the medium icebreaker Healy when it comes to C4ISR capabilities, essential for fulfilling the role of a regional command ship. As commercial and security activities increase in the American Arctic, a highly-capable command and control ship permanently located in-theater will be essential for coordinating and managing increasingly complex missions.

Today, every time a NSC leaves its homeport in Alameda, CA to conduct summertime Arctic Shield patrols, it loses approximately 40 operational days to travel time just to reach the theater. Permanently homeporting the 9th NSC in Kodiak, Alaska would help offset this geographic reality and dramatically reduce the number of operational days lost to transit while also providing an improved, year-round presence in the US Arctic region. Unfortunately, when a current NSC deploys to the Arctic for annual Arctic Shield patrols, it must also abandon other vital missions in the lower 48 states. An example of this, the Coast Guard was forced to suspend  counter-narcotics missions in the Pacific and Caribbean to meet seasonal demands in the Arctic in the summer of 2015 when Shell was conducting exploration activities in the Chukchi Sea. The NSC Waesche was diverted from a mission prosecuting cocaine traffickers in the Caribbean to help provide support for Shell in the Arctic—a trade off that Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Zunkuft lamented as a significant “opportunity cost.”

Some may argue that the Coast Guard’s icebreakers, a classic symbol of American Arctic presence, are themselves homeported in Seattle, WA, and not in Alaska. However, the icebreaker fleet is required to travel both north to the Arctic as well as south to the Antarctic for annual Operation Deep Freeze missions. The old icebreakers also take a beating and generally require larger and more specialized maintenance facilities. Some additional shore-based maintenance personnel and facilities would likely be needed in Kodiak, Alaska to accommodate the larger, more advanced NSC. Fortunately, expensive upgrades were already funded and performed in 2014 on pier infrastructure at Coast Guard Base Kodiak to physically accommodate a NSC on a regular year-round basis.

Homeporting the 9th NSC in Kodiak would offer the Coast Guard a permanent, go-to Arctic command and control ship that can serve to coordinate any and all regional operations.

Ice-strengthen the Hull

While homeporting the 9th NSC in Kodiak instead of places like Alameda, CA or Honolulu, HI would reduce the number of operational days lost to travel time, efforts to ice-strengthen the hull of the ship during its construction phase would extend its Arctic operating window even further. Ice-strengthening the 9th NSC so that it can handle light and medium first-year sea ice, typically up to 0.5 m (1.6 ft) in thickness, would extend the ship’s Arctic operating window by an estimated 40–75 days―making a permanent Arctic deployment more feasible. 

The medium endurance cutter Alex Haley that is currently homeported in Kodiak, AK has had mild ice-strengthening measures applied to its hull, allowing the ship to operate in very light ice conditions. Nonetheless, the light ice-strengthening of the Alex Haley’s hull gives the ship great operational flexibility in the Arctic. Ice-strengthening the 9th Kodiak-based NSC would give the new ship even greater operational flexibility in the 17th District, particularly as the 45-year-old Alex Haley, once dubbed “The Bulldog of the Bering,” comes due for retirement. 

Representatives from the NSC project’s prime contractor, Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), have previously indicated that ice-strengthening the hull of an NSC is achievable and can be done at a relatively low cost. The structural changes would primarily involve reinforcing the hull, adding an improved engine cooling system, and protecting external components from ice damage. These measures would have little negative impact on performance, with some analyses showing that ice-strengthening a NSC would increase the ship’s weight by 75 tons while only reducing its maximum speed from 28 to 27 knots.

At the current rate of NSC construction, the 9th NSC can be expected to launch in 2021-2022, just as the estimated 8-year-long construction of the Coast Guard’s newest heavy icebreaker is scheduled to begin. Not only would the new NSC serve as a fresh replacement for the aging Munro at Kodiak, its ice-strengthened hull would also help fill a light icebreaking need in the region to access areas of thin, first-year sea ice that non-strengthened ships would avoid without icebreaker escort.

The primary contractor for the NSC, HII, is one of the leading candidates to build the Coast Guard’s new heavy icebreaker and has good incentive to ice-strengthen the 9th NSC. The shipbuilding giant could use the opportunity to demonstrate to the Coast Guard it’s ability to build hulls that are capable of taking on Arctic conditions ahead of the new icebreaker acquisition.

Ice-strengthening the hull of the 9th NSC would obviously require more funds on top of the $640 million Congress has already earmarked for the ship. However, given Congress’s apparent enthusiasm for funding additional NSC―there are rumblings that they are open to funding a 10th NSC in 2017―securing the additional funds from the legislative branch does not appear like it will be a challenge. Fellow Arctic nations and NATO allies have pursued similar “slush breaker” models for ice-strengthened patrol vessels at reasonable prices, most notably the successful Norwegian ship NoCGV Svalbard.

An Arctic Legacy

President Obama’s recent actions, including his final budget request and the recent state visit with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, demonstrate a desire to leave an Arctic policy legacy. His final budget request allocates serious funds to acquiring a new icebreaker and devotes $400 million to resettling Alaskan coastal villages at risk due to climate change. Now, if President Obama is serious about leaving an enduring mark on US Arctic policy during his final months in office, his Administration should work with Congress and the Coast Guard to transform the once “luxury” ninth National Security Cutter into America’s flagship cutter in the Arctic.

Ryan Uljua is a graduate of the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where he focused on security and defense policy as well as geographic information systems (GIS) and remote sensing. Previously, Ryan has worked at The American Interest Magazine, International Relief and Development (IRD), and the International NGO Safety and Security Association (INSSA) in Washington, DC. Ryan currently works as an Intelligence Analyst at an international risk management and crisis response firm based in Boston, Massachusetts.