Tag Archives: AIS

Capability Analysis

The Odessa Network

3 Comments
Unlike the Odessa File, there are no Nazis in the Odessa Network
Unlike the Odessa File, there are no Nazis in the Odessa Network

The think-tank C4ADS recently published a new study, The Odessa Network: Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers, which analyzed commercial maritime networks linked to the Russian state and their involvement in arms shipments, particularly those to Bashar al-Assad’s forces in Syria fighting in that ongoing Civil War.

The report received some additional publicity when it formed the meat of a 7 September Washington Post story, with discussion especially devoted towards the report’s analysis of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, claiming that vessels likely carrying arms from the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk were turning off AIS when traveling to Syria.

The analysis conducted by Tom Wallace and Farley Mesko is certainly interesting and provides an in-depth look at commercial maritime networks and practices not generally seen outside of specialist literature on the shipping industry.  The work does leave some questions unanswered and makes unwarranted conclusions based on the available data, however:

  • The piece goes into great detail to lay out the various networks that Russia uses to ship arms, composed of interlocking companies headed and/or controlled by individuals with links to the state.  What’s unclear is why that should be considered unusual or bad.  Shell companies, convoluted ownership, and Flags of Convenience are commonplace for a variety reasons (many business-related) in the maritime industry.  It is not much of a “So What” to reveal that cronies in the maritime industry would be the facilitators used by Putin’s Russia to ship weapons to a pariah state. (Of note for those interested in topics like Flags of Convenience, Rodney Carlisle’s Sovereignty for Sale is a good read which explains the creation of the famous Panamanian and Liberian registries and provides context on why ship “ownership” is rarely straightforward in the maritime industry).
  • Russian arms shipments to Assad’s forces in Syria are clearly “bad,” but the implication in the Odessa Network study is that not only is Russia doing something bad, but that they are also doing it in a particularly devious and underhanded way.  The data provided by Wallace and Mesko only proves, however, that Russia is choosing to use “discreet” means to ship weapons to Syria.  It’s not clear that the Odessa Network’s ties to the Russian state or its business practices are that particularly egregious or unusual within the maritime industry.
  • The authors look at both publicly available data regarding Russian arms shipments as well as AIS data.  According to available data for ships/shipments, they note that “publicly known maritime weapons shipments from Russia to Syria” departed from “northern Russian ports of St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad.”  They then claim, however, based on the curious absence of AIS data for Russian ships in the eastern Mediterranean originating in Oktyabrsk, that there is “a strong circumstantial case that these ships and companies are moving weapons or other sensitive cargo to the Assad regime.”  The argument is inconsistent.  On one hand they make a case that operational security concerns or potential EU pressure on the Ukrainian government is stopping the use of Oktyabrsk as a transshipment site for Syria-bound arms, while on the other hand claiming that nefarious Russian intent is demonstrated by ships originating in Oktyabrsk deliberately not broadcasting AIS data when traveling to Syria.  Can both these assertions be true at the same time?
  • While certainly suspicious, is it actually illegal to turn off AIS as these Russia ships have allegedly done? The authors point out that there is the possibility that data may not be available in certain locations due to a lack of receivers, but also note that the eastern Mediterranean is not exactly an isolated area, and that AIS on these ships seems to work quite well everywhere else in the world.  According to the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO), “all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and all passenger ships irrespective of size” shall “maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.”  These rules were implemented as part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).  Although there is no real chance that these rules could be enforced against Russian ships since they are adopted and enforced by IMO member states themselves, are these ships doing something illegal by not using AIS properly?  Could operators of these vessels be subject to penalties?  Could enforcement of these rules be a round-about way to stop Russian arms shipments to Syria?

Despite my minor criticism above, this sort of analysis is welcome and could be applied to a variety of other maritime issues.  More publicly available detailed network analysis of the commercial networks benefiting from oil theft in West Africa or Somali piracy  could provide new, non-kinetic policy or law enforcement options in the fight against these illicit activities afloat.  Similarly, the methods toward which Iran has been driven by sanctions to facilitate its oil exports could be a useful subject of interest to analysts and policy-makers alike.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a Naval Intelligence officer currently serving on the OPNAV staff. He has previously served at Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2).  The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

Strategic Outlook

Low Tech – High Tech: The Dichotomy of Piracy Tactics and Threat Mitigation

2 Comments

Maritime security, specifically counter-piracy, has undergone an evolution. Spikes in piracy and changes in contemporary threat perception first introduced the ‘Generation One’ maritime security paradigm: the presence of armed guards and kinetic means to protect vessels, goods, and people at sea. Pushes by various groups and governments for increased regulation in this sector, however, quickly ushered ‘Generation Two’ onto the scene, marked by decreases in armed personnel along with rapid acquisition and deployment of high-tech equipment.

Increased reliance on technology increases vulnerabilities. The more components that exist in a system, the more chances the system has to break down or fail. Evaluating radio and satellite communications, vital for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship communication creates a weak-link even in the most basic technology. Mostly unencrypted, these virtually open frequencies are susceptible to interception by hostile parties. Pirates, for example, can and do listen-in on radio communications, using gathered intelligence to plot ship courses and plan their attacks. They can wreak further havoc by interfering with communications, jamming signals, or even feeding misinformation. Thus, commercial maritime security has morphed from physical protection of assets to incorporate elements of signals intelligence, electronic, and cyber warfare.

More disturbing perhaps are reports of pirates, leveraging not only conventional communications, but Automatic Identification System (AIS) data to plan attacks. AIS, used for monitoring vessel movements, has now become an intelligence tool for pirates to locate and select targets. Unlike radar monitoring which requires sophisticated hardware and skill, AIS data is readily available online by a variety of commercial Geographic Information System (GIS) providers. Pirate planners, with standard computer and internet connection, or even just a smartphone, can view and monitor AIS connected vessels worldwide. They can then selectively evaluate potential targets, track their movements, and use gathered information to coordinate attacks. This exemplifies the double-edged sword that technology is: on one hand aiding safety and security, allowing precise positioning and geomapping of vessels to aid operators in their daily business and guide search-and-rescue teams should anything go wrong at sea. On the other hand, improvements in technology also open vulnerabilities that multiply risk, proliferating cheap hardware and valuable information to potential perpetrators.

AIS Data
AIS data indicating real-time vessel locations

 

Interestingly, pirates, just like terrorists, drug-runners, and other criminals, are simultaneously employing low-tech, low-fi solutions to overcome or circumvent high-tech defenses. They are enhancing the performance of engines and hulls; are insulating outboard motors in (mostly unsuccessful) attempts to hide from thermal-imaging cameras; and, are even observed wearing ear-muffs to mitigate effects of Long Range Acoustic Devices (better known as LRADs or Sound-cannons). Such synthesis of simple, yet outside-the-box creative tactics and low-tech equipment, which together are capable of overcoming expensive and sophisticated systems is today’s ‘Generation Three’ piracy/counter-piracy paradigm. It’s exemplified by the continuation of asymmetric threats in the maritime domain, the widening of the technological divide between attacker and defender, and the carry-over of the debate about technology’s ability to reduce risk at sea.

Although shiny kits and gizmos undoubtedly ease processes and enhance operators’ technical situation, experts must evaluate if employment of such sophisticated hardware, whether on a ship, offshore installation, or even in ports will genuinely reduce risk while operationally remaining within legal constraints. They must consider how technology can enhance security, how it can fail, how it can be defeated, and moreover how it can be exploited by potential assailants.

Maritime security planners must not only seek to develop innovative products and procedures to enhance safety in this ‘Generation Three’ paradigm, but must also apply ingenuity in fusing high and low-tech solutions to counter asymmetric maritime threats. They must consider borrowing successful land based tactics from counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and other low intensity conflict operations and find applications for their use in the maritime environment. On land, this blend of hardening assets in conventional ways, maintaining an innovative yet ‘low-tech-low-fi’ profile, and preempting perpetrators actions through better understanding the rules and tactics of their own game has proven triumphant. Replicating this strategy at sea will be a crucial key to piracy threat reduction.

Simon O. Williams is a maritime security analyst specializing in offshore installation and port security, Arctic maritime challenges, naval capabilities, and multinational cooperation. He previously worked in the American and European private sector and US government, but now contributes independent analysis to industry, media, and policymakers while pursuing an LL.M. in Law of the Sea from University of Tromsø, Norway.

Future Tech

Google’s AR Goggles

5 Comments

 

Coming soon to a bridge near you?

Project Glass

 

In late March Google revealed artistic mock-ups and a video (below) of what their secretive Project Glass has been developing. The answer – voice-controlled augmented reality (AR) glasses – have some interesting potential applications for military use, in particular employment aboard ships.

 

This was the first time an AR project garnered widespread media attention (Oakley has also since announced the development of their own AR technology), and for those not familiar with the line of research, it promises to layer additional information on top of a user’s view of the world through a device such as ocular implants or a pair of glasses.

 

In the video, users are able to video chat with others, plot their route around town, and interface with different databases to bring up information. Essentially, the glasses aim to deliver all the features of a smart phone while going hands-free and eliminating the time spent glancing from another view to the screen.

 

Setting aside the practical limitations (cell reception, costs, durability) and safety concerns (the first man-overboard recovery due to AR is likely to generate a humorous situation report), just what benefits could the navies of the world derive from AR?

 

  1. Bridge watchstanders. Glasses for bridge watchstanders could provide a constant “heads-up display” view of standard information such as the ship’s course and speed, preventing the need to call out for the information or walk over to a display when in a remote part of the bridge. Additional displays could be selected to show radar screens. More advanced features could make use of the embedded cameras to search maritime databases to bring up data on a ship in the watchstander’s line of sight. No need to manually check AIS, Jane’s or critical contacts of interest lists. Lastly, the voice-chat feature would be particularly welcome if it replaced the need to carry around clunky handheld radios, although many might want the option of an audio-only chat.
  2. Damage control. AR could make responding to a shipboard casualty or emergency easier with the use of interfaced damage control plotting. This could provide instant visual updates, eliminating the confusion of broken spoken communication through breathing devices, but would likely greatly increase the cost of integrating the microphones into the gear so that the responders could control the AR interface and communicate back to damage lockers and DC central.

What maritime uses and problems do you foresee with the development of AR?

Photo: Google