Seamanship and Leadership

A Strategic Thinker Can Bloom from a STEM

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Recent U.S. Navy guidance directed at least 85% of new officers must come from technical degree programs commonly known as STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics). This has rightfully generated a fair amount of discussion in Navy circles. What I find surprising, and insulting, is degree to which a good portion of the discussion is one-sided. The superiority of liberal arts and humanities degrees are touted and accusations flow that STEM degree-holders are all socially awkward, pocket protector-wearing poindexters who – when they are not underway – still live in their parents’ basements.

I have the Conn!
I have the Conn!

Some even claim this to be the end of the U.S. Navy officer corps’ ability to critically analyze and think strategically on matters of policy or foreign affairs. They imply that STEM majors could never understand the complexities of the liberal arts while in almost the same breath they claim that any lack of technical knowledge and understanding from humanities majors can be easily overcome with additional studying and on-the-job training.

In an effort to remove as much ambiguity as possible, and for brevity, I will take a moment to directly state some of what I think on this subject:

– Possessing an intellectual curiosity is much more important than what someone already knows when developing as a naval officer.

– Being a naval officer is a diverse and complex profession that changes as you progress in your career, so one single major or type of major does not best prepare someone for the job in its entirety.

– There are an incredible number of open-source resources available (e.g. subscriptions to Foreign Policy, The Diplomat, The Economist, and countless lectures from major universities available on the internet) for someone with a STEM degree to broaden their horizons beyond the technical. In fact, anyone desiring a career as a naval officer should do just that.

– I neither agree nor disagree with the current technical-to-humanities degree percentages required at commissioning. I do not have an adequate enough knowledge of the statistical analysis behind that decision to comment one way or the other on the specific percentage.

– And lastly, although a STEM degree is not the end-all, be-all for developing a naval officer, it does provide a good basis to develop a successful division officer immediately out of college.

It is worth asking what the U.S. Navy needs from the majority of officers immediately after commissioning. It needs them to be division officers. They need to lead a division and a watch team. The U.S. Navy does not immediately need someone to write the next volume of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. It does need people who can do that within its ranks, so it is important to ensure they are recognized and promoted. That is a long-term issue that should not and cannot be solved by simply adjusting what types of majors are commissioned. It is a separate discussion for how the Navy manages its evaluation processes and selection boards.

The dynamic nature and remoteness of the maritime environment has always made naval warfare more complex than its land counterpart. Present ships and aircraft are extremely complex technical systems, so a firm basis in technical knowledge can be advantageous. To effectively drive and fight a ship, a division officer should have an understanding of topics like buoyancy, stability, sonar propagation, radar propagation, electrical generation and distribution, thermodynamics, and potentially nuclear engineering. Clearly many humanities majors have mastered all of these things in the past and will continue to do so in the future. A STEM degree is not essential to being a successful division officer, but it can help with initial success.

Alfred Thayer Mahan may have possessed one of the greatest strategic maritime minds in the history of the U.S. Navy. There can be no doubt that his works had an incredible influence on naval thought. But just as some assume that too technical of a mind detracts from effective performance as a naval officer, so to can too literary of one. Maybe if Mahan had a more diverse mind he may have been able to avoid such an evaluation when commanding USS Chicago:

“[Captain Mahan’s] interests are entirely outside the service, for which, I am satisfied, he cares but little, and is therefore not a good naval officer.  He is not at all observant regarding officers tending to the ship’s general welfare or appearance, nor does he inspire or suggest anything in this connection.  In fact, the first few weeks of the cruise she [that is, USS Chicago] was positively discreditable.  In fact, CAPT Mahan’s interests lie wholly in the direction of literary work and in no other way connected with the service.”

In closing I will respond to the claim that having an 85% STEM requirement for commissioning will result in the same percentage across the entire officer corps. This is ridiculous because everyone who commissions does not continue to promote. As I discussed above, a solid technical understanding can help at the lower tactical levels, but as one progresses, a much broader understanding of the world is necessary. Individuals with these capabilities and understanding should be recognized and advanced regardless of their academic degree. Performance at lower levels can serve as part of advancement and selection, but previous success does not guarantee effective future performance. This is not a problem to find a solution for at commissioning. It is a dynamic issue to be evaluated throughout the personnel system at all levels of command. Just as the history or philosophy major can end up being the best Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) in the wardroom, so too can the physics or chemistry major end up writing the next revolutionary strategic or operational concept for the Navy.

LT Jason H. Chuma is a U.S. Navy submarine officer who has deployed to the U.S. 4th Fleet and U.S. 6th Fleet areas of responsibility. He is a graduate of the Citadel, holds a master’s degree from Old Dominion University, and has completed the Intermediate Command and Staff Course from the U.S. Naval War College. His current assignment is to the Navy Warfare Development Command where he serves as a member of the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell. He can be followed on Twitter @Jason_Chuma.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Territorial and Law of the Sea Disputes

Losing the Senkakus/Diaoyus Could Win China the 10-Dash Line

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LI5229C2F896F4CThe specter of nationalism in the Far East looms over ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  China and Japan have increased their civilian and military presence around the islands and continue retaliatory actions and declarations.  History in the region has few examples of such situations concluding amicably. 

However realist or idealist one’s perspective, there remains significant room for de-escalation and peaceful resolution.  The path to finding a solution has been the focus of many academics, policy experts, and the media with two scenarios offered in the commentary. 

First is what amounts to a Grand Bargain:  China cedes their claims in the East China Sea to Japan in return for Japan’s support of China’s South China Sea claims.  Those who believe this the most likely outcome are those who give deference to China’s long-view strategies.  While China appears to have the patience and political structure to execute strategies with time horizons far beyond those of the United States, a Grand Bargain would be readily discerned and countered as it ultimately relies on the United States, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and others to concede interests or territorial claims to China.  That makes for a strategy not only with a long time horizon but also with very long odds.

The second scenario is that China succeeds to some degree in pressing its claims with Japan, using the dispute in the East China Sea as a proving ground for strategies in the south.  Winning territorial concessions from Japan, China’s primary regional competitor, would not only validate its strategies, it would also strengthen China’s position when dealing with weaker competitors bordering the 10-dash line in the South China Sea. Those who predict this outcome tend to believe China will not relinquish any claims. This may be a bit too binary.  First, the territorial disputes in the two regions have very different histories, interests, and actors.  Second, a resolution seen as offering China concessions in the East China Sea could counter-productively strengthen the resolve of the actors disputing China’s claims in the South China Sea.

However, there is another possible scenario.  China could exploit customary international law to its advantage, creating a precedent in the East China Sea simplifies the complexities surrounding the 10-dash line in the South China Sea.  The precedent that best serves Chinese interests is that a country with administrative control over disputed islands exercises economic rights surrounding the territory, even if that country is Japan.  With China in a strong position to enforce administrative control over the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal, a precedent connecting administrative control of disputed territory to economic rights would greatly benefit China.

So, what else needs to happen to make this other potential scenario a reality?  Nothing.  If China continues to bluster about the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Japan continues to retain administrative control and enforce fishing laws in what would be the territory’s Exclusive Economic Zone, the precedent is established.  Only time is needed for this version of status quo to be considered customary international law.  Interestingly, this path finds a convergence between the long view and expansionist proponents.  China could get access to a lot more territory and natural resources if it is willing to ‘lose a battle to win the war’.

Ryan Leary is a U.S. naval officer and Federal Executive Fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.  His opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any command.

Podcast, Seamanship and Leadership

Sea Control 16 – More with CAPT Moore (1)

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CseacontrolemblemAPT Dan Moore, USN Ret, joins us for the first of his monthly series on naval leadership, “More with CAPT Moore.” In today’s episode, we discuss the education of 21st-century naval leaders by discussing examples from the present and past, such as GEN Mattis, LT Sims, and ADM Nelson. Some of the set-up and helpful readings are found in an earlier introduction article. Enjoy our newest episode of Sea Control, “More with CAPT Moore” (Download).

Drones

Drone Motherships – In the Sky!

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We thought we’d treat you to some light reading for Friday as many are finishing up their vacations or short work weeks.

Aerial motherships in their pre-Indiana Jones heyday
An aerial mothership in its pre-Indiana Jones heyday.

In a piece in mid-December, our partner site NavalDrones detailed the U.S. Navy’s solicitation for an unmmaned aerial vehicle (UAV) that incorporates Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) sensors. As the article notes, this capability is useful for finding submarines as it “detects changes in the earth’s magnetic field caused by a large metal object” such as yon u-boat. What is perhaps most interesting about the solicitation is that it calls for the UAVs to be expendable and launched from a P-8A Poseidon.

The concept of aerial motherhips is by no means new – one only need look back to the glory days of zeppelins with biplane detachments, or to the helicarrier in the recent movie The Avengers to get a sense of the breadth of idea. And the solicitation for the Poseidon doesn’t mark the first go at aircraft-launched UAVs:

In 2009, an expendable sonobuoy tube-launched UAV called Coyote was tested out a NOAA’s WP-3D Orion under an Office of Naval Research. A less successful small business grant was awarded to Lite Machines to modify its Voyeur UAV for sonochute launch.

Hydra's take your daughter drone to work day.
    Hydra’s take your daughter drone to work day.

Despite this, more attention is focused on surface and subsurface vessels playing the roles of motherships than aerial drone motherships. DARPA caused a stir earlier in 2013 by announcing the start of a UUV mothership program, named in a not-at-all-sinister fashion “Hydra,” that would be capable of launching embarked UAVs and UUVs, while Coastal Riverine Group-1 got the manned Coastal Command Boat UUV-launching mothership. Elsewhere, debate and intellectual energy is starting to explore the interplay of manned, unmanned, and autonomous aircraft and the tactical possibilities their combinations can provide. 

Less attention has been paid to aerial motherships as the constant and exploring the pros and cons of using any of the following as variables:

1. The mission sets of the UAVs and how they would interact with other platforms.
2. Launching non-expendable UAVs.
3. Launching USVs or UUVs.
4. Motherships that are purpose-built (as opposed to ad-hoc such as the Poseidon).
5. Motherships that are themselves unmanned or autonomous.
6. Lighter-than-air (e.g. blimp) craft vs propeller or jet craft.

In many of these combinations the pros will be outweighed by the cons, but it’s possible there are some winning, creative combos worth discovering. An upcoming issue of USNI’s Proceedings and a week at CIMSEC will be dedicated to naval drones and drone tactics. In the latter I hope to explore these variables in more detail. As I’ve likely missed some salient points I look forward to incorporating your feedback.

 

LT Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founding director and vice president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, and a fellow with the Truman National Security Project.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

 

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.