Why the United States Should Merge Its Ground Forces

Part of our Sacred Cow series, originally posted at USNI Blog.

Speaking at the Association of the United States Army on the 12th, Admiral James Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the audience that in future ground wars the tempo will be “shorter, faster-paced and much harder” because America’s adversaries will work to create a “fog of war.” Thus, the Admiral suggested that the Army “place more emphasis on the growth industry…of protecting American citizens abroad” in order to adapt to the fluid geostrategic environment.

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VCJCS Admiral James Winnefeld speaking at the Association of the United States Army on September 12th.

Indeed, since the sequestration went into effect in March, many defense experts have been debating what the future may hold for the Army, the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Whatever their respective views may be on the utility of landpower in future wars, all seem to agree on one thing: that in the sequestration era, the ground components must fight leaner and smarter.

For John R. Deni, a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, the answer seems to lie in the “Army-led military-to-military activities” which may provide stability in politically volatile regions “if only because most military forces around the globe are army-centric.”

Others beg to differ. Generals James Amos and Raymond Odierno and Admiral William McRaven seem to second Admiral Winnefeld’s claim when they argue that today “the need to conduct large-scale aid and consequence management missions, both within the United States and internationally, is certain to grow.” General James Amos, the Marine Corps Commandant, also recently echoes this view when he advocates a lighter but mobile Marine Corps because he believes tomorrow’s conflicts will likely involve “violent extremism, battles for influence, disruptive societal transitions, natural disaster, extremist messages and manipulative politics.”

However, if the United States Armed Forces is truly concerned about raising a cost-efficient and versatile ground force, it can merge the Army, the SOCOM and the Marine Corps into one unified service branch. This idea is not new. As far back as 1994, the late Colonel David Hackworth advocated the merger of the Army and the Marine Corps because their missions seemed to overlap. He went so far as to claim that the Department of Defense (DoD) could save “around $20 billion a year.” Nevertheless, absent in Hackworth’s column was a coherent blueprint for how the DoD could effectively unify its ground components into a cohesive service because Hackworth did not flesh out his strategic vision for what 21st Century wars may look like.

Which raises a very salient question as to what America’s strategic priorities should be. In a perceptive op-ed, Mark Fitzgerald, David Deptula and Gian P. Gentile aver that the United States must choose to go to “war as a last resort and not a policy option of first choice.” To this must be added another imperative. The United States Armed Forces must prioritize homeland defense as its primary mission and rethink the mistaken belief that the United States can somehow secure its interests through “lengthy military occupations of foreign lands.”

Thus, this newly merged service must redirect its focus towards countering cyber warfare and CBRNe (Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear and explosives) attacks and should work towards bolstering its counterterrorism (CT) capabilities. This is because, due to the convergence of the global community, the United States may be vulnerable to attacks from within by homegrown terrorists and drug cartels—all of which may wreak havoc and may even cripple America’s domestic infrastructures.

Reorientation of its mission focus may also require that the new service reconfigure its size. After all, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey wrote in Foreign Affairs, “Washington should remember that the size of the armed forces is not the most telling metric of their strength.” One solution is to adopt the so-called “Macgregor Transformation Model (MTM)” centered around the combat group concept which may reduce the strength of the new service “yet in the end produce a force that has greater combat capability…[and] more sustainable.” This model may provide the United States with a deployable fire brigade in the event of a national emergency or an international crisis. Already, the bases from which to adopt this viable model exist in the form of Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) of various sizes.

Should the United States decide that it needs to project its hard power abroad to guard its interests, it could deploy the Special Operations Forces (SOF) components of the new service in tandem with UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) to selectively target and neutralize potential threats. While the SOF and UAV surgical raids should not be viewed as substitutes for deft diplomacy, they can provide cheaper and selective power projection capabilities. Moreover, doing so could minimize the risks inherent in power projection and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missions which may potentially mire the United States in messy and protracted conflicts.

Marines from MARSOC honing their rifle marksmanship skills. Photo by MARSOC Public Affairs

Last but not least, this new service could buttress interoperability and capabilities of allied forces around the globe through military-to-military exchanges. Although Deni was referring specifically to the Army-led initiatives when he suggested this, he may be correct that military-to-military engagements may help to promote America’s image abroad as a trusted guarantor of peace. But even more important, such activities may “mean fewer American boots on the ground.” However, implementing what the retired Marine General James Mattis refers to as the “proxy strategy” may be a better means by which the United States could “lead from behind.” Under this arrangement, while “America’s general visibility would decline,” its allies and proxies would police the trouble spots on its behalf.

Contrary to what many in the defense establishment believe, the austerity measures wrought by the sequestration have not been entirely negative. If anything, this perceived “crisis” has provided the much-needed impetus for innovative approaches to national defense. The proposed merger of the ground forces may provide the United States with most cost-effective and versatile service branch to defend the homeland and safeguard its interests abroad.

SSBN(X): Sacred Cow for a Reason

This article is part of our “Sacred Cows Week.”

By Grant Greenwell

SSBNXIn May 2009, President Obama disclosed the inventory of America’s strategic nuclear arsenal: 5,113 weapons. This was done in an attempt to 1) bring attention to smaller states with developing nuclear agendas and 2) pressure Russia to disclose its own nuclear numbers.  While the first objective is not quantifiable, and the second is partially complete (such as Russia cooperating with a recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists study documenting worldwide nuclear arsenals), the startling revelation by President Obama brought to light one widely-known fact: the U.S. possesses a massive nuclear arsenal deployed in missile silos, bombers, and submarines around the world.

In the fiscally constrained environment the U.S. currently resides, many institutions are questioning the efficiency of not only the quantity of nuclear weapons, but also the delivery methods of such an arsenal. A recent Cato Institute white paper argued that the U.S. nuclear arsenal if deployed only in nuclear strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would save the US $20b annually. The argument is predicated on a rivalry between the services in the early days of the Cold War to develop dominance in the field of nuclear weapon delivery (not unlike the Ballistic Missile Defense competition). Each service developed its own delivery method that was robust, survivable, and flexible to deliver a second-strike capability.  Of the three delivery methods of the Nuclear Triad, the SSBN is the most advantageous when it comes to survivability and mobility.

While some parties contend that disassembling the triad into a dyad or even monad eliminates the amplitude of U.S. deterrent strategy, all agree that the SSBN is the cornerstone of that strategy. That being said, the U.S. SSBN fleet is tired, with the first of 14 due to be decommissioned in 2027. A replacement fleet needs to be designed, approved, constructed, and tested in the next 14 years if the strategic deterrence ability of the SSBN fleet is to be continued.

Mr. Maxwell Cooper’s recent Proceedings article “The Future of Deterrence?  Ballistic Missile Defense” correctly cites that the current SSBN replacement (SSBN(X)) estimates are staggering when compared with the rest of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget – roughly $5b per SSBN(X) while the entire budget is roughly $21b/year over the next 30 years. Mr. Cooper further speculates (perhaps correctly) that the cost alone calls for the truncation – if not complete elimination – of the SSBN(X) in favor of vast increases in the BMD realm built around the existing Arleigh Burke platform.  He could not make a more dangerous assertion.

SSBN(X) remains a vital portion of our national maritime strategy as well as our nuclear deterrence strategy. If the SSBN force were to retire without replacement, the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be down nearly 1600 warheads that cannot be easily translated to the other portions of the triad. Additionally, the leg of the triad that is most survivable and mobile would be arrested, forcing our strategic resources to rely solely on fixed sites and aging bombers. Neither of these prospects are ideal, nor appealing. The argument is akin to whether US naval forces should rely on hard-kill (kinetic munitions) or soft-kill (electronic warfare (i.e., chaff decoys, jamming)) for defense. The answer is both, as should be the nuclear deterrent forces.

The U.S. Navy has signaled it agrees with this argument in the form of its FY14 budget.  In an effort to keep forward movement for the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP – formally SSBN(X)), the Navy requested $1.1b for additional research and development with the end goal of procuring a replacement fleet of 12 SSBNs. The Navy has also reasserted its commitment to the SSBN force in a surprising tactic: compromise. As Mr. Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists pointed out, the U.S. SSBN force is doing more with less. While the number of boats has remained the same for years, the deployment numbers are less, yet the nuclear deterrence mission has remained unchanged. In a nod to this trend, the Navy – with guidance from STRATCOM – has agreed to a decrease of the current 24-tube count to a 16-tube count for the future SSBN.

In addition to U.S. commitment to the next-generation SSBN force, their closest ally Britain has also started procuring its next ballistic boat, aptly named Successor that will carry its deterrent capability well into the 2040s.

The need to continues the SSBN fleet is evident and has been appropriately addressed by institutes, politicians, the U.S. Navy, and allies alike. The replacement plan has been programmed for and is projected to be completed in time to start the on-time retirement of the venerable Ohio class. It continues to remain the strongest platform in the US strategic deterrence strategy and as such is privileged to remain a “sacred cow.”

Grant Greenwell is the Director of Operations for CIMSEC since May of 2013. He is also a Surface Warfare Officer for the U.S. Navy and an active participant in American Mensa, the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps, and the Surface Navy Association. His opinions do not represent the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, nor his aforementioned affiliates.

Featured Image: POULSBO, Wash. (Jan. 14, 2015) The ballistic-missile submarine USS Nevada (SSBN 733) transits the Puget Sound on its way to its homeport, Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Ahron Arendes)

Moving the Navy/CIVMAR Integration Experiment Forward

     The contributions of Civilian Mariners (CIVMARS) from Military Sealift Command (MSC) are normally associated with the Combat Logistics mission; however, recent experiments with USS PONCE and other hybrid-manned ships demonstrate a compelling case for further CIVMAR integration into U.S. Naval units.  MSC has been in existence since 1949 as an operator of non-naval government ships, in its current name and organization since 1970, and an operator of naval service support ships since 1972. The Navy first experimented with the assignment of CIVMARs to combatant ships in 2004, when MSC personnel were assigned to the USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20). Subsequent to that first trial the Navy has also re-assigned its Safeguard class salvage ships completely to MSC control and converted substantial parts of the ship’s complement of the tenders USS Emory S. Land and USS Frank Cable. Most recently the Navy assigned CIVMAR’s to the first Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) USS Ponce, formerly LPD 15 forward deployed in the Persian Gulf.  When the Navy decided to reverse the decommissioning of PONCE, the 360 billets were liquidated and the only means of manning the ship in haste were CIVMARs and Individual Augmentees (IA’s) from the Fleet. Ponce’s proven worth after one year of operations presents an attractive means for delivering capability at a reduced cost when considering Ponce is operating with 140 fewer personnel than the naval version of the Landing Platform Dock (LPD). Questions remain whether the low cost of employing CIVMAR’s minimum manning methods can help conserve Navy resources for other priorities?

     The first efforts to integrate CIVMAR’s into combatant naval vessel crews came in the early 2000’s as the Navy’s inventory of conventional steam-powered ships plummeted due to age and replacement ships employment of different propulsion systems. Many Civilian mariners are former naval personnel and have extensive experience in the operation of steam propulsion plants. They were considered an ideal choice to keep aging naval steam plants properly resourced and functional at a lower cost than current naval personnel who would require re-training to operate legacy propulsion systems. A 2005 report by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) warmly endorsed the concept of using CIVMARs in a host of positions on combatant ships. The study also recommended that the Navy adopt many CIVMAR low cost/minimum manning techniques as a way to both improve U.S. warship maintenance and operation. The experiments on Ponce and other ships have tested many of the CNA report’s proposals. The results indicate some distinct organizational, operational, and cultural differences in the MSC and U.S. Navy. An updated version of the CNA 2005 report is in order. It should determine what strengths and weaknesses greater assignment of CIVMAR’s to combatant ships would bring, as well as consider what CIVMAR best practices the Navy might adopt in order to reduce costs but preserve combat efficiency.

     The CIVMAR community has a number of professional strengths. First and foremost, CIVMAR’s emphasize pre-planned and economical operations. “Routine” and “predictable” is entirely in line with their merchant background. Their mission is to move a ship and its cargo on as straight a line as possible from point (a) to point (b) at its most economical speed and do so with the bare minimum of fuel, personnel, and other resources. To meet these requirements, CIVMARs operate precisely and professionally in all ship handling and engineering procedures. Deck officers are licensed with a significant higher level of navigation skills than that of the standard U.S. Navy officer and engineering officers not only orchestrate and manage the engineering plants, but are hands-on operators who actually conduct many equipment repairs. CIVMARs are paid by the hour and are on the ship to work. The Commanding Officer of Ponce put it very succinctly as follows; “You will not find TVs in CIVMAR workcenters. They are “workcenters” not “entertainment centers…and when you pay by the hour, you manage by the hour.”

     The CIVMAR community also brings cultural disadvantages that make integration with naval personnel a challenge. The CIVMAR focus on regular, cost efficient operation does not always lend itself to the non-routine and unpredictable operations of a combatant warship. CIVMAR Engineering officers do not “tear down” equipment for inspection or as part of regular maintenance. They do not drill down equipment during casualty control drills,  shift equipment daily, or subject their plants to excessive changes in speed that are regular operating characteristics of warships. They are very proficient in damage control, but if an MSC ship suffers damage, the operating ethos is to save the ship rather than fight the ship. CIVMAR bridge officers and topside personnel are equally devoted to routine rather than multi-disciplinary operations. The bridge on an MSC ship operates with a fraction of the personnel assigned to a U.S. Navy condition 1 or even condition 3 watch, but the expectations for what that watch is capable of are significantly reduced. CIVMAR deck officers drive in straight lines. They are unaccustomed to steaming boxes or formation operations and they are not familiar with concepts like navigating swept channels and are unfamiliar with maneuvering to avoid missiles/torpedoes. The concept of having the Combat Information Center (CIC) disagree with their course and speed recommendations can be disconcerting to some CIVMAR Mates of the Watch (MOW’s). Some of these cultural divisions between MSC and USN are significant, and would require a good deal of patience and maturity on the part of both communities for effective integration within the lifelines.

     Despite these big differences, the CIVMAR experiment on USN ships to date has been generally successful, especially in getting further service life out of aging steam-powered ships. There are aspects of MSC operation from which the U.S Navy could certainly benefit. The MSC system of engineering watch standing and record keeping (both automatic and paper records) was sighted by several USN officers as more efficient and easier to use than current Navy procedures. A CIVMAR-style engineering watch organization might be beneficial on diesel-powered amphibious warfare ships like the Landing Ship Dock (LSD) class where consistent, most economical speeds are more the norm than in surface combatant vessels. Navy Officers of the Deck (OODs) and Navigators would benefit from the U.S. Coast Guard-tested standards of CIVMAR navigation knowledge. The Navy might consider the assignment of a CIVMAR navigator to smaller Navy ships in a role similar to the Master position of the days of sail. Such an officer would be subordinate to the executive officer and perhaps serve as the actual navigator and principle advisor to the ship’s commanding officer on all aspects of good seamanship. The amount of training potential embodied in this individual is enormous and benefits might include an enhanced knowledge of navigation at all levels of the ship’s company. A similar position might be considered for a ship’s engineering department in the form of a Maintenance expert along the lines of the old ship’s carpenter from the sailing navy.

     In conclusion, the U.S. Navy has proven success with using CIVMAR’s to gain additional service life from aging ships. Successful integration of these two different cultures on combatant ships remains to be seen, but the model seems to be working on the ships where it is currently employed.  Finally, the U.S. Navy should consider further exploiting the wealth of knowledge inherent in the CIVMAR ranks by assigning senior CIVMAR experts to smaller combatants as navigation and maintenance experts. The education benefit for all hands in such an assignment is substantial and might significantly improve naval standards for navigation and maintenance in smaller crews at minimum cost. The Navy should also commission a follow-up study to the 2005 CNA report on CIVMAR manning on Navy ships in order to re-assess those concepts in light of results from the experiments on Ponce, Mount Whitney, and the submarine tenders. The CIVMAR experiment has been useful, but needs a re-evaluation based on these recent experiences in order to move effectively forward.

Steve Wills is a retired surface warfare officer and a PhD student in military history at Ohio University. His focus areas are modern U.S. naval and military reorganization efforts and British naval strategy and policy from 1889-1941. He posts here at CIMSEC, sailorbob.com and at informationdissemination.org under the pen name of “Lazarus”.

Ain’t Ready for Marines Yet? The Sacred Cow of British Army Organization

This article is part of our Sacred Cows Week.

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Don’t laugh, that hat is REALLY heavy.

I’d like to rustle a few feathers and take a swing at the sacred cows that are the British Army’s system of dividing its Infantry along regimental lines and of training its officers and men separately. When it comes to writing about sacred cows in the British military, it is my humble opinion that none are more sacred (and more bovine!) than the regimental system that is still displayed in the British Army today.

So what relevance does this have with maritime security? In comparison with their land based brethren, the Royal Navy and their infantry component the Corps of Royal Marines, have long seen the failings of such a system and are significantly less bound to what I will argue is an outdated and stifling system. This, I argue, makes them significantly more mobile and adaptable without unduly sacrificing tradition and history. I will dare to go a step further and argue that the RM training model and organisation should be more widely implemented, primarily in the Infantry element of the Army. I hasten to add I write this more as devils advocacy and food for thought than devoutly held belief, and would welcome the thoughts and comments of others on the issue.

By the RM model of training, I refer to what goes on at the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, located in Lympstone, just outside of a sleepy fishing village in Devon, in the South West of England. It is here that officers and men alike are taken from civilian life and put through training (32 weeks for enlisted Marines, 64 weeks for officers – widely acknowledged to be the longest of any NATO force) as young officer trainees (YOs). This is unique in the British Armed Forces, where enlisted personnel and officers undergo initial training separately – primarily, I argue, for traditional reasons. Forged anew in the fires of the dark days during the Second World War from Royal Marines and Army Commandos, the Corps today contributes to Britain’s premiere maritime rapid reaction force, the Response Force Task Group. With the increasing importance of the littoral zone, it has more reach and is arguably more suited to modern operations than the Army’s equivalent expeditionary force, 16 Air Assault Brigade, which, as the name suggests, concentrates on air assault and air manoeuvre ops.

One of the main factors that draws many, including myself, to seek a commission in the Corps over that of the Army is the relationship between officers and men. While there is no doubt, both from my own extremely limited experience as an enlisted Infantry reservist, and from anecdotal and literary evidence, that young officers of any branch and service often form a unique and close bond with their troops, there is a particular bond between Royal Marines Commandos thanks to shared hardships. At Lympstone, YOs are not only pushed harder and expected to excel in every arena – physical, martial and academic – but also held to higher standards in physical tests, especially in the famous four Commando tests, which confer the right to wear the coveted green beret. The enlisted Marine recruits see their would-be officers working harder, longer and faster, mitigating any doubt they might have about their capabilities. This is in stark contrast to the famed Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, where Army officers are trained en-masse, regardless of branch, and far from the exacting eye of the enlisted man or woman.

The arguments against implementing such a system are many, some of which are relevant in the modern era, many of which aren’t (and I would love to explore these further in the comments section). To those who would point to the rich and proud tradition of officer training at Sandhurst, and shout down any calls for change, I would argue that radical changes to the way the Army trains officers are nothing new. Although an entire blog post – or two – would struggle to narrate the history of officer training in the British Army, Sandhurst as a unified institution for all initial officer training has only existed in its current form since 1992 – coincidentally as long as my former regiment, but more on that later. Another, more relevant argument is the simple logistics – the British Army was, before recent defence cuts, roughly 108,000 personnel strong – containing 36 Infantry battalions (approximately 650 men, so around 23,400 men). The Royal Marines stand at about 7,500 strong, or around a third of the size. This however, need not be an insurmountable issue – Infantry soldiers undergo 26 weeks basic training at the Infantry Training Centre in Catterick, in the North of England, and I would argue there is little to prevent it following the Lympstone model and encompassing Infantry officer training, leaving Sandhurst for non-Infantry roles. As the Army prepares itself to face the post-Afghanistan challenges, it is clear from recent defence reviews (culminating in ‘Army 2020’, the organisational change up for the next decade) that it will be doing so as a smaller force – steps must be taken to ensure that as the Army shrinks, efforts are made to ensure our military can still punch its weight and above on the world stage. It is not good enough to merely reduce troop numbers (limited to 82,000 by 2018, to include a loss of 4 Infantry battalions) – otherwise it will be a simple, and unconscionable, money saving exercise.

Since its inception, the regimental system has been a necessary, vital and driving factor in British military success, but I will attempt to argue that due to the combination of a natural post 1945 draw down in troop numbers, and more recent swingeing defence cuts, the regimental system has evolved into a beast that is not only dangerously divisive, but actively retards growth and progress – in short, it has outgrown its usefulness. This is not a rare argument, but faces stiff opposition from the serried ranks of retired officers who rustle their newspapers in their Gentlemens clubs and hark back to an era of drill square spit and polish and gleaming uniforms. For some light amusement, it is always worth reading the letters to the editor pages of Soldier Magazine, the Army’s monthly publication, as not a month goes by without some retired warrant officer or senior officer writing in to complain that uniform standards are slipping. I have it on good authority that prescriptions for blood pressure medication sharply increased in the month that the Army decided it was making the switch from black boots to brown, and as we all know, the ability to iron creases into your combat trousers directly correlates with your ability to react to effective enemy fire…

We currently live in a society where a regiment will live or die – or amalgamate/disband – not on the sodden red sand of a desert, but in the corridors of Whitehall and Parliament. This is where the ugly side of the regimental family tradition kicks in – retired officers and men writing letters and protesting in the streets about why another, lesser regiment should get the chop (as seen recently when it was announced that the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers were to lose their 2nd Battalion). No such bitter infighting and backstabbing is seen in the Royal Navy or Royal Marines, where men and women may have a brief loyalty to ship or unit, but this is transient and their greatest loyalty lies to service or Corps. I was recently privileged to spend a few days with 40 Commando, based in Taunton. Both the Commanding Officer and Regimental Sergeant Major (senior enlisted Marine) were recent transfers to the unit from other Commandos, but clearly held the respect of their subordinates. Transfers between Army battalions are relatively uncommon, and between individual Infantry regiments almost unheard of. The primary loyalty of the individual soldier, above that of his immediate brothers in arms, is to that of his regiment – something enforced from the very beginning in basic training, to day to day life, and reinforced by regimental and family associations after service. This is something I can fully understand – I am immeasurably proud to have served in a regiment which had as one of its ancestors the regiment in which two of my own ancestors served in during the Great War – a ‘County’ regiment which itself was an amalgam of several others. Yet still today, many of the men who served in the two regiments that combined to form it in 1992 bitterly resent the fact they were joined to what, in their eyes, were lesser regiments unable to attract recruits. It is this elitist culture that needs to be challenged, and I can think of no better way of instilling humility than by creating a Corps of Infantry (as seen in Australia). While idiosyncrasies unique to individual regiments are valuable, in an age where are in danger of lacking the funds for a sizeable, effective Armed Forces, to have uniforms, accoutrements, traditions, routines and behaviours unique to 36 different Infantry battalions seems rather obtuse. Men may fight long and hard for a bit of coloured ribbon, but I’d rather see them receive proper health care and decent pensions. I believe a generation of senior officers and enlisted men trained alongside each other and without regimental affiliations or ties would encourage innovation and unconventional thinking – two things which are not only displayed in great amounts by Royal Marines, but will also ensure Britain’s Infantry is up to facing the challenges of the post-Afghanistan world head on. Sacred cows? I’ll take mine medium rare, thanks.

Alex Blackford is a former war-dodging Infantry reservist with no tours under his belt, and therefore expects his opinions to be judged accordingly. He holds a BA (Hons) in Arabic, Middle Eastern Studies and Persian and is currently juggling Royal Marines Reserve training while applying for the regular Corps.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.