Indonesia and the Next Australian Defence White Paper

By Daniel Grant

800px-Marty_NatalegawaAustralia’s Abbott government has promised to write a new Defence White Paper within 18 months, and one of the key challenges it will face is considering the place of Indonesia in Australian defence thinking. As the fear of a direct Indonesian threat retreats into the past, it is being replaced by a view of Indonesia as a potential ‘buffer’ separating Australia from the vagaries of the East Asian system. But when the new government considers Australia’s defence options in the next century, it’d do well to remember that Indonesia gets a vote in the role it plays in defending Australia.

Historically, Indonesia has comprised an important, though unclear, element in Australia’s strategic environment. When Australia looks at its neighbourhood in isolation, Indonesia’s proximity and strategic potential makes it appear as a liability. But if the lens is widened to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific strategic system, a strong Indonesia looks more like an asset. During the Cold War Australia’s security concerns about Indonesia revolved around threats associated with Konfrontasi, communism and state collapse, with the prospect of a nuclear-armed Sukarno regime menacing briefly in 1965. But as early as the 1970s, Defence was also conducting studies of possible regional contingencies which involved Indonesia as an ally in achieving regional security. So recognition of our mutual strategic interests coexisted with security concerns about Indonesia.

In a recent Security Challenges article Stephan Fruehling argued that the 2013 Defence White Paper is Australia’s first ‘post-Indonesia’ strategic guidance document since the 1950s. By that he means that the document doesn’t even mention the possibility that relations between Australia and Indonesia might worsen, let alone gesture towards the ‘Indonesia threat’ of yore. Instead, it casts a pretty firm vote in favour of the ‘Indonesia as asset’ conception. This shift reflects not only Australia’s growing comfort with Indonesia as a neighbour, but also the prevailing uncertainty of the Asia-Pacific strategic environment and the attendant need for Australia to build partnerships in the region.

But Australians should be careful not to read this increasingly rosy picture of Indonesia’s strategic significance as a linear trend. While a stable Indonesia acts as a buffer regardless of its policy preferences, assisting it to play the role that we may need it to requires policy coordination. An effective joint response to contingencies involving regional defence against a hostile major power, for instance, requires planning premised on a shared view of Asia’s major power politics. Despite the shifts that have taken place in the bilateral relationship, a convergence of strategic perceptions at this level hasn’t happened, and is unlikely to happen in the near future. There are several reasons for this.

While Indonesia has warmed to the US security presence in Asia, in part because it helps to restrain China, it has also been careful to keep its distance from the US out of regard for China. As Indonesian defence thinkers look out at their archipelago from Java, a complex risk environment stares back at them. While a potentially hostile China is an important risk to be mitigated, overtly pushing against China heightens many other serious risks, not the least of which being major power war. Doing so would sacrifice Indonesia’s development goals for little net security gain.

The main thrust of Indonesian statecraft has been to exert diplomatic influence in regional forums to short-circuit adversarial strategic trends and develop mechanisms to moderate conflict. This approach has been sustained through a period when China’s maritime activism reached a crescendo, America was at its most engaged in decades, and Indonesia itself had its most pro-Western President ever. Because it’s in keeping with Indonesia’s non-alignment tradition, this approach has the critical buttress of domestic support. More importantly, it remains Indonesia’s most viable strategy.

The sense of vulnerability that comes from their geographic location makes Indonesians wary of becoming entangled in the strategic calculations of foreign powers. Australia’s appreciation of Indonesia as a ‘buffer’ is a case in point: the difference between ‘buffer’ and ‘battleground’ is one of abstraction. As disastrous as major power confrontation would be for Australia, for Indonesia the fighting would take place on its doorstep, if not in its living room. This means that Australia might more readily take actions which risk escalation, especially if it feels shielded from the worst of the consequences. Deepening defence cooperation with the likes of Australia is not without its risks for Indonesia.

The next defence white paper will surely assign Indonesia an important place. But Australia should consider the possibility that we’ve already seen the full extent of Indonesia’s ‘Westward’ shift. Indonesia remains a country that pursues regional security through diplomatic means, and in this sense remains aloof from the great power game in Asia. By implicitly or explicitly assigning Indonesia a role it’s unwilling to play, we’d be putting Australia’s defence policy on unstable foundations. It’s the job of the next white paper to chart a course that Australia and Indonesia can both stick to if the seas get rough.

Daniel Grant is the 2013 Robert O’Neill Scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. This article originally appeared on the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s blog The Strategist

Events 20-26 October 2013

Events Week of 20-26 October 2013

21 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Center for Strategic and International Studies“The Future of the Marine Corps”. Following a decade at war and amidst mounting fiscal pressures, the Marine Corps is developing a new force structure designed to address the “new normal” security environment while maximizing scarce resources.  The Corps has already designed and deployed new crisis response capabilities in response to existing security gaps, and is making additional adjustments to help enhance its ability to contribute to joint shaping and combat capabilities going forward.  Join us for a discussion with Major General Frank McKenzie, USMC Representative to the Quadrennial Defense Review, for a look at how these adjustments relate to broader questions being explored as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as to the Corps’ future priorities.

21 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Center for Strategic and International Studies“Rare Earth Elements: Implications on US-Asia Environmental and Security Issues”.  Rare Earth Elements (REEs) are chemical elements that are critical for your mobile phones, laptops, green technologies, and even defense systems. Despite the fact that REEs are more abundant than silver and gold with known reserves in Australia and the U.S., China continues to monopolize global REE supplies, which could negatively impact the national security interests of other countries. Countries such as Japan, which accounts for two-thirds of China’s REE exports and relies on its supply to fuel its automotive and electronics industries, have argued that China’s monopoly over REEs are dangerous, as China can and has imposed trade embargos on REEs to gain political leverage. This roundtable, featuring many prominent speakers, will focus on pressing questions such as: Is China using REEs to gain geopolitical advantage, or is it genuinely concerned about environmental challenges of REE production? What does the current state of REE production imply for the economies and security interests of Japan, other Asia-Pacific countries, and the U.S.? And what can be done to mitigate China’s dominance of mining REEs?

22 October 2013 – London – King’s College“Afghan Question and the Role of Pakistan’s Military Establishment”.  As Afghanistan undergoes a historic political and security transition with the withdrawal of US-led Coalition forces, the role of Pakistan becomes ever more important. Facing unprecedented domestic security challenges, the Afghan situation looms large in Pakistan’s strategic outlook. The speaker, an expert on the Pakistani military establishment and Islamic world’s strategic affairs provides insight on how the Pakistani army and intelligence is currently debating the Afghan question. He is the founding director of IISA.

22 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Hudson Institute“Power Shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Emerging Strategic Relationship of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus”.  The discovery of massive quantities of hydrocarbons in both the Israeli and Cypriot exclusive economic zones, and the selection of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, redraws the region’s hydrocarbon map and will significantly impact energy security policies. This transformation has emerged as large political upheavals continue throughout the area.  Primary topics of discussion will be: 1) the emerging strategic relationship of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus; 2) changes in the region’s energy security environment; and 3) Turkey’s reorientation toward Islamism and the East.

22 October 2013 – London – International Institute for Strategic Studies“Recent Operations in Helmand”.  NATO and the Afghan government are focused on achieving full Afghan leadership of security across the country by the end of 2014, when NATO’s combat mission will end. This security transition requires NATO and Kabul to increase the size and capability of Afghan forces, develop the capacity of the Afghan state, reduce corruption and persuade ‘reconcilable’ insurgents to lay down their arms.

At the end of June, the Afghan government and NATO announced ‘Milestone 13’, marking a significant increase in Afghan leadership of security operations. Security in Helmand is now the full responsibility of the Afghan authorities. The British Army’s 1st Mechanized Brigade has just returned from there. Its commander, Brigadier Rupert Jones, will describe the developing capabilities of the Afghan security forces and the brigade’s role in supporting them.

22 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Stimson Center“Securing the Nuclear Enterprise: What Nuclear Crises Teach Us About Future Security Threats”.  Next spring, the U.S will join other world governments and organizations in The Hague for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Like previous gatherings in 2010 and 2012, the upcoming summit will include debate about the steps the global community must take to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of non-state actors. Central to this objective is the ability of nuclear armed states to maintain control over their weapons and sensitive materials. One way the U.S. can identify existing gaps in the control regime and prepare for the summit is by carefully studying previous nuclear weapons crises.

During its Cultural Revolution, China nearly lost control of its nuclear arsenal. This history – little known in the U.S. – is both chilling and critical to understanding Chinese attitudes towards nuclear security. In the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center’s (NPEC) new study, Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach?, Chinese nuclear weapons management expert and Executive Director of Project 2049 Institute Mark Stokes tells the story of China’s near-nuclear crisis and the lessons that can be learned from it.

23 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Atlantic Council“Cyber Risk Wednesday”.  Cyber Risk Wednesdays brings cyber experts from government and industry together with policymakers to examine topics at the core of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative’s study of interrelated cyber hazards and underlying concentration of risks. The series is designed to expose stakeholders from the technology, policy, and risk management communities to vibrant new cyber topics and provide a venue for the exchange of ideas.

The launch event, held on October 23, will introduce the joint effort by the Atlantic Council and Zurich Insurance to understand how global aggregation of cyber risks could cause systemic shocks and ways, such as insurance and resilience, to mitigate them. A moderated discussion will analyse systemic cyber risks and explore their implications on the future of the internet.  The panel will feature Larry Castro, Managing Director at The Chertoff Group, whose prior government service includes over four decades at the National Security Agency.

24 October 2013 – London – International Institute for Strategic Studies“Prompt Global Strike”.  Today, only nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are capable of striking targets at intercontinental range within minutes. Conventionally-armed aircraft or subsonic cruise missiles could take many hours to travel the same distance. A number of states are, however, seeking to close this ‘capability gap’ by developing hypersonic long-range conventional weapons. The United States’ Conventional Prompt Global Strike programme is the most well-known example. However, China is also very active in this area and efforts in Russia also appear to be underway. James Acton will explore the implications – both positive and negative – of these weapons for international security, and especially nuclear deterrence.

24 October 2013 – Santa Monica, CA – RAND Corporation“Security Versus Privacy?”.  Does homeland security mean you can’t be secure in your own home? A steady drumbeat of revelations about the U.S. government’s trove of phone and electronic communication records of private citizens has unsettled many within the past few months. The government has argued that it needs this information to identify and apprehend terrorists and their sympathizers. But people are wondering if America is sacrificing privacy and civil liberties upon the altar of homeland security, and if so, to what extent? Are the fears of an oncoming police state grossly unjustified? Or should they serve as clarion calls for reform? Join us in discussing where to draw the proper lines between privacy, security, and liberty.

25 October 2013 – London – King’s College“Conventional Prompt Global Strike: What Happens When Technology Overwhelms Strategy”.  James Acton is a senior associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a member of the Trilateral Commission on Challenges to Deep Cuts and co-chaired the Next Generation Working Group on US-Russia arms control. Acton, who holds a PhD in theoretical physics, was previously a lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

25 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Cato Institute“Dangerous World?  Threat Perception and U.S. National Security.”  Last year, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey contended that “we are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime, right now.” This year, he was more assertive, stating that the world is “more dangerous than it has ever been.”

Is this accurate? At this conference, experts on international security will assess, and put in context, the supposed dangers to American security. Speakers will examine the most frequently referenced threats, including wars between nations and civil wars within nations. Panelists will also discuss the impact of rising nations, weapons proliferation, general unrest, transnational crime, and state failures, as well as technological developments, climate change, and the requirement to maintain a stable global economic system.

26 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Georgetown / TED Talks“TEDx Talk”.  The professors giving talks are not just experts in their field of academia- they have achieved great feats beyond the classroom. Sonal Shah worked as Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of the first White House Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation, while Dr. Francis Slakey is the first person in history to both summit the highest mountain on every continent and surf every ocean in the world. For more information on our full list of speakers visit www.tedxgeorgetown.com

For the second independently organized TEDxGeorgetown event, the focus is on student engagement. Through a brief application, select students will have the opportunity to interact with the speakers in an intimate group setting. Tickets are free of charge.

Long-Term
29 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Disruptive Thinkers.  Execution is the new innovation.  All of our innovative ideas won’t amount to much if we can’t find a way to implement them.  And this month we get a chance to hear from Rob Holzer, someone who knows how to do just that.

29 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Atlantic Council“Regional Cooperation: An Imperative for Transatlantic Defense”.  Please join the Atlantic Council for an address by, and discussion with, Finnish Minister of Defense Carl Haglund, who will detail the importance of regional cooperation for transatlantic security.

Building on the successes of Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), Minister Haglund will make a case for NATO member and partner countries to follow a similar framework to sustain present-day interoperability levels and enhance military capabilities. NORDEFCO’s five members states—Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—use regional networking to increase their interoperability via cross-border cooperation, build-up and maintain necessary military capabilities, and provide cost-effective contributions to international efforts.

30 October 2013 – London – King’s College“Geographic Information Systems and the Geographies of War”.

30 October 2013 – Washington, DC – Foreign Policy Association“Georgetown Conference: Iran and the South Caucasus”.

31 October 2013 – London – King’s College“Terror Attacks on Energy Infrastructure – A Growing Threat?”.  The European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS) cordially invites you to the fifth and final roundtable discussion in a series on Resilient Energy Infrastructure co-hosted by acatech – National Academy of Science and Engineering, Germany and the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in London, in partnership with KPMG.

31 October 2013 – Washington, DC – CNA“Asia’s Looming Hotspot”.  Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, U.S. Navy (Ret.) will discuss the increasingly contentious dispute between China and Japan concerning sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and the implications this dispute has for U.S. foreign policy. This talk is one of a series on “Hidden Dangers: Emerging Global Issues of the 21st Century” sponsored with the World Affairs Council of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. – See more at: http://www.cna.org/news/events/2013-10-31#sthash.cBXbR5bq.dpuf

01 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Atlantic Council“Tackling India’s Cyber Threat”.  India is becoming the second-largest victim of cyberattacks after the United States and earlier this year released its first national Cyber Security Policy. The purpose of this framework document is to ensure a secure and resilient cyberspace for citizens, businesses, and the government.

In particular, the policy aims to strengthen the role of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) in coordination with crisis management efforts and awareness-raising activities on cybersecurity. Alongside protecting the country’s cyber infrastructure, the policy strengthens the significant role IT has played in transforming India’s image to that of a global player in providing IT solutions of the highest standards.

11 November 2013 – London – King’s College“New Nuclear Initiatives in Arms Control and Nonproliferation – Likelihood of Success?”.  President Obama’s renewed commitment to ‘a world without nuclear weapons’ along with ongoing challenges over Iran, North Korea, and within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, have given rise to numerous new initiatives in arms control and nonproliferation. A panel will discuss four such initiatives, including the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons initiative, the ‘P5 process’ with the five NPT-recognized Nuclear Weapon States, US-Russia arms control, and developments in Chinese nuclear policy.
 
13 November 2013 – Washington, DC – 10th Annual Disruptive Technologies Conference (Postponed)

14 November 2013 – India – The Diplomat“International Conference on Future Challenges in Earth Sciences for Energy and Mineral Resources”.

16 November 2013 – India – The Diplomat“Global Maritime International Conference”.

10 December 2013 – Washington, DC – USNI2013 Defense Forum Washington: Shaping the New Maritime Strategy and Navigating the Budget Gap Reality.

SC Episode 5: Africa

CIMSEC-LogoWe speak to James Bridger, author of a menagerie of CIMSEC Articles on Africa and an Africa/Middle East Asymmetric maritime security analyst for Delex. Episode 5, our revisit of African security issues (DOWNLOAD)  after African Navies week:

African Navies Week: Al Shabaab Is Only the Beginning
Searching for a Somali Coastguard
East Africa: More Than Just Pirates
Nigeria’s Navy: Setting Sail in Stormy Seas
Balanced Public/Private Effort for West African Maritime Security
East Africa: A Historical Lack of Navies

Particular to James Bridger:

Egyptian Instability and Suez Canal Security (Part I)
Crafting a Counter-Piracy Regime in the Gulf of Guinea
From Fighting Piracy to Terrorism, the PMPF Saga Continues
Re-examining the Gulf of Guinea: Fewer Attacks, Better Pirates
Pirate Horizons in the Gulf of Guinea

We talk about Somalia, Nigeria, piracy, terrorism, and the movie Captain Phillips. Join us on Itunes, Xbox Music, or the website. Stay tuned next week for our episode on USCG mobile training teams.

Battle of Litani River: Maritime Challenges in the Levant

Figure 1As the Syrian conflict drags on well into its third year, military planners continue weighing the differing contingency options and courses of action.  How do Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Israel protect themselves from a pre-emptive strike from the Baathist regime?  Is Russia providing advanced weaponry to the regime?  Will one or some of the various terrorist groups residing within Syria gain control of chemical weapons?  What exactly is the Russian navy doing in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea?  Who is the “opposition”?

The difficult limited choices (boots on the ground, non-fly zone, etc.) and the projection of future scenarios must be a heavy burden for military leadership that claim areas of responsibility for operations in Syria and around the Levant region.  Yet, the common military (and political) dialogue fails to discuss a very real sequel to any military campaign in Syria – What will happen in Lebanon? 

This “Switzerland of the Middle East” is a dynamic and aggravated area, susceptible to flare up and strife. Does it matter?  To the Israelis: of course it does, just look at the recent history of operations in Lebanon.  To the US: they have been involved in Lebanon (continually) since the early 1980s.  The recognized border between Lebanon and Israel is a memorial to the frozen conflict of which is just pending Hizbollah and/or Syria’s next move.

In June 1941, the Allies conducted a Syria-Lebanon campaign (known as Operation Exporter) of which little is written. British, Palestinians, Jordanians, Indians, Australians, and the “Free French” conducted an invasion of Vichy-controlled Syria and Lebanon, ultimately resulting in a victory, with the Free French General Catroux being placed in charge of Syria-Lebanon.  Shortly after, Catroux named both Syria and Lebanon free nations. Lebanon declared its independence in November 1943 with Syria claiming independence two months later.

In this campaign, Australian commandos as part of the British Layforce – an ad hoc assortment of special forces – conducted an amphibious raid into Lebanon through the southern Litani River area in an effort to seize key nodes (bridges and high terrain) in advance of the main force, driving north from Palestine towards Beirut.  The amphibious force was to coordinate with the 21st Brigade’s attack on the Litani River position, through an amphibious assault from sea near the mouth of the river. They were to secure the north and south banks of the river and prevent an enemy demolition of the Qasmiye bridge, allowing the 21st brigade to advance towards Beirut.  The landing force met unforeseen challenges posed both from their adversary as well as their own command and control.  These likewise hold lessons for naval planners contemplating operations in the region today.  

Limited Intelligence

The overall campaign commander, Field Marshal Henry Wilson, was unable to detail the force structure up to 10 days prior to the assault.  There were limited amount of intel handbooks to provide information on Lebanese and Syrian roads, towns, people, and enemy forces. The allied forces only had broad maps (1:200,000) of the area of operations and no prior intelligence on beach landing sites.  In response to this intel gap, action officers conducted a reconnaissance trip to Haifa to inquire on weather.  Finding that the landing area had heavy surf at 300yds from the beach, and given the dates of the pending assault, a landing was not assessed as favorable.

While the information available to naval planners has grown in the last 70 years, given ISR limitations and a robust Syrian air-defense posture, limited actionable intelligence will most likely still present a challenge.  Despite a recent Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of Lebanon, the increased conflict in Syria and multi-national interest in the region pose a much more complicated environment and larger quantity of unknowns.

Conflicting Command Relationships

The senior officer of the amphibious force, consisting of the landing ship HMS Glengyle and destroyers HMS Hotspur, HMS Iris, and HMS Coventry, serving as escorts, delegated responsibility of landing boats to the commanding officer of the amphibious ship CAPT Petrie, RN.  Upon conversing with the other ship captains (who all recommended against a landing) CAPT Petrie decided to recover the boats and return to Port Said.  This decision was not concurred by Col Pedder, the Amphibious Landing Force commander, who argued that the risk was worth taking to maintain surprise (moonlight had showed their presence), but the decision was made to reverse course nonetheless.  The ships returned to Port Said on the afternoon of 09 June, and after a brief meeting decided to get underway and attempt the landing again – early the next morning.  The force returned at 0300 to the same spot (four miles west of the coast) and launched the operation under a full moon in calm weather. Various landing parties came under immediate fire upon arriving at the beach and many felt that the previous night’s loitering tipped off the enemy to their intentions.  Additionally, when the main force (X) arrived south of the Litani River they observed that the enemy had already demolished the Qasmiye bridge.

While the decision to delay the landing had been delegated to CAPT Petrie, he also had a responsibility to report to his senior officer that landing force commander did not concur with the decision.  Communication limitations may have hindered such a correspondence, but this hotly contested command relationship is another reminder of the inherent risks that are always involved in amphibious operations.

 

HMS Glengyle
                                                                                                     HMS Glengyle

Naval history books are filled with command and control mistakes during amphibious operations and Allied forces in World War II learned hard lessons in their gradual development of effective amphibious task force/landing force relationships.  Given the uniqueness of the Levant region and the Eastern Mediterranean there are multiple commands who may be involved.  Recent western-coalition amphibious exercises (i.e. Bold Alligator) found persistent errors in command relationships and no common understanding of an appropriate chain of command.  U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command, and NATO all have operational area boundaries that meet in the Levant Region. Given the complexity of the area and environment, unless lessons of the past are understood, accepted, and acted upon the same issues may continue to haunt future amphibious operations in an around the Litani.

Faulty Navigation Skills

Two of the three landing parties (X and Z) had difficulties finding the correct landing site, resulting in the main effort (X party) landing one mile south of the intended objective and south of the Litani River, whereas the supporting effort (Z party) landed on the unintended side of the enemy forces.  This is not the first early morning amphibious operation (see Gallipoli) in which the leading guide used an incorrect navigational aid (small house vice a bridge).  Despite advances in GPS technology, the lack of updated environmental information and infrequent operations in this area should cause amphibious force planners to expect a comparable level of complexity. 

Six minutes after landing, a battery of field guns including 75mm guns, 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns opened fire on X party’s beach.  This may be viewed as irrelevant in light of today’s advanced equipment, but a friendly reminder that the 11 Scottish Commando’s arrival on the hillcrest overlooking the Litani river met with immediate friendly artillery fire should strike note of caution in maritime planners. 

Lack of Air Support and Coastal Shore Bombardment

Vichy French recon planes made repeated flights over the landing forces, while their destroyers moved down the Lebanese coast, firing into landing parties positions.  Despite ineffective shore bombardment on Z party, the X party sustained direct hits on troops and artillery with no effective friendly ship counter-fire.  It is unfathomable to think that two enemy French destroyers were able to freely maneuver on the coast, disrupting landing force operations, while three allied destroyers and one cruiser were assigned as escorts. 

This scenario easily translates to today’s operations and high-priority Ballistic Missile Defense platforms.  In the Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2AD) environment (easily framed in the Eastern Mediterranean) planners should be asking more than just strategic imperatives and instead  should be asking commanders for operational priorities.  Who is the main effort?  Who is supporting?  In response to the Syrian conflict, will a Lebanon amphibious operation ever be the top priority or will naval forces be asked to conduct multi-functional missions that overlap C2 relationships, confuse capabilities and responsibilities, and fail to achieve mission success?

From a Naval perspective the Levant region is ripe with challenges: small maneuver space in the Eastern Mediterranean, only 3 choke-point entries (Gibraltar, Suez, Bosphorus), and a concave coastline that presents decreased distance from coastal-defense cruise missiles and coastal batteries, as well as, various territorial water space considerations.  The amateur maritime planner may quickly consider these challenges as important for the status quo mission of maritime strike and ballistic missile defense, but with a bit more time invested a planner would quickly surmise that the Levant’s maritime domain is much more of a challenge for potential amphibious operations.

References:  McHarg, Ian “Litani River.” United Kingdom, 2011. www.litaniriver.com

@NavalPlanner is an experienced strategic and operational military planner. He strives to share his perspective on operational art and planning with fellow maritime enthusiasts on his blog.

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