The Maritime Story Missing in “Civilian Warriors”

By Claude Berube

The old adage “a picture is worth a thousand words” is imprecise.  More accurately, a picture is similar to an inkblot in a Rorschach test in which viewers interpret each image differently.  So it is with the former private security firm Blackwater.  The recent publication of “Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror” by the founder of Blackwater, Erik Prince, provides another view of that picture.  Blackwater came to worldwide attention with the 2004 tragedy at the Fallujah bridge, when four employees were murdered and publicly mutilated demonstrating the immediate power of the internet.  Then came the media scrutiny, the congressional investigations, and civil court action. Prince’s book is an important addition to the body of work on PSCs in Iraq but, for the purposes of CIMSEC readers, there is a maritime aspect to the story which unfortunately receives scant mention in the book.

A former Navy SEAL, Prince founded Blackwater in Moyock, North Carolina as a training facility for military and law enforcement officers with numerous shooting ranges where some 1.5 million rounds were expended every month.  One of his first contracts with the Navy was worth $7 million and trained one thousand sailors a week for the first six months.  By Prince’s calculation, Blackwater eventually trained approximately 70,000 sailors.  As Blackwater’s contracts expanded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Prince turned to the experts in the field and hired ex-Navy SEALs for protective details such as for Paul Bremer.  Prince makes the point that Blackwater never lost a person whom they were responsible for protecting.

At its height in 2007, Blackwater had over twenty-five hundred employees deployed in nearly a dozen countries.  But they weren’t simply providing protection to government officials or convoys.  Blackwater also had an aviation component – Presidential Airways – which primarily provided logistics support.  Presidential flew “more than 70,000 missions worldwide, transported 270,000 personnel, and delivered 50 million pounds of cargo and mail.”

Blackwater also sought to build a maritime component.  Unfortunately, Prince’s book barely mentions this aspect to his company with only one paragraph in the entire book.  As the threat of Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden began to increase in 2007, shipping companies slowly recognized that there were insufficient naval assets but were still hesitant to employ private security teams.  In this environment, Prince identified a business opportunity.  “We created Blackwater Maritime Security Solutions,” he writes, “the centerpiece of which was the MCARTHUR, a 183-foot former National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration research vessel that we retrofitted to carry two Little Bird helicopters, three rigid-hull inflatable boats, and a few dozen Blackwater personnel.”

In 2007, a lengthier version of a paper I wrote for a Naval War College course was accepted by Orbis, the quarterly of the Foreign Policy Research Institute which the editor re-titled “Blackwaters for the Blue Waters: The Promise of Private Naval Companies.”  Shortly after that article was published, I learned about the MCARTHUR.  A few weeks later, I was invited to spend a day on the ship in Norfolk and a second day touring Blackwater’s facility in Norfolk.  For the next year, the ship prepared for its intended mission.  Tom (in some cases only first names will be used for this article) was hired by Blackwater as its Director of Maritime Operations to identify a ship, refit it, and get it to sea.   The MCARTHUR was purchased for a reported $300,000 but it would take several million more to make her compliant with Coast Guard regulations as a US-flagged ship.  Tom and Prince had considered flagging her under the Marshall Islands, a flag of convenience, but they elected to make it fully regulated by the United States at that time.  “Without the cert[ifications],” Tom told me, “the ship is just a piece of steel.  It’s like a pile of wood costing $5,000 but the house costs $1 million.”  A major shortcoming of MCARTHUR was its speed.  It could only make 12 or 13 knots – not enough to protect most ships transiting the Gulf of Aden.  The decision also subjected them to the Jones Act requiring all U.S.-flagged ships to have U.S. citizens as crew in coastal waters, and allowed up to 25 percent of a foreign-born crew.

In the course of the next year, the number of pirate attacks necessitated a change by the shipping industry.  At various maritime security conferences, the firms were adamantly opposed to the use of private armed security teams citing liability issues and the likelihood in the increase in violence.  As one major shipping firm told me, “we’ll NEVER use armed guards.”  Eventually the industry changed its position, including the firm which said “never.”  To date, no ship with an armed security team has been taken by pirates.  Several countries soon followed suit.

By January 2009, Blackwater was offering more than just security teams, like some other firms it offered an escort vessel.

————————————————————————————————————————-

Inauguration Day, 2009.  The Beltway (I-495) around Washington was as devoid of cars as it was on September 11, 2001.  Four hours later I arrived in Norfolk to meet with Tom at the pier where MCARTHUR was tied up.  Having already written a few articles about private maritime security companies and interviewed several companies, I informed Blackwater that I was working on a book (the eventually co-edited “Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century” Routledge, 2012.)  I requested access to the ship and an interview with Prince.  Both were accepted with few conditions.  I could ask the crew anything I wanted to, I could photograph anything, but I could not ask Prince about Iraq.

MCARTHUR mess decks (photo by author)
MCARTHUR mess decks (photo by author)

The first day was spent on MCARTHUR.  She was different than when I had last seen her.  The blue hull was gone and replaced by a flat black paint with large white letters along each side spelling “SECURITY”.  I later learned from the captain of the ship, Joe, that that had been his suggestion to Prince.  Since the ship would be providing escort duties in the Gulf of Aden it should seem more menacing and clearly state its purpose (although it is unknown how many Somali pirates can read SECURITY in English).

Tom and I had lunch in the mess deck.  The crew wandered in and out, most eating quietly alone then returning quickly to their duties.  There was one noticeable difference between this crew and a US Navy warship’s crew: age.  Blackwater’s crew is significantly older, with the average around 40 years old.  This was similar to my tour of Blackwater’s hanger for Presidential Airways in Moyock where everyone had gray or white hair.  These were people with experience, most retired or having left the military.  At the end of my table were Greg and Stormy, two of the ship’s mates.  Greg was a graduate of one of the maritime academies.  Stormy, one of the only women I saw on the ship, had been a Navy Boatswain’s Mate.  After lunch I wandered into the galley to speak with the two stewards, one a former Marine cook and the other a former Navy culinary specialist (CS).

Bridge of MCARTHUR (photo by author)
Bridge of MCARTHUR (photo by author)

For the next three hours, I was on the bridge and throughout the ship speaking with the 50-year old captain of MCARTHUR, Joe, who had been at sea since the age of 15 experiencing the knockdown 70 foot waves between the Falklands and Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic.  He talked about Sunday inspections, the lack of micromanagement from the firm, and the discipline of the crew (an assertion that would be challenged only weeks later when the ship pulled in to Jordan).  His mission to the Gulf of Aden was clear: “we’re a bouncer on the water.  If a boat challenges [the ship we’re protecting], we’re turn to let them know.  We’re going to keep a force field around our clients.”

Joe selected the ship’s crew but the security contingent was the responsibility of Hugh, a 40-year-old former SEAL.  “There isn’t anyone nobody knows or hasn’t worked with,” he tells me.  All are former military, Coast Guard, or domestic law enforcement.  The youngest is 30.  Forty percent are military retirees.  Hugh had already prepared for the mission by speaking with the entities in the region including with the naval attache to Nairobi, and the officers with CTF 150, CTF 151, and Operation ATALANTA.  “We’re being transparent and we’re getting the word out there is another set of eyes and ears out there.”  I asked him if MCARTHUR itself might be a target.  “[The pirates] will take a run [at us] just because.  We’ll be tested.  Why wouldn’t we be.”

But Hugh, like Tom, Joe, and Prince recognized the larger issue.  “We know we’re not the solution to the problem,” Hugh says of security at sea.  “The problem is on shore.”  Tom, a US Coast Guard-licensed boat captain and Vietnam-era veteran of the Air Force, adds, “we’re not out to shoot people; we’re out to scare them off.”

The remainder of day I wandered around the ship with Tom – crew berthing, the engine room, an area for the gym, and an infirmary in case the ship is used for humanitarian assistance missions.  The ship, like the Presidential Airways hangar I had visited at the corporate headquarters in Moyock, was immaculate.  It was cleaner than any ship I had been on – including cruise ships except for ocean liners like the Queen Mary II.  Tom points out the RHIBs that Prince briefly mentions in the book.  One person tells me they cost $300,000 a piece while another person says they were $475,000.  In either case, Tom tells me they cost more than the ship itself before its refit.

MCARTHUR Rhib (photo by author)
MCARTHUR RHIB (photo by author)

The refitted MCARTHUR had an accordion-style hangar able to house two Little Bird helicopters, the type Blackwater used in Iraq.  They’re not on board the ship.  I was told that to reduce the cost of the ship for escort duties, the Little Birds would not be aboard for the first missions.   Instead, the ship would rely on commercially-available UAVs.

The following day I met Erik Prince in the wardroom of MCARTHUR.  The transcript that follows is my interview with Prince that day.

BERUBE: Can you walk me through the process of when you decided to add a maritime security component to Blackwater?  When you did it, why, and what you envisioned at that point?

PRINCE: Between the work we were doing with Azerbaijan, hired by DoD to do that, previous problems in the Straits of Malacca, to NSW operations in the Philippines, we wanted a platform that could be a maritime forward operating maritime base.  Piracy patrol, training to be a target vessel for NSW-type units to go against, kind of a Swiss Army knife at sea.  Hugh, when was that in Azerbaijan?

HUGH: We started out in 2004 was the original assessment.  We’ve had the ship for a year and a half, two.  We had the open house, I remember, in September 2007 and the boat just came out of the yards.  We went through extensive refitting, overhaul.

BERUBE: If this proof of concept works, do you envision expanding this operation.  Do you expect buying more, diversifying with regard to the type of boats that you’ll be looking at?

PRINCE: I’ll give you the example we’ve done on the aviation side.  2003, we bought a company that did specialty lifts for the U.S. military an arranged aircraft for a static line jumpmaster courses and free fall schools and those kind of things.  It was Presidential Airways and we went from one aircraft to more than seventy now that we own and operate for the U.S. government around the world doing lift, medevac, that kind of stuff.  We’d like to replicate that same model at sea.  Multi-use, cost-effective platforms that can do training, medical support, homeland security training, capacity building, humanitarian support, counter-piracy operations, ISR support platform, all those kind of things.  [Prince discusses Presidential Airways and its operations in his book Civilian Warriors.]

Wardroom bookshelf (photo by author)
Wardroom bookshelf (photo by author)

BERUBE: Do you look at projections for U.S. forces to see where there might be potential gaps industry could fill?

PRINCE: Sure.  That’s why we’ve got the demand on airlift that we do because for the last twenty to thirty years the U.S. has bought heavily to fight that Fulda Gap kind of fight. C-130s, C-17s, C-5s, and they don’t have the short, ugly, slow cargo airplanes that fly into small airstrips.  The same the Navy has facilitized with a lot of nuclear submarines, with carrier battle groups and all those kind of things, they’ve facilitized for a state on state navy fight and whether its piracy or tsunami response having a small ship that can operate independently, doesn’t have to be in a battle group. It can operate with a small footprint that doesn’t necessarily have to have the huge force protection requirements with a big target on its side that a U.S. Navy vessel does.  You can go in and train doctors, train port security people to know how to interdict weapons of mass destruction or narcotics or weapons or whatever, it’s a small footprint ability to go do stuff.  In North Africa, we operate some aircraft for airlift for medevac and logistics with the U.S. military and we operate that with a pilot, a copilot and a loadmaster who also happens to be a mechanic.  It’s an infinitely smaller footprint than what a U.S. military C-130 crew would have.  So same analogy.  What do you think, Tom, this thing crews up with 14 or 15?

TOM: 12 crew, two stewards

BERUBE: Once the ship gets underway, can you explain to me how the command structure works?  Once the ship gets underway, do you as the corporate executive – essentially commander-in-chief if you want to use that analogy – at what point do you let go, at what point do they request direction from the chain of command here?

PRINCE: On the aviation side we work directly for the U.S. government so there’s a clearly defined command structure.  It’s always been different for the Navy that when you slip the ways and you get underway there’s a lot more authority and responsibility that resides with that ship’s captain because an airplane stays aloft for five hours, ship’s at sea for extended periods so they’ll be sent with clear guidance and clear right and left of what they can and they can’t do.  We’re going over there to be defensive security escort business, escort merchant ship from a point in the water for the next 24 to 36 hours, escort them through the high threat area and then turn it over.  The guys here understand a lot more the maritime law and the dos and don’ts.  They’ll have a clearly defined use of force continuum for defensive actions to be taken against pirates.  There’ll be contracts with the ship owners that we expect them or the ship’s masters that we expect them to do with course and speed and stay in the convoy and stay in the group.   I’m not going to try to do that from twelve time zones away.  Just like I give guidance, we have helicopters and aircraft flying in and guys doing work if they are Americans in trouble, the Good Samaritan rule applies.  Now the Good Samaritan rule also has other meanings when it comes to maritime law, if a ship calls for help and asks for it, there are salvage laws and all kinds of things that can apply if we provide support services to someone who wasn’t contracted to do so.  But they’re smart on those laws.  They know we send proven professionals out there to do a job adapted to the market realities in truly ungoverned space and the seas –  the U.S. Navy at 600 ships or 1,000 ships truly can’t control all the world’s oceans at a time.  It doesn’t matter.  There are truly ungoverned areas.  We’ll at least go provide a security blanket around customers that hire us.

BERUBE: As I understand the law now, the Combatant Commanders in say Irag and Afghanistan have some control, some influence, there’s some relationship now with private security firms.  Taking that now to the Gulf of Aden, is there any operational requirement to deal directly with CTF 150, [CTF] 151, Fifth Fleet – is there any obligation as a U.S. flagged boat to conduct information sharing or anything like that?  Is there any reporting structure once you’re in theater?

[Here, at his request, Prince and I discuss the issue off the record for several minutes.]

HUGH: We’ve been meeting with a diverse group of shipping folks at all levels.  There is tremendous confusion industry-wide about what to do with the pirates when they’re taken, rules of engagement, insurance issues…obviously this has been going on a long time, it’s in the limelight now.

BERUBE: Yesterday there was an inauguration, a new Administration.  Do you see any potential political challenges, given the past few years of how some Democrats in Congress have responded to private security firms?  Do you see that specifically as a challenge with your maritime operations?

PRINCE: First, I think most of the criticism of private security, they’re not so much focused on private security, they’re focused on opposition to the Iraq War and its conduct, how it was executed.  On the maritime side, it’s global ship owners, shipping industry that would be hiring us to assist them over there so the U.S. government, of course they get to vote, but it’s not a government contract.  It’s a non-defense service that we’re providing.

BERUBE: So long as you stay business-to-business rather than with potential government contracts, you’re more immune to that criticism?

PRINCE: Yeah, but whether it’s Darfur, whether it’s piracy, whether it’s a response to some disaster, there are needs.  There’s a hue and cry for the government to do some.  As we have in the past, as we will in the future, we will provide a cost-effective means to respond to get things done.  It’s not the total solution.  The MCARTHUR being in the Gulf of Aden will not solve piracy but it will at least assure the clients that will hire us that their boats will not be taken.

BERUBE: Do you envision any potential circumstances or political challenges where you would say, “all right, let’s switch the flag, we’ll continue to have U.S. citizens aboard…”

PRINCE: Anytime there’s American citizens involved, all the U.S. laws follow after.  As long as I’m an American citizen, that’s not a realistic option.  That being said, the U.S. can make it so difficult that no American citizen wants to be in this business so the more cries there are to hammer on this industry, it can drive other folks out of this industry on the American side and the U.S. government will be left with British, South Africa, or any tax-haven registered companies and it’s not the transparency and the accountability or the standards that they want to operate with.  Look at the big security contracts on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan.  There’ s a lot of presence of non-American companies that don’t have nearly the roots, the U.S. government doesn’t have the reach, so that’s a line the Administration’s going to have to walk.

BERUBE: Did you have any lessons learned from your land-based operations that you’re carrying over to your maritime operations?

PRINCE: Cameras.  I actually got asked that question by numerous folks, “what’s your experience in this?”  Well, really the tactics, techniques, the procedures, the training.  You take the dirt out from underneath of it and you put water and it’s really the same thing.  The layered defense, the defense in depth concept, all of that that we’re doing in various places doing security applies to this in theory and then putting against that the experience of the guys we’ve talked about before, that level of maturity, the age of the guys and you plug that into the program and it doesn’t matter if you’re on land or on sea.

BERUBE: What about lessons learned from a public relations standpoint?

PRINCE: We’re going to be out in front of it this time.  From the public relations standpoint for the work in Iraq, the State Department bars us from talking to the media.  That’s why an unhealthy head of nonsense and total misperceptions existed by us because by contract we’re not allowed.  In this case, there’s no U.S. government involvement.  We can talk and embed the media as much as we want, as much as we deem appropriate.  Sit down with you, talking with major news magazines that want to ride along and see what it’s like out there and we’ll show them what it’s like.

BERUBE: So it’s going to be complete transparency, without violations of OPSEC?

PRINCE: Yeah, but we’re not doing anything Secret Squirrel out there. We’re escorting boats.  Now if we get to the negotiation side we’re assisting insurance companies with that kind of work, obviously there’s mandated discretion because that kind of customer would demand that but that’s the next bridge to cross.

BERUBE: Some suggest that this is not the role of private entities and that it should be state navies or international coalitions.  How do you respond to that?

PRINCE: Nature hates a vacuum.  The U.S. government or state entities can’t be everywhere all the time and can’t provide all the protection so if there’s gaps, the federal government doesn’t protect shopping malls or schools or a lot of other entities.  That’s generally filled by the private sector.  If someone goes on travel to a safari to Africa and they get hurt, they maybe call the Embassy and the Embassy will give a medevac service to call, but that is done by the private sector.  So when a U.S.-flagged vessel is in trouble on the high seas there’s not always going to be a U.S. Navy vessel that’s going to be available.  I can’t imagine the size the Navy would have to be to have quick response time all over the surface of the ocean.  The country was founded with significant input from private organizations.  Even in the Marine’s hymn they talk about “from the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli.”  Even on that there overland expedition there were eight Marines and 250 contracted Greek [the operation led by Major William Eaton]. That was America’s first overseas expedition barring pirates.  So privatizing trash collection or phone service is controversial.  This can be controversial to some folks, especially if it involves guns or danger.  We’ve kind of accepted that and moved on.  Because nature hates a vacuum and gets filled.

BERUBE: Can you tell me about the culture you’ve tried to develop at Blackwater but more specifically with this maritime operations organization.  Is this organization different than how you’ve built other segments of Blackwater.  What do you look for in people that you’re taking on for this mission?

PRINCE: We hire can-do people.  Folks that are going to figure out a way to get it done in the most fast, efficient, cost-effective manner.  Flying an aircraft in a remote of Africa we don’t have a huge infrastructure to support them so they’ve got to figure out how they’re going to fix their airplane, what parts they’re going to need.  They’re going to fix it.  They’re going to make stuff happen.  That’s the kind of folks that we expect to put to sea. The operators are certainly going to be SEAL or Coast Guard type of background.

BERUBE: If you don’t have enough individuals with U.S. military or law enforcement experience, would you consider as part of the operations side looking to British SAS or…

PRINCE: We’d love to do that.  We’d do that right now but it becomes a compliance nightmare with the State Department.  Even putting Filipino stewards on the ship or non-American guys to help out with the basic ship’s services that would make it much more cost-effective, but the State Department regulations make it a regulatory nightmare.

BERUBE: Is that different from land-based operations?  Is it simply because it’s at sea?

PRINCE: If there’s anything happening with a gun or a small boat operation in a security environment and they can somehow witness that, that would be a transfer of military knowledge. Even a guy chipping paint next to a guy cleaning a gun.

BERUBE: Where do you see the growth of the maritime portion of this industry?

PRINCE: The Straits of Malacca have gotten better.  The tsunami wiped out a number of pirate villages.  I don’t think anything’s going to change in the Gulf of Aden unless nation states can go over land and put some kind of functioning government back together in Somalia.  There’s lots of ungoverned places in Africa, even off the coast of Nigeria you’ve got security issues against the oil platforms.  We’ll get out there and see what we can do on piracy issues.  One of the areas we’d like to go after is fisheries enforcement.  You have hundreds of countries around the world that don’t really have effective coast guards and navies.  The economic exclusive zone goes out 200 miles.  You have multinational fishing fleets that come out of Russia, China, Japan, Korea and they pillage.  They take whatever fish they want and no one stops them.  I think we can build a business model around enforcing a country’s fishing laws.  We’d provide a boat like this.  We’d take a fisheries officer or two from the host nation and we’d go out and enforce their laws and we’d get compensated by enforcing license fees and if there are repeat violators, you seize the boat.  There’s impound fees to get the boat out.  And we build a sustainable fisheries industry which will put locals to work. It’s their water for 200 miles.

BERUBE: But a lot of those are ungovernable lands like Somalia or they are failing states.

PRINCE: They don’t have to pay us.  We get that from licensing fees.  But the problem is the illegal fishermen, that’s where you need some level of uncorrupt level of governance to make that work. But we’re going to try.

BERUBE: Assuming you have large fishing vessels registered to countries like China or Russia, you might find some opposition to your proposal within the UN.

PRINCE: It might not be a state-sponsored activity. Russian organized crime, they flag some in some tax havens and they do their fishing, they sell it to the processor on the high seas.  A lot of those ships are truly stateless as well.  In terms of piracy or illegal fishing, I think by dollar volume there’s a lot more illegal fishing going on the world than there is piracy.

BERUBE: At what point do you foresee pursuing that option?  Have you begun entering negotiations?

PRINCE: We floated the idea to Ambassadors and some folks. They’ll eventually think about it and their people.

At the conclusion of the interview,  I asked him one more question: “can I go with the MCARTHUR?”  Prince is surprised.  “As crew or security?” he asks.  “Neither,” I responded.  “I want to be an embedded reporter for the first six weeks of the MCARTHUR’s escorts.”  Prince pauses for a few moments, nods his head, then turns to Tom: “Can we get berthing for him?”  Tom responds that they can provide something.  “Okay,” Prince says, “Coordinate with Tom and we’ll see you in a few weeks.”  The MCARTHUR will have an embedded reporter.

In the course of the next few days, I resigned my position as an adjunct faculty member and gained correspondent credentials from a newspaper, contacted offices in the region, and met with the shipping company Maersk in their Rosslyn, Virginia office.  In addition to submitting articles, I planned on compiling a broader book about piracy to include the Navy (since I had served off Somalia a few years before) and the shipping industry itself.  Maersk agreed to let me pay for a stateroom on a ship from Norfolk to Djibouti and then another on the return trip from somewhere in the region.

Memorial park at Blackwater’s headquarters (photo by author)
Memorial park at Blackwater’s headquarters (photo by author)

Afterward

The realities of the ship and its operations were more like the Rohrshach inkblot.

The morning before I was supposed to get underway from Norfolk, I received an email from Tom.  The MCARTHUR made it across the Atlantic but it was in Aqaba, Jordan not Djibouti.  In addition, it had no clients, despite my being told that shipping companies would commit once the ship was underway.  After speaking with my editor, I decided not to make the trip.  I cancelled the Maersk component as well.  For the return voyage in April, Maersk had offered me one of three ships as options depending on my schedule and location – one of the three options was MAERSK ALABAMA.

The captain and crew also allegedly experienced other realities with three members of the crew filing lawsuits for a series of actions including verbal and physical abuse, racial harassment and unlawful imprisonment for speaking with a reporter without permission from the company.

The MCARTHUR never found a client.  It was eventually sold and renamed EATON (likely after the same Barbary War-era Major William Eaton whom Prince referred to during the interview.)  and later the Comoros-flagged MANDEEQ.

Prince currently lives in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

Claude Berube teaches naval history at the United States Naval Academy.  He is the co-author of three non-fiction books and the author of The Aden Effect, his debut novel.  You can follow him on Twitter at @cgberube.  The views are his and not those of the Department of the Navy.

Sea Control 13: The Queen’s Shilling

seacontrol1Matt and Chris wax on about the new budget deal and military benefits before finally discussing the incident between the Chinese and American navies, the Pacific balance, robotics, and books for the holidays. Remember to tell a friend and subscribe on Itunes or Stitcher Stream Radio. Leave a rating and a comment. Enjoy, Episode 13 of Sea Control, The Queen’s Shilling (download).

The “Mighty Moo” Maneuvers Around Trouble

The Mighty Moo, USS Cowpens, maneuvering with the deftness of its heifer namesake.
The Mighty Moo, USS Cowpens (GG-63), maneuvering with the deftness of its heifer namesake.

The recent near-collision of a PLA Navy tank landing ship and the missile-guided cruiser USS Cowpens in the South China Sea represents yet another incident in a long line of instances of Chinese gamesmanship with the US Navy extending back to the March 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable and the 2001 downing of an EP-3. In each of these cases, the Chinese took issue with the United State conducting surveillance of Chinese military targets at sea or on the Chinese mainland (in this case, the Cowpens was conducting surveillance of the PLAN aircraft carrier Liaoning, which was for the first time conducting exercises in the South China Sea).

All three occurred in the South China Sea, although it is not currently clear from media reports where exactly the most recent confrontation took place. This could prove to be an important distinction. Previously, Beijing justified its escalatory responses to US actions by saying that they interpreted U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to mean that military activities within the Chinese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) were prohibited without the consent of China. The EP-3 and Impeccable incidents both occurred near Hainan Island, inside the Chinese EEZ. If this most recent escalatory move occurred outside the EEZ, it will be particularly interesting to see how China justifies itself. Are they expanding their legal interpretation further by claiming that all military activities conducted in waters within the so-called “nine-dash line” must receive Chinese approval? This of course is conjecture—especially given that as of this writing it also appears from a cursory glance of Chinese-language news websites that neither the PLA nor the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has yet made a statement. At that point this issue will require the analysis of individuals better trained in the vagaries of Chinese territorial legal disputes than I.

Also pertinent to this debate is the recent admission at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue (by a Chinese military officer no less!) that the PLAN was itself already conducting surveillance of U.S. military installations on Guam and Hawaii within U.S. EEZs around those islands. As Rory Medcalf points out, this clearly contradicts the Chinese legal position on the matter. At what point will this hypocrisy actually catch up with the PLA and necessitate a change in China’s legal position?

Last week at an event at the Wilson Center, Oriana Skylar Mastro suggested that China’s recent announcement of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) fits into a pattern of Chinese “coercive diplomacy,” in which China manipulates risk and intentionally raises the risk of an accident, a view echoed by other analysts in an approach known as salami tactics. In this way, China stops just short of further escalation, and achieves its objectives of slowly chipping away at opposing territorial positions and international legal norms. This analysis is clearly simpatico with her earlier published work regarding the Impeccable incident and the most recent confrontation involving the USS Cowpens. In her paper, Dr. Mastro identified a coordinated Chinese media campaign and legal challenge that accompanied the PLA’s military provocation. She also recommended that in order to prevent further Chinese attempts at escalation, the United States should publicize these events, directly challenge the Chinese legal position, and maintain a strong presence in the area, all things which the United States is now doing (specifically in the Cowpens case, the Department of Defense broke the story).

These are sound responses to Chinese attempts to delegitimize lawful operations in international waters. What should the United States not do? In an article published by the Washington Free Beacon, Bill Gertz quotes a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, Rick Fisher, who suggests that China in this incident is intentionally “looking for a fight” that will “cow the Americans,” and that the United States and Japan should heavily fortify the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in response. Aside from the fact that China certainly is not “looking for a fight,” fortifying the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would be a terrible idea. The U.S. government does not even take an official position on the islands’ sovereignty! The U.S. response should certainly be firm in insisting that surveillance within foreign EEZs is completely legitimate and lawful; but turning this issue into about something other than surveillance in international waters would be blowing it out of all proportion. The United States should, in contrast to the ways in which China’s behavior is perceived, proceed carefully but resolutely and stick to its guns.

William Yale is a graduate student at Johns Hopkins SAIS. He has lived in China for two years, and worked at the Naval War College and the U.S. State Department. He tweets @wayale and blogs at williamyale.com.

The Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B): Putting the Air in Air-Sea Battle

The Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), also known as the Next Generation Bomber, is a developmental program aimed at producing a bomber[1] that will replace the current United States Air Force (USAF) B-1 and B-2 bomber fleet by the mid-2020s. [2]

As the United States Armed Forces reduces its Counter Insurgency (COIN) and nation-building operations and pivots towards the Pacific, it will increasingly require the ability to engage in state-to-state conflict. Unlike COIN operations, missions flown against nation states require the ability to penetrate enemy airspace without detection, requiring both stealth and the ability to travel long distances without aerial refueling. The rise of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities by potential adversaries and the limited combat radius of fifth generation aircraft will put our ability to project force via air strikes at risk. The United States strategy cannot rely on a handful of aging B-2 Spirit Stealth Bombers whose ability to evade enemy radar is no longer a certainty.[3]  Therefore, the DOD must develop a multi-role stealth aircraft based on existing technologies while using lessons learned from the F-35 development to minimize costs. If properly developed, the LRS-B will not only drop lead on target, but also serve a variety of stealth roles that would fully complement the future systems of all four branches of service.

The Current United States Bomber Fleet

As of December 2013, the United States Bomber Fleet is composed of approximately twenty   B-2 Spirit “stealth” heavy bombers, seventy-six B-52 heavy bombers and sixty-six B-1B Lancer heavy bombers.[4]

The B-52 Stratofortress

The Soviets had a plane we called the "Fencer." You can call me the "baseball bat with a bunch of nails in it."
The Soviets had a plane we called the “Fencer.” You can call me the “baseball bat with a bunch of nails in it.”

The B-52 is a highly versatile multi-role bomber which can perform strategic bombing, nuclear strikes, close air support (CAS), interdiction and other operations which include anti-ship and mine laying missions. Its versatility derives from the wide variety of weapons that it is able to carry, through both an internal bay and external hard points. It has been the primary U.S. heavy bomber since the 1960s and was the cornerstone of the air arm of the U.S. Military nuclear triad. As technology advanced, the B-52 was adapted to carry up to twenty air launched conventional and nuclear cruise missiles whose ranges vary between 690 and over 2000 miles depending on the type of missile employed. This upgrade maximizes the range of the B-52 (8,800 miles, 4,400 combat radius) while maintaining a safe standoff distance from enemy air defenses. Five B-52s could deploy upwards of 100 AGM-86C/D Conventional Air- Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCM) simultaneously. [5]   Due to its large radar signature, it requires a significant amount of Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions prior to it entering the battle space. [6] According to US Air Force roadmaps, the B-52 will remain in service until 2040 or until the replacement is fielded. [7]

The B1B Lancer

The B1 Bomber program was the third attempt to create a high-speed long-range nuclear bomber that would replace the effective, yet vulnerable, B52. The first two attempts, the B-58 Hustler and the XB-70 Valkyrie, could reach Mach 2 and Mach 3 respectively and outrun Soviet interceptor aircraft enroute to delivering their nuclear payloads. Soviet technical advancements thwarted both projects.

I'm a graceful swan that sprays out JDAMs.
I’m a graceful swan that sprays out JDAMs.

The development of high altitude Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) rendered the B-58 obsolete and forced it into a low-level penetrator role. [8]  Designed for high speed-high altitude flight, the B-58 failed at low altitudes. The B1A succeeded where the B-58 failed. By utilizing variable wing technology and terrain mapping radar, it is able to efficiently travel long distances then utilize its supersonic dash to penetrate enemy air space at low levels below enemy radar and SAM coverage. However, like most innovations in the cold war, it soon rendered obsolete thanks to another technological advancement, Look Down/Shoot Down Radar.[9]  In light of this development, the DOD cancelled the B1A in 1977. Political pressure restarted the program by in 1980. The DOD decided the B1B would take over the heavy bomber role for the B-52 while the USAF transitioned to the B-2 Spirit.[10]

This “transitional” aircraft has endured to become the workhorse of the war on terror, dropping 60% of all ordnance in Afghanistan. Despite flying 1% of the combat missions in Iraq, it dropped 43% of all the Joint Defense Attack Munitions (JDAM) used in theatre. Loitering over the battlefield, the B1B can travel anywhere in Afghanistan in 45 minutes in order to support ground troops carrying 48 JDAMs, all capable of being accurately delivered on target. The B1B is integral to the Air-Sea battle concept for the Pacific Theatre, having the capacity to travel long distances and use up to 24 Joint Air to Surface Stand Off Missiles (JASSM) against enemy targets. [11]  Despite its combat record, the B-1B is beginning to show its age, with each plane having to spend 48.4 hours in the repair shop for every hour it is in the air. Furthermore, each hour in the air costs $60,000 in fuel, maintenance and other costs.[12]

The B2 Spirit

The B-2 Spirit “stealth” bomber is the only bomber in the U.S. arsenal that is still capable of penetrating enemy airspace without the need for prior SEAD missions. Originally designed to drop unguided munitions, the advent of the JDAM now greatly multiplies the B-2’s combat effectiveness. During Operation Odyssey Dawn over Libya, three B-2s eliminated 45 targets in a single mission. [13]

Shhhh! Didn't you hear? I'm invisible!
Shhhh! Didn’t you hear? I’m invisible!

In the 1980s, the USAF anticipated the number of B-2’s in the USAF would number close to 100 and it would be the primary strategic bomber in the U.S. arsenal, replacing the B-52 and its stopgap replacement, the B-1B. The shifting requirements of the end of the cold war, combined with a price tag of nearly two billion per plane, reduced this number to 20, a fifth of the original estimate. [14]

The large price tag of the B-2, F-22, and F-35 highlights the problems inherent in the USAF procurement process.[15] The cost of these stealth programs, albeit high, has provided the USAF with the technologies to develop the LRS-B at a significantly lower cost. The B-2 program, despite its costs, has been a success and remains our only stealth heavy bomber.

Limited Options

The U.S. policy makers originally set the target date for the LRS-B at 2018, however that date is no longer feasible.[16]  The 1999 USAF roadmap planned to continue with the current fleet until 2037; however, the nation can no longer afford to delay the development of a modern and robust deep strike large payload aircraft.[17] As currently composed, the current U.S. bomber fleet cannot meet the challenges of the 21st century. When faced with the need to engage another nation, this aged fleet leaves war planners limited options:

  1. Launch cruise missiles from a standoff distance
  2. Risk sending B-2 bombers into enemy airspace, with each aircraft lost reducing the total number of B-2s in the U.S. Fleet by 5%.
  3. Utilize the above two options in conjunction with a larger SEAD effort

An attack against a nation with five buried and hardened nuclear facilities would require employing the GBU-57 Passive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) to destroy them. Dropping four MOPs per target would involve risking half the entire B-2 fleet to accomplish the mission.[18]  As a nation, the U.S. cannot afford to rely on such a small number of aircraft to execute U.S. policy. The B-2 has never flown a daytime mission due to its size and observeability, limiting enemy airspace penetration to a predictable 12 hours per day. [19] Since its inception, the United States has enjoyed the ability to penetrate any nation’s air defenses at any time with this remarkable weapon. Unfortunately, as SAM capabilities continue to improve, the B-2’s survivability is no longer a certainty.

The Evolving Threat of Air Defense Networks

The USAF 1999 Roadmap which assessed the B-1B, B-2 and B-52 bombers were sufficient to meet the strategic requirements of the U.S. until 2037 was based upon the enviable position in which the U.S. and its allies found itself in the 1990s.[20] The B-1B and B-2 aircraft, designed to penetrate the Soviet Union, entered service amidst the crumbling of their intended adversary. The USSR was the only non-allied nation capable of developing and manufacturing Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and modern SAMs. IADS links various radars and early warning systems with SAM missile emplacements to a command and control station that detects tracks and intercepts enemy aircraft.[21]  Previous SAM systems relied on a single radar array linked to a missile battery. IADS incorporates numerous elements that eliminate a single point of failure. Advanced American SEAD missions overwhelmed the IADS fielded by former Soviet client states such as Iraq and Serbia, however not without losses. The destruction of an F-117 by Serbian SAMs exposed its stealth limitations.

Russia, despite struggling to stabilize and adapt to a new political and economic system in the 1990s, continued to upgrade IADS systems needed to intercept U.S. combat aircraft.[22]The S-300 system, originally fielded in the late 1970s, is highly mobile and effective against targets at most altitudes due to constant upgrades. The system can be deployed quickly, and is designed to “shoot and scoot,” making it elusive to cruise missiles whose long flight time prevent it from hitting mobile targets without updated target data. All U.S. Aircraft, to include the F-35, are vulnerable to the S-300V/VM with the exception of the F-22 Raptor. [23]

China’s IADS budget is a fraction of the United States and its air defense and interceptor aircraft capabilities have lagged behind Russia and the U.S. for years. Based on recent assessments, China lacks a linked nationwide IADS.  However, by using commercial technology to augment and upgrade its air defense infrastructure, China is at a pace equal to the development of commercial electronics. This use of commercial technology frees China from investing in long term and complicated military systems that are less flexible than the free market.[24]  A comparison of Google Earth and Garmen GPS systems to the U.S. Army’s Falconview and Blue Force Tracker, respectively, is an example of this problem.  China, using the S-300 as well as other SAM systems, has incorporated mobile launchers as well as ambush tactics to augment its fixed SAM sites and render its airspace inaccessible to the majority of US aircraft. [25]

Air-Sea Battle: Achieving American Power Projection in the Pacific

The emerging Air-Sea Battle strategy is counters Anti Access Area Denial (A2/AD) measures by utilizing various joint capabilities to penetrate enemy territory. In order to execute this strategy, the Navy and the Air Force will train, equip and organize their forces to seamlessly work in tandem to ensure the U.S. maintains operational access to the entire Pacific Rim. Air-Sea Battle is being developed to counter the increasing A2/AD capabilities of some nations in the western Pacific, such as China.

These A2/AD capabilities prevent a carrier battle group (CBG) from approaching within, at a minimum, 1200 Miles from the coast, which is the half the alleged maximum range of the Chinese HN 2000 Surface to Surface (SSM) Low Altitude Cruise Missile (LACM). A variant of the DH-10, the HN 2000 is still in development but it on the horizon. Following the DH-10 variant, China has the CSS-5C Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) , CSS-5D (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile), CSS-6 Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) and the CSS-7 (SRBM). The CSS-5D ASBM, also known as the DF-21D, it the world‘s first ASBM. The CSS-5D launches into the upper atmosphere and releases one or more reentry warheads that descend on the target from directly above. The speed of the warhead and attack angle makes it impervious to standard anti-missile missiles and to the Close in Weapons System (CWSS) or the RIM-116.[26]  Granted the ability of this weapon system to accurately adjust its trajectory during terminal guidance is unknown. However, the potential threat of these missiles may be great enough to prevent war planners from risking a Gerald Ford Class aircraft carrier, whose price tag is greater than the yearly military expenditure of 136 nations, including Spain and Columbia.

The range of these anti-ship missiles denies not only the entry of a CBG into the South China Sea, but prevents the CBG’s aviation element from getting within range. This is due to the combat radius of the F-35C and F-18 E/F being 707 miles and 449 Miles respectively. In order to attack mainland China using carrier strike aircraft, refueling aircraft must be stationed 250 miles from land to avoid the S-300 IADS, thereby requiring refueling missions both inbound and outbound of any strike mission. Air Force and Marine Corps Aircraft operating out of Japan and Korea could augment a long-range naval air strike force, utilizing F-18 E/F Super hornets, F-15 D Eagles and F-15E Strike Eagles as well as any F-35A/B’s or forward deployed F-22’s. The strike aircraft will be limited in the amount of air to surface missiles that they can carry, reducing the overall effectiveness of the strike.

In light of China’s A2/AD missile perimeter, war planners have limited options. If they do not want the risks associated with a traditional SEAD penetration airstrike, only standoff attacks would remain an option.

One possible method of a standoff attack  is the employment of converted Ohio Class SSGN Cruise Missile Submarines, which are capable of carrying up to 154 Submarine Launched Cruise Misses (SLCM). The SSGN’s would approach by stealth and shower IADS, SAM, and SSM emplacements with cruise missiles to pave the way for naval forces and follow-up strikes by air assets. However, this capability suffers from the same numeric limitations as the B-2 Spirit. There are only four SSGNs currently in service, and are scheduled to be replaced by upgraded Virginia Class Submarines between 2023 and 2026. [27] The loss of one SSGN would result in a 25% reduction in the overall force. A second option is also a large cruise missile assault, albeit launched from the air. B-52, B-1 and B-2 aircraft would launch cruise missiles from a standoff distance of at least 250 miles with a similar target package as the SSGNs. The two options can be used in tandem, but require on-station surveillance to perform Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) and track the mobile SSMs and other IADSs.

Limitations of Cruise Missiles

Cruise Missile strikes from a standoff distance has three primary vulnerabilities.

1. Cruise missiles are equally vulnerable to enemy air defenses as U.S combat aircraft.  Enemy Radar will be able to detect and track the first wave of inbound cruise missiles. Once detected, a cruise missile is vulnerable to SAM interception and can be tracked and destroyed by air-to-air missiles.

2. The majority of Chinese SSM, IADS and SAM equipment are mobile, allowing them to redeploy rapidly. The cruise missiles will strike the original target area without real-time target updates.

3. Fixed targets, such as large radar arrays, command and controls bunkers and airfields will be hardened and may require multiple strikes as the payload of a cruise missile its minimal due for its need to carry fuel and guidance systems. Thus to compensate for the relatively small warheads found on conventional cruise missiles, adversaries could simply harden their high value assets. Furthermore, conventional cruise missiles cannot destroy heavily reinforced bunkers thus requiring the GBU-57 Massive Ordinance Penetrator (MOP).

The employment of this bomb requires heavy bomber presence over the target area. This requirement, due to the stealth limitations of our bomber force, will require SEAD activities prior to their going “feet dry” over the mainland. This requirement runs counter to the purpose of striking fixed positions, which is to blind the enemy and to eliminate command and communication elements. The LRS-B will be able to carry 5,000-pound GBU-28’s as well as the MOP.

One of the critical roles which the LRS-B will perform is Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). The current USAF and USN C4ISR systems are currently not organic to any strike aircraft other than the existing and vulnerable bomber fleet. The USN will continue to develop C4ISR assets that are stand-alone platforms.[28] When conducting blue water fleet operations, such platforms are ideal. However, when operating in enemy air space, these systems will be vulnerable to Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), SAMs, and may require fighter escort, further risking its detection in the battle space. A stealth LRS-B would be combine C4ISR functions with its other capabilities. One such capability is the ability to find, fix and finish. The LRS-B could illuminate targets for other aircraft, perform BDA and conduct immediate follow-up strikes on remaining and partially destroyed targets with its large array of armaments.

Required Capabilities

The goal of the LRS-B Program is to create an airframe that combines the capabilities of the B-1 and B-2 utilizing existing technologies that is updates easily. In order to fulfill its future role as a stealthy long-range strategic bomber, the LRS-B must meet or exceed the following criterion:

•           Crew: 4

•           Low Observable/ Stealth Capability

•           Cyber Warfare Capable

•           C4IRS and advanced targeting capabilities

•           Able to network with equipment from all service branches

•           Avionics

o          Full suite of Air to Air, Air to Ground offensive phased-array radar.

o          Extensive jamming and radar warning equipment

o          Internal targeting equipment capable of guiding USN and USAF ordinance.

•           Armament

o          2 rotary launcher mounted multiple ejector racks

o          Able to carry all weapons systems of the B-1 and B-2 to include the planned Long Range Stand Off Cruise Missile

o          AIM-120D Air to Air Missile

o          B61-12, B83 Nuclear weapons

•           Performance

o          Service ceiling of 60,000 ft.

o          Combat Radius of 4,000 miles

o          Fuel efficient engines which allow for a maximum loiter time over the AO as well Supersonic Dash capability of Mach 1.25

o          Capable of Daytime Operations

 The Multirole Potential of the LRS-B

The LRS-B will be a multirole aircraft that fills critical gaps in capabilities of every branch of service based on two principles that our military currently lacks: The ability to penetrate and persist over enemy airspace and the ability to remain invisible to IADS.

The Missileer

In the late 1950’s, the U.S. Navy conceived of a fleet defense fighter with limited maneuverability. Douglas aircraft was awarded the contract and began development of the F6D Missileer. This plane was designed to loiter over the Carrier Battle Group for long periods while using its powerful radar and long range air-to-air missiles to intercept incoming enemy aircraft.[29]   The concept, developed simultaneously with the F-4 Phantom, represented the popular mindset of the obsolescence of dog fighting due to the development of long-range air-to-air missiles. To this point, the F-4 Phantom was fielded as the primary aircraft for three branches of service without an internal cannon! As we know from literature on the topic (or by watching Top Gun), this concept was discarded following the experiences of the USAF, USMC and USN over the skies of Vietnam. The missile development portion of the missileer program did not fail, as it bore the long range AIM-54 Phoenix and the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

The F6D concept was a 20th Century failure that could easily be a success in the networked military of the 21st century. As part of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, the LRS-B could act as a large missile platform working in concert with the F-22 and F35. Both smaller aircraft have limited internal bay capability and limited range. Upon confronting enemy air defenses during interdiction and anti-fleet operations, the smaller aircraft could act as spotters while a LRS-B defeats the initial wave of interceptors with air-to-air missiles, allowing the F-35 and F-22s to retain their weapons and carry a larger amount of strike weaponry. While such an arrangement is not ideal, the LRS-B should at least have such a capability in order to give future war fighters the maximum amount of tactical options. Given the distances involved, redundant capabilities are essential in the event of a conflict which produces heavy losses of naval and aerial weapons platforms.

Airborne Refueling

If current budgetary trends continue, it will force the U.S. Military to reduce its bases overseas. Even with the current worldwide base structure, airborne refueling operations are essential to almost every significant air operation. Fifth generation aircraft such as the JSF and F-22 lose their stealth capability when burdened with external drop tanks. Given that our current air-borne refueling aircraft, the MC-130P/J and KC-135, is highly vulnerable, the concept of a modified LRS-B acting as a tanker a necessary option. [30] [31] 

Strike Capability/Air Defense

The primary mission of the LRS-B is air-space penetration. It will also retain the abilities of the current bomber force to launch standoff attacks with cruise missiles. A LRS-B designed with an organic air-to-air capability, will be able to defend the vulnerable bomber fleet during standoff attacks. In this role, a Bomber Wing can act independently, freeing up air superiority aircraft for other missions

SEAD/Electronic Warfare/Cyber

Utilizing its stealth capability, the LRS-B will be able to travel unmolested over the battlefield. By using electronic warfare, cyber-attacks and conventional anti-radiation weaponry, the LRS-B will wreak havoc on an enemy’s air defense network. When used in conjunction with non-stealth aircraft on the perimeter of radar coverage, war planners can further deceive an enemy to the true origin of the attack. This variant of the LRS-B would also replace/augment the propeller driven EC-130H electronic warfare aircraft. [32]

Unmanned Capability

The capability may exist for the LRS-B to operate unmanned. Given the current budgetary environment and lack of risk associated with using unmanned vehicles, this capability could tempt future policymakers to choose expedience over reason.[33] An unmanned bomber carrying nuclear ordinance eliminates the human element in the direct release of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, no amount of automation or electronics can substitute for having seasoned pilots at the helm of our most potent aircraft in combat conditions.

The F-4/F-35 of Bombers?

To be clear, one aircraft does not have to fill the aforementioned potential roles of the LRS-B. The fact that the LRS-B is a bomber means the design will require a large internal space in which to carry payload. This large space allows the bomber to be modified, with other items being placed within the confines of the airframe. The F-35, by contrast, was designed around the need of one of its versions to have a SVOTL capability.

The LRS-B is a tremendous opportunity to field a large fleet of Stealth Aircraft to replace airframes that were being developed and fielded during the Cold War. The offensive capability of the United States has always served as the backstop for U.S. Foreign Policy, with our adversaries ever conscious of the U.S. Military’s innate ability to project force on land, air and sea. If the LRS-B is rendered a casualty to budget cuts, it will weaken our ability to respond to potential aggressors, limit our ability to strike an enemy in his own backyard and will ensure our aging bomber fleet will eventually be rendered obsolete.

Robert Hodge is a U.S. Army veteran and graduate student at George Washington University in Washington, D.C.


[1] Carlo Munoz, DoD Fast Tracks New Bomber; ‘Planning Number is $550 Million Per Plane, http://defense.aol.com/2012/02/15/dod-fast-tracks-new-bomber-planning-number-is-550-million-pe/, (February 2012).

[2] Sanda Erwin, “New Stealth Bomber Can’t Be Another B-2,” National Defense 96.700 (Mar 2012): 8.

[3] David Hambling and Becky Ferreira, “Invisible Warriors,” Popular Science 280.1 (Jan 2012), pg 50

[6] “Air Force faces tough decisions on aging fleet,” 24 March 2013, Dayton Daily News, Main; Pg. A1

[7] Adam J. Herbert, “Great Expectations,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 90, No. 8 (Aug. 2007),

[8] Bill Gunston and Mike Spick, Modern Air Combat, (New York: Crescent Books, 1983), pg 132

[9] Bill Gunston and Mike Spick, Modern Air Combat, (New York: Crescent Books, 1983), pg 41.

[10] “Air Force Activates B1B Bomber Unit,” The Washington Post, 2 October 1986, pg. A17.

[11] “B-1B bomber mission shifts from Afghanistan to China, Pacific,” USA Today, 8 July 2012

[12] “The Air Force Needs a Serious Upgrade,” The Wall Street Journal, 15 July 2010, Opinion.

[13] John Tirpak, “Bombers over Libya,” Air Force Magazine (July 2011), Vol. 94, No. 7.

[14] David Axe, “Why can’t the Air Force Build an Affordable Plane?” The Atlantic (March 2012).

[15] Sanda Erwin, “New Stealth Bomber Can’t Be Another B-2,” National Defense 96.700 (Mar 2012): 8.

[16] Tech. Sgt. Russell Wicke, “Gen Moseley: New long-range bomber on horizon for 2018,” U.S. Department of Defense Information / FIND (26 July 2006).

[17] Hearing before the Military Procurement Subcommittee, Performance of the B-2 Bomber in the Kosovo Air Campaign, H.A.S.C. No. 106-24, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1999, pg. 48-50

[18] Brooks McKinney, Northrop Grumman Begins Work to Equip B-2 Bomber with Massive Penetrator Weapon, http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=123187 (July 2007).

[19] Barry Watts, The Case for Long Range Strike: 21stCentury Scenarios, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, www.CSBAonline.org (December 2008).

[20] John Tirpak, “The Bomber Roadmap,” Air Force Magazine Vol. 82, No. 6.

[21] NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8206.htm

[22] Carlo Kopp, “Surviving the Modern Integrated Air Defense System,” Air Power Australia Analysis 2009-02 (Feb. 2002).

[23] Carlo Kopp, “Self Propelled Air Defense System/SA-12/SA-23 Giant/ Gladiator,” Technical Report APA-TR-2006-1202, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Giant-Gladiator.html#mozTocId650591

[24] Sharon Weinberger, China’s Off-the-Shelf Air Defense, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/chinas-off-the/ (January 2008).

[25] Roger Cliff..[et al], Shaking the Heavens and Spitting the Earth: Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011) Pg. 80-83 and appendix xxiv.

[26] Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008, Pg. 30; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf.

[27] Cruise-missile submarines being phased out,” Kitsap Sun 8 February 2013. http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2013/feb/08/cruise-missile-submarines-on-the-way-out/#axzz2SiisIChY

[28] Committee on C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups, National Research Council, C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups (Naval Studies Board, 2006).

[33] “The Air Force’s simple, no-frills, advanced new bomber” DOD Buzz, 13 February 2012, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/02/13/the-air-forces-simple-no-frills-advanced-new-bomber/

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.