Millennials in the Military

This post is a response to an article in the August issue of USNI’s Proceedings by Commander Darcie Cunningham, U.S. Coast Guard, titled “Millennials Bring a New Mentality: Does it Fit?” So if you haven’t read it yet, I recommend you start there.

Where to begin? To her credit, Commander Cunningham asks an important question: “how does our structured military culture adapt to this new generation?” It’s also clear her frustrations are borne of personal experiences in command. Unfortunately it’s a question she fails to answer (more on that later) and in doing so perpetuates myths and patronizing generalizations. [Full disclosure: I’m in the millennial generation, on the older end of the spectrum, and like all such groupings the term “millennial” is a debatable construct but I’ll accept her definition (those born in the 80s and 90s) for argument’s sake.]

“Kids These Days!”

From a more disciplined era of service.
From a more disciplined era of service.

Commander Cunningham begins by noting several behaviors that are supposedly unique to millennials: that they “posture to work only the bare minimum number of hours required,” that their “customs and courtesies are eroding,” and that “there are an increased number of negative confrontations.” It is entirely possible that this is what is happening at Coast Guard Base Los Angeles, it is certainly her perception. But more likely it is just that: perception. Such perceptions have existed about pretty much every generation when they were in their youth. That doesn’t make them accurate.

Let’s return to the important question: “how does our structured military culture adapt to this new generation?” Beyond the advice to use positive feedback to keep the crew motivated, the Commander Cunningham offers nothing. Instead she says they must be “educated,” “course-corrected,” and evaluated for whether they will “truly be able to adapt to the service.” And that’s the thing – this isn’t really an article about adapting the military to millennials, it’s about adapting millennials to the military, as reflected in the title. Which is not all bad. To be sure respect for rank and proper military etiquette are just good manners, and appreciation for a service’s traditions, structure, customs, and courtesies are the marks of a professional.

Yet here is where it gets downright galling. The commander moves to close by questioning whether millennials are just “focused on what’s in it for them.” This is flat-out wrong. As the Washington Post reports, millennials “want jobs that affect social change, and they give what they can. A 2012 study found that three-quarters of young people surveyed gave to a charity in 2011, and 63 percent volunteered for a cause.” It bears remembering that this is an all-volunteer force. While many undoubtedly join the military in part for other reasons – heck I joined partly to pay for college and to travel abroad – I would submit a vast majority, such as myself, also joined in part for the ideals that military service embodies and a belief that such work is work towards a better world.

Instead of playing to these motivations, however, Commander Cunningham advises reminding these servicemembers that there are “long lines” waiting to get into the coast guard and that the economy is not the best. There’s so much wrong in this.

First, it’s unclear if the commander thinks that since “millennials…may not be the right fit,” they can be replaced by one of the other five generations she says she oversees, or if she’s referring to individual millennial members. I’ll give her the benefit of the doubt she means the latter and that she’s not saying that taking on the challenge of motivating millennials may just be too hard and that they should be written-off en masse.

Second, there’s a reason these individuals are the ones in service and not in the supposed long lines. It’s because these they were the top qualified candidates. Even those who aren’t top performers in service are not likely to have too much trouble finding work outside the military, or using their benefits for further education, so this threat rings hollow except for those really troubled individuals threatened with a non-honorable discharge. And that’s to say nothing of how trying to scare one’s employees isn’t typically the best management or leadership strategy.

millennials Third, because these were the top qualified candidates this also means that any millennial you give up on is going to be replaced by…another millennial…who by and large won’t be as qualified. Sure you can keep up the numbers, but again, what does this say of the quality of your talent pool?

One complaint the commander makes that does ring true is that “younger members…have an expectation of accelerated advancement through the organization.” In Commander Snodgrass’ 2014 Retention Survey he notes that 60% of respondents “feel they are making a difference in their job, but regardless of what they do – 64% don’t think they will be rewarded in any way by superior performance.” This should not be an indictment of millennials but a recognition of a drawback of military service in comparison with civilian organizations, as well as an opportunity to prove one’s leadership bona fides.

Yes, we millennials want positive feedback and to know whether we’re doing a good job, and yes we wish we could rise through the ranks commensurate with our talents rather than in accordance with organizational and statutory limitations. Leaders would be well served to look for alternatives such as creating opportunities for crewmembers to prove themselves through increased responsibility or challenges. If the military can’t keep up with the rest of the world in reasonably advancing its people, Commander Cunningham should at least be able to explain what is or isn’t in her control and that she will do what she can to position her people for success.

091013-N-9132C-008 There are going to be bad apples among us, as there are in any generation. But tarring an entire generation with questionable generalizations is counter-productive. While this article may ask the right question, it doesn’t really attempt to answer it. What most millennials want is appreciation, when earned, an opportunity to make a difference, and a voice that is heard if not always heeded. The military, the top employer of millennials, still needs to make a serious attempt at understanding how to best take advantage of what this generation has to offer.

A good place to start exploring the issue is Air Force vet Tim Kane’s Bleeding Talent, NYT review here.

Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founder and president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council.

The Legacy of Adm. William McRaven

The most impressive intellectual leader working today is a one Bill McRaven.

By Robert Caruso

William McRaven is the most charismatic military leader since Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz.

Perhaps more than any other serving officer, McRaven has postured the US Armed Forces to be better prepared when conflicts arise. He is the most accomplished flag or general officer of our time.

The future of what the U.S. armed forces looks like is uncertain, but one constant will be the mark McRaven has left. He is preparing to retire as the head of U.S. Special Operations Command, the nerve center of the effort to combat terrorism and other threats in the unlit spaces. While the past decade has been dominated by Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States cannot take its eyes off the threat of transnational terrorism nor the special activities of a Russia, Iran, or China.

To combat those threats, McRaven, his staff, and his counterparts have engaged willing nations the world over in building capacity, strengthening capabilities, and solidifying partnerships.

All national security professionals should know that more than any other serving officer, McRaven has postured the force to be better prepared when conflicts arise.

He holds the title of “Bull Frog”— the active-duty UDT/SEAL operator with the longest period of cumulative service.

SOCOM recently stood up J-3I, an operations directorate focused exclusively on international cooperation under McRaven’s guidance. A global network of special operations forces will be imperative to the future fight, as the nation increasingly turns to a global network of partners to combat a global network of threats.

Concurrently, he has increased SOF’s stature in Washington and established a framework to lead the interagency in the fight against globally dispersed networks.

During his time leading Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane stood up a customer advocate shop, devoted to resourcing special operations forces—a trend the rest of the sprawling Pentagon equities took to replicating with gusto.

When then-Secretary of State Hilary Clinton wanted to boast of the United States’ success at hacking al Qaeda, she took to the stage at the annual special operations conference, introduced by McRaven.

It was his deputy, Air Force General Marshall Webb, who is featured in the iconic White house situation room photo the night Osama bin Laden was killed.

McRaven is a proponent of the joint approach: early on in the global war on terror, the Pentagon “merged the two commando teams and headquartered the reflagged Task Force 121[McRaven] in Baghdad,” reported The Washington Post.

Indeed, the forces under McRaven’s command time and again revolutionized the way technology was used to win the fight. Much of modern social analysis and mapping techniques, as well as Palantir’s tools and software like Analyst’s Notebook and Webee instant messaging, owe their success with government to organizations he led during his career. And if that wasn’t enough, his 1993 thesis,”The Theory of Special Operations”, is required reading across government.

Many career FBI personnel believe this thesis revolutionized the way FBI looks at counterterrorism. It is considered such a seminal work that Coast Guard special operations forces created a doctrinal foundation based almost exclusively on its contents. In 2012, the President and the Secretary of Defense released new defense strategic guidance, emphasizing the need to rebalance toward the Pacific. But the majority of the crises that the United States will be called on respond to won’t always be in Asia. Globally postured and forward deployed, McRaven has left an indelible mark on the Armed Forces that stabilized the Government of the Philippines, defeated the Islamic Courts Union, captured Saddam, and killed bin Ladin.

In 2012, the President and the Secretary of Defense released new defense strategic guidance, emphasizing the need to rebalance toward the Pacific. But the majority of the crises that the United States will be called on respond to won’t always be in Asia. Globally postured and forward deployed, the Navy that once fielded thousands of river rats to fight in Vietnam and put Seabees on the ground in Afghanistan will be called upon again and again to augment special operations forces. SOCOM will play a large part in the execution, with or without a SEAL at the helm.

As McRaven first said in his June 2011 testimony: “The world’s strategic environment has evolved toward one that is characterized more by irregular warfare activity rather than major nation state warfare […] we must confront this ‘new normal’ and posture our forces to be successful in it.”

The U.S. armed forces and a grateful nation are better prepared to face those challenges because of McRaven’s contributions.

Robert Caruso is a veteran of the United States Navy and served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Department of Defense, in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State and as a contractor for the Department of the Army. He is an Associate Editor at CIMSEC, and concurrently serves as the Tampa Chapter President.

It’s Not Strange For the Coast Guard to Be In the Middle East

There’s nothing strange about it: your United States Coast Guard is everywhere.

ADM-Papp-meets-with-crewmembers-aboard-CGC-Aquidneck

The Coast Guard are in Yemen, training and even getting shot at in anger on the ground. 

The Coast Guard has not one but two graduates from the elite BUD/S training normally limited to aspiring Navy SEALs. Under a program supported by Admirals Losey and McRaven, The Coast Guard sent worthy contenders to BUD/S and they passed.

There is an “Office of Counterterrorism & Defense Operations Policy” of the United States Coast Guard. Totally a thing.

At the onset of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Coasties sent “eight cutters, 600 people, to the Persian Gulf”, according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.  

P4

There’s an entire Patrol Forces element dedicated to supporting USCG operations not on the periphery the continental United States:

USCG Patrol Forces Southwest Asia (PATFORSWA) is the Coast Guard’s largest unit outside of the United States.  Established in 2002 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, PATFORSWA played a key role in maritime security and maritime infrastructure protection operations.  PATFORSWA is currently supporting Operation Enduring Freedom with continued maritime humanitarian presence on the seas, providing U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet with combat-ready assets, utilizing our unique access to foreign territorial seas and ports, formulating strong and independent relationships throughout the Arabian Gulf, and leveraging the full-spectrum, flexible vessel boarding capabilities and maritime country engagements on the shore.  PATFORSWA is comprised of six 110′ cutters, shore side support personnel, Redeployment Assistance and Inspection Detachment (RAID), Advanced Interdiction Teams (AIT), Middle East Training Team (METT), and other deployable specialized forces operating throughout the U.S. Central Command Area of Operation.

Coasties patrol the Persian Gulf–the world, really, but we’re talking about the Gulf at the moment–and regulate the flow of maritime traffic and perform visit, board, search, and seizure missions from their base in Bahrain. No, not the Navy’s base–their base, the Navy has their own base in Fifth Fleet.

The United States Coast Guard is mission focused and  forward deployed anywhere US Armed Forces are, and if they aren’t on station they’re already on the way.

Robert Caruso served in the United States Navy as a special security officer supporting the Strike Operations Officer and Operations Officer of a Carrier Strike Group, a Joint Task Force, and embarked National Mission Force elements. He also served with the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Department of Defense, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and as a contractor for the Department of the Army. Robert is a contributor to The Boston Globe, Business Insider, and The Guardian. He serves as the inaugural president of the Tampa Chapter and associate editor of the NextWar Blog here at CIMSEC. 

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No Money Back? History Lessons on the Russia MISTRAL Sale

Is there a case for historical analogies and the use of military history for contemporary decision-making? Are we just marking the centenary of World War One or, a hundred years on, are we going back to the future? Like others I acknowledge the value of history as a frame of reference, but I try to avoid (too close) analogies. Especially with World War One. Inconveniently, on 17 July 2014, Russian separatists in Ukraine shot down an innocent passenger aircraft killing 298 passengers and crew. Russia’s international credentials headed south, but questions remained also with regards to Ukraine’s role in this sorry episode. As recriminations were flying back and forth I felt reminded of the sinking in 1915 of the British liner LUSITANIA by the German submarine U-20. Then, 159 (neutral) American passengers were killed (out of a total of 1,198 casualties); the episode caused irreparable damage to Germany’s reputation and international relations in World War One.

And there I was. I suppose you can find such analogies everywhere, if you cast your net wide enough. But as the discussion flared up again about the sale to Russia of two MISTRAL-class amphibious assault ships (BPC-210 class) by France, I really had the impression that we have been there before in some way or another. One of the vessels (the VLADIVOSTOK) has already paid for and France is in a quandary whether or not to deliver the ship to Russia, a country against which the EU has by now imposed wide-ranging sanctions. Reversing the German government’s tacit approval of Paris’s sale of the ships to Russia, some German politicians have now suggested that instead the EU should step into the contract and buy the ships. France argues the crews have already arrived in France for familiarisation and France cannot back out of the contract.

Vladivostok
BPC-210 type amphibious assault ship VLADIVOSTOK fitting out at DCSN in St Nazaire, January 2014. (Photo: G Plagué, Shipspotting)

Rewind 100 years: on 2 August 1914 the Ottoman Empire ratified an alliance with the German Empire setting in motion a chain of events whose effects can still be felt today. This step had not been entirely unavoidable for the Entente powers. Unfortunately, the government in Istanbul had placed orders for two dreadnoughts with British shipyards (or rather: it had taken over a Brazilian contract in one case), one in 1911 and the other in 1913 (as well as one in 1914, but work never began on that order). As war loomed large the British government, at the behest of the First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Winston S Churchill, pre-emptively seized the two Ottoman battleships named Sultan Osman-ı Evvel and the Reşadiye after having stalled delivery of the already completed SULTAN OSMAN-I EVVEL for several weeks. The Admiralty offered a fixed payment per day for their usage in war, but this did not mollify the Ottoman government or public. The situation then was, of course, quite different from that of today, since France and Russia are not as war (as the British and Ottoman Empire would soon be after this episode), but the vignette offers a nice object lesson on the diplomatic and strategic reverberations of the cancellation of a major weapons deal in times of heightened tension.

The cancellation of the dreadnoughts’ delivery to the Ottoman Navy pushed Istanbul into the arms of the Central Powers. It also gave the Germans the opportunity to leverage the political and strategic impact of two vessels – the battlecruiser GOEBEN and the light cruiser BRESLAU – that were effectively bottled up inside the Mediterranean. Both ships were sent to the Ottoman Empire, which conveniently “purchased” the vessels as a replacement for the two dreadnoughts on 16 August 1914. However, these two ships were never an adequate replacement for the two heavy dreadnoughts kept by the British. It was only luck and the early demise of Czarist Russia that that prevented the small flotilla from being swept up in the Black Sea by the much bigger Russian dreadnoughts (IMPERATICA MARIJA class) that came into service in the course of the war. The Ottoman Empire also never fully recovered from the loss of her best naval crews that had been interned in Britain, even though the German crews expended much energy on training their Ottoman allies. In this respect, seizing the two vessels made a difference in the balance of power, though one that the Entente was never able to capitalise upon. Ultimately, Russia’s demise was also a result of the Entente’s inability to control the Bosporus.

OSMAN
Battleship SULTAN OSMAN I fitting out at Armstrong in Newcastle upon Tyne, ca. 1913. (Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

Acquiring the two Ottoman dreadnoughts in 1914 was a double edged sword for the Royal Navy. Although it increased the fleet size by two very powerful ships, those never quite fit into the fleet due to the different specifications to which they were built. Agincourt – originally a Brazilian prestige project, failed to impress Admiral John Jellicoe to the point that he initially refused to accept the ship into the Grand Fleet. The ship also required modifications, such as a conversion of the lavatories or addition (in the course of the war) of a better fire control system. The Royal Navy’s lack of enthusiasm for the two gift horses became apparent after the war, when Agincourt and Erin were the most modern major surface combatants to be scrapped in 1922 in order for Britain to meet her obligations under the Washington Naval treaty.

So what is to be done about the MISTRALs due to be delivered to Russia? Just like the dreadnoughts would have been valuable to Ottoman sea control in the Black Sea, the MISTRALs would be just the tool for Russia’s new “ambiguous warfare” and a valuable addition to re-asserting its sea control over the Black Sea rim, as Felix Seidler has argued in a recent post here. Indeed, his suspicion that at least one of the ships would be deployed to the Black Sea, rather than the Pacific, was borne out by a statement made by the Russian Navy on 27 July 2014, stating that one vessel would be based in Sevastopol. Indeed, not just as a C2 platform, but also as a floating base for special operations the MISTRALs would add very convenient capability given Russia’s current security environment and concept of operations in the Black Sea region.

As the Agincourt example shows, purchasing the ships brings its unique set of problems. Beyond the issue of technical integration into western forces, there is Russia’s political response to consider, which includes the small matter of Europe’s (especially Germany’s) dependence on Russian natural gas. The cancellation of the MISTRAL deal (technically only possible if the EU imposes level 3 sanctions) might just be enough to push Russia into retaliating with the “energy weapon”, something that might make even the most vocal German politician pause. France, however, is largely immune to this threat and has little to lose except its credibility as a weapons supplier and the loss of revenue from future arms deals with Russia.

France already has experience with having paid-for warships and problematic (embargoed) customers on her hands. In 1969 the Israelis recovered five Sa’ar 3 guided missile boats that had already been paid for from a French yard after the French had refused to hand them over. This was a somewhat offbeat example of how to resolve such a matter. After the French government under Charles de Gaulle imposed an arms embargo on Israel in 1968, the boats were sold to a mysterious Panamanian-based Norwegian firm which was of course a front for the Israelis. There is some controversy, but it appears that French intelligence was forewarned about Israeli intention to liberate the vessels. So was the shipbuilding supervisor, Felix Amiot, who was later blamed for his part in the affair, but vigorously defended himself by saying “Security is not my problem. My job was to build ships. I got along very well with the Israelis, but as far as I know that is not a crime.” Ironically, Amiot’s shipyard had won the contract largely because it was able to deliver a German-design, which the Germans themselves could not deliver to Israel in the first place due to their restrictive arms export policy. On the morning of Christmas Day 1969 the five boats surreptitiously left Cherbourg and began their transit to Israel. There was some faked outrage, but neither French Mirages who overflew the boats nor Russian, British or American warships engaged the unarmed missile boats on their way.

Two completed Israeli Sa’ar 3 “patrol” boats in Cherbourg in 1969, less their weapons. (Photo credit: forum.valka.cz; photo source: unknown)
Two completed Israeli Sa’ar 3 “patrol” boats in Cherbourg in 1969, less their weapons. (Photo credit: forum.valka.cz; photo source: unknown)

Whatever France’s tacit involvement was in the “escape” of the Stars of Cherbourg, the episode left the relationship between France and Israel markedly cooler for the next 10 years. Israel discontinued the purchase of Mirage aircraft and switched to US products for some time, although France is now again Israel’s largest arms supplier from the EU, especially for equipment that Israel is unable to obtain from the US. Given the protectiveness of France towards its defence industry, it is unlikely that the country would want to risk the highly lucrative arms sale (in the range of US$ 1.5 bn) to Russia just to please its EU neighbours. In any case, short of the EU implementing level 3 sanctions or impending hostilities by Russia against NATO or EU members it would seem unlikely that the MISTRAL deal could (and would) be cancelled without great cost to France – and potentially her European allies, if they are seen to be egging Paris on. More likely that France will try and temporize, hoping that the Ukraine conflict will blow over before the ships are to be formally handed over. Perhaps a lesson from the Ottoman battleships can still be learned here and some “unexpected” technical troubles and delays arising during the acceptance trials could buy France the time needed to avoid having to take an unpleasant decision.

Dirk Steffen is a Commander in the German Naval Reserve and the Director Maritime Security for Risk Intelligence. When not wrestling with West African maritime security issues he reflects on naval and military history, particularly the period between 1840 and 1920. Dirk holds an MA in Military Studies (Naval Warfare) from the American Military University. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.