Apple believes it is protecting freedom. It’s wrong. Here’s why.

Ed. note: This is an expanded version of a previous article, “We Don’t Need Backdoors.”

By Dave Schroeder

Let me open by saying I’m not for backdoors in encryption. It’s a bad idea, and people who call for backdoors don’t understand how encryption fundamentally works.

Apple has been ordered by a court to assist the FBI in accessing data on an iPhone 5c belonging to the employer of one of the San Bernardino shooters, who planned and perpetrated an international terrorist attack against the United States. Apple has invested a lot in OS security and encryption, but Apple may be able comply with this order in this very specific set of circumstances.

Apple CEO Tim Cook penned a thoughtful open letter justifying Apple’s position that it shouldn’t have to comply with this order. However, what the letter essentially says is that any technical cooperation beyond the most superficial claims that there is “nothing that can be done” is tantamount to creating a “backdoor,” irrevocably weakening encryption, and faith in encryption, for everyone.

That is wrong on its face, and we don’t need “backdoors.”

What we do need is this:

A clear acknowledgment that what increasingly exists essentially amounts to virtual fortresses impenetrable by the legal and judicial mechanisms of free society, that many of those systems are developed and employed by US companies, within the US, and that US adversaries use those systems — sometimes specifically and deliberately because they are in the US — against the US and our allies, and for the discussion to start from that point.

The US has a clear and compelling interest in strong encryption, and especially in protecting US encryption systems used by our government, our citizens, and people around the world, from defeat. But the assumption that the only alternatives are either universal strong encryption, or wholesale and deliberate weakening of encryption systems and/or “backdoors,” is a false dichotomy.

How is that so?

Encrypted communication has to be decrypted somewhere, in order for it to be utilized by the recipient. That fact can be exploited in various ways. It is done now. It’s done by governments and cyber criminals and glorified script kiddies. US vendors like Apple, can be at least a partial aid in that process on a device-by-device, situation-by-situation basis, within clear and specific legal authorities, without doing things we don’t want, like key escrow, wholesale weakening of encryption, creating “backdoors,” or anything similar, with regard to software or devices themselves.

When Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency and Commander, US Cyber Command, says:

“My position is — hey look, I think that we’re lying that this isn’t technically feasible. Now, it needs to be done within a framework. I’m the first to acknowledge that. You don’t want the FBI and you don’t want the NSA unilaterally deciding, so, what are we going to access and what are we not going to access? That shouldn’t be for us. I just believe that this is achievable. We’ll have to work our way through it. And I’m the first to acknowledge there are international implications. I think we can work our way through this.”

…some believe that is code for, “We need backdoors.” No. He means precisely what he says.

When US adversaries use systems and services physically located in the US, designed and operated by US companies, existing under US law, there are many things — entirely compatible with both the letter and spirit of our law and Constitution — that could be explored, depending on the precise system, service, software, device, and circumstances. Pretending that there is absolutely nothing that can be done, and that it must be either unbreakable, universal encryption for all, or nothing, is a false choice.

To further pretend that it’s some kind of “people’s victory” when a technical system renders itself effectively impenetrable to the legitimate legal, judicial, and intelligence processes of democratic governments operating under the rule of law in free civil society is curious indeed. Would we say the same about a hypothetical physical structure that cannot be entered by law enforcement with a court order?

Many ask why terrorists wouldn’t just switch to something else.

That’s a really easy answer — terrorists use these simple, turnkey platforms for the same reason normal people do: because they’re easy to use. A lot of our techniques, capabilities, sources, and methods have unfortunately been laid bare, but people use things like WhatsApp, iMessage, and Telegram because they’re easy. It’s the same reason that ordinary people — and terrorists — don’t use Ello instead of Facebook, or ProtonMail instead of Gmail. And when people switch to more complicated, non-turnkey encryption solutions — no matter how “simple” the more tech-savvy may think them — they make mistakes that can render their communications security measures vulnerable to defeat.

And as long as the US and its fundamental freedoms engender the culture of innovation which allows companies like Apple to grow and thrive, we will always have the advantage.

Vendors and cloud providers may not always be able to provide assistance; but sometimes they can, given a particular target (person, device, platform, situation, etc.), and they can do so in a way that comports with the rule of law in free society, doesn’t require creating backdoors in encryption, doesn’t require “weakening” their products, does not constitute an undue burden, and doesn’t violate the legal and Constitutional rights of Americans, or the privacy of free peoples anywhere in the world.

Some privacy advocates look at this as a black-and-white, either-or situation, without consideration for national interests, borders, or policy, legal, and political realities. They look at the “law” of the US or UK as fundamentally on the same footing the “law” of China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea: they’re all “laws”, and people are subject to them. They warn that if Apple provides assistance, even just this once, then someone “bad” — by their own, arbitrary standards, whether in our own government or in a repressive regime — will abuse it.

The problem is that this simplistic line of reasoning ignores other key factors in the debate. The US is not China. Democracy is not the same as Communism. Free states are not repressive states. We don’t stand for, defend, or espouse the same principles. Apple is not a Chinese company. If Apple really believes it will set a precedent for nations like China by complying with a lawful US court order, it really should perform a little self-examination and ask why it would seek to operate in China, and thus be subject to such law.

The other argument seems to be that if Apple does this once, it would constitute a “backdoor” for “all” iPhones, and thus the abrogation of the rights of all. That is also categorically false. There are a number of factors here: The iPhone belongs to the deceased individual’s employer. The FBI may have a companion laptop that this specific iPhone considers a “trusted device”, and is thus potentially able to deploy an OS update without a passcode. The specific device and/or OS version may have other vulnerabilities or shortcomings that can be exploited with physical access.

This argument seems to be equivalent to saying that if government has any power or capability, it will be abused, and thus should be denied; and that encryption, or anything related to it, should somehow be considered sacrosanct. It’s like saying, if we grant the government the lawful to enter a door, they could enter any door — even yours. Some might be quick to say this is not the same. Oh, but it is. This is not an encryption backdoor, and does not apply to all iPhones, or even all iPhone 5c models, or even most. It applies to this specific set of circumstances — legally and technically.

It is puzzling indeed to assert that the government can try to break this device, or its crypto, on its own, but if the creator of the cryptosystem helps in any way, that is somehow “weakening” the crypto or creating a “backdoor.” It is puzzling, because it is false.

Specific sets of conditions happen to exist that allows Apple to unlock certain older devices. These conditions exist less and less, and in fewer forms, as devices and iOS versions get newer. Unlocking iOS 7 only works, for example, because Apple has the key. The methodology would only work in this case because it’s specifically a pre-iPhone 6 model with a 4-digit passcode and there is a paired laptop in the government’s possession. All of this is moot on iPhone 6 and newer.

Apple is welcome to use every legal mechanism possible to fight this court order — that is their absolute right. But to start and grow their company in the United States, to exist here because of the fundamental environment we create for freedom and innovation, and then to act as if Apple is somehow divorced from the US and owes it nothing, even when ordered by a court to do so, is a puzzling and worrisome position.  They can’t have it both ways.

If Apple wishes to argue against the application of the All Writs Act — which, while old, is precisely on-point — it needs to make the case that performing the technical steps necessary to comply with this court order creates an “undue burden.” It may be able to make just that argument.

ios

We exist not in an idealized world where the differences of people, groups, and nation-states are erased by the promise of the Internet and the perceived panacea of unbreakable encryption.

We exist in a messy and complicated reality. People seek to do us harm. They use our own laws, creations, and technologies against us. People attack the US and the West, and they use iPhones.

Apple says that breaking this device, even just this once, assuming it is even technically possible in this instance, sets a dangerous precedent.

Refusing to comply with a legitimate court order levied by a democratic society, because of a devotion to some perceived higher ideal of rendering data off-limits under all circumstances to the valid legal processes of that society, is the dangerous precedent.

The national security implications of this case cannot be overstated. By effectively thumbing its nose at the court’s order, Apple is not protecting freedom; it is subverting the protection of it for the sake of a misguided belief in an ideal that does not exist, and is not supported by reality.

Dave Schroeder serves as an Information Warfare Officer in the US Navy. He is also is a tech geek at the University of Wisconsin—Madison. He holds a master’s degree in Information Warfare, is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, and is currently in the Cybersecurity Policy graduate program at the University of Maryland University College. He also manages the Navy IWC Self Synchronization effort. Follow @daveschroeder and @IDCsync.

The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of the US Navy or the University of Wisconsin—Madison.

Publication Release: Chinese Military Strategy Week

Released: February 2016

The CIMSEC Chinese Military Strategy topic week ran from August 3-7, 2015 and featured shortly after a new Chinese Military Strategy white paper was released in May 2015, and after a new U.S. National Military Strategy was released in July 2015. Authors sought to identify key takeaways from the new Chinese white paper, establish historical context, and several compared the new Chinese document to the American strategy. 

Authors:Screenshot_1
Paul Pryce
Sherman Xiaogang Lai
Chad M. Pillai 
Jack McKechnie
Jan Stockbruegger
Chang Ching
Eric Gomez
Debalina Ghoshal
Amanda Conklin
Justin Chock
Xunchao Zhang

Editors:
Eric Murphy

Dmitry Filipoff
Matt Hipple
Matt Merighi
John Stryker

Download Here

Articles:
The Influence of Han Feizi on  China’s Defence Policy By Paul Pryce

From Expediency to the Strategic Chinese Dream? By Sherman Xiaogang Lai
Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: U.S. & Chinese Strategic Views By Daniel Hartnett
Bear, Dragon & Eagle: Russian, Chinese & U.S. Military Strategies By Chad M. Pillai
Avoiding Conditions for an Asia-Pacific Cold War By Jack McKechnie
Beyond the Security Dilemma? De-Escalating Tension in the South China Sea By Jan Stockbruegger
A Grain of Contextual Salt in the Chinese Military Strategy By Chang Ching
Deep Accomodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait By Eric Gomez
Assessing China’s Nuclear Ambitions By Debalina Ghoshal
The Unnamed Protagonist in China’s Maritime Objectives By Amanda Conklin
A Pacific Rebalance with Chinese Characteristics By Justin Chock
Becoming a Maritime Power? The First Chinese base in the Indian Ocean? By Xunchao Zhang

Be sure to browse other compendiums in the publications tab, and feel free send compendium ideas to [email protected].

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US Department of State Seeks to Clarify Meaning of China’s 9-Dash Line: Finale

By Alex Calvo

This is the fifth installment in a five-part series summarizing and commenting the 5 December 2014 US Department of State “Limits in the Seas” issue explaining the different ways in which one may interpret Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea. It is a long-standing US policy to try to get China to frame her maritime claims in terms of UNCLOS. Read part one, part two, part three, part four

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Whereas the assertion that China has not actually made a claim may not be shared by everybody, in particular given the language flowing from Beijing which the DOS report itself cites, the reference to the “high seas” between mainland China and some islands seems stronger proof that Beijing was not making a historic claim. However, we must again stress that this would be the case if we followed the prevailing interpretation of the law of the sea, but there is no reason why China should adhere strictly to it, and even less that Beijing should not have changed her mind since 1958, when she had little more than a coastal navy and her economy was closed and in tatters. It may be true, as the report notes, that the 1958 Declaration only made a historic claim to the Bohai (Pohai) gulf in northeastern China, but again this should perhaps be judged from a wider historical perspective. After 1949 the PRC took a much more uncompromising stance concerning its North-East than its South-East (and wider maritime) borders. With a pragmatic arrangement in place with the United Kingdom concerning Hong Kong, and a strong economic and political relation with the Soviet Union, it was at the other end of the country where, in 1950, Beijing (not without an intense internal debate given the state of the country), decided to resort to force to prevent the presence of hostile forces close to her border, intervening in the Korean War, pushing back the advancing Allied forces and reversing the impact of the Inchon landing, ultimately forcing a stalemate on the ground. In 1958, just five years after the Korean armistice, nearby waters may have thus been much more present in Chinese leaders’ minds. In addition, these were also the waters directly leading to Tianjin and Beijing, the venue for foreign interventions in both the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion. It would not be until the late 1970s that China’s South-Eastern flank would begin to receive more attention, in part thanks to the rapprochement with the United States and in particular once economic growth and the country’s move to become a net energy and commodity importer turned the waters of the South China Sea into a vital venue and potential choke point. It is true that in December 1941 the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse in the South China Sea had enabled the Japanese to land in Malaya and ultimately conquer Burma, closing the last land route to besieged Nationalist China, but this did not result in a comparable imprint on China’s historical consciousness, among other reasons because the episode did not involve Chinese naval forces and was subsumed into a much larger, dramatic, and quickly-developing picture.

Vietnamese-Americans demonstrating against Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Note the banner in favor of US ratification of UNCLOS.
Vietnamese-Americans demonstrating against Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Note the banner in favor of US ratification of UNCLOS.

Rejecting the validity of a possible historic claim by China. Concerning whether, if China “Made a Historic Claim”, it would “have Validity”, the DOS paper insists that “such a claim would be contrary to international law”, stressing the limited degree to which UNCLOS recognizes this category of claims, as evidenced by its “text and drafting history”. The text argues that “apart from a narrow category of near-shore ‘historic’ bays” in Article 10, and “historic title” concerning “territorial sea boundary delimitation (Article 15)”, “modern international law of the sea does not recognize history as the basis for maritime jurisdiction”, citing the Gulf of Maine ICJ case. It also underlines the fact that UNCLOS provisions concerning the EEZ, continental shelf, and the high seas “do not contain any exceptions for historic claims” to the detriment of coastal states and all estates enjoying certain freedoms. Concerning fisheries, the report acknowledges that UNCLOS refers to “the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished” in the EEZ (Article 62(3)) and to “traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities” (Article 51), but restricts the impact to the possible granting by one state to another of fisheries resources “based on prior usage”. The text stresses that no such traditional fishing practices can “provide a basis for sovereignty, sovereignty rights, or jurisdiction,” adding that UNCLOS rules on oil and gas development contain no “exception for historic rights in any context.” Again we note how a purely legal report like this may be missing part of the picture, given the great importance that fishing vessels have in the ongoing conflict over the South China Sea, where they are one of the pillars of asymmetric naval warfare.

Chinese scholars Gao and Jia have argued that UNCLOS does not regulate “historic title” and “historic rights,” which fall instead under the purview of general international law. In their view, UNCLOS “was never intended, even at the time of its adoption, to exhaust international law. On the contrary, it has provided ample room for customary law to develop and to fill in the gaps that the Convention itself was unable to fill in 1982” as clear from its preamble, which reads “matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.” The DOS report explicitly rejects this position, saying that “it is not supported by international law” and goes against the “comprehensive scope of the LOS Convention.” Experts like Mark Valencia, on the other hand, hold that China’s posture may be compatible with the international law of the sea.

The text does not stop at arguing that it is not open to a state to make historic claims based not on UNCLOS but on general international law, laying down a second line of defense. It explains that, “even assuming that a Chinese historic claim in the South China Sea were governed by ‘general international law’ rather than the Convention,” it would still be invalid since it would not meet the necessary requirements under general international law, namely “open, notorious, and effective exercise of authority over the South China Sea,” plus “continuous exercise of authority” in those waters and “acquiescence by foreign States” in such exercise of authority. Furthermore, it explains that the United States, which “is active in protesting historic claims around the world that it deems excessive,” has not protested “the dashed line on these grounds, because it does not believe that such a claim has been made by China,” with Washington choosing instead to request a clarification of the claim. Whether this view is also meant to avoid a frontal clash with Beijing, in line with the often state policy goal of “managing” rather than “containing” China’s rise, is something not discussed in the text.

The report concludes by criticizing another view put forward by Gao and Jia, namely the relevance of claims made before the advent of UNCLOS. While these two scholars argue that “In the case of the South China Sea as enclosed by the nine-dash line, China’s historic title and rights, which preceded the advent of UNCLOS by many years, have a continuing role to play,” the DOS paper says that “The fact that China’s claims predate the LOS Convention does not provide a basis under the Convention or international law for derogating from the LOS Convention,” adding that “permitting States to derogate from the provisions of the Convention because their claims pre-date its adoption is contrary to and would undermine” the convention’s “object and purpose” stated in its preamble to “settle … all issues relating to the law of the sea.”

Conclusions. Long-standing American policy towards China stresses the need to manage the latter’s rise, so that it does not threaten the post-Second World War system, based among others on freedom of navigation and a ban on territorial expansion as a legitimate causus belli. As a result, Washington has often called on Beijing to clarify her claims on the South China Sea, in an attempt to constrain them while avoiding a frontal clash. This position also seeks to reinforce the perception that the United States focuses on the rule of law at sea, rather than on supporting one claimant against the other over disputed waters. The DOS document, in line with this approach, carefully dissects Chinese claims, analyzing whether they may be compatible with standard American interpretations of international Law of the Sea. The conclusions are rather pessimistic, exposing how, despite having ratified UNCLOS, the Convention’s provisions are not seen in the same light by Beijing and Washington. This should not surprise us, since international law seeks to constrain power but at the same time it is shaped by it, thus as countries rise they seek to play a greater role in the fate of rules and principles. In the case of China this is even clearer due to historical perceptions that it was to a large extent seaborne power which subjected the country to a semi-colonial status for a whole century. If Beijing’s claims in the South Chinese Sea cannot be seen in the light of UNCLOS, the question arises what ultimate Chinese goals are. Could this be the subject of a future paper by the Department of State? Or does Washington prefer to wait until the international arbitration case launched by Manila concludes? While the second option seems more likely, as time goes by the idea that China’s rise may be shaped, rather than constrained, increasingly seems less and less realistic. However, if the time comes to draw a line in the sand, a whole of government effort will be needed, going beyond the naval circles that to date have been most vocal in articulating the need to resist Chinese expansion.

Alex Calvo is a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan) focusing on security and defence policy, international law, and military history in the Indian-Pacific Ocean. Region. A member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and Taiwan’s South China Sea Think-Tank, he is currently writing a book about Asia’s role and contribution to the Allied victory in the Great War. He tweets @Alex__Calvo and his work can be found here.

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How Peaceful Is The South Atlantic?

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

Admiral Eduardo Bacellar Leal Ferreira, commander of the Brazilian Navy, gave an interview to the Uruguayan daily El País this past December 2015. The Admiral optimistically declared that “today there is no ocean more peaceful than the South Atlantic, there are no tensions that cannot be solved. We have problems in the Malvinas [Falklands] or in the Gulf of Guinea, but there are no wars. This is the only ocean where the major powers do not have warships.” This statement is an ideal starting point for an in-depth discussion of South Atlantic geopolitics.

A Conflict-Less Ocean?

Due to space issues, we cannot discuss in detail every South Atlantic maritime conflict. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Admiral is incorrect to declare that the only regional disputes are the Falklands/Malvinas and the Gulf of Guinea. A total list includes:

  • The Falklands/Malvinas: Argentina claims these islands, currently controlled by the United Kingdom (the two countries had a brief war in 1982). In 2013, the inhabitants of the Falklands held a referendum in which they voted to remain part of the UK – Argentina does not recognize the ballot.
  • Ghana and Ivory Coast: The two countries have a dispute over offshore oil drilling along their border. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) gave an interim ruling in 2015 but a final decision is not expected until 2017.
  • Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo: In 2014, the Angolan government attempted to redraw the maritime border with the DRC in order to gain control of some 200 additional miles. The two countries have contested their border since the 1970s.
  • Equatorial Guinea and Gabon: The two countries claim the Mbanie, Cocotiers and Congas islands since the early 1970s. It is believed that there are underwater oil reserves around those islands.

Preventing War

In spite of the aforementioned maritime disputes, Admiral Ferreira is generally correct when he praises the peacefulness of the South Atlantic. After all, the last confrontation in the region was the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War.

Even more, war has been successfully prevented in other disputes: in 1978 Papal mediation helped avoid a war between Argentina and Chile in the Beagle Channel, where the Pacific and Atlantic oceans meet. Moreover, the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula was solved via international ruling – in 2006 the two governments signed the “UN-backed Greentree Agreement [which set] the terms and timeframe for the implementation of the 2002 ruling of the [International Court of Justice], which transferred the Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon.” The list of successfully mediated disputes could grow if ITLOS manages to resolve the Ghana-Ivory Coast issue or if the UN’s current mediation efforts between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are fruitful. In other words there are plenty of examples that highlight the peacefulness of the South Atlantic.

Certainly, there is always the possibility of an unforeseen “X factor” that could jump-start a war. The battle over precious resources like oil is a likely reason as most of these conflicts have to do with control of maritime areas where large deposits of oil are believed to be located. In the case of Argentina, there is a high degree of patriotism over the Falklands/Malvinas themselves, but the recent discovery of new oil deposits by Rockhopper is another reason for Buenos Aires to desire control over them. This scenario is also plausible on the African side of the Atlantic. An October 2015 report by the Institute for Security Studies entitled “Why Africa must resolve its Maritime Boundary Disputes,” argues that “the location of oil fields and natural resources deposits can result in considerable complications when states unilaterally determine and apportion exploration blocks that infringe upon areas of disputed ownership by a neighboring state.”

Should other sources of state-revenue dry up, governments may become more willing to engage in a war, or at least aggressively push for negotiations, over any of the aforementioned maritime disputes.

New Navies But For What?

In a 2011 essay for Small Wars & Insurgencies, I argued that South America was involved in an arms race. The situation has changed in 2016, particularly among the South Atlantic states. For example, the Brazilian Navy continues with its ambitious programs, in spite of its economic woes, which include the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, four Scorpene subs, and repairing its Sao Paulo carrier. Furthermore, in late 2015 Brazil purchased the multipurpose vessBahiacomoG40bememcloseABREABREel TCD Siroco from France – it has been renamed the G-40 Bahia. Nevertheless, these purchases have not made Brazil’s neighbors perceive it as a security threat, as Uruguay’s Navy has not carried out major purchases in years while Argentina has only repaired the submarine ARA San Juan and purchased four Russian vessels that will be utilized for search and rescue operations and Antarctic research. Neither Montevideo nor Buenos Aires appear to expect an invasion from the Portuguese-speaking giant.

As for the African South Atlantic states, Equatorial Guinea commissioned a frigate, the Wle Nzas, in June 2014. “This warship is the flagship of the Equatorial Guinea Navy and it will [help] to ensure security in the Gulf of Guinea,” said President Teodoro Obiang Nguema. Meanwhile Gabon has ordered two offshore patrol vessels from KERSHIP, a joint-initiatives of PIRIOU and DCNS (though a January report by DefenceWeb argues that the contract may have been deferred). As for Nigeria, it constructed the NNS Andoni in 2012; “with a speed of up to 25 knots (46km/h), this can quickly go to intercept the pirates,” said Commanding Officer Adepegba. The country also acquired a patrol vessel from China in 2014. Finally, the Angolan government announced in late 2015 that it will purchase “two fast-attack naval craft and several coastal radar and repeater station systems worth €122 million from two subsidiaries of Italy’s Finmeccanica.”

As has been discussed in various analyses, due to the general inter-state tranquility of the South Atlantic, regional navies are looking for a new raison d’etre. Protecting natural resources and non-traditional security threats are the standard reasons. Without a doubt, Africa’s West coast continues to have a major problem with piracy, including the hijacking of transport ships, so it is in the interest of regional governments to have strong navies to monitor their waters. As for protecting natural resources within a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, this includes both oil exploration as well as combating crimes like illegal fishing. Nevertheless, while African states have valid reasons to upgrade their naval forces, Brazil has a more difficult case regarding its projects. Without addressing the nuclear submarine or carrier by name, in his interview with El País, Admiral Ferreira argues that Brazil must maintain a deterrent force to protect its natural resources, “we have [offshore] oil fields, and if there is an energy crisis it is necessary to deter anyone from coming to Brazil to take our resources.” While there is an obvious logic to the Brazilian Admiral’s statement, it is unclear exactly who is this enemy that requires a nuclear-powered submarine to defeat.

Global Powers

Finally, Admiral Ferreira argued that no world power has vessels in the South Atlantic. That is generally true, particularly since 1986, when the United Nations created the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, which declares that the South Atlantic is a nuclear weapons-free zone.

Nevertheless, warships from the global powers routinely cross the South Atlantic; just this past April 2015, the USS Spearhead arrived in Gabon and carried out exercises with the local navy as part of the Africa Partnership Station. “During our visit, we’ll conduct marine-to-marine training along with medical subject matter expert exchanges, thus helping build a stronger Global Network of Navies,” said Commander Matthew Flemming. In May of the same year, the French offshore patrol vessel L’Adroit docked in Cape Town. As for the French-Navy’s-OPV-Visits-Cape-Town-South-Africa-320x213other side of the Atlantic, the USS America visited Brazil in 2014 while the aforementioned French OPV L’Adroit docked in Uruguay in mid-February 2016. Furthermore, apart from the Falklands, London also controls South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands. Moreover, the British-controlled Ascension Island was a strategically important stopover for British warships and transport vessels during the Falklands War.

Hence, Admiral Ferreira’s declaration is a slight overstatement. While there are no British battle groups patrolling the Falklands nor does the U.S. Navy have a fleet stationed in Ascension Island (though the U.S. Air Force does utilize an auxiliary field there), global powers do have a constant presence in the South Atlantic’s waters.

A South Atlantic NATO?

Even though Admiral Ferreira did not discuss South Atlantic integration, it is important to mention that that the two sides of the Atlantic have increased defense ties in recent years. For example the ATLASUR naval exercises bring South American and African navies together, while Brazil and South Africa (along with India) have carried out the IBSAMAR exercises.

Nevertheless, calls for greater South-South cooperation have not ended in some grand new maritime defense initiative. The aforementioned exercises are important, but neither Brazil nor South Africa, the two powerhouses of the South Atlantic, have taken major steps to bring together all these navies towards some common objective (i.e. forming a trans-oceanic task-force to combat maritime crimes). The region already came together in 1986 with the SAPCZ and there is already a modern precedent for various countries attempting to deal with maritime affairs – namely, the African Union’s “2050 Africa’s Integration Maritime Strategy,” which will address (and ideally solve) the continent’s maritime issues, such as border disputes. We have yet to see the South Atlantic capitalize on its general peacefulness to address non-traditional defense problems.

Final Thoughts

Brazilian Admiral Ferreira is generally correct by praising the peacefulness of the South Atlantic. Of course, an unforeseen incident could occur or a series of decisions within a government that prompts it to decide to start a war with a neighboring state. The possibility of petro-money is an enticing reason to engage in violence, particularly as this non-renewable commodity becomes scarcer in the near future or, as the aforementioned ISS report explains, “maritime boundary disputes, many long dormant, are increasingly exacerbated by a growing interest in exploring and exploiting natural resources.” Nevertheless, the region can praise itself for having avoided inter-state war in spite of several border disputes.

Currently, the South Atlantic’s maritime security issues revolve around cracking down on piracy, drug trafficking and protecting natural resources (like oil deposits and the maritime ecosystem). Robust navies, including coast guards, are an obvious requirement, but there is a thin line that separates obtaining equipment that is needed (like Argentina purchasing search-and-rescue vessels or Angola buying crafts) to other whose usage is questionable (i.e.,  Brazil’s acquisition of a nuclear submarine).

W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. His research interests include inter-state tensions, narco-insurgent movements and drug cartels, arms sales, the development of Latin American military industries, UN peacekeeping operations, as well as the rising use of drones in Latin America. The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated. Follow him on Twitter @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.