Asia-Pacific

Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident

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By Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson

This series on the leading maritime militias of Hainan Province began by examining the “rights protection” efforts of Sanya City’s maritime militia, whose exploits have given them a prominent position among the province’s irregular sea forces. Discussions about the Sanya City maritime militia are still ongoing as we watch their development. Next came our evaluation of the historical legacy of Danzhou’s maritime militia, which directly demonstrated the value of irregular forces in naval warfare during the 1974 Paracels Sea Battle. This third installment in the series is part one of a two-part in-depth look at the maritime militia of Tanmen.

Tanmen Fishing Harbor is a small fishing port on the eastern shore of Hainan Island. It is home to one of China’s best-known maritime militia units, the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company (潭门海上民兵连). This irregular force receives disproportionate media coverage stemming largely from its involvement in numerous incidents with foreign actors at sea, most notably the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Philippines. Since its founding in 1985, Tanmen has received numerous accolades as an “advanced militia unit” from the government and military on all levels. Tanmen’s fame spread further after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s high-profile visit on the first anniversary of the incident. Xi encouraged Tanmen’s maritime militia to build larger vessels, collect information in distant waters, master modern equipment, and support “island and reef” development. The extent of Chinese attention to this fishing village merits a deep-dive analysis to determine what is happening on the ground there, and what kind of maritime militia capabilities are resulting.

Some of Tanmen’s importance to the PRC stems from the wealth of historical artifacts and other evidence China possesses that allegedly support claims that Tanmen fishermen were the earliest community to discover and sustain continuous exploitation of the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Numerous reports of Tanmen fishermen having been detained or attacked by foreign states also support a growing Chinese narrative of the victimization of Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea. This narrative justifies enhanced ‘defensive’ activities by Chinese maritime forces operating there. Contributions from fishing communities such as Tanmen’s to China’s overall posture in the South China Sea bolsters domestic Chinese rationale for regaining lost “blue territory” (蓝色国土) and “maritime rights and interests” (海洋权益). Tanmen Village is likewise the future site of China’s South China Sea Museum and the South China Sea Base for the State Administration of Cultural Heritage’s Undersea Cultural Heritage Protection Center. Both institutions will likely be dedicated to bolstering China’s historical evidence to support its claims of sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and resource rights in those waters. The latter also has a stated purpose of “promoting maritime industries, shoreline protection and development, utilization and conservation of marine resources, marine service systems, and the implementation of the overall national marine economic development strategy.”  

Central to furthering these interests are irregular units including the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company. Its history exhibit, located in its headquarters, houses artifacts documenting historical presence in the South China Sea by the forefathers of present-day militia members. These include navigation logs, compasses, and diving gear. Tanmen’s maritime militia activities began well before the present company’s official establishment in 1985. Previously a more loosely-organized fishermen militia, it became an official militia company when the PRC promulgated new guidelines for developing fisheries in distant waters and opened up the oceanic fishing industry to privatization. A contingent from this new organization was led initially by its first commander, Huang Xunmian, to the Spratlys, thereby becoming the first organized Tanmen fleet for Spratly development. Huang became a major part of the militia movement to mobilize Tanmen fishermen to build bigger vessels and venture to the Spratlys. By the early 1990s, the company included 150 militiamen and 21 vessels. Today it continues to expand under the current political agenda of transforming China into a “maritime power.”

Chinese media coverage of Tanmen fishermen often states that a large portion of incidents in the South China Sea between Chinese fishermen and foreign states is attributable to the Tanmen fishermen and maritime militia, whose members resolutely oppose “foreign encroachment.” The deputy station chief of the Qionghai City Fisheries Management Station told reporters in 2012 that 90% of the Chinese fishing vessels visiting the Paracels and Spratlys are from Tanmen Harbor, the remainder from Sanya City (also in Hainan Province) or Guangdong Province. While that particular claim is difficult to verify, the number of tense encounters between Tanmen fishermen and militia and the maritime forces of other South China Sea states—particularly the Philippines—certainly helps illustrate the point. Below is a brief, non-exhaustive list of events within the past three decades involving Tanmen fishing vessels, documenting their constant presence and activities in disputed waters and the resulting encounters, and periodic altercations, with other claimant states’ maritime forces. Of note, the incidents listed are as reported in the Chinese press.  Instances of provocations by Tanmen fishermen or Chinese law enforcement vessels are therefore not included.

Timeline: Incidents and Other Events involving Tanmen Fishermen/Maritime Militia

Based on accumulated reports on Tanmen fishing vessels, the below list is by no means complete. Chinese media often reports that hundreds of incidents have occurred.

1985, August – First Tanmen maritime militia trip to Spratlys

After the founding of the militia company in August 1985 and the relaxing of China’s fisheries policies, company leader Huang Xunmian (黄循绵) led a group of 100 fishermen on five fishing vessels on their first trip to the Spratlys.

1989, 13 April – Near Philippine-occupied Thitu Island (中业岛):

Fishing vessel Qionghai 00224 and three fishermen—Huang Changbiao (黄昌标), Yu Yeyou (郁业友), and Yu Yexuan (郁业轩)—are arrested by Philippine authorities.

1989-95 – Chinese-occupied Spratly features:

A number of Tanmen maritime militia work in coordination with the PLA over the years on multiple-month trips to erect the first generation of structures on Chinese-occupied Spratly features. These included stilted shacks, sovereignty markers, piers, and helipads.

1993 – Somewhere in the Spratlys:

Qionghai 00417 is attacked by non-uniformed armed men, resulting in the deaths of four Tanmen fishermen. Tanmen fisherman Hu Xingliang (胡兴良) reported that they were speaking Tagalog, the language of the Phillipines.

1995, 25 March – Mischief Reef (美济礁):

Four of the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company’s fishing vessels with 62 fishermen aboard, working near Mischief Reef, are arrested by Philippine authorities. Platoon leader Wang Qiongfa (王琼法) and four other militia members maintain group solidarity despite strong Philippine attempts to coerce confessions from the Chinese fishermen to violating Philippine waters.

1998, 11 January – Scarborough Shoal (黄岩岛):

Tanmen Maritime Militia squad leader Chen Zebo (陈则波), captain of Qionghai 00372, and Tanmen fishing vessel Qionghai 00473 and its captain Chen Yiping (陈奕平) (altogether 22 fishermen) are arrested by the Philippine Navy for poaching, sent to Subic Bay Coast Guard Station, and held there for 5-6 months.

1998, March – Scarborough Shoal:

Trawlers Zhongyuanyu (中远渔) 313 and 311, and their ~29 fishermen, are detained by a Philippine naval patrol for possession of explosives and endangered coral.

1999 May – Scarborough Shoal:

Chen Zebo’s ship is rammed and sunk by the Philippine Navy, sending 11 crewmembers into the water. Chen and two others are picked up and sent to jail, subsequently released in July.

2000, 26 May – Off the coast of Palawan:

Tanmen fishing vessel Qionghai 01068 encounters a Philippine Coast Guard Vessel. Philippine Coast Guard fires on Qionghai 01068, killing captain Fu Gongwu (符功武); and detains the rest of the crew.

2001 – Near Thitu Island:

Captain Feng Xinyi (冯信义) and three other fishermen aboard Qionghai 00389 are arrested by Philippine authorities.

2002 – Scarborough Shoal:

Qionghai 09016’s owner Lu Haichuan (卢海川) and the 22 fishermen aboard were arrested by Philippine authorities and jailed for 8 months in Palawan.

2006, April – South Shoal (南方浅滩):

Chen Zebo’s nephew Chen Yichao (陈奕超) was on Qionghai 03012 in the Spratlys at South Shoal when on 26 April 2006 an armed vessel of unknown origin attacked and killed four fishermen and injured 3 more.

2007, August – Second Thomas Shoal (仁爱礁):

Qionghai 01039, operated by Mo Taifu (莫太福), was pursued and fired upon by Philippine authorities.

2007, September – Somewhere in the Spratlys:

Qionghai 01038, owned by Mo Taifu, was intercepted and inspected by Malaysian authorities.

2012, 10 April – Scarborough Shoal Standoff:

12 Tanmen fishing boats at Scarborough Shoal encounter Philippine Naval Vessel Gregorio Del Pilar. Six fishing vessels were outside the lagoon at the time, including that of Tanmen Maritime Militia Company Deputy Commander Wang Shumao (王书茂), who led an unsuccessful effort to block Philippine fishing vessels from approaching the shoal.

The other six fishing vessels present inside the lagoon, two of which are confirmed maritime militia vessels, were trapped when Philippine forces blocked the lagoon’s opening. These boats were subsequently boarded by Philippine troops:

  • Qionghai 03026 – One of two boats present under the direct command of Tanmen Militia Squad Leader Chen Zebo. Returned to Scarborough Shoal after initial standoff.
  • Qionghai 09099 – Under direct command of Tanmen Militia Squad Leader Xu Detan (许德谭). Returned to Scarborough Shoal after initial standoff.
  • Qionghai 02096 – Owned by Yu Ning (郁宁), Captain is Li Chengduan (李成端), Yu reported the incident to the Tanmen Border Defense Station.
  • Qionghai 03065 – Owned by Zhao Xuxian (赵绪贤); Zhao Shisong (赵市松) is captain. Returned to Scarborough Shoal after initial standoff.
  • Qionghai 05668 – A 300-ton vessel owned by Fu Mingyan (符名燕), its captain is Li Qiongmei (李琼美). Ship had 16 crewmen, 12 conducting underwater clam harvest. Returned to Scarborough Shoal after initial standoff. Qionghai 03889 – Captain is Chen Yiping (陈奕平), (also detained in 1998). Returned to Scarborough Shoal after initial standoff.

2012, May – Triton Island (中建岛):

Possible maritime militia vessel Qionghai 02067 is hired to carry “official” engineering surveyors and stone boundary markers to Triton Island. Media coverage states that crew members were skittish during the Chinese journalist’s inquiry.

2014 Spring – Half-Moon Shoal (半月礁):

Chen Zebo’s older brother Chen Zelong (陈则龙) encounters Philippine authorities.

2014, 6 May – Half-moon Shoal:

Two Tanmen fishing vessels are caught by Philippine personnel poaching endangered turtles near Half Moon Shoal on 6 May 2014. One of the fishing vessels, Qionghai 03168, escaped; Qionghai 09063 and 11 fishermen are detained by Philippine coast guardsmen reportedly disguised as fishermen. Orders were sent via the Beidou system to fishing vessels Qionghai 03168 and Qionghai 05067 to return to the area of last contact to conduct a search. China Coast Guard vessel 3102 was also recalled from its task of blockading Second Thomas Shoal to assist with the search.

While numerous open sources confirm the Tanmen Maritime Militia clearly exists and operates in the South China Sea, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain which of Tanmen’s fishing vessels are part of the militia and which are not. One incident on 25 May 2000, wherein a Tanmen fishing boat captain was shot and killed, yielded contradictory Chinese and Filipino narratives. Tanmen fishing vessel Qionghai 01068 was operating off the coast of Palawan when it encountered a Philippine Coast Guard Vessel. Chinese news coverage portrays Philippine thugs firing upon hapless Tanmen fishermen who drifted into Philippine waters after suffering engine failure. Philippine sources, however, assert that the Chinese fishermen were poaching inside Philippine waters (reported coordinates here) and catching endangered turtle species, an activity for which Tanmen fishermen are well-known. The fishing boat fled as the Philippine Coast Guard vessel approached. When the coast guard vessel fired warning shots to halt them, the fishermen reportedly fired back, sparking a firefight. With the captain dead at the helm, Qionghai 01068 came to a stop. Philippine police suspect the fishermen tossed their weapons into the water before the coast guard boarded. Previously-documented activities by the maritime militia in Tanmen and other areas of Hainan Province suggests that Chinese reports tend to omit important details to present an image of defensive victimization. Such discrepancies make it difficult for observers to separate truth from fiction as each claimant pursues its own interests in making its statements. This article’s scope primarily covers Chinese source materials on Tanmen Township (潭门镇)’s maritime militia; contradicting reports from other South China Sea claimant states merit further comparative research.

Ambiguity surrounding the identity of fishermen-based militia is a veil of protection often exploited by the PRC as it advances its maritime claims in the South China Sea. Even with proof of a boat’s connection to the militia, that force’s part-time nature means that most of the time personnel are non-uniformed and engaged in economic production. Nevertheless, domestic Chinese-language sources sometimes reveal the true identity of the maritime militia, clarifying a fishing vessel’s background. However, as the 10 April 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident makes clear, even when Tanmen fishing vessels may be operating for private gain, they can be quickly transformed into instruments of state policy when the situation calls for it.

The Scarborough Shoal event was the Tanmen militia’s most notable recent encounter and was likely the impetus behind President Xi Jinping’s widely reported visit to the unit. As outlined in the timeline above, twelve Tanmen fishing boats were operating at Scarborough Shoal, six inside the lagoon. The six were boarded by sailors from Philippine Navy vessel BRP Gregorio Del Pilar, who inspected their catches and took photographs. It also appears that Philippine forces’ protocol upon boarding a Chinese fishing vessel is to shut off the vessel’s communications equipment, including the Beidou satellite navigation terminal, as they did upon boarding Qionghai 09063 on 6 May 2014. Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) forces have difficulty interfering in Philippine inspections and arrests of fishermen if they cannot use the Beidou’s transmitter to locate the boarded vessel. Fortunately for Tanmen’s fishermen caught in the Scarborough Shoal lagoon, before Philippine sailors could stop him, Yu Ning (郁宁), owner of Qionghai 02096, was able to transmit several short messages to the phone of Fu Shibao (符史宝), the attendant at the Tanmen Village Border Defense Control Station’s command office. He did so by using the Beidou message transmission service, which can send messages directly to Fu’s phone. Upon receiving the messages “Philippine naval vessel No. 15 inbound,” Fu and his superior verified the reported vessel as the BRP Gregorio Del Pilar. Yu’s final message, “They are boarding,” prompted Fu to rapidly elevate the report to MLE authorities. China Maritime Surveillance ships CMS 75 and CMS 84 were dispatched to the shoal to intervene, arriving that afternoon. China Fisheries Law Enforcement ship YZ 303 left its mission at Mischief Reef to go full steam to Scarborough Shoal, arriving on 11 April. Fisheries cutter YZ 310 also left Guangzhou harbor on 18 April to arrive at Scarborough Shoal on the 20th. 

A report on the Qionghai City Government website features a profile of the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company Deputy Commander Wang Shumao (王书茂). It contains a description of his actions to support the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident. It appears that he was in command of the twelve Tanmen fishing vessels present during the incident, as he led an effort outside of the shoal to block any Philippine fishing vessels from entering the area. The article states that those Philippine fishing vessels were attempting to cross China’s “sea area defense line” (海域防护线), and that other Chinese fishing vessels in the area stopped fishing and joined in the rights protection force. The struggle continued until the 14th, when the remaining fishing vessels left the lagoon under escort by the law enforcement vessels. Some of the fishing vessels returned to Tanmen Harbor, while others continued on to operate in the Paracels.

However, just days after leaving the shoal, some of the Tanmen fishing vessels received notice from the Tanmen Fisheries Law Enforcement Department that it was again safe to operate at Scarborough Shoal. Having sustained economic losses from the incident, several of the Tanmen fishing vessels that had left quickly made the 500-mile journey to fish again at the shoal. This includes Qionghai 09099 and Qionghai 03026, whose captains are maritime militia squad leaders. That the identities of the fishermen are confirmed as maritime militia squad leaders who had been present inside the lagoon during the Scarborough Shoal Standoff and the militia company’s deputy commander operating outside the lagoon suggests that the Tanmen fishing vessels present at the shoal at some point became state-sponsored forces for China’s rights protection action at Scarborough Shoal. Additionally, under orders from shore command, Fisheries Law Enforcement vessel YZ 310 shared its own fuel with the fishing vessels for the stated purpose of maintaining their presence at Scarborough Shoal. By 25 April, eight Tanmen fishing vessels had returned to Scarborough Shoal. It is unclear whether the other vessels that returned, such as Qionghai 03065 and Qionghai 05668, are members of the Tanmen Maritime Militia. Balancing profitability and risk are normal considerations for regular fishermen. However, the tense incident at Scarborough Shoal, and the fact that these same fishermen were boarded days earlier at that shoal by armed commandos from the flagship of the Philippine Navy, renders unlikely the proposition of the Tanmen fishermen returning to the shoal out of concerns for economic profit.

11 April 2012: Fishing vessel Qionghai 09099, a confirmed maritime militia vessel operated by squad leader Xu Detan (center-front) and present at the Scarborough Shoal Standoff, is shown here detained by Philippine authorities for poaching giant clams.
11 April 2012: Fishing vessel Qionghai 09099, a confirmed maritime militia vessel operated by squad leader Xu Detan (center-front) and present at the Scarborough Shoal Standoff, is shown here detained by Philippine authorities for poaching giant clams.

One report from the Qionghai City Development Research Association covered an event held to commemorate the Tanmen fishermen’s contribution to “rights protection” at Scarborough Shoal. In attendance were Qionghai City’s officials and ten “fishermen representatives.” The report states that after the standoff began at Scarborough Shoal, Tanmen Township dispatched 25 fishing vessels in four groups to the shoal in response to a request from “higher national authorities.” Coverage of the event cited their bravery and obedience to commands while executing their mission to fish at Scarborough Shoal during the incident. Qionghai City officials then awarded the ten representatives with “consolation money” (慰问金), presumably meant to reimburse them for the costs of conducting their rights protection mission. It is thus clear that Tanmen fishermen were mobilized, possibly by central government authorities, to support China’s rights protection action at Scarborough Shoal.

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23 August 2012: Qionghai City leaders hold an award ceremony for “fishermen representatives” who participated in the rights protection action at Scarborough Shoal. Banner reads “Consolation Forum by Qionghai City Government for Fishermen that went to Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) for Rights Protection.” Tanmen “fishermen representatives” received “consolation money” for executing the missions assigned to them during the Scarborough Shoal Incident in April 2012.

Political Pilgrimage Begins…

The successful role of the Tanmen Militia in the Scarborough Shoal Incident resulted in visits by numerous delegations to Tanmen, where militia representatives urged others to emulate their example or to learn from their experiences. Some of this attention advances local economic development, but a greater focus is in the stated objective of protecting China’s sovereign rights and supporting “island” construction in the South China Sea. Although some visits predated Xi Jinping’s, it was his visit in 2013 that put Tanmen’s irregular sea forces on the national map.  

Xi Jinping’s visit to the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company was a symbolic gesture that catalyzed growth in maritime militia work nationwide. In the fashion of many Chinese political-economic endeavors, a model unit and locality were selected for all others to learn from and to emulate. The only thing needed was Xi’s stamp of approval to make it official.

Hainan Provincial Party Secretary Luo Baoming and Deputy Party Secretary Li Xiansheng helped lay the foundation for Hainan’s maritime militia construction. Luo visited Tanmen Township on 6 December 2012 and Li on 8 March 2013. Luo spoke with the community about the content of decisions by the CPC’s Eighteenth National Congress, explaining how China’s goals to develop marine resources, protect maritime sovereignty, and become a maritime power were good news for Tanmen’s development. The visits also likely helped prepare townspeople for the political movement about to unfold around them.

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10 April 2013: Chinese President Xi Jinping made a special trip to Tanmen fishing harbor during his tour of Hainan Province. This photo shows him inspecting the Tanmen maritime militia. Behind Xi is Hainan Province Deputy Secretary Li Xiansheng, head of the Hainan leading small group tasked with overseeing construction of maritime militia forces, vessels, equipment, infrastructure, and training.

In the aftermath of Xi’s visit, numerous delegations from other areas of the province made trips to Tanmen’s fishing harbor to learn from the “model work unit.” Most delegations held their ceremonial meetings aboard the same maritime militia vessel that Xi boarded, Qionghai 09045. The vessel’s captain, Platoon Leader Lu Chuan’an, appears to have assumed the role of maritime militia representative for the delegations. Below is a selective sampling of the delegations that visited Tanmen Township, ranging from Hainan’s local counties to national-level agencies:

  • 10 October 2012 – Delegation led by Guangzhou Military Region Deputy Chief of Staff.
  • 19 April 2013 – Delegation led by Party Secretary of Wanning City, Hainan Province.
  • 11 July 2013 – Delegation led by head of Hainan Province’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission.
  • 14 October 2013 – Representatives from Baoting County, Hainan Province.
  • 1 November 2013 – Delegation led by Party Secretary of Dongfang City, Hainan Province.
  • 15 November 2013 – Delegation led by Sansha City Mayor Xiao Jie. China’s newest city, built on Woody Island in the Paracels, this prefectural-level polity administers all PRC-occupied South China features ex-Hainan.
  • 25 March 2014 – Delegation from Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security.
  • 23 September 2014 – National People’s Congress Special Research Group led by Former Guangzhou Military Region Deputy Commander Lu Dingwen.
  • 17 October 2014 – Research group from Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
  • 26 March 2015 – Hainan Governor Liu Cigui; former director, State Oceanic Administration.
  • 16 April 2015 – Hainan Province, Lin Gao County Committee visit.
  • 3 August 2015 – Supervisory group from the National Ministry of Civil Affair’s Double-Support Office, dedicated to the PLA and governments’ mutual efforts to support each other, visits Tanmen and holds a conference in Qionghai.

Most news coverage of these visits showcases the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company as the “first stop.” Many photos in reports of the visit show delegation members visiting the maritime militia headquarters command’s sand table depicting South China Sea geomorphology with markers representing numerous features.

On 23 September 2014, for instance, former Guangzhou Military Region Deputy Commander Lü Dingwen (吕丁文) led a National People’s Congress Special Research Group to survey the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company. With the provincial deputy commander and Qionghai City officials in tow, the delegation followed the usual itinerary for all delegation visits to the Tanmen Maritime Militia. Afterward, it held a conference attended by Qionghai City and Tanmen Township officials, including officials from the City Oceanic and Fisheries Bureau, People’s Armed Forces Department, and fishermen and militia representatives. They discussed issues involving Tanmen fishermen’s income, fuel subsidies, medical insurance, and policy support. The Special Research Group then drafted a feasibility proposal and report for submission to their superiors in Beijing. It appears that Xi’s stamp of approval on Tanmen in particular, and the maritime militia generally, is resulting in research and possible future legislation efforts by the National People’s Congress. 

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23 September 2014: Former Guangzhou Military Region Deputy Commander Lü Dingwen inspecting the pilot house on one of the Tanmen Maritime Militia vessels.

The period after Xi’s visit saw Qionghai City and Tanmen Township transformed into a hotbed for new discussions on what role the militia should play in China’s effort to become a maritime power. In early 2014 Qionghai City hosted a symposium titled “Maritime Mobilization – 1312” held by the National Defense Mobilization Committee. Representatives from the province’s cities and counties came to discuss maritime militia construction, while units from other areas came to Tanmen Harbor for exercises.

With Xi’s having given the Tanmen Militia his stamp of approval as the model unit to emulate, previously influential but obscure grassroots-level figures, such as Deputy Commander Wang, Platoon Leader Lu Chuan’an, and Squad Leader Chen Zebo, will now feature prominently as exemplars in maritime militia work. Chen Zebo, in particular, has become famous for his aforementioned bravery against Philippine encroachments. He was first detained by Philippine authorities in 1998 when he was fishing at Scarborough Shoal, and reportedly held at Subic Bay for around 6 months. A year later his vessel was rammed and sunk by the Philippine navy, again at Scarborough Shoal. More than a decade later he became famous after he stood up to the Philippine authorities who boarded his boat at the start of the 2012 incident. Today, numerous Chinese news articles extol the Tanmen fishermen’s heroism, often profiling Chen Zebo as the archetype of the Tanmen Militia’s success.

This first part of the Tanmen Maritime Militia portion of our series examined the accumulated incidents and events that eventually put the Tanmen Militia on the radar of Chinese leaders, and its subsequent anointing as a model unit. The next installment in this continuing series on the leading irregular sea forces of Hainan Province (Tanmen Militia deep-dive, part two) will detail how the success of this company continued with its deployment to defend the HYSY 981 drilling rig in contested waters near Triton Island in the Paracels. It will also discuss the Tanmen Militia’s force structure, regulatory tensions, and the militia’s involvement in “island” building in the Spratlys.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a Professor of Strategy in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the Naval War College Review’s Editorial Board. He is an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and an expert contributor to the Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time Report. In 2013, while deployed in the Pacific as a Regional Security Education Program scholar aboard USS Nimitz, he delivered twenty-five hours of presentations. Erickson is the author of Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown Foundation, 2013). He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University. Erickson blogs at www.andrewerickson.com and www.chinasignpost.com. The views expressed here are Erickson’s alone and do not represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government.

Conor Kennedy is a research assistant in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received his MA at the Johns Hopkins University – Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies.

Featured Image: Tanmen fishing vessel receiving supplies and fuel from YZ 310 during the Scarborough Shoal Incident. Source: NDD Daily.

Global Analysis

Reflecting on the CIMSEC Forum For Authors and Readers

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By Kaitlin Sharkey

The 2nd Annual CIMSEC Forum for Authors and Readers (CFAR) showcased five member-selected contributions from the last year. Authors presented a recap of their articles as well as updates and future predictions. As a newcomer to CIMSEC and the concept of maritime security as a whole, I was most struck by the simultaneous breadth of the topics covered and depth of the members’ expertise. Presentations included analyses of strategy, history, and current events and incorporated a global range of geographic locations. Discussions between authors and members showed the wealth of experience and knowledge that characterizes CIMSEC.

The authors’ presentations were not fixed summaries but instead prompted critical thinking as to how current and past events can shape future maritime developments and strategy. What do the evacuations of civilians from Yemen tell us about foreign naval capacities? Can we predict the future role of the aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy based on historical debate? As the definition of maritime security evolves, how can U.S. maritime strategy encompass broader threats, like human trafficking and illegal fishing? CFAR enabled these discussions to continue outside of the written articles online and among a diverse group of sailors, academics, and policymakers. As a new CIMSEC member, I look forward to engaging with the community on these critical issues of maritime peace and security. Below are the author presentations.

Joshua Tallis discusses his article The New U.S. Maritime Strategy

Alejandro Sanchez discusses his article  Neither Side Appears Ready for War: Falklands/Malvinas Islands Analysis

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy of the Naval War College discuss their article China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia

Steve Wills discusses his article Four Carrier Crises and Yet No Funeral for the Large Flattop

Claude Berube also presented on his article The Role of Navies in the Yemeni Conflict, co-authored with Stephanie Chenault, Louis Martin-Vezian and Chris Rawley. The video replay is not uploaded per author request. Ryan Martinson, author of East Asian Security in the Age of the Chinese Mega-Cutter, was unable to attend.

The speaker lineup at CFAR demonstrates what is special about CIMSEC. None of the presenters are CIMSEC “fellows” or “staff writers,” they are people who sought to use CIMSEC as a platform for their analysis. They respect our top-notch audience and high standard. Anyone has the opportunity to publish with CIMSEC and have the chance to present at CFAR in the future. Interested authors can view the means at their disposal on our Write for CIMSEC page, and reach out to the editorial team at Nextwar@cimsec.org to see what we can accomplish. From the CIMSEC editorial team, thank you to all our readers, writers, and presenters. You are the driving force behind our success.

Kaitlin Sharkey is a defense consultant and CIMSEC Associate Editor. She holds a Master of Global Policy Studies from The University of Texas at Austin. 

Asia-Pacific, Cyber War

A Cyber-Information Operations Offset Strategy for Countering the Surge of Chinese Power

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The following is a two-part series on how the U.S. might better utilize cyberspace and information operations as a Third Offset. Part I will evaluate current offset proposals and explores the strategic context. Part II will provide specific cyber/IO operations and lines of effort.

By Jake Bebber 

“It is better by noble boldness to run the risk of being subject to half of the evils we anticipate than to remain in cowardly listlessness for fear of what might happen.”

-Herodotus, The Histories

Introduction

In 2014, then Secretary of Defense Hagel established the Defense Innovation Initiative, better known as the Third Offset, which is charged with recommending ways to sustain American military superiority in the face of growing capabilities fielded by powers such as Russia and China.[i] The purpose of the Third Offset is to “pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority” and to “find new and creative ways to sustain, and in some cases expand, our advantages even as we deal with more limited resources.” He pointed to recent historical challenges posed by the Soviets in the 1970’s which led to the development of “networked precision strike, stealth and surveillance for conventional forces.” Centrally-controlled, inefficient Soviet industries could not match the U.S. technological advantage, and their efforts to do so weakened the Soviet economy, contributing to its collapse.

Today, China represents the most significant long-term threat to America and will be the focus here. A number of leading organizations, both within and outside government, have put forward recommendations for a Third Offset. However, these strategies have sought to maintain or widen perceived U.S. advantages in military capabilities rather than target China’s critical vulnerabilities. More importantly, these strategies are predicated on merely affecting China’s decision calculus on whether to use force to achieve its strategic aims – i.e., centered around avoiding war between the U.S. and China. This misunderstands China’s approach and strategy. China seeks to win without fighting, so the real danger is not that America will find itself in a war with China, but that America will find itself the loser without a shot being fired. This paper proposes a Cyberspace-IO Offset strategy directly attacking China’s critical vulnerability: its domestic information control system. By challenging and ultimately holding at risk China’s information control infrastructure, the U.S. can effectively offset China’s advantages and preserve America’s status as the regional security guarantor in Asia.

All effective strategies target the adversary’s center of gravity (COG), or basis of power. “Offset strategies” are those options that are especially efficient because they target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, while building on U.S. strengths, to “offset” the opponent’s advantages. Ideally, such strategies are difficult for an adversary to counter because they are constrained by their political system and economy. Today, China’s COG is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The stability of this system depends greatly on the ability of the Chinese regime to control information both within China, and between China and the outside. Without this control, opposition groups, minority groups, and factions within the CCP itself could organize more effectively and would have greater situational awareness for taking action. Thus, information control is potentially a critical Chinese vulnerability. If the United States can target the ability of the Chinese regime to control information, it could gain an efficient means to offset Chinese power. This offset strategy, using cyberspace and other information operations (IO) capabilities, should aim to counter China during the critical window in the next ten to twenty years when Chinese economic and military power will surge, and then subside as demographic, economic and social factors limit its growth.

Targeting the CCP’s ability to control information can be considered a long-term IO campaign with options to operate across the spectrum of conflict: peacetime diplomacy and battlespace preparation; limited conflict; and, if deterrence fails, full-scale military operations. The goal is to ensure that PRC leaders believe that, as conflict escalates, they will increasingly lose their ability to control information within China and from outside, in part because the U.S. would be prepared to use more drastic measures to impede it.

This strategy is most efficient because it serves as an organizing concept for cyber options targeted against China that would otherwise be developed piecemeal. It could serve as a means to prioritize research and development, and better link military planning for cyberspace operations to public diplomacy, strategic communication, and economic policy initiatives. The nature of cyberspace operations makes it difficult to attribute actions back to the United States with certainty, unless we wish it to be known that the U.S. is conducting this activity. Finally, it provides an alternative array of responses that policy makers can use to offset growing Chinese power without immediate direct military confrontation.

Demographic, economic and social factors will combine to create a ceiling on Chinese power, ultimately causing it to enter a period of decline much sooner than it expects.[ii] These factors will stress the Communist Party’s ability to exclude economic, social and political participation of dissenters, and create further reliance by the Party on information control systems.

The Strategic Environment

The United States is a status quo power. It seeks to retain its position of dominance while realizing that relative to other powers, its position may rise or fall given the circumstances. It supports the post-World War II international order – a mix of international legal and liberal economic arrangements that promote free trade and the resolution of disputes through international organizations or diplomatic engagement when possible. The United States recognizes the growth of China, and that it will soon achieve “great power” status, if not already. It is most advantageous to the United States if the “rise” (or more correctly, return to great power status) of China occurs peacefully, and within the already established framework of international rules, norms, and standards.

There are two important considerations. First is the “singularity” of China with respect to its self-understanding and its role in the world. China views the last two centuries – a time when China was weak internally and under influence from foreign powers – as an aberration in the natural world order. Most Chinese consider their several thousand year history as the story of China occupying the center of the world with “a host of lesser states that imbibed Chinese culture and paid tribute to China’s greatness …” This is the natural order of things. In the West, it was common to refer to China as a “rising power,” but again, this misreads China’s history. China was almost always the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific, punctuated by short periods of turmoil. It just so happened that the birth and growth of the United States took place during one of those periods of Chinese weakness.[iii]

The strategic approach of China is markedly different, based on its concept of shi, or the “strategic configuration of power.” The Chinese “way of war” sees little difference in diplomacy, economics and trade, psychological warfare (or in today’s understanding, “information warfare”) and violent military confrontation. To paraphrase the well-known saying, the acme of strategy is to preserve and protect the vital interests of the state without having to resort to direct conflict while still achieving your strategic purpose. The goal is to build up such a dominant political and psychological position that the outcome becomes a foregone conclusion. This is in contrast to Western thought which emphasizes superior power at a decisive point.[iv]

To the American leadership, the “most dangerous” outcome of a competition with China would seem to be one that leads to war; hence the near-desperate desire to not undertake any action which might lead China down that path. Yet a better understanding of China suggests that it believes it can (and is) achieving its strategic purpose without having to resort to force. Its military buildup, use of economic trade agreements, diplomacy, and domestic social stability are creating the very political and psychological conditions where the use of force becomes unnecessary. China is quite content to remain in “Phase 0” with the United States, because it  believes it is winning there. Thus, the question for America is not “How do we maintain the status quo in Phase 0?” but “How do we win in Phase 0?” The most dangerous course of action is not war with China, but losing to China without a shot being fired.

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Figure 1. In 2015, China reorganized the PLA and created a new Cyber Warfare branch under its Strategic Support Force.

Current Offset Proposals

In response to the call for proposals, a number of initiatives and programs have been put forward by both the Department of Defense and leading national security think tanks. The underlying assumption of most of these proposals is that the United States has lost or is quickly losing its “first mover” advantage – such as that offered by the shift from unguided to guided munitions delivered from a position of stealth or sanctuary. In this regard, China represents a “pacing threat,” leading the way in developing its own guided weapons regime and the ability to deliver them asymmetrically against the United States.[v] In order to regain America’s military advantage, most recommendations follow along these lines:

  • Development and procurement of new platforms and technologies that leverage current perceived technological advantages over China in such areas as:
    • Unmanned autonomous systems;
    • Undersea warfare;
    • Extended-range and low-observable air operations;
    • Directed energy; and
    • Improved power systems and storage.
  • New approaches to forward basing, including hardening of infrastructure (both physical and communication networks), the use of denial and deception techniques and active defense;
  • Countering China’s threats to U.S. space-based surveillance and command and control systems;
  • Assisting allies and friends in the development of or exporting of new technologies that impose smaller-scale anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) costs on China; and
  • Reconstitute and reinvigorate Department of Defense “iterative, carefully adjudicated tabletop exercises and model-based campaign assessments.”[vi]

These approaches[vii] may have much to offer and are commendable, however they suffer from a glaring weakness: none target China’s center of gravity or critical vulnerabilities. They seek to leverage capabilities where the United States appears to enjoy an advantage, such as undersea warfare. For example, while it may be true that the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) is not as proficient as the U.S. Navy (or some allies) in the undersea domain, it is also true that the Chinese regime is investing heavily to “close the gap” in these and other capabilities or is developing asymmetric alternatives. The United States will face a diminishing marginal utility as it attempts to maintain or widen the gap, especially in an era when China’s cyberspace-enabled information exploitation capabilities are extremely robust, and capable of transferring intellectual property back to China on a scale unimaginable in the Cold War.

More fundamentally, the offsets proposed are not guided by an overarching grand strategy that utilizes all elements of national power attacking key weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in the Chinese regime, much in the same way that the Reagan Administration was able to do against the Soviets. Reagan’s policy and strategy represented a “sharp break from his predecessors,” eschewing containment in favor of attacking “the domestic sources of Soviet foreign behavior.”[viii] By recognizing the inherent weakness of the Soviet economic system, the new policy sought to leverage national military, political and economic tools to press the American advantage home, causing the Soviet system to collapse. This is not to suggest that the Chinese economic system suffers from the same malaise as their Soviet brethren did. Despite growing demographic, social and economic headwinds, it is unlikely that the United States can “bankrupt” the Chinese. However, China does have acute vulnerabilities – vulnerabilities which align with unique American advantages.

China’s Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities

None of the proposed previously mentioned offset lines of effort attempt to identify or target China’s COG. The center of gravity is defined by Milan Vego is “a source of massed strength – physical or moral – or a source of leverage whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability to accomplish a given political/military objective.”[ix] Joint military doctrine defines it as “The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”[x] The center of gravity concept is important to offset strategies because it enhances “the chance that one’s sources of power are used in the quickest and most effective way for accomplishing a given political/military objective.” It is the essence of “the proper application of the principles of objective, mass and economy of effort.”[xi]

Using an analytic construct designed by Vego, we note that any military situation encompasses a large number of both “physical and so-called abstract military and nonmilitary elements.” These are the “critical factors” that require attention and are deemed essential to the accomplishment of the objective, both of the adversary and ourselves. Not surprisingly, these factors encompass both critical strengths and critical weaknesses – both of which are essential. Critical vulnerabilities are “those elements of one’s military or nonmilitary sources of power open to enemy attack, control, leverage, or exploitation.” By attacking critical vulnerabilities, we ultimately attack the enemy center of gravity.[xii] The figure below shows notionally how China’s information control systems are a critical vulnerability (note that it is not all-encompassing).

Figure 2. Notional Center of Gravity Analysis[xiii].
Figure 2. Notional Center of Gravity Analysis[xiii].
According to Vego, it is generally agreed that for most authoritarian/totalitarian regimes, the dictator, central governing party or leadership committee is the strategic center of gravity. In the case of China, the CCP is the sole governing political party. The top leadership of the CCP is the Politburo Standing Committee (or Central Standing Committee), currently made up of seven members and led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. A number of factors permit the continued rule of the CCP, including a massive domestic security apparatus and the world’s largest military, a growing standard of living and state control over media and information available to its people. In many ways, the Chinese leadership have already conducted their own vulnerability analysis and concluded that the free flow of information represents the biggest threat to their power – we can see this in both their words and deeds. China spends more on domestic security than on its own military. The last officially reported figures from the PRC in 2013 show the military budget was approximately 740.6 billion yuan ($119 billion) while domestic security received 769.1 billion yuan ($121 billion).[xiv] Beginning in 2014, the PRC stopped reporting on domestic security spending.[xv] In 2015, the PRC announced an 11 percent increase in “public security” spending to 154.2 billion yuan, or $24.6 billion. However, the total amount spent on domestic security remains unreported, and is certainly much higher, since regional and provincial figures are not provided. The reported military spending was 886.9 billion yuan, approximately $139 billion.[xvi] Fourteen separate state ministries are charged with domestic censorship responsibilities, everything from traditional press and broadcast media to text messages on cell phones.[xvii] A form of self-censorship has been institutionalized with Chinese internet companies being required to sign a “Public Pledge on Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet Industry.”[xviii] In short, China has already shown what it fears most and where it is most vulnerable – it has performed its own “COG analysis” and has identified information control as a critical requirement to maintain CCP dominance.

cyber 3
Figure 3. In 2015, the U.S. and China met to discuss recent cyberspace issues.

A Cyberspace – IO Strategy

China’s regime identifies the free flow of information as an existential threat, and has erected a massive bureaucratic complex to censor and restrict free access to the nearly 618 million (and growing) Chinese internet uses (and 270 million social network users).[xix] However, the very nature of the Internet as a networked system makes censorship and restricted access difficult to maintain. As has been shown, China’s information control systems represent a critical vulnerability to their center of gravity. China’s network security is managed by a fragmented, disjointed system of “frequently overlapping and conflicting administrative bodies and managing organizations.”[xx]

China’s cyberspace operations and strategy are driven primarily by domestic concerns, with its central imperative being the preservation of Communist Party rule. Domestic security, economic growth and modernization, territorial integrity and the potential use of cyberspace for military operations define China’s understanding. Even its diplomatic and international policies are built around giving China maneuvering room to interpret international norms, rules and standards to serve domestic needs, principally through the primacy of state sovereignty. This creates a natural tension, as China must seek to balance economic growth and globalization with maintaining the Party’s firm grip on power. Not only is Internet usage controlled and censored, but it is also a tool for state propaganda.[xxi]

Chinese authorities use a number of techniques to control the flow of information. All internet traffic from the outside world must pass through one of three large computer centers in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou – the so-called “Great Firewall of China.” Inbound traffic can be intercepted and compared to a regularly updated list of forbidden keywords and websites and the data blocked.[xxii] Common censorship tactics[xxiii] include:

  • Blocking access to specific Internet Protocol (IP) addresses;
  • Domain Name System (DNS) filtering and redirection, preventing the DNS from resolving or returning an incorrect IP address;
  • Uniform Resource Locator (URL) filtering, scanning the targeted website for keywords and blocking the site, regardless of the domain name;
  • Packet filtering, which terminates Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) transmission when a certain number of censored keywords are detected. This is especially useful against search engine requests.
  • “Man-in-the-Middle” attack, allowing a censor to monitor, alter or inject data into a communication channel;
  • TCP connection reset, disrupting the communication data link between two points;
  • Blocking of Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections; and
  • Network Enumeration, which initiates an unsolicited connection to computers (usually in the United States) for the purpose of blocking IP addresses. This is usually targeted against secure network systems or anonymity networks like “Tor.”

cyber 4
Figure 4. Simplified Chinese Firewall Topology[xxiv].
China also heavily regulates and monitors Internet service providers, Internet cafes, and university bulletin board systems. It requires registration of websites and blogs, and has conducted a number of high profile arrests and crackdowns on both dissidents and Internet service providers. This “selective targeting” has created an “undercurrent of fear and promoted self-censorship.” The government employs thousands who monitor and censor Internet activity as well as promote CCP propaganda.[xxv]

China’s information control regime is vulnerable on a number of levels to a coordinated strategy that seeks to hold it at risk. From a technical standpoint, the distributed nature of the internet makes it inherently vulnerable, the “Great Firewall” notwithstanding. The techniques used to filter and block content have a number of workarounds available to the average person. For example, IP addresses that have been blocked may be accessed utilizing a proxy server – an intermediary server that allows the user to bypass computer filters. DNS filtering and redirection can be overcome by modifying the Host file or directly typing in the IP address (64.233.160.99) instead of the domain name (www.google.com). These are simple examples that a novice government censor can easily outwit, but the point remains.

China has long been rightfully accused of being a state-sponsor of cybercrime and theft of intellectual property. One negative consequence of this from China’s perspective is the high level of cybercrime within China “due in large part to rampant use and distribution of pirated technology” which creates vulnerabilities. It is estimated that 54.9 percent of computers in China are infected with viruses, and that 1,367 out of 2,714 government portals examined in 2013 “reported security loopholes.”[xxvi] China’s networks themselves, by virtue of their size and scope, represent a gaping vulnerability.

At the same time, China’s information control bureaucracy is especially unwieldy. This is an ideal target to exploit the seams and gaps both horizontally and vertically in their notoriously byzantine structure. The fourteen agencies that conduct internet monitoring and censorship operations must all compete for resources and the attention of policy makers, leading to organizational conflict and competition. Any strategy should exploit these fissures, complicating China’s ability to control information.

Part 2 will outline several lines of effort the U.S. might pursue to attack China’s critical vulnerabilities in its information control system. It will advance the notion that the full range of American power – overt, covert, diplomatic, economic, information and military – must be coordinated and managed at the national level to wage a successful information operations campaign. Based on America’s past success, the future may be brighter than it first appears. Read Part 2 here.

LT Robert “Jake” Bebber USN is a Cryptologic Warfare Officer assigned to United States Cyber Command. His previous assignments have included serving as an Information Operations officer in Afghanistan, Submarine Direct Support Officer and the Fleet Information Warfare Officer for the U.S. Seventh Fleet. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from the University of Central Florida. His writing has appeared in Proceedings, Parameters, Orbis and elsewhere. He lives in Millersville, Maryland and is supported by his wife, Dana and their two sons, Vincent and Zachary. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy or U.S. Cyber Command. He welcomes your comments at jbebber@gmail.com.

[i] Charles Hagel. “The Defense Innovation Initiative .” Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 15, 2014.

[ii] Robert Bebber. “Countersurge: A Better Understanding of the Rise of China and the Goals of U.S. Policy in East Asia.” Orbis 59 no. 1 (2015): 49-61.

[iii] Kissinger, Henry. On China. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2012).

[iv] David Lai. “Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi.” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. May 1, 2004, accessed Decmeber 26, 2014. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=378

[v] Shawn W. Brimley. “The Third Offset Strategy: Security America’s Military-Technical Advantage.” Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. Washington, D.C., December 2, 2014.

[vi] David.Ochmanek. “The Role of Maritime and Air Power in the DoD’s Third Offset Strategy.” Testimoney Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. Washington, D.C., December 2, 2014.

[vii] This list is certainly not exhaustive. For a more thorough review of the ones mentioned, see:. Brimley, Shawn W. “The Third Offset Strategy: Security America’s Military-Technical Advantage.” Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. Washington, D.C., December 2, 2014. Martinage, Robert. “Statement Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces on the Role of Maritime and Air Power in DoD’s Third Offset Strategy.” Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. Washington, D.C., December 2, 2014. Ochmanek, David. “The Role of Maritime and Air Power in the DoD’s Third Offset Strategy.” Testimoney Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. Washington, D.C., December 2, 2014.

[viii] Thomas G. Mahnken.”The Reagan Administration’s Strategy Toward the Soviet Union.” In Successful Strategies: Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present, by Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

[ix] Milan N. Vego. Joint Operational Warfare – Theory and Practice. (Newport, RI: Government Printing Office, 2007) VII-13-29.

[x] Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operational Planning. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011).

[xi] Vego, Joint Operational Warfare – Theory and Practice, VII-15

[xii] Ibid, VII-15.

[xiii] Joint Publication 5.0 defines Critical Capability as “A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s);” Critical Requirement as “An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational;” and Critical Vulnerability as “An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect  attack that will create decisive or significant effects.”

[xiv] Ben Blanchard and John Ruwich. “China Hikes Defense Budget, To Spend More on Internal Security.” Reuters, March 5, 2013, accessed December 23, 2014.http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-china-parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305  

[xv] Michael Martina. “China Withholds Full Domestic Security-Spending Figure.” Reuters, March 4, 2014, accessed September 25, 2015.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/05/us-china-parliament-security-idUSBREA240B720140305

[xvi] Ting Shi and Keith Zhai. “China To Boost Security Spending as Xi Fights Dissent, Terrorism.” Bloomberg News, March 5, 2015 accessed September 25, 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-05/china-to-boost-security-spending-as-xi-fights-dissent-terrorism

[xvii] Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield. “China’s Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet.” The New York Times, April 7, 2010, accessed December 23, 2014.http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/world/asia/08censor.html

[xviii] Biena Xu. Media Censorship in China. February 2014, accessed December 23, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515

[xix] Ibid..

[xx] Amy Chang. Warring State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy. (Washginton, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2014) 12.

[xxi] Rebecca MacKinnon. “Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship and Civic Discourse in China.” Public Choice 134 (2008): 31-46.

[xxii] Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield. “China’s Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet.”

[xxiii] Jonathan Zittrain, and Benjamin Edelman. “Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China.” Harvard Law School Berkman Center for Internet and Society. March 20, 2003, accessed December 23, 2014. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/

[xxiv] Available at: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4931595

[xxv] Thomas Lum, Patricia Moloney Figliona, and Matthew C. Weed. China, Internet Freedom, and U.S. Policy. Report for Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013).

[xxvi] Amy Chang. Warring State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy. 15. 

Europe

Trident: An Introduction to the UK National Debate

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By Alex Calvo

Introduction

Ever since its conception, the UK’s sea-based deterrent Trident has prompted a measure of controversy. This includes, among others, the wider question of nuclear armament, the system’s opportunity cost (in this context, the weapons or other security and defence assets the UK stops buying or producing in order to pay for Trident) the indirect impact on the conventional defence budget, and the British “minimal” nuclear posture and doctrine. Trident has also been part of debates such as the UK’s place in the world, her relationship with the EU, and the “special relationship” with the US, while featuring strongly in the 2014 Scottish referendum. While the Conservative victory in the last election featured a “manifesto that included a commitment to build four new ballistic missile submarines … replacing the Vanguard submarines that come out of service from the early 2030s,” as stressed by British Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, the debate is still likely to continue, boosted by both political and technological factors. The purpose of this four-part series is to outline the most important terms of the debate, in a language accessible to non-specialists, providing a short yet comprehensive look at the matter. An effort has been made to sum up the different views on this issue, and to present alternatives.

In the first installment in the series, we review some key concepts in nuclear strategy theory and look at the basic characteristics of the Trident system, which provides sea-based, national, and minimum deterrence. We then examine the costs involved, what is meant by “extending Trident,” and discuss the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence. This first part concludes with a look at the gap between the UK’s nuclear and conventional postures.

Preliminary Considerations

The basis of nuclear deterrence is the belief that a country equipped with nuclear weapons will not be attacked by another nuclear power because this would result in an exchange and the resulting destruction of both countries. As a result, a “balance of terror” is achieved, whereby nobody uses this kind of weapon, which nevertheless, in spite of being “unusable,” plays a key role in the national security of nuclear powers. The concept of nuclear “mutual deterrence” quickly gained currency as soon as the US nuclear monopoly was breached in 1949, with the Soviet Union’s maiden nuclear test, and became one of the defining characteristics of the Cold War. It is also known as MAD (“mutually assured destruction.”)

It is important to stress two aspects of mutual deterrence:

1. A key condition is the invulnerability of both nuclear deterrents. If there is no way country A can destroy the nuclear weapons of country B, and vice versa, then none will have an incentive to use them, since it would inevitably result in the attacker’s destruction. This would happen, no matter who attacked first, the end result being the same. Attacking first only means dying a bit later. Thus, this acts as a stabilizer at times of crisis, since there is no incentive to strike first in order not to lose one’s nuclear deterrent, there is thus no “use them or lose them” factor. This explains why, during the Cold War, the two superpowers agreed to limit work on anti-missile defences, signing the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. While it may seem counterintuitive, by agreeing to have their cities remain vulnerable to a nuclear strike, they considered to be favouring stability. A working missile shield may have tempted its owner into believing that a nuclear war was “winnable,” one of the reasons for continued Russian hostility in this area. This need to guarantee the invulnerability of one’s nuclear forces also explains the drive to develop sea-based deterrents in the form of submarines equipped with nuclear missiles. Since it is very difficult to detect a submarine, it is expected to survive an attack, thus removing any incentive for the enemy to strike first in the hope of destroying one’s nuclear missiles. Again, like in the case of the ballistic missile defence ban, this was considered to contribute to stability, reducing the risk of nuclear war.

2. The possession of nuclear weapons by two powers, under the above circumstances (vulnerability of their population and invulnerability of the weapons themselves) meant, according to the theory, that nuclear war would not take place. Proponents of nuclear deterrence cite the Cold War as evidence for this. However, neither the theory nor actual historical evidence excluded the possibility of conventional or asymmetrical war (in this series, we will understand “asymmetric warfare” in a broad sense of the term, including terrorism, insurgency, non-lethal use of force, and the currently very much en vogue “mixed war” or “hybrid warfare”). Indeed, the Cold War did not feature any nuclear exchange, but many conventional conflicts took place, involving proxies and sometimes one of the superpowers as well, in addition to myriad instances of terrorism and insurgency. Concerning the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons, some countries have issued a guarantee that the former would not be used against a non-nuclear enemy, but not all have, and even where a formal guarantee exists, some observers doubt a nuclear-weapons state would renounce using them if its very existence or essential national interest was at stake.

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October 2012 test off the coast of Florida, the first in three years by a British strategic nuclear submarine.

Right from the beginning it was clear that nuclear weapons would have a major impact on warfighting, and the British nuclear program and the later US Manhattan Project were fueled by fears that Nazi Germany may be more advanced in this field. Nuclear weapons were controversial even before they were first used, with some of the nuclear scientists involved making a last-minute attempt to employ a device for a “demonstration” in the hope Imperial Japan would surrender without the need for the mass destruction of civilian lives. Later years saw campaigns against nuclear weapons, often wider and including a blanket opposition to civil nuclear power, while some countries made desperate efforts to secure their own deterrent, and others signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states in exchange for some sort of guarantee by an accepted nuclear power that the latter would use, if necessary, its own nuclear weapons to defend them. This practice, known as “extended deterrence,” should not be forgotten, since it is doubtful that without it so many countries would have accepted the NPT. This division of countries into two leagues, only one of which was allowed to own nuclear weapons according to international law, was bitterly denounced by India, which branded it as “Nuclear Apartheid.” Other established nuclear powers kept insisting that “non-proliferation,” the policy of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, was conducive to stability. One may note a certain contradiction between the concepts of deterrence and non-proliferation, whose relationship is complex. In recent years New Delhi has signed a number of agreements with the US and other countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, so that we can now say India is a “de facto” recognized nuclear weapons state outside the NPT.

Trident: The Basics

In a few words, Trident is a sea-based national minimum nuclear deterrent.

Sea-based because it consists of four Vanguard-class submarines equipped with nuclear missiles. As explained above, submarines are considered to be very difficult to detect and destroy, making them the ideal platform for deterrence, since an aggressor managing to destroy UK population centers could expect swift retaliation in kind. To achieve this, it is necessary to always have at least one submarine on patrol (known as CASD, “Continuous At Sea Deterrence”), with four widely considered to be the minimum number of boats needed to achieve this. Otherwise, an aggressor aware of a window of vulnerability, with no submarines on patrol, may choose to strike at that particular time. This minimum number means that it is not really possible to cut the cost of the program by reducing the number of units deployed, since below this minimum the key objective of one submarine in patrol at all times would no longer be achievable. It should also be stressed that there is no absolute guarantee that a submarine is invulnerable, since technological developments may enable an enemy to track and destroy or otherwise neutralize them. In part three of our series we will discuss cyberwarfare and submarine drones, whose potential impact on Trident has been discussed over the last few months. It is also necessary to take into account that, while four is widely considered to suffice for the purposes of nuclear deterrence, this number comes from statistical studies and past experience, but does not amount to any iron-clad guarantee in the face of possible trouble from, among others, damage, malfunction, or cyber attacks.

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Infographic with details of Trident submarines and their missiles.

National, since it is owned and operated by Her Majesty’s Government, being under national command. It must be noted though, as discussed later, that the technology employed is not exclusively British, being dependent to a considerable extent on the United States. The missiles are American, the submarines and warheads British. Second, British nuclear doctrine does not exclude the possibility of employing Trident to protect NATO Allies. The UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review states that “The UK has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies, and we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use.”

Minimum, for a number of reasons. First, because it only features submarines, one of the legs of a possible “Nuclear Triad,” the others being land-based missiles and aircraft-dropped bombs. Second, because the number of submarines is the smallest compatible with a continued patrol capability. Third, because these submarines only carry a fraction of the missiles and warheads they are capable of delivering (8 and 40 respectively, instead of 16 and 192 originally envisaged). Fourth, because British nuclear doctrine, while not going as far as ruling out, for example, a first nuclear strike, or an attack against a non-nuclear country, seeks to considerably restrict the scenarios in which atomic weapons may be employed. This is clear for example in the section on “Five Enduring Principles” in the 2006 white paper titled “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent.” The 2006 white paper states that “the UK will retain only the minimum amount of destructive power required to achieve our deterrence objectives.”

Trident can thus be seen as a compromise solution between, on the one hand, the perceived need for a nuclear deterrent, and on the other the wish to minimize its scope. This does not mean that it results from a simplistic calculation, since many other factors may have influenced the choice including inter-service considerations and relations with the US, just to mention two, and to be discussed later.

How Much Does Trident Cost?

Given that a key aspect of the debate is financial, it is necessary to bear in mind how much money we are talking about, both concerning the existing Trident system, and the possible replacement of its submarines. In 2012 the Secretary of State for Defence replied to two parliamentary questions covering these issues, saying that “As stated in the White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994) published in December 2006, we expect that once the new successor nuclear deterrent submarine comes into service, the in-service costs of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, which will include Atomic Weapons Establishment’s costs, will be similar to today (around 5% to 6% of the defence budget)” and, concerning the estimate for “the cost of design and build for a replacement continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent system” that “current forecast costs, including planned Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme efficiency measures, indicate that we remain within the 2006 White Paper estimates of £11 billion to £14 billion (at 2006-07 prices) for the Successor platform costs (assuming a four boat fleet).”

With regard to the cost of the new submarines, the then coalition government officially confirmed in 2011 the 2006 estimate by the previous Labour administration. In present-day pounds, it would be “£20 billion to £25 billion at out-turn” according to then Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox, who added “Between now and main gate [in 2016] we expect to spend about 15% of the total value of the programme. That is entirely consistent with defence procurement guidance. The cost of long lead items is expected to amount to about £500 million.” As is generally the case with defence procurement, it may be difficult to provide accurate cost estimates given possible overruns, unexpected contingencies, and evolving technological and doctrinal changes. The long life span makes any calculation even more difficult, with London-based think-tank RUSI noting that “estimating total costs for a programme which will last beyond 2050 is a highly speculative exercise.” What seems clear is that the sums involved are substantive, yet within the means of the UK. Thus, although cost may be used by detractors of the program or of nuclear deterrence in general, what matters the most from a defence policy perspective is first whether a more economic alternative may be found to provide the UK with an equivalent nuclear deterrent, and second the opportunity cost of Trident for conventional defence. Both will be covered later in our four-part series.

We should also note that in assessing the cost of alternatives to Trident, the schedule to replace the existing submarines must be taken into account. This means that some alternatives that may seem cheaper are no longer so when the time to develop them is taken into account. The Trident Alternatives Review admits that “The costs of delivering an alternative system could theoretically have been cheaper than procuring a like-for-like renewal of Trident” but adds “were it not for timing and the fact that the UK deterrent infrastructure is finely tuned to support a submarine-based Trident system. In particular, the time it would take to develop a new warhead (itself a costly and high risk exercise) is judged to be longer than the current Vanguard-class submarines can safely be operated.” Also relevant is the fact that, as noted by think-tank BASIC, “Replacement of the submarines is already underway in several respects,”

What do we mean by “extending” Trident?

We should briefly note that the decision to be taken by the current parliament does not, strictly speaking, directly involve the Trident missiles or their warheads but the Vanguard class submarines carrying them. As noted by an observer, “The same Trident 2 D5 missiles currently in service will continue to be used at least out to 2042, so it is most definitely not a matter of replacing Trident. The warheads are also good out to 2032 at least, as they are subject to a life extension programme which brings them to MK4A standard” but “The four Vanguard submarines, on the other hand, can no longer be life extended safely and effectively. Their useful life has already been stretched and the first of the class is now due to soldier on until 2028, but it is assessed that extending further is not desirable.”

Nuclear Deterrence: Still Needed?

The first question to answer when considering the future of Trident is whether the concept of nuclear deterrence is still current or has become obsolete. A second question is whether a country needs to be a nuclear weapons state in order to be a top diplomatic power. Third, we have the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear defence, and more precisely whether nuclear weapons are necessary to wage conventional or asymmetric war.

As discussed later, an affirmative answer to these questions does not automatically mean we should support Trident, since other nuclear alternatives exist, but should we answer them in the negative then it would be logical to defend Trident’s end.

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Nuclear-themed pin-up. Ever since its invention, the bomb has had a contradictory place in popular culture, as a harbinger of both Armageddon and supreme power.

With regard to the first question, as long as other powers sport their own nuclear forces, and even more so if tensions or significant conflicts persist with some such powers, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is indeed necessary for the UK to retain her own nuclear deterrent. Terminating it would mean that the country may become the victim of nuclear blackmail. It is true that the UK may seek to rely on extended deterrence (also known as the “nuclear umbrella”) by the United States, but this would mean outsourcing national security, with the corresponding loss of power and influence on the one hand, and the risk that American authorities may not be ready (or may be perceived by a potential aggressor as not being ready) to risk American lives to preserve British ones. Some observers in Japan, which relies on US extended deterrence, have often posed the question whether America would be willing to “trade LA for Tokyo,” and as noted by a Congressional Research Service paper “Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella,’ although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.” A similar question could be asked with regard to London, Manchester, or Birmingham.

Furthermore, it should be noted from a financial and industrial perspective that relying on extended deterrence may also directly or indirectly lead to the UK shouldering part of the cost of providing that protection, without the industrial benefits from having a national system. This may be another consideration against the nuclear umbrella as opposed to an independent deterrent.

It must be noted, though, that some observers doubt the value of a nuclear deterrent, and furthermore point at recent history as evidence that money should best be spent elsewhere. For example, writing for RUSI, Hugh Beach argues that “It cannot be shown that by virtue of its UK nuclear arsenal, Britain has been able to take any action vis-à-vis another country that it could not otherwise have undertaken, nor prevented action by any other country that it could not otherwise have prevented. British nuclear weapons did not deter Argentina from attempting to annex the Falkland Islands in 1982,” a line of thought that he extends to other nuclear powers.

The Gap between the UK’s Nuclear and Conventional Posture

In connection with the above, we should mention that, as noted by RUSI’s Malcolm Chalmers, British conventional and nuclear defence policy may be seen as out of step. The former is based on the assumption that no state conflict involving the homeland is foreseeable, whereas the latter is posited on the opposite assumption. Chalmers wrote “Discussion of options for conventional capability in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is based on the assumption that the UK homeland does not face a significant threat of attack by other states. Nor, it is assumed, could one emerge without an extended period of strategic warning. While the UK plans to maintain and improve capabilities for a range of national tasks, including strategic intelligence, counter-terrorism, counter-cyber, and defence of dependent territories, these tasks do not include defence of the UK against military attack by other states. The main focus of conventional force planning, accordingly, is now on the appropriate size and shape of the UK’s contribution to collective capabilities for intervention and stabilisation in other parts of the world. By contrast, the commitment to maintain a nuclear-armed missile submarine on patrol at all times (i.e., CASD) has remained largely unchanged since the 1960s, when a surprise attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union was a central driver for UK force planning.” Although this different posture is clearly in place and can be observed in the respective doctrinal documents, we should be careful before reaching any rushed conclusions. We should also be careful before imagining that the solution to the Trident debate is to put nuclear policy in line with conventional doctrine and forego or downgrade the British deterrent. Possibly because it is conventional doctrine that needs an in-depth review in a more realistic direction. Second, because there may not be, as discussed later, a gulf between conventional and non-conventional defence, but rather a continuous spectrum. In other words, any cuts in nuclear capabilities or credibility may have a negative impact on conventional deterrence and the ability to wage conventional, unconventional, and hybrid war.

In our second part, we shall first examine the impact of nuclear weapons on a country’s hard and soft power, and then proceed to discuss “Hybrid warfare” under a nuclear umbrella. While this term has become a buzzword, it is often examined without taking into account its non-conventional dimension, thus failing to capture its complexity. We shall also cover Trident’s opportunity cost and, as some opponents argue, whether it may constitute an obstacle for British conventional rearmament. This second installment concludes with a look at the connection between Trident and, on the one hand, the “special relationship” between London and Washington, and, on the other, the UK’s place within the European Union, the subject of a referendum on 23 June.

Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University, Japan, focuses on security and defense policy, international law, and military history in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. He tweets at Alex__Calvo and his papers can be found here. Previous work on British nuclear policy includes A. Calvo and O. Olsen, “Defending the Falklands: A role for nuclear weapons?” Strife Blog, 29 July 2014, available here.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.