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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: U.S. & Chinese Strategic Views

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week by Daniel M. Hartnett

A Comparison of U.S. and Chinese Views of the International Strategic Environment

Within approximately a month of each other this year, both China and the United States published official documents detailing their respective views of the current security environment.  China’s assessment was captured in its 9th biennial defense white paper, published in late May, and officially titled China’s Military Strategy. The U.S. view is presented in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015 (hereafter, U.S. National Military Strategy), published in June. The authoritative nature of each document provides an interesting opportunity to comparatively assess how both nations see the international military and security situation, more clearly understand their similarities and differences, and draw out any relevant implications.

Before comparing the views contained within the two documents, however, it is important to clarify that this is not a perfect comparison. Although both documents are official and therefore represent the approved views of the respective government, they are not exact equivalents. China’s defense white paper, while drafted by the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is actually coordinated with and vetted by China’s foreign policy making community, to most importantly include the Chinese Communist Party.1 Therefore, it represents the view of the Chinese Party-State, not just the PLA.  On the other side of the ledger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for producing the U.S. National Military Strategy. This document draws closely from other U.S. government statements, most importantly from the President’s National Security Strategy. However, ultimately the U.S. National Military Strategy is a U.S. military document, not a whole-of-government product. As a result, comparing it with China’s Military Strategy is imperfect at best. However, such an exercise is still of value, particularly given the authoritativeness of the two documents combined with the general lack of publicly released official Chinese statements on national defense issues.    

Going forward with this imperfect yet still useful comparison of these two views on the international security situation yields four findings of interest. First, both documents describe the international security situation as experiencing great change. According to the U.S. National Military Strategy, “complexity and rapid change characterize the strategic environment, driven by globalization, the diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts.” China’s defense white paper paints a similar picture, stating that “profound changes are taking place in the international situation.” Although China’s Military Strategy is silent on what is causing these changes, it does assert that the changes in question are changes to the international balance of power, global governance structure, and Asia-Pacific geostrategic landscape, as well as an increase in international economic, military, and technological competition.

Second, although they both maintain the international system is in flux, the two documents disagree about the impact these changes will have.  The U.S. National Military Strategy takes a more pessimistic view, stating that these changes are giving rise to a host of problems. As General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, writes in the foreword to the U.S. National Military Strategy, “today’s global security environment is the most unpredictable I have seen in 40 years of service,” and that “global disorder has significantly increased while [U.S.] comparative military advantage has begun to erode.” Concerns noted include increasing societal tensions, resource competition, political instability, military challenges, and non-traditional security concerns. More concerning, the document also asserts that the risk of “U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing” [emphasis added].

DengXiaopingTime_1979
Deng Xiaoping, Time Man of the Year in 1979

China’s assessment, on the other hand, is more positive. It asserts that overall the international situation is good, although it also recognizes that some problems exist. For example, the document maintains that “peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times,” continuing a basic position held since the mid-1980s when then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping took China off the constant pre-war footing of Mao Zedong.2 That doesn’t mean that China’s Military Strategy doesn’t recognize the existence of international problems; the document notes such issues as “hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism,” as well as increasing competition for power and interests, international terrorism, and ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes. However, it does assert that “the forces for peace are on the rise, [and] so are the factors against war,” and as a result, a major war is unlikely and the “international situation is expected to remain generally peaceful”—although minor conflicts and wars can occur.  More importantly, China’s Military Strategy states explicitly that China confronts a “generally favorable external environment,” something the document claims is a prerequisite for China’s continued development.

Third, the two documents focus on different levels of the international system. The U.S. National Military Strategy, for example, squarely assesses the international situation from a global perspective. For example, the four countries mentioned by name as revisionist (Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China) span much of the globe. Similarly, when discussing the threat of violent extremist organizations, the document notes this is a global concern (although it does highlight the Middle East and North Africa for exceptional concern). Furthermore, the U.S. National Military Strategy explicitly rejects the notion of emphasizing any one region or issue, stating that “the U.S. military does not have the luxury of focusing on one challenge to the exclusion of others.”

In contrast, China’s Military Strategy emphasizes China’s periphery, and in particular the maritime areas of the western Pacific Ocean. Although global issues are mentioned, they are done so only briefly and ambiguously. Instead, China’s Military Strategy mainly discusses regional concerns. Concerns noted include the U.S. rebalance to Asia, especially efforts to strengthen the U.S. military presence and alliances in the region; Japan’s ongoing adjustments to its defense policy; tensions on the Korean Peninsula; relations with Taiwan; and extremist movements that could spill over China’s borders. Of particular note is China’s focus on maritime concerns, such as the growing tensions concerning its disputed claims in the East and South China seas, U.S. special reconnaissance operations, and alleged outside interference in China’s maritime disputes. The only non-peripheral concern expressly noted in the document reflects the recognition that China’s growing overseas interests are creating new security issues, such as sea lane security and the security of Chinese foreign investments and overseas citizens. 

SouthChinaSeaReclamation-Economist
Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, Economist.

Fourth, each document portrays the other country as part of the problem.  According to China’s Military Strategy, the increase in China’s peripheral insecurity is partially due to U.S. actions in the region, such as the U.S. rebalance to Asia and its interference in China’s maritime disputes with other East Asia states. For its part, the U.S. National Military Strategy also explicitly calls out China, stating that its “aggressive land reclamation efforts” in the South China Sea could allow the PLA to position forces “astride vital international sea lanes.” As a result, “China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region.” This mutual finger pointing in order to assign blame for tensions in the South China Sea exemplifies what Dr. David M. Finkelstein, director of CNA’s China Studies division, has referred to as a “perception gap” between China and the United States on regional security concerns.

From this simple comparison of the two authoritative documents, it is easy to see that a large divide exists between the U.S. and Chinese views on security issues.  While the United States sees the rapidly changing international systems as a potential concern, China sees it as an opportunity for continued development. The U.S. focus on the global level is indicative of its position as an established global power with global interests. Conversely, China’s focus, although gradually expanding to the international level, emphasizes the East Asia region, reflecting that Beijing continues to be primarily concerned with its immediate periphery. Each country also sees the other as part of the problem, especially in the case of the South China Sea issue.

Ultimately this difference in views should not be shocking since both countries have their own set of national interests and related concerns. The more important questions, however, are: Is it possible, as some claim, to bridge these differences and build “mutual trust” between the two militaries? Or will asymmetries of interest on certain issues prevent reaching a peaceful accord? Can the two militaries reach a middle ground on issues where they see the other as the main culprit? For this author, it would seem a difficult challenge, for as the Truman-era senior bureaucrat Rufus F. Miles said in the late 1940s, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”3

Daniel Hartnett is a research scientist with CNA’s China Studies division, as well as a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council. He can be followed at @dmhartnett. The views expressed in this article are his alone.

[1] Daniel M. Hartnett, “China’s 2012 Defense White Paper: Panel Discussion Report,” CNA Conference Proceeding (September 2013), p. i.

[2] For an interesting read on China’s military reforms during the Deng era, see Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 523-552.

[3] Rufus F. Miles, “The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law,” Public Administration Review Vol. 38, No. 5 (Sep. – Oct., 1978), pp. 399-403.

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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

From Expediency to the Strategic Chinese Dream?

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week Week by Sherman Xiaogang Lai

China’s Military Strategy, the white paper released by the Chinese Ministry of Defense on 26 May 2015, is a milestone document in the People’s Republic of China’s military history. It marks China’s confidence in its ability to control the potentially explosive issue of Taiwan and its territorial disputes with its neighbors in the East and South China Seas and signals the beginning of China’s advance into overseas markets, where China’s interests have been rapidly expanding since Deng Xiaoping initiated his market-oriented reform by terminating Mao Zedong’s regime of isolation, “self-reliance, and arduous struggle.” China’s Military Strategy states that “the basic point for PMS [preparation for military struggle] will be placed on winning informationized local wars, highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS.” It asserts that the “traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” For the first time in its history, the mission of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) is defined as jinhai fangyu, yuanhai huwei (“offshore waters defense and open seas protection”), and the PLAN’s focus is on the transition from the former to the latter.

news_chan_flagsThis new military strategy traces its origin to the Military Strategy Guideline of the New Era (MSGNE) of 1993. Although the text of the MSGNE has not been made public, its objective is known to be deterrence of Taiwan from de jure independence. The current strategy is thus significantly different from the MSGNE because of the former’s emphasis on the navy’s role in protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC), which were used by Admiral/General Liu Huaqing, China’s Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, to promote the PLAN as early as 1975, when Mao was alive. That Liu did not engage in the process of the MSGNE’s formation and in fact kept himself at a safe distance from it deserves attention. This reveals China’s strategic dilemma created by Taiwan’s inclination toward de jure independence and China’s growing dependence on international trade. The former demanded that the PLA develop an effective fighting capacity to deter Taiwan and convince the United States that it would pay a price if it did not help China in this effort. The latter required that the PLAN assume a new mission to protect China’s growing overseas interests. The hope was that this dilemma would be solved when China’s rapid economic growth eliminated the huge gap in living standards across the Taiwan Strait, bringing the two sides together. However, despite China’s admirable economic growth, Taiwan shows no sign of surrender. In addition, China’s territorial disputes with its neighbours in the East and South China Seas have escalated. The PLAN’s strategic dilemma thus remains intact. Will China’s tremendously increased economic and military strength help the PLA solve this problem and guide China onto the track toward the “Chinese Dream?” Before answering this question, let us go back to the fall of 1992, when the MSGNE was conceived.

The Economist SCS Claims
South China Sea Claims, The Economist.

By the spring of 1991, the PLAN leaders, including Admiral/General Liu, faced an unprecedented embarrassment: in addition to it being well known that the PLA was armed with obsolete weapons, the Allies’ triumph in the Gulf War demonstrated that the PLA’s operation doctrine was outdated. Making the situation worse was the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union. China, which had been benefiting tremendously from the West-East rivalry, had to face pressure from the United States, Taiwan’s patron, alone. As the island was in the process of rapid democratization and those residents who had fled to the island from the Mainland in 1949 were losing their dominance in politics, Taiwan began to pursue de jure independence and emerged as the fatal threat to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communists’ rule over Mainland China. Having recognized the reality of the changed world, Admiral/General Liu, one of the members of the PLA’s commanding agency, the Central Military Commission (CMC), and other PLA strategy planners began to develop a new strategy. Liu’s efforts coincided with Jiang Zemin’s endeavour to control the PLA. Jiang was a protégé of one of Deng’s rivals and managed to obtain Deng’s trust in the fall of 1992. As Jiang did not serve in the PLA, Deng appointed General Zhang Zhen, the PLA’s most senior officer in active duty, to help Jiang, who then asked Zhang to develop a new military strategy. Zhang tasked General Zhang Wannian, the recently appointed Chief of General Staff, with completing this job. Both generals’ entire careers were devoted to the PLA, and the final fruit of their efforts was the MSGNE approved in 1993.

The MSGNE departed fundamentally from the PLA’s strategic tradition at the time, which was based on ground forces armed with outdated weapons, in two aspects. The first was its shift from continental defence to the immediate challenges off China’s coast: deterring Taiwan’s de jure independence and managing the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The second was prioritizing development of a few critical weapon systems, the so-called shashoujian, in contrast to the previous emphasis on ideological indoctrination. It is interesting that the MSGNE has not been officially defined and explained, despite it being a watershed strategy in the PLA’s history. Equally interesting is the fact that Admiral/General Liu was away from Beijing when the Generals Zhang were preoccupied there developing this maritime-oriented military strategy. The authors of his official biography cautiously implied that Liu had nothing to do with the creation of the MSGNE.

China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles wheeled through a military parade. Internet photo.

Twenty years after the MSGNE was implemented, a PLAN consisting of two very different fleets emerged. The first consists of large surface warships and auxiliary vessels capable of operating as far as the Mediterranean Sea. The second is an anti-access fleet of submarines, fast missile craft, and destroyers supported by the PLAN’s land-based aircraft, the PLA Air Force, and the strategic striking force of the Second Artillery. In 2013, the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21, with a range of 3,000 km, was reported to be operational. The deployment of the DF-21 means that US fleets, especially its aircraft carriers, are exposed to critical attacks by China’s conventional missiles when they are far
from China’s territorial waters. The DF-21 is a part of the PLA’s shashoujian and alters the naval game in the Pacific. Although it offers Chinese leaders more options in weapon selection, it makes a military solution more tempting and creates a set of challenges to both Chinese and American decision-makers if a cross-Strait conflict breaks out. The Chinese leaders will be able to use the DF-21 against approaching US fleets instead of their nuclear weapons. US leaders will have to make the decision either to risk US aircraft carriers being lost to the DF-21 in international waters and thus being forced into a large-scale war against China or to acknowledge China’s hegemony over the Western Pacific.

Neither Beijing nor Washington wants to make these difficult decisions. But China, the weaker side of this cross-Pacific rivalry, gains much more than it loses from the deployment of DF-21, and this gives it confidence. The PLAN’s new “offshore waters defense and open seas protection” mission is a reflection of this new confidence among the Chinese national and naval leaders over their recent boost in naval strength. This new mission could be regarded as China’s tremendous contribution to world peace if it were irrelevant to the DF-21 and the tension in the South and East China Seas. The intermediate DF-21 is a weapon system of expediency to compensate for China’s lack of command of sea in the case of a cross-Strait war, but it is able to disrupt the status quo of the world if it is used offensively as a shield for its fleets. Admiral/General Liu must have recognized this potential danger, which was in opposition to his dream for a high-seas fleet protecting China’s SLOC. As the founder of China’s modern navy, he knew the PLAN’s inherent deficiencies better than anyone. In striking contrast to the PLAA, which was forged into a formidable fighting machine through numerous victories and defeats, the PLAN was a mosaic of Soviet-trained officers with fragments of the Nationalist navy trained by either the US Navy or the Royal Navy. And it did not experience the forging process that the PLAA did and thus has been plagued with factional struggles and has been vulnerable to the struggle among the PRC leadership. In addition, China’s semi-closed coast places the PLAN in a disadvantageous geographic position if it is involved in a war against the United States. Realizing that its expediency would lead the PLA and China into a cul-de-sac, Liu kept himself out of the MSGNE’s development. If he were alive today, he would be proud of his beloved PLAN while increasingly anxious about its future.

Dr. Sherman Xiaogang Lai is an adjunct assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). Before he immigrated to Canada in 2000, he served as a frontline foot soldier in China’s war against Vietnam, UN military observer and researcher in history and military strategy in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army during 1987-1997. The views expressed in this article are his own.

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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

The Influence of Han Feizi on China’s Defence Policy

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week by Paul Pryce

There is much of concern in China’s Military Strategy white paper released by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in May 2015. In particular, the notion of active defense extolled in the document arguably poses a far greater threat to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region than the reinterpretation of Article 9 in Japan’s Constitution. Coupled with other recent developments in the formulation and expression of China’s defense policy, there is a startling willingness to resort to the threat of force in order to resolve disputes. In July 2015, a meeting of the Central Military Commission announced that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) requires a stealth-capable strategic bomber with a minimum range of 8,000 kilometers and the capacity to carry a payload of more than 10 tons of air-to-ground munitions. Although this envisioned replacement to the Xian H-6K bomber would still have a range and payload capacity less than the Northrup Grumman B-2 Spirit that has been in service with the United States Air Force (USAF) for almost two decades as of this writing, the extended range would allow China’s bomber fleet to reach as far as Guam or Japan’s Northern Territories, also known as the Kuril Islands.

Xu Qiliang (L), vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, salutes China's President Xi Jinping (C) during the closing ceremony of the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, March 13, 2014. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon
Xu Qiliang (L), vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, salutes China’s President Xi Jinping (C) during the closing ceremony of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, March 13, 2014.

This saber-rattling can be explained in part by examining a school of thought that has risen to prominence together with the People’s Republic of China’s fifth generation of leadership, of which Xi Jinping is a part. Since Mao Zedong, Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin promoted the virtues of Confucianism and frequently quoted from Confucian works in their public remarks. With an emphasis on community-mindedness and obligations to the authority of the state, Confucius seemed to offer the philosophical justification for the entrenchment of the Communist Party of China in all areas of Chinese life. But there has been a noticeable departure from this tradition under Xi Jinping, who has relied heavily upon references to the works of Han Feizi.

Han Feizi
Han Feizi, Public Domain

Believed to have lived from 280 to 233 BC, Han Feizi was one of the founding thinkers of Legalism, a meritocratic ideology that came into being during the Warring States period of China’s history and was formally adopted by the victorious Qin state. Han Feizi has been called China’s Machiavelli, concerned more so with the efficiency of the state than with any over-arching moral or ethical questions. One passage from Han Feizi’s essay “The Eight Villainies,” a quote the fifth generation of leadership has apparently taken to heart, reads, “It is customary with a ruler that, if his state is small, he will do the bidding of larger states, and his army is weak, he will stand in fear of stronger armies. When the larger states come with demands, the small state must consent; when stronger armies appear, the weak army must submit.” Han Feizi does not comment on whether the doctrine of might makes right ought to be; he simply regards it as a natural and unavoidable consequence of a system in which different actors hold varying levels of power. There is also no apparent role for soft power in Han Feizi’s worldview – the strength of a ruler and his state is directly tied to military strength.

The memory of foreign occupation looms large for many Chinese leaders. In 2010, a diplomatic spat emerged when Chinese officials asked visiting British dignitaries to remove their poppies, worn to commemorate Remembrance Day and the Commonwealth’s war dead, because it allegedly reminded them of the Opium Wars. Xi Jinping himself often evokes the century of humiliation and the supposed role of the Communist Party of China in restoring national independence. If we regard Chinese history from the 1840s to the 1940s in the Legalist context, China was made subservient because it was militarily weak in relation to global powers like the United Kingdom, France, Russia, the United States, and others. If the weak must do the bidding of the strong and China is militarily weak in comparison to American hyperpower, the conventional thinking among the members of the Central Military Commission is that the gap must be closed or else it will only be a matter of time before the United States dictates to China once again.

PLAAF Xian H-6M makes a turn over Changzhou city, Jiangsu. Creative Commons.
PLAAF Xian H-6M makes a turn over Changzhou city, Jiangsu. Wikimedia Creative Commons.

One need not look far for examples of this anxiety about the capability gap. Xu Qiliang, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, wrote in 2013 that the People’s Liberation Army cannot currently meet the needs of national security and requires rapid modernization to contend with “the world’s advanced militaries”. Even though China already possesses the means to deter military aggression from any of its neighbors, it is apparent that the fifth generation of leadership still regards China as vulnerable unless it has an equivalency to every tool in the United States’ security toolbox. After all, it is telling that Xu Qiliang does not regard China as one of the world’s advanced militaries even though the PLAAF’s contingent of Xian H-6K bombers places China in a very exclusive club – only the United States, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom can also boast having strategic bombers at their disposal.

It is also worth noting how the presentation of the most recent Chinese Military Strategy reflects Han Feizi’s thought. In another of his works, The Difficulties of Persuasion, Han Feizi writes that, “If you wish to urge a policy of peaceful coexistence, then be sure to expound it in terms of lofty ideals, but also hint that it is commensurate with the ruler’s personal interests.” Just as the white paper advances the ideas of active defense and bottom-line thinking, it also emphasizes China’s commitment to participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions, the role of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, and appeals to such values as “the peaceful settlement of disputes.” This reflects a growing awareness on the part of Chinese officials that the rest of the world is paying attention to what kind of actor China might become in the 21st century. The message, in many respects, is that the Chinese Dream is inclusive – other nations and societies can benefit from China pursuing its own national interests, such as the investment and increased security that might come to Djibouti through the proposed establishment of a PLAN base there.

It is vital that those studying or interacting with Chinese policymakers to consider the historical context for China’s policies and their ideological framework. The China threat narrative considers Chinese strategy within a strictly neo-realist prism that supposes conflict will inevitably arise from a shift in polarity in international politics. Rather, Xi Jinping and Xu Qiliang can be best understood by consulting Han Feizi. As such, the explicit reference to China in the United States’ most recent maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, might not help matters. It indicates to the Chinese political leadership that Han Feizi’s view of international politics endures more than two millennia later – the strong will continue to dictate to the weak, and so the United States will continue to determine the outcome of any territorial dispute in the South China Sea or East China Sea so long as the capability gap with China persists. An appeal to lofty ideals in the U.S.-China relationship, rather than explicit reference to geopolitical changes, could have spoken to the fifth generation of leadership on a deeper level without alienating the US’ Asia-Pacific allies. For its part, the National Military Strategy of the U.S. released in June 2015 goes some way toward accomplishing this, balancing criticism of China’s actions in the South China Sea with assertions that the U.S. “support[s] China’s rise.”

It may be that the revised maritime strategy adopts a harsher tone toward China in order to generate political will among other countries to participate in what the original Cooperative Strategy termed the Global Maritime Partnership. By distinguishing the U.S. from China as far as adherence with international maritime law is concerned, the U.S. Navy demonstrates that it can be a more reliable partner than PLAN to such countries as the Philippines and Vietnam. Nonetheless, with China participating meaningfully in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) and other multilateral venues, there must be consistency in the message delivered by the U.S. at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels. Security in the Asia-Pacific region will not benefit from mixed signals delivered by any actor.

Paul Pryce is Political Advisor to the Consul-General of Japan in Calgary and a Research Analyst at the Atlantic Council of Canada. The views expressed in this article are his own.

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Book Review, Strategic Outlook

Toward a New Maritime Strategy

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Toward a New Maritime Strategy

Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era. Peter D. Haynes. Naval Institute Press, 2015. 304pp. $49.95.

Review by James Holmes

Peter D. Haynes has written a singularly useful book for anyone interested in how the American sea services—shorthand for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—think about, make, and execute maritime strategy. Captain Haynes is a naval aviator, sports a Ph.D. from the Naval Postgraduate School, and serves as deputy director for strategy, plans, and policy at the U.S. Special Operations Command.

Now, it’s doubtful he has penned a bestseller. There just aren’t that many folks out there in the wider reading public inclined to get their navy geek on. That’s a shame. But it should be required reading for readers of these pixels, and for anyone entrusted with devising, prosecuting, or overseeing endeavors on the briny main. It will adorn my bookshelf from henceforth.

So much for the overall verdict. Let me share two big takeaways I culled out of Toward a New Maritime Strategy. First and foremost, this is a venture in self-knowledge. Take it from the ancients: that’s important. Know thyself, commanded an inscription at the entryway to the Greek temple at Delphi, where supplicants went to ask counsel from the god Apollo.

Knowing who we are as the seafaring arm of American foreign policy will alert us to habits of mind and patterns of behavior that prevail within the services. In so doing it helps us glimpse our future while alerting us to pitfalls and obstacles we’re apt to confront. Knowing ourselves is half the battle, as a Chinese sage of famous memory once advised.

Which is a roundabout path back to Haynes’s treatise. As the title advertises, the book is about strategy-making since the fall of the Soviet Union. The author, however, starts by delving into the prehistory to today’s strategic debates. He traces the maladies he discerns to the Cold War’s early days as much as to its endgame. Enamored of its tactical and operational success in the Pacific War, deprived of a peer adversary, and with the U.S. Air Force clamoring for an outsized share of the defense budget for the atomic age, the navy leadership in effect lost its vocabulary for thinking about and debating maritime strategy.

This was an unintended consequence of change in the marine surroundings. The navy commenced deployments around the Soviet periphery unbidden in the immediate post-World War II years. The proportion of sea time in a mariner’s career swelled as a result, making “sustained superior performance at sea” the benchmark of excellence—and thus of promotions, awards, and all manner of good things.

However healthy it may be for seamanship and tactical skill, sea duty affords little leisure for studying larger matters such as diplomacy and strategy. Other factors—the mania for scientific-technical disciplines, increased stovepiping between the surface, submarine, and aviation communities, and on and on—only compounded the career penalties besetting would-be strategic thinkers.

For Captain Haynes, in short, the early Cold War begat an organizational culture unfriendly to strategic thought. Culture is resilient. Oftentimes that’s a good thing. It provides intellectual ballast in tumultuous times.

But it can be a bad thing—as the greats attest. “To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a featherbed,” as Franklin Roosevelt reportedly exclaimed while serving as assistant secretary of the navy during World War I. “You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.”

Or as FDR’s secretary of war Henry Stimson joked after World War II, “the peculiar psychology of the Navy Department … frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church.”

In Roosevelt’s and Stimson’s spirit, Haynes suggests that navy culture worked against higher-order thought long after the war. Indeed, this failing constitutes a recurring theme as he examines strategy-making efforts spanning from the 1980s through the triservice 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. His account of these enterprises—which gave rise to directives bearing titles like …From the Sea and Sea Power 21—is worth perusing at length.

Second, Haynes attests to the hazards of placing inordinate faith in the social sciences when drawing up strategy and designing forces. Exhibit A: the 1991-1992 Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort. This was the project that resulted in …From the Sea, the navy’s first post-Cold War statement of how it viewed the surroundings and intended to manage them. The planning effort convened a group of senior U.S. Navy and Marine officers and civilian academics.

Group members based their deliberations largely on the “Manthorpe Curve.” This graph, the brainchild of then-Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Bill Manthorpe, represented an attempt to foretell how the strategic environment would evolve over the coming twenty years. Captain Manthorpe based it on his study of the past, looking at patterns of rise-and-fall and regional flare-ups. He forecast turbulence following the Soviet collapse, intermittent regional threats, and the rise of a potentially hostile empire around 2011.

Schools of thought coalesced around these three intervals: Cold War aftermath, midterm regional troubles, advent of a new peer competitor. Those worried about managing the transition to the post-Cold War world coveted large numbers of inexpensive constabulary-like platforms. Carrier aviators and a few fellow travelers called for pummeling rest-of-world threats selectively to keep them from mutating into global problems. Submariners beseeched the sea services to husband their technological edge, investing in top-end platforms—like attack and ballistic-missile subs—that it would take to face down another Soviet-caliber antagonist.

Such are the demands on a global sea power that feels obliged to manage the system of international trade and commerce, keep a lid on regional troublemaking, and discourage a Eurasian hegemon from challenging the international order it leads.

But isn’t strategy the art of staying in tune with the times? Why not realign strategy and forces to cope with immediate problems rather than hedge against a great-power struggle that may never come? That’s what some members of the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort urged. And indeed, …From the Sea in effect codified this view, proclaiming that the U.S. Navy could afford to focus on projecting power ashore because no one threatened its command of the sea.

Yet adapting to new, less trying circumstances is imprudent when it wrong-foots efforts to meet foreseeable challenges of greater consequence later on. For this observer the message that leaps out from the Manthorpe Curve is this: history granted post-Cold War America only a short respite—in historical terms—before the onset of the next great-power challenge. It was imperative to start getting ready then. It takes a long time to regenerate advanced weaponry and adept users—the lineaments of combat power—once those resources lapse. By adapting then, the naval leadership let the material and human capacity for readapting languish.

Think about it from the vantage point of 1991-1992. The generation of commanders destined to face Manthorpe’s next big thing circa 2011 was already in uniform. They were junior to mid-career officers. Having them unlearn the skills and habits needed to wrest maritime command from a serious foe was a decision of colossal moment.

Ships, aircraft, and armaments to wage the new struggle needed to be dreamt up, built, and tested to be ready when a new rival came on scene—meaning now. We’re now scrambling to reinvent capabilities—long-range anti-ship missiles, among many others—that atrophied when history ended a quarter-century ago. Others have disappeared without replacements.

Such insights are scattered throughout Toward a New Maritime Strategy. Lastly, it’s a book reviewer’s sad but sacred duty to join the nattering nabobs of negativity—that is, to find some fault with the work under review. One quick but significant critique. Maritime strategy is about more than naval strategy. It’s even about more than a navy and its corps of sea soldiers. Haynes can be taken to task for neglect on this point.

For the United States, any genuinely maritime strategy should encompass the U.S. Coast Guard, whose commandant, after all, was the third co-signer of the 2007 Maritime Strategy. Yet this sister sea service is largely invisible in Haynes’s account. The tension between this book’s title and subtitle is revealing: Toward a New Maritime Strategy, but American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era.

There’s more truth-in-advertising in the latter than the former. What was that hybrid constabulary/combat service doing during the era under study, how did its leadership contribute to the making of the Cooperative Strategy, how does the strategy shape its operations, and how does coastguardsmen’s maritime thought resemble and differ from that of fellow seafarers? What changed after 9/11, when the U.S. Coast Guard became an arm of the newly created Department of Homeland Security?

More attention to the coast guard, in short, would have enriched Haynes’s commentary while imparting a truly maritime flavor to it. But I quibble. Opinionated as it is, this book may win Peter Haynes few friends within the naval establishment. One hopes it influences people, nevertheless—reacquainting the services with their cultures, strengths, and foibles as they reenter a competitive age of sea power. Read it.

James Holmes is professor of strategy at the Naval War College and senior fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer and combat veteran of the first Gulf War, he served as a gunnery and engineering officer in the battleship Wisconsin, engineering and damage-control instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and military professor of strategy at the Naval War College. His most recent books (with long-time coauthor Toshi Yoshihara) are Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age and Red Star over the Pacific. Designated an Atlantic Monthly Best Book of 2010, Red Star over the Pacific has been named to the Navy Professional Reading List as Essential Reading. The views voiced here are his alone.

Readers interested in reviewing books for CIMSEC can contact the book review editor at books@cimsec.org.