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Global Analysis

Collective Defense in the High North: It’s Time for NATO to Prioritize the Arctic

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By Sally DeBoer

In late May of this year, NATO, along with Sweden and Finland, participated in the Arctic Challenge Exercise (ACE) 2015. The aerial exercise, which included more than 100 aircraft and 4,000 ace_4personnel, predictably ruffled a few feathers in Moscow; Russia responded by mobilizing their nascent but formidable ‘Arctic Brigade’ for an unannounced inspection. Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic (and in general) are thinly – if at all – veiled. Russia unabashedly considers itself the preeminent actor in the High North. Recent remarks by U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Paul F. Zukunft seem to codify this self-assessment. On July 8th, Zunkunft conceded that the U.S. is “not even in the same league as Russia right now” (this assessment was based on a comparison between U.S. and Russian Arctic investment and infrastructure). The discussion of the changing Arctic landscape is hardly new, nor is it limited to re-freezing Cold War tensions. The United States, NATO, and their Nordic allies have a vested interest in building and sustaining a meaningful presence in the High North. While a good start, ACE and other exercises like it won’t be sufficient to secure not only these actors’ self-interested notions but also the idea of the Arctic (and its rapidly opening maritime corridors) as a freely accessible extension of the global commons. The U.S. and their arctic-minded allies should encourage NATO to make the Arctic a higher priority now.

NATO’s stance on the Arctic has, to this point, been non-committal. As recently as 2013, NATO outright rejected idea of establishing a strong direct military presence in the Arctic High North, citing laudable diplomatic hopes that cooperation would win out over confrontation in the region. It’s possible, but unlikely, that a lack of meaningful counterweight in the High North will lead to more cooperative regimes or greater adhesion to existing legal precedents. The Arctic is dynamic and should be treated as such. The following analysis provides just a few reasons to support a defined, consistent, and robust role for NATO in the Arctic.

Arctic actors, including many NATO member states like the U.S., Iceland, and Norway, have much to gain economically from a rapidly opening Arctic in terms of both resources and newly navigable shipping routes. The Arctic is often described as a vast storehouse of resources – oil and natural gas, other minerals, fisheries, and forests- and the prospect that climate change will permit increased exploration for, and exploitation of, these presumed resources has generated a great deal of interest, both public and private.[1] The High North has long been a lynchpin of the Russian petro-state. Indeed, as of 2013 eleven percent of Russia’s GNP, 93 percent of its natural gas, and 75 percent of its oil came from the Russian Arctic.

Gazprom's pioneering Arctic drilling platform Prirazlomnaya
Gazprom’s pioneering Arctic platform Prirazlomnaya

With access to these lucrative resources increasing and costs to exploit them decreasing, so too will conflict over access to those resources increase. In addition to tangible reserves, climate change has also opened previously impassable shipping lanes, some of which overlie disputed sovereignty claims. The national interests of NATO and allied actors with either Arctic real estate or interests would be best served by a consistent, cohesive NATO policy on the Arctic that would serve as a counterweight to Russia’s economic ambitions; a prospect that has thus-far eluded the alliance.

A sustained allied naval presence has been, over the past several decades, been the primary arbiter of freely accessible global maritime arteries as an extension of the global commons. This protection must extend to the Arctic, particularly as new shipping routes progressively open. The Northwest Passage just to the north of Canada could become an economically viable shipping route, passable most of the year, by mid-century. Russia’s rather extensive territorial claims in the Arctic encroach on the Northern Sea Route

Map of Arctic territorial claims (2015)
Map of Arctic territorial claims (2015)

above Siberia, an issue of particular concern to the U.S. Thus far, efforts to resolve disputes over the High North have been cooperative and civil, but that civility has never been significantly challenged. As the Heritage foundation’s Luke Koffey and Daniel Kochis argue, “NATO should consider the implications of Russia’s recent aggressive military behavior; NATO is a collective security organization with five members that are also Arctic countries and two close allies (Finland and Sweden) with Arctic territory. NATO’s commitment to a consistent and robust presence in the High North would be the surest protection of continued rules-governed behavior if (and likely when) tensions rise. Rather than contribute to tensions in the High North (which, this author predicts, will be the narrative Russia will pursue in response to a more cogent NATO Arctic policy), NATO’s presence and prescience, if such a policy is meaningfully pursued, would be a stabilizing force that would ensure free access to newly navigable waters and accessible resources in accordance with international law and orderly management of territorial claims.

The practicalities of achieving the consensus necessary within NATO to move forward with such a step cannot be overlooked. Historically, the alliance has struggled with a general scarcity of consensus. U.S. leadership on the issue of the Arctic will be indispensable in convincing member states with no direct Arctic interests (and plenty of competing security concerns) to move forward with policy and action on the High North, as well as convincing fellow arctic actors that non-Arctic member states deserve their share of influence in NATO’s Arctic policies. Despite any challenges inherent in alliance operations, supporting a greater and more carefully defined role for NATO in the changing Arctic remains far preferable, in this author’s estimation, to a unilateral attempt to provide a counterweight in the High North.

A possible first step might be to cooperatively drafting a statement of intention on NATO’s intentions and intended role in the Arctic, officially acknowledging NATO’s interests and stakes in the region. Further, continued and broader participation in exercises like ACE send a clear signal to Arctic allies like Finland and Sweden, along with the international community at large, that NATO is prepared to face the unique challenges inherent in Arctic operations. The sooner that NATO can find cohesion and take action on their Arctic policy, the better. Already playing from behind in terms of investment and strategy, a comprehensive NATO Arctic policy and presence will provide the best chance to sustain not only for NATO members’ and allies’ economic interests but also the concept of the changing Arctic as an extension of the global commons.

[1] Le Miere, C., & Mazo, J. (2013). Economic Opportunities. In Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity. The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Sally DeBoer is an associate editor for CIMSEC.  She is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and a recent graduate of Norwich University’s Master of Arts in Diplomacy program. She can be reached at Sally.L.DeBoer(at)gmail(dot)com.

Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

Call for Articles: Chinese Military Strategy Week, 3-7 Aug 15

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Week Dates: 3-7 Aug 15
Articles Due: 29 Jul 15
Article Length: 500-1500 Words
Submit to: nextwar(at)cimsec(dot)org

In a watershed moment, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense recently published a white paper on the Chinese Military Strategy (with an English-language version made available and published almost immediately by USNI News). This document lays out a policy for future Chinese military engagement with the world, proclaiming the centrality of active defense as the essence of the Chinese Communist Party’s military strategic thought and then describing an approach for implementing this military policy in the air, cyber, land, and maritime domains. This document comes at a particularly interesting time as General Martin Dempsey, Chairman on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has since approved a new National Military Strategy for the United States, a strategy that names China explicitly as culpable for increased tension in the Asia-Pacific region and establishes an explicit interactive dynamic between the Chinese and U.S. strategies. While this is not the first time a U.S. National Military Strategy names China as a consideration, the shift in tone here is noteworthy.

During the first week of August, CIMSEC will host a series focused on exploring the relationship between the new Chinese military strategy and the strategic policies of the United States and others. Of particular interest are the dynamics of symmetry and asymmetry in their respective National Military Strategies (ideological, technological, doctrinal, coalitional, etc.); the implicit and explicit assumptions in each; the potentially divergent social and political purposes of such documents given their sources; and the implications for the other elements of national power in China, the United States, and the other actors (state and otherwise) in the international system. If the United States and China were to pursue their stated military strategies in whole or in part, what are the implications for their relative and absolute advantage? What are the acknowledged and unacknowledged risks for each in their stated policies?

Contributions should be between 500 and 1500 words in length and submitted no later than 29 July 2015. Publication reviews will also be accepted.

Eric Murphy is a Strategist and Operations Research Analyst with the United States Air Force and a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

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Global Analysis

Distributed Lethality’s C2 Sea Change

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The concept of Distributed Lethality implies a simple command and control (C2) challenge: the surface fleet will field more ships with offensive weaponry, so more Commanding Officers will hold the ability to use deadly force.  Yet, today’s Navy does not grant individual ship CO’s enough autonomy to rapidly conduct offensive strike, nor can it rely on its world class tactical networks to always be available for a group commander to execute C2 remotely.  Even with the right C2, the Navy does not produce enough CO’s to fulfill the vision of Distributed Lethality.  To bring the exciting concept to life, the Navy will have to adjust the way it approaches maritime C2, and even its venerated notion of Command at Sea.

Maritime C2 is not “one-size-fits-all” and the roles, responsibilities, and authorities the Navy routinely assigns to its forces, particularly Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), will have to be adjusted to capitalize on the real benefits of Distributed Lethality.  The Navy’s default approach to C2 – Composite Warfare Command (CWC) – would dictate that an Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) be designated, who would then assign specific warfare areas to individual Warfare Commanders.  The Surface Warfare Commander  (SuWC) is responsible for surface warfare, the Air and Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) responsible for air and missile defense, etc.  In a CSG, Composite Warfare Command works well.  The Strike Group Commander, onboard the aircraft carrier with all its staff and bandwidth benefits, is the OTC.   Normally, the Destroyer Squadron Commodore is the SuWC and Anti Submarine Warfare Commander (ASWC), and the CO of the Aegis Cruiser is the AMDC.  The OTC is ideally positioned to execute C2 of his or her forces and each Warfare Commander is ideally suited to defend the aircraft carrier.  There’s a reason CWC works so well in CSG operations…it was designed for CSG operations.  Over time, the Navy has come to apply CWC to almost every group of ships at sea (with varying degrees of success).  A simple scenario will show that, as the Navy begins to employ groups that look less and less like traditional CSGs, it will have to get back to its autonomous roots for Distributed Lethality C2.

Take, for example, a squadron of four next-generation Frigates with a primarily Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) mission.  Applying CWC, the first step would be to designate an OTC.  Perhaps there is a Commodore located on one of the Frigates, making the decision easy (although the Commodore has no technical or equipment advantage in C2 over any of the other Frigates).  It’s also possible that the Commodore is located on some other platform outside the squadron.  This would require a highly networked force, but in today’s maritime operations such a force is not uncommon.  Lacking a Commodore, one of the Frigate CO’s could be designated OTC, in which case the decision is essentially a wash.  Let’s assume for argument’s sake that OTC is a Commodore is located onboard a nearby aircraft carrier.  He or she would have more than enough C2 capability and capacity, as long as the tactical network remained robust.

Next, specific warfare areas need to be assigned to Warfare Commanders.  Let’s start with Air and Missile Defense.  None of the Frigates have a particularly remarkable air defense capability, especially when it comes to defending a group of ships.  OTC could just designate one of the Frigate CO’s as AMDC to facilitate command and reporting, but it is doubtful the CO and his or her crew would have any kind of specialized training in AMD C2.  The assignment would be largely nominal with minimal value added to overall C2 (each ship would likely end up just defending itself from airborne threats based on each CO’s individual direction).  To get any real value, an Aegis DDG or CG would need to be assigned to provide an AMD umbrella over the squadron…a challenge but not impossible! After all, any deployed CG or DDG is charged with area air defense at one time or another.

Now, let’s consider the assignment of SuWC.  The squadron’s entire mission is to locate, track, and possibly destroy enemy surface assets.  Each ship CO has the ideal weaponry, adequate C2 capability, and probably specialized training to make him or her a fine candidate for SuWC.  Choosing one CO over another would essentially be an arbitrary decision, which could have detrimental impacts in the heat of operations.  For example, if a CO (not designated as SuWC) gains contact and a firing solution on an enemy surface combatant, that CO then has to reach out to a peer for permission to engage (naval tactical enthusiasts will cry foul here, citing “command by negation” as a central tenet of CWC.  Command by negation may be the intent of CWC, but it is most certainly not the execution…especially in offensive operations).  Assuming SuWC doesn’t have to reach back to OTC for further permission, this C2 construct still introduces a costly time delay which effective offensive maritime operations can rarely afford.  Worse, the targeting CO may simply disregard the CWC contruct altogether because it doesn’t make any sense in this context.  After all, the Navy has always prided itself in developing CO’s capable of making tough decisions on their own.

So, you can see how the “cookie cutter” application of CWC falls apart pretty quickly in Distributed Lethality.  Certain elements, such as the assignment of an AMDC, can definitely be borrowed from CWC wherever they make sense; however, ship CO’s need to be empowered to perform their mission without excessive interference from higher headquarters.  If the squadron has robust tactical network connectivity – of which we already have the best in the world and we’re improving everyday – with the Commodore, then there’s no reason to deny him or her close control of the mission.  The Commodore has the experience, training, and staff support advantage over the individual CO’s.  When everything is clicking, Distributed Lethality with networked C2 can be achieved with lightning speed and violent effectiveness.  But what happens when the network breaks down?

As good as our tactical networks are, they can always fail, especially when our potential enemies are investing millions to make that happen.  To make Distributed Lethality work reliably, we need to shift from Network Centric Warfare to Network Optional Warfare.  The default C2 construct should be networked.  We have the capability and we’ve proven it can work.  But when a ship gets cut off from the network, the CO needs the training and authority to act autonomously and make the call.  This is more than just a call to return to Mission Command (hyperlink).  More appropriately, we need to practice Adaptive Mission Command.  Ship CO’s need to be well versed in playing as part of a team and taking tactical orders from a remote commander, but they need to rely on their own judgment when the time comes and higher headquarters is “unavailable for comment.”

Adaptive Mission Command implies a subtle, but monumental shift in the way the Navy views Command at Sea.  In Distributed Lethality, the basic unit of force application is actually not the individual ship, but the group of ships, whether that is a flotilla, a squadron, an ARG, etc.  Today, the pinnacle of a Naval Officer’s career is their first Command at Sea tour, typically “Commander Command.”  In the future, if we keep moving in the direction of Distributed Lethality, the pinnacle might be the command of a group of ships, which is treated as Major Command today.  Major Command tours as they are today, such as Commodore of a squadron, will be become more common within the vision of Distributed Lethality.  Consequently, the opportunity for command of ships with lethal capability will also grow.  Today’s manning and career development models don’t support producing enough “Commander Command” Officers to fuel Distributed Lethality.  Instead, we need to push the typical rank of first Command at Sea down, probably to senior Lieutenant Commanders, and view this as a predecessor to command of a group of ships (this does imply a need to field more inexpensive “low end” surface combatants such as Frigates or Patrol Craft, but I’ll stay away from the force structure aspect of Distributed Lethality for now).

The Distributed Lethality concept has the potential to revolutionize the American Naval way of war, but the Navy will have to radically change the way it approaches command of ships at sea.  Certain aspects of CWC, such as the AMDC, will work but CWC cannot be applied wholesale the way the Navy does so often today.  Instead, CO’s will need to be empowered to pull the trigger when they cannot reach back to the group commander, while being skillful in the art of networked group operations.  When the Navy begins to employ this sort of Adaptive Mission Command, it will find that it needs to re-examine one of its most fundamental pillars.  The flotilla or squadron will become the basic unit of force application, and the pinnacle of a naval career will become group command, not command of an individual ship.  CO’s may begin to view their first command tour as a stepping stone to group (or major) command…a chance to fine tune their warfighting and communication skills, and at times exercise their independent tactical judgment.  The venerated concept of Command at Sea may have to evolve with the advent of Distributed Lethality, but when we win the next war at sea, we will all ask the same question…what took so long?

LCDR Jimmy Drennan is a Surface Warfare Officer.  He is currently assigned as the Operations Officer in USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64).

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Asia-Pacific, Beans Boots Bullets, Strategic Outlook

Distributed Basing: The Key to Distributed Lethality’s Success in the Western Pacific

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The following is a submission from guest author Eric Gomez for CIMSEC’s Distributed Lethality week.

The distributed lethality concept that was unveiled in Proceedings at the start of this year represents a new way of using naval forces against an adversary attempting to deny the U.S. Navy access to a combat area. Simply put, distributed lethality calls for creating hunter-killer surface action groups (SAG) consisting of a handful of surface combatants that conduct offensive anti-submarine and anti-surface operations.

In the Western Pacific, the greatest challenges to the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet are the air, naval, and missile forces of the People’s Republic of China, which are supported by a growing array of surveillance and reconnaissance systems. However, China’s ability to track and target American surface ships is still relatively weak and could be the “Achilles’ heel” of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. Distributed lethality seeks to exploit this surveillance weakness by putting more targets into a combat area, making tracking and targeting a more complex problem.

If implemented as intended, distributed lethality will likely succeed at making it difficult for the Chinese military to target U.S. Navy surface ships that are underway. However, the ports and base facilities in the region that the Navy depends on to keep it surface forces in the fight would be at risk. For example, the naval base at Yokosuka, Japan, the only base west of Hawaii that can repair aircraft carriers, lies within the range of Chinese land-based missiles. Bases that are protected by distance from Chinese attack, such as Guam, are too far away to play a major role in the distributed lethality concept that calls for fast tempo offensive operations.

A look at US bases in the Western Pacific (2011)
A look at US bases in the Western Pacific (2011)

In order for distributed lethality to work, the U.S. Navy and government must start reaching out to Western Pacific partners to expand American access to naval bases and port facilities. Realistically, “expanded access” would probably look like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines, or the stationing of Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore. These are not full-fledged U.S. bases, but there is an expanding American military presence that should include more of the surface combatants that are the lynchpin of distributed lethality. The best way to implement the distributed lethality concept in the Western Pacific is through distributed basing, expanding the number of facilities where U.S. surface combatants can be based.

Distributed basing gives strategic heft to the distributed lethality concept in two ways. First, distributed basing increases the credibility of American extended deterrence in the Western Pacific by creating more “tripwires” similar to the token American forces stationed in Berlin during the Cold War. Second, distributed basing raises the costs of Chinese attacks by placing U.S. surface combatants alongside the military equipment of host countries. If the Chinese military wants to inflict a crippling first strike on U.S. Navy surface combatants in port, it will risk destroying the equipment and killing the personnel of another country’s military. This would likely draw that country into military conflict with China, thereby raising the economic, political, and military costs of the Chinese decision to strike.

However, no military decision comes without negative consequences, and it is important to consider the costs or pitfalls of distributed basing. Bases and other facilities will have to be able to withstand attacks. There has been much discussion about hardening U.S. Air Force bases against Chinese missile attacks. Similar hardening efforts or installing the Aegis Ashore missile defense system would be two examples of American efforts to keep a

A depiction of Aegis Ashore (USNI)
A depiction of Aegis Ashore (USNI)

distributed surface combatant force alive in the opening stages of a conflict. Fully implementing such base defenses will take time and resources, both of which might be in short supply. This could create a “window of opportunity” for Chinese military action in which the distributed lethality concept will be less effective as bases and facilities are upgraded.

Additionally, there is no guarantee that other states will allow the U.S. to implement distributed basing. Even in Japan, a U.S. treaty ally, there is considerable popular opposition to the basing of American forces. An increasingly threatening China could provide a compelling rationale for allowing American warships to be put back into bases and ports, but distributed basing is by no means a political slam dunk.

The distributed lethality concept does provide a new and potentially effective way for the U.S. Navy to respond to A2/AD threats, but more work needs to be done on the logistical side. In order for distributed lethality to be most effective, U.S. surface combatants should be distributed at more locations throughout the Western Pacific. This would enable them to get to their combat areas faster and would present more targets for the Chinese to engage in the early stages of an armed conflict. However, expanding access and distributing surface combatants across more facilities in the Western Pacific will not be easy tasks. Having the U.S. Navy spread across more facilities will not be beneficial unless those facilities can be adequately defended. Bringing many facilities up to an acceptable standard of protection will require an investment of time and resources that create a “window of opportunity” for Chinese action.

Having the distributed lethality concept is a good start because it shows the Navy is thinking creatively about new ways to counter the A2/AD strategy. However, more thinking and writing on the logistics aspect of distributed lethality needs to be done in order for distributed lethality to reach its full potential.

Eric Gomez is an independent analyst and recent Master’s graduate of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is working to develop expertise in regional security issues and U.S. military strategy in East Asia, with a focus on China. Eric can be reached at gomez.wellesreport@gmail.com.

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