Category Archives: Asia-Pacific

Analysis relating to USPACOM.

Can’t Anybody Play This Game? US FON Operations and Law of the Sea

This article originally featured on Lawfare. It may be read in its original form here

By Raul “Pete” Pedrozo and James Kraska

The United States has been unable to synchronize successful air and sea freedom of navigation (FON) operations in the South China Sea with an erratic diplomatic message and a legal case that is too clever by half. Our colleagues Bonnie Glaser and Peter Dutton tried to reconnect these dimensions when they wrote in the The National Interest that while the administration has not done a “stellar job of explaining its actions,” the U.S. approach was still a sophisticated signaling mechanism. But their laudable effort to square the circle is not supported by the law of the sea.

Here’s why.

The past two FON operations in the South China Sea – the USS Lassen (DDG 82) surface navigation on October 27 and the flight of B-52s on November 8-9 – are models in how to squander flawless operational execution with confused, inconsistent, and ultimately damaging messaging that in some ways left the United States in a worse position than it would have been had it not done the operations.

After more than a month of dithering, the United States ordered the USS Lassen to challenge something – many are still unsure what – in the South China Sea. Some American officials characterized the operation as “innocent passage,” while others described it as “not innocent passage.” As confusion over the true nature of the FON challenge mounted, Senator John McCain requested the Department of Defense to “publicly clarify…the legal intent behind this operation.” Just days later, the U.S. did it again. Air Force B-52 bombers from Guam overflew the South China Sea. A U.S. official told The Hill that the aircraft did fly within 12 nm of China’s artificial islands, whereas another U.S. official said it did not. The confusion in both cases appears to be a mixture of politics combined with a lack of understanding of the law of the sea, presenting the United States with two unforced errors that should not be repeated.  

The legal implications of the Lassen operation are inexplicable to this day. The Lassen could not have transited near Subi Reef in innocent passage because the feature is a low-tide elevation (LTE) that does not generate a territorial sea. High seas freedoms apply around low-tide elevations. Although Subi Reef is a an LTE, it is located within 12 nautical miles (nm) of Sandy Cay, an uninhabited rock that is entitled to a 12 nm territorial sea. Under article 13 of UNCLOS, an LTE located within the 12 nm territorial sea of a “mainland or island” may generate a territorial sea as though it were itself a rock. Accordingly, Glaser and Dutton conclude that Subi Reef was used “as a baseline to ‘bump out’ the territorial sea” of Sandy Cay. Under this theory, the USS Lassen was compelled by law to transit the territorial sea of Sandy Cay/Subi Reef in innocent passage.

There are four reasons why this rationale is unsupported by the law of the sea. First, article 13 of UNCLOS clearly states that an LTE within 12 nm of a “mainland or island” may extend out the territorial sea of the primary feature as though it were a rock. This is called a “parasitic” LTE, since its territorial sea depends on an adjacent mainland or island. But Sandy Cay is neither a mainland nor an island – it is a rock, so it may not be used by Subi Reef to generate a territorial sea.

Our colleagues appear to suggest that “mainland or island” includes mere rocks – that islands are just a form of rock. This argument confuses the text in Article 121 on the regime of islands, which forms Part VIII of the Convention and addresses what features are entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with the rules in Part II on the territorial sea. Islands are naturally formed areas above water at high tide [Article 121(1)]. Islands are entitled to the full suit of zones of sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction [Article 121(2)]. All that Article 121(3) says is that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own” are not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf. This text does not mean that islands are simply a type of rock – they are not and to make this argument is a circular reading that defies the negotiating history of the convention that sought to distinguish rocks from islands, as well as common sense that would have the two distinct words imbued with two discrete meanings.

Furthermore, the feature of one country cannot be used to generate maritime entitlements for a feature of another country. The only way for Subi Reef to be a parasitic LTE and have a territorial sea generated from Sandy Cay’s territorial sea is if the same country has lawful sovereign title to both features. Is the United States ceding both features to China?

Second, perhaps more fundamentally, no feature in the Spratly Islands, including Subi Reef, has a territorial sea. None. UNCLOS Article 3 allows states to “establish” a territorial sea – it is not automatic. Neither China nor any other claimant has established a territorial sea around a feature in the Spratly Islands. The law of the sea requires affirmative action by a sovereign state – China has not done so, so why does the United States appear to recognize (and therefore encourage) such action? There is no territorial sea around Subi or any other Chinese occupied feature, and therefore no purported requirement in Chinese law for prior consent of transit for the Lassen to challenge. Whether U.S. ships or aircraft stay beyond or transit within 12 nm of any these features is legally immaterial – none of them have a territorial sea.

Third, in order for a rock to generate a territorial sea it must be under the sovereignty of a coastal state. The United States does not recognize any country as having sovereignty over the features occupied or claimed by China, and in fact China has the weakest claim to the features of any nation in the region. No country recognizes China’s claim of sovereignty over any Spratly feature. Consequently, even if China declared a territorial sea around one or more feature, which it has not, the declaration would be legally nugatory. It would be the same as the United States declaring a territorial sea around Antarctica – no other state would recognize it. So why does the United States appear to recognize Chinese sovereignty over any of these features by trying to challenge provisions of Chinese law that even China has refrained from imposing?

Fourth, Glaser and Dutton suggest the Lassen challenged China’s law that purports to require prior notification for innocent passage in its territorial sea. Yet the operation appears to have been leaked to the media by a U.S. official the day before it was conducted, giving de facto notice – probably in a vain effort to “reduce tension” over the transit. That move undermined the U.S. legal case and created operational risk. It was not a coincidence that China’s maritime militia was already in position to harass the Lassen when the U.S. warship approached Subi Reef – potentially placing the security of the mission and the lives of U.S. Sailors at risk.

So did the FON operations challenge anything at all? Yes, but not what the United States or outside observers have claimed. Both the Lassen and the B-52s challenged China’s ubiquitous nine-dashed line claim to “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea. Of course nobody, including our interlocutors in Beijing, have any idea what China’s preposterous claims mean in terms of the law of the sea. The difficulty in trying to fit U.S. FON operations into the prism of the law of the sea – combined with a lack of understanding of the law of the sea – has driven U.S. officials and pundits bananas. This falls into the trap laid by China, which has, at least since 1995, intentionally used confusion and ambiguity over its maritime claims in the South China Sea as a strategic weapon. It would be far better for the United States to continue to operate freely, persistently, and without the hand-wringing and drama, with ships on the surface, submarines under the water, and aircraft in overflight of the South China Sea, within and beyond 12 nm of all the features in the region.  

Raul “Pete” Pedrozo is Deputy General Counsel for the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA). Previously he was a Professor of International Law in the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College, where he now serves as a Non-Resident Scholar.

James Kraska is Howard S. Levie Professor of International Law at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, U.S. Naval War College, Distinguished Fellow at the Law of the Sea Institute, University of California at Berkeley School of Law, and Senior Fellow, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law.

Interview with Zoha Waseem: Pakistani Navy Remains Committed to Karachi

By Alex Calvo

In the Second World War, Karachi was a key component in the long logistics chain connecting unoccupied China with the United States. After decolonization and partition, the city retained her significance, at both the economic and political level. Among others, it was and still is the main base for the Pakistani Navy, as well as a shipbuilding centre. Often in the news due to a challenging security situation, no look at naval developments in the Indo-Pacific Ocean Region is complete without Karachi. We have thus interviewed Zoha Waseem, an expert in policing and counterterrorism and PhD candidate at King’s College London.

Calvo.- Is the situation in Karachi considered by the Pakistani Navy as a reason to push for further diversification away from the city, in terms of naval basing and construction?

Waseem.- The situation in Karachi in terms of the ongoing operation is linked with the need of the Military to keep investing in Karachi. The construction of military bases, infrastructure and training centres and accommodation does not appear to be decreasing. Karachi is an ATM machine, and a prime location for any stakeholder to have its assets here. Karachi is an important port, being connected to the Arabian Sea, connecting the city by water to Iran and India. That said, there does exist an alternative Naval base 200 kilometres away from Karachi (Jinnah Naval Base in Ormara, Balochistan). Heavy investments have been made into this base since the Navy came under threat in Karachi.

Railway (Karachi Port)
Railway (Karachi Port).

Calvo.- Are the demands of internal security preventing Pakistan from devoting enough funds and political attention to military modernization?

Waseem.- Military modernization is generally regarded not as falling within the domain of political actors but of the military. The Armed Forces appear to be devoting enough funds to military modernisation. Internal security operations take manpower away from the armed forces but their budgetary allocations come from different departments.

Calvo.- Are the Armed Forces, to the detriment of civilian police, seen by most citizens as the mainstay of security?

Waseem.- The general public appears to have bought into the narrative that armed forces are the only bodies capable of dealing with security issues. This is taking focus away from the police, especially in areas where armed forces have acquired policing powers of search and arrest. Nevertheless, there are voices on ground that call for the strengthening of police forces for internal security, law and order.

Karachi Port
Karachi Port.

Calvo.- What are the prospects for police reform in the mid-term? What are its main aspects, and most significant obstacles?

Waseem.- There were police reforms in 2002 which were reversed in 2011 in Sindh and Balochistan. No serious initiatives appear to be in place at the moment. Main obstacles for this are: political interferences, weak leadership, and corruption. Policing falls under the domain of the provincial governments and there will be no serious reforms implemented till the will of these governments is not present.

Calvo.- Does Beijing trust Islamabad’s promises to severely prosecute groups assisting Xinjiang activists? What about guarantees of better protection of Chinese nationals in Pakistan?

I’m not sure what Beijing is thinking at the moment, but Pakistan seems to be making efforts to curb any apprehensions on their part. For instance, both the armed forces and civilian government has decided to strengthen security measures of the Chinese in Gwadar, Balochistan. Plans for deploying 10,000 army personnel for their security and deweaponisation of Gwadar are underway too. Much of the reason for the escalation in the internal security operation in Karachi is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Zoha Waseem got her LLB from SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies) and her MA in Terrorism, Security and Society from King’s College London. She has studied in Karachi, Chicago, and Washington DC, and interned at different Pakistani news channels. From 2012 to 2013 she was an intern at Interpol’s Public Safety and Terrorism Sub-Directorate, in Lyon (France). She is currently working on her PhD thesis, at King’s College, on “Enforcement, Encounters and the Everyday: Contemporary Policing in Karachi, Pakistan”. Waseem’s research interests include Pakistan, policing and security, urban violence, counterterrorism, and police culture. She tweets at @ZohaWaseem and recently wrote “Darkness in the city of light” on Paris’ terror attacks.

Interview by CIMSEC member Alex Calvo.

South China Sea: FONOPS Not Enough, Time for Boots on the Ground, Active Neutrality

By Alex Calvo

After a long wait, the US Navy resumed FON (Freedom of Navigation) operations in the South China Sea (last carried out in 2012) on 27 October, with USS Lassen sailing within 12 nautical miles of Subi and Mischief Reefs, and conducting actions incompatible with innocent passage, in order to make it clear Washington does not recognize any territorial waters arising from the artificial islands built by Beijing through reclamation on low-tide elevations. On the other hand, in line with long-standing American policy, the US also emphasized that it was not taking sides concerning the underlying territorial disputes, and that freedom of navigation operations were aimed at any excessive maritime claims, underlining this by also sailing through waters around features claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines. Commentary has focused on the need for further FON cruises, and on China’s response, including the possibility of Beijing declaring an ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone).

Freedom of Navigation is indeed one of the pillars of both the post-war open economic system drawn up during the Second World War, and of the traditional American reliance on the ability to move troops by sea (in line with the British Empire, and its tandem Royal Navy – Indian Army). Therefore, contesting Chinese maritime claims is indeed an important policy goal, and furthermore one that should be shared by other maritime democracies. However, we must ask ourselves whether this is all. Furthermore, the time may have come to consider whether agnosticism on territorial claims is a sustainable policy, and whether the US can afford to see allies like the Philippines lose further territory to the PRC.

Even if FON operations become a regular feature and China’s extensive reclamation work turns out to pose no obstacle to peace-time navigation by merchantmen and warships, we would be fooling ourselves if we thought that there is no price to pay for failing to confront Beijing. First of all, an extensive network of man-made islands could make it much more difficult to operate in the region in the event of hostilities. Second, by condoning the violent taking of contested territories, the principles enshrined in the UN charter and in UNSC Resolution 502 would risk becoming irrelevant.

Concerning the latter, being neutral concerning territorial disputes can be interpreted in two ways. Up to now in the South China Sea it has meant Washington not supporting any competing claims. However, this is no longer enough. The Philippines’ marines have been making a heroic stand at BRP Sierra Madre, guarding Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal / Ren’Ai Jiao) while surrounded by hostile ships bent on preventing their resupply. However, given the much larger forces available to China, this strategy may not be sustainable. Furthermore, despite an existing mutual defense treaty and growing capacity building assistance (also provided by Japan), Washington has de facto been signaling Beijing that the occupation of the Second Thomas Shoal would not be considered an attack on Filipino territory. This increases the risk of a miscalculation, should China come to believe that the US will stand on the sidelines in such an scenario. Mutual defense treaties are not of much use if restricted in their geographical scope.

An alternative policy would be to embed USMC personnel in their Filipino counterparts, while explicitly announcing that despite still not taking sides on the ultimate issue of sovereignty, the US considered the Second Thomas Shoal (and other disputed territories currently under actual control by Manila) to fall within the purview of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. American policy would then be to actively seek to prevent changes on the ground, including expelling Filipino military personnel from the Second Thomas Shoal, while still pressing for a mediated (or arbitrated) solution, in line with US support for the international arbitration bid currently under consideration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Preserving the status quo requires extensive work on the BRP Sierra Madre, or its replacement by another ship or structure. In other words, America would be moving from passive neutrality to active neutrality. From merely declaring that differences must be settled peacefully in accordance to international law, to helping freeze the status quo so that revisionist powers are not tempted to gain in the field of battle what they should only be claiming in the diplomatic table or the courtroom.

FONOPS-body

A precedent for this are Japan’s Senkaku Islands, also claimed by China and Taiwan. After some doubts and conflicting reports on whether the US-Japan Security Treaty extended to them, Washington explicitly announced that they did, while remaining non-committal about ultimate sovereignty. Japan, having greater maritime and naval capabilities than the Philippines, employs a different strategy to protects the islands, shielded by the country’s coastguard without any permanent ground deployment. Should Tokyo decide, or be forced, to permanently deploy some ground troops, it would also be positive to see USMC personnel embedded in them. We could also mention the occupation of Iceland during the Second World War, before Pearl Harbor.

Being neutral in a territorial dispute does not just mean supporting its peaceful resolution in accordance with international law. That is only the case when all sides involved renounce the use of force. When one refuses to take this step, and regularly resorts to it, notwithstanding the fact it is mostly of the non-lethal kind, the only alternative to appeasement is active neutrality, meaning a deployment designed to provide a tripwire, lessening the risks of miscalculation and signaling that aggression will not be condoned. Only this can provide the necessary incentives for a future peaceful resolution of the conflict, where Washington would indeed be neutral concerning its outcome, yet having avoided neutrality regarding how it came about.

Alex Calvo is a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan) focusing on security and defence policy, international law, and military history in the Indian-Pacific Ocean. Region. A member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and Taiwan’s South China Sea Think-Tank, he is currently writing a book about Asia’s role and contribution to the Allied victory in the Great War. He tweets @Alex__Calvo and his work can be found here.

An Embarrassing Fact: The Legal Basis of the PRC East China Sea ADIZ

By Chang Ching

Two years ago on this day, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China issued a statement on establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. According to “the Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” three PRC domestic laws and administrative rules were addressed as the basis of the East China Sea ADIZ within the following text:

The government of the People’s Republic of China announces the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in accordance with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense (March 14, 1997), the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation (October 30, 1995) and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China (July 27, 2001). The zone includes the airspace within the area enclosed by China’s outer limit of the territorial sea and the following six points: 33º11’N (North Latitude) and 121º47’E (East Longitude), 33º11’N and 125º00’E, 31º00’N and 128º20’E, 25º38’N and 125º00’E, 24º45’N and 123º00’E, 26º44’N and 120º58’E.

IMG_5846
It is highly unlikely that the East China Sea ADIZ may effectively terminate all the foreign air reconnaissance maneuvers.

Further, based on this government statement, China’s Ministry of National Defense issued an announcement of the aircraft identification rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Republic of China as the following text:

The Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, now announces the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone as follows:

First, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must abide by these rules.

Second, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must provide the following means of identification:

  1. Flight plan identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should report the flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of China.
  2. Radio identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ.
  3. Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with the secondary radar transponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire course.
  4. Logo identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of their registration identification in accordance with related international treaties.

Third, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.

Fourth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China is the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.

Fifth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China is responsible for the explanation of these rules.

Sixth, these rules will come into force at 10 a.m. November 23, 2013.

For the most part, military observers and political commentators have analyzed the matter from the political dimension. What is lacking is an examination of the validity of these three PRC domestic laws and rules as well as their association with the PRC government statement and the subsequent aircraft identification rules. 

After reviewing the three laws and rules, i.e. the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China, noted by the PRC East China Sea ADIZ statement (hereafter, the statement) and the associated aircraft identification rules, we may conclude the following flaws:

First, the effective dates of these three laws and rules noted by the statement are indeed questionable.

For the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense, it was initially put into force on March 14, 1997, as noted by the statement. Likewise, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation was originally put into effect on October 30, 1995, also noted by the statement. Nevertheless, according to the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending Some Laws” issued by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on August 27, 2009 and subsequently put into effect by the “Order No.18 of the President of the People’s Republic of China”, the Article 48 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense was revised. Similarly, contents or wordings of the Article 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199 and 200 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation were also revised by the same amending process and government document. Hence, the effective dates of these two laws noted by the statement were definitely incorrect after the law amendment process.

IMG_5850
The original map attached to the PRC East China Sea ADIZ government statement.

Moreover, the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China was not initially put into force as noted by the statement. It was first jointly issued by the PRC State Council and the PRC Central Military Commission on July 24, 2000, by the “Decree No. 288 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China” after a large scale revision from its progenitor with the identical title established by the same two institutions on April 21, 1977.

Based on two separate documents but with the same titles known as the “Decision of the State Council and the Central Military Commission on Amending the General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China”, it was subsequently twice amended on July 27, 2001 and October 18, 2007. Also, the revised rules were put into force by the “Decree No. 312 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China” and “Decree No. 509 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China” on August 1, 2001 and November 22, 2007, accordingly. We therefore may notice that the effective date of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China noted by the statement was neither the initial effective date of the rule nor the latest effective date of the rule.

Based on the survey results already mentioned , we may conclude that the validity and legality of the judiciary documents cited by the statement is undeniably questionable. The quality of this government statement is poor.

Second, the jurisdiction associated with the contents noted by these three laws and rules as compared with the airspace defined by the PRC East China Sea ADIZ can also be problematic. The jurisdiction defined by the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense is basically illusive. It does note with the territorial airspace in its text. Yet, the substantial content of this law has never specifically mentioned its jurisdiction may extend to any air defense identification zone. Likewise, the Article 2 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation does declare the PRC’s exclusive sovereign rights over its territorial airspace. Many other articles of this law also repeatedly address its jurisdiction over the PRC territorial airspace. By the principle of ratione loci, we may clearly identify the jurisdiction defined by this law never was intended to extend to the airspace over the East China Sea.

A screenshot from a video posted on the website of China's Ministry of National Defense shows a Japanese fighter jet following Chinese fighter jet. (Handout)
The PRC East China Sea ADIZ is not a hollow statement. The Substantial interception maneuvers toward the JMSDF MPA by the PLAAF fighters.

On the other hand, according to the Chapter 13 and the Article 173 of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation, its jurisdiction does cover those foreign aircrafts or other flying objects within its territorial airspace. Also, by the terms noted in its Article 182, its jurisdiction may extend to certain search and rescue areas out of its territory. Nonetheless, such search and rescue areas are governed by the international treaties and totally irrelevant with any air defense identification zone.

Basically, the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China is the administrative rule originated from the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation. This is exactly the reason why the Article 1 of this rule specifically noted its jurisdiction only covering those aviation activities within the PRC’s territory. However, the Article 2 of the same rule also extends its jurisdiction over those units and persons with the ownership of the aircrafts as well as the personnel relevant to the aviation activities and the activities themselves. There are numerous articles of this rule repeatedly addressing its jurisdiction and objectives involved in the activities within this airspace as well as the aviation activities themselves.

The only exception regarding the jurisdiction out of its territorial airspace ever appeared in this rule is the Article 121 of Chapter XII titled with Supplementary Provisions: “In regard to the aircraft of the People’s Republic of China operating over the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones or high seas beyond the territorial waters of the People’s Republic of China, where the provisions of an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China are different from the provisions of these Rules, the provisions of that international treaty shall apply, except the provisions for which reservation has been declared by the People’s Republic of China.” According to the content noted above, its jurisdiction may only cover the aircraft with the PRC nationality registration. It does not authorize any jurisdiction over foreign aircraft out of its territorial airspace.

After reviewing the content of these three laws and rules, we may very confidently believe that there is no basis of jurisdiction over the East China Sea ADIZ ever granted by them. This is another solid evidence of staff work negligence.

Third, terms or any substantial contents noted by these three laws and rules are never associated with the airspace defined by the statement or the aircraft identification rules requested by the PRC Defense Ministry announcement. The term of the ADIZ itself was never specifically defined by these three legal documents since it never ever appeared in any text of them. Further, for those means of identification demanded by the PRC Defense Ministry announcement, no corresponding regulation has ever been noted in these three laws and rules. Of course, Article 167 and 168 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation as well as Article 39 and 90 of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China are noted with the term of flight plan, yet, the substantial content is totally irrelevant with the flight plan identification within the PRC East China Sea ADIZ.

As for the radio identification, the term does appear in the text of the Article 10, 88 and 90 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation for eight times and in the Article 48, 57, 60, 87, 95, 101 and 105 of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China for a total of thirteen times. Again, the context of these applications is not relevant to the East China Sea ADIZ identification procedures. The term of secondary radar transponder noted by the transponder identification section of the PRC Defense Ministry announcement of identification rules is never noted in these three legal documents. Last but not least, for the logo identification, the term “logo” itself is mentioned by the Article 8, 58, 61 and 85 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation five times but the contexts are not substantially associated with the East China Sea ADIZ identification procedures.

Likewise, it was also noted by Article 24, 41 and 47 of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China for six times. The content of the Article 24 and 47 is totally unrelated to the logo of any aircraft. Only the Article 41, “Aircraft operating within the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall bear distinct identification marks. Aircraft without identification marks are forbidden such flight. Aircraft without identification marks shall, when in need of such flight due to special circumstances, be subject to approval by the Air Force of the People’s Liberation Army. The identification marks of aircraft shall be subject to approval in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State,” the content is seemingly in accordance with the East China Sea ADIZ identification rule. Nonetheless, the jurisdiction of the Article 41 is only within the PRC territory, which is not the airspace defined by the East China Sea ADIZ.

It is noteworthy that there are various airspaces defined by these three laws and rules. Apart from the search and rescue areas mentioned above, the only other airspace that has the coverage out of the PRC territorial airspace is the “Flight Information Region” noted in the Article 30 and the Article 85 to Article 88 of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China. The significance of the Flight Information Region is clearly defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization. It is totally different from ADIZ declared by any nation in the world. No confusion can happen between these two terms.

The PRC government statements on establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone and the Defense Ministry announcement of the aircraft identification rules within this ADIZ are fundamentally reckless. The PRC East China Sea ADIZ has already existed for almost two years. Can we ask the following questions?

Does the PRC adopt this ADIZ to expand its sovereign claim as many political accusations ever predicted? Does this ADIZ successfully expand the PRC sphere of influence as many commentators ever actively speculated? Does this ADIZ pave the solid foundation for the PLA to exercise its airpower above the East China Sea as many military experts assessed? Do expanding PRC military air activities associate with the mechanism of this ADIZ? How much national pride is substantially acquired after establishing this ADIZ? Whether this ADIZ actually serves the functions as the PRC government originally claimed? And finally, do we fairly and comprehensively judge this issue by excluding our prejudice first?

All readers may have their own answer to these questions. We should never forget that the biased vision may only cause distortion of the fact and creating confusions that hindering us to see the reality. Whether we may fairly observe and assess the regime in Beijing does matter to our future strategic options and welfare.

Chang Ching is a Research Fellow with the Society for Strategic Studies, Republic of China. The views expressed in this article are his own.