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The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares

August 25, 2016 Guest Author Leave a comment

This piece was originally published by The Jamestown Foundation, and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Elsa Kania

Beijing’s response to the unfavorable South China Sea arbitration outcome has highlighted an important aspect of its military strategy, the “three warfares” (三战). Consisting of public opinion warfare (舆论战), psychological warfare (心理战), and legal warfare (法律战), the three warfares have been critical components of China’s strategic approach in the South China Sea and beyond. In peacetime and wartime alike, the application of the three warfares is intended to control the prevailing discourse and influence perceptions in a way that advances China’s interests, while compromising the capability of opponents to respond.

Beijing has sought to delegitimize the arbitration process and achieved some success in undermining the coalescence of consensus in support of the ruling, while engaging in coercive signaling and deniable attempts to punish the Philippines. China’s response has also included “regularized” “combat readiness patrols” over the South China Sea by H-6K bombers, as well as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against Philippine government websites (China Military Online, August 6; China Military Online, July 19; InterAksyon, July 15). Consistently, Beijing has attempted to advance narratives that frame itself as the upholder of international law, while claiming that the U.S. is to blame for the “militarization” of the South China Sea (China Military Online, June 23). For instance, official media has frequently characterized the arbitration process as a “farce,” and China’s ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai, has argued that the arbitration case would “undermine the authority and effectiveness of international law,” justifying China’s rejection of it as a defense of “international justice and the true spirit of international law” (Xinhua, July 12; PRC Embassy to the U.S., July 13).

These aspects of Beijing’s response should be contextualized by China’s theoretical framework for the “three warfares.” Beyond the South China Sea, this approach has been manifest in a variety of recent cases, including also the East China Sea dispute, China’s opposition to THAAD, and intensifying pressures on Taiwan. The PLA’s evolving strategic thinking on the three warfares, which is linked to its emphasis on information warfare, could influence its efforts to utilize such techniques in future contingencies.

Progression of the PLA’s Approach to Three Warfares:

Although the three warfares constitute a relatively recent addition to Chinese strategy, the PLA’s approach to public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare has been formalized and already advanced considerably. Based on the 2003 and 2010 Political Work Regulations (政治工作条例), the three warfares, under the aegis of “wartime political work” (战时政治工作), were the responsibility of the General Political Department of the former General Staff Department, which, through the recent organizational reforms, has become the Political Work Department (政治工作部), subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC) (CPC.com.cn, December 5, 2003; China Brief, February 4). In 2005, the CMC ratified—and the former General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armaments Department jointly promulgated—official guidelines (gangyao, 纲要, literally “outline” or “essentials”) for public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare, officially incorporating the concepts into the PLA’s education, training, and preparation for military struggle. [1] While these gangyao themselves are not publically available, the open-source PLA literature on the three warfares, which dates back to the mid-2000s, constitutes a valuable resource for analysis and comparison. [2]

Several recent texts present authoritative perspectives on the three warfares and illustrate the extent of their integration into the PLA’s strategic thinking and officers’ curricula. These include the latest editions of influential PLA texts on military strategy, the 2013 Academy of Military Science (AMS) edition of Science of Military Strategy (SMS, 战略学) and the 2015 National Defense University (NDU) SMS, as well as teaching material used by the NDU, An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare (舆论战心理战法律战概论). [3] Based on these texts, China’s use of the three warfares constitutes a perceptual preparation of the battlefield that is seen as critical to advancing its interests during both peace and war.

Three Takes on the Three Warfares:

2013 Science of Military Strategy:

The 2013 AMS SMS highlighted the significance of the three warfares as a force multiplier in military operations and political or diplomatic scenarios alike. [4] In particular, the text introduced the concept of huayuquan (话语权) through the use of information, belief, and mentality (信息一信仰一心智). Although, in more general or colloquial usage, the term might seem to imply the “right to speak” or “freedom of speech,” the quan (权) in this context apparently alludes not to rights (权利) but rather to power or authority (权力). In this regard, the concept refers to the capability to control the narrative in a given scenario and might therefore be translated as “discursive power.” [5] To contest huayuaquan requires “the integrated usage” of public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. These three warfare operations should be complementary and mutually reinforcing in future wars or in political and diplomatic struggle.

According to the text, the use of the three warfares in a particular circumstance should be adapted based on the operational context and intended outcome. In particular, the authors argue that achieving international sympathy and support, while diplomatically seizing the initiative, can “provide a powerful pillar to support the whole operational activity.” For instance, if the operational intention must be hidden, the use of propaganda to influence public opinion can reinforce the stratagem of “making a feint to the east and attacking in the west” (声东击西). [6] So too, three warfare operations can have a strong “psychological frightening force” (心理震慑力) against an adversary. Although this text does not define the three warfares or discuss their usage in further detail, this focus on their importance, including in deception, indicates recognition of their potential utility in a range of circumstances.

2014 Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare:

This 2014 text, which serves as discipline teaching materials (学科教材) for the NDU, presented a comprehensive overview of the three warfares, including their primary missions, historical development, theoretical foundation, basic principles, implementation, and tactics. [7] The text illustrates the NDU’s sustained efforts to develop a “science of the three warfares” (“三战”学), which are considered a “major innovation” in the PLA’s political work, and to integrate the concepts into its curriculum. [8] This is informed by the study of variety of traditional, ideological, and contemporary precedents, from the ancient Chinese emphasis on the use of “strategems” (谋略) to the U.S. military’s perceived engagement in analogous practices. At a basic level, the primary purpose of the three warfares is to influence and target the adversary’s psychology through the utilization of particular information and the media as “weapons.” In particular, the three warfares are seen as critical to increasing the PLA’s “soft power” (软实力) and contributing to its success in future wars. As warfare has evolved toward greater “informationization” (信息化), the three warfares have evidently achieved a “breakthrough” beyond their “traditional scope and model,” becoming an “organic” aspect of national strategy and warfare.

While the three warfares “permeate” the “whole course” of military struggle, their functions have also expanded and are relevant to the PLA’s increasingly “diversified” military missions. In particular, the relevant functions include:

· control of public opinion (舆论控制)

· blunting an adversary’s determination (意志挫伤)

· transformation of emotion (情感转化)

· psychological guidance (心智诱导)

· collapse of (an adversary’s) organization (组织瓦解)

· psychological defense (心理防御)

· restriction through law (法律制约)

In more general terms, the primary missions are to seize the “decisive opportunity” (先机) for controlling public opinion, organize psychological offense and defense, engage in legal struggle, and fight for popular will and public opinion. Under the aegis of these missions, this requires efforts to unify military and civilian thinking, divide the enemy into factions, weaken the enemy’s combat power, and organize legal offensives.

According to the text, the implementation of the three warfares should be guided by certain basic principles. These emphasize integration with national political and diplomatic struggle; revolving around the launching of military operations; rapidly taking advantage of the “decisive opportunity” (先机); engaging in offense and defense, with an emphasis on offense; and the integration of peace and warfare (平战结合). Such principles imply advancing a highly coordinated approach that involves proactive peacetime preparation of the perceptual domain in order to enable the PLA to rapidly seize the initiative in a crisis or conflict scenario.

In its entirety, this NDU text highlights the PLA’s focus on these informational, non-kinetic aspects of modern warfare and its extensive efforts to formulate a complex theoretical approach, with a focus on implementation, education, training, and the construction of specialized forces. Beyond the traditional applications of the three warfares, the text also displays efforts to innovate in the application of these concepts to new contexts, such as counterterrorism and stability protection (反恐维稳), international peacekeeping, protecting transportation and escort (保交护航), and closing and controlling borders (封边控边).

2015 Science of Military Strategy:

The 2015 NDU SMS provides an overview of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare and guidance regarding their implementation. According to the text, public opinion warfare involves using public opinion as a weapon by propagandizing through various forms of media in order to weaken the adversary’s “will to fight” (战斗意志), while ensuring strength of will and unity among civilian and military views on one’s own side. Psychological warfare seeks to undermine an adversary’s combat power, resolve, and decision-making, while exacerbating internal disputes to cause the enemy to divide into factions (阵营). Legal warfare envisions use of all aspects of the law, including national law, international law, and the laws of war, in order to secure seizing “legal principle superiority” (法理优势) and delegitimize an adversary. Each of the three warfares operates in the perceptual domain (认知领域) and relies upon information for its efficacy.

The 2015 SMS emphasizes the “tight connection” of three warfares as an “integrated whole” that should be utilized synthetically. From the authors’ perspective, public opinion warfare and legal warfare primarily operate at the strategic level of warfare, whereas psychological warfare is often implemented at the campaign and tactical levels. If effectively implemented, the three warfares have the potential to establish favorable conditions for battlefield success and eventual victory.

For public opinion warfare, the requirements outlined are to “demoralize one’s opponent by a show of strength” (先声夺人), “create momentum to control the situation” (造势控局), “assail strategic points” (抨击要害), and “seek the avoidance of injury” (趋利避害). In particular, it is critical to be the first to release information in a contingency and actively guide public opinion in order to achieve and preserve the initiative on the “public opinion battlefield.” Beyond efforts to exploit an adversary’s shortcomings, the opponent’s attempts to engage in public opinion warfare must also be countered. For example, this approach is reflected in Beijing’s attempts to influence domestic and international public opinion with regard to the U.S. role in Asia—including claiming that the U.S. is at fault for regional tensions and the “militarization” of maritime territorial disputes, while frequently denouncing U.S. “hegemony” and pursuit of “absolute security.”

The principles articulated for psychological warfare focus on “integrating [psychological attacks] and armed attacks with each other” (与武力打击相结合), “carrying out offense and defense at the same time, with offense as the priority” (攻防并举以攻为主), and “synthetically using multiple forms of forces” (综合运用各种力量). In this regard, psychological warfare is envisioned as closely integrated with all forms and stages of military operations in order to intensify the efficacy of conventional attacks. The implementation of psychological warfare should also focus on taking advantage of “opportune moments” and “striking first” to seize the initiative, based on the efforts of multiple forms of psychological warfare forces, including those from the armed forces, reserves, and society. For instance, the intensification of psychological pressures against and attempted intimidation of Taiwan at times of tension or crisis, especially recently during Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency, reflects the application of such an approach, which has been carried out by the PLA’s “Three Warfares Base,” Base 311 in Fuzhou (Taiwan Link, August 8).

The implementation of legal warfare, which seeks to provide legal support to operational success, is informed by the principles to “protect national interests as the highest standard” (以维护国家利益为最高准则), “respect the basic principles of the law” (尊重法律的基本准则), “carry out [legal warfare] that centers upon military operations” (围绕军事行动展开), and “seize standards [and] flexibly use [them]” (把握规范灵活运用). This approach emphasizes the necessity of a nuanced understanding of relevant domestic and international law in order to engage in “legal struggle” and achieve the initiative. In the context of the South China Sea dispute, this has involved the utilization of rather tortuous interpretations of international law to oppose the Philippines’ position and seek to delegitimize the arbitration process.

Conclusion

Based on these texts, the PLA perceives public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare as of distinctive strategic and operational significance, and the three warfares are evidently being incorporated more systematically into its overall thinking on military strategy. While the conceptualization of the three warfares in these recent texts builds upon the prior PLA literature and thinking on the concepts, these sources particularly highlight the complementarities among the three warfares and the importance of their synthetic integration with conventional military operations. This approach is also informed by the PLA’s concerns about countering the perceived “ideological assaults” (意识形态攻击) of “hostile forces” via the Internet (PLA Daily, August 12). In practice, this involves attempts to take advantage of prior peacetime preparation of this perceptual battlefield to establish favorable conditions for going on the offensive to seize the initiative. Since this is a dimension of strategic competition in which China has already demonstrated the efficacy of its efforts, understanding the three warfares will continue to have immediate, real-world relevance.

Looking forward, the PLA’s future approach to the three warfares could continue to evolve in accordance with its recent and ongoing strategic, doctrinal, and also organizational changes. Beyond the recent changes in Chinese military strategy, with the 2014 revision of the PLA’s military strategic guidelines (fangzhen, 方针), overdue changes to its operational regulations (作战条令) or doctrine also seem to be occurring (China Brief, April 21). The PLA appears to remain in the process of working toward the official promulgation of a fifth-generation doctrine, and the underlying campaign outlines (战役纲要) and combat regulations (战斗条令) might include revised guidance for the implementation of the three warfares, given the recent focus on advancing the PLA’s three warfares “science.” Despite the limitations of the available sources, these three texts present the latest available perspectives on the PLA’s evolving strategic thinking on the three warfares and thus can inform analyses of the PLA’s implementation of these concepts.

Elsa Kania is a recent graduate of Harvard College and currently works as an analyst at the Long Term Strategy Group.

Endnotes

1. Wu Jieming [吴杰明] and Liu Zhifu [刘志富], An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, [and] Legal Warfare [舆论战心理战法律战概论], National Defense University Press, 2014, p. 1.

2. For prior discussions of the three warfares, see prior analyses, including: Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049, October 14, 2013. “China: The Three Warfares,” prepared for Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessment, by Professor Stefan Halper, May 2013. Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare,” Heritage Foundation, May 21 2012. Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion Warfare and the Need for a Robust American Response,” Heritage Foundation, November 26, 2012. Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge,” Heritage Foundation, July 12, 2013.

3. The Science of Military Strategy (SMS) is an authoritative text, typically used as teaching materials for senior PLA officers, that articulates the PLA’s thinking on military strategy in multiple domains and contexts. The latest AMS edition of SMS was the focus of a recent book (Joe McReynolds, China’s Evolving Military Strategy, Jamestown Foundation, 2016), but there has been less published analysis on the 2015 NDU text thus far. Since the AMS plays a more direct role in the formulation of military strategy, the 2013 SMS text might be more authoritative than the 2015 NDU edition. Nonetheless, this NDU text also presents a more recent and perhaps reasonably influential perspective that merits closer examination. Concurrently, it is important to recall that such works are primarily theoretical and reflect the viewpoints of these influential institutions, rather than the PLA as a whole. Given such caveats, these texts’ respective content on the three warfares should not be taken as official articulations of the PLA’s strategic or doctrinal approach but rather constitute more theoretical discussions of the concepts that can inform future analysis of these topics.

4. Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department [军事科学院军事战略研究部], eds.,The Science of Military Strategy [战略学]. Military Science Press, 2013, p. 131.

5. John Costello and Peter Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese Information Operations,” in Joe McReynolds, China’s Evolving Military Strategy, Jamestown Foundation, 2016.

6. This particular saying from the Thirty-Six Stratagems, which has been variously attributed to Sun Tzu and Zhuge Liang, seems to have originated from various aspects of Chinese written and oral military history.

7. Wu Jieming [吴杰明] and Liu Zhifu [刘志富], An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, [and] Legal Warfare [舆论战心理战法律战概论], National Defense University Press, 2014, pp. 1–7, 14–20, 62–69, 121–132, 133–143, 226.

8. The text was formulated with high-level support from NDU starting from 2009 and authored by a committee of scholars under the leadership of two relatively senior NDU professors as a culmination of that process.

9. Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], eds., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学]. National Defense University Press, 2015, pp. 216–218.

Featured Image: BEIJING, CHINA – SEPTEMBER 03: Chinese missiles are seen on trucks as they drive next to Tiananmen Square and the Great Hall of the People during a military parade on September 3, 2015 in Beijing, China. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

Asia-Pacific

China and Freedom of Navigation: The Context of the International Tribunal’s Verdict

August 19, 2016 Guest Author 1 Comment

The following article was originally featured by the National Maritime Foundation and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Gurpreet S. Khurana

On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal constituted at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) issued its decision in the arbitration instituted by the Philippines against China. It relates to the various legal issues in the South China Sea (SCS) inter alia pertaining to China’s historic rights and ‘nine-dash line,’ and the status of features and lawfulness of Chinese actions.¹

Within hours of the release of PCA Tribunal’s decision, India released a government press release, stating that

“India supports freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS. India believes that States should resolve disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability…”²

However, Beijing has stated that China would not accept the Tribunal’s verdict.³ Furthermore, tensions have rekindled in the SCS with reports indicating that China intends “closing off a part of SCS for military exercises.”⁴ The issue of Freedom of Navigation (FON) is of immense relevance not merely for the SCS littorals, but for all countries that have a stake in peace and tranquillity in the SCS; and yet bears a significant potential to flare-up into a maritime conflict.

This issue brief aims to examine China’s approach to FON in context of international law, including the verdict of the PCA Tribunal. In this writing, the term ‘FON’ refers to the broader concept of ‘navigational freedoms,’ including the freedom of over-flight. Furthermore, this brief attempts to identify the de jure ramifications – even if not de facto, considering China’s rejection of the verdict – of the PCA Tribunal’s decision on China with regard to FON in the area.

FON is a fundamental tenet of customary international law that was propounded in 1609 by the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius, who called it Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas). The legal tenet is codified in the UNCLOS, a process that involved over two decades of intense labor of international maritime lawmakers at three brainstorming Conferences. The Third Conference itself (UNCLOS III) spanned nine years, which led to the signing of Convention in 1982 and its subsequent entry into force in 1994. The Peoples’ Republic of China was among the first signatories to the Convention on 10 December 1982 (along with India), and ratified it on 07 June 1996. The key question is whether China – despite the foregoing – is impeding freedom of navigation in the SCS? For a comprehensive answer, the issue would need to be examined separately for the three legal regimes/ areas wherein international law applies differently: China’s Territorial Sea, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the other areas within the ‘nine-dash line.’

Territorial Seas

In a State’s 12-nautical mile (NM) Territorial Sea, the right of ‘Innocent Passage’ provided for in UNCLOS Article 17 applies to both commercial and military vessels. As regards commercial shipping, there is no evidence whatsoever of China denying this right to such ships flying the flag of any nationality. Notably, China is a manufacturing-based and export-led economy, which imports nearly 80 percent of its oil and natural gas via the sea. Therefore, China has tremendous stakes in unimpeded maritime commerce, and does not stand to gain by deliberately impeding the FON of merchant ships.

For foreign warships, however, the ‘yardstick’ of ‘Innocent Passage’ differs. During the UNCLOS negotiations, most developing countries wanted restrictions on foreign warships crossing their Territorial Seas. Many of these States proposed that foreign warships must obtain ‘authorization’ for this from the coastal State. Eventually, however, the proposed amendment was not incorporated in UNCLOS; nonetheless, the States were permitted to take measures to safeguard their security interests. Consequently, and in accordance with UNCLOS Article 310⁵, like many other States, China made a declaration in June 1996 while ratifying UNCLOS, seeking ‘prior permission’ for all foreign warships intending to exercise the right of Innocent Passage across its Territorial Seas.⁶The declaration was based upon Article 6 of China’s national law of 1992.⁷It is pertinent to state that about 40 other States – including many developed countries in Europe – made similar declarations seeking ‘prior permission’ for Innocent Passage. (Notably, India seeks only ‘prior notification’. However, the United States does not recognize the right of either ‘prior permission’ or ‘prior notification’).⁸

It may be recalled that during the Cold War, in 1983, the Soviet Union promulgated rules for warship navigation in its Territorial Seas, which permitted Innocent Passage only in limited areas of Soviet Territorial Seas in the Baltic Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and Sea of Japan. This led to a vigorous protest from the United States. Later in 1986 and 1988, the United States Navy conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the Soviet Territorial Sea in the Black Sea.⁹ In contrast, therefore, China’s stand on navigation of foreign warships through Territorial Seas of ‘undisputed’ Chinese territory is clearly legitimate.

However, the passage of foreign warships within 12-NM of the disputed SCS islands/features – which are occupied and claimed by China – has been highly contentious. Since the United States seeks to prevent any norm-building in favor of China’s territorial claims, it has been undertaking FON operations (FONOPS) in the 12-NM zone of these islands. Notably, since the launch of the U..S “Freedom of Navigation Program” in 1979, the United States has conducted such operations on numerous occasions all around the globe; sometimes even against its closest allies.

From the perspective of China – that is in de facto control of the islands/features – its objection to the U.S. warships cruising within 12-NM of these islands/ features without ‘prior permission’ is as much valid as the U.S. FONOPS to uphold its right of military mobility across the global commons. Hence, until such time that the issue of sovereignty over these islands is settled, the legitimacy of China’s stand on FON in these waters cannot be questioned.

Exclusive Economic Zone

Alike in its Territorial Sea, China has never impeded FON of commercial vessels in its EEZ. However, like many other States, China has been objecting to foreign military activities in its EEZ. It may be recalled that in April 2001, China scrambled J-8 fighters against the U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft operating about 60 NM off China’s Hainan Island, leading to a mid-air collision.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the UNCLOS does not contain any specific provision, either permitting or prohibiting such activities. According to Articles 58(1) and 87 of UNCLOS, the EEZ is part of ‘International Waters’ wherein all foreign warships may exercise High Seas FON, with certain exceptions that relate to economic/ resource-related uses of the EEZ, such as Marine Scientific Research, which may be conducted only if permitted by the coastal State. Therefore, if a foreign military conducts hydrographic surveys in China’s EEZ, it may be justified as being among the High Seas Freedoms since it may be necessary for safe navigation of warships. However, if a foreign military conducts intelligence collection in the EEZ – as China interprets the objective of U.S. military activities in its EEZ – it may be objectionable, at least in terms of the spirit of UNCLOS, whose Article 88 says that “The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.” Of course, some may consider ‘intelligence collection’ as a normal peacetime activity of a State to bolster its military preparedness to maintain peace. But this only serves to reinforce the prevailing void in UNCLOS, rather than legally deny China the right of ensuring its own security.

Other Areas within ‘Nine-Dash Line’

China has never explicitly articulated its stand on the legal status of the sea areas within the ‘nine-dash line’, which lie beyond its 12-NM Territorial Sea and the 200-NM EEZ. However, by laying ‘historic’ claim to all SCS features (islands, rocks or reefs), and referring to all these as islands entitled to EEZ and Legal Continental Shelf (LCS), it has implicitly claimed sovereign jurisdiction over the entire sea area enclosed within the nine-dash line. Based on such assumed sovereign rights – though disputed by other claimant States – China has been curtailing FON in these areas, particularly for warships. For example, in the days leading to the International Tribunal’s verdict on the China-Philippines Arbitration, Beijing declared a ‘no sail zone’ in the SCS during a major naval exercise in the area from 4 to 11 July 2016 (see Fig. 1 below).

SCS — Figure 1 – China’s ‘No Sail Zone’ in South China Sea, promulgated: 04 July 2016. (DefenseOne.com)

As the map indicates, the ‘prohibited zone’ was a sizable 38,000 sq mile area lying between Vietnam and the Philippines. It encompasses the Paracel Islands, but not the arterial International Shipping Lane (ISL) of the SCS.¹¹ During such exercises in the past, China has imposed such restrictions on navigation in the SCS. While some analysts have referred to such restrictions on FON as violation of maritime law,¹² given the susceptibility of prevailing international law to divergent interpretations, China cannot be denied the right to interpret law in a manner that best suits its security interests.

However, the above scenario prevailed prior to 12 July 2016. The verdict of the PCA Tribunal has changed all that. The Tribunal has dismissed China’s claim to ‘historic rights’ within the ‘nine-dash line’, indicating that such claims were incompatible with UNCLOS, and asserted that no feature claimed by it in the SCS is capable of generating an EEZ. At least from the standpoint of international law, therefore, Beijing’s claim to sovereign jurisdiction over these areas is decisively annulled. Henceforth, China will need to concede to unimpeded FON in the SCS, both for commercial shipping and warships. For example, if it needs to conduct a naval exercise in the area, declaring a ‘no sail/ prohibited zone’ would no longer be legally tenable. Instead, China could, at best, merely promulgate a mere ‘advisory’ for the safety of ships and civil aircraft intending to transit through the exercise area.

China could possibly react to the adverse verdict of the International Tribunal by declaring an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the SCS. A resort to this would not be constructive since it would further heighten anxieties in the area. Nonetheless, China’s declaration of an ADIZ would be tenable from the legal standpoint. The promulgation of such Security zones is not prohibited by international law. However, for interpreting it as ‘not prohibited, and hence permitted,’ promulgating such a zone must adhere to the spirit of law in terms of its need for maintaining peace or for self-defense, and that it is not obverse to the overarching principle of freedom of navigation and over-flight.

Concluding Remarks

It is amply clear from the foregoing that the contentions over freedom of navigation and over-flight in the SCS are more a result of the geopolitical ‘mistrust’ between China and the other states, aggravated by the voids and ambiguities of international law, rather than any objective failing on part of China and the other states involved to observe the prevailing tenets of international law.

The geopolitical relationships constitute an aspect that China and the other countries involved need to resolve amongst themselves, and the rest of the international community can do little about it. Further, there is hardly a case for convening a fourth UN Conference on the Law of the Sea to renegotiate the UNCLOS, which already is a result of painstaking efforts of the international community during a period that was geopolitically less complex than it is today.

Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the lingering maritime-disputes in the Asia-Pacific are being arbitrated upon by international tribunals. Over the years, the decisions of international tribunals on cases such as the India-Bangladesh (July 2014)¹³ and the more recent one between China and Philippines on the SCS would be valuable to fill the legal voids, and would firm up over time to add to the prevailing tenets of international law.

China’s adherence to PCA Tribunal’s decision would not only contribute to peace and prosperity in the region, but would also best serve its own national interest, at least in the longer term. However, it remains to be seen how long Beijing will take to assimilate the ‘new normal’ into its policymaking.

Captain Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD is the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com.

Notes and References

1. ‘The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines V. The People’s Republic of China)’, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, Press Release, 12 July 2016, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf

2. ‘Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS’, Ministry of External Affairs (Govt of India) Press release, 12 July 2016, at http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27019/Statement_on_Award_of_Arbitral_Tribunal_on_South_China_Sea_Under_Annexure_VII_of_UNCLOS

3. ‘Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, 12 July 2016, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492.shtml

4. ‘China ups the ante, to close part of South China Sea for military exercise,’ Times of India, 18 July 2016, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-ups-the-ante-to-close-part-of-South-China-Sea-for-military-exercise/articleshow/53263905.cms

5. Article 310 of UNCLOS allows States to make declarations or statements regarding its application at the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention.

6. Office of the Legal Affairs of the United Nations, Treaty Section website (Date of most recent addition: 29 October 2013), at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm

7. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, No.55, 25 February 1992, at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocottsatcz739/

8. Limits in the Seas, US Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, US Department of State (Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs), No 112, 09 March 1992, p.52

9. Rules for Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in the Territorial and Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR; ratified by the Council of Ministers Decree No. 384 of 25 Apr 1983, cited in Limits in the Seas, US Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, US Department of State (Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs), No 112, 09 March 1992, pp.56-57

10. Patrick Martin , ‘Spy plane standoff heightens US-China tensions,’ World Socialist Web Site, 3 April 2001, at https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/04/spy-a03.html

11. Echo Huang Yinyin , ‘China Declares a No-Sail-Zone in Disputed Waters During Wargame,’ Defense One, 5 July 2016, at http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/07/china-declares-no-sail-zone-disputed-waters-during-wargame/129607/?oref=d-river

12. Sam LaGrone, ‘Chinese Military South China Sea ‘No Sail’ Zone Not a New Move’, USNI News, 7 July 2016, at https://news.usni.org/2016/07/07/chinese-military-south-china-sea-no-sail-zone-nothing-new

13, Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh V. India) Award, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, 07 July 7, 2014, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1376

Featured Image: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (Sept. 6, 2006) – Chinese Sailors man the rails aboard the destroyer Qingdao (DDG 113) as they arrive in Pearl Harbor. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Joe Kane)

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis

China’s Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam

August 16, 2016 Guest Author 1 Comment

The following article is adapted from a report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Read the original report here.

By Jordan Wilson

Observers of China’s September 2015 military parade witnessed the surprise introduction of a new road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the DF-26, reported to feature nuclear, conventional, and antiship variants and a range of 3,000–4,000 kilometers (km) (1,800–2,500 miles [mi])^¹—greater than any of China’s current systems except the ICBMs in its nuclear arsenal. This range would cover U.S. military installations on Guam, roughly 3,000 km (1,800 mi) from the Chinese mainland, prompting some analysts and netizens to refer to the missile as the “Guam Express” or “Guam Killer” (derived from the term “carrier killer” used to refer to China’s shorter-range DF-21D antiship ballistic missile).^² Combined with improved air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and modernizing support systems, the DF-26 would allow China to bring a greater diversity and quality of assets to bear against Guam in a contingency than ever before.

China’s reason for developing capabilities to hold locations in the Pacific at risk can be traced to the domestic political interests of its leaders. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) perceives that its legitimacy in the eyes of China’s citizens is based, in part, on its ability to demonstrate that it is capable of strengthening the nation^³ and safeguarding China’s territorial interests and claims.^⁴ Yet the CCP leadership believes the United States’ presence in the Asia Pacific—intended to back the U.S. commitment to defending key interests and upholding global norms in the Asia Pacific, such as the security of allies and partners, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and freedom of navigation^⁵—could interfere with its ability to defend these interests and claims if a regional crisis were to arise.^⁶ This concern has prompted Beijing to develop conventional missile capabilities to target U.S. military facilities in the Asia Pacific in general, and Guam in particular, in order to expand China’s options and improve its capacity to deter or deny U.S. intervention during such a crisis. Guam is referenced in many Chinese academic and military writings as a highly important feature in the purported U.S. “containment” strategy,^⁷ with analysts noting its strategic position,^⁸ and its role as an “anchor” of U.S. forces in the region^⁹ and of the “second island chain”* in particular.^¹⁰ China has been able to reach Guam with nuclear weapons for decades. It could theoretically employ conventional gravity bombs, naval gunfire, and torpedoes as well, but the same air and naval platforms that would deliver these are now equipped with significantly more advanced cruise missiles. This article thus focuses on the more relevant concerns posed by missiles below the nuclear threshold.

First and Second Island Chains Showing Guam. The precise boundaries of the island chains vary among Chinese sources, and have never been officially defined by China’s government. Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains,’” China Quarterly, January 21, 2016, 3, 7-9, 17. http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0305741016000011. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Multiplying Forces Capable of Striking Guam

Several new conventional platforms and weapons systems developed by China in recent years have increased its ability to hold U.S. forces stationed on Guam at risk in a potential conflict:

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles: The DF-26 is China’s first conventionally-armed IRBM and first conventionally-armed ballistic missile capable of reaching Guam. Its inclusion in the September 2015 parade indicates it has likely been deployed as an operational weapon,^¹¹ although only a few have likely been installed thus far. The missile also reportedly has serious accuracy limitations:^¹² a 2015 report by IHS Jane’s assesses its current circular error probable (CEP)** at intermediate range to be 150–450 meters,^¹³ while China’s DF-15B short-range ballistic missile, for example, is reported to have a CEP of 5–10 meters as a precision guided weapon.^¹⁴ Practically, this means that many more launches would be required to achieve the same degree of confidence in inflicting damage, pending the improvement of the sensor systems on the missile and the space-based systems providing pre- and post-strike intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and position, navigation, and timing data.

Antiship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs): The DF-26 ASBM version is, like the DF-21D, unproven against a moving target at sea^¹⁵ but likely to undergo further development.

Air-Launched Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs): China’s newest and most capable bomber, the H-6K, when equipped with up to six recently-developed air-launched CJ-20 LACMs, gives China the ability to conduct precision airstrikes and potentially reach Guam with air-launched weapons for the first time.^¹⁶ However, these antiquated bombers*** would have a high probability of being detected and intercepted by U.S. aircraft and anti-aircraft systems.^¹⁷ Such an attack would also outdistance the range of any Chinese escort fighters, according to a 2015 RAND Corporation study,^¹⁸ and China’s air refueling fleet is still too small to support large-scale, long-distance air combat.^¹⁹

Air-Launched Antiship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs): The PLA Navy’s H-6 bombers, including its H-6Ks, can carry up to four of China’s new long-range, supersonic YJ-12 ASCMs,^²⁰ but would have the same limitations in employing these weapons.

Sea-Launched Land Attack Cruise Missiles: The PLA Navy currently does not have the ability to strike land targets, but China has likely begun to develop a sea-based LACM capability over the last few years.^²¹ The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has stated that this capability may involve China’s forthcoming Type 095 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) or new LUYANG-III guided missile destroyer (DDG).^²²

Sea-Launched Antiship Cruise Missiles: PLA Navy platforms equipped with ASCMs, particularly the new YJ-18, could complicate U.S. naval operations near its Guam facilities, provided the PLA Navy vessels were able to get into position without being detected. China’s quietest submarines, however, are diesel-electric and relatively slow in comparison to other types (see comparison in figure below).

The Expanding Range of China's Conventional Missiles. Full list of sources available here. — The Expanding Range of China’s Conventional Missiles. Click to enlarge. (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)

China’s new conventional regional strike weapons, as well as ongoing qualitative improvements to its naval operations and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems, provide Beijing with the ability to hold U.S. forces and installations on Guam at greater risk than in the past, despite remaining challenges and gaps that indicate the level of risk is still low. Overall, the efficiency/vulnerability tradeoff between China’s air and naval forces probably factors into why China pursued a third option by developing DF-26 ballistic missiles. Beijing is working to advance its regional strike capabilities across the board, however, indicating concerns will be posed by ground-, air-, and sea-launched types going forward. To evaluate China’s ability to strike Guam in the future, the areas that should be monitored most closely are increased deployments of DF-26 missiles and qualitative improvements to China’s precision strike capabilities, bomber fleet, in-air refueling capability, and submarine quieting technology.

Implications for the United States

Guam is growing in importance to U.S. strategic interests and any potential warfighting operations in the Asia Pacific, even as China’s ability to strike the island is increasing. The island is home to two U.S. military facilities, Apra Naval Base and Andersen Air Force Base, and hosts a total of about 6,000 military personnel^²³ (with 5,000 more projected to be moved from Okinawa by 2020^²⁴), as well as four nuclear attack submarines;^²⁵ three Global Hawk UAVs;^²⁶ continuous rotations of B1, B-2, and B-52 bombers;^²⁷ temporary fighter rotations;^²⁸ the largest U.S. weaponry storage in the Pacific;^²⁹ and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile battery.^³⁰ It is also crucial to U.S. preparations for responding to crises, providing valuable basing capacity^³¹ and a location to which the United States can pull back assets from within China’s precision strike range, if needed.

China’s conventional missile force modernization could complicate the United States’ response in a contingency in which Beijing sought to deny or delay a U.S. intervention. An assessment by the RAND Corporation, for example, estimates that with 50 (hypothetically more accurate) IRBMs, “China could keep Andersen AFB closed to large aircraft for more than eight days (assuming missile reliability of 75 percent and eight-hour repair times), even if the PLA is denied battle damage assessment … With 100 IRBMs, the PLA could make a full sweep of all unsheltered aircraft parking areas and then use the rest of its inventory to keep Andersen shut to large aircraft for 11 days.”³²Of additional concern, China’s leaders could also be more willing to resort to military force in an existing crisis if they believed they could successfully hold Guam at risk, diminishing the United States’ ability to deter escalation, although it is difficult to determine the extent to which better operational capabilities might influence strategic thinking in Beijing.

U.S. experts and analysts have proposed several options that could help mitigate these concerns:

Hardening Facilities on Guam: Investing in improved protection for U.S. assets on Guam could increase the costliness and uncertainty of conventional ballistic and cruise missile strikes against these facilities, and thereby work to disincentivize a first strike and increase regional stability, as noted by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in its 2015 Report to Congress.^³³ However, this approach is complicated by the likely high costs of such investments,^³⁴ and the potential for China to counter them with an even further buildup of its missile arsenal.

Dispersing U.S. Regional Military Facilities: A greater dispersion of U.S. military facilities throughout the Asia Pacific, or access to an increased number of alternate regional ports and airfields, would multiply the number of targets against which China might employ missile strikes and complicate its ability to disrupt U.S. operations in a contingency, particularly through a first strike.^³⁵ This approach does face high financial costs, the possibility that China might respond with further missile deployments, and potential difficulties in obtaining approval and financial support from host countries.^³⁶ It also runs counter to efforts to reduce long-term dependence on foreign bases. The United States has nonetheless been able to take steps towards this objective, recently securing access to facilities in the Philippines and entering discussions regarding access to airfields in Australia.^³⁷

Investments in New Missile Defense Capabilities: Continued U.S. investments in “next-generation” missile defense initiatives such as directed energy and rail gun technologies, as recommended in the Commission’s 2015 Report to Congress,^³⁸ could yield better options for defending U.S. bases and platforms from China’s conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. While current missile defense systems such as THAAD—already stationed on Guam—and PAC-3 (the upgraded Patriot missile system) may help to an extent, they are intended to stop North Korean missiles and would likely not completely protect against an attack from China.^³⁹

Revisiting the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: China’s missile force modernization has contributed to a U.S. policy debate regarding the United States’ participation in the INF Treaty, particularly given Russia’s recent violations of its Treaty obligations.^⁴⁰ Signed by the United States and Soviet Union in 1987, the INF Treaty required “destruction of both parties’ ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,418 miles), along with their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment,” altogether eliminating 846 U.S. and 1,846 Soviet missiles. Although titled a “Nuclear Forces” treaty, INF’s prohibition of conventional systems is the substance of the current debate, as China’s buildup of conventional intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles has been a driving force behind concerns regarding the Treaty in recent years.⁴¹ As China has engaged in a relatively low-cost buildup of land-based theater-range conventional missiles, including the DF-26, the United States has been prevented under the Treaty from doing so. As policymakers weigh the costs and benefits of continued U.S. participation, three potential actions would allow the United States to carefully explore these questions while remaining in full compliance with the Treaty: reports examining the potential benefits and costs of incorporating ground-launched short-, medium-, and intermediate-range conventional cruise and ballistic missile systems into the United States’ Asia Pacific defensive force structure;^⁴² research and development activities for conventional INF-accountable cruise and ballistic missiles, in preparation for possible changes;^⁴³ and discussions with allies regarding whether they would be open to hosting such systems,^⁴⁴ investing in INF-accountable missiles themselves,^⁴⁵ or joining in advocating for a broadened Treaty at the multilateral or global level.^⁴⁶

Maintaining Superiority in Regional Strike Capabilities: The United States could invest in maintaining its ability to strike an adversary’s launchers and support networks as part of its deterrence posture in the Asia Pacific, aiming to prevent conflicts from beginning and to protect U.S. regional assets should one begin.^⁴⁷ Some experts have specifically noted the high number of LACMs carried by some U.S. attack submarines^⁴⁸ and the potential for U.S. procurement programs such as the Long Range Strike Bomber and Virginia payload module (which increases the missile capacity of the Virginia-class SSN) to provide a higher volume of firepower at a more affordable rate than ground-launched missile forces.^⁴⁹ Policymakers could continuously monitor the performance and sustainability of these and other aspects of the U.S. regional force posture to ensure the United States maintains its military edge.

Conclusion

Beijing’s assessment of Guam’s role in the United States’ regional force posture has made it a focal point of developments in China’s conventional regional strike capabilities, although limitations to these systems render the current risk to U.S. forces on Guam in a potential conflict relatively low. At present, the new DF-26 IRBM headlines China’s expanding capabilities, although it likely will remain extremely inaccurate until China successfully extends its precision strike complex. China could also employ surface- and submarine-launched ASCM attacks, should the platforms be able to move into range undetected; while air-launched ASCM and LACM attacks could reach Guam more quickly, but with a high risk of the bombers being detected and intercepted by U.S. aircraft and anti-aircraft systems. The DF-26 ASBM is still unproven, and China has yet to develop a sea-launched LACM capability. China will likely continue to invest in developing these systems, however, even as Guam’s importance to U.S. strategic interests in the Asia Pacific continues to grow. Options such as hardening facilities on Guam, further dispersing U.S. regional military facilities, continuing investments in “next-generation” missile defense capabilities, revisiting the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty, and maintaining superiority in regional strike capabilities offer potential avenues for addressing these key security concerns.

Jordan Wilson is a Policy Analyst at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, focusing on U.S.-China security and foreign policy issues.

Featured Image: The Los Angeles-class submarine USS Topeka (SSN 754) arrives at its new homeport of U.S. Naval Base Guam in May 2015. Courtesy of Navaltoday.com.

Endnotes

* The first island chain refers to a line of islands running through the Kurile Islands, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, and Natuna Besar. The second island chain is farther east, running through the Kurile Islands, Japan, the Bonin Islands, the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, Naval Institute Press, 2010, 174-176.

** CEP is defined as the radius of a circle, centered about the intended point of impact, whose boundary is expected to include the landing points of 50 percent of the rounds. Oleg Yakimenko, “Statistical Analysis of Touchdown Error for Self-Guided Aerial Payload Delivery Systems,” (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Aerodynamic Decelerator Systems Conference, Daytona Beach, FL, March 26, 2013), 1.

*** The H-6 design, on which future versions have been based, is a licensed copy of the ex-Soviet Tu-16 “Badger” medium jet bomber, first flown in 1952. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, April 2015, 18; Encyclopedia Britannica, “Tu-16.” http://www.britannica.com/technology/Tu-16.

Citations

1. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 3, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” in 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 372; Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” National Interest, September 3, 2015; and Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “DF–26 IRBM May Have ASM Variant, China Reveals at Military Parade,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 2, 2015.

2. Wang Changqin and Fang Guangming “PRC Military Sciences Academy Explains Need for Developing the DF-26 Anti-Ship Missile,” China Youth Daily (Chinese edition), November 30, 2015; Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” National Interest, September 3, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/showtime-china-reveals-two-carrier-killer-missiles-13769; Wendell Minnick, “China’s Parade Puts U.S. Navy on Notice,” Defense News, September 3, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/2015/09/03/chinas-parade-puts-us-navy-notice/71632918/; Charles Clover, “China Unveils ‘Guam Express’ Advanced Anti-Ship Missile,” Financial Times, September 5, 2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8847ddd0-5225-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html#axzz3uKTMR2rn; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “Revealed: China for the First Time Publicly Displays ‘Guam Killer’ Missile,” National Interest, August 31, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/revealed-china-for-the-first-time-publicly-displays-guam-killer-missile/.

3. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream,” New York Times, June 4, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html?_r=0.

4. Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis Management Theory and Practice in China,” Naval War College Review 69:1 (2016), 40; Edward Wong, “Security Law Suggests a Broadening of China’s ‘Core Interests,’” New York Times, July 2, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/world/asia/security-law-suggests-a-broadening-of-chinas-core-interests.html; Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on Nov 26, November 26, 2015; and Caitlin Campbell et al., “China’s ‘Core Interests’ and the East China Sea,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 10, 2013, 1-5. http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China’s%20Core%20Interests%20and%20the%20East%20China%20Sea.pdf.

5. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, November 15, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific; Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Carnes Lord, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, Naval Institute Press, 2014, 17, 25; and Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security, Columbia University Press, 2012, 357.

6. Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis Management Theory and Practice in China,” Naval War College Review 69.1, 2016, 34; Harry J. Kazianis, “America’s Air-Sea Battle Concept: An Attempt to Weaken China’s A2/AD Strategy,” China Policy Institute, 2014, 1-2. http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/policy-papers/cpi-policy-paper-2014-no-4-kazianis.pdf; Lu Zhengtao, “PRC Article Urges PLA to Boost Air-Sea Force Building for Breaking U.S. ‘Island Chain’ Strategy,” China Youth Daily (Chinese edition), November 19, 2013; Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, Naval Institute Press, 2010, 20; and Bi Lei, “Sending an Additional Aircraft Carrier and Stationing Massive Forces: The U.S. Military’s Adjustment of Its Strategic Disposition in the Asia-Pacific Region,” People’s Daily (Chinese edition), August 13, 2004.

7. Song Shu, “Is the DF-26 a ‘Guam Killer?’” Naval Warships (Chinese), December 1, 2014; Li Jie, “U.S. Quickens Construction of ‘Bridgeheads’ of the Second Island Chain,” Global Times (Chinese edition), September 30, 2013; Lin Limin, “A Review of the International Strategic Situation in 2012,” Contemporary International Relations (Chinese), December 2012; Zhang Ming, “Security Governance of the ‘Global Commons’ and China’s Choice,” Contemporary International Relations (Chinese), May 2012; Liu Qing, “New Changes in U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Deployment,” Contemporary International Relations (Chinese), May 20, 2011; Liu Ming, “Obama Administration’s Adjustment of East Asia Policy and Its Impact on China,” Contemporary International Relations (Chinese), February 20, 2011; Modern Navy (Chinese), The Island Chains, China’s Navy, October 1, 2007; and Lu Baosheng and Guo Hongjun, “Guam: A Strategic Stronghold on the West Pacific,” China Military Online, June 16, 2003.

8. Qiu Yongzheng, “Second U.S. Aircraft Carrier Likely To Be Deployed to East Asia,” Youth Reference (Chinese), July 21, 2004.

9. Run Jiaqi, “Experts Say China’s Military Power Has Forced the United States to Fall Back from the First Island Chain,” People’s Daily (Chinese edition), October 8, 2014.

10. Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains,’” China Quarterly, January 21, 2016, 9. http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0305741016000011; Li Jie, “U.S. Quickens Construction of ‘Bridgeheads’ of the Second Island Chain,” Global Times (Chinese edition), September 30, 2013; Liu Bin, “The ‘Roadmap’ of the Asia-Pacific Military Bases of the U.S. Military,” People’s Daily (Chinese edition) April 23, 2012; and Modern Navy (Chinese), The Island Chains, China’s Navy, October 1, 2007.

11. Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” National Interest, September 3, 2015.

12. IHS, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems: Offensive Weapons, China, DF-26, September 11, 2015, 2.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid, 4.

15. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, written testimony of Dennis Gormley, April 22, 2015; and Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 1, 2015, 6–7.

16. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, April 2015, 12, 36, 40; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Military Modernization and Implications for the United States, written testimony of Lee Fuell, January 30, 2014; and U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Hearing on Nuclear Weapons Modernization in Russia and China: Understanding Impacts to the United States, written testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., October 14, 2011.

17. Ian Easton, “China’s Evolving Reconnaissance Strike Capabilities: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Project 2049 Institute, February 2014, 26. http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/140219_JIIA-Project2049_Ian_Easton_report.pdf.

18. Eric Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017,” RAND Corporation, 2015, 63. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf.

19. Michael Pilger, “First Modern Tanker Observed at Chinese Airbase,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 18, 2014, 1. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/StaffBulletin_First%20Modern%20Tanker%20Observed%20at%20Chinese%20Airbase_0.pdf.

20. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 3, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” in 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 357, 373.

21. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, May 2014, 36. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse Karotkin, January 10, 2014; Craig Murray, Andrew Berglund, and Kimberly Hsu, “China Naval Modernization and Implications for the United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 26, 2013. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Backgrounder_China’s%20Naval%20Modernization%20and%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States.pdf.

22. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, May 2014, 36; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, 6-7.

23. Shirley A. Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Congressional Research Service, November 26, 2014, 2, 3. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf.

24. Gidget Fuentes, “Navy Signs off on Plan to Move 5,000 Marines to Guam,” Military Times, September 5, 2015. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/09/05/navy-signs-off-plan-move-5000-marines-guam/71657614/.

25. Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, “Second Submarine Tender to Be Homeported in Guam,” December 23, 2015. http://www.csp.navy.mil/Media/News-Articles/Display-News/Article/637958/second-submarine-tender-to-be-homeported-in-guam; Dean Cheng, “China’s Bomber Flight into the Central Pacific: Wake-Up Call for the United States,” War on the Rocks, December 23, 2015. http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/chinas-bomber-flight-into-the-central-pacific-wake-up-call-for-the-united-states/.

26. Shirley A. Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Congressional Research Service, November 26, 2014, 2, 3. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf.

27. Eric Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017,” RAND Corporation, 2015, 41. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf; Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Carnes Lord, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, Naval Institute Press, 2014, 20.

28. Oriana Pawlyk, “12 Air Force F-16s to Deploy to Guam,” Military Times, January 8, 2016. http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/01/08/12-air-force-f-16s-deploy-guam/78501546/; Shirley A. Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Congressional Research Service, November 26, 2014, 3. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf.

29. Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Carnes Lord, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, Naval Institute Press, 2014, 17.

30. Wyatt Olson, “Guam Anti-Missile Unit’s Main Focus Is North Korean Threat,” Stars and Stripes, January 10, 2016. http://www.stripes.com/news/guam-anti-missile-unit-s-main-focus-is-north-korean-threat-1.388070; Jen Judson, “Lockheed Secures $528 Million U.S. Army Contract for More THAAD Interceptors,” Defense News, January 4, 2016. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/01/04/lockheed-secures-528-million-contract-for-more-thaad-interceptors/78274842/; Cheryl Pellerin, “Work: Guam Is Strategic Hub to Asia-Pacific Rebalance,” U.S. Department of Defense News, August 19, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603091/work-guam-is-strategic-hub-to-asia-pacific-rebalance; and Shirley A. Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Congressional Research Service, November 26, 2014, 3. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf.

31. Eric Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017,” RAND Corporation, 2015, 78-79. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf.

32. Ibid, 64-65.

33. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 3, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” in 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 566.

34. Marcus Weisgerber, “Pentagon Debates Policy to Strengthen, Disperse Bases,” Defense News, April 13, 2014. http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140413/DEFREG02/304130017/.

35. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, written testimony of Toshi Yoshihara, April 1, 2015; Marcus Weisgerber, “Pentagon Debates Policy to Strengthen, Disperse Bases,” Defense News, April 13, 2014. http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140413/DEFREG02/304130017/; Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Carnes Lord, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, Naval Institute Press, 2014, 25, 31.

36. Shirley A. Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Congressional Research Service, November 26, 2014, 11. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf; David J. Berteau et al., “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012, 19. http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf.

37. Armando J. Heredia, “Analysis: New U.S.-Philippine Basing Deal Heavy on Air Power, Light on Naval Support,” USNI News, March 22, 2016. https://news.usni.org/2016/03/22/analysis-new-u-s-philippine-basing-deal-heavy-on-air-power-light-on-naval-support; Rob Taylor, “U.S. Air Force Seeks to Enlarge Australian Footprint,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-air-force-seeks-to-enlarge-australian-footprint-1457431803; Manuel Mogato, “Philippines Offers Eight Bases to U.S. Under New Military Deal,” Reuters, January 13, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usa-bases-idUSKCN0UR17K20160113.

38. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 3, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” in 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 566.

39. Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Carnes Lord, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, Naval Institute Press, 2014, 22.

40. Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Worldwide Threats, statement for the record of Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, February 9, 2016, 7. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-09-16.pdf; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 3, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” in 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 370.

41. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 3, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” in 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 370.

42. Ibid, 566.

43. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, oral testimony of Elbridge Colby, April 1, 2015; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, oral testimony of Robert Haddick, April 1, 2015.

44. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, written testimony of Evan Montgomery, April 1, 2015.

45. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, oral testimony of Toshi Yoshihara, April 1, 2015; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, oral testimony of Evan Montgomery, April 1, 2015.

46. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, oral testimony of Mark Stokes, April 1, 2015.

47. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 3, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” in 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 368-369.

48. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, oral testimony of Dennis Gormley, April 1, 2015.

49. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, oral testimony of Robert Haddick, April 1, 2015.

Featured Image: USS Topeka at Polaris Point, Guam in 2012. (U.S. Navy)

Asia-Pacific

Breaking the Silence: Why Canada needs to speak out on the South China Sea Part 1

August 12, 2016 Guest Author 1 Comment

The following was originally published by the Conference for Defence Associations Institute. Read it in its original form here.

CDA Institute guest contributor Dave Beitelman, a PhD candidate at Dalhousie University, comments on why Canada should take a stronger position on China’s claims in the South China Sea. This is Part 1 of a two-part series.

It was just announced by Defence Minister Sajjan and Foreign Affairs Minister Dion that Canada will be contributing a battalion-sized force as a key element of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence in Eastern and Central Europe. With smaller commitments elsewhere, including in Iraq and Ukraine, this is a considerable commitment, and one which will limit the ability of the Canadian Army to deploy elsewhere. To put this new troop commitment in perspective, Canada deployed, on average, 2,500 troops to Afghanistan at any one time – the size and duration of which put an incredible strain on the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The new NATO deployment is expected to number approximately 1,000CAF personnel, though the exact number, and their particular responsibilities (infantry, support, etc.,) will not be known until a formal announcement is made at the NATO Summit in Warsaw.

In the official press release, Minister Sajjan is quoted as saying, “As a responsible partner in the world, Canada stands side by side with its NATO Allies working to deter aggression and assure peace and stability in Europe.” As a member of the NATO alliance, it makes sense that Canada would contribute to the mission, and can even be seen as an expansion of the work the CAF have been doing in Ukraine. Beyond the alliance politics, however, the more fundamental point is that Canada’s strategic and economic interests are served by a stable and peaceful Europe. Contributing to that stability is part of being a responsible ally and member of the global community.

Far from the borders of Eastern Europe, however, another challenge to the peace and stability of the global order is unfolding in the Asia-Pacific region, and most pressingly in the South China Sea. On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague is set to announce its verdict on the maritime jurisdiction dispute between the Philippines and China. China lays claim to nearly the entire South China Sea, while many other states in the region, including Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, the Philippines, and Vietnam, have claims of their own. China has said it will not recognize the Court’s ruling, a message the Chinese government has repeated since 2013.

While the circumstances and historical context of Russia’s challenges in Eastern Europe and China’s challenges in the Asia-Pacific are different, the essence is the same. In both cases, Russia and China have used proxy forces to do the pushing, with Russia using ‘volunteers’ and other non-official forces to help push its claims in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and China using a mix of coast guard and militia forces to bully its neighbors, while People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) vessels lurk nearby. By refusing to acknowledge the right of the PCA to hear the case, or even of the Philippines to file it, China has made its preferences well known: the South China Sea belongs to China and any disputes should be discussed and negotiated bilaterally, rather than through third-party mechanisms – particularly non-Asian ones. Notably, China can throw its weight around in bilateral negotiations and coerce its smaller neighbors more easily. This has the other states in the region worried, and rightfully so.

In addition to seeking closer ties to the United States, many states in the region have increased their defence budgets and made public statements denouncing China’s behavior. How China, the U.S., or any other country in the region will react to the PCA’s ruling is anyone’s guess. Some speculate China will unilaterally announce the imposition of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea, supported by the network of radar stations, missile batteries, and airstrips on the islands China has dredged into existence over the years. When China announced an ADIZ over parts of the East China Sea in 2013, the U.S. responded by flying two B-52 bombers through the zone. The stakes in the South China Sea, where the Chinese government has invested significant amounts of both financial and political capital, are much higher. Accordingly, tensions in the region leading up to the July 12th announcement are running high.

Over $5 trillion in trade passes through the South China Sea per year. The Canadian government has made the region a key economic priority, due to its many emerging economies, of which China is clearly the most important. To support its economic ambitions, Canada has also tried to gain membership to the institutions through which the region’s economic and security architecture are created, namely the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). All that is to say, it is a region of the world where stability is being threatened and where Canada has substantial economic and strategic interests. And yet, while Canada has been vocal in opposing Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, it has been largely silent on Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Save for two superficial ‘statements of concern’ by former Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird, Canada has said almost nothing. And that is a mistake which sorely needs correcting.

The reasons for Canada’s silence vary. It has been said that Canada has no ‘real’ strategic interests at stake in the South China Sea or vis-a-vis China, nor any real capacity to influence Chinese behavior, and so Canada has little to gain by ‘rocking the boat.’ What’s more, China is an important economic partner with whom Canada has sought closer engagement. By involving itself in regional politics, Canada risks alienating its second largest trading partner. As I’ve argued elsewhere, these arguments don’t hold water.

Outside of its membership in NATO, what direct interests does Canada have in Eastern Europe or the Baltic states? Members of NATO determine their level of engagement based on the relevance to their national interests (along with other considerations), and so it would not be unusual for Canada to be less active in the region than it has been. And, given its recent long-term engagement in Afghanistan, and its on-going missions in the Middle East to combat ISIS, the argument that Canada isn’t pulling its weight would not be particularly persuasive.

Canada has as much interest in the stability of the Asia-Pacific as it does Eastern Europe, if not more. Not only does Canada have extensive economic interests in the region, the many partners Canada has been attempting to build relationships with do too. Canada’s Five Eyes allies Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. are directly impacted by the rise of China. Japan, another important economic and defence partner, is at risk. Canada has very clear strategic and economic interests which are currently at risk. More to the point, however, the argument that Canada has few, if any, security interests at stake in the Asia-Pacific region contradict existing Canadian policies and actions– something I will explore in more depth in Part 2.

David A. Beitelman is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Dalhousie University and a Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, where he served as Deputy Director from 2013–14.

Featured Image: (July 12, 2012) – Soldiers from multiple countries (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Tonga and United States) get in position on the flight deck to man the rails on amphibious assault ship USS Essex in Honolulu, Hawaii, on July 11 2012. (Canadian Forces photo by : MCpl Marc-Andre Gaudreault, Canadian Forces Combat Camera.)

Center for International Maritime Security

Category Archives: Asia-Pacific

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Breaking the Silence: Why Canada needs to speak out on the South China Sea Part 1

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