The CIMSEC Chinese Military Strategy topic week ran from August 3-7, 2015 and featured shortly after a new Chinese Military Strategy white paper was released in May 2015, and after a new U.S. National Military Strategy was released in July 2015. Authors sought to identify key takeaways from the new Chinese white paper, establish historical context, and several compared the new Chinese document to the American strategy.
Authors: Paul Pryce Sherman Xiaogang Lai Chad M. Pillai Jack McKechnie Jan Stockbruegger Chang Ching Eric Gomez Debalina Ghoshal Amanda Conklin Justin Chock Xunchao Zhang
Editors: Eric Murphy Dmitry Filipoff Matt Hipple Matt Merighi
John Stryker
This is the fifth installment in a five-part series summarizing and commenting the 5 December 2014 US Department of State “Limits in the Seas” issue explaining the different ways in which one may interpret Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea. It is a long-standing US policy to try to get China to frame her maritime claims in terms of UNCLOS. Read part one, part two, part three, part four.
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Whereas the assertion that China has not actually made a claim may not be shared by everybody, in particular given the language flowing from Beijing which the DOS report itself cites, the reference to the “high seas” between mainland China and some islands seems stronger proof that Beijing was not making a historic claim. However, we must again stress that this would be the case if we followed the prevailing interpretation of the law of the sea, but there is no reason why China should adhere strictly to it, and even less that Beijing should not have changed her mind since 1958, when she had little more than a coastal navy and her economy was closed and in tatters. It may be true, as the report notes, that the 1958 Declaration only made a historic claim to the Bohai (Pohai) gulf in northeastern China, but again this should perhaps be judged from a wider historical perspective. After 1949 the PRC took a much more uncompromising stance concerning its North-East than its South-East (and wider maritime) borders. With a pragmatic arrangement in place with the United Kingdom concerning Hong Kong, and a strong economic and political relation with the Soviet Union, it was at the other end of the country where, in 1950, Beijing (not without an intense internal debate given the state of the country), decided to resort to force to prevent the presence of hostile forces close to her border, intervening in the Korean War, pushing back the advancing Allied forces and reversing the impact of the Inchon landing, ultimately forcing a stalemate on the ground. In 1958, just five years after the Korean armistice, nearby waters may have thus been much more present in Chinese leaders’ minds. In addition, these were also the waters directly leading to Tianjin and Beijing, the venue for foreign interventions in both the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion. It would not be until the late 1970s that China’s South-Eastern flank would begin to receive more attention, in part thanks to the rapprochement with the United States and in particular once economic growth and the country’s move to become a net energy and commodity importer turned the waters of the South China Sea into a vital venue and potential choke point. It is true that in December 1941 the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse in the South China Sea had enabled the Japanese to land in Malaya and ultimately conquer Burma, closing the last land route to besieged Nationalist China, but this did not result in a comparable imprint on China’s historical consciousness, among other reasons because the episode did not involve Chinese naval forces and was subsumed into a much larger, dramatic, and quickly-developing picture.
Vietnamese-Americans demonstrating against Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Note the banner in favor of US ratification of UNCLOS.
Rejecting the validity of a possible historic claim by China. Concerning whether, if China “Made a Historic Claim”, it would “have Validity”, the DOS paper insists that “such a claim would be contrary to international law”, stressing the limited degree to which UNCLOS recognizes this category of claims, as evidenced by its “text and drafting history”. The text argues that “apart from a narrow category of near-shore ‘historic’ bays” in Article 10, and “historic title” concerning “territorial sea boundary delimitation (Article 15)”, “modern international law of the sea does not recognize history as the basis for maritime jurisdiction”, citing the Gulf of Maine ICJ case. It also underlines the fact that UNCLOS provisions concerning the EEZ, continental shelf, and the high seas “do not contain any exceptions for historic claims” to the detriment of coastal states and all estates enjoying certain freedoms. Concerning fisheries, the report acknowledges that UNCLOS refers to “the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished” in the EEZ (Article 62(3)) and to “traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities” (Article 51), but restricts the impact to the possible granting by one state to another of fisheries resources “based on prior usage”. The text stresses that no such traditional fishing practices can “provide a basis for sovereignty, sovereignty rights, or jurisdiction,” adding that UNCLOS rules on oil and gas development contain no “exception for historic rights in any context.” Again we note how a purely legal report like this may be missing part of the picture, given the great importance that fishing vessels have in the ongoing conflict over the South China Sea, where they are one of the pillars of asymmetric naval warfare.
Chinese scholars Gao and Jia have argued that UNCLOS does not regulate “historic title” and “historic rights,” which fall instead under the purview of general international law. In their view, UNCLOS “was never intended, even at the time of its adoption, to exhaust international law. On the contrary, it has provided ample room for customary law to develop and to fill in the gaps that the Convention itself was unable to fill in 1982” as clear from its preamble, which reads “matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.” The DOS report explicitly rejects this position, saying that “it is not supported by international law” and goes against the “comprehensive scope of the LOS Convention.” Experts like Mark Valencia, on the other hand, hold that China’s posture may be compatible with the international law of the sea.
The text does not stop at arguing that it is not open to a state to make historic claims based not on UNCLOS but on general international law, laying down a second line of defense. It explains that, “even assuming that a Chinese historic claim in the South China Sea were governed by ‘general international law’ rather than the Convention,” it would still be invalid since it would not meet the necessary requirements under general international law, namely “open, notorious, and effective exercise of authority over the South China Sea,” plus “continuous exercise of authority” in those waters and “acquiescence by foreign States” in such exercise of authority. Furthermore, it explains that the United States, which “is active in protesting historic claims around the world that it deems excessive,” has not protested “the dashed line on these grounds, because it does not believe that such a claim has been made by China,” with Washington choosing instead to request a clarification of the claim. Whether this view is also meant to avoid a frontal clash with Beijing, in line with the often state policy goal of “managing” rather than “containing” China’s rise, is something not discussed in the text.
The report concludes by criticizing another view put forward by Gao and Jia, namely the relevance of claims made before the advent of UNCLOS. While these two scholars argue that “In the case of the South China Sea as enclosed by the nine-dash line, China’s historic title and rights, which preceded the advent of UNCLOS by many years, have a continuing role to play,” the DOS paper says that “The fact that China’s claims predate the LOS Convention does not provide a basis under the Convention or international law for derogating from the LOS Convention,” adding that “permitting States to derogate from the provisions of the Convention because their claims pre-date its adoption is contrary to and would undermine” the convention’s “object and purpose” stated in its preamble to “settle … all issues relating to the law of the sea.”
Conclusions. Long-standing American policy towards China stresses the need to manage the latter’s rise, so that it does not threaten the post-Second World War system, based among others on freedom of navigation and a ban on territorial expansion as a legitimate causus belli. As a result, Washington has often called on Beijing to clarify her claims on the South China Sea, in an attempt to constrain them while avoiding a frontal clash. This position also seeks to reinforce the perception that the United States focuses on the rule of law at sea, rather than on supporting one claimant against the other over disputed waters. The DOS document, in line with this approach, carefully dissects Chinese claims, analyzing whether they may be compatible with standard American interpretations of international Law of the Sea. The conclusions are rather pessimistic, exposing how, despite having ratified UNCLOS, the Convention’s provisions are not seen in the same light by Beijing and Washington. This should not surprise us, since international law seeks to constrain power but at the same time it is shaped by it, thus as countries rise they seek to play a greater role in the fate of rules and principles. In the case of China this is even clearer due to historical perceptions that it was to a large extent seaborne power which subjected the country to a semi-colonial status for a whole century. If Beijing’s claims in the South Chinese Sea cannot be seen in the light of UNCLOS, the question arises what ultimate Chinese goals are. Could this be the subject of a future paper by the Department of State? Or does Washington prefer to wait until the international arbitration case launched by Manila concludes? While the second option seems more likely, as time goes by the idea that China’s rise may be shaped, rather than constrained, increasingly seems less and less realistic. However, if the time comes to draw a line in the sand, a whole of government effort will be needed, going beyond the naval circles that to date have been most vocal in articulating the need to resist Chinese expansion.
Alex Calvo is a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan) focusing on security and defence policy, international law, and military history in the Indian-Pacific Ocean. Region. A member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and Taiwan’s South China Sea Think-Tank, he is currently writing a book about Asia’s role and contribution to the Allied victory in the Great War. He tweets @Alex__Calvo and his work can be foundhere.
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This article originally featured on the Phoenix Think Tank, and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.
By Hal Wilson
Even thirty-three years after the end of hostilities there, the Falklands Islands still enjoy close attention. Diplomatic skirmishes and oil exploration at the islands merit recurring interest. But perhaps above all, the positioning of the Argentine military draws attention which few of its other Latin American counterparts receive.
In 2012, the Royal United Services Institute released a thorough review of the Anglo-Argentine security ‘equation’.1In 2014, David Axe of War is Boring reviewed the Argentine Air Force (FAA) in close detail.2Geopolitics help drive this attention – as Axe highlighted, Argentina “aspires to be a regional power”. Likewise, after investing blood and prestige in 1982, Britons remain concerned about the Falkland Islands’ security.
The latest flurry of interest comes with the retirement of Argentina’s ‘fast-jet’ fleet – leaving the FAA with an inventory of subsonic fighters and training aircraft. A layman might assume this marks the end of the Argentine military threat – but these waters are muddied by plenty of spilled ink.
In August 2013, the British Sunday Express highlighted potential sales of Spanish Mirage fighters to the FAA.3Then again in February 2014 the Express announced a £3 billion increase in the Argentine military budget, including “£750 million for 32 procurement and modernisation programmes.”4 Later that year, both Spanish-language5and English-language6outlets covered potential Russian leases of Sukhoi attack aircraft to Argentina.
In January this year the Uruguayan news outlet MercoPress reported on potential Chinese fighter aircraft sales to Argentina 7, news substantiated later by Jane’s Defence Weekly.8 Both MercoPress 9 and Jane’s 10returned to this topic in February – this time highlighting the sale of the Chinese P18 corvette to the Argentine fleet.
Put simply, a cursory review suggests a determined Argentine policy to enhance its military power.
There is real merit to this recurring emphasis on Argentina’s air and naval inventories: Power projection capabilities are often the most important metric of military power. While land forces can secure and defend territory, only air and naval forces have the reach to intimidate, deter or attack distant targets. Indeed, the critical role of the FAA in 1982 makes it a natural focus-point for anyone familiar with the Falklands Conflict.
That said, attentive readers will already see the fault in accepting the first-glance impression from the press: Not only are the FAA’s last supersonic jets retiring – they are retiring without replacement: Argentine efforts to procure replacement fighters through both Spain and Sweden failed. The Chinese jet program also failed amid increasing costs, leaving a last, doubtful option for replacements from Israel.11
Argentina’s stock of air-launched missiles – though barely publicized – likewise seems of dubious standards. The venerable Exocet anti-ship missile, infamous in 1982, still features: Spanish-language coverage reports that efforts began in 2005 to extend Exocet lifespans,12 but by 2014 these had apparently met with only partial success.13 Latin American social media and Argentine military blogs both refer to another anti-ship missile model – the AS-25K – but reliable details are less forthcoming on stockpiles and capabilities.
But given the Argentine fighter inventory now stands at just 25 subsonic A-4 jets,14 their armament is almost a moot point. Deadly enough in 1982 but increasingly obsolete today, these aging fighters will also suffer increasingly poor serviceability – the FAA is cutting back on working hours and maintenance, not just its jets.15 While the FAA’s transport fleet of five C-130 planes is undergoing a limited upgrade, even this is not expected to be completed until May 2019.16
But what of the Argentine Navy? Annual bilateral exercises are held with the Chilean Navy17 and a vital life-extension program for its P3 Orion patrol aircraft is underway.18 Coupled with the acquisition of Chinese P-18 corvettes, initial impressions suggest a service intelligently building core capabilities – but a fleet is more than the vessels it operates.
Argentina’s maritime-industrial supply chain, on which any navy relies for upgrades and maintenance, appears to be chronically underperforming. A Mid-Life Update for one of the fleet’s two submarines had a seven-year turnaround;19 the Argentine Navy icebreaker AlmiranteIrízar completed its refit in August 2015 – eightyears after suffering a fire in 2007.20 With such a track record, the 2010 announcement that a nuclear submarine would be built in Argentina21 appears unrealistic at best.
The Argentine Navy itself comes off little better. A sensational 2012 MercoPress article revealed a host of striking shortcomings: Each of Argentina’s four destroyers were reportedly suffering engine problems and expired ordnance; while submarine crews were receiving 19hours rather than the 190 days minimum submerged training.22 In a 2014 TV expose, Former Argentine Minister of Defence Horacio Jaunarena identified the fleet as Argentina’s most modern armed force – but estimated it as only 40% operational.23 To date, little appears to have been done to remedy the situation.
ARA Santisima Trinidad, the only British Type 42 destroyer built outside Britain. She was the lead ship of the Argentine landing force on the Falklands/Malvinas islands in April 1982.
Argentina’s air and naval capabilities are trapped in a deep malaise. But what lessons does this hold for British military and political leaders, who have more reason than most to take note?
As RUSI’s Michael Clarke highlighted in 2012, “there is no plausible mainstream military option open to Buenos Aires”24for capturing the Falklands Islands. The British press occasionally raises concerns regardless, whether stressing “aggressive Latino diplomacy”25 or possible Argentine special forces raids26 as subverting Britain’s position in the South Atlantic. More thoughtful commentators draw parallels to ongoing tensions in the South China Sea.27
But how relevant are such ‘hybrid’ threats to the Argentine context? Where asymmetric tactics have succeeded – as in the Ukraine or the South China Sea – China and Russia materially and economically dominate their opponents. A militarily weak Kiev was caught surprised and uncertain by Russia’s lightning invasion; Vietnam and the Philippines are divided and outclassed against China’s fleet. The hybrid threat rests on conventional power, and the ability to project or escalate a confrontation.
Britain’s position in the Falklands, by contrast, is challenged by a dysfunctional economy wielding a shrinking arsenal of aging, ill-equipped air-naval assets of minimal power projection value.
The core lesson in this context is for UK policymakers to hold their current course. Key capabilities at the Falklands garrison are already being improved, including enhanced air mobility28 and radar upgrades.29 Both steps are politically and militarily valuable for deterring Argentine initiatives, whether conventional or hybrid. Combined with British diplomatic clout – Argentina’s bid for Swedish jets was doomed by British pressure – the Falklands will remain secure against the full spectrum of possible threats.
Hal Wilson graduated with first class honors in War Studies and History from King’s College London in 2013. He wrote his dissertation on the counterinsurgency lessons of the Afghan War, and also specialized in modern naval history. He works as an analyst in financial services, and has also worked as Principal Administrator of the Phoenix Think Tank since late 2012. Hal has a continuing interest in British maritime history, and its lessons for current policy.
[1]Michael Clarke, ‘The Falklands: The Security Equation in 2012’ in RUSI Analysis (16 Mar. 2012) https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F6324444BE2E/#.Vdmy9PlVikp (Accessed 23/08/2015)
[2]David Axe, ‘Sad and Hopeful Tales of Extinct Air Forces’ in War is Boring (24 Dec. 2014) http://warisboring.com/articles/sad-and-hopeful-tales-of-extinct-air-forces/ (Accessed ibid.)
[3] ‘Jet fighter threat to the Falkland Islands’ in Sunday Express (13 Aug. 2013) http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/419522/Jet-fighter-threat-to-the-Falkland-Islands (Accessed ibid.)
[4]Marco Giannangeli, ‘New arms threat: Argentina’s £3 billion boost to military’ in Sunday Express (23 Feb. 2014) http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/461327/New-arms-threat-Argentina-s-3billion-boost-to-military (Accessed ibid.)
[5] ‘Aseguaran en el Reino Unido que Rusia le ofreció aviones de combate a la Argentina’ in Infobae.com (28 Dec. 2014) http://www.infobae.com/2014/12/28/1617683-aseguran-el-reino-unido-que-rusia-le-ofrecio-aviones-combate-la-argentina (Accessed ibid.)
[6]Jaroslaw Adamowski & Andrew Chuter, ‘Report: Russia May Supply Su-24 Aircraft To Argentina In Exchange For Food’ in DefenseNews (2 Jan. 2015) http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2014/12/30/russia-argentina-jets-food/21045405/ (Accessed ibid.)
[7] ‘Chinese jet fighters, an option to re-equip the Argentine Air Force’ in MercoPress.com (14 Jan. 2015) http://en.mercopress.com/2015/01/14/chinese-jet-fighters-an-option-to-re-equip-the-argentine-air-force (Accessed ibid)
[8] Gareth Jennings, ‘Argentina and China agree fighter aircraft working group’ in IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly (5 Feb. 2015) http://www.janes.com/article/48726/argentina-and-china-agree-fighter-aircraft-working-group (Accessed ibid.)
[9] ‘China to supply Argentina five ‘Malvinas Class’ offshore patrol vessels’ in MercoPress.com (5 Feb. 2015) http://en.mercopress.com/2015/02/05/china-to-supply-argentina-five-malvinas-class-offshore-patrol-vessels (Accessed ibid.)
[10]Richard D Fisher Jr, ‘China, Argentina set for defence collaboration, Malvinas-class OPV deal’ in IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly (1 Feb. 2015) http://www.janes.com/article/48512/china-argentina-set-for-defence-collaboration-malvinas-class-opv-deal (Accessed ibid.)
[11] Jose Higuera, ‘Argentina Eyes Second-Hand Kfirs to Replace Mirages’ in DefenseNews (25 Jul. 2015) http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/07/25/argentina-eyes-second-hand-kfirs-replace-mirages/30247999/ (Accessed Ibid)
[12] ‘La Armada de Guerra Argentina presenta los misiles Exocet repotenciados’ in Infodefensa.com (18 Aug. 2011)
[14] David Axe, ‘Wave Goodbye to the Argentine Air Force,’ in War is Boring (19 Aug. 2015) http://warisboring.com/articles/wave-goodbye-to-the-argentine-air-force/ (Accessed Ibid.)
[15] Diego Gonzalez & Inigo Guevara, ‘Argentine Air Force cuts working hours, retires Mirage fleet,’ in IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly (16 Aug. 2015)
[16] ‘Rockwell Collins to support Argentine Air Force’s c-130 upgrade programme’ in airforce-technology.com (20 Apr. 2015) http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsrockwell-collins-to-support-argentine-air-forces-c-130-upgrade-programme-4556677 (Accessed 24/08/2015)
[17] ‘Argentine and Chilean navies in Beagle channel joint sea and air exercise’ in MercoPress.com (20 Aug. 2015) http://en.mercopress.com/2015/08/20/argentine-and-chilean-navies-in-beagle-channel-joint-sea-and-air-exercise (Accessed Ibid.)
[19] ‘Argentine Navy receives refurbished TR1700 class submarine ARA San Juan’ in MercoPress.com (19 Jun. 2014) http://en.mercopress.com/2014/06/19/argentine-navy-receives-refurbished-tr1700-class-submarine-ara-san-juan (Accessed 24/08/2015)
[20] ‘Sener completes ‘Almirante Izmar’ [sic] refit’ in The Motorship (3 Aug. 2015)
[23] See 21:00 onwards, ‘#FuerzasDesarmadas: el informe completo de PPT’ in El Trece (20 Jul. 2014) http://www.eltrecetv.com.ar/periodismo-para-todos/fuerzasdesarmadas-el-informe-completo-de-ppt_070512 (Accessed 26.08/2015)
[25] ‘Falklands: are we ready for the latest threat from S America?’ in The Week (23 Nov. 2011) http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/falkland-islands/42902/falklands-are-we-ready-latest-threat-s-america (Accessed 26/08/2015)
[26] Dan Warburton, ‘Special Forces in Falklands threat as ‘Argentines may seize the tiny island’ in Daily Mirror (29 Mar. 2015)
[27] Alex Calvo, ‘Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Next Stage in the South Atlantic?’ in The Phoenix Think Tank (10 Apr. 2015) http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/articles/alex-calvo-asymmetric-naval-warfare-the-next-stage-in-the-south-atlantic.html (Accessed Ibid.)
[28] Philippe Naughton & Jenny Booth, ‘UK to boost Falklands military presence’ in The Times (24 Mar. 2015) http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/defence/article4391457.ece (Accessed Ibid.)
[29] Ben Farmer, ‘Britain orders £36m air defence radar to protect Falklands from Argentina’ in The Telegraph (25 Aug. 2015)
Since the end of the Second World War, the military dominance of the United States has rested on its relative technological superiority over its adversaries, what has been underwritten by its impressive economic strength and high-tech domestic industries. For the first time in seventy years, the United States military is forced to contemplate a long-term strategy without the implicit guarantee that it will enjoy decisive technological superiority as its most likely adversaries come closer and closer to achieving parity in both technological and economic strength. In order to remain viable in future conflicts, the American military will have to rethink its operational paradigm and learn to rely more heavily on the creativity and individual zeal of its leaders and less on its hard assets.
For much of its history, the American military has fought its major conflicts without the overwhelming technological and financial superiority that it has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War. I believe that this phenomenon can best be explained by the following paradigm: raised in an age where American military power was relatively lacking on the world stage, the American officer corps did not possess any of the bad habits or laziness of thought engendered in today’s officer corps. Looking down on the rest of the world’s militaries from a plateau of overwhelming superiority and relative security, we have become haughty and ignorant of our peers’ capabilities. Previously generations of American military officers were forced to contend with a world in which the United States Army and Navy were not the best – indeed, not even in the top ten at times.
This forced American military leaders to develop and utilize a currently unimaginable level of organizational, operational, and strategic creativity comparably unknown to the armed forces of today, where an over-reliance on financial superiority has led to an over-reliance on technological superiority, which has led to an over-reliance on established procedures and doctrine. In order for the armed forces of the United States of America to continue to enjoy success in the future, both on the battlefield and as a viable instrument of soft power, American military leaders must look to lessons from the past and re-learn how to plan and fight wars without the assumption that they will always enjoy superiority of force.
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A humorous quote from a European officer highlights the benefit of this, “One of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals nor do they feel any obligations to follow their doctrine.” This emphasizes the extensive freedom of judgment American commanders previously enjoyed while executing missions in complex operational environments. From the author’s perspective as a contemporary unrestricted line officer in the U.S. Navy, this freedom of judgment is virtually non-existent nowadays. Instead, American military commanders are so hamstrung by strict adherence to the protocol and procedures that have been enshrined throughout their military upbringings that they are often afraid to rely on their own intuition, experience, and creativity. This risk aversion is not unjustified since the risk to reward ratio for officers willing to try new ideas has shifted so heavily to the risk side, that many deem the potential gains not worth imperiling their careers over. The main problem with this method of doing business is that operational arenas are not the static playing fields that we presuppose them to be in most exercise and operation briefs. They are constantly evolving, which requires adaptability and ingenuity instead of a flow-chart approach to missions.
Members of the U.S. Naval Academy Class of 2014 participate in the Oath of Office ceremony at Tecumseh Court. (U.S. Navy photo by David Tucker/Released)
This is not meant to be a rebuke of procedural compliance – far from it. Procedural compliance is important to ensure the safety and proper execution of our technical missions: safety and maintenance. However, it is important to also recognize its inherent limitations, and understand that it’s impossible to write “winning a war” into procedural compliance, since procedures only extend to the realm of what is known, and war often devolves into the area of the unknown. Simply put, officers should be proficient at procedural compliance and planned execution, but once the situation is no longer covered by procedures, strategic entrepreneurship and improvisation must take over seamlessly. If we consistently deny our Navy leadership the ability to improvise and test their creative problem solving abilities for fear of imperiling their careers, how and when can this creative solution seeking process be fostered?
The key question then is how do we recapture the ingenuity of the individual officer? I assert that it must start at the earliest possible point in the officer’s career – for creativity once lost is nearly impossible to rediscover. The Navy should develop programs that both encourage and train officers to think of creative solutions to problems early on in their careers. The best time to start this is at the O-2 and O-3 levels, directly after the completion of an officer’s initial warfare qualifications and first operational tour.
The importance of instilling and encouraging the idea of creative thought early on in the officer corps cannot be overstated. Senior officers that attend the Naval War College relatively late in their careers to explore ideas on war and its strategic theory have already come to depend on the rigidity of the Navy establishment for their paychecks and lifestyle, and thus are less willing to question the institution or its authority. The junior officer, relatively fresh and with fewer mental harangues, owes no such allegiance to the organization and does not see it through the same cynical lens, allowing them to see the flaws in our organization much more clearly than a dyed-in-the-wool career officer. These junior officers are still willing to question the military’s fatal deficiencies and flaws before becoming completely indoctrinated into the system.
One way to implement this would be to establish a school that officers attend with peers from their warfare areas concentrated around every major career milestone. The goal of such a school would be to gather high-flying officers into small groups where they would be posed complex operational problems. However, they would face them with handicaps and constraints put in place, making normal doctrine and pre-planned responses obsolete, and forcing them to develop creative solutions to real world problems. Officers would return to the course at every major career milestone, such as in between division officer tours, prior to starting their department head tours, prior to beginning their XO/CO fleet-up, and prior to achieving flag rank.
One of the most resonant lessons that has been gleaned from the attacks on the USS Stark, USS Samuel B. Roberts, and USS Cole is that in unexpected situations, conventional procedures often are inadequate, and improvisation dominates. Generations of American military officers have become complacent through the knowledge of their nation’s technological and financial superiority. It is time to train them to think and fight absent this implicit safety net once again. It is better to start learning these critical skills now, while remaining in control of the pace, than to be forced to learn them under fire in a future conflict.
Capt. Frank Olmo, deputy commander, Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), introduces SMWDC and the new career opportunities it provides junior surface warfare officers (SWOs) during a brief aboard USS Bunker Hill (DDG 52). (U.S. Navy photo).
Secondly, while an understanding of mathematics and the sciences remain ever important in an increasingly technical and specialized military, officer programs must also recapture the emphasis on liberal arts education and creative thinking that has steadily dwindled in the twentieth and twenty-first century formation of modern military officers. At the United States Naval Academy it is a requirement that sixty-five percent of those graduates must complete degrees in the science, technology, engineering, or mathematics disciplines. Of students commissioning from ROTC programs around the country – which, combined with the Naval Academy, contribute roughly two thirds of new officer accessions the fleet each year – eighty-five percent of available scholarships are rewarded to those students who choose majors in the STEM fields. Those remaining fifteen percent who do express interest in studying disciplines outside of these fields, ignominiously referred to as “Tier 3” majors, find their options for earning scholarships and commissioning more limited.
Technical courses do an excellent job training officers to operate complex combat systems and nuclear reactors, where every aspect can be distilled to checklists and procedures, but do a poor job in training strategic and creative thought. Such critical thinking skills are ultimately where officers render the greatest value to the armed forces as leaders and warfighters, not technicians. At a minimum, a certain number of liberal arts courses in subjects such as philosophy, history, literature, and economics should be required for certain officer programs in just the same way that calculus, physics, and other mathematics and science courses are. An officer able to harness the problem-solving ability taught by an education in engineering with the propensity for creative though that comes from a study of the liberal arts would be the best equipped to execute all of the Navy’s missions.
Thirdly, the United States military must push decision-making back down the chain of command to the unit level. In our age of global real-time communication we have achieved the ability to control even the minutest detail from the highest level. We must resist the temptation to do so, for this robs on-scene commanders of the crucial experience that comes from tense, independent decision-making. Instead, we must once again become comfortable with giving commanders autonomy over their units and operations, giving direction only in broad strokes and leaving the details to the “man on the spot,” who is inevitably the subject matter expert on what is happening within and directly around his unit. In today’s fleet, the number of daily updates that a deployed warship is required to provide up the chain of command off-ship has become a full-time job on top of the full-time job of running the ship and executing its mission. No effective leader has two full-time jobs.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt on the steps of the Naval War College.
And all of this for what? It is absolutely ludicrous to imagine that a remote commander and their staff, often years detached from single-unit leadership, require or need all of the information now required to be tracked on a daily basis. The massive off-ship administrative burden that this places on the wardroom of an operational unit, simultaneously interfering with their ability to effectively do their job within the lifelines of the ship, significantly degrades morale and unit-level success. By fostering a culture in which officers are afraid of making even the smallest decisions themselves, we are handicapping the abilities of junior officers to develop leadership skills and to learn to take the initiative, resulting in the ones who adapt to this climate being cautious to a fault for the rest of their careers, and inducing those individuals who want more control and autonomy to seek opportunities elsewhere.
Finally, the United States military must consider drawing talent into its ranks from untraditional sources outside the military and recognize that its rigid and traditional career path that exclusively emphasizes hiring and promotion from within might have to change. This is not entirely without precedent – the Navy already does this for many of its staff corps officers who have demonstrated experience and proficiency in their civilian careers. There are many individuals with different backgrounds and specialties who hear the call to serve their country at different points in their life. A master software engineer at Google with ten years in the industry would be an incredible asset to the military’s cyber warfare communities, but at that point in his career he would likely be too old to enlist and would have his talents wasted as a newly-commissioned ensign while also being grossly under-compensated. Instead, why not bring this cyber star in as a Lieutenant Commander? This arrangement would offer significant benefits and opportunities to both the military and the individual.
If the United States wants to avoid catastrophe on the battlefield in the coming decades, it will need to come to terms with the fact that having more money and better technology will no longer be enough to win the next war against the next foe – who may very well enjoy parity in these domains, if not even superiority. Accepting this, rather than continuing to do the same thing while expecting a different result, is a required preliminary step.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work presents a Master of Science diploma to Ken Thomas at the Naval Postgraduate School.
The United States military must fundamentally change the way it does business and drive its officer corps to rediscover skills that gave way to technology and money when they seemed to no longer be needed or valued. In order to do this, we must encourage creative thought in our officers starting at a very junior level – both by commissioning a greater portion of our officers with backgrounds in the liberal arts as well as technical majors, and by creating incubator programs at multiple levels of officer career tracks to cultivate and stimulate creative thought. The military must also learn to re-delegate greater amounts of control and authority to unit commanders while unit commanders must learn to do the same to their subordinates. This ensures that if subordinate commanders are fighting a conflict in which they are cut off from communication with headquarters or things are not going quite as they had expected them to, they aren’t paralyzed with indecision, experiencing what is in effect their first ever real experience with high-stakes decision making.
Finally, the United States must harness the huge pool of potential talent that exists in the form of civilians who want to serve but don’t fit into the current recruiting construct. By allowing experienced non-military personnel to enter the organization at mid and even upper-level officer positions, the military can harness a huge untapped reservoir of private sector talent. The same skills that our military forefathers used to achieve victory on the battlefield when outclassed in technology, money, manpower, and weapons – creativity, zeal, initiative, and guile – are needed once again. All that is lacking is the will and tenacity to bring them back.
Lieutenant Junior Grade Ian Akisoglu is a Surface Warfare Officer living in Norfolk, Virginia. He graduated from American University with a Bachelor of Arts in economics and history and was subsequently commissioned through Officer Candidate School. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the U.S. Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy. He can be reached at ian.akisoglu@gmail.com.
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