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Book Review

Hunters and Killers

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Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman, Hunters and Killers: Volume 1 and Volume 2. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2015/2016, $44.95.

By Joe Petrucelli

In their two-volume work, Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman have written the first comprehensive history of Anti-Submarine Warfare. As the authors note in their preface, there are histories of ASW campaigns as well as  both adversary and U.S. submarine operations, but no one has examined the discipline of ASW from its humble beginnings. Polmar and Whitman do just that in these two volumes, starting with the rudimentary ASW operations of the American revolution through the massive campaigns of the First and Second World War and finishing with the nuclear revolution and post-Cold War implications. Through their analysis, one can discern four factors that make ASW campaigns effective throughout history: numbers, technology, intelligence coordination, and organizational integration and concepts.

The most important conclusion that can be drawn from Polmar and Whitman’s analysis is that in ASW, numbers matter. While acknowledged as important, most navies do not appear to consider ASW as one of their most important capabilities and invest in it accordingly. Thus, during the interwar period, Polar and Whitman observe that the U.S. and Royal Navies drastically cut their ASW platforms both in absolute and relative terms, preferring to expend limited resources on larger, more prominent line combatants. Unfortunately, all the successful ASW campaigns they examined required presence over a large open-ocean area and a small number of highly capable combatants were not necessarily helpful, leaving the Allies to suffer severe losses until embarking on emergency building programs. To emphasize this point, in 1940 none other than Winston Churchill observed that large surface combatants (even if equipped with ASW weapons and sensors) were not effective escorts because they were valuable enough to become targets themselves. The most effective force structure during the ASW campaigns they examined consisted of long-range patrol aircraft and a large number of small, relatively expendable escorts.

The history of ASW is one of technological innovation by both submarines themselves and ASW forces. Polmar and Whitman do an excellent job explaining these complex technical developments in ASW (i.e. sound wave attenuation, convergence zones, etc) and translating them into layman-ese. However, it is important to note that they do not present technology as the solution for ASW dominance, but rather as a never-ending balance between offensive and defensive technologies. As ASW forces developed new technical capabilities such as depth charges, radar, and sonar, submarines countered with technologies such as snorkels, longer-range torpedoes and air-independent and nuclear propulsion. In the end, technology provided necessary tactical capabilities for an effective ASW campaign, but by itself was not sufficient to practice effective ASW.

Additionally, the authors explores the role of intelligence and cryptology in ASW, a vital factor in historical ASW campaigns. Allied cryptology efforts, known as ULTRA during WWII, were vital to cueing ASW forces and helping convoys avoid known U-boat patrol areas, while HF/DF capabilities deployed on escort ships gave ASW forces more tactical-level cueing. Polmar and Whitman describe a similar cueing role for U.S. undersea surveillance assets during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, it was not just intelligence and cryptology capabilities by themselves that gave ASW forces an advantage, but the fusion of intelligence capabilities into operational forces. By devising employment schemes to utilize intelligence and cryptology windfalls in the short time window that they were relevant, the Allies gained critical advantages in the ASW fight.

Underlying all of these factors and capabilities is the awareness that ASW is a team sport. Integrating ASW platforms from multiple services, intelligence/cryptology sources, and new technical capabilities into an effective campaign required new organizations and employment concepts. The most well known ASW concept, one that was initially resisted during both World Wars, was the convoy system. While convoys probably had the biggest impact in reducing the effectiveness of enemy submarines, German submarines were able to at least partially adapt to it with their own “wolfpack” concept.  Other operational concepts that proved crucial to effective ASW included the development of hunter-killer groups (including escort carriers) to reinforce the convoys and the creation of dedicated ASW organizations (such as the WWII U.S. Tenth Fleet).

USS Providence (SSN-719) snorkeling at her berth in Groton, CT before having honors rendered by the Sloop Providence. (Source)

Although these volumes are a history of ASW and do not explicitly present policy recommendations, there are some lessons from Polmar and Whitman’s work that seem increasingly relevant today. First, reliance on a breakthrough technology to turn the oceans “transparent” is a risky proposition, as the Royal Navy discovered during World War II when their planned reliance on ASDIC (or active SONAR) for ASW proved not nearly as effective as hoped. Additionally, numbers matter, and effective ASW requires a force structure we lack today – namely small surface combatants and escorts (admittedly the LCS is small, but in this reviewer’s opinion it lacks range, combat capability, and is not designed as an escort). Lastly, ASW requires organizational integration in a way that has not been stressed in recent years. While the U.S. Navy (and close allies) have maintained ASW organizations and periodically exercised those capabilities since the end of the Cold War, convoys were last utilized during Operation EARNEST WILL in the Persian Gulf while the last ASW convoys appear to have been during World War II. It is not clear if we have truly exercised convoy tactics (much less having the merchant shipping in the current era to string together a convoy system) or have war-gamed a theater level war against dozens of commerce raiding submarines.

Overall, Polmar and Whitman’s two volumes are an amazingly comprehensive history of Anti-Submarine Warfare. This reviewer’s only complaint is that the analysis largely ends with the end of the Cold War. While the intensity of ASW operations declined at this time and more recent issues are admittedly difficult to research due to classification issues, there are a number of public ASW incidents that would have been worthy of including, from the 2007 incident where a Chinese submarine surfaced inside a U.S. carrier battle group to the 2009 deployment of a Russian Akula SSN in the Western Atlantic. These recent incidents, as well as changes in technology and command structures, would better complete their description of ASW. Despite that one critique, this is a very readable and informative set of books and one that should be required reading for every naval officer serving with surface combatants, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and undersea surveillance organizations.

Joe Petrucelli is a former submarine officer and current Naval Reserve officer. He is a PhD student at George Mason University and a Student Fellow at the school’s Center for Security Policy Studies. His opinions are his own and do not reflect the positions of the Department of Defense or his employer.

Featured Image: An allied ship is seen sinking through the periscope of a German U-Boat in WWII. 

Cyber War

Standing Up the NIWDC with CAPT John Watkins

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By Sally Deboer

CIMSEC was recently joined by Captain John Watkins, the first commanding officer of  the Naval Information Warfighting Development Center (NIWDC). Read on to learn about this new command’s role in shaping the U.S. Navy’s information warfighting skills and capabilities.

SD: We are joined by CAPT John Watkins, the first commanding officer of the newly opened Naval Information Warfighting Development Center. It is truly an honor to have you here. Before we begin, can you share a bit about yourself and your background?

JW: Thanks first and foremost for having me, it’s an honor for me as well. I came into the Navy in 1992 as a Surface Warfare Officer and completed various tours in engineering. I did that for roughly five years and really enjoyed it, but subsequent to those tours I attended the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California where I achieved a Master’s degree in IT Management during which time I laterally transferred into the space and electronic warfare community. A few years transpired and that community was subsumed into the information professional community that we know of today, which comes with the 1820 designator.

Since being an IP, I’ve had multiple operational and staff tours, to include XO of USS Coronado, serving as N6 and Information Warfare Command on Expeditionary and Carrier Strike Group Staffs, and as the N6 on a Numbered Fleet staff. Staff tours have included time on the OPNAV and SURFACE FORCES staffs. I’ve been very fortunate and blessed to have had multiple command tours including NAVCOMTELSTA San Diego, Navy Information Operations Command Texas, and now just recently, my assignment here at the Naval Information Warfighting Development Center.  

SD: Let’s kick off by introducing our readers to your new command. Initial operating capability for the NIWDC was declared on 27 March 2017. Could you please explain the role of this warfighting development center, and specifically the mission of the NIWDC within the information domain?

JW: Like the other warfighting development centers (WDC), we are all focused on four primary lines of operation. First, we’re concerned with enhancing advanced level training. As you can imagine, in terms of NIWDC, that entails all of our information-related capabilities. The advanced level training for our units and forces in the fleet occurs at the latter stages of the optimized fleet response plan (OFRP). We’re heavily invested in that along with our fellow WDCs.

The second line of operation is the development of doctrine that allows us to achieve that advanced level of proficiency – doctrine including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), standard operating procedures (SOPs), higher level Concepts of Operation (CONOPS), or as necessary, revisions to Naval Warfare publications.

The third line of operation is to cultivate and develop a subject matter expertise known throughout all the WDCs as a ‘warfare tactics instructor’ or WTIs. Other WDCs have WTIs in place today, for example, the model that has been around longest is the Naval Aviation WDC, “Top Gun,” associated with advanced tactics for jet fighting, air-to-air combat, etc. What we want to do here at NIWDC is to build out our own WTI pipeline, which I think of as the “Information Warfare Jedi Knights” of the future; we’ll have quite a few WTI pipelines, as we have a broad spectrum of capabilities.

Last but not least, we’ll have an organic assessments capability built into the command which allows us to, in an OODA loop fashion, assess our advanced level training capabilities, our TTPs and SSPs, and our doctrine as we bake it into our training pipeline and processes, ensuring it is delivering optimal IW warfighting effects. Those are the four lines of operation that were promulgated to the WDCs, directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, in 2014.

SD: The traditional warfare Type Commanders (Air, Surface, Undersea) have established their own warfare development centers, as you mentioned. Given that IW is a critical enabler of other warfare areas, how do you envision the NIWDC interacting with the other warfare development centers? What key IW concepts and understandings should be incorporated by other communities?

JW: That’s a fantastic question. NIWDC just achieved IOC designation in late March, and the good news is that while we are the last WDC to be stood up, we already have IW community professionals, both enlisted and officer, arrayed across the other WDCs today, totaling about 150 people, who are working Information Warfare expertise into Naval warfighting. Even as we’re building up to this capability, our folks that have been embedded throughout the other WDCs have done a remarkable job laying the groundwork and foundation for us to come to fruition as the NIWDC. This is significant because the information-related capabilities that we bring to bear are so ingrained in all the other mission warfare areas of the Navy that we have to be interlinked with the other WDCs and visa-versa.

As we build up our capabilities here, we’d like to see the reciprocal detailing back and forth – where ideally we’ll have Surface Warfare Officers, Submariners, Aviators, etc., embedded and billeted to the NIWDC. That’s the future, and it’s absolutely imperative that we get to that point – to have that common back and forth day in and day out as we’re contemplating modern day warfare – it’s essential for us to understand the other warfare areas, their requirements, how our systems are interdependent, and how we have to operate in real time to optimize our overarching warfare capabilities.

SD: You recently stated, “a key objective of the NIWDC is to provide hard-hitting, fleet-relevant information warfighting effects…” Can you outline what some of those effects might be and what specific mission areas within Information Warfare (IW) they support? 

JW: I think the best way I can answer that question is to describe how we’re building out the command here today. We’ve established a headquarters staff that will manage seven core Mission Area Directorates, or what we refer to as “MADs.”

Those Mission Area Directorates include an Assured command-and-control and CyberSpace Operations MAD, a Space Operations MAD, a Meteorology MAD, an Intelligence MAD, a Cryptology MAD, an Electronic Warfare MAD, and an Information Operations MAD. Laying that all out, we can generate information warfare effects from any of those Mission Areas—but when combined, it becomes extremely optimal. It’s the traditional ‘sum of the parts’ principle.

As we develop our organization here, another big effort we’re putting into play in the larger Navy is the Information Warfare Commander construct, which is an organization led by a fully board-screened senior Information Warfare Community Captain (O-6). I’ll describe the construct at the tactical level for now because I think it will be the best way to articulate where we’re headed in employing our model. On a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) staff, for example, we have the Information Warfare Commander (IWC)—again, that board-screened IW Community Captain, who is providing leadership and oversight on core IW mission areas run by the N2 Intelligence Officer, the N39 Cryptologic Officer, the N6 Communications officer, and to the extent where we can get it into play, the Meteorological officer, who at the end of the day, all work for this O-6 IWC. The entire IWC organization works for the Carrier Strike Commander similar to a Destroyer Squadron or Carrier Air Group Commander.  

Where the synergistic effect really comes in is in information operations planning. If you think across typical phased wartime planning scenarios, the folks that are sitting down at the table in the IWC organization bringing their skills and attributes to the team while enabling holistic planning across all phases of warfare, achieve tremendous synergy and total awareness of the  interdependencies and linkages across their mission areas. This powerful effect cannot be overemphasized. Planning in individual stovepipes, i.e. within traditional N Head silos like the N2, the N39, N6 or Meteorology, is counterproductive in today’s modern warfare continuum. It’s essential that planning along these lines factors in and accounts for the coordination and integration of needs and requirements of our fellow Composite Warfare Commanders. When done correctly, we give our collective Navy team every advantage possible to win when we need to. Suffice it to say, I’m very excited about where we’re headed and how we’re going to make our phenomenal Naval warfighting prowess even better!

SD: There seems to be growing agreement that in future conflict, naval forces will not enjoy undisputed access to the electromagnetic spectrum. How will naval information warfare capabilities enable distributed operations when the spectrum required for C4ISR is being, denied, degraded, disrupted and subject to deception operations?

JW: That’s another great question that we are constantly focused on. We all acknowledge the fact that in modern warfare scenarios, the likelihood that we will have denied or degraded communications is a given. Frankly, it’s almost no longer an assumption—it’s reality. Simply put, we need to be able to retain organic capabilities as much as possible wherever we are, so that if we lose the link back to the beach, we can still function and fight.

To that end, we’ve got to be able to train, operate, and be proficient in fighting in those types of scenarios. We’re all about getting at that advanced level of necessary training here at the NIWDC.

SD: How do you propose addressing the acquisition and fielding of new information technology (cyber/EW/IW) and developing TTPs under the current DOD acquisition system?

JW: Acquisition is an evolving process, and I think acquisition reform surfaces quite frequently anytime we talk about the dynamics of advancing IT. The rate of advancement in technology is astounding, and the acquisition process needs to be agile enough to keep pace. To that end, we’ve looked for creative and innovative ways within our acquisition process to accelerate and expedite systems that facilitate IW warfighting effects and we need to continue doing so. NIWDC participates in many experimentation and innovation venues that help facilitate that speed-to-fleet dynamic and we’re excited to be a partner in those efforts.    

To your question about the TTPs and SOPs – when we introduce new tech to the fleet, it is important that we have TTPs and SOPs built into them from day one. We’ve got to be able to deliver a product that comes with robust training behind it so that when it’s delivered to the fleet, our sailors can put it into immediate effect. The TTPs and SOPs that accompany that capability need to be solid enough out of the gate so that we achieve immediate success from day one of fielding.  

On top of that, what I want to achieve at the NIWDC is the ability to refine and tweak TTPs and SOPs at a high rate – what I call the “wash, rinse, repeat” approach. There’s no reason we can’t take those TTPs and SOPs, have sailors put them into effect, provide their feedback to us if they’re not quite right and suggest course corrections, then update those on a continuous, OODA-loop basis until we have delivered optimal doctrine.

SD: Our adversaries approach the information space (IW/EW/cyber) holistically, blending electronic and information warfare with cyberspace operations, psychological operations, deception – and conduct these operations across all elements of national power (diplomatic, economic, legal, military, information). What steps are you taking to ensure the Navy is developing information warfare strategies, operational concepts, and TTPs that cut across all elements of national power?

JW: I’ll give you an example – that’s the best way I can answer this question – it’s a great question, but one you could spend an hour answering. Earlier in our discussion, we talked about the IWC construct. I’m a firm believer that if we get that instituted correctly and make it a robust organization with the goal of delivering those optimal IW effects that it will serve as the bedrock going forward across the Navy enterprise. We’ll look to institute that construct, as applicable, by using that optimized model at the tactical level and building out from there to implement at the operational and strategic levels.

Back to the point about our adversaries – when they’re exploiting all this goodness and delivering their effects, they are planning across the DOTMPLF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities) spectrum. We must do the same thing with our IWC Construct. At the NIWDC, in partnership with IFOR, this is one of our tasks – to perform this DOTMPLF analysis that will codify the IWC construct. We’ve been tasked by Fleet Forces Command and PACFLT to do just that – this will be one of our top objectives in the first years here at the NIWDC – to ensure we’re setting ourselves up for success for decades to come.

SD: Last but not least – if our listeners are new to information warfare, can you suggest any resources or reading materials that could help the less tech-inclined among us become more familiar with the domain and more ready to address its unique challenges?

JW: There are so many great reference materials, but perhaps the quickest way to answer that is to recommend your readers and listeners go to our command website and InfoDOMAIN, or our Navy News Web page or Facebook page. We have a lot of good products posted there – that would be a great start. We have some items posted there that are specific to the NIWDC, so if your readers want more information or a summary, they can find it there as well.

SD: Thank you so much for your time today, CAPT Watkins. It’s truly been an honor speaking with you, and we thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to help educate us on your new command and the role of IW in the Navy and DoD going forward. We hope you’ll join us again sometime. 

Captain John Watkins is a native of California, where he went on to graduate from the NROTC program at the University of San Diego obtaining his commission in 1991. He joined the Naval Information Warfighting Development Center as the commanding officer in March of 2017.

Sally DeBoer is an Associate Editor with CIMSEC, and previously served as CIMSEC’s president from 2016-2017. 

Featured Image: Chief Fire Controlman Daniel Glatz, from Green Bay, Wisconsin, stands watch in the combat information center aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56). (Alonzo M. Archer/U.S. Navy)

Current Operations

Contested Seas: Maritime Security in Libya

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By James Pothecary

Introduction

On 20 February, the Bahamas-flagged car carrier Morning Compass was seized by militants purporting to represent the Libyan Navy. The ship, which was carrying around 5,000 cars to South Korea, was interdicted by a heavily armed skiff and forced to divert to Misrata port, which is located on the western tip of the Gulf of Sirte. The following day the ship was released and resumed its planned course.

The skiff belonged to fighters loyal to the Tobruk-based administration, an unrecognized government that operates in Libya’s east and which has de facto control over broad swathes of the country. The internationally recognized, United Nations-backed unity government, situated in the capital Tripoli, has its own naval force. Therefore, the Tobruk-based vessel had no authority to detain Morning Compass under international law.

This is the latest in a series of incidents between foreign vessels and armed Libyan craft belonging to both the unity government and non-state armed groups (NSAGs). On 17 August 2016, Libyan naval assets loyal to the unity government attacked the Luxembourg-flagged Bourbon Argos, which had been chartered by the international aid organization, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), to assist refugee rescue efforts in the Mediterranean. The incident occurred in international waters, outside Libya’s territorial claims, and involved Libyan naval forces opening fire on the Bourbon Argos. Accounts vary, with the Libyan Navy claiming the shots were fired in warning, while MSF says that naval forces fired at the bridge.

With refugees and economic migrants using Libya as a springboard to cross the Mediterranean to Europe, there are also suspicions that the Tripoli government is implicated in human trafficking. A 13 December 2016 report by the U.N. Support Mission in Libya reported claims that Libyan Coast Guard forces were participating in migrant smuggling networks, rather than attempting to curtail refugee flows to European shores.

While the report did not detail specific incidents, the lack of regulatory oversight, as well as documented examples of sexual abuse, extortion, and similar activities by Libyan coastguard and naval personnel, means Allan & Associates (A2) assesses these claims as credible.

These two incidents are risk-negative indicators of the security environment in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean links eastern and western markets via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, North Africa to Europe, and south-western Russia to the rest of the world via the Black Sea. The sea has 22 littoral states, ranging from countries with little to no functional maritime trade, such as Syria, to major trading nations, such as France and Italy. The World Shipping Council’s latest statistics, from 2013, show the Asia-Mediterranean route shipping 6.7 million TEU, and the North Europe-Mediterranean-South America route 1.68 million TEU. Short sea shipping from Spain and Italy alone, according to a 2015 report from the E.U. statistics office, amounted to GWT468.8 million. Therefore, the significance of the Mediterranean to maritime shipping cannot be overstated.

Security Risks

A2 assesses that there is a credible threat of armed vessels, either operating under the auspices of the Libyan military or as NSAGs, interdicting civilian vessels within 50km of the Libyan coastline. This poses a major risk to shipping. Unlike pirate activity elsewhere, such as off the Yemeni coast, it is likely that NSAGs will purport to belong to the Libyan government, either in Tripoli or Tobruk. This complicates any attempt at deploying countermeasures, as it could be unclear whether interdicting vessels are genuine naval or coast guard assets.

In particular, aid organizations using ships to support rescue efforts in the Mediterranean, such as MSF, are at risk of a kinetic incident. This is because such vessels are more likely to be regarded by Libyan armed maritime fighters as interfering in their country’s sovereign affairs. Furthermore, aid ships are constantly present in and around Libyan territorial waters, making it more likely they will be detected by hostile armed maritime forces. Although the 17 August attack against an MSF vessel did not result in casualties, further incidents could have fatal consequences.

The risk is heightened by the lack of professionalism of Libyan maritime forces. Although international actors, including the E.U., are providing some levels of training, this is primarily focused on basic seamanship skills and military capability. Libyan military personnel, therefore, are more likely to overreact when interdicting shipping, and will likely lack the ability to carry out lawful searches without escalation.

Insecure ports

As at sea, so in port. Ports outside of the capital Tripoli have little to no functional governance, and multiple criminal, tribal and political armed groups operate in these areas. Such groups have unilaterally seized several merchant ships. For example, in February 2017, the Turkish-flagged oil tanker Hacı Telli was seized by armed militants in the north-western city of Zuwarah. The militia claimed that the vessel’s owner owed around USD $4,000 to a local company. Eleven crew members are currently being detained on the ship more than a year later.

The Libyan coast and the Gulf of Sirte. (NASA)

Moreover, there is a risk that ships entering ports outside the control of the unity government will be engaged by Libyan military forces. On 5 January 2015, a Libyan fighter aircraft launched an airstrike on the Liberian-flagged oil tanker Araevo, killing two crewmen. The ship, which was carrying crude oil, had been warned by military units not to attempt to enter Derna port, which was under the control of the Tobruk administration. Logistics operators should regularly update bridge officers on which faction controls intended ports of call, and masters should have discretionary authority to alter travel plans, should they believe there is a kinetic risk from Libyan military forces.

These incidents demonstrate that both the Libyan government and NSAGs pose a direct kinetic security risk to shipping calling at Libyan ports, and A2 stresses that maritime operators should carefully consider the feasibility of docking at ports in-country until the security situation markedly improves.

This includes oil terminal installations such as Ras Lanuf and Zuwetina, which are located on the Gulf of Sirte and are beginning to ramp up oil exportation operations. There is ongoing fighting in these areas, and control over the ports is fluid and liable to change with little to no warning.  

Regulatory Attention

Libyan ports are designated by the U.S. Coast Guard as lacking anti-terrorism measures, under the International Port Security Program. Merchant shipping which has previously called at Libyan ports will, therefore, be subjected to increased attention from the U.S. Coast Guard and port authorities.

This will likely include delayed travel times due to additional security checks being conducted on said vessels. A2 notes that merchant vessels can minimize disruption when visiting U.S. ports if masters enact heightened security procedures when in Libyan ports. These measures should include minimizing time spent in port, the deployment of guards at ship entry points, and briefing all hands to observe personal security procedures when ashore.

Ships calling at European ports could also face increased attention from national security forces, due to the poor security environment in Libyan and other North African ports. Masters can minimize the risk of being targeted for inspection by naval or coast guard units by ensuring location transmission devices are kept on at all times, avoiding diverting from pre-established routes and not using flags of convenience.

Supply Chain Integrity

The lawlessness of Libyan ports also poses a secondary risk: illicit cargo will infiltrate legitimate supply routes. Logistics operators should take steps to implement strict chain-of-custody and supply chain integrity rules and procedures for all cargo loaded in Libyan or other North African ports, to mitigate the risk of illicit shipments infiltrating commercial shipping.

Bridge officers should be trained on how to detect suspicious cargo, and all hands should be regularly briefed on their responsibilities under corporate ethics policies and the law. Operators should not rely entirely on customs authorities for supply chain integrity, as it is practically impossible to comprehensively search all ships, and the effectiveness of customs regimes differs markedly between countries.

Search & Rescue

There is an ongoing migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea, as refugees from the Middle East and Africa seek to flee by ship to Europe. Libya and other North African countries are a primary staging ground before refugees attempt maritime crossings. The quality of the vessels used is extremely poor, and sinkings are common. Often, this leads to considerable loss of life. Article 98 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea obligates masters to render all assistance to individuals ‘in danger of being lost’ at sea. Diversions in the Mediterranean to assist rescue operations could delay scheduled freight shipments. However, A2 reminds maritime operators of their legal obligations in such circumstances.

Forecast

A2 assesses that the security environment around the Libyan coast will continue to decline as multiple NSAGs as well as the Libyan Navy skirmish for maritime supremacy. In particular, as oil exportation resumes in the Gulf of Sirte, maritime forces will attempt to gain control of the surrounding ports and waters, due to their increasing strategic importance.

Further kinetic incidents against civilian shipping are likely within the one-year outlook, and masters should continue to regard Libyan territorial waters as a high-risk environment until the security situation stabilizes. This will be contingent on a political agreement being reached by the various factions, an achievement which currently seems a remote possibility.

James Pothecary is a Political Risk Analyst specializing in the Middle East with Allan & Associates, an international security consultancy which provides a range of protective services including political and security risk assessments, security policy design and crisis management response.

Featured Image: Smoke rises from the oil tanker Anwar Afriqya after a Libyan warplane attacked the tanker in Sirte, Libya, Sunday. (Reuters0

Asia-Pacific

Normalizing Military Operations in the South China Sea

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By Brandon D. Hughes

Introduction

On December 22, 2016 Hainan Airlines flew its first chartered flight to Woody Island (Ying Xing Dao), one of the many disputed islands in the Paracel Island Chain claimed by China in the South China Sea. For a mere 1200 Yuan (roughly $173 USD), a patriotic Chinese tourist could purchase a one-way ticket to visit the controversial island outpost.1 Less than a week later, China sailed its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, around Taiwan, accompanied by an escort of five People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships, amid vocal protests from the Taiwan and Japanese governments.2 Though decades behind the more advance U.S. Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford class carriers, the deployment of China’s newest power projection platform sends a clear strategic message. The series of moves by Beijing are not only tactical decision points, but part of a broader strategic narrative aimed at regional competitors, periphery countries, and the United States. Beijing is sidestepping concerns over its militarization in the region by simply continuing on its own agenda. By downplaying controversial decisions and promoting “standard” and “scheduled” actions or exercises, Beijing is shaping the narrative to its benefit. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is pursuing multiple avenues to promote mutual interests with its neighbors and shift attention away militarization efforts.

China’s militarization is as much a domestic issue as it is a blunt approach to international diplomacy. The ever-growing military prowess of Beijing is steamrolling weaker countries and brushing off critics. The CCP does subscribe to the age-old analogy using both the carrot and the stick in global diplomacy. For example, in the Philippines case, Beijing has had an on again off again charm offensive, supporting President Rodrigo Duterte, and sidestepping disputes over the Scarborough Shoal.3 The remarkable policy shift in the Duterte administration has allowed Beijing to continue development of the Shoal without widespread pushback. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims nearly all of the South China Sea and therefore has ongoing disputes with nearly every Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member. Officially, the United States declines to take sides in the territorial disputes, and continues to support United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and continues overflight surveillance and Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS).  Leadership in Beijing does not seem to possess a sense of urgency to resolve the South China Sea disputes, nor does it have enough external pressure to do so. In fact, the first U.S. FONOP patrol since President Trump took office was only conducted on May 24, 2017, passing within 12 miles of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Island China near the Philippines.4

Since 1949, China has settled disputes with nearly every country along its borders. These have not always been in Beijing’s ultimate favor, but were instrumental in allowing the CCP and PLA to refocus time and resources towards Taiwan and other core interests. The South China Sea may be seen as a flash point by many, but there remains plenty of room to negotiate. The South China Sea is one of the last disputed “borders” that Beijing has to contend with, and given the sheer volume of untapped natural resources, centrality of international trade, and over-fished Chinese littorals, it is in Beijing’s interest to maintain its position and continue to expand its footprint in the region.

Capabilities and Possibilities

By further wielding this defiant attitude and increased military aptitude, Beijing hopes to grow its footprint farther from its borders. Emplacement of HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island and the likelihood of increased air defense and intelligence capabilities in the region are small moves towards a tactical asymmetric proficiency.5 Additionally, a recent article quoted U.S. military officials as having assessed that China’s Hainan Island harbors a robust system of air defense missile systems, including the SA-21 system with a 400km range.6 Once these emplacements are finalized, the accompanied C4ISR infrastructure refined, and defenses fully hardened, these small outposts will most certainly be incorporated into a notional South China Sea air defense identification zone.7

In the event of a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency, the possibility for China to declare a no-fly zone over the disputed islands is a near certainty, albeit one that will present significant difficulties in execution. A functioning aircraft carrier forward deployed into the South China Sea, active patrols by Chinese attack submarines, and Chinese fighters launching and recovering from the Paracel Island Chains, increase the possibility for China to blockade, inhibit, or force the hand of its Asia-Pacific neighbors if a crisis emerges. Emplacing Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Warfare (EW), and SAM assets on these islands sets conditions for China to be able to enforce stronger coercive options. Granted, these systems function perfectly in theory, and in the absence of outside interference, but will be stressed by the offensive capabilities of the U.S. and their allies in the event of an escalating conflict. A blockade or any sort of crisis places in jeopardy trillions of dollars in trade that pass through the South China Sea each year. The likelihood of a large-scale action is unlikely; however, smaller disputes have the potential to erupt if gone unchecked.

Conclusion

The Chinese strategy is to probe, test, and normalize its economic and military efforts while reinforcing a strategic message characterizing these operations and policies as normal part of statecraft. Actions by the U.S. and other regional stakeholders have been unsuccessful in bringing about significant changes to the current dynamic. FONOPs by the U.S. Navy are met with stern rebuttals from Beijing, but do little to change Chinese policy. The continued Chinese development of artificial islands in the South China Sea will offer a jumping off point for both civil maritime and military operations. This also adds a geographic buffer zone against western influence. So far, none of the artificial islands are assessed to be capable of handling a deep-water port limiting the amount of force projection capability the islands can provide.  However, Beijing has more options should the deployment of its submarine fleet from the Sanya base in Hainan require additional coverage. The buildup of the island and the capability does not greatly increase China’s force projection capability, but it does offer something more valuable at this time, a permanent foothold in South China Sea. The U.S. has few options which may alter Beijing’s path but the longer this policy goes unchecked the more dug in reality becomes. Countering the Beijing narrative is crucial but concrete steps must be taken by the U.S. and the ASEAN countries before these small outposts become bigger militarized stepping stones.

Brandon Hughes is a Senior Regional Analyst-Asia for Planet Risk and has previously worked with the U.S. Army, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, and Asia Society. He is a combat veteran and has conducted research on a wide variety of regional conflicts. Brandon holds a Masters of Law in International Relations from Tsinghua University, Beijing and has extensive overseas experience focused on international security.

References

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Featured Image: Subi Reef in the South China Sea. (CSIS AMTI/DigitalGlobe)