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War in 140 Characters: The Fighting Words of Homo Digitalis

David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First CenturyBasic Books, 2017,$17.99/e-book

By LTJG Robert Solonick

What are the origins of social media? It is hard to say; all media is inherently social in that it shares and conveys information to others beyond what we as individuals can do face-to-face. By this definition, anything presented to a public audience, whether through print, images, TV, radio, electronically, or other means, meets this criterion. In that case, does it begin with Martin Luther’s literal post of the “95 Theses” to the door of a church in Germany in 1517? Or does social media begin in a more contemporary setting in the nascent years of the 21st century, where the medium is the internet in which we “post” information to share our lives with others?

In David Patrikarakos’ book, War in 140 Characters, the definition of social media falls within the content of the latter. My first interaction with social media came in the form of the website Myspace in 8th or 9th grade. I created a Myspace account for a singular reason – everyone else was doing it – and I got my first social media friend, Tom.

What Myspace may have sparked, Facebook perfected. Users can message friends, family, and strangers. They can post images and videos, and other people could tell you how great you were by “liking” your posts. Groups of community interests could form and interact in this virtual forum. In doing so, Mark Zuckerberg had done something unprecedented in that Facebook recreated the affirmation and rejection that face-to-face social interactions would otherwise provide, but in the cyber realm. Nothing provided greater ego inflation than dozens of likes on your post, and nothing hurt more than being “unfriended” by someone.

Since my time in high school, social media has grown, morphed, and evolved into dozens of different styles, platforms, and languages. Twitter, Instagram, QQ, WeChat, WhatsApp, Youtube; the list goes on and on. Unfortunately, as with all things in life, those with a determined motive can pull all sorts of means and materials to their cause. As a military officer, I am hyper-aware and keenly curious as to how this plays out in conflict.

What do you do when you cannot buy missiles? You fly planes into buildings. What do you do when you cannot get C4 explosives? You build bombs out of pressure cookers or fertilizer. What do you do when you cannot acquire firearms? You rent trucks and drive them down pedestrian walkways. The principle is simple: those who wish to engage in conflict or commit acts of violence will always find a way. Social media is no exception to this immutable law of human nature, and David Patrikarakos’ book shows how actors across the world are leveraging and weaponizing social media to their cause.

War in 140 Characters introduces a series of case studies exemplifying the various means by which social media influences the ideas and opinions of a public audience, rallies them to support or confront a cause, while also obfuscating the truth, undermining the credibility of existing institutions, and tipping the balance in a physical battlespace. Patrikarakos’ investigation takes readers into the heart of the fear and sadness of Farah Baker, a 16-year-old Palestinian girl residing in the Gaza Strip during the 2014 Israel-Palestine war. Farah’s tweets, retweeted thousands of times globally, brought to the attention of the global community the effects of the war on her and her family and radically altered public perceptions of who was the aggressor and the victim in the conflict. Farah, a young girl with no weapon nor political position, but rather a single social media persona coined as Homo digitalis, redirected the discourse surrounding the entire conflict and effectively cast Israel as the aggressor in the eyes of the global community. Israeli forces, seeing their loss of global legitimacy, were put on the defensive and had to master the art of the counter-narrative.

Patrikarakos introduces readers to Anna Sandalova, the “Facebook warrior” of Ukraine resisting Russian aggression. “It’s all about networks,” Anna states in an interview with the author. “Facebook is the main tool I use because there is an entire community on there who can find solutions.” Unlike Farah, Anna as Homo digitalis uses the social network to directly influence battlefield conditions. When government institutions become inept, hyper-connected private citizens assume the functions of the state, including waging war. Anna stands in the frigid air of the eastern European winter passing out uniforms sourced from supporters in the West after a plea for aid she posted on Facebook. “They really like the German uniforms. They’re really high quality,” Anna comments as soldiers line up for sizing. Anna posts images of soldiers with new supplies to her Facebook page, bringing faces to otherwise faceless fighters. Moreover, Anna’s posts ensure the benefactors see the results of their donations, ensuring the donations will continue.

War in 140 Characters shines a spotlight on several other Homo digitali whose influence in conflict is something any information warrior must understand. Another is Vitaly Bespalov, an internet troll in Russia’s state-sponsored troll farms whose sole responsibility is to delegitimize the narratives of media outlets and institutions that do not support the official Russian line. Vitaly doctors images, fabricates hoaxes, falsifies facts, and misrepresents truths to create “a post-truth world.” Eliot Higgins, a British uber-gamer turned online investigator, pieced together images posted to social media websites to trace the path of the Russian Buk surface-to-air missile system from the 53rd Brigade of the Moscow Military District based in Kursk, across the Ukrainian border, to the field just outside of the village of Chervonyi Zhovten, where it shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014. From the comfort of his home in the U.K., Eliot unequivocally proved Russian culpability.

War in 140 Characters was thoroughly enjoyable. Written for a general audience, David Patrikarakos’ writing style is clear, articulate, and replete with vivid detail.  His choice in case studies provides breadth and depth to social media’s use in conflict and will capture the reader’s attention through every page. For an information warrior, the work will provide clear ideas for the murky battlefield of social media.

For a non-warrior, it will shock you. When you finish reading, you will want to delete your Facebook, turn off your cable news, unfollow everyone on Twitter, and insist your friends and family do the same. You will realize how pervasive social media is in your life. But on the other hand, perhaps you will be inspired, and endeavor to bring your cause to social media to turn the tides in favor of your struggle. Either way, no one will ever escape social media’s influences, and for Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, public figures or private citizens, social media is going to be one of the most powerful weapons in any arsenal, and also any adversary’s.

In modern conflict, victory will not go to whose military causes more casualties on the battlefield, but whose story garners more support. Who comes out on top will be heavily influenced on how effectively one aims the social media barrel. And that is on you.

LTJG Robert Solonick is a naval intelligence officer stationed at the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D.C., where he serves as a collections strategist and operations officer. LTJG Solonick has a Master’s Degree in Public Administration from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University with a concentration in U.S. national security policy and an advanced graduate certificate in post-conflict reconstruction. He and his wife, Mariah Lopez, a ballet instructor, reside in Virginia with their German Sheppard, Cairo. These views are presented in a personal capacity.

Featured Image: “Social Media Marketing Strategy” via Wikimedia Commons. 

On The Decline of European Naval Power: A Conversation with Jeremy Stöhs, Pt. 1

By Roger Hilton

The intensifying competition between the United States, Russia, and China for control of strategic spaces has brought with it a slew of challenges and a lowered threshold for potential confrontation. Consequently this new security dynamic has forced national policymakers to reconsider the importance of the maritime domain when it comes to global statecraft. Consequently, this new security dynamic has forced national policy makers to reconsider the importance of the maritime domain when it comes to global statecraft. On quick observation the situation does not inspire much confidence. Years of neglected force structure investment by European nations coupled with shifting American presence to Asia suggest a distressing situation. Consequently, based on these factors it is only natural to ponder if Europe’s naval forces are doomed to impotency for the foreseeable future, or if reform if possible.

Here to help us navigate these questions is Jeremy Stöhs, an Austrian-American defense analyst at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University and its adjunct Center for Strategy and Security. In addition, he is also a fellow at the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda, and Security Studies. His current research and teaching focuses on transatlantic relations, maritime security, and European naval power. He has written various articles and chapters on the matter and is the author of the recent book, The Decline of European Naval Forces, Challenges to Sea Power in an Age of Fiscal Austerity and Political Uncertainty.

The decline of European naval power can provide insight into the evolution of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold War. To illuminate the drastic changes many European navies have undergone in the past 25 years, we turn to Jeremy who has analyzed the defense policies and naval strategies of 11 European states, as well as the evolution in deployments and capabilities of their respective forces.

JS: Thank you for having me Roger, it’s always a pleasure talking to you.

RH: Before we dive in, it might be helpful if we structure the conversation. We will cover three distinct periods as they relate to the decline of European naval forces. The first period reaches from 1990-2001, and encompasses the post-Cold War peace dividend. The second period, from 2001-2014, covers land wars in the age of global terrorism after 9/11. Period three, 2014 to the present, begins with the annexation of Crimea. 

In your book you describe both the concept of sea power and naval power, can you explain each concept and explain what distinguishes them?

JS: Thank you very much for the question. There is, as you infer, significant semantic awkwardness regarding these terms and their numerous definitions for seapower, for maritime power, for naval power. I like to paraphrase retired British Admiral Chris Parry who argues that sea power is the combined investments of various resources of the state or enterprises in the pursuit of favorable outcomes at sea. I happen to focus on states despite non-state actors gaining power in the world.

But it’s not only about investments or what Geoffrey Till calls the inputs. Sea power is also about the outputs, or in other words, what capacity states have to influence human behavior by what they do at sea. The state is one basic unit for the measurement of power distribution so sea power broadly speaking would include all investment of the state, such as cultural, commercial, military in the maritime domain. Naval power is but one part of sea power, it’s the military investment.

RH: Can you provide some contemporary examples of each?

JS: The concepts are linked, so I would not say there is one example for one or the other. In order to have sea power in my opinion, you need to have a degree of naval power. Some states may have some significant maritime commercial interests but relatively little means for similarly large investments in naval power. But I refer again to Geoffrey Till who refers to that as the virtuous circle, so one investment in one area is mutually beneficial, and a decline in one area can affect decline in another. I believe this is something we have seen in the past, it is important to remember that most every state –  or rather every state – has some interest in the sea, and they enjoy different forms of agency at sea. Even landlocked countries like my home Austria has a part to play within the global trade regime and therefore also has stakes at sea.

Sea power and naval power are linked, and it’s a different concept than how it was understood maybe 200 years ago, but today they are inextricably linked. 

RH: We have the post-Cold War peace dividend, from 1990-2001. You describe in detail how this period started the initial erosion of naval capabilities and strategies. With the end of the Cold War, yourself like many experts declared that the existential threat of the USSR disappeared and by extension led to the abandonment of traditional naval doctrine. As this was a period of transition from sea control, sea denial, and territorial defense operations to power projection and operations in the littorals. How would you describe this transition, and was this shifting of capabilities for nations smooth or for others was it a regrettable experience?

JS: Well now we have the benefit of hindsight and hindsight is always 20/20. But generally speaking you are correct, although I would say that this process was much more nuanced depending on the respective state and more nuanced than it might seem today.

Two broad trends that are discernable during this period of time are states either adhering to traditional strategies of territorial defense, or seeking greater power projection in all its forms, not only military but also in terms of economics and so on. Those are the two opposing trends. But as always I think it’s important to keep in mind it was not black and white but a continuum of change. States might have had a government that emphasized one area over others, and because sea power is an enduring element many of the developments were gradual. So I try to refrain from revolutionary language, I think it was very incremental. Ships cannot be built overnight, naval and maritime proficiencies cannot be gained overnight, and the capabilities in existence in the 1990s were very much the same as the 1980s. It was the same or similar platforms, systems, and people, largely working in unfamiliar waters maybe, and often in unfamiliar ways.

It’s important to note that some navies in some states welcomed these new missions whereas others were reluctant to join in the post-Cold War euphoria. And this is of course related to geostrategic freedom of action. You look at a state like Norway with its proximity to a historical antagonistic, Russia, and other states with very limited financial means it’s difficult to change its naval policy. Therefore I don’t think there is a clear answer to your question.

RH: Against the backdrop of this maritime landscape that deemphasizes traditional doctrine, how are navies in this time justifying their existence and budgets?

JS: A difficult question to generalize and, again, it depends a lot on each Navy, and there should be much more research of each Navy in terms of how the defense policies have changed. But broadly speaking already during the 1980s in the period of easing tensions between East and West, the German reunification, the maintenance of previous spending levels on defense was not possible. You see this already in British defense studies such as the Options for Change white paper of 1990 that clearly describes how previous defense spending was no longer feasible. So how do they actually justify their existence?

It depends. You have the Scandinavian states, with the exception of Denmark, justifying their existence through a continued threat to their territory, with Russia still being the most powerful military power on the continent. The need to protect their Exclusive Economic Zones was also a core argument, and it’s important to remember that provisions of UNCLOS came into force in 1994, elevating the importance of the EEZs even more so.

In the south you have Greece and Turkey which lived through a period of increased tension during the 1990s. This necessitated hikes in defense spending. And for the rest of Europe, many countries placed great emphasis on projecting power, interventions, peace support operations and such. These took navies outside of the NATO’s traditional areas of operation, ‘out-of-area,’ and naval forces were uniquely suited in this role because of their three basic functions, including: the military, the diplomatic, and the constabulary function.

In this period of fiscal austerity, defense planners used every opportunity they had, but it differed from country to country.

RH: You make the observation that green and brown-water navies evolved into blue water navies. Was this a matter of survival, or was this repurposing utility?

JS: There are only a couple of examples where that actually occurred and that has something to do with this aforementioned trend toward power projection. During the Cold War, European navies were assigned specific duties within their areas of responsibility, such as anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, escort duties, amphibious assault, and so they were quite limited by the bipolar world order.

Once these restrictions ended then states that enjoyed strategic freedom of action sought to use naval forces to project power. And an interesting point, those examples that stick out are the Germany Navy or the Danish Navy, to the less extent the Belgian and Spanish navies, they really saw power projection in different forms. But these navies, mainly the German and the Danish navies, were mainly green water navies, operating close to shore occasionally conducting escort duties, but now they would become blue water navies operating far from home. Now they would go into other littorals at great distances, so they would still act as littoral navies, but at a great distance from home. So that’s an interesting aspect of this whole blue water, green/brown debate.

And of course the repurposing had some utility for those navies. They were able to contribute to increasing number of peacekeeping operations that were emerging in the 1990s, including crisis management which was one of NATO’s main roles, military interventions of course in the Balkans for example, but also further afield. We have numerous operations, including Desert Storm, Yugoslavia, Operation Desert Fox in the late 90s, the intervention in Sierra Leone, also low-key humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts after natural catastrophes and so on.

RH: Despite it being a time of economic prosperity and peace, you reference large-scale investments and procurement projects that took place during this period. Can you situate some of the naval hardware being bought and used at the time?

JS: I provide a lot of examples in my book on naval procurement and force structure, and to a certain extent the platforms and their advantages and disadvantages. It’s important to note that European defense industry was of course a powerful actor. It had influence on how naval forces were built and what they looked like, and critical technologies and jobs of course were still main concerns.

It’s important to remember as I mentioned before, navies can’t be built overnight. So, during the 1990s, they were designed for the Cold War, for high intensity warfighting. If you look at the Italian Navy, the German Navy, they were designed for warfighting, a lot of anti-submarine warfare, escort duties, and mine warfare. Now, all of the sudden, you have this need for expeditionary operations and what you need for that, well you need multi-purpose surface combatants, landing platform docks, amphibious assault ships, helicopter carriers and such. So, on one hand, you see this trend that you need larger platforms for low-intensity operations, and at the same time you have all those procurement projects that were developed and designed in the 1980s. There was a divergence between strategic necessities and the security environment for what you need for that and the procurement plans that are already in the pipeline. In the 1990s you see European countries developing air defense capabilities and air defense destroyers and frigates, and those were capable ships that were commissioned at a time where threats of anti-ship missiles in the littorals are not all too great, and where European countries are operating ships with relative impunity.

But of course this had the advantage of supporting important industries and just goes to show that you have to be very prudent about your decision-making and strategic forecasting.

RH: Is there anything else you’d like to add that we should know or that we’ve overlooked?

JS: With respect to downscaling in this period of time, you have fiscal austerity, a peace dividend, so especially maintenance-intensive and manpower-intensive platforms are decommissioned. But it can be considered a period of relative plenty, especially with regard to the threat scenarios at the time. You still have highly capable platforms coming online, you have highly-proficient crews and personnel, so it’s important to note those capabilities that were being developed in Europe. The Horizon-class, the Daring-class, the German air defense frigates, they were state-of-the-art and comparable to the best air defense destroyers in the world. The UK got the Tomahawk land-attack missile for their subs, the French got their Charles De Gaulle carrier. There was also closer cooperation between the states because of the need to streamline and operate together at a tactical level.

The United States still had such great capabilities that they could compensate to some extent for the dwindling numbers among European naval powers. But the 1990s still proved how important naval power was.

RH: Let’s move on to the second period, involving land wars in the period between 2001-2014. This was a seminal moment not just for European navies but also world history. Not only did this period bring two major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the global financial crisis. How did these developments play a major role in the development of European naval forces?

JS: I would argue not to over-dramatize this period. It is true that the last decade it was very challenging for European naval power and the defense community in general in Europe. But it’s also important to put it into a historic context, for the naval forces of some European states, such as the Spanish armada in the 19th century or the 20th century German or Italian navies, they had endured far greater calamities and declines than what we’ve witnessed recently.

However, if you look at the past 30 years, this last decade had the most significant impact on naval forces. I wouldn’t say that it was mainly the land wars but, more importantly, the decreasing defense spending because that more or less is what shapes your naval forces.

RH: At the time we’re in Afghanistan and Iraq, how did the preoccupation with these land wars recalibrate naval power?

JS: There are a couple points to keep in mind here. First of all these operations, we talk about the war on terrorism, you have military operations on land but naval forces play an important role in contributing to these campaigns from air strikes to cruise missiles to providing close air support and medevac, inserting special forces, logistics, and so on. At the same time you had a broadening of the security agenda in general. That already occurs throughout the 1990s but then picks up speed during the 2000s. 9/11 caused Article V of NATO to be invoked for the first time. A large number of European states contributed to the war in Afghanistan, and then also two years later in Iraq. This changed the security environment in such that you have a broadening security environment, a broadening of the term security, and from the 1990s onward and especially after 9/11 you have the threat of terrorism as one of the challenges the naval forces have to deal with. So you see naval forces being deployed in counter-terrorism, combating illegal trafficking of arms, drugs, people, counter-proliferation against weapons of mass destruction. The concept of maritime security is prevalent at this time and naval forces are assigned with dealing with all kinds of maritime security challenges.

RH: It’s been argued that this period helped assert the dominance of the Army and Air Force, and that it led to the de-prioritization of naval power. Amidst this interservice rivalry, did it force navies to expand their repertoire of functions to become more versatile?

JS: I would have to say that really depends on each individual state. I find it difficult to make general claims here. But one thing that is clear is that air and land forces received the lion’s share of funding during this period of time and usually they got a greater portion of the defense budget. We have similar developments in the U.S. as you see in Europe, in those wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where you prioritize the capabilities that you need in war. I remember the discussions quite vividly in investing in low-intensity capabilities such as mine resistant ambush protected vehicles. That was the problem, the high-low mix, therefore U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates slashed the F-22 program for instance. You have a similar problem in Europe.

What this period of time does, I believe, is it changes the perception of the functions of the navies and the understandings of navies in what their constabulary and diplomatic roles are. This is reflected in concepts such as the 1,000-ship Navy, the U.S. maritime strategy A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, and the European effort for capacity building on the low-end of the intensity spectrum together with partners, and it’s easier to build partnerships at the lower-level compared to the high-end.

So you see this growing cooperation and this cooperative approach toward maritime missions, and of course what happens is that this comes at the expense of warfighting capabilities. Especially anti-submarine warfare wasn’t really practiced, offensive mining was relinquished, anti-surface warfare is difficult to do when you lack surveillance assets like maritime patrol aircraft. So the focus is shifted perhaps too much toward the low-end, it really changed the perception of what navies can do. But I think that is being forgotten again.

Read Part Two Here.

Jeremy Stöhs is a security and defense analyst at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and its adjunct Center for Maritime Strategy & Security as well as a fellow at the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda & Security Studies (ACIPSS).

Roger Hilton is the defence and Security stream manager at GLOBSEC, a global think-tank based in Bratislava, Slovakia  as well as a research fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI).

Featured Image: British Royal Navy air defense destroyers HMS Daring (front) and HMS Dauntless operate, February 2010. (Wikimedia Commons/UK Ministry of Defence)

Undersea Surveillance: Supplementing the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook

By Shang-su Wu 

The recently announced Indo-Pacific Outlook by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the 34th Summit indicates the Southeast Asian perspective on the evolving geostrategic environment. Unsurprisingly, ASEAN highlights cooperation, stability, peace, freedom of navigation and other values in the statement. The Outlook, however, leaves a question: how will ASEAN protect these values when diplomatic measures fail?

Under the ASEAN way, it would not be realistic to expect strong words such as those implying the use of force in any official statement, but member countries bordering critical straits could indirectly convey the message by demonstrating relevant defense capabilities. Among a variety of defense capabilities, tracking foreign submarines through enhanced undersea surveillance could be a relevant option.

Tracking Submarines

The major strategic significance of Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific region is mostly found in several critical sea lanes where various powers’ military assets travel through channels connecting the two oceans. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), military vessels and aircraft enjoy the right of innocent passage through these sea routes, whether classified as international straits or archipelagic waters, and coastal countries track these movements. Modern technology makes it feasible for coastal states to readily track foreign military aircraft and surface vessels, a task that is more about safety than security. But tracking submerged submarines is another matter with a much higher barrier to entry.

In the face of complicated hydrographic conditions along with the improving stealth of submarines, there are high requirements for detection in terms of sonars, training, joint operations, and other elements of undersea surveillance. Therefore, successfully tracking submarines requires a high degree of military professionalism and capability. But once successfully tracked and trailed, a submarine receives a clear but private message of deterrence.

Silent Deterrence

This kind of covert deterrence would fit the geopolitical context in Southeast Asia. Firstly, it is generally legitimate for a littoral state to detect underwater entities because submarines should sail on the surface during innocent passage in territorial waters, while a submerged transit is acceptable under UNCLOS in passing sea routes and international straits. But only when a littoral state can identify the locations of foreign submarines transiting underwater can it determine whether UNCLOS is violated or obeyed. In other words, Southeast Asian countries have a sovereign right and legal obligation toward undersea surveillance. 

Tracking submerged submarines also presents a credible level of readiness for uncertainty. Overt exercises can be tailored for specific scenarios to prove certain levels of joint operations and other tactical skills, while bilateral and multilateral exercises highlight partnership, alliance, and other interstate security ties. Exercises are often much broader than the single capability of tracking submarines. Exercises, however, are either fully or semi-planned, and tracking foreign submarines is a truly dynamic encounter between two sides without an advance arrangement. Furthermore, Southeast Asian countries already have routinely conducted various bilateral and multilateral exercises with regional and extra-regional counterparts.

Tracking submerged submarines is usually beyond the microscope of conventional and social media, and can avoid the open hostility or other forms of public outcry that often transpire after close encounters between surface vessels. As the detecting side can deny any information on the tracking, publicity of the event would be more controllable compared with open statements or actions. For the country of the tracked submarine, such encounters are usually negative for national pride and military professionalism, so decision-makers would not have much incentive for revealing the encounter.  

Improving Hardware and Challenges Ahead

Since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asian navies, particularly those of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have built up their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, including through several types of undersea sensors. These three countries have acquired survey vessels to establish their individual hydrographic databases. They have also procured state-of-the-art anti-submarine warfare helicopters such as the Super Lynx, S-70B, and AS-565MBe and deployed them on their respective frigates and corvettes which have towed or hull-mounted sonars. Furthermore, all three navies possess submarines to play the role of targets during training.

SOUTH CHINA SEA (June 18, 2013) A Royal Malaysian Navy Super Lynx prepares to land on the flight deck of USS Freedom (LCS 1) during deck landing qualifications (DLQs). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Cassandra Thompson/Released)

Some characteristics impose challenges on the ability of Southeast Asian countries to track submarines. Large areas of territorial waters are natural obstacles for Malaysia and Indonesia. The numbers of maritime survey vessels they have in service are rather small for accumulating and updating their hydrographic data. By the same token, these two countries’ sensors and platforms, including ASW helicopters or ships, are likely not numerous enough to cover their broad territories or responsively deploy to where contacts are found.

Thanks to its tiny size, Singapore’s assets cannot be geographically diluted, but it shares other constraints with its neighbors, including a lack of fixed-wing ASW aircraft. The Indonesian CN-235 and the Singaporean Fokker-50 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) only have limited ASW capabilities, and Malaysia’s smaller Beech-200 MPAs have no payload space for ASW weapons. Finally, operational experience is another common challenge for these three countries, as they began to introduce their sophisticated ASW assets mainly in the post-Cold War era where opportunity for practice was slim. 

Currently, the three navies are on a trajectory of improving their ASW capabilities, such as through the towed sonar arrays found in Malaysia’s upcoming frigates and Indonesia’s plan of building underwater surveillance systems. These efforts would gradually make tracking foreign submarines underwater more feasible in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

Unlike in the Cold War-era, some Southeast Asian countries, especially these three bordering critical straits, do not have empty arsenals. Although their defense capability is still inferior to most extra-regional powers, some wise and tailored applications of their military assets would support ASEAN agenda’s beyond diplomatic and economic means. Successful tracking foreign submarines would make the ASEAN Outlook more valid in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic landscape.

Shang-su Wu is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Featured Image: A Chinese submarine transits in the Yellow Sea (Wikimedia Commons)

Chief of Naval Operations Zumwalt’s Project 60, Pt. 3

Read Part One. Read Part Two.

By Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt

PERSONNEL RETENTION AND MOTIVATION

  • FAMILY SEPARATION
  • COMPENSATION
  • HOUSING/FACILITIES
  • JOB SATISFACTION

There are several critical areas that must be dealt with directly before retention rates can be improved and shortages in experience corrected.

First, family separation must be reduced significantly. Second, pay must be raised to a level that reflects the unique problems associated with a Naval career. Third, Naval personnel support facilities must be improved. Last—and more generally—we must find new ways to restore the zest, challenge, and fun of a Naval career.

Our surveys have shown consistently that family separation is a key factor in the career decisions of most Navymen. This slide shows the average number of days spent by our ships in their home ports last year. Some of our career men in deprived ratings are at sea for more than 7 years at a stretch on schedules such as these.

ACTION TAKEN TO MINIMIZE FAMILY SEPARATION

  1. CONUS IN-PORT POLICIES
    1. 30 DAYS LEAVE FOR ALL CHANGES OF DUTY STATION
    2. LEANER WATCH SECTIONS
    3. ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND WATCH STANDING SUPPORT BY SHORE COMMANDS FOR TENANT SHIPS
    4. LEAVE FOR 50% OF ALL CREWS DURING POST-DEPLOYMENT PERIOD
    5. IMPROVED PIER FACILITIES TO PROVIDE UTILITIES FOR ALL POST-DEPLOYMENT SHIPS
    6. IMPROVED IN-PORT STABILITY BY 40% REDUCTION OF SCHEDULE CHANGES
  2. OVERSEAS POLICIES
    1. CONUS LEAVE FOR 5% OF DEPLOYED CREWS
    2. NAVAL-SPONSORED/COORDINATED FLIGHTS TO MED FOR DEPENDENTS

Here are some actions we have initiated—or intend to initiate—to increase the amount of time that Navymen can spend with their families. We are willing to accept the slight reduction in our CONUS training and readiness as the price of increases in time at home—“family” time.

These actions are clearly inadequate, however, unless they are coupled with real reductions in Naval commitments commensurate with reductions in force levels. Consequently, if force levels are reduced further, we will ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support a selective reduction of our forward deployments, to ensure a one-in-three rotation policy for deployable units. The resultant reductions in our deployed forces for Case C, based on a budget $1B lower in expenditures than the fiscal guidance, are shown here. The main effect, of course, would be to reduce further the number of attack carriers in the SEVENTH Fleet to only 2. There would be no significant decrease in our Mediterranean commitment. At a ratio of 1:3, or at the more desirable peacetime 1:4, we would retain the capability of a strategic contingency force for quick reaction.

Raising pay requires your personal support more than any other single subject. In the absence of comprehensive salary reform legislation, I solicit your support toward the enactment of legislation in each of these areas.

Sea Pay constitutes the single most important “people legislation” sponsored by the Navy, because it identifies and provides compensation for the unique, hardship aspect of a Navy career. We had sea pay before 1949. It amounted to 10% and 20% of the base pay of officers and enlisted men respectively. In 1949, payment of sea pay to officers was discontinued, and the enlisted entitlement was changed to a flat rate; for a typical second class petty officer, it is now 4.3% of base pay. Our proposal, which is also for a flat rate, increases entitlement (to 12.6% of base pay for the second class petty officer), extends it to officers, and relates increases in sea pay to years spent at sea rather than seniority. This legislation has been returned from the Bureau of the Budget with the recommendation that it be studied further. We will discuss this matter with you separately and need your support in gaining approval of this vital proposal. The other recommended legislation is concerned with specific trouble spots in retention and puts the money where the problems are.

A compensation-related problem is the poor condition of many of our housing units and training facilities. We are exploring ways to engage the Seabees and other self-help forces more actively in such construction forces. To stretch our construction dollars, we are investigating innovative financial approaches. As an example, the Navy Relief Society has agreed to extend a $2M low-interest loan to construct personnel facilities. The shortfalls in our current facilities are so acute that we are recommending changes in our MILCON, even at the price of smaller forces today.

The family separation problem is especially acute in artisan enlisted ratings for which there is a paucity of shore assignments in the Navy. Many of these petty officers have skills that are usable in other areas of government—such programs as the Job Corps and VISTA, for instance. As an interim objective, I request your support in helping to ease our severe rotation problems by the authorization of 4,000 additional billets ashore. We would try to make as many of them reimbursable as possible, that is, other government agencies would repay the Department of Defense. But even if the entire cost came from the Navy’s budget, I would regard the expenditure as well worth our while.

INITIATIVES TO INCREASE JOB SATISFACTION

  1. IMPROVED JOB ASSIGNMENT POLICIES
    1. INCREASE ATTENTION TO OFFICER JOB
    2. PROVIDE INDIVIDUAL ATTENTION TO JOB ASSIGNMENTS FOR ENLISTED
    3. CREATE MORE CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE 500 TO 600 ENLISTED MEN WITH ADVANCED
  2. EARLIER RECOGNITION AND GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR TOP PERFORMERS
    1. DISSOLVE CONVENTIONAL CAREER “PATTERNS” FOR TOP TEN PERCENT
    2. DOUBLE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE PROMOTED EARLY
    3. SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE COMMAND OPPORTUNITY FOR LIEUTENANTS
    4. ESTABLISH TRIAL PROGRAM TO INCREASE RESPONSIBILITY IN GRADE IN ONE DESTROYER AND FOUR AVIATION SQUADRONS
    5. EXCHANGE DUTY ASSIGNMENTS BETWEEN AVIATORS AND SURFACE OFFICERS TO BREAK DOWN TRADITIONAL ASSIGNMENT CONSTRAINTS

To restore the zest of going to sea, we have initiated a number of programs; some are outlined here. I hope that the net effect of these and related initiatives will be to dissolve conventional—and now obsolete—career patterns, encourage greater latitude and more personal attention in both officer and enlisted assignments, provide increased responsibility earlier, encourage a bolder and more innovative philosophy of command, and open new avenues of communication.

The turbulence associated with rapid force reductions has a very real bearing on retention. To achieve lowered budget targets, we have had to take personnel release and redistribution actions that degrade fleet readiness and undercut our retention efforts. In my opinion, if we drop below 575,000 in FY 72, we will jeopardize seriously our ability to “put people first.” Yet, force mixes A, B and C all could be as low as 550,000 depending on actions taken in the shore establishment. Even a figure of 575,000 would require stringent personnel actions, starting this year. Further reductions would have severe and lasting effects on the Navy’s readiness and retention.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS TO REDUCE MILITARY MANPOWER

SECDEF SUPPORT NEEDED IN FOLLOWING RETENTION-RELATED AREAS:

  1. SELECTIVE REDUCTION OF FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS TO INSURE ONE-IN-THREE ROTATION POLICY THIS YEAR AND ONE-IN-FOUR POLICY BY F Y 72
  2. DISSOLUTION OF FIXED COMMITMENTS, TO PERMIT GREATER NAVAL  FLEXIBILITY IN EXTENDING PEACETIME PRESENCE
  3. BILLETS IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR RATINGS WITH INADEQUATE SEA/SHORE ROTATION
  4. SPECIFIC PAY LEGISLATION
  5. FORCE STRENGTH NO LOWER THAN 575,000

These, in sum, are the areas related to retention in which we will need your personal support.

SUMMARY

This completes the detailed part of my presentation. I would like now to summarize my main points. It is from these that our proposals will originate in the immediate future; we will request your support.


THE SOVIET NAVY HAS ATTAINED SIGNIFICANT WORLDWIDE CAPABILITIES

  • IT IS CONTESTING U.S. FOR CONTROL OF THE SEAS
  • ITS FORCES ARE GROWING IN QUALITY AND QUANTITY
  • WITH ITS PRESENT MOMENTUM, FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS ARE CERTAIN

1. The Soviet Navy has attained significant worldwide capability toward controlling the seas. The Soviet forces are increasing in quantity and quality and have a momentum of development that suggests further sharp improvements in the future.


  • IF U.S. NAVAL FORCES ARE REDUCED BELOW THE END FY 70 LEVEL, SIMULTANEOUS TASKS AGAINST THE SOVIETS IN THE PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC MAY NO LONGER BE FEASIBLE

2. The Soviets have a two-ocean Navy. If our Naval forces are reduced below the level of end FY 70, we will no longer be able to oppose them simultaneously in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.


  • SEA CONTROL MISSION SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY OVER PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE
  • PROJECTION FORCES SHOULD BE STRUCTURED TO:
    • SUPPORT NIXON DOCTRINE IN ASIA
    • PROVIDE STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY FORCE

3. The Soviet Naval threat, our commitments abroad, and the credibility of our sea-based strategic deterrent demand that the sea control mission be assigned priority of resources at the expense of projection of power This action will reduce the capability of our projection force to support the Nixon Doctrine in Asia and to serve as a strategic contingency force.


  • IF THE SOVIETS CHALLENGE THE U.S. AT SEA, OUR CHANCE OF DEFEATING THEM IS:
    • 55% WITH PRESENT FORCES
    • 30% WITH POM-72 FORCES 

4. If the Soviets challenge us at sea, either as an adjunct to conflict on land or in a war restricted to the sea, we will have, in my judgment, a 55% chance of defeating them with our present forces. The forces at the POM-72 level, even after optimization, reduce my confidence of success to about 30%. The U.S. may thus be unable to support or hold together the Free World alliance in the face of a conflict with the Soviets at sea.


  • WE ARE PROPOSING ACTIONS THAT CAN, WITHIN FISCAL CONSTRAINTS:
    • INCREASE OUR CAPABILITY FOR SEA CONTROL
    • RETAIN SOME PROJECTION FORCES TO SUPPORT NIXON DOCTRINE
    • INCREASE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
  • THESE ACTIONS CANNOT:
    • OFFSET FORCE REDUCTIONS
    • REVERSE THE CONSEQUENTLY ADVERSE POWER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS

5. We propose a number of actions designed to increase our capability for sea control while retaining some forces for projection of power ashore in support of the Nixon Doctrine—all within the fiscal restraints we face. These actions are intended to increase combat effectiveness within a given force structure and funding level, but do not offset the potential force reduction or reverse the critically adverse power relationship with the Soviets implicit in that reduction.


  • GIVEN CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FY 72 FISCAL GUIDANCE, THE NAVY:
    • MUST CUT FORCES TO MAKE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR:
      • DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS
      • MODERNIZATION OF FORCES 

6. Under the current and potential FY 72 Fiscal Guidance, we see no alternative to accepting some further reduction in force levels, so that development of new weapons systems and modernization of forces can continue.


  • NAVY WILL PAY ATTENTION TO ALL HIGH-COST PROGRAMS; SOPHISTICATION WILL BE ADDED ONLY WHERE IT IS NEEDED TO MATCH THE SOVIET THREAT.

7. We shall pay particular attention to all high-cost programs, adding sophistication only where the threat makes it necessary. The high quality of some of the Soviet systems, particularly in submarines, missiles and air defense, sets some limits to that objective.


  • U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE APPROPRIATE ALLIES TO BUILD UP THEIR SEA CONTROL FORCES
  • U.S. MUST REALIZE THAT THE COMMITMENT OF EVEN OUR CLOSEST ALLIES WILL DEPEND ON THEIR COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL POWER

8. We must engage the understanding and commitment of appropriate allies to build up their own sea control forces. This objective should be coordinated closely with our capabilities. In pursuing this course, we must realize that the commitment of even our closest friends will depend on their assessment of our naval power, compared with the Soviets.


  • FUNDING ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED FOR ULMS IOC IN LATE 1970’s

9. We shall require assistance in funding an acceleration in ULMS, if directed to achieve an IOC in the late 1970’s.


  • DEVELOPING PLAN OF ACTION TO INCREASE 6th FLEET DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

10. We are examining the situation in the Mediterranean, to develop a plan of action that will increase the defensive capabilities of the SIXTH Fleet in the event of hostilities, to permit it to carry out its offensive mission. 


  • CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF EW & COMMAND & CONTROL AREAS

11. We are establishing an office with the necessary authority and responsibility to centralize direction of electronic warfare and command and control. 


  • SURVEILLANCE IMPROVEMENTS WILL PROVIDE LARGE RETURNS IN COMBAT CAPABILITY AT LOW COST

12. We anticipate large returns in combat capability at low cost by taking strong actions to improve our capabilities for satellite and underseas surveillance.


  • THE PERSONNEL SITUATION REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION:
    • TO REDUCE COSTS NOT RELATED TO COMBAT STRENGTH
    • TO INCREASE READINESS
    • TO REEMPHASIZE PURPOSE
  • NAVY
    • IS GIVING THIS AREA THE CLOSEST ATTENTION
    • WILL SACRIFICE FORCE LEVELS NOW IN EXCHANGE FOR LONG-TERM GAINS IN PERSONNEL READINESS

13. The most urgent action within the Navy, to reduce costs that are not related directly to combat strength, to increase readiness, and to reemphasize purpose lies in the personnel field. We are giving this area the closest attention. Some proposals have gone forward to you; others are in process. We are prepared to make some sacrifices in immediate force level in exchange for potential gains in personnel readiness. Your support in this key and vital matter is essential.

We are not presenting specific matters for your approval today. However, the actions we are taking or plan to take to set the new direction, will be introduced into the budget process. As these, and related, papers go forward we will request your support in each instance.

Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt served as the nineteenth Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, from 1970-1974. 

Featured Image: Stuttgart, West Germany, May, 1970: Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., on a worldwide tour of U.S. installations before taking over as Chief of Naval Operations, ponders a question during a press conference in Stuttgart. (Lloyd Borguss/Stars and Stripes)