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Undersea Surveillance: Supplementing the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook

By Shang-su Wu 

The recently announced Indo-Pacific Outlook by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the 34th Summit indicates the Southeast Asian perspective on the evolving geostrategic environment. Unsurprisingly, ASEAN highlights cooperation, stability, peace, freedom of navigation and other values in the statement. The Outlook, however, leaves a question: how will ASEAN protect these values when diplomatic measures fail?

Under the ASEAN way, it would not be realistic to expect strong words such as those implying the use of force in any official statement, but member countries bordering critical straits could indirectly convey the message by demonstrating relevant defense capabilities. Among a variety of defense capabilities, tracking foreign submarines through enhanced undersea surveillance could be a relevant option.

Tracking Submarines

The major strategic significance of Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific region is mostly found in several critical sea lanes where various powers’ military assets travel through channels connecting the two oceans. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), military vessels and aircraft enjoy the right of innocent passage through these sea routes, whether classified as international straits or archipelagic waters, and coastal countries track these movements. Modern technology makes it feasible for coastal states to readily track foreign military aircraft and surface vessels, a task that is more about safety than security. But tracking submerged submarines is another matter with a much higher barrier to entry.

In the face of complicated hydrographic conditions along with the improving stealth of submarines, there are high requirements for detection in terms of sonars, training, joint operations, and other elements of undersea surveillance. Therefore, successfully tracking submarines requires a high degree of military professionalism and capability. But once successfully tracked and trailed, a submarine receives a clear but private message of deterrence.

Silent Deterrence

This kind of covert deterrence would fit the geopolitical context in Southeast Asia. Firstly, it is generally legitimate for a littoral state to detect underwater entities because submarines should sail on the surface during innocent passage in territorial waters, while a submerged transit is acceptable under UNCLOS in passing sea routes and international straits. But only when a littoral state can identify the locations of foreign submarines transiting underwater can it determine whether UNCLOS is violated or obeyed. In other words, Southeast Asian countries have a sovereign right and legal obligation toward undersea surveillance. 

Tracking submerged submarines also presents a credible level of readiness for uncertainty. Overt exercises can be tailored for specific scenarios to prove certain levels of joint operations and other tactical skills, while bilateral and multilateral exercises highlight partnership, alliance, and other interstate security ties. Exercises are often much broader than the single capability of tracking submarines. Exercises, however, are either fully or semi-planned, and tracking foreign submarines is a truly dynamic encounter between two sides without an advance arrangement. Furthermore, Southeast Asian countries already have routinely conducted various bilateral and multilateral exercises with regional and extra-regional counterparts.

Tracking submerged submarines is usually beyond the microscope of conventional and social media, and can avoid the open hostility or other forms of public outcry that often transpire after close encounters between surface vessels. As the detecting side can deny any information on the tracking, publicity of the event would be more controllable compared with open statements or actions. For the country of the tracked submarine, such encounters are usually negative for national pride and military professionalism, so decision-makers would not have much incentive for revealing the encounter.  

Improving Hardware and Challenges Ahead

Since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asian navies, particularly those of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have built up their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, including through several types of undersea sensors. These three countries have acquired survey vessels to establish their individual hydrographic databases. They have also procured state-of-the-art anti-submarine warfare helicopters such as the Super Lynx, S-70B, and AS-565MBe and deployed them on their respective frigates and corvettes which have towed or hull-mounted sonars. Furthermore, all three navies possess submarines to play the role of targets during training.

SOUTH CHINA SEA (June 18, 2013) A Royal Malaysian Navy Super Lynx prepares to land on the flight deck of USS Freedom (LCS 1) during deck landing qualifications (DLQs). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Cassandra Thompson/Released)

Some characteristics impose challenges on the ability of Southeast Asian countries to track submarines. Large areas of territorial waters are natural obstacles for Malaysia and Indonesia. The numbers of maritime survey vessels they have in service are rather small for accumulating and updating their hydrographic data. By the same token, these two countries’ sensors and platforms, including ASW helicopters or ships, are likely not numerous enough to cover their broad territories or responsively deploy to where contacts are found.

Thanks to its tiny size, Singapore’s assets cannot be geographically diluted, but it shares other constraints with its neighbors, including a lack of fixed-wing ASW aircraft. The Indonesian CN-235 and the Singaporean Fokker-50 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) only have limited ASW capabilities, and Malaysia’s smaller Beech-200 MPAs have no payload space for ASW weapons. Finally, operational experience is another common challenge for these three countries, as they began to introduce their sophisticated ASW assets mainly in the post-Cold War era where opportunity for practice was slim. 

Currently, the three navies are on a trajectory of improving their ASW capabilities, such as through the towed sonar arrays found in Malaysia’s upcoming frigates and Indonesia’s plan of building underwater surveillance systems. These efforts would gradually make tracking foreign submarines underwater more feasible in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

Unlike in the Cold War-era, some Southeast Asian countries, especially these three bordering critical straits, do not have empty arsenals. Although their defense capability is still inferior to most extra-regional powers, some wise and tailored applications of their military assets would support ASEAN agenda’s beyond diplomatic and economic means. Successful tracking foreign submarines would make the ASEAN Outlook more valid in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic landscape.

Shang-su Wu is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Featured Image: A Chinese submarine transits in the Yellow Sea (Wikimedia Commons)

Chief of Naval Operations Zumwalt’s Project 60, Pt. 3

Read Part One. Read Part Two.

By Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt

PERSONNEL RETENTION AND MOTIVATION

  • FAMILY SEPARATION
  • COMPENSATION
  • HOUSING/FACILITIES
  • JOB SATISFACTION

There are several critical areas that must be dealt with directly before retention rates can be improved and shortages in experience corrected.

First, family separation must be reduced significantly. Second, pay must be raised to a level that reflects the unique problems associated with a Naval career. Third, Naval personnel support facilities must be improved. Last—and more generally—we must find new ways to restore the zest, challenge, and fun of a Naval career.

Our surveys have shown consistently that family separation is a key factor in the career decisions of most Navymen. This slide shows the average number of days spent by our ships in their home ports last year. Some of our career men in deprived ratings are at sea for more than 7 years at a stretch on schedules such as these.

ACTION TAKEN TO MINIMIZE FAMILY SEPARATION

  1. CONUS IN-PORT POLICIES
    1. 30 DAYS LEAVE FOR ALL CHANGES OF DUTY STATION
    2. LEANER WATCH SECTIONS
    3. ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND WATCH STANDING SUPPORT BY SHORE COMMANDS FOR TENANT SHIPS
    4. LEAVE FOR 50% OF ALL CREWS DURING POST-DEPLOYMENT PERIOD
    5. IMPROVED PIER FACILITIES TO PROVIDE UTILITIES FOR ALL POST-DEPLOYMENT SHIPS
    6. IMPROVED IN-PORT STABILITY BY 40% REDUCTION OF SCHEDULE CHANGES
  2. OVERSEAS POLICIES
    1. CONUS LEAVE FOR 5% OF DEPLOYED CREWS
    2. NAVAL-SPONSORED/COORDINATED FLIGHTS TO MED FOR DEPENDENTS

Here are some actions we have initiated—or intend to initiate—to increase the amount of time that Navymen can spend with their families. We are willing to accept the slight reduction in our CONUS training and readiness as the price of increases in time at home—“family” time.

These actions are clearly inadequate, however, unless they are coupled with real reductions in Naval commitments commensurate with reductions in force levels. Consequently, if force levels are reduced further, we will ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support a selective reduction of our forward deployments, to ensure a one-in-three rotation policy for deployable units. The resultant reductions in our deployed forces for Case C, based on a budget $1B lower in expenditures than the fiscal guidance, are shown here. The main effect, of course, would be to reduce further the number of attack carriers in the SEVENTH Fleet to only 2. There would be no significant decrease in our Mediterranean commitment. At a ratio of 1:3, or at the more desirable peacetime 1:4, we would retain the capability of a strategic contingency force for quick reaction.

Raising pay requires your personal support more than any other single subject. In the absence of comprehensive salary reform legislation, I solicit your support toward the enactment of legislation in each of these areas.

Sea Pay constitutes the single most important “people legislation” sponsored by the Navy, because it identifies and provides compensation for the unique, hardship aspect of a Navy career. We had sea pay before 1949. It amounted to 10% and 20% of the base pay of officers and enlisted men respectively. In 1949, payment of sea pay to officers was discontinued, and the enlisted entitlement was changed to a flat rate; for a typical second class petty officer, it is now 4.3% of base pay. Our proposal, which is also for a flat rate, increases entitlement (to 12.6% of base pay for the second class petty officer), extends it to officers, and relates increases in sea pay to years spent at sea rather than seniority. This legislation has been returned from the Bureau of the Budget with the recommendation that it be studied further. We will discuss this matter with you separately and need your support in gaining approval of this vital proposal. The other recommended legislation is concerned with specific trouble spots in retention and puts the money where the problems are.

A compensation-related problem is the poor condition of many of our housing units and training facilities. We are exploring ways to engage the Seabees and other self-help forces more actively in such construction forces. To stretch our construction dollars, we are investigating innovative financial approaches. As an example, the Navy Relief Society has agreed to extend a $2M low-interest loan to construct personnel facilities. The shortfalls in our current facilities are so acute that we are recommending changes in our MILCON, even at the price of smaller forces today.

The family separation problem is especially acute in artisan enlisted ratings for which there is a paucity of shore assignments in the Navy. Many of these petty officers have skills that are usable in other areas of government—such programs as the Job Corps and VISTA, for instance. As an interim objective, I request your support in helping to ease our severe rotation problems by the authorization of 4,000 additional billets ashore. We would try to make as many of them reimbursable as possible, that is, other government agencies would repay the Department of Defense. But even if the entire cost came from the Navy’s budget, I would regard the expenditure as well worth our while.

INITIATIVES TO INCREASE JOB SATISFACTION

  1. IMPROVED JOB ASSIGNMENT POLICIES
    1. INCREASE ATTENTION TO OFFICER JOB
    2. PROVIDE INDIVIDUAL ATTENTION TO JOB ASSIGNMENTS FOR ENLISTED
    3. CREATE MORE CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE 500 TO 600 ENLISTED MEN WITH ADVANCED
  2. EARLIER RECOGNITION AND GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR TOP PERFORMERS
    1. DISSOLVE CONVENTIONAL CAREER “PATTERNS” FOR TOP TEN PERCENT
    2. DOUBLE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE PROMOTED EARLY
    3. SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE COMMAND OPPORTUNITY FOR LIEUTENANTS
    4. ESTABLISH TRIAL PROGRAM TO INCREASE RESPONSIBILITY IN GRADE IN ONE DESTROYER AND FOUR AVIATION SQUADRONS
    5. EXCHANGE DUTY ASSIGNMENTS BETWEEN AVIATORS AND SURFACE OFFICERS TO BREAK DOWN TRADITIONAL ASSIGNMENT CONSTRAINTS

To restore the zest of going to sea, we have initiated a number of programs; some are outlined here. I hope that the net effect of these and related initiatives will be to dissolve conventional—and now obsolete—career patterns, encourage greater latitude and more personal attention in both officer and enlisted assignments, provide increased responsibility earlier, encourage a bolder and more innovative philosophy of command, and open new avenues of communication.

The turbulence associated with rapid force reductions has a very real bearing on retention. To achieve lowered budget targets, we have had to take personnel release and redistribution actions that degrade fleet readiness and undercut our retention efforts. In my opinion, if we drop below 575,000 in FY 72, we will jeopardize seriously our ability to “put people first.” Yet, force mixes A, B and C all could be as low as 550,000 depending on actions taken in the shore establishment. Even a figure of 575,000 would require stringent personnel actions, starting this year. Further reductions would have severe and lasting effects on the Navy’s readiness and retention.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS TO REDUCE MILITARY MANPOWER

SECDEF SUPPORT NEEDED IN FOLLOWING RETENTION-RELATED AREAS:

  1. SELECTIVE REDUCTION OF FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS TO INSURE ONE-IN-THREE ROTATION POLICY THIS YEAR AND ONE-IN-FOUR POLICY BY F Y 72
  2. DISSOLUTION OF FIXED COMMITMENTS, TO PERMIT GREATER NAVAL  FLEXIBILITY IN EXTENDING PEACETIME PRESENCE
  3. BILLETS IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR RATINGS WITH INADEQUATE SEA/SHORE ROTATION
  4. SPECIFIC PAY LEGISLATION
  5. FORCE STRENGTH NO LOWER THAN 575,000

These, in sum, are the areas related to retention in which we will need your personal support.

SUMMARY

This completes the detailed part of my presentation. I would like now to summarize my main points. It is from these that our proposals will originate in the immediate future; we will request your support.


THE SOVIET NAVY HAS ATTAINED SIGNIFICANT WORLDWIDE CAPABILITIES

  • IT IS CONTESTING U.S. FOR CONTROL OF THE SEAS
  • ITS FORCES ARE GROWING IN QUALITY AND QUANTITY
  • WITH ITS PRESENT MOMENTUM, FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS ARE CERTAIN

1. The Soviet Navy has attained significant worldwide capability toward controlling the seas. The Soviet forces are increasing in quantity and quality and have a momentum of development that suggests further sharp improvements in the future.


  • IF U.S. NAVAL FORCES ARE REDUCED BELOW THE END FY 70 LEVEL, SIMULTANEOUS TASKS AGAINST THE SOVIETS IN THE PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC MAY NO LONGER BE FEASIBLE

2. The Soviets have a two-ocean Navy. If our Naval forces are reduced below the level of end FY 70, we will no longer be able to oppose them simultaneously in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.


  • SEA CONTROL MISSION SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY OVER PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE
  • PROJECTION FORCES SHOULD BE STRUCTURED TO:
    • SUPPORT NIXON DOCTRINE IN ASIA
    • PROVIDE STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY FORCE

3. The Soviet Naval threat, our commitments abroad, and the credibility of our sea-based strategic deterrent demand that the sea control mission be assigned priority of resources at the expense of projection of power This action will reduce the capability of our projection force to support the Nixon Doctrine in Asia and to serve as a strategic contingency force.


  • IF THE SOVIETS CHALLENGE THE U.S. AT SEA, OUR CHANCE OF DEFEATING THEM IS:
    • 55% WITH PRESENT FORCES
    • 30% WITH POM-72 FORCES 

4. If the Soviets challenge us at sea, either as an adjunct to conflict on land or in a war restricted to the sea, we will have, in my judgment, a 55% chance of defeating them with our present forces. The forces at the POM-72 level, even after optimization, reduce my confidence of success to about 30%. The U.S. may thus be unable to support or hold together the Free World alliance in the face of a conflict with the Soviets at sea.


  • WE ARE PROPOSING ACTIONS THAT CAN, WITHIN FISCAL CONSTRAINTS:
    • INCREASE OUR CAPABILITY FOR SEA CONTROL
    • RETAIN SOME PROJECTION FORCES TO SUPPORT NIXON DOCTRINE
    • INCREASE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
  • THESE ACTIONS CANNOT:
    • OFFSET FORCE REDUCTIONS
    • REVERSE THE CONSEQUENTLY ADVERSE POWER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS

5. We propose a number of actions designed to increase our capability for sea control while retaining some forces for projection of power ashore in support of the Nixon Doctrine—all within the fiscal restraints we face. These actions are intended to increase combat effectiveness within a given force structure and funding level, but do not offset the potential force reduction or reverse the critically adverse power relationship with the Soviets implicit in that reduction.


  • GIVEN CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FY 72 FISCAL GUIDANCE, THE NAVY:
    • MUST CUT FORCES TO MAKE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR:
      • DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS
      • MODERNIZATION OF FORCES 

6. Under the current and potential FY 72 Fiscal Guidance, we see no alternative to accepting some further reduction in force levels, so that development of new weapons systems and modernization of forces can continue.


  • NAVY WILL PAY ATTENTION TO ALL HIGH-COST PROGRAMS; SOPHISTICATION WILL BE ADDED ONLY WHERE IT IS NEEDED TO MATCH THE SOVIET THREAT.

7. We shall pay particular attention to all high-cost programs, adding sophistication only where the threat makes it necessary. The high quality of some of the Soviet systems, particularly in submarines, missiles and air defense, sets some limits to that objective.


  • U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE APPROPRIATE ALLIES TO BUILD UP THEIR SEA CONTROL FORCES
  • U.S. MUST REALIZE THAT THE COMMITMENT OF EVEN OUR CLOSEST ALLIES WILL DEPEND ON THEIR COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL POWER

8. We must engage the understanding and commitment of appropriate allies to build up their own sea control forces. This objective should be coordinated closely with our capabilities. In pursuing this course, we must realize that the commitment of even our closest friends will depend on their assessment of our naval power, compared with the Soviets.


  • FUNDING ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED FOR ULMS IOC IN LATE 1970’s

9. We shall require assistance in funding an acceleration in ULMS, if directed to achieve an IOC in the late 1970’s.


  • DEVELOPING PLAN OF ACTION TO INCREASE 6th FLEET DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

10. We are examining the situation in the Mediterranean, to develop a plan of action that will increase the defensive capabilities of the SIXTH Fleet in the event of hostilities, to permit it to carry out its offensive mission. 


  • CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF EW & COMMAND & CONTROL AREAS

11. We are establishing an office with the necessary authority and responsibility to centralize direction of electronic warfare and command and control. 


  • SURVEILLANCE IMPROVEMENTS WILL PROVIDE LARGE RETURNS IN COMBAT CAPABILITY AT LOW COST

12. We anticipate large returns in combat capability at low cost by taking strong actions to improve our capabilities for satellite and underseas surveillance.


  • THE PERSONNEL SITUATION REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION:
    • TO REDUCE COSTS NOT RELATED TO COMBAT STRENGTH
    • TO INCREASE READINESS
    • TO REEMPHASIZE PURPOSE
  • NAVY
    • IS GIVING THIS AREA THE CLOSEST ATTENTION
    • WILL SACRIFICE FORCE LEVELS NOW IN EXCHANGE FOR LONG-TERM GAINS IN PERSONNEL READINESS

13. The most urgent action within the Navy, to reduce costs that are not related directly to combat strength, to increase readiness, and to reemphasize purpose lies in the personnel field. We are giving this area the closest attention. Some proposals have gone forward to you; others are in process. We are prepared to make some sacrifices in immediate force level in exchange for potential gains in personnel readiness. Your support in this key and vital matter is essential.

We are not presenting specific matters for your approval today. However, the actions we are taking or plan to take to set the new direction, will be introduced into the budget process. As these, and related, papers go forward we will request your support in each instance.

Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt served as the nineteenth Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, from 1970-1974. 

Featured Image: Stuttgart, West Germany, May, 1970: Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., on a worldwide tour of U.S. installations before taking over as Chief of Naval Operations, ponders a question during a press conference in Stuttgart. (Lloyd Borguss/Stars and Stripes)

Join New CIMSEC Chapters: Caribbean, South Korea, Nigeria

By Michael Madrid

We are excited to announce the launch of several new CIMSEC chapters, as well as a new president for our Italy chapter. Below is information and president contacts for the newly created Caribbean, South Korea, and Nigeria CIMSEC chapters.

CIMSEC chapters bring together like-minded individuals who share an interest in maritime security. Located all over the world, CIMSEC chapters can organize many sorts of activities for their membership, ranging from an informal meetup at a local bar to a panel discussion at a university. To learn more about CIMSEC’s membership activities you may reach us at [email protected]

Not a CIMSEC member? Sign up here for free!

Caribbean Chapter

President: Vice-Admiral (Ret.) Omar Eduardo Andujar-Zaiter
Contact: 
[email protected]

Vice-Admiral (Ret.) Omar Eduardo Andujar-Zaiter was born in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in 1961. He entered to the Dominican Naval Academy as Midshipman in 1978 where he earned a Bachelor’s Degree in Naval Sciences and commissioned Ensign of the Dominican Republic Navy (DRN) in December 1982. On active duty as Surface Warfare Officer, he served for (9 years in a variety of naval, maritime, joint, and combined assignments. At sea, he was Logistics, Navigator, Operations, XO, and Commanding Officer. Ashore, he served as aide to several Chiefs of the Navy; Public Affairs Director of the Ministry of Defense, as well as at the Navy. He integrated a Commission to Reform and Modernization of the Armed Forces. He was Vice President of the Caribbean Information Sharing Network Conference. At the Naval Academy, he had different assignments as Junior and Senior Officer, obtaining the position of director prior to becoming Vice Chief of the Navy in 2002. Next, he served as Director, Military Institute of the Human Rights and International Conflict Rights; and Director, Haitian Affairs Office of the Ministry of Defense.

South Korea Chapter

President: Alexander Hynd
Contact: [email protected]

Alexander M. Hynd works as a security analyst in Seoul, South Korea. He holds a BA from SOAS, University of London, and an MA from Korea University

Nigeria Chapter

President: Umoh Ofunmbuk
Contact: [email protected]

Umoh Ofonmbuk (born in 1975, in Nigeria and to Nigerian parents) is a chemical engineer, writer, environmentalist, security consultant and entrepreneur. A farm owner, whose company, Garfield Services started in 2017, has been a key producer of organic vegetables in Rivers State. He has served as the Coordinator of Homeland Preservation and Luminosity Foundation (HPLF), an NGO in Nigeria involved in the restoration of the environment, humanity and its values since 2018. He has served as a research consultant to the Chairman and House Committee on Petroleum Resources (Downstream), House of Representatives-National Assembly, from 2011 to 2014, and an independent researcher on the role of the Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) in maritime safety and security. He has completed the UN advanced Security in the Field Course, and completed a UN sponsored course on climate change. He has been a freelance correspondent to The News Magazine and New Dawn, under the supervision of Sylvester Asoya, Former Assistant Editor, The News Magazine.

Italy Chapter

We are pleased to announce the CIMSEC Italy chapter has a new president, LtCdr (r.), French Navy, Francois-Phillipe M. Durbach. Contact him at [email protected]g.

Born in Nancy, France in 1973,  Francois-Phillipe Durbach has a B.A. in Political Sciences/Administrative branch in 1995 at the Institut d’Etudes politiques (Strasbourg). An Erasmus student in 1993-94, he studied at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the LUISS (Rome). In love with the Eternal City, he came back there in 1997 as a Midshipman (French Navy reserve) serving in the Military Attaché Office of the French Embassy in Italy. He also served in the Navy as a political and military analyst in the Defence Mission of the French Embassy in Italy, continuing his career as an officer. He also served as a freelance translator until 1998 and an accountant of the French Desk of International Fides Agency (Vatican). A member of the French Navy Reserve officers’ central association (ACORAM), he is also counselor of Ladispoli’s group of ANMI (National Association of Sailors of Italy). He lives and works in Rome.

Michael Madrid is CIMSEC’s Director of Membership. Contact him at [email protected]

Featured Image: Cruise ship approaching St Martin/St Maarten (Profcruise.com)

Thinking for Seapower: Educating and Organizing for Intellectual Advantage

By Mie Augier and Nick Dew

Introduction 

In 1758 King Frederick the Great of Prussia battled Russian forces at Zorndorf, in the first major battle of the Seven Years War. In a desperate situation, three times the King sent a message to his youngest general Fredrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz: “Attack!” Seydlitz demurred, saying the time wasn’t right, his cavalry would be wasted. Finally the King sent a message that if Seydlitz didn’t attack immediately, the King would have his head. Seydlitz responded: “Tell the King that after the battle my head is at his disposal. But in the meantime, I will make use of it.”2

 “As an organization, we must anticipate changes in the operating environment and adapt to maintain an advantage. This can only be done by eliminating outdated personnel practices, adopting agile processes and continuously improving how we operate and fight, it is highly unlikely that the greatest naval strategists and leaders of our past … would be successful in todays’s bureaucratic environment. Simply put, the best naval strategists that our naval education enterprise can produce today will fail without improving the organization in which they operate.”–Education for Seapower Study Report3

Recent enthusiasm for critical and strategic thinking as part of a renewed focus on educating future generations of Navy leaders has rightly brought attention to the need for the Navy’s PME institutions to be agile and adaptive, and to the role of thinking and the education of thinkers. Preparing for the future fight means not just valuing agility in our officers, but also valuing agility in these vital organizations. It is important to consider several dimensions relevant to the recent discussions, including thinking about thinking, the importance of organizations, and what our educational institutions can do to better educate strategic and critical thinkers in the future.

An agile and adaptive response to the Education for Seapower Report (E4S) (as well as the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy (NSS)) by our educational institutions can help meet the Navy’s educational goals by building critical and strategic thinking into curriculum, creating new curriculum concentrated on strategic leadership, and by helping inculcate desirable learning attitudes in officers to help them learn how to be lifelong learners. At the core of these initiatives is (re)emphasizing the teaching and nurturing of how to think rather than what to think, educating for judgment, and cultivating broad, curious, questioning minds – characteristics that are at the very core of critical and strategic thinking capabilities.

Some of these dimensions that are particularly germane to the E4S initiative need to be clarified. It requires putting E4S in the context of earlier debates within PME and naval education, as well as some relevant aspects from the civilian domain that are particularly suitable for educating for the ‘cognitive era.’

By integrating aspects of different institutional and intellectual approaches we hope to clarify some elements of E4S in the spirit of the interdisciplinary and integrative approach that E4S calls for. We make some concrete suggestions for how our PME institutions and the Navy can proactively emphasize (critical and strategic) thinking, as well as understanding the vital role of organizing itself in ways that capture and leverage those capabilities. Our objective throughout is aligned with the E4S goal of helping the Navy build and retain an intellectual competitive advantage that is likely to be central to its strategic competitiveness in the future.

The Character of the Contemporary Strategic Context

E4S can be understood as being a key product (along with the NSS and the NDS) of the current strategic context. All three documents emphasize some of the core dimensions of the current and likely future strategic environment that we (as a country as well as our PME institutions) ought to adapt to and get ahead of.

For the first time since the height of the Cold War the U.S. is realizing it is faced with adversaries that are providing substantive competition in many areas, ranging from big competitors who may rival our core strengths to smaller competitors who may not at first glance rival our strengths but may have studied our weaknesses. In the presence of multiple different threats our organizations need to be even more adaptive and flexible than in earlier periods when the threats were more concentrated and less diverse.4

In these kinds of situations, very successful strategies are two-edged swords because they tend to attract the most effort by rivals to mitigate them through imitation or countermeasures. This intensifies the competition further. In short, our rivals are also smart and we can expect that they will, like us, invest in becoming smarter.

It is in this context that E4S’ proposed investments in intellectual competitive advantage need to be understood. The Navy (and DOD in general) should expect that rivals will respond to E4S by ramping-up their own investments in education plus take actions that attempt to mitigate any advantages the Navy gains from implementing E4S. Competitors will furthermore respond with their own escalations of this capability.5

As a result, to win in the cognitive age it will not be enough simply invest in education as a means of creating an intellectual competitive advantage. Easy-to-imitate educational investments will quickly get matched or neutered by adversaries. If the Navy wants to develop more sustainable advantages, it will need both to invest in intellectual advantage, and combine it with ways of organizing that are not easy for adversaries to counter. These complementary elements will need to be built into the very heart of our organizational capabilities, not just as simple add-ons. Fortunately, there are some examples from the past that the Navy can draw on for inspiration.

Getting Thinking Right

Critical and strategic thinking is, and has long been, recognized as important topic within PME institutions. Key panels (e.g. the Skelton panel) and commissions have looked into this issue in the past and spurred reorganizations of PME to better educate thinkers. Furthermore, individuals engaged at all levels of our military institutions and organizations have used and been very aware of the importance of nurturing and leveraging thinking.

One outstanding example (of not just recognizing the importance of thinking but also organizing and educating for it) for the Navy comes from the reorganization of the USMC under Gen. Gray. Gray – who is mentioned on the first page of E4S – is well-known for restructuring the USMC for maneuver warfare and building it into the heart of the organization’s capabilities. This is an example of strategic leadership that specifically emphasized the role of thinking and judgment in the operating concepts and documents, and involved a substantial reorganization of the USMC to properly build and leverage thinking and judging capabilities. The transformation of the USMC of course involved other elements including significant debates in the USMC Gazette about these concepts (sometimes with strong arguments on all sides), an emphasis on free exercises and organizing after-action debates so that good ideas mattered more than rank, and protecting people with good ideas from being drowned by bureaucracy (usually organizations do the opposite).

A key element in the transformation was the emphasis on education, and Gray’s vision for thinking and judgement. As he noted:

“My intent in PME is to teach military judgment rather than knowledge. Knowledge is of course important for developing judgment, but should be taught in the context of teaching military judgment, not as material to be memorized…The focus of effort [of PME] should be teaching through doing, through case studies, historical and present-day, real and hypothetical, presented in war-games, map exercises, and table exercises, free-play, force-on-force ‘three day wars’ and the like…As education progresses…the material should grow more complex, but the essence should remain the same: teach officers and NCO’s how to win in combat by out-thinking as well as out-fighting their opponents.”6

An important insight about the nature of critical and strategic thinking skills the Navy needs to educate and inculcate comes from LtGen Paul Van Riper, himself a U.S. Marine, and the first president of Marine Corps University.7 Van Riper is, of course, well-known from the Millennium Challenge wargame for demonstrating the practical value of effective thinking.8 And he has important advice for the type of thinking that needs to be courted and what should be avoided:

“Considerable contemporary US military literature focuses on the need to develop critical thinking skills. Unknown to the majority of its proponents is the fact that critical thinking is a field dominated by analytical procedures. Systems analysis is at the core of many of these procedures. There are a number of organizations promoting critical thinking that endorse this analytic focus… [T]here are also numerous websites devoted to the subject that advocate analysis. I believe students need to be able to think critically, however they should shy away from the prescriptive methods advocated by those who champion a form of critical thinking building on…analysis.”9

Van Riper’s insights on the dangers of analysis (and the need for thinking) complements another well-known thinker in the defense field: Herman Kahn. Kahn, who in his era was widely viewed as a brilliant thinker,10 famously warned against some of the pitfalls detrimental to good thinking that can arise from over-relying on analysis.11 The evolution of Kahn’s thinking about thinking is a salutary tale for the PME world. In the 1950s Kahn became RAND Corporation’s top expert in Monte Carlo simulation (when he was hired his official title had been ‘computer’). But Kahn’s intellectual development ultimately led him to reject computational methods for thinking about the future, which “[C]ame to seem like precisely the wrong approach.”12 Among other elements, Kahn became highly critical of over-relying on models and neglecting model limitations. “Modelism,” as Kahn termed it, meant that analysts were in fact more interested in their model than the real world, which stunted their ability to actually understand the real world. Another favorite target of Kahn’s criticism was the use of statistical uncertainty as opposed to ‘real’ uncertainty. According to Kahn it is always real uncertainty that keeps commanders awake at night: “How many bombs will the enemy have? What size?…Secret bases? How good is he? Will his skill change? What surprises does he have? How good are we? …”13 Like Van Riper, Kahn’s example reminds us that in the PME world we must educate for problems that are analytically tractable where we can, but also educate for critical and strategic thinking that recognizes the inherent limitations and pitfalls of any particular analytical approach to problems.14

In a sense we shouldn’t be surprised at the direction these practitioner-thinkers point to for the kinds of thinking Navy leaders need to excel in. The etymology of critical thinking, for example, derives from ‘critic’, which means to judge or be able to discern. A study by the American Philosophical Association determined that core critical thinking skills include inference, evaluation, interpretation, explanation and self-regulation as well as analysis.15 This means that good critical thinking is a complex bundle of skills that amounts to much more than analytical adeptness alone. The same principle applies to strategic thinking.

We highlight these issues because of the importance of getting our thinking about thinking right in the PME community. Others steeped in the military profession have long emphasized that critical and strategic thinking is not synonymous with analytic knowledge or the use of analytic tools. Because of this distinction, there are important differences between educating good analysts and educating good thinkers. Understanding this issue is easier when remembering the roots and broader context for the recent calls for more critical and strategic thinking within the defense and PME communities. The aim is to broaden a student’s mind, nurture and stimulate curiosity, and develop sense of judgment. All these facets have been emphasized in reports about the recent E4S study.16

Active Learning to Develop Active Minds: The Role of Experiential Learning in the Education of Thinkers

“There are no specific set of disciplines that must be mastered to be a strategist. People who think strategically come from a number of different backgrounds. What seems central is a cast of the mind that is questioning, eclectic, able to address the broadest kinds of issues and goals and able to formulate appropriate ways of achieving those goals…A high tolerance for the uncertainty that necessarily accompanies any effort to think…is required. Turning to what kind of academic study or professional training might be useful, I would start with business school training…”–Andrew Marshall17

“[A] most urgent national security task before us today is to intellectually prepare our leaders for … uncertainty, by equipping them with a strategic framework of how to think about the future.”–Education for Seapower Report18

Having discussed briefly some initiatives and ideas that were useful thinking in the past, we continue with a few suggestions on how to educate with an emphasis on thinking for seapower. Our proposal is that developing active minds is best done through active learning approaches. Two that are particularly worth mentioning are wargaming and case studies.

The use of cases as a teaching method has an ancient history. Arguably, this approach has been used in PME at least since von Moltke encouraged debate of scenarios in the Prussian academies in the late nineteenth century (and, informally, probably much longer). In the Prussian academy model, students were posed with scenarios, invited to suggest solutions to them, and discussed these collectively. Students were expected to show initiative and disagreement was presumed, even with the instructor, who was understood to be a comrade among peers.

Cases have been widely adopted in business schools in the last several decades, where they likewise encourage a combination of student initiative, disagreement, and vicarious learning from peers. The case methodology can be adapted for much wider use within the PME community as well. A key idea in cases is to help students improve in how to think, not what to think. It can be difficult for educators used to professing (based on carefully manicured and planned slide decks) to adopt case teaching as it requires that teachers be comfortable with the vagaries of an evolving class discussion. However, cases come with a prime benefit in that they give students ample opportunities to practice thinking through difficult problems and issues, and debating and directly experiencing how their peers think about them. There few methods that give students as many opportunities to practice thinking for themselves on a diverse range of issues in a limited amount of time.

The general point of wargaming and cases is that both are methods of active learning. For sure there are also other methods of active learning (simulations come to mind). In our experience case studies are one that works very well, but we would also encourage PME institutions to experiment with alternatives in an effort to discover what methods are most effective. Cases can either be decision forcing (What are you going to do now?) or reflective (What went wrong? What would you have done differently?). Both work well and a mix is probably optimal.

Conclusion

We have elaborated some central aspects of educating and inculcating good thinking in future naval leaders, in line with E4S’ insights into future Navy competitive advantages. As noted, intellectual competitive advantages are subject to rivalry, and it would be naïve to think that U.S. rivals are going to sit on their hands and allow the U.S. to establish an uncontested lead in this area. Instead, we must think critically and strategically about how we educate for thinking, and anticipate that our rivals will compete vigorously in this domain, just as they are doing in others such as shipbuilding and advanced technology development.

E4S, in pointing toward the importance of thinking, ought to lead our PME institutions to reflect on how they can better educate for this key skill. How do their curriculums support this aspect of E4S and, in turn, the NDS and NSS? How can they better adapt to the Navy’s emerging needs, or get ahead of those needs? How can our PME institutions align their own internal thinking and organization to deliver the vision of E4S?19 Hopefully, such issues will be a central element in the development of the naval university system going forward.

Finally, in order to realize the potential of its intellectual investments, it is imperative for the Navy also to be organized to better leverage talented thinkers (both individual and teams) than our rivals are. This entails identifying ways to combine intellectual resources (which are largely replicable) with organizational capabilities that are hard for rivals to imitate. The way the Navy puts its intellectual assets to use depends heavily on these organizational factors. It will do no good to have the Navy’s exceptional strategic thinkers exhausted by the inertia of a Navy organization that is well adapted to yesterday’s strategic environment, but not tomorrow’s. This means that the realization of E4S depends on more than the Navy’s PME institutions delivering the education of tomorrow. It also depends on the Navy getting itself organized to best leverage the strategic thinking capacity its PME institutions help to deliver. It will take the coupling of both intellectual and organizational resources to generate the kind of competitive advantages the Navy seeks – ones that cannot be immediately imitated by rivals.

Dr. Mie Augier is a professor at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. She is interested in strategy, organizations, innovation, leadership, and how to educate strategic and innovative thinkers.

Dr. Nick Dew is a professor at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. His research is focused on entrepreneurial thinking and innovation in defense organizations.

References

[1] We are grateful to the late Andrew Marshall for helping us shape our thinking on the topic and encouraging the writing in the first place; and to Gen Al Gray (USMC, Ret), Capt Karl M. Hasslinger (USN, Ret) and VADM Ann Rondeau (USN, Ret) for comments on earlier versions. Any remaining errors were produced without help. We also would like to dedicate this essay to the memory of Andrew Marshall. His ideas and legacy gives us much to build upon and learn from in the future.  

[2] p.169 in Jörg Muth (2011) Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II.

[3]  Education for Seapower Study Report (E4S), p. 11-12

[4] In thinking about E4S it is also important to highlight the dynamic nature of this competition, and its implications. A defining characteristic of near-peer competition is that it is a state of continual rivalry in which any action one side takes to put themselves ahead in the competition is subsequently imitated or countered by competitors. Every solution becomes the rivals’ problem, which sets-up a competitive cycle in which leadership tends to be a temporary zero-sum game. The competition is ultimately defined by the capabilities of the competitors; their available organizational and financial resources, and the strategic choices they make about where to invest their scarce organizational and financial capital.

[5] In fact, some might say that our competitors for quite a while have emphasized the educational angle at least as much as we — e.g. Chinese upping educating and also having education as part of their country’s measure of national power. We can only hope that we are studying their educational initiatives well too (as understanding how opponents think is key to trying to understand and anticipate what they might do).

[6] Commandant of the Marine Corps to Command General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Training and Education,” October 10, 1988.

[7] Van Riper has reflected on his own experiences and the importance of education; see Paul K. Van Riper, “The relevance of history to the military profession:  an American Marine’s view,” in The Importance of History to the Military Profession, eds. Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[8] Micah Zenko, Millennium Challenge: the real story of a corrupted military exercise and its legacy. War on the Rocks, November 5, 2015.

[9] Paul van Riper, 2013, “The identification and education of Army strategic thinkers”

[10] B. Bruce Briggs, Supergenius: The Mega-Worlds of Herman Kahn (New York, 2000). Kahn is the acknowledged father of scenario planning.

[11] Kahn and Mann, 1957, Pittfalls in Analysis.

[12] Williams, World Futures 2016, p.480.

[13] Ibid p.17

[14] Understanding wicked and genuinely ill structured problems takes thinking and synthesizing information from many different domains and angles; an approach perhaps best illustrated in John Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” lecture. 

[15] Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of Educational Assessment and Instruction, Peter Facione, November 1989.

[16] https://news.usni.org/2018/08/16/35846

[17] Andrew Marshall (1991), “Strategy as a profession for Future Generations” (In “On not confusion ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy” edited by A. W. Marshall, J.J. Martin and H. Rowen (Boulder: Westview Press)

[18] E4S report, p. 9

[19] This is an argument for another day – but examples of central reports that in the past inspired constructive change in educational institutions are the Flexner report in medical education and the Gordon Howell report in business school education.

Featured Image: A graduating student of the Eisenhower School at the National Defense University shakes the hand of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Joseph Dunford. (NDU photo)