Southeast Asia: A New Strategic Nexus for Japan’s Maritime Strategy

Regional Strategies Topic Week

By John Bradford

Japan’s maritime strategy is fundamentally focused on partnering with its United States ally to ensure that the Indo-Pacific sea lanes critical to its security are safe and secure. Most of the activities by its two maritime security services, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and Japan Coast Guard (JCG), are focused on Japan’s near seas and seek to deter aggressive actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Russia while enabling good governance of the Japanese EEZ. Japan also deploys its forces to locations along those sea lanes, such as the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz, where Japanese shipping is under significant and direct threat. Equally critical to the strategy are the Japanese activities aimed at the relatively more safe and secure, yet still vulnerable sea lanes that pass through and near Southeast Asia. This includes enclosed seas such as the South China Sea, Java Sea, and Bay of Bengal as well as critical chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok.

Much of this effort draws on Japan’s economic strength and Japan has been heavily invested in developing infrastructure and safety capacity alongside this region’s coastal states for more than 50 years. For the last 20 years the Japan Coast Guard has also been engaged with developing the coastal states’ maritime law enforcement capacity. In the last decade, the Japanese Ministry of Defense has become involved. It has started new capacity-building projects with regional navies and the JMSDF has been increasingly conducting military operations in the regional waters.

With all branches of Japan state power now investing in Southeast Asian maritime security, this region is cementing as a new nexus in Japan’s maritime strategy. The scope, strategic intent, and likely future development of Japan’s maritime security activities in Southeast Asia merits closer examination.

Japan’s Maritime Strategy

Japan’s well-established maritime security strategy can be broadly separated into two geographic segments, one pertaining to Japan’s home waters and the other to Indo-Pacific sea lanes. In its near seas, Japan faces significant security pressures from the north, west, and south. Aggressive contemporary military postures, territorial disputes, and war legacy issues create security concerns and constrains cooperation between Japan and its neighbors Russia, China, and the Koreas.

In the maritime space, the competition with the PRC is the most strained. The concentric rings of Japanese and PRC coast guard and naval forces persistently contest sovereignty, probe reactions, and seek to assert control over the waters surrounding the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Mandarin) islands.1 This situation demands significant fleet resources while the remainder of the East China Seas provides a long front for patrol and surveillance. The ballistic missile threat from North Korea and Japan’s support for the enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions against that state also keep the fleet busy. Above the waters approaching Japan, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) regularly scrambles fighters in response to PRC and Russian flight operations. Given this increasingly severe situation, protecting Japan’s rights and executing its national responsibilities in the sea and airspace associated with the nation under UNCLOS have occupied the bulk of Japan’s security resources.  

Although pressured in home waters, the government of Japan has long understood that its national security equally relies on the safe transit of goods along critical sea lanes. As measured in calories, Japan is reliant on imports for more than 60 percent of its food.2 Japan is also 99.7 percent, 97.5 percent, and 99.3 percent dependent on imports for crude oil, liquified natural gas (LNG), and coal, respectively. Together, these three commodities provide more than 85 percent of Japan’s energy. The LNG sources are well-diversified, but 88 percent of the crude oil comes from the Middle East, and Australia is the main supplier of coal.3 Thus, most of Japan’s energy passes along Southeast Asian sea lanes. This energy fuels Japan’s status as the world’s fourth largest exporter of products. Over $700 billion of goods leave Japan, about 99 percent of those by ship.4

Japan’s strategy to ensure the safety and security of its critical sea lanes rests on three elements: capitalizing on its alliance with the United States, deploying forces to most critical threat locations, and strengthening positive relations with increasingly capable partners along the sea routes.

In recent years, Japanese maritime strategy has cleanly nested under national campaigns to focus Japan’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific band that stretches along its sea lanes to Europe and Africa. Shortly after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first assumed office in 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso announced the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.5 This foreign policy complemented Japan’s existing priorities involving managing relations with immediate neighbors and strengthening the U.S. alliance with an additional emphasis on promoting democracy and increased capability with an arc of partner nations stretching from northern Europe, though the Middle East, past the Indian subcontinent, and across Southeast Asia.6 Notably, this arc aligned geographically with Japan’s main trade routes minus those across the Pacific Ocean that were already secure thanks to the U.S. alliance. Abe is also credited as the first global leader to highlight the Indo-Pacific geopolitical concept when he gave a 2007 address to the Indian Parliament entitled, “Confluence of the Two Seas.”7 The next two Prime Ministers, both also from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), continued with this prioritization. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led the government from 2009-2012, Prime Ministers Hatoyama, Kan, and Noda used different branding but sustained this foreign policy approach toward the coastal states of South and Southeast Asia.8 Immediately after returning to power in 2012, Abe published an essay titled “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.” This essay opened with:

“Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role – alongside Australia, India, and the U.S. – in preserving the common good in both regions.”9

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s first-of-class flattop JS Izumo visits Vietnam’s Cam Ranh port in June 2019. (JMSDF)

Southeast Asia was clearly at the heart of the diamond and it is now the central nexus of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision announced in 2016.10

Japan’s Maritime Forces: Operations Near Home and Far Abroad

Japan’s 1945 constitution states that “sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” Imperial Japanese Navy veterans were re-employed by the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), a civilian law enforcement body established in 1948 that was also tasked with clearing the approximately 100,000 sea mines laid around Japan during World War II. As the Cold War progressed, the United States forged an alliance with Japan and encouraged the development of Japanese defense forces. In 1952 the first U.S.-Japan security treaty was ratified and the Maritime Guard Forces, equipped with former U.S. frigates and landing craft, were established under the MSA. In 1954, this body was detached from the MSA, redesignated as the maritime component of the new Self Defense Force (SDF), and its units were quietly dispatched to support mine countermeasure operations around the Korean Peninsula. In 1960, the current U.S.-Japan Security Treaty came into force obligating U.S. forces based in Japan to provide for the defense of Japan and the security of the region. As the Cold War progressed, the JMSDF became more capable and began working hand-in-glove with the U.S. Navy (USN) to contain Soviet units operating from Pacific ports. After the Cold War, JMSDF capability continued to grow and the United States encouraged Japan to expand the geographic scope of JMSDF operations. The MSA remained a civilian force responsible for law enforcement and maintaining the safety of Japanese waters, and its name was officially revised in English to Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in April 2000.

In the years after the Cold War, the JMSDF has been dispatched on a series of mission to enhance security around the western terminus of its Indo-Pacific sea lanes. These dispatches have all been made in coordination with the U.S. and all but one responded to immediate threats to Japanese shipping. The first JMSDF operation beyond Northeast Asia was the 1991 deployment of vessels to support the clearance of sea mines from the Arabian Sea in the wake of the First Gulf War. 10 years later, it sent a force to provide logistics support to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. In 2009, the new DPJ government ended the Afghanistan support mission, but established a new anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden thereby continuing the persistent presence of Japanese maritime forces in the Western Indian Ocean. Initially, the JMSDF units and their JCG augments provided anti-piracy escorts and conducted maritime surveillance without being a part of any coalition, but they coordinated closely with the United States and eventually joined the U.S.-sponsored CTF 151. In 2015 and 2020, Japan commanded CTF 151. In 2020, Japan dispatched an additional maritime force to gather intelligence and protect its ships in the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. The government of Japan has made clear that these forces were not a part of the U.S. Operation Sentinel to guard shipping against Iranian provocations. However, it should be noted that the dispatch was made after a U.S. request, so may represent a compromise within the alliance. It can be safely assumed that the operations, including the P-3 flights originating from a Djibouti runway Japan shares with American forces, are coordinated with the U.S. 5th Fleet in a manner reminiscent to that of the initial anti-piracy deployments in 2009.

Japanese Civil Activities to Strengthen Southeast Asian Maritime Safety and Security

The sea lanes between Japan’s home waters and the dangerous sea space around the Middle East stretch for more than 5000 nautical miles. For the most part, these sea lanes pass by coastal states capable of providing the governance needed to ensure safety that is sufficient for the free flow of commerce. However, the coastal states vary widely in terms of maritime capacity, the sea lanes are far from hazard free, and Japanese business and government leaders worry about the possibility that disruptive events could quickly create a crisis. The hazards that concern Japan include the navigation challenges associated with densely trafficked chokepoints, environmental challenges such as extreme weather and oil spills, piracy, terrorism, and war risks. For the last five decades Japan has become increasingly involved in addressing these challenges by supporting coastal state capacity-building projects as a core element of its maritime security strategy.

Japan began these efforts in the late 1960s with an initial focus on assisting coastal state efforts to improve navigational safety in Southeast Asian waterways. The key milestone marking the start of these activities was the founding of the Malacca Strait Council (MSC) in 1969. This Tokyo-based organization coordinated efforts of the privately-funded Nippon Foundation with those of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japanese Transportation Ministry, and JCG. Projects included the installation and maintenance of navigation aids, the removal of shipwrecks, the provision of oil skimming vessels, the donation of a buoy tender to Malaysia, and dredging work.11

In the 1970s the Japanese foundations and government agencies expanded their capacity-building activities to include waterways and coastal states beyond the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. These projects neatly aligned with Japan’s other Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) activities in Southeast Asia that similarly aimed to build capacity that strengthen the region’s trust in Japan and develop relationships that would help drive Japan’s economic success. When, in 1975, the grounding of the Japanese tanker Showa Maru created a massive oil spill in the Singapore Strait, Japan swiftly recognized the potential for environmental catastrophes to interrupt commerce and added environmental protection to their capacity-building portfolio.12 Under the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, this ODA was decoupled from political objectives and Japan pledged that it would not assume a military role in Southeast Asia. When, in 1981, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki responded to U.S. demands for Japan to assume greater burdens within the alliance by announcing the JMSDF would begin defending sea lanes up to 1000 nautical miles from Japan, it was no coincidence that the distance reached only the Bashi Channel and not into the South China Sea. Indeed, Japan remained quite concerned about memories of war and Southeast Asia sensitivities.13

In the early and mid-1990s, Japan took advantage of its improved standing in the region to take initial steps to become involved in Southeast Asia’s maritime security. For example, a subsidiary of the Nippon Foundation provided most of the seed money for the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Report Centre established in Kuala Lumpur in 1992, and the Japanese shipping industry covered significant portions of its operating costs.14 During the 1990s the JMSDF also conducted some leadership engagements under the auspices of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and held its first navy-to-navy staff talks with Southeast Asian partners in 1997.15

The rise of regional piracy rates in the wake of the 1997 Asian Monetary Crisis catalyzed an expansion of Japan’s capacity-building efforts to include maritime law enforcement.16 Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi kickstarted this expansion at the December 1999 ASEAN +3 summit when he sought international cooperative actions against piracy by proposing the establishment of a regional “Coast Guard body,” the strengthening of state support for shipping companies, and improvement of regional coordination.17 Soon Japan was offering equipment and training, and pressing for joint patrols.18 After a series of Japanese fact-finding delegations visited the region and Tokyo-hosted several large conferences, the Japan’s ambitions were scaled back, but the expanded involvement in Southeast Asian maritime law enforcement nonetheless came quickly. In 2000 the JCG began establishing permanent overseas positions for officers to support regional coast guards (starting with the nascent Philippine Coast Guard), and in 2001 the JCG began exercising with regional coast guards (starting with the Philippines and Thailand). In 2006 Japanese diplomatic efforts culminated in the creation of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).19

A notable aspect of Japan’s support for Southeast Asia’s maritime security has been transfer of patrol boats to regional maritime law enforcement agencies. These transfers have included used converted fishing vessels, retired Japanese patrol boats, and new construction vessels. They have been provided by private Japanese foundations, through government facilitated loans, and as direct assistance. An early example were the transfers to Indonesia and the Philippines made in the mid-2000s. As these vessels were armored, the transfers were governed by Japan’s Three Principals on Arms Exports and the receiving partners could only use them for law enforcement operations, to include anti-piracy and counterterrorism.20 Relaxations of the Three Principals in 2011 and 2014 have streamlined the policy process and in recent years Japan has expanded its programs to provide patrol vessels. To date, coast guard and maritime law enforcement agencies in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pulau, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam have received patrol vessels from Japan.

Japan Self Defense Force Operations in Southeast Asia

Civilian arms of Japan’s foreign policy apparatus have been investing in strengthening the safety and security of Southeast Asian sea lanes for more than 50 years. In contrast, the JMSDF was essentially absent in Southeast Asia until a bit over a decade ago. That is not to say it was completely missing. Its annual training cruise invariably made some goodwill port visits in the region, ships and aircraft paused to enjoy liberty and build relations while enroute to and returning home from missions in the Western Indian Ocean, it was involved in Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) activities, and it provided transportation support to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste.21 However, these activities were irregular, generally small in scale, and did not involve strengthening the capabilities of neither the JMSDF nor their partners. In the most recent 10 or so years, a period that scholar Andrew Oros marks as corresponding to a Japanese “security renaissance” when a broad political consensus developed in favor of expanding Japan’s direct involvement in international security affairs, the JMSDF began deploying forces specifically to influence the security situation in Southeast Asian waters.22

SASEBO, Japan (July 31, 2020) – Commander, Fleet Activities Sasebo Capt. Brad Stallings and Deputy Commander, Amphibious Force 7th Fleet Capt. Marvin Thompson meet with Capt. Tetsuro Sato, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Sasebo District’s director of operations and plans onboard CFAS July 31, 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Jasmine Ikusebiala)

The earliest JMSDF ship deployments aimed specifically to impact the Southeast Asian maritime security situation were in alignment with multilateral efforts and frameworks. In December 2004, SDF ships and aircraft were among the international forces that responded to the Indian Ocean tsunami.23 In 2005, the JMSDF participated in the inaugural WPNS at-sea exercise that was hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy, and the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) officers participated in the tsunami relief workshop and high-level staff exercise portions of the U.S.-Thai exercise Cobra Gold.24 Since then, maritime exercises sponsored by multilateral organizations such as WPNS, ARF, and ADMM+ have become more frequent and the JMSDF has consistently participated, often sending the largest contingents.25 While significant from a defense diplomacy perspective, these multinational maritime exercises were often quite simple and were aimed more at confidence-building than strengthening operational capacity. Many focused on disaster response rather than more traditional security concerns.26

Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2010 was the first major Japanese policy document to state that the SDF would begin conducting capacity building missions with foreign militaries. The first operation of this new policy was the 2010 deployment of a JMSDF ship to conduct capacity-building activities in Vietnam and Cambodia as a part of the U.S. Pacific Partnership campaign. Since then, JMSDF ships have participated in Pacific Partnership annually, only missing 2011 when they were occupied with supporting domestic disaster response operations in the wake of the tsunami and earthquake. In 2012, Japan executed its first bilateral capacity-building activity in Southeast Asia, an underwater medicine seminar held with the Vietnam Navy. The second bilateral event was a February 2013 oceanography-focused seminar held at the Indonesian Navy Maritime Operations Center in Jakarta. Since then, Japan has conducted similar bilateral capacity-building activities with another eight partner nations. Of these 10 partners, all but Mongolia are South China Sea or Bay of Bengal coastal states.27 In December 2013, Japan’s first ever National Security Strategy explained the strategic intent behind these activities: “Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.”28 In November 2016, Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada delivered the Vientiane Vision at the second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting. Meant to be a major defense policy statement, the Vientiane Vision outlined Japan’s priority for defense cooperation with the ASEAN states as centering on the principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space; promoting maritime security through the building of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and search and rescue (SAR) capacities, and capability growth in other security fields.29

In the last decade, the JMSDF has also expanded its naval operations in the South China Sea. Unlike the multilateral exercises and capacity-building activities previously mentioned, these activities appear to be more focused on developing JMSDF options to conduct high-end naval operations around that body of water. In that sense, the activities clearly go well beyond the militarization and geographic limitations described four decades ago in the Fukuda and Suzuki Doctrines. Since the government of Japan does not publish the locations of its ships and submarines, it is unclear exactly when these deployments began. One of the earliest activities reported by the Japanese government was a June 2011 trilateral JMSDF-USN-Royal Australian Navy (RAN) exercise in the South China Sea. Since then, reports of JMSDF exercises with other extra-regional navies in the South China Sea have become increasingly frequent. However, JMSDF operational presence in the South China Sea may date back even further. After the Japanese government reported a September 2018 unilateral ASW exercise in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Abe explained, “Japan has been performing submarine exercises in the South China Sea since 15 years ago [sic]. We did so last year and the year before that.”30 The apparent emphasis on ASW may reflect concerns that PRC submarines could interdict Japanese shipping. Some analysts, including some retired JMSDF admirals, argue that the JMSDF is also readying itself to be able to counter a potential PRC ballistic missile submarine bastion in those waters.31 Either concern would help explain the JMSDF’s emphasis on its partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, the nations that straddle the north section of the South China Sea, and flank the important PRC submarine base on Hainan Island.

The JMSDF’s relationship with the Philippine Navy is the most developed of its Southeast Asia partnerships. SDF officers began observing the annual U.S.-Philippines Balikatan exercise in 2012 and involvement increased such that the ‘observing’ delegation of 2018 included two destroyers and a submarine. The Philippines also hosted a JMSDF P-3 for a maritime patrol exchange that took place simultaneously with the U.S.-Philippines exercise CARAT 2015. Japanese P-3s have since visited for several additional cooperative events, and in May 2018 the JMSDF deployed a P-1 to the Philippines for a training event. Notably, before this mission, P-1s had only been deployed overseas for airshows and for a brief counter-piracy mission flying from Djibouti. In 2016, Japan’s training submarine Oyashio visited Subic Bay alongside two JMSDF destroyers and the crews took part in confidence-building activities with Filipino counterparts. This was the first JMSDF submarine port call to the Philippines in 15 years, but since that event JMSDF submarines have been frequent visitors to Subic Bay.32

In October 2018, the JGSDF’s nascent Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) landed amphibious assault vehicles from a USN ship onto the Philippine shores during the U.S. and Philippine exercise Kamandag. This was the first overseas deployment of the ARDB, a unit created, at least in part, to conduct defensive operations against potential foreign state aggression around Japan’s outlying islands. It was also the first deployment of Japanese armored vehicles to Southeast Asia since World War II. Although Japanese spokesmen emphasized that the training was focused on disaster response, other elements of the U.S.-Philippine joint military exercise suggest that it was structured in such a way to also have military applications.33

The Philippines is also the first, and, thus far, only, nation to acquire Japanese defense equipment. 2014 policy reforms allowed Tokyo to approve defense exports to partner militaries, and in 2017 two used JMSDF TC-90 training aircraft were delivered directly from the SDF to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) where they were redesignated as C-90s for work as maritime patrol aircraft. Three additional TC-90s were transferred in 2018. Although offering a significant boost to the Philippine ability to develop maritime domain awareness, this new capacity offers limited military value. The C-90s are incapable of carrying weapons and do not incorporate the sort of electronic information collection and sharing system required for effective military surveillance and targeting missions. There are reports that Japan is interested in transferring P-3C aircraft, an ASW-focused aircraft capable of carrying a wide array of weapons and electronic systems, to Southeast Asian partners, but contacts in those countries have explained to the author that their preference for lower life-cycles costs would likely result in acquiring newly constructed European options.34

In August 2020, Japan’s Mitsubishi Electric Corporation concluded a contract with the Philippines’ Department of National Defense to support four air defense radars. For the Philippines, the three FPS-3 fixed radar units and one TPS-P14 mobile radar will provide it considerable new capability to detect and track missiles and aircraft. For Japan, this transfer breaks new ground in that it is the first transfers of newly-built Japanese-made defense equipment to any nation since the end of World War II. In contrast to past transfers of unarmed patrol boats and aircraft, this is the first Japanese transfer of equipment that will enable much more significant contributions to creating the kill-chains need to counter serious military threats.35

JMSDF P-1 patrol craft (Photo via Japanese Ministry of Defense)

Japan has also been prioritizing the development of its defense relations with Vietnam. Japan’s first JMSDF capacity-building activity in the region was the previously mentioned 2010 dispatch of JS Kunisaki to Qui Nhon, Vietnam under the Pacific Partnership umbrella. While focused on medical treatment activities and cultural exchanges, the visit included the use of amphibious vehicles landing on a Vietnamese beach.36 The next year, Vietnam hosted the first SDF capacity-building activities in Southeast Asia that were not facilitated as part of a U.S. or multilateral event. Since then the relationship has continued to grow, though it has not yet reached a level such that it includes bilateral defense exercises or operations. In April 2016, two Japanese destroyers made the country’s first-post war port call at Cam Ranh Bay. In 2018, JS Kuroshio became the first-ever JMSDF submarine to visit Vietnam. Interactions ashore included courtesy calls and cultural exchanges.37 In 2019, JS Izumo (the helicopter carrier now slated for refit to carry F-35B fighters) and an escort visited Cam Ranh Bay and conducted goodwill exercises with a Vietnam Navy corvette.38 This decade of engagements is clearly creating a valuable partnership. In April 2020, Vietnam agreed to provide refueling services to a JMSDF P-3 returning home from a Djibouti deployment when other nations declined due to their COVID-19 precautions. The aircraft then developed mechanical issues preventing its departure. Vietnam hosted the crew for nearly two months and facilitated special arrangement or the entry of technicians and parts during the height of the pandemic.39

Annual deployments of large helicopter carriers such as Izumo for a multi-month deployment to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean provide excellent encapsulations of the varied nature of new JMSDF activities in the region. In 2016, during the first of these deployments, JS Ise was the largest ship at the multinational exercise Komodo hosted by Indonesia. Ise then transited to the South China Sea with a cadre of midshipmen from WPNS navies onboard for training while conducting a trilateral passing exercise with RAN and USN ships.40 After a goodwill visit to Manila, Ise was then the largest ship involved in the May 2016 ADMM+ Maritime Security/Counter-Terrorism Field Training Exercise that began in Brunei and concluded in Singapore. The following year, the largest ship in the JMSDF fleet, JS Izumo, made a similar deployment to Southeast Asia that included a maritime security training program for officers from ASEAN navies while the ships were in the South China Sea; hosting Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte during a port visit to Manila; calling in Sri Lank; and completed two days of exercises with ships from Australia, Canada, and the U.S. that included cross-deck exchanges and live-fire events.41 Similar deployments in 2018 (JS Kaga) and 2019 (JS Izumo) similarly blended unilateral operations in the South China Sea, exercises with the U.S. and other extra-regional navies, support for multilateral maritime security programs, and bilateral relationship-building with regional partners.42

Conclusion: Future Trajectories for Japan’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Maritime Security

The blended nature of the JMSDF capital ship deployments to Southeast Asian waters reflects its multifaceted maritime goals in the region. Japan is expanding on its decades of capacity-building initiatives in the region to include military dimensions. These activities are aimed at creating strengthened relationships with increasingly capable coastal states along Japan’s Indo-Pacific sea lanes. These naval activities are in some ways a simple progression of Japan’s longstanding policy to support the development of maritime capacity. However, this expansion reflects a loosening of Japan’s domestic policy constraints and the increased comfort that Southeast Asian partners have with hosting Japanese forces. The PRC’s increasing capabilities and assertive maritime behavior have hastened this trajectory given Japan’s heavy reliance on South China Sea sea lanes and Japan’s concerns that China’s campaign to assert sovereignty in the South China Sea is strongly linked to its campaign against Japan in the East China Sea.

Japan’s overarching strategic goal to promote the sustained safety and security of the critical Southeast Asian sea lanes has remained essentially unchanged for more than 50 years. However, Japan has incrementally expanded the range of regional security challenges that it directly addresses and agencies that it mobilizes to assist in this effort. For the last decade or so, these agencies have included the Ministry of Defense and the JMSDF. The JMSDF now regularly deploys to the South China Sea and has a record of conducting high-end warfare exercises with the U.S. and other extra-regional navies in that contested body of water. It makes major contributions to multilateral exercises in the region and has been conducting bilateral capacity-building activities with regional navies. The activities should be expected to continue to expand with the primary limiting factors being the availability of ships and other fleet resources.

To date, the bilateral engagements in Southeast Asia have been almost entirely restrained to goodwill activities, and modest projects focused on building regional partners’ constabulary capacities. However, we can expect to see Japan become more involved in assisting regional states with the military defense capabilities. The deal to send newly built and modern air defense radars to the Philippines sets an important precedent in this regard. Continued PRC maritime aggression will be an important driver, but Japan will remain concerned by other maritime threats and increasingly seek to diversify it defense relations away from reliance on the U.S.

Although Prime Minister Abe has been an important figure driving Japan’s defense engagement in Southeast Asia, his departure is unlikely to cause major adjustments to this trajectory. The domestic policymaking constraints that previously inhibited these sort of defense activities have been dismantled and there is a broad political consensus advocating for more Japanese direct involvement in regional security affairs. Most of the LDP candidates to succeed Abe as Prime Minister played a direct role in developing and implementing these policies. Others, such as former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, hold similar views. Even the opposition party seems comfortable with expanding SDF operations in Southeast Asia. This is not an area where they have resisted, it was on their watch that ships were first sent to Southeast Asia for disaster response and then under the Pacific Partnership umbrella.

The developments are proceeding in general alignment with a Japanese effort to foster stronger multilateral security networks and new bilateral partnerships in the face of a shift in relative power and influence that is unfavorable to its ally, the United States. With the Ministry of Defense and SDF joining the other Japanese agencies as direct participants in Southeast Asian maritime security, Southeast Asia has clearly become a new nexus in Japan’s maritime strategy. It is important for Southeast Asian states to realize that as Japan’s self-restraint relaxes, they will face bigger decisions regarding the nature and scope of the defense relations they desire with Japan.

John Bradford is a Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and the Executive Director of the Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies. Prior to entering the research sector, he spent 23 years as a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer focused on Indo-Pacific maritime dynamics.

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15. Katzenstein, P., & Okawara, N., “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for AnalyticalEclecticism.” International Security, 26(3), 2001, p. 152.

16. Bradford, J. “Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and Coastal State Responses.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(3), 2004, pp. 489-90.

17. Chanda, N. “Foot in the Water.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 Mar 2000.

18. Takei, S., Suppression of Modern Piracy and the Role of the Navy. NIDS Security Reports, 2003, pp. 38-58.

19. Bradford, J, “Japanese Naval Cooperation in Southeast Asian Waters: Building on 50 Years of Maritime Security Capacity Building Activities,” Asian Security, 25 May 2020, pp. 13-14.

20. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japans’ Official Development Assistance White Paper 2006. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2006/ODA2006/html/honpen/hp202040400.htm

21. Yoshihara, T. and Holmes, J., “Japan’s Emerging Maritime Strategy: Out of Sync or Out of Reach?” Comparative Strategy, 27(1), 4 Mar 2008, p. 31.

22. Oros, A., Japans Security Renaissance. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.

23. Yoshihara, T. and Holmes, J., “Japan’s Emerging Maritime Strategy: Out of Sync or Out of Reach?” Comparative Strategy, 27(1), 4 Mar 2008, p. 32.

24. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Command and Staff College. Western Pacific Naval Symposium Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation. N.d. http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/seminars/eng_wpns_song.html; Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Retrieved from Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs: https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/press_room/…/2005/…/18may05_fs.html; and Slavin, E. (2005, May 9). Japan is New Player at Cobra Gold. Stars & Stripes. https://www.stripes.com/news/japan-is-new-player-at-cobra-gold-1.32955

25. Shoji, T., “Japan’s Security Cooperation with ASEAN: Persuit of a Status as a ‘Relevent’ Partner.” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security (16), Dec 2015, pp. 97-110.

26. Bradford, J., & Adams, G. “Beyond Bilateralism: Exercising the Maritime Security Network,” Issues & Insights, 2016, p. 6.

27. Japan Ministry of Defense, International Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy. “Japan’s Defense Capacity-Building Assistance.” April 2016, pp. 2, 8-10 and Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 2014, pp. 273-4.

28. Japan National Security Council, National Security Strategy,  17 Dec 2013, p. 17.

29. Japan Ministry of Defense. (n.d.). Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN. https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/exc/vientianevision/

30. Kato, M., “Japanese submarine conducts drill in South China Sea,” Nikkei Asian Review, Sept 17, 2018 and Kusumoto, H., “Japanese submarine trains for first time in South China Sea,” Stars & Stripes, Sept 18, 2018.

31. Leavenworth, S., “How Beijing may use the South China Sea to create a Submarine Haven,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 Jun 2015. https://www.smh.com.au/world/how-beijing-may-use-south-china-sea-to-create-submarine-haven-20150623-ghuwzm.html

32. Johnson, J., “Japanese Submarine, Destroyers arrive in Philippines for Port Call Near Disputed South China Sea Waters,” The Japan Times, 3 Apr 2016. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/03/national/msdf-submarine-escort-ships-arrive-philippines-port-call-training/

33. Fuentes, F., “Japanese Amphibious Soldiers Hit the Beach in the Philippines with U.S. Marines, 7th Fleet,” USNI News, Oct 15, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/10/15/japanese-amphibious-soldiers-hit-beach-philippines-u-s-marines-7th-fleet

34. “Japan to Donate Patrol Aircraft to Malaysia: Report,” The Straits Times, May 6, 2017 and Panda, A “Second-Hand Japanese P-3C Orions Might Be the Right Call for Vietnam,” The Diplomat, 27 June 2016 and various privileged sources, Kuala Lumpur and Langkawi, Malaysia, March 2019.

35. Embassy of Japan in the Philippines, “Transfer of the Air Surveillance Radar Systems to the Philippines, 28 Aug 2020. https://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/11_000001_00188.html

36. Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, “About Participation in Pacific Partnership 2010,” https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/english/operation/ppt10.html

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38. Gady, F. “Japan’s Largest Flattop Visits Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Port,” The Diplomat, 17 Jun 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/japans-largest-flattop-visits-vietnams-cam-ranh-port/ and Japan Maritime Staff Office, “Goodwill Exercises with the Vietnam People’s Navy,” 17 Jun 2019. https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/release/201906/20190617.pdf

39. “Japan thanks Vietnam for Assisting Military Aircraft, Crew Amid COVID-19,” Vietnam Times, 7 July 2020. https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/japan-thanks-vietnam-for-assisting-military-aircraft-crew-amid-covid-19-22052.html

40. Parameswaran, P., “US Conducts Trilateral Naval Drill With Japan, Australia After Indonesia Exercise.” The Diplomat. 21 Apr 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/us-conducts-trilateral-naval-drill-withjapanaustralia-after-indonesia-exercise/

41. “Australia Department of Defense, “HMAS Ballarat Completes Passage Exercise,” 17 June 2017. https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/hmas-ballarat-completes-passage-exercise

42. Japan Ministry of Defense, Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019, https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/exercises/IPD19.html

Featured Image: Japanese: Maritime Self-Defense Force escort ship Atago (DDG-177) front port side. April 13, 2019 at Maizuru base (Wikimedia Commons)

Vietnam’s Struggles in the South China Sea: Challenges and Opportunities

Regional Strategies Topic Week

By Viet Hung Nguyen Cao

The new U.S. South China Sea policy, recently announced by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, once again put the disputes between China and other claimants in this Westernmost area of the Pacific back into the limelight. The core component of the disputes is China’s nine-dash line claim which overlaps with the existing maritime zones of several countries in the region. In recent years, China has deployed grey zone tactics, such as utilizing micro-aggressive measures such as maritime militia and the deployment of survey vessels to enforce its claims.

Vietnam, as one of the major claimants involved, has been a frequent target of these tactics. With only weak, symbolic reactions to China’s aggression, Vietnam is without a proactive or effective strategy to fight back. There are policies that Vietnam should adopt, but at the heart of these policies is the need for more international cooperation in resolving the issues linked to China’s strategy.

China’s Tactics

A primary component of China’s tactics in the South China Sea is the use of maritime militia and law enforcement vessels to intimidate fishermen and drive them away from traditional fishing areas. Annually, China announces a fishing ban, claiming that its purpose is to preserve the fish stock in the South China Sea. Empowered with this ban, Chinese vessels frequently harass, attack, and sink Vietnamese vessels. The most recent case occurred in June 2020, when a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) cutter and motorboat surrounded a Vietnamese fishing boat and rammed the vessel. The Vietnamese fishermen were then captured, beaten, and were forced to sign documents stating that they had violated the fishing ban. The CCG also took away the fishing equipment and caused damage to the ship.

China’s tactics in the SCS also feature the use of research vessels and their escort fleets to harass gas and oil development activities of other claimants, forcing them to reconsider or abandon their projects. China often deploys several survey vessels, as well as an escort fleet of law enforcement vessels and maritime militia, to planned oil and gas blocks of claimant states in order to deny other claimants access to these waters. Notable cases include the Vanguard Bank standoff from July to October 2019, as well as the recent appearance of Chinese research vessel Haiyang Dizhi 4 inside Vietnam’s EEZ near bloc 6.01, a gas bloc where Vietnam was planning to jointly explore with Russian gas conglomerate Rosneft.

These tactics clearly show China’s ambitions to establish a permanent maritime presence in the region. China aims to use these tactics as a means to enforce its excessive maritime claims and force Southeast Asian countries to accept China as the new hegemon.

Vietnam’s Efforts

Faced with these challenges, what has the Vietnamese government done to protect its sovereignty and maritime rights? The answer is, on paper, a lot, but their actions thus far have been lackluster and ineffective. Vietnam’s primary response to Chinese aggression has been through diplomatic protests and public statements.

Vietnam’s diplomatic protests against these actions are often conducted at the bilateral level, such as through meetings or teleconferences between foreign affairs officials, both at government and party levels. Most recently, after the aforementioned incident in June, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister held a teleconference with his Chinese counterpart to discuss solutions. Similar lines of communication have been effective in preventing conflict escalation, thus mitigating a potential diplomatic crisis or an all-out war. Yet, these protests have been unable to reverse Chinese actions.

In their public statements, Vietnam demonstrates a firmness regarding the sovereignty of Vietnam, as well as a willingness to cooperate to resolve the dispute according to international law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, the repetition of these phrases through the years have turned these statements into meaningless pronouncements, and the messages in these statements have even become memes, used in a mocking attitude by Vietnamese netizens. In recent years, these statements have begun to include mentions of litigation as a possible means of resolving the disputes, suggesting Vietnam’s willingness to bring China to court. However, a threat is only credible when those making the threat are willing to walk the talk. Without concrete action to signal serious intent, the threat of bringing China to court will become meaningless over time.

Vietnam has suffered the consequences for its weak and symbolic reactions to China’s aggression in both the political and economic fields. The most notable setback to Vietnam was how China increased the frequency of its activities in recent years. After the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff, China had repeatedly deployed research vessels and oil rigs to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Vietnam, and generally with longer duration and increased frequency of missions. In 2014, China only deployed its vessels into Vietnam’s EEZ once, and only for about two months. Then last year, it deployed the vessel four or five times, with the total duration of these missions being around six months, from late March until early October. In the whole of 2019, there were three cases of Chinese vessels attacking and/or harassing Vietnamese fishing vessels. This year, three cases have occurred in just the first six months.

With China showing little tolerance for vessels violating their arbitrary fishing ban, many Vietnamese fishermen are being forced to abandon their traditional fishing grounds and sail further south. This is a root cause for increasing illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities in the region. These fishing vessels intrude into the waters of Indonesia and Malaysia and conduct illegal fishing. This has created a wedge issue in the relations between Vietnam and both countries as more and more Vietnamese fishing vessels are being detained and in some cases, destroyed. Most recently, a clash between Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency vessels and Vietnamese fishing vessels operating illegally inside Malaysian waters resulted in the death of a Vietnamese fisherman.

Proven and probable reserves of gas and oil in the South China Sea (Graphic via CSIS Asia MaritimeTransparency Initiative)

Aside from an international level, there is a possibility that Vietnam is also facing political consequences at home. With the increased harassment of China, Vietnam has had to cancel several oil and gas development projects, with the compensation for foreign companies totaling close to $1 billion. Most recently, Vietnam delayed the exploration of block 06-01 until next year, a project previously rumored to be cancelled altogether. Aside from this, there have been reports of grassroots dissatisfaction of Vietnamese fishermen whose vessels were sunk. According to one researcher, they expressed disappointment that their cases were not appropriately handled by the Vietnamese authorities, and their loss was not compensated sufficiently. If this situation continues, the Vietnamese government might face challenges to its legitimacy and lose domestic support.

Policy Recommendations

In order to resolve these issues, Vietnam should consider alternative policies, alongside existing ones, to both manage the situation in the meantime, as well as solving issues in the long run. The first step is to expand its current international cooperation on increasing maritime domain awareness. Potential measures include providing fishing vessels with radio and tracking equipment, with updated Geographical Information System (GIS) signals. Vietnam should also negotiate with countries in the region, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, on protocols in situations where local authorities capture Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in their EEZs, as well as for unexpected encounters at seas. By mitigating possible consequences of IUU fishing, Vietnam can avoid regional tensions and domestic backlashes.

An image taken from a Vietnamese Coast Guard vessel shows a Chinese Coast Guard ship firing a water cannon at a Vietnamese fisheries research ship in disputed waters in the South China Sea. (Photo via Evan McKirdy/CNN)

Secondly, Vietnam should also consider the possibility of initiating joint patrol operations along with the coast guards of other states. Considering how Chinese fishing bans and maritime militia are also affecting Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines as well, these countries should consider coordinating patrol activities in the South China Sea, as well as improving their information sharing systems in order to minimize the impact of China’s actions. The joint patrols will help in driving out Chinese maritime militia operating in the waters, as well as managing IUU fishing.

An alternative policy to consider is to organize Vietnam’s fishing vessels into fleets. In past incidents, the vessels that were sunk by Chinese vessels were operating alone and far from other ships. With the establishment of the fishing fleets, the vessels will be better protected against Chinese aggression, and in the case of an attack, the vessels will be able to help one another, minimizing the damage to the ship and the loss of personnel.

Last but not least, Vietnam should take actions regarding its threat to file a case against China, making the threat more credible. While the recent move of nominating arbitrators to Annex VII of UNCLOS indicated Vietnam’s intention of using this mechanism, it might also be better to look into other options as well, such as The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). In order to signal its intention, Vietnam should raise concerns regarding Chinese nominations for ITLOS judges. As recently pointed out, China’s nominations had been elected uncontested since 1996. Opposition from Vietnam would show serious commitment to upholding international legal values, and demonstrate serious consideration of resolving the disputes through legal means.

Conclusion

China’s strategy in the South China Sea has brought significant challenges to Vietnam, and the government’s weak and symbolic responses have only worsened the situation. In order to manage these issues, Vietnam needs to address these challenges individually, yet they cannot be fully addressed without cooperating with other states. Vietnam alone is not an economically, diplomatically, nor military sufficient contender against China, but through cooperation with others, Vietnam can exert significant influence to change the status quo and turn the tables in its favor.

Viet Hung Nguyen Cao is an MA student at the Graduate School of Political Science, Waseda University, and a Research Assistant at the South China Sea Data Initiative. His primary research interests are the maritime disputes in East Asia and Japanese politics.

Featured Image: A Vietnamese Coast Guard ship (second right, dark blue) tries to make way amongst several China Coast Guard ships near a Chinese drilling oil rig (right background) being installed in disputed waters in the South China Sea on May 14, 2014. (Photo via Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP/Getty)

Sea Control 200 – European Naval Procurement with Dr. Jeremy Stöhs

By Jared Samuelson

Amidst the chaos of Regional Strategies Week here at CIMSEC we welcome an Austrian navalist, Dr. Jeremy Stöhs, to discuss European naval procurement, including his book on the decline of European naval forces, European shipbuilding infrastructure, and trends in systems and platforms.

Download Sea Control 200 – European Naval Procurement with Dr. Jeremy Stöhs

Links

1. “On the Decline of European Naval Forces: A Conversation with Jeremy Stöhs,” by Roger Hilton, CIMSEC, September 6, 2019.
2. The Decline of European Naval Forces: Challenges to Sea Power in an Age of Fiscal Austerity and Political Uncertainty, by Jeremy Stöhs, Naval Institute Press, 2018.

Jared Samuelson is the Senior Producer of the Sea Control Podcast. Contact him at seacontrol@cimsec.org.

Between the Giants: The Future of the Taiwanese Navy in an Era of Great Power Competition

Regional Strategies Topic Week

By Jonathan Selling 

For years worries about a potential second Cold War between the United States and China have swirled within discussions on the Asia-Pacific. For a while these proclamations seemed overblown, seemingly more the fever dreams of Cold Warriors hoping for a new adversary. But in the last few years it seems these concerns are finally coming true as tensions between the two nations have increased dramatically. While it is still possible that relations between the United States and China could improve and tensions may fall, various regional states are preparing for a new era of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific.

In this new world of enhanced competition between the United States and China, no nation has more reason to be concerned than the island nation of Taiwan. Claimed by China, and largely protected by the United States, Taiwan cannot avoid being drawn into the competition. Because of its unsettled political status, Taiwan could easily become a flashpoint between the two powers. Tensions have risen across the strait recently and it remains to be seen how much more it would take for them to boil over. For this reason, a rise in great power competition will signal a precarious time for Taiwan, where its independence will be threatened more severely than perhaps ever before.

In the naval realm, this has resulted in a shift in how the Republic of China Navy (ROCN) is composed and deployed. A focus on asymmetric warfare has become the mainstay of ROCN defensive plans, with major surface ships becoming much less important for Taiwan’s seaborne defense. Likewise, a new emphasis on integration with the United States and its allies has become more important and has allowed for a new use for Taiwan’s surface fleet.

A Shifting Doctrine

Taiwan’s defense doctrine has had to undergo shifts in recent years. Until recently the ability of China to existentially threaten the island nation was negligible. Taiwan could be confident it could repel a major Chinese attack with the backing of the United States. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 demonstrated the inability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to deter the United States Navy from sailing through the Strait, and a significant American show of force was enough to dissuade the Chinese.

While the crisis demonstrated Taiwanese safety from the mainland, it sowed the seeds of the current climate. It prompted the PLA to undertake wide-reaching reforms and modernization which allowed the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to become larger and more advanced, which has significantly changed the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait as the PLAN now dwarfs the ROCN. This has driven a shift toward a strategy of asymmetric warfare to harass and chip away at the PLAN in the event of war with the goal of inflicting mounting casualties and ideally preventing an invasion fleet from crossing the strait.

Taiwan’s most recent defense plan, the Overall Defense Concept, lays out the concept of asymmetric warfare. The plan calls for a two-phase system to defeat China. Phase one involves harassing a Chinese invasion fleet and weakening it before it hits the beaches. The second phase calls for the invasion to be annihilated as Chinese soldiers wade ashore on Taiwan. This change calls for assets to be lighter and more survivable than what Taiwan has traditionally relied on.

The adoption of this strategy has led the ROCN to recently purchase systems specifically for this task and to focus exclusively on this mission. This meant acquiring small, cheap, and asymmetric assets that can harass the PLAN as it attempts to cross the strait. The Taiwanese Navy has invested in minelayers that will quickly litter the seas with mines to slow down the invasion fleet. Diesel-powered submarines will prowl the Taiwan Strait, a body of water uniquely suited for submarine warfare, looking for Chinese vessels to pick off. Fast attack boats armed with anti-ship missiles will also harass the incoming fleet and wreck havoc on the landing ships crossing the strait.

However, as Taiwan procures new force structure to pursue these operating concepts, there still remains the question of how its older force structure will figure into the equation.

The Surface Fleet: Holdover or Essential?

Despite seemingly not fitting into its latest doctrine, the Taiwanese Navy maintains a number of large surface ships, and is continuing to construct or purchase more. In the event of war, these ships would likely either be sunk quickly or would be forced to flee Taiwanese waters, perhaps taking shelter at American or allied ports. Plans for the ships to regroup to wreak havoc during a PLA landing are highly optimistic, and even if successful, would still not be an ideal role. If these ships are so ill-suited for high-end warfighting only miles away from the Chinese coast then why spend valuable resources on them?

This shift to asymmetric warfare is well-suited when it comes to preventing an invasion, but offers little for patrolling Taiwan’s territorial waters or exerting power at any significant distance from Taiwan’s shores. For this, Taiwan relies on its surface fleet, made up of four destroyers and 22 frigates. Although the Chinese threat is primarily depicted as a naval invasion, Beijing could take other actions to subjugate or pressure Taiwan. In particular, a naval blockade or more distant naval skirmishes could be options. In this case, the surface fleet with its range would be invaluable. Likewise, in normal times, Taiwan’s surface ships provide security in the island’s territorial waters, a task that small missile boats and minelayers cannot perform well.

The surface fleet also serves to lend a level of prestige to Taiwan, which helps explain the Taiwanese government’s continued buildup of it. While an asymmetrical fleet is more efficient for protecting Taiwan, switching over to an entirely asymmetrical fleet focused on littoral warfare would signify a degradation of Taiwan’s power and prestige via-a-vis mainland China. This would only serve to enhance mainland China’s diminishment of Taiwan, allowing China to more effectively portray the island not as a sovereign nation but as a rebellious province.

The Taiwan Navy’s ‘Friendly Fleet’ is welcomed home at Zoying Naval Base in Kaohsiung, southern Taiwan, on April 15, 2020. (Photo via South China Morning Post)

Finally, the surface fleet can conduct goodwill tours to bolster Taiwan’s international profile. Taiwan’s dwindling amount of official relations still play an important role in legitimizing the nation against China’s claims of its status. By paying visits to overseas nations the ROCN is able to make diplomatic efforts that can have positive effects on these countries’ relations with Taiwan.

The United States: An Indispensable Ally 

Both the Obama and Trump administrations have pushed traditional allies of the U.S. to spend more on defense so as to shoulder their fair share of the burden, and this focus on burden-sharing has upset some of America’s traditional allies. But unlike Germany or Japan, Taiwan is far more reliant on the United States for its survival. The threat of American intervention is perhaps the only truly credible deterrent that could foreclose the PRC’s military options against Taiwan. As such, Taiwan can at times be portrayed as a burden for the United States, and there is worry that Taiwan’s future could be a bargaining chip in a grand settlement between the two powers.

Since relations between the United States and China began to deteriorate, Taiwan’s importance has increased. It is now being recognized as an especially important bulwark in the First Island Chain that prevents unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean for the Chinese Navy. But due to its lack of official relations or a guarantee stronger than the ambiguously worded Taiwan Relations Act, the island nation’s security has not meaningfully increased. In fact, due to the increased tensions, Taiwan is at a greater risk of conflict than before.

Taiwan’s surface fleet thus serves the important role of garnering American support. By being able to contribute to missions far from Taiwan’s shore, such as maritime security missions and cooperative exercises, these surface ships can contribute to some forms of burden sharing with the United States and demonstrate Taiwan’s value as an ally.

The surface fleet also provides the only area where the ROCN can integrate with the United States Navy (USN) in any real capacity. The United States has not operated diesel submarines since the 1950s and mine-laying and sweeping are not emphasized in the U.S. Navy. Fast attack craft with long-range anti-ship missiles are not utilized in any way by the U.S. Navy. This lack of interoperability is a constant headache for the ROCN as well as the other branches of the Taiwanese military. This may be changing though, as Taiwan has begun to ramp up work on its domestic arms industry. After almost two decades of trying to purchase new diesel submarines, Taiwan has begun construction of its own. Likewise, the island has made great strides in developing domestic anti-ship missiles, which will be used by both the Army and Navy.

Ultimately, Taiwan’s surface fleet can do more to protect Taiwan by assisting and cooperating with the United States than it does by lying in wait for a Chinese invasion force to materialize. By integrating itself into U.S.-led alliance and partnership structures, Taiwan can come to be seen as more than just a burden for the United States. The ROCN has also increased its connections to U.S. allies, most notably Australia and Japan. Like with the United States, the more that Taiwan can make itself a helpful ally, the more it will be seen as indispensable in the region.

Conclusion 

In this new era of great power competition the ROCN is designed to maximize utility with a small budget while facing a much wealthier and larger adversary. The small surface fleet patrols and guards the island’s territorial waters, while the anti-invasion force is designed to ensure that the PLA will not be able to land troops on the beach without paying a heavy toll.

The future of the ROCN is likely one of further bifurcation, with the anti-invasion fleet continuing to dwarf the surface fleet. Pursuant to its hedgehog strategy, the ROCN will concentrate on raising the cost of conflict with China in the years to come in an attempt to prevent Chinese aggression, while the surface fleet will conduct goodwill tours and conduct joint operations with allies to build relationships and raise Taiwan’s image abroad.

Ultimately, it will be the United States that will keep China at bay. The power discrepancy between Taiwan and the mainland has grown too great for Taiwan alone to deter China for much longer. While China likely cannot successfully conduct an invasion of the island just yet, it will not be long until it is capable. The continued freedom of the island lies with its friends and allies. It is only through alliances with the United States and other like-minded Pacific nations that Taiwan can hope to continue to prevent a Chinese invasion.

Some claim that Taiwan’s naval defense strategy doesn’t make sense. While the navy is not singularly designed to repel an invasion, it is still designed with a coherent strategy in mind, one that promises to be more effective at protecting the island than the strategy the navy’s critics insist on. While a purely asymmetric fleet would bring better bang for Taiwan’s buck, this fleet would serve to shrink Taiwan’s international profile and reinforce the idea that Taiwan is wholly dependent on the United States.

Taiwan may come to see this new era of great power competition as a blessing in disguise. Ten years ago, one view saw Taiwan merely as an irritant to better relations with China. This argument was made fairly often, and called for a grand bargain with China that would see the United States relinquish its security commitments to Taiwan in exchange for better relations with China. Today such talk is almost unheard of. With the threat of great power competition rising anew, Taiwan is now seen as an important bulwark in the competition with China, and Taiwan is doing its part to rise to that role. The ROCN is preparing for an era of intense competition and has set out policies to keep Taiwan safe during this turbulent era.

Jonathan Selling is a graduate of Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies with an MA International Affairs. His primary research interests are the rise of great powers and American alliances in the Indo-Pacific. 

Featured Image: Navy sailors walk past a 500-ton corvette named Tuo Chiang at the Tsoying navy base in southern Kaohsiung on March 31, 2015. (Photo: Sam Yeh/AFP/Getty Images)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.