In May 2013, Chief of the Army, General Ray Odierno stood in a small DC area ballroom in front of a few dozen graduates and their families. Central to the crowd were several Army Captains and recently minted Majors as well as the 2013 Class of the Institute for World Politics. General Odierno and the US Army were both familiar friends with IWP, having participated in speaking engagements and sending dozens of students through the tiny graduate school nestled in an old mansion on the outskirts of Dupont Circle in Washington, DC. IWP’s faculty of approximately 30 instructor-practitioners are all leaders in their diverse field of expertise. At no other institute of learning is such a small group constituted of Generals, Ambassadors, and former Intelligence Operatives. The high caliber of experience brought together by the instructors drives the school to focus in a few key areas. IWP’s majors are limited to Master’s Programs is the fields of Statecraft and National Security Affairs, Statecraft and International Affairs, and Strategic Intelligence Studies with an additional Executive M.A. in National Security Affairs.
In a city filled with storied centers of learning such as Georgetown University, George Washington University, and countless military and intelligence centers of excellence, why has the Army invested their time and money in a school of less than 150 students? The Army has simply adopted IWP as a vehicle for training their Officer Corps in a way that no other military or civilian institution can currently supply. Beyond the ever present push for inter-service “jointness” IWP takes the Army’s mid-level leaders to a new level of inter-agency understanding and cooperation. The broad array of government leaders is seen not only in the staff, but also the student body of IWP. A typical class, consisting of only a handful of students could contain of a Captain from the US Army, an analyst from the CIA, and a Foreign Service officer from the State Department, all instructed by a retired Air Force General, Intelligence Community Professional, or former member of the National Security Council to learn the lessons of the past and together share ideas using every facet of the United States Government’s foreign policy resources. In an environment where fiscal resources are being stretched ever thinner among all government agencies, the Army has used IWP as a planning lab for learning how to better achieve mission goals by employing the resources and expertise of all government agencies. Following their time at IWP, many Army graduates are able to take their newfound understanding of inter-agency capabilities and jointness to forge the future of a more integrated and more capable US Army and US Government. It is clear that the Army has found a unique and invaluable resource in a government focused melting pot of higher education. However, the US Army is currently the only branch of the US Military that sends active duty officers to be among the ranks of the student body of this particular school. If the Army has found value from this program, why have the other services not followed the Army’s lead?
The US Army has recognized the importance of strategically focused professionals since the creation of the Functional Area (FA) 59 designation for Strategic Planning and Policy Officers. The Navy is starting to realize a need for a similar expertise to the Army’s FA 59 program. Making strides to create a new US Navy skill set, the Naval War College has recently begun its inaugural year of a Naval Strategy program. While the program is a first step in creating a corps of strategically thinking Naval Officers, it appears to be limited in scope and lacks a “full government” approach. To be prepared for the future of warfare, US Navy military planners will need to be familiar with the realms of conflict that reach far beyond naval engagements and sea power to remain effective.
It is my belief that the US Navy faces an additional hurdle in its pursuit of a strategic level expertise: the stigma that in order to remain relevant an officer must remain tactical. As a junior officer, I have seen my role as a tactical asset in the aviation community quickly diminished by the ever present budget cuts and the ever expanding age of unmanned aerial vehicles fulfilling every role from air-to-air combat to airborne vertical replenishment. However, when I attempted to look to the future and the Navy’s need to focus strategically, I quickly discovered that even inquiring how to shape the next generation of war fighter was frowned upon by the operational environment.
While the US Navy will always have a need to build young officers to sharpen the “pointy end of the spear”, an equal value must be placed on sharpening the young ingenious minds which will shape the strategic picture needed to effectively employ the Navy’s spear alongside the CIA’s arrows and the State Department’s shield in order to maintain America’s role as the preeminent foreign policy leader.
In light of the MH17 disaster in Eastern Ukraine, we re-air Sea Control 25: The Crimean Crisis (with three CIMSEC writers: Dave Blair, Viribus Unitis, and Robert Rasmussen). As we discuss this disaster, how it will shape the continuing conflict, and how those involved should proceed – we must keep ourselves honest. With the months of pontification on Ukraine – there are lessons we can learn from how wrong, or right, those past selves were. This podcast covers Russian intentions, Ukranian governance, passive resistance, Maidan, and the EU/NATO.
CDR John Callaway, U.S. Navy, is a strategic planner assigned to the Air-Sea Battle Office. He is a graduate of Georgetown University, Harvard’s Kennedy School, and the National War College. The opinions expressed here are his own.
Air-Sea Battle is described as a limited objective concept by the Department of Defense. Some critics have argued that Air-Sea Battle must be more than a limited objective concept, possibly a war plan or a strategy. Others have argued that it is less than a concept and is just a meaningless set of buzzwords. From a military planner’s perspective, Air-Sea Battle is a piece of art – operational art that describes the “broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state.”
Joint doctrine uses operational art to begin the military planning process by developing an “operational approach.” An operational approach is based on an understanding of the military environment and the problem facing the commander. Air-Sea Battle describes an operational approach to address the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) problem and is “limited” in objective to the access required to conduct concurrent or follow-on actions, not decisive defeat of an adversary. If faced with an operational A2/AD challenge, a combatant commander may build on the operational approach described by Air-Sea Battle to design a war plan suited to the specific region and situation. This is an important distinction, especially for those who believe Air-Sea Battle is focused on a specific country. No matter what specific operational plan is used, Air-Sea Battle’s operational approaches can be applied if access and freedom of action in the global commons is at risk.
Why Air-Sea Battle is Important: The A2/AD Mission. Understanding strategic goals and the military missions that support them is an important first step in developing an operational approach. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance assigned the ability to project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges as a distinct mission for the U.S. armed forces. Countering A2/AD challenges is separate from and in addition to the traditional, conventional mission to deter and defeat aggression because of the complexity and paradigm-breaking challenge created by A2/AD capabilities. The Defense Strategic Guidance directs the implementation of the Joint Operational Access Concept as one of the ways to address A2/AD challenges. Joint Operational Access Concept begins to describe the A2/AD environment and then refers to the Air-Sea Battle Concept to address specific aspects of A2/AD.
The Air-Sea Battle Concept in turn applies military operational art to A2/AD: an understanding of the A2/AD operational environment, the specific problems posed by A2/AD, and an operational approach that envisions how a commander can mitigate the risks of the A2/AD environment and continue to operate in the global commons. The name “Air-Sea Battle” is derived from the air and maritime domains traditionally associated with the global commons and the new assumption that U.S. forces must fight to achieve and maintain access in those domains. This simple etymology of the Air-Sea Battle Concept in Department of Defense writings clearly defines the intent of Air-Sea Battle and should not be confused with think tank and other commentator “sources.”
Envisioning the A2/AD Operating Environment. Air-Sea Battle was directed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to shake-up the institutional inertia generated by uncontested access. The A2/AD operating environment will be one where U.S. forces will not only fight to get to the fight but also fight to sustain access and the ability to maneuver in all domains. A2/AD presents a layered, multi-domain, integrated system-of-systems that gives potential adversaries a new dimension of strategic depth. While U.S. forces have always expected to be contested in theater when they maneuver within the operating range of adversary organic capabilities, the ability to merely move and sustain forces from homeports and bases to and across distant theaters will now be contested as well.
In addition to the increased technological sophistication of military capabilities on land, at sea, and in the air, the nascent development of potentially hostile space and cyberspace capabilities expands the access challenge across all five warfighting domains. Friendly forces in the air, sea, land, space and cyberspace domains are now threatened not only physically but also through the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. The expectation that command and control structures will be attacked through the disruption of friendly communications and decision-making architectures is probably the most-significant change from today’s warfighting paradigm. In short, our traditional understanding of the phases of conflict, the definition of battlespace, our access to and ability to maneuver within domains, and our expected operational tempo will all be challenged.
Maintaining freedom of action in the global commons requires overcoming the physical threats of long-range missiles, torpedoes, mines, and other threats as well as maintaining our ability to command, control, and communicate with the forces from the strategic to the tactical levels. Initial analysis led some to conclude that only through striking the land-based hosts of these threat capabilities would the U.S. be able to maintain access. The Joint Operational Access Concept acknowledges the risks associated with that approach. To provide national leadership and military commanders with an array of viable options, Air-Sea Battle promotes operational art, not prescriptive solutions and advocates the innovative use of existing technology and potential future developments as the means to maintain U.S. qualitative superiority in the global commons.
Defining the A2/AD Problem. The Air-Sea Battle Concept defines the A2/AD problem and desired end-state as “capabilities (that) challenge U.S. freedom of action by causing U.S. forces to operate with higher levels of risk and at greater distance from areas of interest. U.S. forces must maintain freedom of action by shaping the A2/AD environment to enable concurrent or follow-on operations.” In short, the A2/AD environment consists of threats to movement, threats to maneuver, and threats to command and control.
For example, capabilities in space and cyberspace as well as terrorist tactics may threaten the movement of deploying forces, logistics forces and follow-on forces from home bases to theater. These threats will challenge our understanding of the phasing of conflict. In addition, increased area denial capabilities are directly and indirectly challenging the long-range air and missile capabilities of U.S. forces, specifically to negate U.S. stand-off capability and driving a change to our understanding of battlespace and operating areas by making our current frames of reference obsolete. Finally, adversaries are preparing to contest the domains of space and cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum in order to create a degraded or denied communications environment that directly challenges U.S. reliance on ”reach back” communications and theater level command and control. This will greatly impact our ability to dictate the tempo of battle. The effect of these A2/AD capabilities is summarized in the Concept: “(t)he range and scale of possible effects from these capabilities presents a military problem that threatens the U.S. and allied expeditionary warfare model of power projection and maneuver.”
An Operational Approach to A2/AD. An operational approach is a “commander’s description of the broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state.” It is a “visualization of how the operation should transform current conditions into the desired conditions at end state.” The Joint force uses operational approaches to provide the foundation for planning guidance, to provide a model for execution and assessment and to enable a better understanding of the operational environment and of the problem. Air-Sea Battle provides an operational approach to A2/AD.
Air-Sea Battle’s operational approach to the A2/AD challenge in the global commons is a networked, integrated force capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary forces (NIA/D3). As defined above, the A2/AD problem at its core is about sophisticated threats to movement, maneuver and command and control. Readers of the Concept document will find the broad framework of Air-Sea Battle as it addresses A2/AD threats. The individual parts of Air-Sea Battle are briefly summarized as follows, but the reader is cautioned to view them not as individual lines of effort but as strands woven together when a commander is designing a plan:
Networked. “Networked” describes not only the communications pathways but also the authorities and relationships needed to enable commanders faced with threats to their decision-making process. Cross-domain operations are conducted by integrating capabilities from multiple interdependent warfighting domains to support, shape, or achieve objectives in other domains. The Joint Operational Access Concept advocates for cross-domain synergy, which goes beyond the merely additive, de-conflicted capabilities of today where commander’s must “reach back” for space, cyber and long-range fires. Cross-domain operations will go a step further to exploit asymmetric advantages in specific domains to create positive and potentially cascading effects in other domains, as commanded at the operational level.
Integrated. “Integrated” reflects three emerging trends that will challenge the current U.S. understanding of the opening phase of war with A2/AD adversaries. First, an adversary can initiate military activities with little or no indications or warning. Second, forward deployed friendly forces will likely be in the A2/AD environment at the commencement of hostilities and, third, adversaries will likely attack U.S. and allied territory supporting operations against adversary forces. In other words, the U.S. will no longer have the luxury to build up combat power in an area, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conduct operations as desired. To overcome this, forces must train against A2/AD capabilities together, as an integrated Joint and combined force, for cross-domain operations prior to deploying to theater. This pre-deployment Joint and combined training is called pre-integration.
Attack-in-depth. “Attack-in-depth” includes offensive and defensive fires and includes both kinetic and non-kinetic means to attack an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities without requiring systematic destruction of the enemy’s defenses. This is a significant departure from today’s rollback methodology that relies on uncontested communications and the ability to establish air superiority, or dominance in any other domain. The attack-in-depth methodology seeks to create and exploit corridors and windows of control that are temporal in nature and limited in geography. At the tactical level, Air-Sea Battle’s attack-in-depth methodology provides a unique lens to consider the A2/AD threat. Air-Sea Battle analyzes adversary effects chains, or an adversary’s process of finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging and assessing an attack on U.S. forces. The insight from this analysis contributes to the operational approach of Air-Sea Battle.
Disrupt C4ISR. “Disrupting” adversary effects chains focuses on impacting an adversary’s decision-making ability, referred to as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Ideally, friendly efforts to disrupt an adversary’s decision-making will preclude attacks on friendly forces. For example, commanders faced with threats to planned “movement” into theater should consider disruptive offensive operations to combat the adversary’s ability to track and locate forces in transit using all five domains.
Destroy and Defeat. The “Destroy and Defeat” operational tasks focus the commander on adversary A2/AD platforms and weapons systems that threaten forces in theater as they maneuver. Destroying or neutralizing adversary weapons systems enhances friendly survivability and provides freedom of action. In terms of access, destroying adversary platforms regains access and defeating employed weapons sustains it.
The Air-Sea Battle Concept document, and not the blogosphere, should be read in detail for a deeper understanding of how the operational art of Air-Sea Battle addresses the A2/AD problem. As stated in the unclassified version of the concept, for those with appropriate clearances and need to know, there a growing body of work that explores subordinate tactical concepts and mission essential tasks that will be required for Air-Sea Battle to evolve from operational art, to operational design, to concepts of operations and operational plans.
Historical Analogy: War Plan Orange. Air-Sea Battle is not a strategy or a war plan; however, there is a particularly appropriate analogy to Air-Sea Battle in the development of War Plan Orange during the interwar years. There are striking similarities in the institutional changes driven by the changing operational environment as well as the specific time-distance-resistance military problem confronted by planners in the Pacific then and in the global commons today.
First, the era of uncontested power projection for U.S. forces may well be over – Air-Sea Battle assumes U.S. forces will have to fight to get to the fight – an assumption also made by the planners of War Plan Orange. Similar to the historical evolution of War Plan Orange, Air-Sea Battle’s development is driving institutional changes to better understand the challenges of potential future fights. Edward Miller’s book, War Plan Orange, explores what he called “the American way of planning” in detail and perhaps future historians will compare the “color” planning efforts of the pre-World War II era and the overall effort to explore the anti-access and area denial challenge through the Air-Sea Battle Concept, the Joint Operational Access Concept, and others. War Plan Orange’s many iterations included the Through Ticket and the Royal Road, evolutions in the plans that accounted for better understanding and new insights between the Services. Air-Sea Battle represents a similar evolution in 21st century warfare.
Second, the defining military problem faced by Army and Navy planners working on War Plan Orange in the decades preceding World War II was largely one of geography, where access to the high seas and international airspace was defined by the air and maritime distance between bases and the Pacific islands. The same geographic considerations bound Air-Sea Battle in the global commons, but with the added complexity of access to non-sovereign cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Air-Sea Battle is in the vanguard of a likely long-term effort to address a similar problem of time, distance and resistance associated with A2/AD.
In conclusion, Air-Sea Battle describes an operational approach that, for military planners, helps make sense of the A2/AD operating environment, defines the military problem of A2/AD, and describes the characteristics needed in the future force and the broad actions U.S. and allied forces must take to achieve access in the global commons. For every complaint about Air-Sea Battle generated inside the Beltway, there are numerous requests for support from the Fleets and Forces in how to approach the growing challenge of advanced A2/AD capabilities. Further, the operational approach of Air-Sea Battle promotes mutual understanding and unity of effort not just forward in the Fleets and Forces but among the Services in their Title 10 force development roles. Air-Sea Battle’s operational framework is being used to find the solutions necessary for the U.S. military to continue to operate forward and project power wherever an A2/AD challenge emerges.
 Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges, May 2013, p.4
 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, pp.4-5
 The “Air-Sea Battle” name is attributed to various sources, including former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, Andrew Marshall, Andrew Krepinevich’s “AirSea Battle” or to Admiral James Stavridis’ 1992 war college paper. While it does not take much imagination to jump from AirLand Battle to Air-Sea Battle, perhaps the credit really belongs with the Atari Corporation which launched a video game called Air-Sea Battle in 1977.
 Air-Sea Battle, p.1
 See reports authored by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments on this topic. These reports preceded and are often confused with the actual Department of Defense Air-Sea Battle Concept.
 Joint Operational Access Concept, Department of Defense, 17 Jan 2012, p.24 (footnote) and p.38
 Air-Sea Battle, p.3
 Air-Sea Battle, p.2
 Joint Pub 5-0, p.III-5
 Joint Pub 5-0, p.III-5-III-6
 Joint Pub 5-0, p.III-13
 Air-Sea Battle, p.4
 Air-Sea Battle, p.5
 Air-Sea Battle, p.2
 Air-Sea Battle, pp.7-8
 Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD: 1991.) As an interesting aside, and potentially a strategic message about the willingness of the United States to work with those formerly considered competitors and adversaries, planners from more than one country targeted by a “color plan” are included in the Air-Sea Battle implementation effort.
There is a general consensus in the global maritime industry that the rate of unlawful acts against vessels in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) has been on the increase in recent years. However, information on the exact nature of such unlawful acts in the region is distorted and unreliable with confusing statistics – hampering efforts to suppress the menace. There are confusing definitions of piracy and armed robbery at sea, coupled with weak legal mechanisms for dealing with and prosecuting apprehended offenders. There is also evidence suggesting that most unlawful acts against vessels in the region, irrespective of their nature or location, are erroneously being classified as acts of piracy. There have also been various allegations of low prosecution rate for apprehended offenders.
The Nature of Crimes Against Vessels in GoG from a Legal Perspective
It is vital that the exact nature of the unlawful acts against vessels in that region is established from a legal perspective so as to determine whether any counter measures, including apprehension and prosecution of offenders, should be international or nationalistic in approach or a combination of both. It seems that the confusion over the legal nature of crimes against vessels in GoG is due to the different definitions of piracy adopted by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
The IMB is an agency established by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) with the support of the IMO for the purpose of collecting, exchanging and disseminating information on maritime crimes for the benefit of international commerce. Until 2009 the IMB defined piracy in its annual reports as:
An act of boarding (or attempted boarding) with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act.
The IMO is the United Nations agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. IMO has adopted the international law definition of piracy under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. Article 101 of UNCLOS 1982 provides that:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
The IMO clarifies the position further with a separate definition for armed robbery against ships as follows:
1) Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;
2) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.
It is worthy to note that the IMB’s definition of piracy above makes no distinction as to the nature or location of unlawful acts against vessels, including unlawful acts against vessels whether in internal waters, within or outside port facilities, and whether within or outside territorial waters. On the contrary, the IMOs’ definition recognises a distinction between piracy as only occurring in international waters and all other unlawful acts within internal and territorial waters and port facilities as armed robbery. For this purpose, international waters means all maritime zones, including the Contiguous Zone, the EEZ, and High Seas, but excluding the Territorial and Internal waters.
Thus the distinction between Territorial Waters and International waters is crucial in establishing whether a criminal act against a vessel constitutes piracy under international law. This leads to the question: what is Territorial Waters? The answer is provided by Article 3 of UNCLOS stating:
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.
Under UNCLOS, a coastal state may claim right to Territorial Sea of any breadth subject to a maximum limit of 12 nautical miles from the baseline.
The IMB’s definition of piracy above may be useful for commercial expediency. However, in the quest for a strategy to tackle unlawful acts against vessels in GoG (or anywhere); including where to prosecute offenders, a legal definition will be more appropriate. Therefore it is submitted that the IMO’s definition of piracy in accordance with Article 101 of UNCLOS should be the preferred mechanism for this purpose. This is because piracy is an international crime for which every state has the right and duty to fight. Theft and armed robbery within internal waters, port facilities and territorial waters is a national problem properly dealt with under the domestic laws of each country. Moreover, some of the theft and armed robberies against vessels in GoG and Nigeria in particular, are due to high level of bribery and corruption, such as port and security personnel colluding with criminals. Thus, it is not only inappropriate but it is legally wrong to describe theft and armed robbery against vessels within internal and territorial waters and port facilities as piracy.
Critics to the above position may point out that some countries, such as the United States, are yet to ratify UNCLOS. The answer to such critique is that the definition of piracy under UNCLOS is not a new concept. It is a restatement of the customary international law which was previously codified in similar language under one of the preceding conventions to UNCLOS, i.e. the High Seas Convention (HSC) 1958, to which the United States and other non-UNCLOS countries are parties. Above all, as at 29 October 2013, UNCLOS had either been ratified or acceded to by 166 States worldwide which makes it one of the most widely accepted international conventions of all time.
Further support as to why the definition of piracy under UNCLOS is the most appropriate mechanism for determining whether an unlawful act should be classed as such could be found from the fact that the IMB’s annual reports since 2010 adopts this view. In fairness, it seems that the IMB has taken steps to rectify the confusion with its definition of piracy, but this has not had any impact since its statistics are not broken into separate heads for international waters and territorial waters, whereas most players in the global maritime industry rely on the IMB’s statistics in making crucial decisions, such as designating High Risk Areas (HRA) as well as fixing insurance premiums and freight rates.
Statistics for crimes against vessels in GoG
Having made a case as to why the IMO’s definition of piracy based on UNCLOS should be the preferred mechanism for determining whether or not an unlawful act constitutes piracy to warrant international action, we now look at the IMO’s own statistics to ascertain the legal nature of the unlawful acts against vessels in GoG. Although the IMO’s statistics are described as a Regional Analysis on West Africa, but it relates to the whole of GoG as it includes the few reported incidents of unlawful acts against vessels in central Africa, such as the incident of the MV Kerela which took place in the internal waters of Angola on 18 January 2014.
Below is a table compiled by the IMO for unlawful acts against vessels in West Africa (including central Africa) for the period between 10 August 1995 and 6 March 2014. The table gives a breakdown of location of all reported incidents for that period, indicating the total number of reported incidents for International Waters, Territorial waters and Port area; the status of the vessels at the time of the incident – whether steaming, at anchor or unspecified; number of attackers involved; consequence of the attacks on the crew; nature of weapons used by the attackers; parts of the vessel raided; and other miscellaneous information such as number of lives lost, number of wounded crew, number of missing crew, number of crew taken hostage, number of crew assaulted and whether any ransom was paid.
IMO Regional Analysis of unlawful acts against vessels in West Africa between 10 Aug 1995 and 6 Mar 2014
From the IMO’s Regional analysis on maritime crime in West Africa above, it could be seen that a total of 843 reported incidents of unlawful acts against vessels took place in the more than 18 year period between August 1995 and March 2014. Out of the above figure, only 158 reported incidents took place in international waters which could legally be classified as acts of piracy. Of the remaining 685 reported incidents for that period, 296 incidents took place in Territorial Waters and 389 incidents took place in port areas.
Based on the IMO Regional Analysis above, it is clear that more than 81% of the reported incidents of unlawful acts against vessels in the West African region (and indeed GoG) should be properly and legally classified as armed robbery, whereas piracy accounts for less than 19% of such incidents.
Suggested Solutions for Dealing with the Menace
In formulating an effective strategy to repress the surge in unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation in GoG it is vital that we first appreciate the exact nature of the problem from a legal perspective. This is based on simple logic because it is impossible to have an effective solution to a problem without establishing the nature of the problem. The necessary corollary for that reasoning is that for any security measure to be fruitful in combating crimes against vessels in GoG it must be based on a sound legal footing bearing in mind the rights and obligations of states within the various maritime zones under UNCLOS with issues relating to sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the various maritime boundary disputes which abound in the region due to the presence hydrocarbons. Examples of maritime boundary disputes which could hinder collaborative efforts for maritime security measures in GoG include the acrimonious dispute over Bakassi peninsular between Nigeria and Cameroon; Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea over the island at the estuary of river Ntem; Equatorial Guinea and Gabon over Corisco Bay and Mbane Island; Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire over the Dzata-1 oil well near Cape Three points, as well as the potential maritime disputes between Liberia and its western and eastern neighbours following the recent discovery of oil in its waters. It is important for GoG states to set up necessary mechanisms for peaceful resolution of maritime boundary disputes as provided under UNCLOS, as failure to do so may potentially derail maritime security initiatives in the region.
Based on the IMO statistics above it is safe to conclude that more than 81% of the crimes against maritime navigation in GoG is armed robbery (and theft) within territorial and internal waters including port facilities, most of which take place within Nigerian waters, as opposed to piracy in international waters. It is also obvious that the immediate threats offshore have its roots ashore. Therefore any strategy to deal with the problem effectively must be aimed at tackling both ends simultaneously.
Suggested solutions for dealing with the problem are as follows:
A) Tackling the problem offshore:
i. Littoral states in GoG must first recognise that it is the primary responsibility of each coastal state, not the international community, to secure its internal waters and port facilities as well as individual territorial waters. This is a fundamental factor that must be appreciated to ensure an endearing and effective maritime security in the region. This is because the sovereignty of a state extends to its territorial waters and the state has exclusive jurisdiction and competence to ensure the good order and security of its territorial waters. Thus every coastal state has a legal responsibility by way of a duty of care to provide proper and adequate security for maritime traffic in its territorial waters. There seems to be good arguable grounds to say that a coastal state that fails to provide proper and adequate security in its territorial waters in accordance with the requirements of UNCLOS may be liable for breach of that duty of care to victims of maritime crimes in their territorial waters and port facilities by virtue of the doctrine of State Responsibility. Of course such liability will depend on the facts of each case and may be easily established against coastal states with weak maritime security due to bribery and corruption and / or bad governance.
ii. GoG States, especially Nigeria, should adopt a zero tolerance policy to all forms of offshore bunkering activities. This is because the surge in maritime crimes in GoG is intrinsically linked to the illegal activities in the oil industry in that region, particularly Nigeria. Offshore bunkering activities in that region often entails a lot of underhand dealings with bent tycoons, which is a potential ground for organised crime and other illegal activities, including rivalry among criminal gangs, some of which ultimately lead to attacks on vessels. Therefore the recent decision by the Nigerian government to legalise offshore bunkering with a view to curtail illegal oil exports will be counterproductive to maritime security initiatives as security operatives will be placed in the difficult position of having to differentiate between legal and illegal bunkering in their operations.
iii. GoG States need to adopt firm and aggressive anti-smuggling measures with zero tolerance for such activities. Smuggling is the backbone of criminal acts against vessels and seafarers. This is because the clandestine nature of smuggling which is carried out to evade payment of customs and port duties are often conducted sneakily without security protection, thereby creating the propensity for criminal activities which leads to attacks on vessels. Crimes against vessels in GoG is an offshoot of the high rate of smuggling by sea in the region, which has always been a means for trafficking in weapons and narcotics as well as other illicit activities because it gives the perpetrators the confidence to undermined any security regime in the region. Thus any initiative to suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea in GoG will not achieve any meaningful result without curbing the high rate of smuggling in the first instance. In short, anti-smuggling initiatives should be used as a barometer in the quest for suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation in GoG.
iv. Coastal states in GoG need to give priority to removal of shipwrecks from their waters and to have stringent measures to prevent abandonment of vessels. The reason for this is that proliferation of abandoned vessels in the region are not only a source of navigational and environmental hazards, but they also provide cosy nests for maritime criminals to store arms and launch attacks on vessels. Wherever possible, the relevant authorities should identity owners of abandoned vessels from names of the vessels and other identification marks, and to get them to pay for the cost of removal of such wrecks. In this regard it should be noted that the Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (the Convention) which was adopted by the IMO on 18 May 2007 will come into force on 14th April 2015, being twelve months after the ratification of the 10th country for that convention i.e. Denmark. The ten countries that ratified the Convention to bring it into force on the above date are: Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, India, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Palau and United Kingdom. Under the convention, all vessels of 300 gross tonnes and above registered in any state which is a party to the convention or calling at ports and terminals in those states must have evidence of insurance policy to cover wreck removal. The convention only applies in the EEZ, but there is a provision under Article 3 for states to extend its application to their territories, including territorial and internal waters, where most shipwrecks occur due to higher risk of grounding. Denmark’s ratification of the Convention made it the third country along with Bulgaria and the United Kingdom, to extend its application to their territories. In view of the high rate of abandoned vessels within the territorial and internal waters of Nigeria and other states in GoG, it will be highly appropriate for the Nigerian authorities to rely on Article 3 of the convention to extend its application to their territory, and for other GoG states to ratify the convention and do the same.
v. Combating maritime crime in GoG does not require more warships because it is obvious that the root cause of the problem is ashore, as opposed to offshore. Maritime criminals in that region will always try their luck in view of the highly lucrative nature of such illegal activities compared to the low risk of apprehension and prosecution. Therefore naval and coast guard activities should be conducted with the aim to deter, detect and defeat maritime criminals before they are able to carry out any successful operation. What is required for this purpose is the capability for the authorities to have virtual control of their maritime environment so that the presence of security operations could be seen and felt by prospective criminals, which cannot be achieved with warships, but with fast and well equipped patrol boats that are able to outsmart speed boats used by criminals, with more emphasis on use of aircraft equipped with the necessary tools and equipment to undertake far reaching aerial surveillance and able to get to the location of any reported incident in the shortest possible time, all of which must be supported with modern technology to capture the activities and movements of all types of vessels, large or small. There is a need for more and well equipped faster patrol boats manned by properly trained officers. In view of the large expanse of the area to be kept under surveillance, it will be cost effective and the naval and coastguard forces would benefit from Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC). Thus, in addition to better equipped and fast patrol boats, what is required is more patrol and reconnaissance aircraft with multiple capabilities, supplemented with extensive use of modern technology. Of course, it will also require the hardening, reinforcement and co-ordination of the existing naval and coastguard capabilities of GoG states to ensure efficient and regular patrol by well trained officers, as well as instilling more discipline and professionalism in the naval forces, for effective maritime law enforcement. This is will be particularly useful in the case of Nigeria in view of the endemic allegations of corruption within the Nigerian navy.
vi. GoG States must invest in modern technology in their efforts to combat maritime crime due to the large expanse of the area to be kept under surveillance. With modern technology which is constantly improving, it is possible for the authorities to have virtual control of their maritime domains by investing in various maritime surveillance systems to complement water and aerial patrols. Whilst technology enhances maritime security, no technological system will provide full proof surveillance, and some may need to be integrated with others to increase reliability. Choosing the right technology also requires careful consideration of prevailing local circumstances and available infrastructure, such as frequent disruption to electricity supply especially in Nigeria, in order to be of any benefit. Examples of available technology for maritime security surveillance are:
Automatic Identification System (AIS) This is a navigational aid which broadcasts information about a vessel to other vessels and to shore-based authorities automatically. The requirement for vessels to have AIS was adopted by the IMO as Regulation 19 of Chapter V of the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 as amended. The Regulations make it a mandatory requirement for AIS to be fitted on all vessels of 300 gross tonnes or more engaged on international voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnes or more not engaged on international voyages and all passenger vessels irrespective of size, with effect from 31 December 2004. To ensure effective maritime security, all GoG states should consider adopting and implementing the above AIS Regulations (where they have not done so) and to make it a compulsory requirement for all vessels (irrespective of size) to be fitted with AIS, with a zero tolerance policy for any vessel to operate in their maritime domain without AIS. Such a requirement will make it possible for all vessels to be tracked and suspicious vessels interdicted before any atrocities are committed. AIS is useful for short range vessel identification and tracking.
Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system is a global messaging system for security as well as Search and Rescue purposes. LRIT system was adopted by the IMO and came into force on 1 January 2008 through Regulation 19-1 of Chapter V of SOLAS. The LRIT Regulations require passenger ships on international voyages including high-speed craft, cargo ships including high speed craft of 300 gross tonnes and above, as well as mobile drilling units, to transmit information relating to identity and location specifying position, date and time for a vessel to their Flag State at least every 6 hours. Flag States maintain a database for such transmitted information to share with any other State which is a party to SOLAS Convention, upon request. Thus coastal States may request information on any vessel which is within 1000 nautical miles from their coast. The Flag State will release such information to the requesting state unless there are reasons not to do so on grounds of confidentiality. There is no interface between LRIT and AIS. The IMO has since set up an Information Distribution Facility (IDF) to provide LRIT data from SOLAS member states to naval forces in the suppression of crime against vessels in Gulf of Aden and wider Indian Ocean. The IMO issued a circular on 6 December 2010 advising SOLAS member states that North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and EU NAVFOR are involved with the IDF and urged Flag States to provide LRIT information to those organisations, on request.
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) is a satellite-based monitoring system capable of providing information on the location, speed and course of a vessel. VMS is mostly used for purposes of monitoring fishing vessels, but could equally be used for purposes of security surveillance. It will be helpful to make it mandatory for vessels to have VMS to report the location of ships at regular interval.
Vessel Detection System (VDS) which makes it possible for vessels to be detected through Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) under any weather condition, day and night. This is a vital tool in maritime security surveillance because detecting the position of vessels neither requires co-operation of vessels nor voluntary disclosure of information by vessels. Thus VDS makes it possible for suspicious vessels to be detected and reported to relevant naval and coastguards for interception.
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) System involves having a station ashore with sensors, radars and optical or infrared cameras for trained personnel to monitor local maritime traffic. VTS systems are used in areas of heavy maritime traffic to ensure safety of navigation but could also be useful for purposes of maritime security surveillance.
B) Tackling the problem ashore:
vii. GoG states must give priority to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in their national security policies. The Maritime Domain of a coastal state is all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, and other conveyances. MDA on the other hand is the appreciation of everything relating to the maritime domain with the potential to affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of a coastal state. GoG states rely heavily on their Maritime Domain as a major source of revenue. Maritime insecurity in GoG is a direct consequence of the fact that until recently most states in the region overlooked the need for any or proper MDA programmes as they concentrated mainly on land security with little or no attention for their maritime domains. Thus GoG states must have long term MDA Plans in their security policies. Such MDA plans must be tailored to the peculiar needs of each state bearing in mind their social, economic and political circumstances. The MDA plans must be reviewed regularly to ensure efficacy, as well as anchored to regional and international MDA plans. Maritime security initiatives are unlikely to be effective unless GoG states engage in long term and sustained MDA programmes to complement such efforts.
viii. Coastal States in GoG need to appreciate that maritime activity is the mainstay for their economies and the need to guard that source of income jealously by allocating adequate and commensurate resources for maritime security. Of course this should go hand in hand with having an effective system to ensure that allocated resources are utilised for the intended purpose. It seems that the situation has got this bad because, while all littoral states in GoG derive most of their revenue from their maritime domain, they have not been enthusiastic about allocating adequate resources for purposes of maritime security. This can be seen from the fact that most GoG states do not have any or adequate naval or coastguard capabilities, apart from Nigeria and Ghana who have some naval capability to operate at sea for a reasonable period. Nigeria has the largest navy in the region but its operational capability had been undermined for years by lack of maintenance of its fleet and equipment due to inadequate funding amidst allegations of mismanagement, though it seems that situation is currently being addressed following the recent intervention of Nigeria’s Senate Committee on the Navy.
ix. It is of utmost importance for GoG states to initiate viable welfare programmes by boosting job opportunities in their coastal communities, to engage those who are enticed into criminal activities as a way of survival. This is particularly important as almost all GoG states have no social security systems for those who are unemployed to fall back on. Thus most unemployed people in the region resort to survival by all means, often with no regard for law and order. This problem is particularly acute in Nigeria being the most populous and richest country in the region, but with a very high unemployment and poverty rate. The problem is aggravated by government policies which are not given careful consideration before implementation, such as the privatisation of Nigerian seaports in which resulted in mass redundancies of about 18,000 people in 2006 within the maritime sector, thereby increasing the number of unemployed people with links to the maritime sector to increase the regiment of maritime criminals. No maritime security initiative is likely to yield any positive result so long as there remain a high number of people with links to the maritime sector, including maritime security sector, with no source of livelihood. There is an urgent need for aggressive job creation programmes within the coastal communities. One way in which this may be done is by rejuvenating the fishing sector which has been neglected as a result of the booming petroleum industry by clamping down on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, to absorb some of those artisans and security personnel who were affected by the mass redundancies in the maritime sector. Reviving the erstwhile thriving agricultural sector which has also been abandoned for same reason will go a long way to ameliorate the problem.
x. The root causes of maritime crimes in GoG in general and Nigeria in particular are bribery and corruption coupled with weak governance, which is responsible for the high rate of poverty and consequential crimes in the region. Attaining effective maritime security in GoG will remain elusive so long as millions of people are deprived of basic necessities of life such as food, shelter, employment, and access to proper medical facilities. The situation is worsened by the fact that such detrimental activities are perpetuated by some of those who are charged with the responsibility of managing affairs of the state and ensuring law and order. In some instances, government policies and actions amount to nothing short of blatant disregard for the law. This is why the ordinary citizens have no regard for law and order or any form of constituted authority because they do not see or feel any positive impact of the government. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. There is urgent need for improved governance and for existing anti-bribery and corruption laws to be vigorously enforced. The remedies for crime are good governance, accountability and transparency underpinned with respect for rule of law by the custodians of the law for the general population to emulate. Unfortunately actualisation of those simple remedies for the depravity may be the hardest part in the quest to suppress the general insecurity in the region because it will require some form of mass social mobilisation with the aim of complete reorientation and change in mindset from the leaders and the general population.
xi. There is an urgent need for GoG states to review and overhaul existing legal mechanisms for the prosecution of criminals apprehended for maritime crimes. Such an exercise is necessary in view of the various allegations of corruption against the prosecuting authorities and members of the judiciary who are involved in dealing with such cases, especially in Nigeria. This is because the current low prosecution rate compared to the number of apprehended offenders is an incentive for such acts to continue. In order to deal with the unsatisfactory state of affairs regarding prosecution of maritime criminals, it will be helpful for GoG states to consider pulling their resources to establish a specialist regional tribunal to try such cases. This may entail having to amend their domestic criminal laws to give harmonised jurisdiction to such a specialised regional tribunal to try cases of maritime crimes committed within the territorial waters of member states. The different legal systems of the various Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries in the region should not be an obstacle as there are several international criminal courts and tribunals with templates for such initiative. Having such a regional specialised tribunal will send a strong message to maritime criminals and their ‘godfathers’ that GoG states are all out to combat maritime crimes in the strongest terms, which will serve as a durable deterrent.
xii. GoG states need to engage in greater regional cooperation in the fight against maritime crimes. The porous and contiguous nature of maritime boundaries means that maritime crimes cut across national jurisdictions and this may occur easily in GoG where most maritime boundaries have not been clearly demarcated resulting in various maritime boundary disputes, which may lead to allegations of transgression. Therefore there is a need for coordination of efforts and resources as well as information sharing between GoG states in the quest for repression of maritime crimes. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illicit maritime activity in West and Central Africa (Yaoundé Code of Conduct) which was adopted on 25 June 2013 is a laudable step in the right direction because it demonstrates that the governments of GoG states are ready to put aside their differences from the relics of colonialism to combat a common problem. Unfortunately, despite its ambitious aims, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct deals with only the symptoms of the problem by addressing offshore threats, without addressing the root causes of the problem ashore. For instance, it does not propose a solution for the low prosecution rate for apprehended maritime criminals in the region. Rather, the relevant provisions relating to prosecution of apprehended maritime criminals under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct merely provides that:
The Signatories intend to prosecute, in their domestic courts and in accordance with relevant domestic laws, perpetrators of all forms of piracy and unlawful acts against seafarers, ships, port facility personnel and port facilities.
The organization and functioning of this national system is exclusively the responsibility of each State, in conformity with applicable laws and regulations.
…..each Signatory to the fullest possible extent intends to co-operate in arresting, investigating, and prosecuting persons who have committed piracy or are reasonably suspected of committing piracy.
This is a serious deficiency in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct because the low prosecution rate for apprehended maritime criminals in GoG is a big incentive for such acts to continue. The failure of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to address the root causes of the problem ashore may be attributable to the fact that it was deliberated upon and adopted by officials of the same governments who will not accept any allegations of bad governance and corruption. The effectiveness of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as a tool for combating maritime crimes in GoG will be greatly improved if it is amended to also deal with the root causes of the problem ashore, such as establishing a specialised regional tribunal for prosecution of maritime criminals. Such initiative will address the problem of low prosecution rate and serve as a strong deterrent for maritime criminals.
It is indisputable that there has been a significant increase in the number of attacks on vessels in GoG and that most of such activities take place within Nigerian waters. However, the exact nature of the attacks seems tangled due to the confusing definitions of piracy used by the major organisations interested in global maritime affairs, as a result of which even theft within port facilities and anchorage areas are classed as piracy. This article has sought to untangle the exact nature of such illegal activities in GoG from a legal perspective, using the most authoritative and widely accepted definition of piracy under UNCLOS which reflects the customary international law position, to the effect that piracy is a universal crime which can only be committed in international waters.
Relying on IMO statistics over an 18 year period from 1995 to 2014 which are based on the UNCLOS definition of piracy, it is evident that more than 81% of such unlawful activities are acts of armed robbery (and some theft) as opposed to piracy because they occur within territorial and internal waters, including port facilities, and not in international waters. Therefore it is safe to conclude that the legal responsibility for dealing with the problem is that of the national governments in GoG as opposed to the international community. The concept of independence and equality of states imposes a duty on countries to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of other countries. Thus, any intervention from the international community without a formal invitation from or the consent of the states concerned, which will of course require a consensus from all the affected states in GoG, will amount to a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those states. Whilst only about 19% of the problem could be properly classified as piracy to warrant international intervention, any support from the international community to stem the menace will be highly beneficial to the global community in view of the adverse impact on international trade.
Unlike other regions in the world with similar problem such as Gulf of Aden and Malacca Straits, maritime crime in GoG is a convoluted issue because of the peculiarity of such activities in the region. The foremost reason for this is because the menace is a spin-off from the mismanagement of the abundant hydrocarbons in the region, especially in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Thus it is not surprising that the militants who have been engaged in violent agitation for ‘resource control’ of the crude oil exploited from the Niger Delta have been singled out as the culprits for the surge in attacks on vessels in GoG. The reality of the situation is more intricate than that, as a careful examination of the causes of the problem indicates that it is rooted in the high level of bribery and corruption with lack of good governance in the region, especially Nigeria, coupled with indifference to MDA among GoG states generally. The real culprits include corrupt public and political office holders who recruit criminals to commit various atrocities including attacks on vessels; low and high ranking officers in the armed forces and security services in the maritime sector who abuse their position by engaging in unlawful acts; greedy workers for Multi-National Oil companies and shipping companies who facilitate attack on tankers by providing information to criminals on movement of oil tankers; prosecutors and judicial officers who accept kickbacks in return for not prosecuting apprehended criminals or for trials to falter; as well as greedy foreigners who collude with crooked indigenes to carry out illegal bunkering activities.
Irrespective of the complexities surrounding maritime crimes in GoG, the problem is not beyond subjugation and should not go unchecked. Unfortunately most of the efforts made so far to tackle the menace have been aimed at the symptoms of the problem offshore, with little or no attention in dealing with the root causes of the problem ashore. In finding a lasting solution, efforts must be made to deal with both ends of the problem concurrently. There is an imperative need for the unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation in GoG to be nipped in the bud. Crime is contagious, and the negative successes of the terrorist groups in the Sahel, especially the recent atrocities of Boko Haram with the Chibok abductions in Bornu state of north eastern Nigeria may be transposed into the maritime domain, if no firm action is taken to check the situation swiftly. GoG states need to change their mindset from thinking of the cost of having adequate and effective maritime security. Rather, they need to start thinking of how much they stand to lose by not having proper, adequate and effective security in their maritime domains.
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, Report of Conference held at Chatham House, London, 6 December 2012, p.9
 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Report for the Period 1 January to 30 June 2009, p.3; 2009 q2 imb piracy report (1).pdf
 Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes or Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, IMO Resolution A.1025(26), Adopted on 2 December 2009.
 The Contiguous Zone is the maritime zone immediately after the Territorial Sea, up to a further limit of 12 nautical miles after the Territorial Sea (or 24 nautical miles from the baseline inclusive of the Territorial Sea) and within which a coastal state has limited powers to enforce its fiscal, customs, sanitary and immigration laws. Article 33 of UNCLOS.
 The EEZ is a maritime zone which extends up to 200 miles from the baseline, and in which coastal states enjoy extensive rights as regards natural resources and jurisdictional rights, while other states enjoy the freedom of navigation, over flight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines; Articles 55 – 58 of UNCLOS 1982
 The Territorial Sea, sometimes referred to as Territorial Waters, is the immediate maritime zone measured from the baseline of a coastal state and extends up to 12 nautical miles into the sea. Article 3 of UNCLOS
 Churchill. R. R. and Lowe. A. V, The Law of the Sea, Third Edition, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.209
 Article 15 of HSC 1958 provides that Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.
Herbert I. Anyiam LLB(Hons), BL, LLM, MCIArb. Herbert is the CEO of Global Maritime Bureau, an international maritime consultancy firm in the UK. He is a dual qualified lawyer in England & Wales and Nigeria and a member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. He is an expert in international maritime and admiralty law, international dispute resolution services and multi-jurisdictional disputes. He is a Supporting member of London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA), member of the International Maritime Statistics Forum (IMSF) and a member of International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Roster of Expert Consultants.
Every community has a canon that best encapsulates the genealogy of personalities, ideas, and events that shape the way the community sees itself and is perceived by others. The naval community is no exception. This article suggests that an important monograph has been overlooked in that canon: Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” published in 1555. It is the oldest treatise on maritime strategy.
The naval lore and the mainstream canon Maritime strategy and war at sea have long occupied the minds of sailors and statesmen. The scholarly study of maritime strategy, however, is a relatively recent endeavour. Its roots in the modern western tradition are found in the United Kingdom during the latter half of the 1800s.
Authors such as the Colomb brothers, Sir John Laughton, and, more famously, Sir Julian Corbett were among the first to muster a robust understanding of strategy in discussions of naval problems. The United States soon followed suit as Alfred Mahan, William Sims, and Willis Abbot, among others, penned numerous other works to an increasingly sophisticated naval lore.
Not surprisingly, the standard account of the disciplinary evolution of maritime strategy and naval affairs reflects this Anglo-Saxon outlook. This account is taught in naval academies and some civilian universities around the world, further reinforcing the existing canon. Other influences surely contribute to the debate, including Jomini and Beaufre, and even ancient Greeks, such as Thucydides and Themistocles, but by and large the naval lore is founded on works dealing with the British and American experiences at sea.
Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” (1555)
In its rise to become the first global maritime empire, Portugal had to develop an understanding of maritime strategy that enabled the achievement of its political aims. Like Britain’s Corbett and America’s Mahan, Portugal’s greatest maritime strategist was Fernando de Oliveira. Writing at the peak of Portuguese power, Oliveira put in writing the foundations of that global empire.
Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” (Arte da Guerra do Mar), published in Coimbra in 1555, stands as the oldest treatise on maritime strategy. Oliveira himself acknowledges that very little had been written on the subject; he only refers to Vegetius (4th century AD) for his important but sparse insights into naval warfare. In historical context, Oliveira wrote this treatise three centuries before Corbett, Mahan, and others acquired the habit of thinking strategically about naval warfare. So what can we find in Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea”?
The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the principles of war at sea whereas the second explores its conduct. Each part has fifteen chapters. The genius of Oliveira’s work is found not merely in his (dated) analysis of Portugal’s 16th century navy, but, more importantly, in his comprehensive grasp of the (perennial) foundations of maritime power. The chapters focus on topics such as just war theory, strategic theory, leadership, shipbuilding, logistics, personnel recruitment and retention, and military readiness. And this is just in the first half. The second part goes on to tackle force structure, situational awareness, oceanography, and intelligence, among other topics.
These are obviously modern terms to describe very old phenomena. However, the challenges of 16th century naval power are not dissimilar to those of today’s navies whose countries depend on the sea for wealth and prestige. Oliveira, like Corbett and Mahan, was aware of this and expressed it in the opening pages of the treatise. Discussing naval matters, the author argues, “is a useful and necessary matter, particularly for the people of this land [Portugal] who now fare more at sea than others, whereby they gain many profits and honour, and also run the risk of losing it all, if they do not preserve it […].” This verdict ought to resonate contemporary strategists from nations such as the United States, Britain, and Japan, but also those strategists whose countries have maritime ambitions, such as China and India.
Fernando de Oliveira (or Fernão de Oliveira) was an interesting man living in interesting times. A true polymath educated in a Catholic seminary, it soon became evident that God had other plans for him. Oliveira dwelled in the maritime community of Lisbon, then as now a capital with an umbilical connection to the sea, learning key skills that made him a valuable asset for any navy. These skills included: navigation (he became a pilot aboard a French warship in expeditions against British commerce); shipbuilding (two English kings coveted his counsel whilst a prisoner of war in London); negotiation (he led a prisoner exchange when a Portuguese military expedition to north Africa failed; and possibly espionage (some sources mention his spying for the Portuguese Crown in negotiations with the Vatican).
In between his adventures, Oliveira wrote invaluable works that rival “The Art of War at Sea” in scope and insight. These include the world’s first encyclopaedic treatise on navigation and shipbuilding entitled Ars Nautica (ca. 1570), which he later expanded into the first treatise on naval architecture, Livro da Fabrica das Naos (ca. 1580), the first book on Portuguese grammar, Grammatica da Lingoagem Portuguesa (1536), and one of the first books on Portuguese history, Historea de Portugal (ca. 1581). These works attest to Oliveira’s genius. Unlike Corbett, who entertained a career as a novelist at first, Oliveira made a lasting literary contribution to fields beyond maritime strategy.
Conclusions There is every reason for Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” to become compulsory reading for sailors, mariners, strategists, historians, and laymen with an interest in the complexity of conflict at sea. I will highlight only four of them. First, the book is a distant yet direct ancestor to the current mainstream canon of maritime strategy. Incorporating this source into the canon and submitting it to academic scrutiny will help illuminate the origins of Western maritime strategic thought. Second, there is an inherent value in studying Oliveira’s work in the context of naval warfare in the age of sail, particularly Portugal’s path toward a global maritime empire. Third, the book retains great relevance for current debates on maritime strategy. Oliveira’s thoughts on the building, maintenance, and deployment of navies in the pursuit of policy can inform decision-makers, analysts, and the larger policy community on the often misunderstood nature and character of naval warfare. Fourth, “The Art of War at Sea” can foster a debate on broader issues of strategy and power in light of existing scholarship on just war theory, military leadership, defence economics, and so forth.
In conclusion, it is high time for the naval community to retrieve Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” from the dustbin of history. My current efforts to translate the treatise to English will hopefully set this process in motion.
Tiago Mauricio is a WSD-Handa non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. He holds an MA in War Studies from King’s College London and is continuing his studies at Waseda University, after spending two years as a researcher at Kyoto University, Japan. He is currently translating Fernando de Oliveira’sArte da Guerra do Mar (1555) to English.
Join our DC chapter for its July meet-up with food, drinks, and conversation at Fuel Pizza (Farragut Square Location). At 1800 we will be joined by LCDR Claude Berube, USNR, to discuss his recent War on the Rocks article and discuss the arguments surrounding the “Global Network of Navies” concept.
Time: Wednesday, 30 July 1730-2030 (Discussion with Claude will begin at 1800) Place: Fuel Pizza (Ask up front if you can’t find us)
1606 K St NW, Washington DC
Farragut North / Farragut West metro stops
CIMSEC is having a Non-Navies Week from 29 July to 2 August as a first step in a longer series on specific non-navies. Delve into this list of non-navy navies with us.
Mainstream policy discussions of navies and maritime law enforcement often consider the denizens of the high seas to be a pliant polity – passive actors being defended, disrupted, or directed by the might of global or local security networks. However, national fleets and their individual warships are not the only ones with the agency to effect global politics and security.
Some topics we have covered at length - pirates and the Private Military Contractors that have risen up in opposition – but we have only scratched the surface.
Commercial enterpirses pursue the possibility of massive drone-ships, bringing new possibilities and vulnerabilities as our virtual network and our trade network grow closer together. Remember those pirates?
Fishing fleets have their own interests and controls - their operations and movement impacting global politics from the Gibraltar to the South China Sea. Sometimes inadvertant, sometimes purposeful, their movements can motivate states or global institutions – from territorial disuptes, to security, to environmental concerns.
Ever-better organized and equipped activists are taking to the high-seas, battling whalers or even states. From the Sea Shepards to the “amphibious landings” of Japanese and Chinese activists in the Senkakus, civilians are taking the politics to sea. Somalian piracy actually started as activism, fisherman-come-vigilantes.
Terrorists are an unfortunate reality on the high seas, from the category of at-sea terrorist attacks to the use of amphibious operations as vectors for attack from Israel to Mumbai. Some groups, such as the Tamil Tiger’s “Sea Tigers”, even went so far as be considered a possible real-world naval force.
Around the raucus political conflicts flows the silent schemes of smugglers, black marketeers, and human traffickers. From drug runners to sanction busters, admirals are not the only ones trying to mask their position. Criminal enterprises conduct their own air-sea battle, even operating submarines to smuggle goods.
The almost clinicically precise maps of the sea lines of communication would lead one to think that the oceans are a tame and organized place. Hardly. The sea is as alive with merchants, combatants, and all number of active players creating their own order and chaos.
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