It has been over a month since Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner called for the U.K. to give up the Falkland Islands to Argentina. While this could have been nothing more than an attempted distraction by President Kirchner from a multitude of domestic issues, the dispute over the islands is constant background noise for both countries. In the meantime a referendum on the future sovereignty of the islands is scheduled for March. What this latest uptick allows is an opportunity to look at the logistics of fighting on the other side of the world and the role of aircraft carriers in modern conflict.
During the Falkland Islands conflict in 1982, the UK deployed two aircraft carriers and a sizable fleet to the South Atlantic. Since then, the end of the Cold War and shifting priorities have changed the composition of military forces for both Argentina and the UK. There is ample research comparing the naval forces of 1982 with those of today, but the lack of a British aircraft carrier remains of particular concern. This disadvantage was evident during the intervention in Libya. The absence of a mobile platform to launch aircraft contributed to a more expensive conflict as RAF sorties were flown out of airfields in Southern Europe. The result was longer flight times, fewer missions, and higher rates of fatigue.
With the exception of the facilities maintained in the Falklands themselves, the region is as far away as the U.K. can get from its bases, and it won’t have the benefit of friendly airfields and support sites nearby. While the U.K. has significantly increased the units deployed in defense of the islands, its airfields are known targets.
During the gap between carriers (The first of the two new Queen Elizabeth-class carriers isn’t expected to undergo sea trials for at least a year), questions remain about the functionality of the future ships. The carriers in development lack capabilities that existed during the first Falklands conflict, such as aerial refueling, that are essential for lengthy engagements.
What turns aircraft carriers into a truly formidable force are the carrier strike groups and support craft. By themselves, carriers are offensive weapons and have limited operations. Strike groups combine a carrier with a mix of frigates, destroyers, supply ships, and other vessels. These ships ensure non-stop air operations while protecting the carriers from land-, air-, and sea-based threats. Under its current makeup the Royal Navy, while smaller than it used to be, still maintains a modern and efficient force with all the pieces of a carrier strike group in place, minus the carrier.
The next round of predictions on the Falklands Islands won’t start until after the referendum in March. Until then, the UK needs to identify how it plans to projects its power and defends its interests abroad – both while short a carrier, and in view of the carriers’ limitations.
A 2006 graduate of Illinois State University, Ben Brockschmidt moved to Washington, D.C., on a whim in 2007. Concurrent internships in the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate, Ben worked for Congressman Tim Johnson of Illinois (retired) who was a senior member of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (T&I). He is a 2012 CDE graduate of the U.S. Naval War College and today is the Executive Director of the Infrastructure Council and Director of Federal Affairs for the Illinois Chamber of Commerce.
Royal Navy destroyer HMS Dauntless (D33) and Spanish navy air defense frigate Almirante Juan de Borbon (F102) operating together.
Following Kyle Mizokami’s ownshot at war simulation, I apply the exercise to European waters by focusing on a potential clash over Gibraltar.
Much has been written about the so-called frozen conflicts of Eastern Europe but few pay attention to the crystallized conflicts of Western Europe. There are border disputes between Portugal and Spain, Spain and Morocco, France and Italy, Ireland and the UK, Netherlands and Germany, Serbia and many of the post-Yugoslav republics, etc. Perhaps the one that most often elicits media attention is Gibraltar – with rival claims by the UK and Spain unresolved to this day.
Periodically clashes occur between British and Spanish forces in the territorial waters (with 28 Spanish ‘incursions’ in Jan alone) – and more rarely in the land border crossing – of ‘the rock’. This article addresses from a military perspective the potential for conflict as well as the likely outcome of one.
Imminent War?
Is there a threat of imminent war? In short the answer is a resounding ‘no’. Using the Falklands conflict as analogy one can conclude that Gibraltar is not as economically important as the Falklands – with its fishing banks, a large EEZ and potential oil and gas reserves – and Spain is not as politically populist as Argentina – whose politicians are ever-tempted to use the Falklands as a ‘rally to the flag’ instrument in times of economic downturn. Nor is Gibraltar that far from Great-Britain and hence as strategically vulnerable. Then there are the catastrophic diplomatic and political consequences of a conflict between two EU and NATO member-states, and the underlining fact that Madrid is much more militarily on par with London than Buenos Aires could ever hope to be in the foreseeable future – the UK spends around $60 billion ($17 billiongoes to the Royal Navy) to Spain’s $14 billion ($2 billion goes to the Armada) in their respective militaries, but both spend far more than Argentina’s meager $3 billion in overall military expenditure.
Descubierta-class frigate Elena (P-76)
Strategically the case against belligerence grows even stronger if one considers the relative advantage Spain would enjoy fighting a war in its own turf. The UK would be forced to fight this war – if one assumes the UK would want to fight in the Mediterranean – 2000 km away from its shores (if, of course, one does not include Gibraltar itself). This means the Royal Air Force would be of little or no use, especially considering that neither air force enjoys advantages in aerial warfare – both Spain and Britain deploy the Eurofighter Typhoon as air superiority fighter – and that Britain no longer flies strategic bombers, which might have helped target Spanish installations with cruise missiles. That said, Britain would still have a distinctadvantage in numberswith its 5 destroyers, 13 frigates, 11 submarines, and 2 amphibious assault ships. In operational terms, this means London could continuously deploy a task-force comprising 6 surface combatants, 3 submarines and probably 1 assault ship.Madrid operates5 destroyers, 6 frigates, 3 submarines and 3 assault ships but without the hindrance of force projection, it could probably operate half of them continuously. This means in turn that together with the aid of the Spanish Air Force and with the Armada’s 10+ coastal patrol vessels, it could very possibly keep the Royal Navy away from its continental shores. An important factor would be the gap that the Portuguese coast represents in separating Spain’s Atlantic fleet from its Mediterranean ones: no fighting would be tolerated in Portuguese territorial waters and EEZ which means that while Spain could theoretically move its ships through Portuguese waters, the British would also be able to shadow them, and this would imply a great risk. More dubious would be its defense of the Canary Islands which would be vulnerable to British submarine warfare and thus tactical isolation. The two nations’ maritime concerns throughout the world, from fishing fleets to oil tankers, would be equally vulnerable to interference from occasional minor naval sorties from either fleet – conceivably the British could capture Spanish trawlers in the Atlantic and the Spaniards could intercept British oil tankers out of the Middle East. Spain would be able to prevent the British navy from crossing the strait of Gibraltar and could then deploy the occasional warship to the Red and Arabian seas while Britain could do the same but with much longer lines of supply. The Royal Navy could also force Madrid’s Atlantic fleet into coastal defense, and pick off Spanish civilian vessels one at a time in the Atlantic Rim.
The result of a conventional conflict would thus be a draw, with no side able to win without spilling too much blood and treasury to prove the issue. More likely than all-out war might be a single clash: one bad enough to bring both parties to a halt and later on to the negotiation table.
Single Engagement
Most clashes in the area of Gibraltar occur between Royal Gibraltar Police and the Royal Navy’s Gibraltar Squadron small craft on one side, and on the other small craft of Spain’s Guardia Civil – a paramilitary force which is also used as the Spanish Customs Surveillance Service – and most often, Spanish fishing vessels. None of these is heavily armed and none could go beyond exchanging gunfire.
Among the reported incidents involving the Spanish Armada itself, the biggest vessels to date were the 27 crewedAnaga-class ship Tagomagoand the 100+ crewedDescubierta-class corvette Vencedora. The Royal Navy in turn deploys periodically to Gibraltar, with warships transiting through the Mediterranean – generally frigates such as the 180+ crewed Duke-class HMS Argyll – in an attempt to deter the Spaniards from further incursions in what London calls “Gibraltar territorial waters”.
If a major exchange were to happen – be it carefully planned or as a result of hotheads – these would likely be the type of vessels involved. Who then would get the upper hand?
Combat Tactics
HMS Argyll (F231)
For the purpose of this scenario we’ll give only a cursory look at the Tagomago aside and go instead with the corvette Vencedora since the former would have no means of counter-attack due to its lack of heavy armament. A Harpoon-missile attack from the Argyll on Tagomago would actually be overkill since one missile alone suffices to disable a frigate and to use it against a patrol boat would likely disintegrate the craft’s structure. On the other hand, if the Argyll’s crew couldn’t obtain radar lock (the Harpoon needs a minimum firing range of 3km) or decided to switch to the frigate’s 114mm Mark 8 gun, the result would still be disproportionately bad for the Tagomago, which would sustain the hits of heavier shells fired from a longer range and guided by an automatic targeting system; the Spanish ship would not be able to respond in kind with either of its 76 mm Mk22 or Oerlikon Mod. 5 TG 20 mm cannons and it would be facing a much bigger target.
The Vencedora would be a different proposition altogether as theDescubierta classcan be deadly to a frigate in close proximity. The good news for the British is that if Argyll fired first, the old corvette would likely not survive the impact, not least because it lacks a CIWS system. On the other hand, what chance would the Vencedora have if it detected Argyll’s radar lock and preempted the missile attack with one of its own? At a great distance Argyll’s air-defense Sea Wolf missiles and two 30mm DS30M Mark 2 Automated Small Caliber Guns should be able to intercept perhaps two incoming missiles, and lets optimistically discount another two lost to the British frigate’s electronic counter-measures. However if the Spanish corvette fired a complete volley of its eight Harpoons the Argyll would surely not live to fight another day. Yet a third possibility would be for Argyll’s helicopter to fire first on the Vencedora. EveryDuke-classvessel carries a helicopter, one usually intended for anti-submarine warfare, and HMS Argyll carries a Westland Lynx which can also be equipped with anti-ship missiles. If the British wanted to sink the corvette, it might be preferable to risk a helicopter rather than a frigate. If the British intended only to intimidate, the helicopter could also be a good option since it would send a message without exposing the lives of 180+ British sailors to a Spanish overreaction, even if the helicopter itself would become an easy target for the corvette’s Sea Sparrow air defense system.
A second possible type of engagement is the less dire possibility of the two ships exchanging cannon fire. This would have the potential of avoiding de facto war by allowing both ships to attempt intimidation, save face, and avoid the complete destruction of ships and the death of hundreds. Such an exchange would pit the Argyll’s 114 mm Mark 8 against the Vencedora’s Otobreda 76 mm. The two guns have similar range and both fire High-Explosive shells; the difference is in the number of projectiles fired per minute which is higherin the 76mm and the size of the projectile which is biggerin the 114mm. Another essential factor would be the top speed of each vessel which would give a competitive edge in maneuvering to the fastest ship, in this case the British frigate. Because the British frigate would pack more of a punch and would be able to position itself better, the outcome of this encounter also leaves the British on top.
In addition, given the Spaniards task is essentially to provoke with their presence so as todeny acceptance of Britain’s local sovereignty fait accompli – it stands to reason that the British vessel would be the first one to fire. The tactical advantage of initiative together with the British frigate’s superior weaponry would most likely punish the Spaniards for their trespass, even if at close distance the Spaniards would enjoy some equalizing edge.
Of course as previously mentioned the victory would be tactical rather than strategic. Trading blows would be a media sensation and the electorates would almost certainly push for a real push for a permanent political settlement.
Miguel Silva is a Portuguese international relations analyst and regularly writes for the publications Eurasia Review, Small Wars Journal and the Atlantic Sentinel
What maritime dispute is most likely to lead to armed conflict in the next 5/10/20 years?
This is the seventh in our series of posts from our Maritime Futures Project. For more information on the contributors, click here. Note: The opinions and views expressed in these posts are those of the authors alone and are presented in their personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of their parent institution U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, any other agency, or any other foreign government.
LT Scott Cheney-Peters, USNR:
I’m going to confine my thoughts here to the most likely to spill over into conflict and save the rest for Question 9. I expect that I will of course get most of this wrong. There’s a reason I’m not a betting man.
0-5 Years: As we’ve been arguing on this site since last year, the numerous maritime disputes in which China is involved, China’s seeming unwillingness to seek a diplomatic resolution to these disputes, and China’s unilateral moves to change the situation on the ground (sea) means that there is an alarming risk of miscalculation and escalation in any of a number of conflicts (the Senkakus/Diaoyus; the Spratleys, the Paracels, etc). This is not to lay the blame solely in China’s lap, however. The recent (re-)election of Shinzo Abe in Japan at the head of a nationalist LDP government will perhaps be just as unwilling to make concessions in the Senkakus dispute, for example. And as we saw with the protest voyage to the Senkakus of the Kai Fung No. 2, non-state actors can just as easily force a government’s hand. All of this is despite the incredibly complex and large economic ties which bind all of the participants. Further, there is the possibility in any of these conflicts that a “wag-the-dog” component might come into play as the Chinese, Japanese, or another government seeks to distract from political or economic domestic problems through foreign adventurism.
5-10 Years: The collapse of North Korea is something of a continuously looming catastrophe. Any prediction attempting to nail down a date has, of course, thus far been proved wrong. But the likelihood that it will happen at some point and the magnitude of follow-on effects requires robust contingency planning.
The reason I bring it up is that many of these potential follow-on effects dangers involve the possibility of maritime conflict – from a starved North Korea launching a land and sea invasion across the Demilitarized Zone and Northern Limit Line, or a combustible mix of Chinese and South Korean troops flooding into a post-regime North Korea, “disagreeing” over the terms of administration and reconstruction.
In a Naval War College class last year we presented a scenario in which the collapse of the North precipitated a potential humanitarian disaster, prompting a Chinese move across the border to stem the flow and the grave danger of miscalculation leading to conflict between some combination of American, South Korean, Chinese, and ex-regime ground and/or naval forces. We argued contingency planning (and regular multinational Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response exercises) for such a possibility needed to begin now between the U.S., South Korea, and China. More on this will follow in my oft-delayed post “Thinking About Prevention, Part III.”
Runner-up: Iran – because, well, the IRGCN sometimes seems like it requires individual units to bring foreign vessels to the point of batteries release as part of a bizarre initiation process.
10-20 Years: The long-range forces likeliest to lead to maritime conflict in this timeframe and beyond may be urbanization, bringing more people to the cities, and climate change, bringing the seas closer to the cities. These won’t necessarily lead to a specific conflict, but could create a greater possibility of some new forms (in a tactical sense) of maritime insurgencies or require new/improved abilities to fight in maritime urban environments.
Simon Williams, U.K.: The disputes raging between China and its South East Asian neighbours over islands and influence in the energy reserve rich South China Sea, I believe, has the greatest potential to escalate into armed conflict with many regional powers flexing their military muscles. The standoff also has the potential to draw in other global powers, with America and India waiting in the wings to defend their interests should they deem it necessary. Moreover, options for a diplomatic solution are slowly contracting; last year ASEAN nations failed to agree on a ‘code on conduct’ at the annual summit meeting. Tensions also have the inherent risk of drawing in other powers due to the globally vital trading routes passing through the region. America has already announced an increased focus on the wider Pacific region, a strategic shift which has caused some chagrin in Beijing, which contends the Americans are interfering and in effect staging an attack on China.
The increasing size of the Indian Navy and the ambitions of China to build a credible fleet, demonstrated by the recent launch of their first aircraft carrier, are likely to lead to a further increase in tensions. History demonstrates that two nation’s with large navies and divergent regional interests rarely get along.
LT Drew Hamblen, USN: The Senkaku Islands, the Spratlys, or Taiwan itself.
Marc Handelman, U.S.: Unchecked African-based oceanic piracy. Polar (Northern) national territorial & natural resource exploitation.
Felix Seidler, seidlers-sicherheitspolitik.net, Germany:
Spreading the love.
Definitely the South China Sea, not the Persian Gulf. The Iranian naval threat is over-hyped. The U.S. Navy would sink most of Iran’s vessels within a few hours. However, in the South China Sea, the interests of the U.S., China, and India clash. With rising 1) population numbers, 2) regional economies, 3) nationalism/nation self-confidence, 4) resource demand, and 5) Armed Forces capabilities, armed conflict between two or more states is more likely in the South China Sea than anywhere else. These five points create a dangerous cocktail, because any conflict, from whatever cause, could quickly escalate.
Dr. Robert Farley, Professor, University of Kentucky: I would not be at all surprised to see conflict between China and one or more ASEAN states over island control and access in the South China Sea. The game is extremely complicated, ripe for miscalculation, and prone to a variety of principal-agent problems. States that don’t want to be in an armed dispute could easily find themselves embroiled if they miscalculate the intentions of others.
Bryan McGrath, Director, Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis: Cliché, but one of the ongoing South China Sea scenarios seems most likely.
YN2(SW) Michael George, USN: Within the next 2 decades, the only legitimate threat from a maritime perspective I can foresee is China. From various disputes with Japan to burgeoning naval capabilities, such as its new aircraft carriers, China seems to be a force to be reckoned with.
LCDR Mark Munson, USN: I don’t see the various disputes that China has with neighbors in the East and South China Seas as being the seeds for future armed conflict. One possibility that could snowball into something worse would be the various Persian Gulf states reacting in response to further efforts by Iran to assert its control over the Straits of Hormuz. My most likely scenario, however, would be a fight between North and South Korea over encroachments across the Northern Limit Line.
Sebastian Bruns, Fellow, Institute for Security, University of Kiel, Germany: Until 2018: South China Sea; Strait of Hormuz/Persian Gulf. Until 2023: China’s rise (in general); Northwest & Northeast Passage; South America undersea resources; and/or any of the above. Until 2033: China’s rise (in general); and/or any of the above.
CDR Chuck Hill, USCG (Ret.):
“Limit Line” is more of a suggestion than a reality.
China and Iran are the most obvious candidates. Today’s Navy seems geared to those threats. Looking elsewhere, we are likely to see some asymmetric conflicts where insurgents attempt to exploit the seas.
China will continue to push its claims in the South and East China Seas by unconventional means, or perhaps we may wake up some morning and find that every tiny islet that remains above water at high tide has been occupied. They are building enough non-navy government vessels to do that. They may also sponsor surrogates to destabilize the Philippines, Indonesia, and other Asian Nations that don’t willingly accept Chinese leadership.
We may also see conflicts: – in Latin America, e.g. Venezuela vs. Colombia; – between the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea over oil and gas drilling rights; – over water resources on the great rivers of Asia.
There are always wars in Africa. They may become more general. Wherever there is both oil and weak governments, there may be conflict – Nigeria and Sudan come to mind. The entire Maghreb is at risk with Libya unstable, an ongoing arms race between Morocco and Algeria, and a growing Al-Qaeda franchise.
Bret Perry, Student, Georgetown University 5 Years: Nigerian Piracy. Although not necessarily a maritime dispute, this is a serious maritime security issue that could get ugly. Piracy is on the rise again in Nigeria but unlike previous periods of piracy in the country the current episode appears less political and more criminal making it more threatening and difficult to combat. Although Nigeria does not see as much commercial shipping traffic as Somalia, it still is a significant oil exporter via sea. This, combined with the increase in offshore oil facilities in the area, make piracy a serious threat to the area.
Nothing to see here!
10 Years: Persian Gulf Conflict. There is so much military activity among multiple countries in this region that conflict is likely. Although the US Navy and IRGCN have both displayed discipline thus far, if either side makes a mistake, or is pushed by another party, then the Gulf could experience some maritime conflict.
20 Years: The South China Sea. Tensions in this region between the different parties involved will continue to fluctuate, but it will be some time until China possesses the confidence to decisively act militarily.
LT Alan Tweedie, USNR: Both Iran and North Korea are unpredictable enough to start an armed conflict which would spill into the sea. The two also have enough land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and ballistic missiles to put AEGIS/BMD to work for its intended purpose. India and Pakistan could also heat up their cold war, although I highly doubt the U.S. would get involved militarily in such a dispute.
LT Chris Peters, USN: 5 Years: Iranian maritime claims in conjunction with their nuclear development. 10 Years: North Korea vs South Korea OR China vs Japan re: disputed islands. 20 Years: Access to Arctic waterways and seabed resources.
CDR Chris Rawley, USNR: I’ll answer this question in the broader context of defense strategy. The U.S. DoD is making a deliberate pivot to East Asia, but changing global demographics don’t necessarily support such a shift. At the Jamestown Foundation’s recent Terrorism Conference, insurgency-expertDavid Kilcullenspoke to four global trends:
1) Population growth – By 2050, there will be over 9 billion people on earth. Much of this rapid growth will continue in less-developed regions of the world, with the “youth bulge” more prominent in the Middle East and Africa. Meanwhile the populations of industrialized countries, including China, will remain stagnant, or even shrink. 2) Urbanization – The trend of people moving to cities will continue, especially in Africa and South Asia. Urbanization brings with it higher rates of crime, pollution, and sprawling slums. The problems associated with these issues will often spill outside of a city’s borders, sometimes even becoming transnational. 3) Littoralization – Mega-cities (those with more than 10 million people) appear mostly in coastal regions. Poverty-stricken mega-cities in littoral areas such as Mumbai, Karachi, Dhaka, and Lagos are growing the fastest. 4) Connectedness – People and financial sectors are increasingly linked together globally with networks, cell phones, and satellites communications. These technologies provide constant global reach to anyone, anywhere.
Battlegrounds of the future?
The demographic trends are global, but the first three are most pronounced in coastal Africa and the Indian Ocean rim countries. Kilcullen primarily discussed these trends in the context of al Qaeda’s future. As an example, he believes (as do I) we will see more Mumbai-style attacks, with the terrorists infiltrating from the sea and command-and-controlling their operations in real time with smart phones and social media. But these four trends have greater implications for national security than the terror threat alone. Importantly, they indicate that irregular, people-centric threats will continue to create a disproportionate share of crises most likely to precipitate military intervention. It makes sense to array higher-end forces in areas where higher-end, state-centric threats are possible. But before we realign too much force structure to counter a blue-water fight in East Asia, we should consider that the types of missions these ships have been doing in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf the past two decades is what they will likely continue to do for the next two decades.
Moreover, the trends revalidate the importance of sea power to our nation’s security and support disproportionate defense spending on the Navy/Marine Corps team. From an acquisition stand-point, the Navy will need more platforms and weapons optimized to operate in the littorals and a continued focus on expeditionary logistics. Doctrinally, the Marine Corps will need to develop and practice new concepts for fighting in urban terrain.
LCDR Joe Baggett, USN: Melting of the Polar Ice caps – Creating a race for claim and sovereignty over resources. Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of competition and conflict for access and natural resources.
Increased competition for resources, coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural resources—potentially resulting in conflict.
LTJG Matt Hipple, USN: In the specific realm of dispute over the maritime domain, as opposed to just armed conflict in the maritime domain (in which case, Iran), the Senkakus are the most likely candidate. It wouldn’t be a full-blown war, but certainly there is a likelihood of shots being fired in misguided anger or accident with the increased level of friction contact between multiple opposing navies and fanatical civilians.
LT Jake Bebber, USN: If history teaches us anything, it is that the next major conflict will occur in an area we will not expect and involve parties and issues that will surprise us (how many of us could point out Afghanistan on a map on September 10, 2001?). We will likely not be prepared. That being said, if I had to bet money, I would suggest that the maritime dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands is the one most likely to lead to a maritime conflict, drawing in a reluctant United States.
This was inspired by a question raised by Dr. Robert Farleyhereandhere.
Within a navy the terms ‘frigate’ and ‘destroyer’ may have specific meanings, but there is no international standard. Governments often choose to call a ship a cruiser, destroyer, frigate, or corvette for political reasons, so the terms have lost much of their meaning. With the Germans building 7,200-ton F125-class ‘frigates’ and the Iranians calling their 1,500-ton Jamaran-class ‘destroyers,’ the naval typology system has lost its ability to inform.
Cruisers have all but disappeared. The term has certainly lost its relevance as a step between destroyer and battleship. In the few cases they do exist, with the sole exception of the Russian “Peter the Great,” they are functionally virtually indistinguishable from ships called destroyers, and even from some ships called frigates.
All these classes actually form a continuum of capabilities, influenced most strongly by their displacement. All fight primarily with gun, torpedo, or missile. All these ships are cruisers in the classic sense of a ship capable of sustained independent operations. They are all cruisers in the way Julian Corbett used the term, in that they are the ships that exercise sea control by enforcing blockades and protecting friendly commerce while denying it to the enemy. Additionally these are the ships that most commonly do boardings and fight piracy.
When the term cruiser first appeared it was a generic term that referred to a range of ship types with their own names. Frigates, sloops, and brigs might all have been referred to as cruisers. I’d like to propose a a return to something closer to the original meaning, to use cruiser as a generic term for surface warships that are not amphibs or aircraft carriers. I will suggest a further breakdown based on displacement with this example to show how this might be more informative:
Micro-Cruisers 1,000-<2,000 tons Mini-Cruisers 2,000-<4,000 tons Light Cruisers 4,000-<8,000 tons Heavy Cruisers 8,000-<16,000 tons Battle Cruisers 16,000 tons or more
…vs Destroyer.
For illustrative purposes, below is a comparison of five fleets. I have included ships of the U.S. and Russian Coast Guard, because they are also capable of doing some cruiser-type work, but added a notation. The numbers may be suspect. My sources may not be up to date, but I believe the comparison is generally valid.
US Russia China UK France Battle Cruisers — 1 — — — Heavy Cruisers 84 4 — — — Light Cruisers 3 (CG) 13 42 17 13 Mini-Cruisers 38 (10 CG) 19 (12 CG) 14 — 11 Micro-Cruiser 27 (CG) 34 (12 CG) 17 4 9 —- —- —- —- —- TOTAL 152 (40 CG) 71 (24 CG) 732133
There is no reason this typology could not be used in parallel with existing national or alliance systems that retain the destroyer, frigate, and corvette terms. The numbers above are based on the following:
US Battle Cruisers — Heavy Cruisers 84 – 22 CG – 62 Burke Light Cruisers 3 – 3 Bertholf (CG) Mini-Cruisers 38 – 28 FFG/LCS – 9 Hamilton (CG) – 1 Alex Haley (CG) Micro-Cruisers 27 – 13 Bear (CG) – 14 Reliance (CG) TOTAL 152
China Battle Cruisers — Heavy Cruisers — Light Cruisers 42 – 2 Type 052 Luhu – 4 Soveremenny – 3 Type 51 B/C – 9 Type 052 B/C/D – 17 Type 054 – 9 type 051 Luda Mini-Cruisers 14 – 14 Jianghu Micro-Cruisers 17 – 17 Jianghu TOTAL 73
UK Battle Cruisers __ Heavy Cruisers __ Light Cruisers 17 – 17 Type 45 and Type 23 Mini-Cruisers __ Micro-Cruisers 4 – 4 River-class __ TOTAL 21
France Battle Cruisers — Heavy Cruisers — Light Cruisers 13 – 2 Horizon – 2 Cassard – 1 Tourville – 1 Aquitaine – 7 Georges Leygues Mini-Cruisers 11 – 5 La Fayette – 6 Floreal Micro-Cruisers 9 – 9 D’Estienne d’Orves TOTAL 33
Chuck Hill is a retired Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard. He writes at Chuck Hill’s CG Blog, with the objective of looking, over the longer term, at the budgets, policies, tactics, roles, missions, and their physical expression – the platforms – that allow the Coast Guard to do its job.
