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Current Operations, Middle East

Multinational Corporations in the Oil Industry

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NAFAC Week

By Monica Sullivan 

Diplomacy is not only a function of the military and the federal government, but it is very much an integral facet of multinational corporations. The diplomatic agenda pushed by American multinational organizations is one focused on building trust between nations as a way by which to further national security aims. Additionally, the spread of American businesses overseas allows for the introduction of business ventures into areas otherwise untouched by basic capitalist ideas. Since American multinational corporations are predominantly apolitical forces, their primary purpose is not to force a political agenda, as seen in other diplomatic outlets. However, multinational corporations still have the abilities to introduce other countries to the basic tenets of American democracy through the business interactions that take place. Due to the extent of interactions between American multinational business and other countries, these businesses are one of the most important outlets when it comes to shaping the perception of America abroad. For the scope of this paper, the interactions of American multinational oil companies will be examined. As multinational corporations are involved in the development of foreign infrastructure, their relationships abroad should be considered as a viable alternative for diplomatic action when military and state actors fail.

Within the oil industry, the presence of American multinational corporations have allowed the growth of otherwise improbable relationships and the promotion of U.S. values abroad. The presence of U.S. oil companies in the Middle East have allowed a line of communication to bridge the gap between the starkly different Western and Islamic worlds. American involvement in the Middle Eastern oil prospects began in post-World War I period as American business was eventually permitted under the British mandate. It was evident that U.S. military and economic power would be beneficial as the Middle East was unstable and its future looked to be volatile.1 Since the U.S. became involved in the oil scene in the 1920s, it has only used this connection to strengthen bonds between itself and Saudi Arabia. Despite the inherent benefits attributed to the multinational nature of oil companies, there are some considerable downfalls that must be taken into account.

With the power of oil companies as influential multinational corporation comes the risk associated with such a unique diplomatic tool. Foremost, oil is a constantly dwindling natural resource that doubles as a crucial economic commodity. Since the United States is not a primary source of oil production, it must rely on other foreign oil producers. Any fluctuation in foreign industry can plunge the world into recession. The delicacy of oil dependence in the world is not as apparent as it was during the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973. The sanctions forced upon the U.S. by OPEC as retribution for allying with Israel crippled America’s supply of oil. In turn, this also drove up the price of oil and gasoline to quadruple the price prior to the sanction.2 This crisis demonstrated the power Saudi Arabia derived from its oil production and the United States’ lack of oil control. Although the United States reduced its dependency on Arab oil after this incident, it became apparent the importance of American corporations maintaining viable and open relationships with foreign countries. The economic and military relevance of oil was underscored once more in 2002, as Saddam Hussein used his control of oil processing as leverage during military campaigns. His threats to destroy oil platforms were met with the response of special warfare to ensure that his rogue actions would not cause an economic recession in the midst of the Iraqi conflict.3

Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, American multinational oil corporations were involved in humanitarian aid efforts to try to quell the mistreatment of the civilian population. However, this initiative, known as the Oil for Food program, devolved into an international scandal in which American corporations like Chevron received illegal kickbacks which undermined the goal of transmitting food to a population crippled by United Nations’ sanctions.4 The fact that Chevron was manipulating this program to its benefit demonstrates the possible risks associated with using multinational corporations as means for diplomacy.5 Multinational corporations are subject to the whims of their executives, thereby allowing for their private ethical perspectives to drive the corporation’s representation of American ideals in foreign states. Despite the bad reputations evoked by some multinational corporations, the overall purpose of these businesses is grounded in their desire to spread American interests abroad.

One of the most influential examples of the positive power of multinational corporations is direct advancement of African civilizations in Chad by ExxonMobil. American interests in Africa peaked following World War I, but were overshadowed in the years since, until 9/11. Africa was not of strategic interest to the U.S. until it was determined that it was a breeding ground for radicalized terrorists. Prior to the unfolding of 9/11, ExxonMobil explored Chad as an option for oil extraction. These plans for extraction detailed that how the country was to develop its infrastructure, education, and healthcare through the use of the money received from taxes and royalties from the oil produced.6 By investing in Chad, Exxon-Mobil was able to provide about $4.2 billion dollars of aid, whereas the United States was only providing about $3 million dollars of aid to the area.7 The United States’ positive presence in the area allowed for a smooth transition of American military and state presence in the years following 9/11, as the CIA established stations in the area to monitor and track terrorist cells thought to have been left over from Bin Laden’s time in Sudan during the 1990s. Whereas the military and state was primarily focused on missions regarding terrorist activity, Exxon was involved in turning their business aims into an opportunity for eliminating poverty in the region. The bonds forged between Exxon and the local population prior to the introduction of American operatives in the region made this transition much easier than if Chadians had no prior interactions with American people. This may be just one case study of the impact of the diplomatic power of an American multinational corporation, but it exhibits the mindset of the American business owners to further American ideals abroad. 

Multinational oil corporations do not only have to form relationships with other states, but they have to coordinate with each other. Looking to the future, American oil corporations will be faced with the challenge of competing with Saudi Aramco, the largest multinational corporation in the world. As this one entity has more power than any other American based company, it has the power to bend the U.S. to their will. The question that remains is: How will the American values modeled by multinational corporations abroad continue future diplomatic relations?

Monica Sullivan is a 3/C Midshipman at the United States Naval Academy. She majors in Political Science with a minor in Spanish language. In her free time, Monica enoys singing with the Protestant Chapel Choir.

Works Cited

Coll, Steve. Private empire: ExxonMobil and american power. London: Penguin, 2013.

“Q&A: Oil-for-food scandal.” BBC News. September 7, 2005. Accessed March 31, 2017. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4232629.stm.

“Chevron to Pay $30 Million to Settle Charges For Improper Payments to Iraq Under U.N. Oil For Food Program.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. November 14, 2007. Accessed March 30, 2017. https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-230.htm.

Myre, Greg. “The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo: The Old Rules No Longer Apply.” NPR. October 16, Accessed March 30, 2017. http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/10/15/234771573/the-1973-arab-oil-embargo-thE-old-rules-no-longer-apply.

Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power. London: Simon & Schuster, 2012.

References

1. Daniel Yergin. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power. 196

2. “The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo: The Old Rules No Longer Apply.”

3. Steve Coll. Private Empire, 154-176.

4. “Chevron to Pay $30 Million to Settle Charges For Improper Payments to Iraq Under U.N. Oil For Food Program.”

5. “Q&A: Oil-for-food scandal.”

6. Steve Coll. Private Empire, 154-176.

7. Steve Coll. Private Empire, 154-176.

Featured Image: Ed Kashi/Corbis

Middle East

Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Proxy War in Yemen

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NAFAC Week

By Rose Cote

Iran and Saudi Arabia’s struggle for power in the Middle East and North Africa has led to many states becoming involved in their proxy wars. Some states have been left open to their intervention due to a power vacuum, and Yemen is no exception. Since the Houthi rebels’ overthrow of the Saudi allied leader Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, both states have become involved (Malsin 2016). Since their revolution in 2011, the country has suffered from famine as well as airstrikes that have led to high casualty counts, particularly of civilians.

The Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict is often characterized as a religious divide between Shia and Sunni sects of Islam. However, when talking about the conflict in Yemen, it is most important to examine its location and strategic value to each of these states. Both states seek to gain ideological dominance and regional hegemony. This is due to many factors including their oil wealth, relative stability in the region as well as both of their religious sects and being seen as the leader of these sects. While religion is a factor for the conflict, particularly for Iran supporting the Shia Houthi rebels, this conflict is primarily centralized around Yemen’s strategic value for both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Yemen is of particular strategic value for both states. For Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s proximity makes it concerned about border security. The Saudi-Yemen border is susceptible to infiltration from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a large terrorist group (Reardon 2015). This is one of the main reasons for their concern over the stability of the Yemeni government. This issue has led to their contribution toward propping up the government using ground support and airstrikes (Reardon 2015). But Yemen also sits along vital shipping lanes for Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea (“The Sunni…” 2016). Given that the Saudi economy relies heavily on oil and the safety of these routes, its interests rely heavily on the security of trade and its borders.

Additionally, they see Yemen as an easy target for Iran to take hold of in the Gulf region (Reardon 2015). Saudi Arabia currently holds hegemonic power in the Gulf region and it is concerned about the loss of this soft power given its intervention in states like Yemen and Bahrain. However, Yemen can be considered more easily controlled given its extreme instability. Iran has an easy path into the role of Yemen through common faith with the Houthi rebels. Iran seeks to find a solid foothold in the Gulf and Yemen is a good candidate because of the rebels’ strength. By propping up the rebels and joining with them based on their common sect of Islam they could potentially hold ground close to Saudi Arabia and use it as a bargaining chip in the future.

Religion certainly does still play a role in this conflict and is fuel for the fire but it is not the only source of tension. The Houthis are a Zaydi Shia militia and while this is not Iran’s brand of Shia Islam, they have chosen to align themselves with this group (“The Sunni…” 2016). Although this link is less strong than the Saudi’s pledge to the Yemeni government, both states have chosen opposing sides. Iran may be less involved in the conflict, financially and militarily, but more importantly, Saudi Arabia believes that Iran is backing the rebels to secure Shia hegemony and so prompts much of their involvement (“The Sunni…” 2016). While both countries are linked to the conflict by religion, they both have more stakes in the country than just these ties. Without other strategic value in Yemen, it is likely that these states would not be involved or less involved. Yemen’s location and strategic significance has likely prompted most of the conflict.

Due to Iran’s tenuous connection to the rebels, many have argued that their involvement is minimal and therefore Yemen’s conflict cannot be classified as a proxy war. Even though their connection is not heavily supported financially there is clear ideological support and since Iran’s involvement there has been more support for Iran in the region, threatening Saudi control and prompting their further involvement (“The Sunni…” 2016). Additionally, many have said that Yemen has primarily been a revolution of people given its beginning in 2011 during the Arab spring. Despite this, it was certainly a revolution against Saudi Arabia because of its support of the previous president and Saudi Arabia is keen on maintaining control over this strategic state. Iran saw this revolution as an opportunity to gain another ally in the Gulf and used their connection to the Shia rebels to gain access.

To the outside viewer religion may seem like the primary motivation for both states involvements. In the landscape next to Iran and Saudi Arabia’s various other conflicts, Yemen could be seen as another proxy war between the two rivals. However, Yemen is unique given its strategic location for trade and its vulnerable border shared with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s involvement clearly lies in its interest in keeping the Yemeni allied government in power for these reasons while Iran saw the weak state as an opportunity to gain advantage over Saudi Arabia in yet another conflict and used its Shia ties to the revolutionaries to gain access. Therefore, while the religious divide has certainly fueled the desire of both states to be involved in the conflict, each has chosen to be a part of the conflict in Yemen because of its strategic geographic significance in the region.

Rose Cote attends Syracuse University, where she majors in International Relations and Economics. She did a semester abroad in Morocco to study Arabic, and will be joining the Peace Corps to work in Namibia after graduation.

Works Cited

Ighani, Helia. “Managing the Saudi-Iran Rivalry.” October 25, 2016. Council of Foreign Relations. Accessed March 31, 2017. file:///Users/rcote/Downloads/Workshop_Report_CPA_Saudi_Iran_Rivalry_OR.pdf

Malsin, Jared. “Yemen Is the Latest Victim of the Increase in Iran-Saudi Arabia Tension.” TIME. January 11, 2016. http://time.com/4174837/yemen-analysis/

Reardon, Martin. “Saudi Arabia, Iran and the ‘Great Game’ in Yemen.” Al Jazeera. March 26, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-iran-great-game-ye-201492984846324440.html

“The Sunni Shia Divide.” February 2014. Council of Foreign Relations. Accessed March 31, 2017. http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176#!/?cid=otr-marketing_url-sunni_shia_infoguide

Yeranian, Edward. “Yemen Proxy War Adds to Tensions Among US, Iran, Saudi Arabia.” February 6, 2017. VOA News. Accessed March 31, 2017. http://www.voanews.com/a/proxy-war-in-yemen-adds-to-tensions-among-us-iran-saudi-arabia/3707893.html

Featured Image: Shi’ite Muslim rebels hold up their weapons during a rally against air strikes in Sanaa Shi’ite Muslim rebels hold up their weapons during a rally against air strikes in Sanaa, Yemen, March 26, 2015. (Reuters/Khaled Abdullah)

Asia-Pacific

India’s Bid for Global Power in a Multipolar System During Development

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Note: Original title of essay: “Rising in the Storm: India’s Bid for Global Power in a Multi-Polar System During Development.”

NAFAC Week

By Corey Bolyard

India is the most populous democracy in the world with 1.2 billion people and potential for intense economic growth.1 India seeks to protect its regional interests and become more involved in global power politics while balancing the needs of its economy and people. India must engage in economic reform to stimulate development and support an increasingly assertive foreign policy. By engaging in economic reform, India will have the opportunity to develop and exploit its large population and economic opportunity to become a global power in an increasingly multi-polar system, thereby allowing for an ambitious foreign policy permitting India to protect its interests in South Asia and act as the preeminent power in the region.

Economic development is key to India’s global status. Without a strong economy, India cannot provide for its citizens, much less engage in global affairs and find its place in a multi-polar system. India has a GDP of 2.2 trillion USD, but 30 percent of the population lives in poverty, hindering India’s continued growth.2 India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, promised substantial economic reform and introduced the “Make in India,” program in 2014, but the democratic process is slow. “Make in India,” is a nationalistic program that would boost India’s growth from within and improve the manufacturing sector.3 Manufacturing would provide a low-education alternative to India’s waning agricultural industry, but current labor laws stunt this sector, leaving few options for this segment of the population.4 Internal manufacturing would advance domestic development, but requires foreign investment to propel economic growth to a competitive global rate. Part of Modi’s proposed reforms would allow increased foreign investment in sectors such as coal, construction, railways, and multi- and single-brand retail, which would allow India to boost development.5 Many promised reforms are either in progress or incomplete. A demonetization reform took high currency bills out of circulation in late 2016 to curb the black market economy.6 India is in the process of digitization, moving toward a cashless economy, which would help reform tax administration and enhance government revenue.7 Modi’s government has showed a willingness to engage in economic reform despite the difficult process, and must continue to push for economic development driven by external aid and internal growth to elevate India to global leadership in an increasingly competitive global political stage.

India’s vivid democracy plays a key role in its economic advance. India’s citizens are engaged in democracy, with a voter turnout of 66.4 percent in the 2014 parliamentary elections.8 Freedom House, a prominent NGO, denotes India as “Free,” with press and net freedoms as “partially free.”9 Transparency International ranked India 79 in the world in its 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a final score of 40 that tied India with Brazil, Belarus, and China.10 However, there are some concerns for democracy in India. The Human Rights Watch World Report 2017 identifies a lack of accountability for police violence, treatment of religious and ethnic minorities, and the government’s use of sedition and defamation laws to persecute citizens.11 There is growing economic disparity in the country and a history of corruption, perceived and real. India is experiencing major demographic change, and the government’s ability to exploit this positively will determine future capabilities. India is ending a demographic transition and is almost at replacement-level fertility, which can become a great opportunity for India’s pursuit of global status. India’s working class will continue to grow over the next half-century, as the adult population will comprise 68 percent of India’s population in 2035.12 The demographic dividend is an opportunity for India, but does not guarantee growth, as economic opportunities must be available for this large population.13 Several factors India’s government must resolve include educational deficits, high unemployment, and a policy environment conducive to promoting competitive economic development globally.14 Due to India’s complex democracy at the state and federal level, reform and change is slow to proceed. India’s leadership must find a sustainable way to manage its population and economic goals regardless of their form. Through careful management, India’s democracy can succeed in implementing its domestic and economic policies, which will make it possible for India to focus on its foreign policy concerns.

India sees itself as the preeminent power in South Asia, but is dependent on economic growth for global success. India’s foreign policy focuses on improving relationships among South Asian countries with a “neighborhood first” policy through increased trade and aid.15 Economic integration in the neighborhood is low, as interregional trade makes up only five percent of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’s (SAARC) economic activity.16 With higher integration there is less tension and increased trade, giving India more opportunities to enhance its global position. India and China both see South Asia as a sphere of influence, and India is investing in its neighbors as part of a counterbalancing strategy to China, increasing the Ministry of External Affairs 2017 budget by 200 million USD.17 India sees China’s ‘One Belt, One Road,’ initiative as a threat to its economic and political dominance in the region, particularly the creation of a Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).18 Tension between Pakistan and India has great potential for conflict. India is the status quo power of the two nations, since it controls most of the disputed territories, has a stronger military, and has greater diplomatic standing, but both nations possess nuclear weapons and high tensions lead to an elevated risk of conflict.19 India is expanding its military capabilities and is the largest defense importer in the world, buying 15 percent of total world exports of weapons in the past five years.20 India has always followed a strategy of non-alignment and openly eschews cooperative alliances, preferring cooperative or bilateral relations for security. India must balance China and Pakistan, as open conflict would be disastrous and Chinese investment can help the Indian economy grow. In the interest of protecting interests and finding a place in a multi-polar system, India must decide if non-alignment is a viable path going forward or if closer relations with nations such as the United States, Japan, and Australia are worth the risk. Reviving quadrilateral dialogue among these four nations may be the logical next step for India’s foreign policy. A “democratic quad” increases India’s soft and hard power capabilities, but could alienate other countries in the region.21 

India’s decisions on economic reform and foreign policy will determine if it remains a developing country or rises to a key place in global politics. The government must find a way to implement economic reform to benefit its demographic dividend. Attracting foreign investment, implementing economic reform, and providing opportunities for its growing population will give India the economic strength to engage in an assertive foreign policy that will help define India’s role as a global leader among competitive powers. India must engage in economic development to support an assertive foreign policy as India navigates changing global power balances to give its people a path forward.

Corey Bolyard attends University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, VA where she is majoring in Political Science with a focus in Asian Policy and Regional Security. She is currently working on a thesis concerning China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative.  Upon graduation, she hopes to work in national security analysis. Her round table paper “Rising in the Storm: India’s Bid for Global Power in a Multi-Polar System During Development“ argues that by engaging in economic reform, India will be able to emerge as a global power, thereby allowing for an ambitious foreign policy to defend and develop its interests in the South Asia Region.

Endnotes

1. “South Asia: India,” Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, Dec. 12, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.

2. “South Asia: India,” Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook.

3. About Us,” Make In India, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.makeinindia.com/about.

4. “The Difficulties of Retooling the Indian Economy,” Stratfor, 2016, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/difficulties-retooling-indian-economy.

5. “The Modi Government’s Reform Program: A Scorecard,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, accessed March 28, 2017, http://indiareforms.csis.org/.

6. Mukesh Butani, “State election results: Strong mandate for bold economic reforms,” Forbes India, March 18, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/state-election-results-strong-mandate-for-bold-economic-reforms/46329/1.

7. Wade Shepard, “A Cashless Future Is The Real Goal Of India’s Demonetization Move,” Forbes, December 14, 2016, accessed March 30, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/14/inside-indias-cashless-revolution/.

8. “India Voter Turnout,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/146/40.

9. “India,” Freedom House, accessed March 27, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/india.

10. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016,” Transparency International, January 25, 2017, accessed March 27, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2016. Of all the countries listed in TI’s Corruption Perception’s Index, India is listed in the upper half by rank. With a perfect score of 100, India’s score of 40 is lower than its rank.    

11. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2016: India,” Human Rights Watch, January 12, 2017, accessed March 27, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/india.

12. KS James, “India’s Demographic Change: Opportunities and Challenges,” Science 333, no. 6042 (July 29, 2011):578, accessed March 29, 2017, doi:10.1126/science.1207969.

13. KS James, “India’s Demographic Change: Opportunities and Challenges,” Science, 578.

14. Ibid., 578-579.

15. “A Defining Rivalry in South Asia,” Stratfor, February 24, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/defining-rivalry-south-asia.

16. “A Defining Rivalry in South Asia,” Stratfor.

17. Monish Gulati, “What India’s Finance Budget Means For Its Foreign Policy – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, March 03, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.eurasiareview.com/04032017-what-indias-finance-budget-means-for-its-foreign-policy-analysis/.

18. Ananth Krishnan, “India cannot stop Silk Road plan, warns Chinese media,” India Today, March 20, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-warns-india-cannot-stop-silk-road-plan/1/908010.html.

19. “In India, a Military Strategy Guided by Precision,” Stratfor, October 6, 2016, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india-military-strategy-guided-precision.

20. “How Losing India’s Business Could Ruin Russia’s Defense Industry,” Stratfor, January 27, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-losing-indias-business-could-ruin-russias-defense-industry.

21. Rohan Mukherjee, “A democratic quadrilateral in Asia?,” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, March 27, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.gatewayhouse.in/a-democratic-quadrilateral-in-asia/. “Democratic Quad” is a colloquial term for quadrilateral dialogue between the United States, Australia, Japan, and India, since all four nations are democracies and share similar security interests in Asia. 

Bibliography

“About Us.” Make In India. Accessed March 27, 2017. http://www.makeinindia.com/about.

“A Defining Rivalry in South Asia.” Stratfor. February 24, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017.  https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/defining-rivalry-south-asia.

Butani, Mukesh. “State election results: Strong mandate for bold economic reforms.” Forbes India. March 18, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/state-election-results-strong-mandate-for-bold-economic-reforms/46329/1.

“Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.” Transparency International. January 25, 2017. Accessed March 27, http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table.

“Ease of Doing Business in India.” Doing Business in India – World Bank Group. Accessed March 28, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/india.

Gulati, Monish. “What India’s Finance Budget Means For Its Foreign Policy – Analysis.” Eurasia Review. March 03, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://www.eurasiareview.com/04032017-what-indias-finance-budget-means-for-its-foreign-policy-analysis/.

“How Losing India’s Business Could Ruin Russia’s Defense Industry.” Stratfor. January 27, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-losing-indias-business-could-ruin-russias-defense-industry.

“Human Rights Watch World Report 2016: India.” Human Rights Watch. January 12, 2017. Accessed March 27, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/india.

“India.” Freedom House. Accessed March 27, 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/india.

“India Voter Turnout.” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Accessed March 27, 2017. http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/146/40.

“In India, a Military Strategy Guided by Precision.” Stratfor. October 6, 2016. Accessed March 28, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india-military-strategy-guided-precision.

James, KS. “India’s Demographic Change: Opportunities and Challenges.” Science 333, no. 6042 (July 29, 2011): 576-80. Accessed March 29, 2017. doi:10.1126/science.1207969.

Krishnan, Ananth. “India cannot stop Silk Road plan, warns Chinese media.” India Today. March 20, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-warns-india-cannot-stop-silk-road-plan/1/908010.html.

Mukherjee, Rohan. “A democratic quadrilateral in Asia?” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. March 27, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://www.gatewayhouse.in/a-democratic-quadrilateral-in-asia/.

Shepard, Wade. “A Cashless Future Is The Real Goal Of India’s Demonetization Move.” Forbes. December 14, 2016. Accessed March 30, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/14/inside-indias-cashless-revolution/.

“South Asia: India.” Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, Dec. 12, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.

“The Difficulties of Retooling the Indian Economy.” Stratfor. 2016. Accessed March 28, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/difficulties-retooling-indian-economy.

“The Modi Government’s Reform Program: A Scorecard.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://indiareforms.csis.org/.

Featured Image: School children arrive to watch the proceedings of Indian parliament in New Delhi December 7, 2012. (Reuters/Stringer)

Current Operations

Understanding Systems of International Order

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Note: Original title of essay: “Understanding Systems of International Order: Challenging Existing Evaluation Criteria”

NAFAC Week

By Kimberly Ross

Foundational literature exploring the respective merits and shortcomings of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar international orders largely evaluate these systems in terms of their durability and propensity for peace.1 This essay serves to challenge these criteria as the main bases for evaluation, arguing that consideration of global prosperity and human rights is key in assessing the advantages of each system. It is beyond the scope of this essay however, to evaluate the three systems’ abilities to generate prosperous and fair environments, as empirical support for these claims would be distorted for the sake of argument. Instead, this essay seeks to make a claim for the inclusion of prosperity and human rights criteria in understanding and appraising international balances of power.

Realist international relations (IR) theory assumes the global order is naturally anarchical, meaning power balances resulting in peace defy relational norms and indicate success.2,3 It is for this reason propensity for peace is so highly valued in analyses of these systems, as seen in the work of Wohlforth, Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and others.4 Sustained, ‘true’ peace ensures stability, leading to the second quality valued in power balance assessments: durability. Any power balance with longevity similarly defies patterns of relations between states. Thus, scholars maintain peace and durability are the most important qualities to consider in evaluating international systems.5

These two qualities are undoubtedly important, but should not be the sole basis for understanding which system is preferred. It is assumed stability is inherently peaceful; stability only exists when all major actors accept the status quo. Stability however, could also be derived from the violent oppression of minor powers into supporting roles. A number of scholars reflect upon the Cold War as a tension-filled but stable period of bipolarity, as both powers were the only match for each other’s capabilities.6 As Nuno P. Monteiro rightly points out, peace in this context is only evaluated in terms of direct nuclear war between the superpowers.7 Narratives of Cold War peace overlook the numerous proxy wars waged on behalf of each power’s ideology, resulting in a singularly violent period within international politics.8 Smaller powers are often forced into their roles in conflicts due to powerful states’ oppressive assertions of influence.

Smaller powers similarly fall prey to natural resource exploitation under all three systems of power balance. Globalization has exacerbated this reality, creating unequal systems of production and consumption.9 International power balances give way to asymmetrical and oftentimes oppressive systems, a fact many regard as the nature of state relations. While minor powers may always be destined to suffer harsh realities, in advocating for either a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar system it is important to value that which most effectively minimizes the unsavory consequences of inequality. 

A successful world order is one which assures relative prosperity and human rights for all. In systems where a minority of powerful states benefit from the labor and exploitation of the majority of the population, power balances are not only unequal but extremely skewed. This arguably results in increased instability as minor powers vie to dismantle the status quo.10 Therefore, it is within powerful states’ best interests to move toward leveling the playing field to ensure the durability of their dominance. It is for this reason prosperity and human rights are two of the best markers by which to measure the success of an international power structure.11 These two conditions factor heavily into minimum living standards generally accepted by the international community and should be prioritized in the evaluation of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems.

The realist assumption that states are self-interested actors offers an immediate rebuttal to this argument. Major powers in all three systems are arguably strong to a point where they are unthreatened by the discontent of less capable actors.12 However, it should be noted that sustained resistance, even from much less capable powers, has the ability to drain the resources of major powers to a point of disrupting the status quo in their favor. Although states may be self-interested, they are not always rational. Given the appropriate pressures, it may be within states’ best interests to engage in power redistribution to ensure the longevity of their status.

Proponents of the peace-durability evaluation criteria would point out that prosperity and human rights are impossible to guarantee in the absence of peace. While this argument certainly holds merit, the anarchical nature of international relations systems means peace is an abnormality.13 Within the current system of unipolarity, the United States has been at war for over 25 percent of its total time as global hegemon.14 Moreover, only recently in history have questions of basic standards of living and human rights begun to be seriously considered.15 In advocating for any one international power balance system, peace should be a central goal but not at the expense of the protection of adequate living standards and human rights.

As previously stated, it is beyond the scope of this essay to empirically evaluate each system’s ability to generate prosperity or foster human rights, however, data-driven monitoring structures are needed for future evaluations. One method to examine the prosperity enjoyed under each system could be through comparative examination of GDP and global economic inequality statistics. Reliance upon these sources has shortcomings, especially since the bulk of contemporary globalization has occurred under United States hegemony. The use of tools such as the Legatum Prosperity Index may provide more useful for deriving meaningful findings.16 In measuring human rights, one can employ the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ set of indicators which assess topics ranging from the rights of disabled persons to ratification of treaties on a yearly basis.17

Adequate living standards and human rights are central to evaluating the attractiveness of international power-balancing structures. Use of statistics on these standards should be integrated into scholarly considerations of system merits.

Kimmie, who hails from Springfield, Virginia, represents Vassar College at NAFAC 2017. She is a senior who is majoring in International Studies and French. Kimmie is passionate about all things relating to international relations, but harbors a special interest for counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East and Maghreb. Kimmie also greatly admires Harriet Beecher Stowe, as not only does she embody some great ideals, but Kimmie is related to her as well. If Kimmie could travel anywhere, it would be New Zealand. Finally, Kimmie was inspired to write her paper not only because of the looming deadline, but because she finds the aspect of human rights integral to understanding the changing climate of great power dynamics around the globe.

Works Cited

Bate, Roger. “What is Prosperity and How Do We Measure It?” American Enterprise Institute Development Policy Outlook no. 3 (2009): 1-7. poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php.

Cohen, Michael. “Peace in the Post-Cold War World.” The Atlantic, December 15th, 2011. www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/peace-in-the-post-cold-war-world/249863.

“Human Rights Indicators.” UNHCR. Accessed March 15th, 2017. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Indicators/Pages/HRIndicatorsIndex.aspx.

Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth. “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences.” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 1-27.

Krugman, Paul and Anthony J. Venables. “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 4 (1995): 857-880.

Mingst, Karen A. and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft. Essentials of International Relations, Fifth Edition. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2010). 

Monteiro, Nuno P. “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful.” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011): 9-40.

UN General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. December 10th, 1948, 217 A (III). http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html.

Waltz, Kenneth N. “The Stability of a Bipolar World.” Daedalus 93, no. 3 (1964): 881-909.

Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 5-41.

Consulted works 

Wohlforth, William C. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power.” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 28-57.

1. Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011): 9.

2. Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, Essentials of International Relations, Fifth Edition (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2010), 83-96.

3. This essay employs realist theory in its discussions as much of the literature on unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems relies upon the theory’s assumptions in evaluating the international political order.

4. See consulted sources in bibliography for further reading. 

5. William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 7.

6. Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, no. 3 (1964): 882-887.

7. Monteiro, Unrest Assured, p. 17.

8. Michael Cohen, “Peace in the Post-Cold War World,” The Atlantic, December 15th, 2011, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/peace-in-the-post-cold-war-world/249863.

9. Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables, “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 4 (1995): 857-868.

10. Monteiro, Unrest Assured, p. 20-23.

11. Prosperity in this instance refers to the baseline economic standards which guarantee the right to an adequate standard of living as established by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

12. G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 8-10.

13. Monteiro, Unrest Assured, p. 17.

14. Ibid, p. 11.

15. UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10th, 1948, 217 A (III), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html.

16. See Roger Bate, “What is Prosperity and How Do We Measure It?,” American Enterprise Institute Development Policy Outlook no. 3 (2009): 1-7, poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php.

17. “Human Rights Indicators,” UNHCR, accessed March 15th, 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Indicators/Pages/HRIndicatorsIndex.aspx.

Featured Image: A wide view of the Human Rights and Alliance of Civilizations Room at the Palais des Nations during the high-level segment of the Human Right Council’s thirty-fourth regular session. (UN Photo/Elma Okic)