Tag Archives: South China Sea

Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

The Unnamed Protagonist in China’s Maritime Objectives

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week by Amanda Conklin

China’s ability to exercise its power in the maritime domain is essential to advancing its economic interests and ensuring its security. Attention to safeguarding maritime rights and interests was documented in China’s 2012 National Defense white paper, and the 2015 Chinese Military Strategy white paper has expanded the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) area of operations from offshore defense to include open seas protection. As the PLAN moves into the open ocean, the responsibility for offshore defense and protection of China’s interests in its near seas will fall to the China Coast Guard (CCG). Changes in the organizational and operational mandates of the CCG are paving the way for it to become a more important actor in the achievement of the PLA’s traditional and non-traditional security objectives.

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Liu Huaqing in March 1996. Associated Press, Greg Baker

Since the 1980s, China’s changing threat perceptions and growing economic interests have catalyzed a shift in the strategic orientation and the perceived utility of naval forces. By 1987, PLAN Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing established a strategy referred to as offshore defense, expanding the bounds of China’s maritime defenses beyond coastal waters to deter, delay, and if necessary, degrade potential intervention in a regional conflict. Offshore defense is associated with operations in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea (China’s near seas), covering 875,000 square nautical miles. The Philippine Sea, a key interdiction area in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, expands the battlespace by another 1.5 million. In this vast space, navies and coast guards from seven regional countries and several forward-deployed nations combine with tens of thousands of fishing boats, cargo ships, oil tankers, and other commercial vessels in an area often referred to as “China’s 3 million square km of blue territory.”

From the founding of the PRC in 1949 until the mid-1980s, China’s strategic concept of naval operations was limited to coastal defense (the inherent mission of any coast guard), with an emphasis on defending China’s coast from amphibious invasion. As the PLAN shifts away from patrolling the near seas and expands its area of operations, the CCG will need to meet demands to operate well off China’s coast. Many in the U.S. view the CCG’s activities in the East and South China Seas as a product of a coordinated national strategy. The goal is quiet expansion — as opposed to a loud invasion and occupation by the PLA.

Evidence of a strategy can be traced to possible visions guiding procurement decisions made years in advance, such as the State Council’s approval of plans to purchase dozens of rights protection cutters in 2010. Protecting China’s expanding coastlines, as well as fishermen and maritime companies, requires the CCG to conduct operations further from their home ports and for longer periods of time. For example, a 2012 standoff between China Maritime Surveillance (former CCG) vessels and the Philippines Coast Guard at the disputed Scarborough Shoal lasted for ten weeks, and since then the CCG has maintained a continuous presence there to preempt a recurrence of that event. This could put the CCG in an uncomfortable and unsustainable operating scheme unless it procures large ships, recruits enough officers for numerous and simultaneous rotations at sea, and coordinates communications and collaboration across 3 million square km of blue territory.

In 2013, China consolidated its maritime law enforcement (MLE) agencies to better protect China’s sovereignty and safeguard its maritime interests. During the March 2013 National People’s Congress, the Chinese government announced a new State Oceanic Administration (SOA) that would essentially form a “fist out of fingers” by combining the organizations and the responsibilities of the existing SOA and four MLE agencies into the China Coast Guard (CCG), which maintained a purely civilian status. The consolidation allows the CCG to more flexibly deploy patrol ships from its larger fleet in response to sovereignty challenges and maintain its presence in hotspots.

Additionally, during the last decade, China’s MLE forces have increased both the sizes of their ships and overall capability. As of March 2015, China had 95 large patrol ships (over 1,000 tons) and 100 patrol combatants between (500-1,000 tons). The current phase of the construction program, which began in 2012, will add over 30 large patrol ships and over 20 patrol combatants to the force by the end of 2015. This will increase the overall CCG force level by 25 percent — faster growth than any other coast guard in the world.

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Map of territorial disputes in South China Sea.

Although the CCG has taken an increased role in asserting China’s maritime sovereignty over disputed areas, PLAN vessels still share the responsibility for patrols in China’s territorial waters, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The PLAN’s close relationship with the CCG certainly helps deter counter actions by other claimants. When the CCG responds to an incident, the PLAN will likely also deploy destroyers and frigates several dozen miles behind to provide an indirect, over-the-horizon presence. This approach intimidates smaller claimants and contains larger ones, but also limits the potential for confrontations to escalate since most CCG ships are not heavily armed (though some are refitted navy vessels with permanent torpedo tubs and gun turrets that add a factor of intimidation to the CCG’s presence). Given the recurrence of confrontations, China is wise in not using armed ships, but arguably, deploying the CCG allows China to be more aggressive against foreign civilian ships than it could be with the PLAN. Instead, while CCG activities assume a militarized connotation, PLAN ships make friendly port calls to China’s neighbors.

China’s controversial use of the CCG to assert its sovereignty in maritime disputes and expand China’s presence in disputed areas gives it the unique privilege of being the world’s only maritime law enforcement (MLE) agency to regularly make international headlines for activities other than botching rescue missions. The CCG’s press coverage, however, has been overwhelmingly negative for causing conflagrations with China’s neighbors, and the fallout of its activities has reinforced China’s need for its sustained presence. China must reconcile that the CCG’s activities to advance its interests in the South China Sea have inspired Southeast Asian nations to strengthen their own MLE organizations. The Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia have already turned to the U.S. and Japan for help increasing their capacity.

China’s use of the CCG has created a conundrum for the U.S. Navy, but it does not want to risk a conflict by using the 7th Fleet to check China’s white hull advance. Meanwhile, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) does not have a dedicated presence in the area (its closest port is at Guam), and funding troubles have already stretched its capacity for traditional missions. Even though the USCG has 42,190 active duty service members compared to the new CCG’s 16,296 billets, the USCG is not concentrated in a single region. It has a global mission ranging from the Arctic to NATO countries to the Pacific. Thus, the USCG, like other branches of the U.S. military, has placed emphasis on utilizing and building the capacity of its partners in the region – an asset the U.S. has more of than China (the new military strategy only named Russia as a partner).

The growing possibility of clashes at sea is troubling. If the CCG is able to easily coerce smaller actors in China’s various maritime disputes, especially in the South China Sea, and institute a new status quo to safeguard China’s interests, this would have serious implications for freedom of sea navigation and safety of passage, as well regional stability and peace. If the U.S. and its partners believe this is the goal of a comprehensive strategy, building more capable maritime law enforcement and coast guard organizations in Southeast Asia could deter Beijing from maritime expansion. However, China’s approach to its maritime interests goes beyond the CCG’s veiled offensive, or active defense, maneuvers. China’s hybrid strategy also involves legal, economic, high-tech, and cyber elements that are less likely to provoke a large-scale war and do not fit neatly into challenges addressed by traditional military strategies. Adequately addressing the role of CCG as an increasingly capable civilian implementer of China’s foreign policy and unique tool in China’s military missions will require the U.S. and its partners to consider new, comprehensive policy options in the Asia-Pacific.

Amanda Conklin was a Fulbright in Macau from 2012-13 and is currently working on Asia policy issues in the field of international affairs. The views presented in this article are her own.

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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: U.S. & Chinese Strategic Views

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week by Daniel M. Hartnett

A Comparison of U.S. and Chinese Views of the International Strategic Environment

Within approximately a month of each other this year, both China and the United States published official documents detailing their respective views of the current security environment.  China’s assessment was captured in its 9th biennial defense white paper, published in late May, and officially titled China’s Military Strategy. The U.S. view is presented in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015 (hereafter, U.S. National Military Strategy), published in June. The authoritative nature of each document provides an interesting opportunity to comparatively assess how both nations see the international military and security situation, more clearly understand their similarities and differences, and draw out any relevant implications.

Before comparing the views contained within the two documents, however, it is important to clarify that this is not a perfect comparison. Although both documents are official and therefore represent the approved views of the respective government, they are not exact equivalents. China’s defense white paper, while drafted by the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is actually coordinated with and vetted by China’s foreign policy making community, to most importantly include the Chinese Communist Party.1 Therefore, it represents the view of the Chinese Party-State, not just the PLA.  On the other side of the ledger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for producing the U.S. National Military Strategy. This document draws closely from other U.S. government statements, most importantly from the President’s National Security Strategy. However, ultimately the U.S. National Military Strategy is a U.S. military document, not a whole-of-government product. As a result, comparing it with China’s Military Strategy is imperfect at best. However, such an exercise is still of value, particularly given the authoritativeness of the two documents combined with the general lack of publicly released official Chinese statements on national defense issues.    

Going forward with this imperfect yet still useful comparison of these two views on the international security situation yields four findings of interest. First, both documents describe the international security situation as experiencing great change. According to the U.S. National Military Strategy, “complexity and rapid change characterize the strategic environment, driven by globalization, the diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts.” China’s defense white paper paints a similar picture, stating that “profound changes are taking place in the international situation.” Although China’s Military Strategy is silent on what is causing these changes, it does assert that the changes in question are changes to the international balance of power, global governance structure, and Asia-Pacific geostrategic landscape, as well as an increase in international economic, military, and technological competition.

Second, although they both maintain the international system is in flux, the two documents disagree about the impact these changes will have.  The U.S. National Military Strategy takes a more pessimistic view, stating that these changes are giving rise to a host of problems. As General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, writes in the foreword to the U.S. National Military Strategy, “today’s global security environment is the most unpredictable I have seen in 40 years of service,” and that “global disorder has significantly increased while [U.S.] comparative military advantage has begun to erode.” Concerns noted include increasing societal tensions, resource competition, political instability, military challenges, and non-traditional security concerns. More concerning, the document also asserts that the risk of “U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing” [emphasis added].

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Deng Xiaoping, Time Man of the Year in 1979

China’s assessment, on the other hand, is more positive. It asserts that overall the international situation is good, although it also recognizes that some problems exist. For example, the document maintains that “peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times,” continuing a basic position held since the mid-1980s when then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping took China off the constant pre-war footing of Mao Zedong.2 That doesn’t mean that China’s Military Strategy doesn’t recognize the existence of international problems; the document notes such issues as “hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism,” as well as increasing competition for power and interests, international terrorism, and ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes. However, it does assert that “the forces for peace are on the rise, [and] so are the factors against war,” and as a result, a major war is unlikely and the “international situation is expected to remain generally peaceful”—although minor conflicts and wars can occur.  More importantly, China’s Military Strategy states explicitly that China confronts a “generally favorable external environment,” something the document claims is a prerequisite for China’s continued development.

Third, the two documents focus on different levels of the international system. The U.S. National Military Strategy, for example, squarely assesses the international situation from a global perspective. For example, the four countries mentioned by name as revisionist (Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China) span much of the globe. Similarly, when discussing the threat of violent extremist organizations, the document notes this is a global concern (although it does highlight the Middle East and North Africa for exceptional concern). Furthermore, the U.S. National Military Strategy explicitly rejects the notion of emphasizing any one region or issue, stating that “the U.S. military does not have the luxury of focusing on one challenge to the exclusion of others.”

In contrast, China’s Military Strategy emphasizes China’s periphery, and in particular the maritime areas of the western Pacific Ocean. Although global issues are mentioned, they are done so only briefly and ambiguously. Instead, China’s Military Strategy mainly discusses regional concerns. Concerns noted include the U.S. rebalance to Asia, especially efforts to strengthen the U.S. military presence and alliances in the region; Japan’s ongoing adjustments to its defense policy; tensions on the Korean Peninsula; relations with Taiwan; and extremist movements that could spill over China’s borders. Of particular note is China’s focus on maritime concerns, such as the growing tensions concerning its disputed claims in the East and South China seas, U.S. special reconnaissance operations, and alleged outside interference in China’s maritime disputes. The only non-peripheral concern expressly noted in the document reflects the recognition that China’s growing overseas interests are creating new security issues, such as sea lane security and the security of Chinese foreign investments and overseas citizens. 

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Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, Economist.

Fourth, each document portrays the other country as part of the problem.  According to China’s Military Strategy, the increase in China’s peripheral insecurity is partially due to U.S. actions in the region, such as the U.S. rebalance to Asia and its interference in China’s maritime disputes with other East Asia states. For its part, the U.S. National Military Strategy also explicitly calls out China, stating that its “aggressive land reclamation efforts” in the South China Sea could allow the PLA to position forces “astride vital international sea lanes.” As a result, “China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region.” This mutual finger pointing in order to assign blame for tensions in the South China Sea exemplifies what Dr. David M. Finkelstein, director of CNA’s China Studies division, has referred to as a “perception gap” between China and the United States on regional security concerns.

From this simple comparison of the two authoritative documents, it is easy to see that a large divide exists between the U.S. and Chinese views on security issues.  While the United States sees the rapidly changing international systems as a potential concern, China sees it as an opportunity for continued development. The U.S. focus on the global level is indicative of its position as an established global power with global interests. Conversely, China’s focus, although gradually expanding to the international level, emphasizes the East Asia region, reflecting that Beijing continues to be primarily concerned with its immediate periphery. Each country also sees the other as part of the problem, especially in the case of the South China Sea issue.

Ultimately this difference in views should not be shocking since both countries have their own set of national interests and related concerns. The more important questions, however, are: Is it possible, as some claim, to bridge these differences and build “mutual trust” between the two militaries? Or will asymmetries of interest on certain issues prevent reaching a peaceful accord? Can the two militaries reach a middle ground on issues where they see the other as the main culprit? For this author, it would seem a difficult challenge, for as the Truman-era senior bureaucrat Rufus F. Miles said in the late 1940s, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”3

Daniel Hartnett is a research scientist with CNA’s China Studies division, as well as a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council. He can be followed at @dmhartnett. The views expressed in this article are his alone.

[1] Daniel M. Hartnett, “China’s 2012 Defense White Paper: Panel Discussion Report,” CNA Conference Proceeding (September 2013), p. i.

[2] For an interesting read on China’s military reforms during the Deng era, see Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 523-552.

[3] Rufus F. Miles, “The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law,” Public Administration Review Vol. 38, No. 5 (Sep. – Oct., 1978), pp. 399-403.

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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

From Expediency to the Strategic Chinese Dream?

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week Week by Sherman Xiaogang Lai

China’s Military Strategy, the white paper released by the Chinese Ministry of Defense on 26 May 2015, is a milestone document in the People’s Republic of China’s military history. It marks China’s confidence in its ability to control the potentially explosive issue of Taiwan and its territorial disputes with its neighbors in the East and South China Seas and signals the beginning of China’s advance into overseas markets, where China’s interests have been rapidly expanding since Deng Xiaoping initiated his market-oriented reform by terminating Mao Zedong’s regime of isolation, “self-reliance, and arduous struggle.” China’s Military Strategy states that “the basic point for PMS [preparation for military struggle] will be placed on winning informationized local wars, highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS.” It asserts that the “traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” For the first time in its history, the mission of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) is defined as jinhai fangyu, yuanhai huwei (“offshore waters defense and open seas protection”), and the PLAN’s focus is on the transition from the former to the latter.

news_chan_flagsThis new military strategy traces its origin to the Military Strategy Guideline of the New Era (MSGNE) of 1993. Although the text of the MSGNE has not been made public, its objective is known to be deterrence of Taiwan from de jure independence. The current strategy is thus significantly different from the MSGNE because of the former’s emphasis on the navy’s role in protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC), which were used by Admiral/General Liu Huaqing, China’s Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, to promote the PLAN as early as 1975, when Mao was alive. That Liu did not engage in the process of the MSGNE’s formation and in fact kept himself at a safe distance from it deserves attention. This reveals China’s strategic dilemma created by Taiwan’s inclination toward de jure independence and China’s growing dependence on international trade. The former demanded that the PLA develop an effective fighting capacity to deter Taiwan and convince the United States that it would pay a price if it did not help China in this effort. The latter required that the PLAN assume a new mission to protect China’s growing overseas interests. The hope was that this dilemma would be solved when China’s rapid economic growth eliminated the huge gap in living standards across the Taiwan Strait, bringing the two sides together. However, despite China’s admirable economic growth, Taiwan shows no sign of surrender. In addition, China’s territorial disputes with its neighbours in the East and South China Seas have escalated. The PLAN’s strategic dilemma thus remains intact. Will China’s tremendously increased economic and military strength help the PLA solve this problem and guide China onto the track toward the “Chinese Dream?” Before answering this question, let us go back to the fall of 1992, when the MSGNE was conceived.

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South China Sea Claims, The Economist.

By the spring of 1991, the PLAN leaders, including Admiral/General Liu, faced an unprecedented embarrassment: in addition to it being well known that the PLA was armed with obsolete weapons, the Allies’ triumph in the Gulf War demonstrated that the PLA’s operation doctrine was outdated. Making the situation worse was the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union. China, which had been benefiting tremendously from the West-East rivalry, had to face pressure from the United States, Taiwan’s patron, alone. As the island was in the process of rapid democratization and those residents who had fled to the island from the Mainland in 1949 were losing their dominance in politics, Taiwan began to pursue de jure independence and emerged as the fatal threat to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communists’ rule over Mainland China. Having recognized the reality of the changed world, Admiral/General Liu, one of the members of the PLA’s commanding agency, the Central Military Commission (CMC), and other PLA strategy planners began to develop a new strategy. Liu’s efforts coincided with Jiang Zemin’s endeavour to control the PLA. Jiang was a protégé of one of Deng’s rivals and managed to obtain Deng’s trust in the fall of 1992. As Jiang did not serve in the PLA, Deng appointed General Zhang Zhen, the PLA’s most senior officer in active duty, to help Jiang, who then asked Zhang to develop a new military strategy. Zhang tasked General Zhang Wannian, the recently appointed Chief of General Staff, with completing this job. Both generals’ entire careers were devoted to the PLA, and the final fruit of their efforts was the MSGNE approved in 1993.

The MSGNE departed fundamentally from the PLA’s strategic tradition at the time, which was based on ground forces armed with outdated weapons, in two aspects. The first was its shift from continental defence to the immediate challenges off China’s coast: deterring Taiwan’s de jure independence and managing the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The second was prioritizing development of a few critical weapon systems, the so-called shashoujian, in contrast to the previous emphasis on ideological indoctrination. It is interesting that the MSGNE has not been officially defined and explained, despite it being a watershed strategy in the PLA’s history. Equally interesting is the fact that Admiral/General Liu was away from Beijing when the Generals Zhang were preoccupied there developing this maritime-oriented military strategy. The authors of his official biography cautiously implied that Liu had nothing to do with the creation of the MSGNE.

China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles wheeled through a military parade. Internet photo.

Twenty years after the MSGNE was implemented, a PLAN consisting of two very different fleets emerged. The first consists of large surface warships and auxiliary vessels capable of operating as far as the Mediterranean Sea. The second is an anti-access fleet of submarines, fast missile craft, and destroyers supported by the PLAN’s land-based aircraft, the PLA Air Force, and the strategic striking force of the Second Artillery. In 2013, the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21, with a range of 3,000 km, was reported to be operational. The deployment of the DF-21 means that US fleets, especially its aircraft carriers, are exposed to critical attacks by China’s conventional missiles when they are far
from China’s territorial waters. The DF-21 is a part of the PLA’s shashoujian and alters the naval game in the Pacific. Although it offers Chinese leaders more options in weapon selection, it makes a military solution more tempting and creates a set of challenges to both Chinese and American decision-makers if a cross-Strait conflict breaks out. The Chinese leaders will be able to use the DF-21 against approaching US fleets instead of their nuclear weapons. US leaders will have to make the decision either to risk US aircraft carriers being lost to the DF-21 in international waters and thus being forced into a large-scale war against China or to acknowledge China’s hegemony over the Western Pacific.

Neither Beijing nor Washington wants to make these difficult decisions. But China, the weaker side of this cross-Pacific rivalry, gains much more than it loses from the deployment of DF-21, and this gives it confidence. The PLAN’s new “offshore waters defense and open seas protection” mission is a reflection of this new confidence among the Chinese national and naval leaders over their recent boost in naval strength. This new mission could be regarded as China’s tremendous contribution to world peace if it were irrelevant to the DF-21 and the tension in the South and East China Seas. The intermediate DF-21 is a weapon system of expediency to compensate for China’s lack of command of sea in the case of a cross-Strait war, but it is able to disrupt the status quo of the world if it is used offensively as a shield for its fleets. Admiral/General Liu must have recognized this potential danger, which was in opposition to his dream for a high-seas fleet protecting China’s SLOC. As the founder of China’s modern navy, he knew the PLAN’s inherent deficiencies better than anyone. In striking contrast to the PLAA, which was forged into a formidable fighting machine through numerous victories and defeats, the PLAN was a mosaic of Soviet-trained officers with fragments of the Nationalist navy trained by either the US Navy or the Royal Navy. And it did not experience the forging process that the PLAA did and thus has been plagued with factional struggles and has been vulnerable to the struggle among the PRC leadership. In addition, China’s semi-closed coast places the PLAN in a disadvantageous geographic position if it is involved in a war against the United States. Realizing that its expediency would lead the PLA and China into a cul-de-sac, Liu kept himself out of the MSGNE’s development. If he were alive today, he would be proud of his beloved PLAN while increasingly anxious about its future.

Dr. Sherman Xiaogang Lai is an adjunct assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). Before he immigrated to Canada in 2000, he served as a frontline foot soldier in China’s war against Vietnam, UN military observer and researcher in history and military strategy in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army during 1987-1997. The views expressed in this article are his own.

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Global Analysis

Invite to CIMSEC SCS Wargame Crowd-Sourcing Phase

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The Economist SCS ClaimsThis year, CIMSEC’s DC chapter is holding a series of participatory events focusing on different maritime security challenges and disputes. To do so, we’re using an experimental event format with elements of wargamming, simulation, ideation, and crowd-sourcing to elicit creative insights. Our live events will be followed by online crowd-sourcing phases in which the outputs the CIMSEC community at large is invited to participate.

The first of these events attempts to aid crisis management planners dealing with the South China Sea by cataloging the range of possible actions and drawing insights about their potential effectiveness in achieving their initiator’s objectives.

The objectives developed by each of the country teams are listed on our wargames page. To participate, help us evaluate the developed actions on their effectiveness here. If you have a potential action you’d like to propose as part of the crowd-sourcing phase, you can also do so at the above link – just ensure you are not duplicating an existing entry. The first stage will begin with claimant state actions. Non-claimant actions will be introduced soon – so hold on to your good ideas. Whether evaluating the proposals or developing your own it is important to keep in mind the prompt on our wargames page given to our participants and conditions for the action.

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