Tag Archives: South China Sea

Asia-Pacific, Territorial and Law of the Sea Disputes

Transparency as Strategy: The Maritime Security Initiative and the South China Sea

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The following article is adapted from a report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS): Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea.

By Dr. Van Jackson, Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Paul Scharre, Harry Krejsa, and Jeff Chism.

South China Sea watchers know it as a strategically important and resource-rich area, crucial to the lifeblood of U.S. and Indo-Pacific economies. It is also a highly contested space, and the proximate sources of tensions are well-known. Ongoing sovereignty disputes among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei lead to competition over hundreds of islands, reefs, and reclaimed land.

Yet underlying these resource and sovereignty tensions is something even more pernicious: The South China Sea is an opaque, low-information environment. Most South China Sea islets are hundreds of miles from shore, making it especially difficult for governments and commercial entities to monitor events at sea when they occur. This dearth of situational awareness worsens regional competition in the South China Sea. The region is already rife with rapid military modernization, resurgent nationalism, the blurring of economic and security interests, and heightened geopolitical wrangling with China (by great and small powers alike). Left unchecked, these pressures make conflict more likely by tempting major military accidents and crises that could drag down the economic and political future of the region.

These negative trends converging in the South China Sea also create missed opportunities among regional stakeholders for positive gains. South China Sea stakeholders have many transnational and economic interests of growing importance in common – from counterpiracy to maritime commerce and disaster response – but the competitive nature of the South China Sea today impedes collective action to solve shared problems. States have trouble engaging in cooperation, even when it would advance shared interests. This challenges the foundations of a stable regional order. The more states believe they live in an anarchical neighborhood, the more likely the region sees the worst of geopolitics: security dilemmas, arms races, and policies motivated by fear and greed rather than reason and restraint. 

There is no silver bullet to entirely resolve the historical, strategic, and technological factors that are contributing to a more contentious security environment in Asia. Nevertheless, there remain practical and politically viable initiatives that could have a substantial effect in mitigating insecurities while fostering cooperation on issues of common interest.

Our new report with the Center for a New American Security—Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea—proposes that enhanced, shared maritime domain awareness (MDA) among ASEAN states is a realistic means of addressing some of the underlying and proximate problems facing this strategic waterway. An MDA architecture may engender cooperation in a region devoid of trust, prevent misunderstandings, encourage operational transparency, and lead to capacity-building efforts that contribute to the regional public good. Our report explores how advances in commercial technology services, regional information-sharing, and security cooperation can contribute to enhanced regional security. We believe these advances can do so by moving the region closer to establishing a common, layered, and regularly updated picture of air and maritime activity in the South China Sea – a common operational picture (COP) for a tempestuous domain. 

Transparency: The Next Phase of the Rebalance

Over the past year, U.S. policymakers made two major public commitments linking South China Sea transparency to larger goals of stability and assured access. The first, the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, lays out what the Department of Defense sees as the most pressing challenges facing the region, as well as the most promising openings for future collaboration and improvement. The second, the Maritime Security Initiative, seeks to make these opportunities reality, funding regional capacity-building efforts to the tune of $425 million. Both initiatives rightly prioritize enhancing local partner military abilities, regional cooperation, and maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea, but they focus much more on framing past actions and justifying present initiatives than on laying out a road map for the future.

Our report builds on these initiatives, prescribing for the United States a maritime domain awareness road map comprising four broad lines of effort:

  • Coordinated capacity-building among a concert of outside stakeholder powers;
  • A U.S.-centric effort relying heavily on U.S.-controlled information collection and distribution;
  • Expansion of the capacity and reach of extant institutions that perform maritime awareness and information-sharing functions in the region; and
  • An inclusive approach that empowers regional institutions and relies on private-sector partnerships.

Each of these strategies—detailed at length in our report—prioritizes different ways of enhancing maritime domain awareness, and each has distinct benefits and drawbacks. In aggregate, the types of activities constituting these strategies offer policymakers menus from which they can pick and choose to build better maritime domain awareness given political realities, cost constraints, trust, and other salient conditions that may shift over time. Advancing shared situational awareness in practice will likely require drawing on all four strategic approaches, and our report identifies several key near-term tasks for policymakers and operators to render the region’s most volatile waterway into an open, transparent, and stable one. 

Read the full report: Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea.

Dr. Van Jackson is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at CNAS and an Associate Professor in the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper is a Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security program at CNAS.

Paul Scharre is a Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Warfare Initiative at CNAS.

Harry Krejsa is a Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security program at CNAS.

Jeff Chism is a Commander in the U.S. Navy and at the time of writing was a Military Fellow at CNAS. The views expressed are his own.

Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: March 2016 Part One

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to part one of the March 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past month CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including an increase in Russian naval activities and deployments, recent U.S. naval exercises demonstrating the Fleets’ application of the distributed lethality concept, laser technologies and the U.S. defense acquisition program and as usual, the increasingly tense security environment in the Asia-Pacific.  

Paul Pryce begins the roundup in the Asia-Pacific with a discussion, on what he refers to as, the new era in Singaporean defense procurement. In his article at Offiziere, Mr. Pryce highlights that previous procurement strategies for the country’s Navy have focused on acquiring mainly European designed vessels, either built specifically for Singapore or purchased following a short period of service in the initial European country. However, the planned construction of eight indigenous Independence-class littoral mission vessels beginning in 2016 and the expected procurement of a domestically built light aircraft carrier through 2021 suggests that the Singapore’s shipbuilding capacity and overall maritime force projection capabilities are becoming increasingly strengthened – a significant implication for Singapore’s role in South East Asian security dynamics.

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Alex Calvo, for Asian Military Review, discusses the challenge Taiwan faces in securing a replacement for its four aged hunter-killer submarines (SSKs), two of which are vintage Tench-class World War II boats while the other two were commissioned in the Netherlands in 1987 and 1988. Mr. Calvo explains how Europe has become reluctant to support Taiwanese military procurement needs for fear of angering China while the United States no longer produces SSKs. He suggests that Taiwan may look to Japan as an alternative source for its SSK replacement largely due to recent efforts by the Japanese shipbuilding industry to win the contract for the Royal Australian Navy’s SSK procurement requirements while also noting a lack of other feasible alternatives.

Kyle Mizokami, for Popular Mechanics, discusses China’s plans to establish aircraft carrier battle groups tasked with defense of the country’s territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and overseas interests both regionally and perhaps globally. Mr. Mizokami highlights the nature of China’s first operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, as he explains its training role and limited capacity to carry large numbers of combat capable aircraft. However, he also notes that China has confirmed the construction of the Dalian carrier, which will have more hangar space for support and combat aircraft – but will still only displace about 50 000 tons, or half that of a modern U.S. carrier.

Leaving the Asia-Pacific, Dave Majumdar outlines the implications of Russia’s planned massive live-fire nuclear exercise being conducted by two Project 955 Borei-class ballistic missile submarines deployed with the Northern Fleet. In his article at The National Interest, Mr. Majumdar explains how one of the missile boats will sequentially launch all sixteen of its RSM-56 Bulava missiles at a depth of 164ft while highlighting that such an exercise, whether a U.S. or Russian ballistic missile boat, would only launch their entire payload in conflict as part of full-scale retaliatory or offensive nuclear strike. In a second article at The National Interest, Mr. Majumdar discusses the spotting of a Russian Project 667 BDRM Delfin-class ballistic missile submarine near French territorial waters – the boat carries sixteen missiles capable of carrying four nuclear warheads each with a range of 7500 miles.

Bryan McGrath, for the War on the Rocks, provides the ‘First Principles’ that will help guide the difficult task of structuring the U.S. Navy’s future fleet. Mr. McGrath emphasizes that the Navy must be sized and shaped into a fleet that allows for both combat-credible and presence forces to be positioned globally in a manner that secures national interests while effectively deterring major power conflict. He also mentions the implementation of the distributed lethality concept, where individual platform lethality is increased even as the force becomes geographically dispersed. On this point, Mr. McGrath argues that an individual combat capacity increase should not compel policy makers to reduce the size of the fleet, as one does not necessarily balance the others strategic importance. On the same topic at The National Interest, Dave Majumdar describes a recent test of the SM-6 missile where it was revealed that the system now retains effective anti-surface capability, a major step for distributed lethality implementation across the fleet.

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the first part of March:

CIMSEC has also recently (February) published a compendium discussing a range of strategies, challenges and policy options concerning Distributed Lethality. You can find a download link for all of the articles here.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to [email protected].

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies and defense policy and management.

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Asia-Pacific

America’s Dilemma in Avoiding Confrontation in the East Asian Littoral

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By David Hervey

The recent innocent passage of USS Lassen through waters claimed by China in the South China Sea, billed as a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) by the United States, highlights the inefficiency of US policy in the Asia-­Pacific.

As has been widely reported, while the US government portrayed the voyage of Lassen through the waters around Subi Reef as a freedom of navigation exercise to challenge Chinese claims to those waters under international law, Lassen conducted an innocent passage, which would have been allowed even in territorial waters under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and therefore not a challenge to Chinese claims. This compromised the US government’s stated goals for the operation.

030328-N-7265L-025 East China Sea (Mar. 28, 2003) - The guided missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82) sails through the rough seas. Lassen is part of the USS Carl Vinson Battle Group that just recently completed participating in the joint exercise FOAL EAGLE and is continuing a scheduled deployment in the western Pacific Ocean. U.S. Navy Photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Inez Lawson. (RELEASED)
East China Sea (Mar. 28, 2003) – The guided missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82) sails through the rough seas. Lassen is part of the USS Carl Vinson Battle Group that just recently completed participating in the joint exercise FOAL EAGLE and is continuing a scheduled deployment in the western Pacific Ocean. U.S. Navy Photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Inez Lawson.

This raises an important question of why the US intentionally compromised its objectives. It is unlikely that this was a result of neglect or ignorance, given the fact that everyone from officers on the ship to the Washington higher­ups who planned and approved the operation are familiar with international law and the protocol of an innocent passage. The most apparent intention of the US decision to conduct an innocent passage rather than a true FONOP is in an attempt to show restraint, and to avoid serious provocation of China. An important question, then, is whether the US, through its apparent restraint, succeeded in not provoking China.

At the moment, the US appears to have failed. One way of determining whether the FONOP­lite provoked China is by examining statements from the Chinese Government and state media about the operation. Admittedly, this isn’t a perfect measure because the Chinese Communist Party is a relatively opaque organization, and it is inherently tough to parse the posturing from the genuine signalling, ­­especially in party-­run media outlets. But these statements can point observers in the right direction. Regardless of whether such credit is due, the United States has not gotten any credit in the Chinese press or from officials for its apparent attempt to show restraint. Indeed, op­eds in the People’s Daily accuse the US of using FONOPs as “a cover­up for the US to destroy peace and stability in the South China Sea” and officials “[urge] the US to stop sowing dissension and deliberately stirring up tension and stop deeds and actions that undermine peace and stability in the region.”

SCS
Subi Reef, a disputed land feature in the South China Sea, pictured in May 2015, and undergoing land reclamation to enlarge the island. Such activities have been a controversial development. (Source: US Navy).

Furthermore, the actions and words of the Chinese government agree with each other. Even if their statements were posturing, the pace of Chinese militarization of the sea has quickened. This is clear from recent announcements of new missile deployments, a radar station, and the flight of fighter jets to the sea. The interesting thing about all these developments is that none were announced by the Chinese government. If China was stoking nationalist fervor in an attempt to please citizens who would have been otherwise inclined towards dissent as a result of the recent economic slowdown the Chinese government would have announced these developments itself, and loudly publicize them. However, given its initial decision to keep quiet, observers can reasonably infer that China’s recent actions are driven by considerations of power rather public opinion. This lends even more credibility to the Communist Party’s public statements.

To an extent, the Chinese government has a point. If a foreign warship sailed within twelve nautical miles of US land, even if American claims to that land were questionable, most of the press and politicians of both parties would be outraged. A rough analogy is the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US had nuclear missiles in Turkey at about the same distance from the Soviet Union as Cuba is from Florida, but when Soviet missiles came to Cuba, there was widespread furor in America. Thus, it is questionable whether the FONOP could have been perceived as anything but a provocation.

Yet the FONOP’s true goal (making a statement under international law) was compromised in an attempt to allay Chinese concerns. If it is impossible to avoid provoking China, but the US desires to make a statement, it should do so more vocally and less equivocally. If, to avoid confrontation, the US compromises the legal goals of the FONOP, there is little substantive argument for the FONOP to be carried out at all.  This paradox reveals a fundamental problem with US strategy and policy in East Asia – committing to a strategy neither of engagement nor of confrontation is futile because such a strategy will inevitably be interpreted as a strategy of confrontation. The assets necessary for the current “neither ­here­ nor ­there” strategy ­­ such as warships, fighter jets, and the like ­­ can easily, in China’s view, be repurposed towards a strategy of confrontation and encirclement. President Obama’s “pivot” can be seen in the same light, because while it diplomatic on the one hand, it has significant military aspects.

This is, to a large extent, a manifestation of the Security Dilemma, in which the actions taken by one state for the purposes of strengthening its defense against hypothetical future attacks is interpreted by another state, usually a regional or geopolitical rival, as proactive preparation for future conflict. The security dilemma spurs the rival state to strengthen their defences, beginning a cycle of military upgrades popularly called an arms race. This dynamic unfortunately appears to be at work in East Asia even with defensive weapons, given given China’s vocal opposition to South Korea’s

A test launch of the THAAD missile defense system. (Source: US Army).
A test launch of the THAAD missile defense system. (Source: US Army).

acquisition of the THAAD missile defense system. Whether China’s opposition is warranted is beside the point,­­ the fact is that it exists, and China considers THAAD to be an attempt to negate its capabilities, much in the same way that Russia considered a plan for ballistic missile defense systems in Eastern European countries to be a provocation, despite these defenses being plausibly directed toward Iran rather than Russia, leading to significant changes to the deployment of missile defense systems in Europe.

The security dilemma is closely related to the Thucydides Trap, a dynamic taking its name from at the end of Book 1, Chapter 1 of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, stating that the most important cause of war between Athens and Sparta was the rise of Athens’ power relative to that of Sparta, which the Spartans considered to be an existential threat to their city­state. The Thucydides Trap is often referenced in the context of US­China relations. While the Thucydides Trap is an example of the Security Dilemma, they are not exactly the same. The Thucydides Trap refers to relative shifts of the balance of state power, and the Security Dilemma, on the other hand, is usually used to refer to deployment of weapons systems, rather than state power in general. The distinction is precise, but it exists nonetheless.

How, then, can the United States maneuver around the Thucydides Trap? The current “neither­-here-­nor-­there” policy is probably not the best option, given the fact that tensions in the South China Sea continue to rise. A cursory analysis would suggest that America’s options are binary ­­confrontation or conciliation. But this would be oversimplifying the available options. State politics are not binary, there is a wide spectrum of possible actions (hence Clausewitz’s famous “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means”). A committed strategy of confrontation is not optimal, and even if it was, it would be politically impossible. A tack toward conciliation would probably require concessions on too many national security interests to be a viable strategy.

A better strategy would require constant communication with China about not only current developments in the area, but clarifications that US and allied actions are purely defensive in nature, rather than attempts at encirclement. Observers can reasonably conclude that such communication already occurs, but it should be stepped up. US and Chinese leaders should be in contact as close as US and Soviet Leaders were at the height of the Cold War. Many deployments by US allies and partners of defensive systems, such as THAAD, are in direct response to threats other than China (namely North Korea) so their deployment should be explicable to Chinese officials. The only place where a such a strategy of communication would fall short is where US and Chinese interests are in direct and irreconcilable conflict, as they are in the case of Taiwan. However, the status quo established by the Shanghai Communique, in which the United States acknowledged the One-China Policy and stated its support to a peaceful solution to the question of Taiwan’s status,  seems to be acceptable to the US and to China, at least over the short­ to medium­ term, so barring the unforeseeable, this asymmetry of interests should not be fatal to a strategy of increased communication.

A map showing territorial claims in the South China Sea (Source: VOA News)
A map showing territorial claims in the South China Sea (Source: VOA News)

While it is probably too late for the Obama administration to make a lasting initiative to rationalize diplomacy in the East Asian Littoral, this makes it all the more necessary for the next administration to have a clear vision, no matter what that administration’s party affiliation happens to be. Its vision must be not only clear, but decisive, because a strategy of both engagement and confrontation is not an effective way of pursuing either. A tack to either direction, but not to either extreme, is necessary. This requires an evaluation of US interests in the region. Of course, regional stability and safety of merchant shipping in the area are vital US national security interests, as is continued reassurance of allies. What all of this entails ought to be the subject of further discussion. More importantly, the US needs to envision and debate the status of other interests in the region, and the cost of achieving or protecting them. A strategy of increased engagement would likely require concessions on some non­vital interests, while a more confrontational strategy would entail significant risk. Either way, the current US policy has limited viability over the long term, and carries with it all the risks, but few of the benefits, of a more purposeful strategy.

David Hervey is an undergraduate in his third year at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. He is studying Political Science and Economics, with research interests including political philosophy, low-intensity conflict, and the Asia-Pacific region.

Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: February Part Two

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to part two of the February 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past month CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including a rapid increase in naval modernization in the Indian Ocean, China’s recent South China Sea military deployments, challenges within the U.S. defense acquisition program and the evolving China-Taiwan political and security relationship in East Asia.

Beginning the roundup at Popular Mechanics, Kyle Mizokami discusses the U.S. Navy’s interests in the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and the importance of acquiring the weapon system quickly. Mr. Mizokami explains that the increasing threat of modernized surface fleets with advanced weapon systems, particularly from Russia and China, requires the U.S. Navy to deploy a weapon more capable than the current U.S. Anti-Ship Missile (ASM) – the Harpoon missile. He also outlines technical features of the missile, including its use of Artificial Intelligence, data links, an ability to avoid static threats by use of fluid way points and the platforms that can deploy the weapon system – currently the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F-35C, B1 and the U.S. Navy’s standardized Mk.41 Missile Silo.

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Bryan Clark, for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, explains that the U.S. Military’s defense requirements need to be balanced with realistic and appropriate budgets and schedules. He highlights that since 1970 major DoD Defense Acquisition Programs have increased in cost from 20-60 percent while new weapon systems are on average fielded 20 percent later than originally planned. Mr. Clark suggests that eliminating overly ambitious requirements for new capabilities is key to reducing acquisition malpractice while the limitations of competition within the defense industry need to be understood to allow for DoD’s buying power to improve.

Entering the Asia-Pacific, Harry Kazianis for The National Interest explains that Washington’s FONOPs in the South China Sea are not intended to halt Chinese dominance in the region, but rather to defend freedom of navigation and maritime legal principles. Mr. Kazianis highlights that regardless of the intent of the operations, China has remained firm on its artificial island construction and militarization in addition to strengthening its security apparatus in the region. This has been evident with the deployment of the HQ-9 air-defense system atop the newly constructed islands and the drastic increase in PLA-N deployments in the region. In a second article at The National Interest, Mr. Kazianis identifies the possibility that China may deploy several of its 24 recently purchased Russian Su-35 fighters to the airfields that have been constructed on these same islands.

Lauren Dickey, for The Council on Foreign Relations, provides the perspective that China’s recent deployment of surface-to-air missile launchers and radar systems to the contested Woody Island not only represents China’s ambitions for challenging U.S. regional presence but also to forward a broader agenda of modernizing the capabilities of the PLA. Ms. Dickey also highlights President Xi’s planned reforms for the PLA likely to result in a leaner, stronger fighting force, an enhanced power projection capability and an increased ability to deter threats along the country’s periphery.

Michal Thim, for The Diplomat, discusses the recent meeting between foreign affairs officials from both the Chinese and Taiwanese government. Mr. Thim explains that these representatives have met before in other unofficial non-governmental forums, but this meeting represents the first time in six decades that officials from the two governments have met in their official capacities. He also notes that although this meeting may reflect a positive change in the dynamic of China-Taiwan relations, significant security tensions still exist between the two countries with the Taiwan Strait missile crisis still fresh in-mind and current Chinese missile deployments near the Taiwan theatre threatening Taiwanese regional defense posture.

To conclude the roundup, Vijay Sakhuja for Nikkei Asian Review discusses the high-tech naval buildup in the Indian Ocean from a regional perspective, focusing on India, Pakistan, Iran, South Africa, Australia and Indonesia. Mr. Sakhuja notes that these powers have been supporting diplomatic multilateral institutions, such as the Indian Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, to jointly address piracy concerns and to train for potential mine countermeasure operations.

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the second part of February:

  • Shawn VanDiver, for Task and Purpose, discusses the threat climate change poses to U.S. National Security, noting its destabilizing effects in hotspot regions and its resulting security implications for nearby deployed personnel. He also explains how climate change poses a direct threat to the homeland, with increasing sea levels, larger wild fires, longer and more frequent droughts and heating-cooling strains on the domestic power grid.
  • Robert Farley, for The National Interest, provides an analysis on a recent RAND wargame exercise that demonstrated NATO’s inability to prevent Russian forces from occupying the Baltic States if it relied only on conventional forces currently available. However, Mr. Farley highlights that NATO’s primary deterrent is not necessarily its ability to counter any initial attack, rather to escalate any notional conflict beyond the parameters of Russian tactical abilities or political will.
  • Ankit Panda, for The Diplomat, discusses China’s Ministry of Defense statement that construction on support facilities for the PLA-N in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, has begun construction. Mr. Panda highlights that the Chinese government has refrained from calling its Djibouti facility as a ‘naval’ or ‘military’ base. In a second article at The Diplomat, Panda discusses South Korea’s interest in deploying Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems in response to North Korea’s recent nuclear and satellite tests.
  • Sam LaGrone, at USNI News, explains how China’s deployment of an advanced high-frequency radar array as part of a wider detection network in the South China Sea may put U.S. stealth aircraft at risk while reducing their operational capacity. In a second article at USNI News, LaGrone discusses comments released by U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) suggesting that the U.S. would ignore a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
  • Dave Majumdar, for The National Interest, highlights the U.S. Navy’s ‘undersea crisis’ with only 41 attack boats planned to be in active service by 2029 while China plans to have nearly 70. Even more concerning, the article suggests that while Russia and China are both continuing to build the volume of their undersea fleet, Russia has already begun construction on higher-end submarines that pose specific operational issues for the U.S. submarine fleet.

CIMSEC has also recently published a compendium discussing a range of strategies, challenges and policy options concerning Distributed Lethality. You can find a download link for all of the articles here.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to [email protected].

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies and defense policy and management.

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