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Russia’s Strategic Brown Water Capabilities: A NATO Blind Spot?

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By Helge Adrians

Russia is working to integrate inland waterways more deeply into its deterrence and defense posture. In Western contexts, this area of maritime geography is usually termed the ‘brown water zone.’ A harbinger of that development was the October 2015 strike against positions of Islamist groups in Syria, carried out by small warships in the Caspian Sea using land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). Russia not only demonstrated a new level of operational reach (of over1 1,500 kilometers), but also revealed a singular capability that remains unmatched to this day – executing deep precision strikes (DPS) from inland waters.2

Indications that the Russian Navy could carry out such an operation from lakes and possibly even rivers had emerged a few years prior. As part of the State Armaments Program for 2007-2015, Russia started outfitting many of its naval vessels with a new, long-awaited universal vertical launch system (VLS). Like the US MK 41 VLS — which has been in use since 1986— the Russian 3S14 VLS is designed to accommodate different types of missiles (rather than using specialized tubes for each missile type, as was previously the case on Soviet and Russian warships)3. The outfitting included river-capable Buyan-class corvettes, of which a modified batch with an eight-cell VLS was built from 2010—the Buyan-M class, sometimes also called Sviyazhsk-class.4 Two years later, the 3M14 LACM—a variant of the Kalibr family of missiles—was introduced on surface warships. One of the first units was the Gepard-class frigate Dagestan, which is part of the Caspian Flotilla. The formation also received the first three Buyan-M class corvettes, commissioned in 2013.

The reinforcement of the Caspian Flotilla was no coincidence. It was closely linked to the naval build-up of the three former Soviet republics Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan from the mid-2000s. The motivations behind this trend were twofold – a growing interest amongst the littoral states in exploiting the Caspian Sea’s economic potential, and the ambiguity surrounding its legal status at that time, particularly concerning maritime borders and access rights. Despite its scale resembling a marginal sea, the Caspian Sea is in practical terms an inland lake.5

Russia’s military port of Kaspiysk on the Caspian Sea. (Google Earth image via TWZ.com)

Although Western observers were aware of these two developments — ‘Kalibrization’ of the Russian Fleet and strengthening the combat power of forces of an inland water body — it seems they failed to derive the correct insights. For example, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, concluded with the United States in 1987, prohibited land-based medium-range missiles, but not sea-based ones. This explains why Russia’s strike in October 2015 caused such significant surprise. As is often the case with such events, many of the subsequent analyses focused on the political implications and the technologies used, while paying less attention to the underlying conceptual framework.

New strategic importance of Russia’s inland waters

Russia’s inland waterways hold strategic significance. This is due to three reasons: first, the country has a large number of rivers spread across its entire territory; second, many of them are long and wide, well-suited for transporting cargo; and third, most of the rivers lie entirely within Russian borders, making them less accessible to Western intelligence. That may have been one of the reasons why the Soviet Union connected the waters west of the Urals in the mid-20th century. At the center is the Volga River, which flows into the Caspian Sea. Through the construction of canals, the Volga was also linked to the Baltic Sea and the White Sea in the North, and to the Black Sea in the South.6 This network is most commonly referred to as the Unified Deep Water System of European Russia (UDWS).

Map of the United Deep Waterway System of Russia. (Graphic via Wikimedia Commons)

From the earliest days of the Cold War, there were discussions within NATO about the military utilization of the UDWS. However, this was more about the possibility of moving single warships, especially submarines, between the northern and the southern flank covertly and thus protected from NATO attacks. To this day, Russia maintains naval shipbuilding at several shipyards along the Volga River. Until the 1990s, even Kilo-class submarines were constructed at a facility there.

Fitting river-capable corvettes with 3M14 LACMs and using them from the Caspian Sea has fundamentally altered strategic assessments of the UDWS, from a useful logistical corridor to an inland naval bastion. However, the capability to carry out DPS from such an unexpected location seems less the outcome of deliberate planning. It was more a consequence of budgetary limitations as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the Russian financial crisis in 1998.7 Faced with the need to maintain its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), Russia was forced to make cuts in surface fleet development. Enhancing the operational reach of so-called third-rank combatants like corvettes, traditionally used for operations in the littoral ‘green water,’ or as they say in the Russian Navy – ‘near sea’ zone – emerged as a pragmatic and creative compromise, particularly against the backdrop of the INF Treaty, which was in effect until 2019.8,9 Amongst these are the aforementioned Buyan-M class and its more advanced successor, the Karakurt-class, of which several examples have been commissioned since 2018. 

Searching for safe spaces

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, naval platforms became part of the ground campaign through the use of 3M14 LACMs. Initially, such strikes were launched from the Black Sea. By end of December 2022, the Caspian Sea—far away from the frontlines—had also become a launch area for these operations. As Ukraine gradually managed to keep the Black Sea Fleet at distance through a combination of shore-based anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and later—with growing intensity since summer 2023 at the latest—uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), the strategic relevance of the Caspian Sea grew. It not only served as a safe space for continued DPS but also as a hub for repairing and replacing damaged ships.

The expanded use of uncrewed systems in the war against Ukraine plus Western intentions to acquire such platforms have made secure maritime areas increasingly vital for the Russian Navy. However, those are scarce. During the Cold War, Soviet fleets relied on an ‘area denial’-strategy (AD),10 also known as the ‘Bastion’-concept with regard to the defense of the bases of the Northern and the Pacific Fleet where Russia continues to concentrate its SSBNs. The extended defense of this protected space can be described as an ‘anti-access’-approach (A2). Long before the term ‘A2/AD’ was coined by Western analysts in 2003 and became a buzz word from 2014, Moscow had already developed the necessary capabilities as a lesson learnt from World War II (mainly a large long-range aviation and submarine force).11,12 These platforms threatened opposing surface warships, which could be detected and targeted before reaching Soviet positions. Even fleets in marginal seas were enabled to perform A2/AD. A renaissance came with the introduction of various land-based long-range missile systems from around 2012.13 For a long time, Western nations appeared to have little means to counter these A2/AD capabilities. Unmanned systems may offer a solution, as the Ukrainian armed forces have repeatedly demonstrated in the air and in the maritime domain. Due to their small size and design, uncrewed systems have low signatures. Consequently, they are frequently able to penetrate Russian defense layers unrecognized. As a result, the retreat of warships into protected areas under full Russian control—including the UDWS—appears to be the only viable option to safeguard against new asymmetric threats such as USVs and uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs).

In light of this, the Russian Navy has adapted for better protection, starting with the creation of a new naval district for the Sea of Azov in July 2023. Situated north of the Black Sea, it is a shallow shelf sea accessible primarily via the Kerch Strait, which Russia has controlled since annexing Crimea in March 2014. In the early stages of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces succeeded in closing the gap between Donbas and Crimea. Since then, Russia has gained full control over the Sea of Azov. One of the main reasons for this approach may have been that there is access to the UDWS via the Don River, which flows into the north-west. In the Sea of Azov, Russian warships are less exposed to Ukrainian attacks than in the Black Sea. This made the maritime enclave appear suitable, amongst other things, as a launch area for corvettes with LACMs.

Efforts to identify secure maritime spaces were also observed in other regions: in the east of the Baltic Sea, the Russian Navy appears to be planning to open up Lake Ladoga—situated north of St. Petersburg—as a fallback area for small warships. Covering nearly 18,000 square kilometers, it is the largest inland body of water in Europe. Since Finland’s defeat in the Second World War, it has been completely surrounded by Russian territory14 and became part of the UDWS. During the Cold War, the lake’s remoteness made it a strategically valuable site for naval testing, playing a role comparable to that of the Caspian Sea. Now, according to Russian media, it is set to become a component of Moscow’s deterrence and defense posture vis-à-vis NATO. For this, two Karakurt-class corvettes of the Baltic Fleet were deployed to Lake Ladoga for several days in September 2023, followed by two Buyan-M class vessels for a similar duration in September 2024.15 While in the first year the focus lay on navigation training and surveying former naval mooring sites repurposed by Russian state-owned defense companies, the second year was reportedly marked by notional launches of 3M14 LACMs as part of the major naval exercise Okean 2024.16

In Russian media, there have been discussions about bolstering forces for brown water operations. This was sparked by a March 2024 announcement from the then Russian Minister of Defense, stating plans to reconstitute a Dnieper Flotilla by the end of the year—intended to take over riverine combat duties from the ground forces. Such formations have existed intermittently since the 18th century, most recently until 1951. The Soviet Union also operated similar groupings on other major rivers. Russia has taken over some of them. The last major command was the Amur Flotilla at the Russian-Chinese border in the Far East: it was transferred to the Border Service in 1995 and formally disbanded in 1998. Apart from that, a sizable shipyard still exists on the Amur River, which also builds Karakurt-class corvettes. However, it is not yet known to what degree these will be deployed from there and whether Russia intends to build up further riverine units.

Amur River basin. (Graphic via Wikimedia Commons)

Decisive, complementary impact without salvos

The extent to which the Russian Navy attributes a strategic role to inland waters is currently connected to the deployment of Buyan-M and Karakurt-class corvettes. Nevertheless, the presence of these vessels beyond the usual duration of a transit is better understood as a sign that changes might be underway, rather than definitive evidence that a change has already taken place. This is because, although the corvettes can strike far-off targets using 3M14 LACMs, they are limited to carrying just eight per ship. However, in conjunction with long-range and decoy UAVs that could saturate air defenses, these assets enable surgical strikes or DPS, respectively, against select targets, particularly critical infrastructure. This reflects the ‘Strategic Operation for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets’-approach outlined in Russian military theory around 2010. The concept is to discourage an adversary from escalating or continuing a conflict by selectively destroying high-value targets, aiming to impact political or societal morale without causing mass casualties. This behavior has been repeatedly demonstrated in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Such effects could also be achieved through ground- or air-based systems. In this context, warships should be seen as a supplement — particularly when other assets are absent or limited. One example is the Russian part of Karelia, an area east of Lake Ladoga, where Moscow only recently began expanding its ground force presence in 2024, following Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023, leaving the area initially lacking adequate deterrence capabilities.17 Even though Lake Ladoga is seasonally unusable due to ice cover, it can nonetheless be utilized temporarily for defensive or deterrent purposes.

The potential use of LACMs also serves to demonstrate the Russian Navy’s relevance in land operations—an aspect that should not be underestimated. Here, the focus is less on quantity but more on quality; internally, this reinforces the Navy’s standing within the Russian armed forces and political leadership, while externally, it contributes to strategic ambiguity by signaling that all branches of the military are capable of delivering long-range effects.

Closing NATO’s blindspot

Striking land targets from lakes offers several advantages. In addition to the protection against asymmetric threats, it also provides cover from reconnaissance and targeting by enemy missile systems. This is due to the stealthy design of the Buyan-M and Karakurt-class corvettes. When moving or hiding near shorelines, spotting, tracking, and targeting them becomes difficult. Moreover, engaging warships requires different types of munitions than those used against land-based systems like rocket launchers—specifically, warheads capable of penetrating hulls or superstructures to cause significant damage or achieve a kill. Most Western anti-ship missiles have limited range, typically only a few hundred kilometers, and travel at subsonic speeds over longer distances, making them easier to detect and intercept. Additionally, some anti-ship missiles designed for blue-water targets may struggle with targets amongst the cluttered shorelines of lakes and rivers.

While NATO may not prioritize countering Russian warships on lakes in a broader conflict scenario, the risk remains significant. Ukraine’s response offers a blueprint of what can be done. On the one hand, obstructing passage through chokepoints such as straits or locks can effectively trap warships or prevent them from entering. Since the start of the war, Ukraine has sought to block the Kerch Strait; for example, in July 2024, it targeted the nearby ferry terminal at Kavkaz from the air. According to the Ukrainian Navy, Moscow has withdrawn all warships from the Sea of Azov as a result.

On the other hand, the destruction of port infrastructure can disrupt the resupply of naval forces, particularly the reloading of missiles, which can only be done pier-side. Ukraine successfully struck Russian warships in the captured port of Berdiansk on the Sea of Azov in March 2022 as well as in the naval base at Kaspiysk on the Caspian Sea in November 2024. In the latter, both Gepard-class frigates and a Buyan-M class corvette would have been affected.

Ukrainian drones strike the naval base of the Russian Caspian Flotilla in November 2024. (Footage via Twitter/OSINT Technical)

There are also lessons to be learned from Russia’s tactics: in August 2025, it launched an attack on a Ukrainian reconnaissance vessel deep in a tributary of the Danube River. The vessel was reportedly underway in Ukrainian waters, just meters away from the opposite Romanian bank. Remarkably, Russia succeeded in covertly deploying a USV about 40 kilometers into the Danube to conduct the kamikaze strike, while coordinating a UAV to monitor the mission from the air (which could also have fired on the ship).

In principle, it seems possible that the Russian Navy may seek to enhance the strategic role of inland waters. The deployment of Kilo II-class submarines or the loading of 3M14 LACMs in the containerized Club-K version18 onto civilian riverboats are both conceivable, though unlikely due to the logistical complexity involved (because of, for example, river depths19 and currents20 as well as satellite connections). Instead, Russia is more likely to focus on better protecting its Buyan-M and growing Karakurt-class corvettes. Increasing their numbers and distributing them when at sea or over several supporting sites make detection significantly more difficult. This would allow Russia to maintain a strategic reserve for DPS.

Conclusion

NATO should not underestimate Russia’s strategic brown water capabilities. The same applies to Japan and South Korea in the event that Moscow, contrary to current indications, intends to use the Amur as a launch area to defend the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. Therefore, it is essential to prepare doctrinally, enhance surveillance techniques, and develop effective countermeasures. This will require more unconventional thinking—for example, the dropping of sea mines, USVs and UUVs from the air or the arming of partisans with portable anti-ship missiles such as the Swedish RBS-17. New doctrine and capabilities can effectively account for this important yet underappreciated dimension of Russian naval influence.

Commander Helge Adrians, German Navy, M.A., is a Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

References

1. 3M14 should be able to fly up to 2,500 kilometers, according to [U.S.] State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (2020): 2020 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report), online in: https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-Adherence-to-and-Compliance-with-Arms-Control-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament-Agreements-and-Commitments-Compliance-Report-1.pdf (PDF file), June 2020 (accessed: 26.12.2024), p. 14 and 16.

2. The distance from the Caspian Sea to the targets in Syria was given by the official Russian side as ‘nearly 1,500 kilometers’, cf. TASS (2015): Caspian Flotilla ships fire 26 cruise missiles on IS targets in Syria — Defense Minister [sic!], online in: https://tass.com/defense/826919, 07.10.2015 (accessed: 18.12.2024).

3. Cf. Bogdanov/Kramnik (2018), p. 6.

4.  Cf. Office of Naval Intelligence (2015): The Russian Navy. Historic Transition, Washington: N.p., p. 20.

5. For decades, the Soviet Union and Iran—the Caspian’s only littoral states until 1991—neglected to define its legal status. Only in 2018 did the five current coastal states reach an initial agreement (i.e., the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, also known as ‘Teheran Convention’), concluding that the Caspian Sea should be treated as neither a sea nor a lake in legal terms.

6. Cf. Jaghdani, Tinoush Jamali/Ketabchy, Mehdi (2023): The Strategic Significance of the Russian Volga River System, in: Russian Analytical Digest, Vol. 304, pp. 22-27, here: p. 22.

7. Cf. Mommsen, Klaus A. R. (2020): The Russian Navy. “Russia’s pride, strength, and asset”, in: Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security, edited by Krause, Joachim/Bruns, Sebastian (2018), Abingdon/New York: Routledge, pp. 305-314,
here: p. 307.

8. Cf. Kofman, Michael (2023): Evolution of Russian naval strategy, in: The sea in Russian strategy, edited by Monaghan, Andrew/ Connolly, Richard (2023), Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 94-123, here: p. 109.

9. For example, the delays in delivering the first two Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates in 2015 prompted a shift in focus toward building Karakurt-class corvettes instead, cf. РИА Новости (2015): Минобороны заявило, что ОПК “немножко сорвал” срок сдачи двух фрегатов, online in: https://ria.ru/20151224/1348076684.html, 24.12.2015 (accessed: 19.08.2025).

10. Cf. Ushirogata, Keitaro (2025 in English; 2019 in Japanese): Global Maritime Military Strategy. 1980-2023, Singapore: Springer, p. 128 ff.

11. This was related to the fact that the US developed a new strategy to deprive Chinese A2/AD-capabilities. Russia and Iran were also credited with such capabilities, making the issue more relevant for European NATO members, especially as there were fears after the occupation and annexation of Crimea that Russia could do the same with the Baltic states and make defence more difficult by activating A2/AD-systems, cf. Simón, Luis (2016): A European Perspective on Anti-Access/Area Denial and the Third Offset Strategy, online in: https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/a-european-perspective-on-anti-accessarea-denial-and-the-third-offset-strategy/, 03.05.2016 (accessed: 27.08.2025).

12. Cf. Gorschkow, Sergej (1976): Seemacht Sowjetunion, edited by Opitz, Eckardt (1978), Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, p. 266.

13. In 2012, the S400 air defence system, which entered service in 2007, was stationed in Kaliningrad—the first of the three missile systems primarily linked to A2/AD, cf. Dalsjö, Robert/Berglund, Christofer/Jonsson, Michael (2019): Bursting the Bubble. Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region. Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications (FOI-R–4651–SE), p. 27. The other two systems are Iskander (both the -M and -K version) against land targets, and Bastion-P against sea targets, cf. ibid., p. 10.

14. In late 1939, the Soviet Union demanded territory from Finland, citing the security of Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) as a primary justification. After Finland refused, the Soviet Union invaded in November. The war ended in March 1940 with the Moscow Peace Treaty and the formerly shared Lake Ladoga became entirely surrounded by Soviet territory. Though contested during the 1941–1944 war, this control held. This outcome was formally recognized in 1947 with the Paris Peace Treaty that formally established Lake Ladoga as a Soviet inland lake under international law.

15. It was the Sovetsk (hull number: 252) and the Odintsovo (252), see the report ‘Baltic Fleet on Ladoga’ in: https://vpk.name/en/ 784930_baltic-fleet-on-ladoga.html 16.10.2023 (accessed: 24.11.2024). This is the English translation of the original Russian article by Timur Gainutdinov, published on Krasnaya Zvezda. The original text was published online but is not accessible from within Germany, cf. http://redstar.ru/na-sedoj-ladoge/. However, the Norwegian military blogger Thore Are Iversen uploaded the article and another English translation to X; see corresponding images at https://x.com/The_Lookout_N/status/ 1714640171176493411, 18.10.2023 (accessed: 27.12.2024).

16. One them could be the former naval base Lakhdenpokhya in the north west of the lake, cf. Ryabov, Kirill (2023): “Karakurt” on Lake Ladoga, online in: https://en.topwar.ru/228351-karakurty-na-ladozhskom-ozere.html, 19.10.2023 (accessed: 24.11.2024). Otherwise, the corvettes were moored at the floating bridge in Priozersk, as satellite images showed, see the Tweet by Thore Are Iversen in: https://x.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1833800057469952169, 11.09.2024 (accessed: 28.12.2024).

17. It was only in April 2024 that Russia announced its intention to station three missile artillery battalions equipped with the Iskander-M system in Karelia, see report ‘В Карелии сформирована отдельная ракетная бригада с ОТК «Искандер-М»0‘, in: https://iz.ru/1684603/2024-04-19/v-karelii-sformirovana-otdelnaia-raketnaia-brigada-s-otk-iskander-m, 19.04.2024 (accessed: 12.01.2025).

18. However, ‘[t]he current status of the Club-K system is unclear, and there is no public evidence that russia [sic!] has commenced serial production of this system’, cf. Syngaivska, Sofiia (2024): New Icebreaker Showcases russia’s [sic!] Advanced Naval Technology, Allegedly Suitable for the Kalibr Missiles, online in: https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/new_icebreaker_ showcases_russias_advanced_naval_technology_allegedly_suitable_for_the_kalibr_missiles-10743.html, 05.06.2024 (accessed: 26.08.2025).

19. Kilo-class submarines were usually deployed on barges across rivers, see the following undated photo in https://imgur.com/a/ lYRJeAO, 12.12.2023 (accessed: 04.01.2025). The link was shared in a discussion on Reddit, see https://www.reddit.com/r/ submarines/comments/18g02tl/how_submarines_built_in_nizhny_novgorod_were/, n.d. (presumably 2024; accessed: 04.01.2025). In 2021, a decommissioned November-class nuclear submarine was even transported via the White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal, see https://paluba.media/news/11667, 21.09.2021 (accessed: 16.01.2025).

20. Even smaller warships are therefore accompanied by tugs, as can be seen in a video showing the Karakurt-class corvette Taifun (805) on its way to Lake Ladoga in 2019, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZ7uYoh-hXg&t=1s, 20.05.2019 (accessed: 03.01.2025).

Featured Image: Buyan-M-class corvette of the Russian fleet, December 2022. Russia. (Photo via Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)

Russia-Ukraine Week

Reconsidering Russian Maritime Warfare

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Russia-Ukraine Topic Week

By Michael B. Petersen

How might Russian maritime forces be brought to bear against the United States and its allies? This question is particularly critical as fears of inadvertent escalation in Ukraine increase. Understanding the answer requires a close reading of what Russian military theorists themselves write about warfare, matched with an examination of maritime geography; combat power; and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR-T). Constraints in all of these areas mean that rather than solely seeking out targets at sea for a series of navy-on-navy fights, Russian maritime forces are likely to be more effective at operations that focus on striking “critical objects” on land rather than ship-to-ship combat at sea.

Many analyses of Russian naval warfare focus on the concept of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). These valuable studies nevertheless do not discuss Russia’s ability to fight at the theater level. A broader assessment at this level is necessary in light of renewed suggestions that Russia may seek to close the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap or English Channel, or engage in a “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic” over sea lines of communication.

The Russian Federation Navy’s Wartime Tasks

Understanding the navy’s role first requires a basic grasp of Russian conflict periodization. The two most critical periods in Russian military thought are the “Threatening Period” (“Ugrozhayemyy Period,”) and the “Initial Period of War” (“Nachal’nyy Period Voiny”). In contemporary Russian military philosophy, the Threatening Period is generally characterized as a short, sharp crisis potentially leading to war, while the Initial Period is characterized by decisive, rapid, joint, military, political, and cyber operations designed to achieve primary objectives or enable follow-on operations.

The Ministry of Defense has assigned several tasks to the Russian Navy in the Threatening Period. They include

  • rapid mobilization and transition to wartime footing as part of a strategic deterrence mission
  • Isolation of local conflicts and preventing them from growing into a regional war
  • Protection of Russian economic interests and freedom of navigation at sea

Given the Russian General Staff’s philosophical emphasis on preemptive operations, the Navy is also required to be able to rapidly shift to offensive and defensive combat operations when ordered. This is generally considered the start of the Initial Period of War.

In the last decade, Russian naval thinkers have emphasized the importance of land attack against critically important targets (or “objects”), especially in the Initial Period. Its official doctrine notes that one of its roles is “to attack the critically important ground-based facilities of the adversary, without violating, until a certain moment, its national sovereignty.” A crucial wartime objective is “destruction of enemy’s military and economic potential by striking its vital facilities from the sea.” This is a concept known in some circles as “the fleet against the shore.”

This is not to minimize the more traditional need to destroy naval targets at sea. For example, an influential article in the General Staff’s journal Military Thought highlights attacks against “maritime carriers that are the global strike assets” and “maritime components of the U.S. national [missile defense] system”). Thus a combination of strikes against critical targets afloat and ashore are at the core of a naval cost imposition strategy.

Indeed, despite the West’s analytic emphasis on A2/AD, Russian naval warfighting philosophy does not focus exclusively on sea control or denial. Instead, it emphasizes cost imposition ashore and afloat via strikes against targets selected for their critical strategic value. Russian naval strategists blend both, attempting to both limit damage and impose cost.

The Tyranny of Geography

While geography offers Russia certain advantages in the littorals and so-called “Near Seas” (a term rarely defined, but generally understood as laying up to 300 nautical miles off shore), as a factor in warfighting against distant targets, geography presents Russian forces with significant challenges. The long-standing geographical concept of a “loss of strength gradient” is useful here. This is a unit of competitive power that is lost per some unit of distance from home shores. In short, relative military strength changes with distance. In Russia’s maritime domain, this loss of strength gradient is particularly relevant at the operational level of war because of capacity limitations and the broad failure to secure overseas alliances or bases.

Russian warfighting in its littoral and Near Sea regions is based around a densely layered and redundant network of land-based sensors, jammers, decoys, land-based missiles, and tactical fighters. As it moves into the Far Sea zone and distant “World Ocean,” (both roughly over 300-400nm from Russia) the military’s loss of strength gradient begins to take hold as the potential volume of contested geographic space increases and available sensors decrease. Larger areas require higher-volume over-the-horizon search capabilities coupled with large numbers of survivable oceangoing warships. Both are in limited supply in the Russian Navy.

Moscow has successfully built lines of smaller and less complex naval platforms that are expected to defend its near seas in conjunction with shore-based assets. The smaller size of these ships limits their range and survivability, confining their anti-ship capabilities to local waters. But many are nevertheless equipped with the Kalibr land-attack cruise missile, capable of performing a theater strike role against targets ashore nearly 1,000 miles away.

Larger platforms, especially large surface combatants and nuclear-powered submarines based in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, have greater range and survivability. In the near term, however, they suffer from severe order of battle constraints. If Moscow draws off SSNs to defend its strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines, then the navy’s fighting strength in the Far Sea and World Ocean is may be limited to three to five submarines in the North Atlantic, for example (an area comprising some 6.4 million square miles), and two or three in the vast Pacific.

Over-the-Horizon ISR

Over-the-horizon (OTH) ISR, an essential element of open-ocean warfare, is perhaps Russia’s most critical maritime warfighting challenge. Its maritime joint combat force has developed extraordinary long-range anti-ship missiles, but they cannot kill what they cannot find. In order to exploit that range, the volume of required search space has exploded. OTH sensors capable of transmitting target-quality data to shooting platforms have lagged behind this need.

Russian shore-based sensors have impressive capability out to a few hundred miles — the Near Sea Zone — but are inadequate for open-ocean targeting. To overcome this, Moscow has constructed a new family of electronic intelligence satellites. The “Liana” system of satellites collects electronic signals emitted by adversary naval vessels and transmits that information to Russian warships equipped with the proper satellite communications equipment. According to open sources, only one Pion-NKS satellite and three Lotos-S satellites are currently operational. Publicly available satellite tracking websites indicate that there may be considerable coverage gaps.

Long-range maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft such as the Tu-142 Bear-F and Il-38 May must fill these gaps. But Russia lacks forward basing, fighter aircraft with similar range, and carrier-based fighter aircraft, making long-range escort of these missions impossible. Unless they are willing to assume extraordinary levels of risk, unarmed reconnaissance aircraft must stay within easy reach of Russian fighter patrols or land-based SAM coverage for their own protection, limiting the ocean area they can safely cover.

Sensors aboard warships and submarines also have critical limitations. For submarines, only under certain conditions will sonar detections of surface vessels be possible out to a few dozen miles. Surface platforms can have much greater detection ranges, but lack the endurance and survivability of nuclear-powered submarines. Ship-based ISR presents an ever-increasing risk as it patrols farther away from shore-based air defense. Finally, as Russian analysts themselves acknowledge, even the most advanced systems are not foolproof against sophisticated adversaries.

Imagining Russian Warfare at Sea

How might these dynamics manifest themselves in a high-intensity, regional or large-scale war in the next two to three years? Combining these military concepts at the operational and strategic level of war with Russian strengths and limitations, and pitting them against a sophisticated adversary such as the United States and NATO, it is possible to gain a sense of the broad contours of such a conflict.

During the Threatening Period, the Russian Navy is likely to begin dispersing to assigned patrol areas in the littorals, Near Sea, and Far Sea zones in an effort at crisis deterrence. Ashore, theatre-level Aerospace Defense Forces deployed along maritime frontiers will be brought up to higher states of readiness and possibly deployed from garrisons. The goal of all of these forces would be to threaten “deterrent” or unacceptable damage to the potential adversary.

Given the General Staff’s sensitivities to correlations of forces over time and its emphasis on preemptive warfare, Moscow may initiate hostilities if it believes that deterrence is failing. Rapid, decisive strategic aerospace operations, or strategic operations for the destruction of critically important targets (SODCIT), are key elements of potential campaigns in the Initial Period. Yasen and Yasen-M SSGNs are especially crucial in this regard, and may be required to attack military-industrial facilities, headquarters, and C2 nodes. Importantly, with only two or three potential submarines in this class in the near term, order of battle shortfalls place limitations on Russia’s ability to execute this mission, but given targeting limitations against naval targets, land attack is a key area of emphasis. 

The navy will likely comprise one component of a larger effort to achieve local superiority during this period. For example, in a hypothetical conflict in Europe or East Asia, the Initial Period may be characterized by an intense campaign against targets in places such as Norway, Romania, and Poland in Europe, and perhaps in Japan in East Asia. This campaign may form part of a larger effort to conduct theater-wide attacks on strategic targets with precision standoff weapons. Put another way, Russia may attempt to “expand” its adversary’s relative geography by pushing its opponents out of bases closer to Russia, forcing a more costly application of resources, while a nation like the U.S. may attempt to “shrink” its own by using standoff strike in order to bring follow-on military power forward.

Russian Long Range Aviation (LRA) bombers firing long-range precision-guided munitions from sanctuary may be more dangerous than the navy’s limited number of cruise-missile shooting submarines and their relatively small potential salvo size. Nevertheless, modern Kalibr-capable vessels should not be dismissed. Even if “bottled up” in their home waters in the Barents, Baltic, or Black Seas, smaller vessels can still strike most of northern, central, and eastern Europe. These attacks can have a decisive political effect on the course of a conflict.

Moving, uncooperative adversary naval targets are a far more difficult targeting problem. Large naval platforms in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, dispersed in the Threatening Period, may attempt to overcome open-ocean ISR shortcomings by lying in wait near maritime choke points. Though limited in number, nuclear-powered submarines play a crucial role in both offensive cost imposition and defensive damage limitation by seeking out these vessels before they get into striking range of Russian shores.

This is where the geographic loss of power gradient may affect Russia’s adversaries. If Russia can successfully eliminate forward air basing, the U.S and its partners must invest greater resources to move large amounts of combat strength forward. If the U.S. Navy must come forward, the searchable volume of ocean shrinks proportionately. Surface ships, including carrier strike groups, could be exposed to attacks from strike aircraft, other surface ships, and any submarines that may be lying in wait. Counter-ISR-T and operational maneuver techniques are likely to be the difference between life and death. Given these conditions, it is possible that the relative power gradient may rebalance if a U.S. carrier strike group or other platforms come forward.

This stage of warfare may be where Russia can impose the most cost. Large Russian surface combatants will provide air defense and surface strike while smaller frigates and corvettes, many equipped with Kalibr anti-ship cruise missiles, will conduct anti-surface warfare. But given limitations in numbers of missiles on board and the absence of at-sea reloads, an equal contributor in the effort to dole out punishment on any adversary naval forces that come forward will be made by land-based strike aircraft supported by tactical fighters and shore-based missile systems.

Implications for Analysis and Planning

This analysis has several implications. First, arguments about threats to Trans-Atlantic SLOCs require much greater analytic clarity because they run the risk of warping strategic realities. Given Russian capacity and OTH ISR challenges, it seems likely that points of embarkation and debarkation — the ends of the SLOCs, not the vast middle of the SLOCs — are at risk, primarily because it is comparatively easier to destroy a ship in port than it is to do so at sea. The circumstances of geography and the state of their own military modernization would likely drive Russian naval forces in this direction.

The majority of Russian naval effort would likely be dedicated to inflicting carefully dosed conventional damage effects in an effort to disorganize responses, interrupt logistics flows at fixed points, and generally impose “deterrent” or “unacceptable” damage that coerces an adversary to sue for peace on terms favorable to Russia. Thus, the bulk of offensive activity is likely to be on landward, fixed targets as part of a joint campaign aimed at cost imposition. Long-range precision guided munitions may be used either from the sanctuary of distant bastions or from the far seas. Russian joint assets are less likely to dedicate the lion’s share of resources for long and frustrating hunting missions for moving targets in a very large ocean. Such attacks, while possible, are far more ISR-intensive and tactically complex.

Concerns about Russia’s purported ability to threaten targets south of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap (GIUK Gap) are probably inflated. While Russia may technically be able to close the GIUK Gap or even the English Channel for a time, the likelihood of such an attempt is low. Rather, Russian warfighting strategy is partially shaped by its need to minimize its asymmetric disadvantages in warship capacity and ISR. In short, Russia still lacks the open-ocean capacity necessary to meaningfully overcome the geographic loss of strength gradient and successfully conduct ship-to-ship fighting in the central Atlantic at a scale to defeat the United States and NATO.

Even so, this analysis also suggests that the U.S. and NATO should not ignore investments in key future capabilities. Continued development in ISR and counter-ISR capabilities will remain essential. But counter-ISR will be no guarantee against attack. As Russia fields more advanced sensors to feed combat platforms equipped with new hypersonic anti-ship missiles, avoiding detection and shooting down inbound missiles will become ever more difficult, requiring more investments in so-called “soft-kill” technologies that seduce missiles to strike false targets. In addition, if Russia is able to successfully expand the maritime geography, U.S. and NATO partners are likely to require greater investments in aerial refueling to ensure that tactical combat aircraft are able to transit and fight at long distance.

Finally, it is worth remembering that any wartime adversary of Russia gets a vote. Too much of what passes for analysis of the Russian military, particularly its maritime warfighting capabilities, is carried out in the absence of what a sophisticated adversary may do with its own force. War is a dynamic interaction. Moscow’s potential opponents have effective and powerful militaries of their own, and are developing sophisticated concepts to deter or defeat Russia. Any clear-headed assessment of Russian maritime warfighting must take both perspectives into account. 

Dr. Michael Petersen is director of the Russia Maritime Studies Institute and Holloway Advanced Research Program at the U.S. Naval War College. The opinions here are solely the author’s and do not represent those of the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense.

Featured Image: Russian Navy Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Gorshkov. (Alamy photo)

Global Analysis

The New Russian Naval Doctrine

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This article originally featured on CIMSEC on Sep. 3, 2015 and has been updated for inclusion into the Russia Resurgent Topic Week. 

By Sean MacCormac

To inaugurate the Russian Navy’s new doctrine, President Vladimir Putin met with Deputy Prime Minister Dimitrij Rozogin, Defense Minister Sergej Šojgu, Commander of the Navy Viktor Čirkov, and Commander of the Western Military District Anatolyj Sidorov aboard the frigate Admiral Gorškov on July 26th to discuss the latest draft of the Maritime Doctrine. The doctrine itself is a comprehensive look and revision of Russian naval goals and strategy, from improving living standards of sailors to expanding Russian naval reach in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions. The ultimate goal is to restore the Russian Navy as a blue water force.

With Russian concerns over NATO once again coming to the forefront, the document outlines a plan to have a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean as well as increasing the existing Russian naval presence in the Black Sea, Atlantic, and Arctic oceans. The Arctic is seen as key to the Russian Navy strategy due to the abundant natural resources in the region, as well its position as a strategic link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Control of the Arctic would give the Russian Navy an easy passageway connecting the North Atlantic and North Pacific.

The new strategy calls for the construction of new nuclear-powered icebreakers to allow access to the Arctic. Shipbuilding was largely abandoned after the fall of the Soviet Union. Recently, Russia has begun a program of naval vessel building to supplement a program of naval vessel building to supplement and replace its aging Cold War era fleet. Since the 1990s, however, only submarines and smaller vessels such as corvettes and frigates have been built. Exacerbated by Russia’s current economic troubles, the Federation currently lacks the shipbuilding expertise and facilities required to construct large modern warships. Only a quarter of Russia’s current fleet is capable of conducting blue water operations.

According to Deputy Prime Minister Rozogin, Russia’s new naval doctrine was decided as a result of NATO’s eastward expansion. Former Russian Navy Commander Maxim Šepovalenko, a military expert at the Russian think tank Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, suggests that the new doctrine is built on a strategy preparing for an imminent confrontation with the US and its allies.

With a sustained presence in the Crimea, Russia now has greater access to the Black Sea and possibly the Mediterranean, especially if Russian attempts to improve relations with Turkey and Greece 9025993203_c4ef2dd5c9_bare successful. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was primarily to ensure Russian control of the naval base at Sevastopol, which had been heretofore leased to Russia by the Ukrainian government. To this end, the document notes improving the infrastructure at the Sevastopol base as a priority, as well as the completion of further strategic infrastructure in the Black Sea region.

As for the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the document urges further cooperation with India and China. Shen Shishun, director of Center for South Pacific Studies at the China Institute of International Studies, stated that he believes that cooperation between Russia and China on naval issues would be beneficial, citing China’s expansion in the Pacific Ocean as an example of like strategy. Both Russia and China plan on continuing a series of joint naval exercises in the Sea of Japan after Joint Sea 2015 in the Mediterranean, and Russia and India have plans for joint “Indra Navy 2015” exercises as well.

Though Russia is desperately seeking re-entry into the blue-water navy club, it remains an open question whether or not they will meet their goals anytime soon. Economic difficulties, clashes with European nations previously willing to sell technology to Russia, and a lack of expertise in capital shipbuilding threaten to sink Russia’s naval revival. Perhaps Russia will be able to piggy back off China’s attempt to create a first-rate navy and use their finds to aid their old ally India. What is clear, however, is that Russia intends to create a navy capable of deterring the United States and NATO, as well as China should push come to shove in the Pacific (albeit for now Russia seems to be content with cooperation with the rival Asian power). What is of greatest concern to American strategic planners is Russia’s interest in control of the Arctic and the natural resources in the waters there. Russian control of the Arctic is a possibility that should not be dismissed lightly.

Sean MacCormac is a 2008 graduate of the University of Virginia and a 2013 MA graduate of Austin Peay State University.  He can be reached at sean.j.maccormac@gmail.com.

The featured image from this post is from the AP.

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