Tag Archives: Navy

Fit to be a Frigate?

LCS 3One of the most persistent complaints about the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) is that it is not fit to replace the retiring Perry class frigates. LCS has been characterized as under-armed in comparison with the Perry class, and not capable of assuming the roles and missions of a frigate. In light of these criticisms it’s useful to examine what constitutes a frigate in the second decade of the 21st century. What sort of frigate does the U.S. Navy need to meet present requirements? Finally, does the LCS, in both its current form, and as envisioned in the frigate upgrade meet those requirements, particularly in armament? The answers may surprise LCS critics who continue to call for a Cold War frigate as the solution for 21st century naval missions.

The definition of the frigate as a naval combatant has been in constant flux since the end of the Second World War. It appeared in the Second World War as a British Royal Navy (RN) classification for an independent antisubmarine warfare vessel. By 1945, the term “frigate” generally meant a ship of 1300-2000 tons; less than 350 feet in length; a speed of less than 25 knots, and an armament focused on antisubmarine weapons.

The U.S. Navy substantively changed the frigate designation after World War 2 with its first generation of purpose-built aircraft carrier escorts. The demise of the Axis surface fleets, the well-established threat from air attack, and the rise of a Soviet Navy based on submarines called for a new, affordable combatant that could meet these challenges. A ship roughly 6000 tons in displacement, a speed comparable to fleet carriers, and capable of mounting significant antiair (AAW) and antisubmarine (ASW) weapons was seen as an ideal cross between the expensive, man-power intensive cruiser and the cheaper, but less capable destroyer class. The new ship was designated first as a “hunter killer” (CL) and later as a “frigate” (DL) with missile armed versions classified as DLG’s. Destroyers, such as the Forrest Sherman class and their missile-armed immediate successors, the Charles Adams class remained general purpose combatants optimized for a variety of roles, but generally less capable than frigates. Smaller combatants optimized for antisubmarine warfare remained labeled as destroyer escorts (DE’s).

This condition persisted until the mid 1970’s. U.S. frigates had approached the size and capabilities of World War 2 cruisers in the California and Virginia class DLGN (nuclear-powered) frigates of 10000 tons and nearly 600 feet in length. The traditional antisubmarine warfare escort had also grown in size and capability. Many of these ships, such as the FF 1052 Knox class were significantly larger than the 1940’s-era ships they were replacing. These changes compelled the U.S. to re-designate a number of its warships in 1975 to better reflect the changes in the frigate classification since 1945, as well as to combat a persistent myth that the U.S. had less cruiser-designated ships than the Soviet Union. The frigates were divided into guided missile cruisers and destroyers based on size and capability. U.S. destroyer escorts were renamed as frigates.

The patrol frigate, later the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class was the zenith of American Cold War escort design. The Soviet Union was expected to deploy a significant force of subsurface, surface, and aviation platforms to destroy the expected Reforger re-supply convoys crossing the Atlantic to support embattled North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Western Europe. Unlike previous escort classes, the FFG-7 was designed as a multimission combatant in order to better meet the expanding Soviet threat. It too, like the LCS,  ballooned in cost. According to a January 3, 1979 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the cost per ship increased from 64.8 million dollars a ship in 1973, to 194 million a copy by 1979.

This general classification system of U.S. surface combatants persisted through the end of the Cold War and the first decade of the 2000’s. After 1991, however, the international definition of the frigate category again began to change. Falling defense budgets across the Western world in the wake of the Cold War’s end compelled many nations to put more capabilities into fewer hulls, often designated as frigates, as a cost savings measure. These ships now occupy a place in many European navies analogous to that of the U.S. Arleigh Burke class DDG as the primary surface warships of those nations’ navies. Japan and South Korea have made similar changes, but have retained the destroyer classification for these larger vessels. Russia maintained the Cold War classification structure throughout most of the last 20 years, but its recent frigates are smaller than their late Cold War cousins. The Chinese Navy has followed the Russian Cold War model and gradually increased the size of its frigates as general patrol and escort ships. Although there remain several descriptions of the frigate type warship, the post-Cold War ship now associated the frigate classification has generally grown into a large and capable surface combatant for many nations.

Does the U.S. Navy need a frigate as defined by these new standards? At the end of their service lives, the Perry class had lost much of their (AAW) and (ASUW) sensors and weapons. Their MK 92 fire control system, MK 13 single arm missile launchers, and medium range Standard Missile (SM-1 MR) systems were largely out of date against the growing antiship cruise missile threat by the turn of the century. They had become the early 21st century equivalent of the late 19th century colonial cruiser, whose chief purpose was to show the flag and conduct low-intensity combat operations.

The U.S. high capability combatant class is well filled by the CG 47, DDG 51 and DDG 1000 class ships. Such a mass of AAW capable ships was not in service when the Perry’s were conceived. While the U.S. Navy requires a replacement for the Perry’s “show the flag” role, there appears to be no requirement for another medium capability convoy escort in the tradition of past U.S. frigate designs. The cruise missile threat is considerable for even high capability warships such as the DDG 51. A supporting frigate similar in size and capability to current European designs could be built, but would provide little in the way of additional capability beyond present ships. It would also not be a cost effective product for low end presence missions. Unlike during the Cold War, no potential U.S. opponent yet deploys a global naval force capable of simultaneously effectively threatening U.S. seaborne communications in multiple geographic locations. The absence of this threat for now obviates the need for 21st century version of the FFG-7. If that threat develops, advances in missile and torpedo technology will require high capacity escorts like the DDG 51 rather than a new FFG-7.

The frigate needed for the present Navy is not another Cold War antisubmarine combatant, or an expensive, but less capable version of the DDG 51. It should instead be a general-purpose warship capable of multiple tasks. It must conduct low threat missions such as counter-piracy and presence operations in order to free the DDG force for offensive and defensive missions in high intensity combat. It should be able to perform escort missions for amphibious and logistics force ships for limited periods in appropriate threat environments. The addition of a surface to surface missile armament should allow the frigate to conduct limited ASUW under the Navy’s emerging concept of distributive lethality. LCS’ endurance is 70% of the FFG-7, but it’s still sufficient for extended operations in comparison with smaller corvettes or missile patrol craft. The LCS baseline platform with 57mm gun, Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), electronic warfare gear, boats, and large flight deck and hangar is an excellent replacement for the FFG-7 in low threat, presence missions. The ship can accomplish escort and additional warfare missions with the weapons and sensors provided in its warfare modules and frigate upgrade. The ship’s modular design readily accepts additional weapons and associated equipment. The frigate upgrade to the basic LCS hull has been derided as insufficient, but only if a 21st century FFG 7 is the desired product. The modifications envisioned for the LCS-based frigate meet current requirements and definitions for the 21st century frigate the Navy requires.

No would deny the LCS program has suffered significant problems over the course of its history. It introduced multiple new technologies in one platform in order to replace three classes of ship. Problems associated with this effort remain and will likely persist for some time. In spite of these issues, the LCS and its frigate variant represent the best choice for replacing the retiring Perry class frigates in their current role as presence, patrol, and low intensity combat platforms, as well as emerging surface warfare missions. The Navy does not need a 21st century Perry class frigate.

Steve Wills is a retired surface warfare officer and a PhD student in military history at Ohio University. His focus areas are modern U.S. naval and military reorganization efforts and British naval strategy and policy from 1889-1941. He posts here at CIMSEC, sailorbob.com and at informationdissemination.org under the pen name of “Lazarus”.

Members’ Roundup Part 11

Welcome back to another edition of the Member Roundup. For those readers who have recently joined CIMSEC, or have just started reading the NextWar blog, this series seeks to promote the works that CIMSECians have published or been involved in on other sites. These include blog posts, journal articles, interviews and podcasts.

The roundup usually consists of articles and blog posts. This edition will be the first to feature a podcast with CIMSECians as panel members. Scott Cheney-Peters and Mira Rapp-Hooper (CSIS) were joined by Bryan McGrath of the Hudson Institute’s Centre for American Seapower, as well as RADM Mike Devitt (retd.) from CNA. The discussion ranged from maritime boundary and territorial disputes to the balance of seapower in Asia. You can stream and/or download the podcast here.

The Center for a New American Security’s Bavevich Fellow, Jacob Stokes, co-authored a policy brief titled ‘Slow Thaw: Testing Possibilities for Cooperation with Iran After a Nuclear Deal.’ The policy brief explores sources of disagreement and continued obstacles to cooperation, despite progress being made in the nuclear area. An analysis of possible areas of cooperation is presented, particularly within maritime security and the stability of Afghanistan. Finally, the paper provides a set of recommendations on how to maintain a positive relationship moving forward. You can access it via CNAS.

A flight of Aggressor F-15 Eagles and F-16 Fighting Falcons fly in formation. The jets are assigned to the 64th and 65th Aggressor squadrons at Nellis Air Force Base.
A flight of Aggressor F-15 Eagles and F-16 Fighting Falcons fly in formation. The jets are assigned to the 64th and 65th Aggressor squadrons at Nellis Air Force Base.

Over at The Daily Beast, freelance Defense reporter (and CIMSECian) Dave Majumdar reports that the U.S. Air Force are considering hiring military contractors in order to train their fighter pilots. There are some mixed opinions within the military in pursuing this type of training support. Certainly, those who have a background or interest in training and simulation will find this an interesting read.

Additionally, in a roundup of his own Dave assesses the top 4 weapons in the U.S. arsenal that should be retired. These include the Classic or “legacy” F-18 Hornets (A, B, C & D), as well as the M16 and M4 family of rifles. For a dissenting opinion on the M4 family of rifles, you might find this post over at War is Boring an interesting counter to Dave’s argument.

Finally, Zachary Keck from The National Interest returns with four posts for this week’s roundup. The first is his analysis of the top  5 U.S. Weapons of War Iran should fear. The second is a report that Russia’s Nuclear forces conduct surprise drill. Alliances are not perfect; here is Keck’s analysis of the 5 Most Precarious U.S. Allies of all time. Finally, the truth is revealed on how China purchased the Liaoning, its first aircraft carrier.

An officer maintains lookout on China's aircraft carrier, Liaoning, during initial sea trials.
An officer maintains lookout on China’s aircraft carrier, Liaoning, during initial sea trials.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to [email protected].

 

Charting a Closer Course: Obama’s Trip to India

When President Obama next week attends India’s Republic Day festivities, celebrating the 65th anniversary of the country’s constitution, he’ll be the first U.S. President invited as the guest of honor and treated to a spectacle rife with symbolism. In addition to floats, bands, and regiments parading along the Rajpath on everything from mounted camel to motorcyle representing the diversity of India, the President will also witness a ceremonial flyover of a P-8I maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) in formation with two MiG-29K fighter jets (pending security concerns). This flight is symbolic in its own right for several reasons.

A Maritime Renewal

On the face of it, the flyover celebrates the induction of both aircraft into the Indian Navy. But their inclusion, the only other time than the display of Harriers in 1984 that naval aviation has taken part in the flyover, also highlights India’s renewed emphasis on bolstering its status a maritime power. India’s confidence in its naval service was shaken in the wake of a spate of nearly a dozen terrible accidents over a roughly the past year-and-a-half, resulting in the loss of more than 20 lives and significant damage to several vessels.

2nd_Boeing_P8IDespite adopting a “Look East” policy in 1991, India has in large part to this day viewed its strategic choices through the prism of its contentious relations with its neighbor to the northwest, Pakistan, promoting its air and ground forces at the expense of its naval. After Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in November that he would follow through on the previous policy’s promise by setting out to actually “Act East,” observers are beginning to see signs of action. Modi has boosted ties with Vietnam and Japan, including inviting the latter to return last summer for its U.S.-India naval exercise Malabar and last week agreed to further strengthen US-India-Japan trilateral ties, although the effective result of this sentiment is unclear at this point. Early this year India may have also (but denies having) played a role in reversing China’s influence in Sri Lanka, seen as a key node in China’s Maritime Silk Road concept and playing host to Chinese submarine port calls to India’s displeasure, through aiding the surprise defeat of President Rajapaksa.

Additionally, the increased investments India has made of late in the sea services are starting to bear fruit, as evidenced by more than just the new aircraft. The sea trials begun in December of India’s first indigenous nuclear ballistic missile submarine, the commissioning of its first indigenous guided-missile destroyer in August, and the construction underway of its first indigenous aircraft carrier also demonstrate – despite schedule slippages – the increased priority in funding the sea services are receiving. On New Year’s Day, India received another confidence boost, reporting that its coast guard succeeded in intercepting a fishing boat operated by terrorists before they were able to execute another “Mumbai-style attack.”

Opportunities

1280px-Mikoyan_MiG-29K_of_the_Indian_NavyHowever there is another view of the symbology of the flyover. It will not be lost on most observers that the MiG is of Russian origin, and the P-8 hails from the United States. As such, the flight represents the choice for India between its traditional weapon supplier, Russia, and new options. These alternatives include India itself, as it looks to produce as much domestically as it can, at times in partnerships with those willing to share technologically advanced designs, but also those with whom it would like to cement friendships. In the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, which is attempting to finalize a deal over US-2 amphibious aircraft.

This presents the United States with several opportunities. During his trip President Obama is expected to renew a defense cooperation framework with India for another 10 years. But this is more or less the continuation of the status quo. At the same time, India is seeking suppliers of drones, and is likely to get the RQ-11 Raven, but would be well suited for sale of larger drones for maritime surveillance or as strike aircraft. Further, India is reportedly weighing the benefits of nuclear propulsion for its second indigenous carrier.

Both drones and nuclear propulsion are fields in which the United States excels, yet selling either carries risks. The sale of armed and larger drones, which U.S. export controls currently restrict, would if nothing else pique other partners already turned down from purchases. If lax safety standards led to an accident aboard a nuclear vessel, public opinion could call into question the U.S. Navy’s use of it. But the bigger risks are those of missed opportunity, the opportunity not only for business, but for binding ties between two maritime powers with much to gain through increased cooperation.

 

Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founder and president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council.

#CARRIERDEBATE: Bearcraft are the Answer

[Editor’s Note: The following more appropriately fits in our annual International Maritime Satire Week, but Matt couldn’t wait]

Friday night,  Naval Academy History Museum and USNI hosted a debate on the viability of Aircraft Carriers as a future naval asset. Bryan McGrath, the affirmation, and Jerry Hendrix, the negation, wrestled over the value-for-return and vulnerability of a carrier to enemy weapon systems. There were, however, three particular points of agreement – that there are concerning issues about the range and ability of the modern-day carrier air wing, that unmanned aviation is the future… and Grizzly Bears are terrifying.

In that light, it seems that a mutually-acceptable solution for the investment security and return sought by Jerry Hendrix and the flexibility and potential sought by Bryan McGrath would be using our greatest fear to solve our mutual problem. Even as we speak, the CNO’s office for naval aviation, N98, is testing the B3AR5: unmanned bearcraft. With the terrifying visage and endurance of a grizzly bear, with the flexibility and precision of an aircraft, the B3AR5 propels US naval security, and the bearcraft carrirer, into another 60 years of dominance.

ABHC Connor Stark coaxes a baseline B3AR5 out of it's bear trap for upgrade s and work-ups.
ABHC Connor Stark coaxes a baseline B3AR5 out of it’s bear trap for upgrade s and work-ups.

 

A confused B3AR5 during basic work-ups and training.
A B3AR5 is startled during advanced training.

 

Lockheed Martin's bid for the new B3AR5 data link architecture to act as a force-multiplier to the deadly lethality of flying bears.
Lockheed Martin’s bid for the new B3AR5 data link architecture, enabling swarm attacks to act as a force-multiplier to the deadly lethality of flying bears. Also synergy.

 

Prototype B3AR5 conducting flight-deck tests during sea trial.
Prototype B3AR5 in idle during flight-deck tests during sea trial.

 

AT1 Billie Sanders conducting pre-flight checks on a B3AR5
AT1 Billie Sanders conducting pre-flight checks on a B3AR5

 

The first B3AR5 catapault launch w/ F-18 flight lead off the USS LEEROY JENKINS (BVN-1)
The first B3AR5 catapault launch w/ F-18 flight lead off the USS LEEROY JENKINS (BVN-1)

 

 

B3AR5 overflight of USS LEEROY JENKINS (BVN-1)
B3AR5 overflight of USS LEEROY JENKINS (BVN-1)

 

Naughty B3AR5 hits the sound barrier during a unauthorized flyby of the USS GERALD R FORD during sea trials.
Naughty B3AR5 hits the sound barrier during a unauthorized flyby of the USS GERALD R FORD during sea trials.

 

The first flight of Carrier Bear Wing, BVW-1, off the USS LEEROY JENKINS (BVW-1).
The first flight of Carrier Bear Wing, BVW-1, off the USS LEEROY JENKINS (BVW-1).

 

For the Army's new Coastal Artillery project, intended to give the US it's own ground-based A2AD capabilities, General Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, has commissioned tests of a ground-based version of the B3AR5.
For the Army’s new Coastal Artillery project, intended to give the US it’s own ground-based A2AD capabilities, General Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, has commissioned tests of a ground-based version of the B3AR5.