Tag Archives: Navy

Maritime Coordination and Inter-American Cooperation in the South

By Sabrina Medeiros

When the Inter-American Defense Board created the Maritime Coordination Area for the South Atlantic in 1959, cooperation had a different scope for enhancing maritime security and promoting Maritime Domain Awareness. Nevertheless, the changing scenario as late as 2015 shows a dedicated reinforcement of protocols and regimes to guarantee that states can cover the actual vulnerabilities that challenge maritime transportation and security. Naval Control of Shipping is one of the main problems for the development of a region such the Americas and cooperation agreements have been playing an important role to permit states have the same guidance and work together to deal with the remarkable difficulties around security of the transnational commerce.

In that sense, controlling variables that may threaten maritime situation awareness is one of the aspects that are commonly included in the hemisphere regional organizations, but also, specialized ones as to make inter-agency work at a lower level, based on strengthening protocols and the valuation of common standards. In this respect, the Americas have been from the various types of organizations, some dealing with a necessary institutional renewal, others looking for the complex agenda states are involved in. In addition to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance – signed in 1947, Rio de Janeiro – theCDMALogosome decades ago projected a plan for the inter-American defense coordination of the maritime traffic (Plan para la Coordinación de la Defensa del Tráfico Marítimo Interamericano – PLANDEFTRAMI, 1959). The CODEFTRAMI substituted the first plan by the end of 1996 and it has divided the areas into four groups: North Atlantic, South Atlantic, North Pacific and South Pacific. Whereas differently oriented, the process of institutionalization was effective for the Atlantic South Area, called AMAS (Área Marítima del Atlántico Sur), that was formed by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

The Coordination for the South Atlantic Area (CAMAS) would have a biennial rotated command occupied by one of the members from the highest Navy authority (a position currently alternating among Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay). At this point we might ask what is the key position such an organization has nowadays based on the fact that multidimensional tasks are taking place. Although helping to create a sense of developing both technical systems and institutional capabilities, AMAS is still a step back compared to forums where different agents can contribute to the success of a variety of circumstances, legal arrangements and diffuse actors. Also, its public visibility is short, with a limited confluence to the regional approach on borders reinforcement and security.  A coverage  to the cited gap could be the CAMAS proposal on promoting cooperation with ZOOPACAS Organization, to enhance cooperation reaching the area bordering Africa (Uruguay, XXVI Reunion de COLCO). Considering the multidimensionality of those efforts, one of the main causes for the diminishing interest in promoting institutionalization is how the lack of capabilities and resources affects the management of correlated institutions in crossing themes and areas.

The Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur (CPPS), built after the Declaración de Santiago, 1952, is an example of this eventual overlapping compromises that fall onto some of the other regional engagements in course, proposing itself on behalf of the Seguridad Integral Marítima, an even broader understanding of maritime security. While focused on maritime sustainable development more than security and the use of maritime routes, the CPPS played an important role helping Chile and Peru, both founding members, provoke diplomatic discussions on the maritime limits harmonization in the South America Pacific, and clearly is a way to deal with the main topics that the Pacific South and North Maritime Areas inside CODEFTRAMI could ultimately cover. Furthermore, CPPS has done a memorandum of understanding with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that enables it to join the international maritime regime as a legitimate observer actor, as well as did ALADI (Asociación on Latino-Americana de Integracion), CARICON (Caribbean Community) and OAS (Organization of American States) in the Americas.

Then, the CAMAS initiative has still an important responsibility in the South Atlantic and it still can be the best means to improve South-South Cooperation, as it can even command the maritime area if members decide. As the way to integration has been from micro-level agency cooperation to the macro-level of state’s foreign relations institutions and vice-versa, we can state that the multidimensionality paradigm may become the next source of CAMAS tasks on the region. Correspondingly, this can guarantee a better participation in other forums whenever the level of cooperation is open to other nations from inside or outside of the continent. A good example is the combined exercise for maritime control (Ejercício Naval de Tráfico Marítimo), named TRANSOCEANIC Exercise, which is being held over years together with Mexico, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and South Africa, and can clearly provide protocols and common guidance to the other actors and common platforms.  CAMAS also participate annually in the COAMAS exercise and the biannual TRANSAMERICA Exercise (as part of Plan CODEFTRAMI), where there are other Americas countries together with AMAS members:  Mexico, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. For better and constant communications, recent improvements that can be cited include the already implemented system called REDE AIS DA AMAS, from where protocols and cases can be shared to partners.

One trending topic that can be cited as a way to articulate the different locus of technical cooperation and, ultimately, stirring accountability on maritime security is also deepening communication standards. Over time, communications has been a central topic when considering the possibilities of maintaining security with the prevalence of states’ authority in its respective area. That is how technical cooperation has been built in the South America zone making possible arrangements that fulfill needs and commit exchange of information based on equivalent systems. Guaranteeing that those institutions be maintained and integrated as observers in each other’s initiative is a way to boost cooperation without losing focus and the micro-level decision making process. A sub-regional seminar on surveillance systems is a good example, as proposed this year to Brazil by IMO (International Maritime Organization) and counting as members on the Portuguese speaking countries of Africa and, as observer, the South Atlantic Area Coordination and the Guinea Gulf Center for Maritime Security.

One of the results that could be part of the initiatives above is the recognition of a transition from controlling to cooperating, which not only was proposed by NATO on its willingness to approximate the commercial shipping community, but also can be seen in the South America as a prevailing policy. When talking about outcomes, there is also a consciousness that regional integration in the macro level has in someway helped those micro-agencies projects succeed, when domestic political actors would reinforce that direction.

Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros is a professor at IADC-OAS (Washington, DC), Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Marítimos – Escola de Guerra Naval and PPGHC-UFRJ (Brazil).  She received a PhD in Political Science at IUPERJ and her main area is international cooperation and reputation.

Sea Control 71 – The Thucydides Trap

seacontrol2Matthew Merighi, CIMSEC’s Membership Director and Boston Chapter President, interviews Professor Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College about the “Thucydides Trap,” a political science term which predicts inevitable conflict between a rising great power and established great powers. The conversation addresses whether the Trap is truly inevitable, how it relates to the rise of China, and how navies fit into the equation. Professor Yoshihara also delves into the roles of strategic studies in professional military education and about Thucydides’ unique history in the Naval War College.

DOWNLOAD: Sea Control 71 – Thucydides Trap

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Produced by: Matthew Hipple
Hosted by: Matthew Merighi

Audio Editing By: Dmitry Filipoff

Raid Breaker: Robert Work’s Soft Kill on Hard Costs

Winston Churchill noted that, “it is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war” – so too once the war-war has started, “it is better to buzz-buzz, then to bang-bang.” U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work’s desire for new electronic-warfare (EW) solutions AKA Raid Breaker, aimed at large missile salvos in particular, is necessary not only for the arena of physical war, but the internal war of budgets and force planning that enable such critical fights.

For the following argument I assume the effectiveness of soft-kill (EW) over hard-kill options. I also assume that ultimately shooting down a guided missile is more expensive than confusing it; as Secretary Work states,for relatively small investments, you get an extremely high potential payoff.

However, beyond the immediate cost/effectiveness argument, we are forced to spend more in other areas due to the increasing amount of space/weight/weapon systems we dedicate to missile defense on our surface ships. That dedication to defense pushes out offensive capabilities, which we must then buy in other areas. Some might argue that the “need” for the F-35 and its stealth capabilities were, in part, driven by destroyers whose long-range weapons weapons were almost wholly turned over to defense – requiring a carrier for offensive punch. That technological bias towards the defensive has become so extreme that it has required VADM Rowden’s new “Distributed Lethality” effort – a course change back into a realm that should be a natural instinct for the surface force: distributed operations and killing enemy ships.

Of course, the pricetag and weight of kinetic systems has also prevented the fleet from finding more cost-effective ways to increase the ship count – requiring DDG’s or, in the case of the original LCS plan, expanding smaller ships to take on additional responsibilities. With significant investments in defensive systems not requiring a vast VLS magazine, we could build smaller ships with bigger relative punches at a lesser cost. We could more aggressively pursue the Zumwaltian dream of the High-Low Mix: more ships for more effect for less money – every CNO and SECNAV’s dream.

Raid Breaker is a case of finding, and exploiting, competitive advantage. We have been using our best offensive capabilities – the kinetic weapons – for defense. We have let the best defensive options languish, and in so doing pushed expensive requirements into other areas where we must find our offensive edge. A firm dedication to electronic warfare for “soft-kill” options gives us our ships, and our procurement flexibility, back.

In the end, the excitement over Raid Breaker should not primarily involve its awesome war fighting impact if successful – but all the other ideas it will all the Navy to pursue. What makes Raid Breaker so beautiful is that the raid it breaks, in the long-term, is the one on our bottom line.

Matthew Hipple is a Naval Officer and Director of Online Content at CIMSEC. He also produces our Sea Control podcast, hosting the US edition.  

F-35 Fanboy Makes His Case

By Dave Schroeder

Fair warning: what follows is commentary about the F-35. However, this isn’t going to be a very popular commentary, as it doesn’t follow suit with the endless stream of recent articles, opinions, and blog posts making the F-35 out to be the worst debacle in the history of the militaries of the world. On top of those you’d expect, even automotive and IT blogs have piled on.

People who have no idea how government acquisition works, nor the purpose of the Joint Strike Fighter program — or even some who do, among many with ideological axes to grind — relish trashing the F-35, always managing to include “trillion dollar” (or more) somewhere in the title of the latest article to lambast the plane.

The F-35 is a multirole fighter that is designed to replace nearly every fighter in not just the Air Force inventory, but the Navy and Marine Corps as well: the F-16, F/A-18, AV-8B, and A-10, and to augment and partially replace the F-15 and F-22. The F-35 lifetime cost will be less than that of all the diverse platforms it is replacing — and their own eventually needed replacements.

China devoted significant national espionage resources to stealing everything they could about the F-35, and implementing much of what they stole in the J-31/F-60 and J-20, China’s own next-generation multipurpose stealth fighters. This theft added years of delays and hundreds of millions of additional redesign dollars to F-35 development.

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSZr58hH_cI]
Navy test pilot LT Chris Tabert takes off in F-35C test aircraft CF-3 in the first launch of the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter from the Navy’s new electromagnetic aircraft launch system, set to install on USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78).

If anything, the F-35 suffers from being a “jack of all trades, master of none” — which is itself a bit of an overstatement — but we also can’t afford the alternative of follow-on replacement for all existing platforms. And for all the delays, we still have aircraft in the inventory to serve our needs for the next 10-20 years. Articles oversimplifying sensor deficiencies in the first generation, software issues with its 25mm cannon (the gun remains on schedule), or the oft-quoted 2008 RAND report, apparently choose overlook the reality that it’s not going to be instantaneously better in every respect than every aircraft it is replacing, and may never replace aircraft like the A-10 for close air support.

The F-35 development process is no more disorganized than any other USG activity, and if you want to look for people protecting special interests, it’s not with the F-35 — ironically, it’s with those protecting all of the myriad legacy platforms, and all of the countless different contractors and interests involved with not just the aircraft, but all of the subsystems made by even more contractors, all of whom want to protect their interests, and which are served quite well by a non-stop stream of articles and slickly-produced videos slamming the F-35.

NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope was originally to cost $500 million, and is now expected to cost $8.8 billion and will be over a decade late. Shall we cancel it? Or take the pragmatic approach when the purpose of the mission is important and no reasonable alternatives exist? This isn’t a problem with just DOD acquisition. It’s the reality in which we live.

A F-35B hovers during testing.
A F-35B hovers during testing.

One of the reasons the JSF program, and the F-35, came into being is precisely because we won’t be able to afford maintaining and creating replacements for a half-dozen or more disparate aircraft tailor-made for specific services and missions.

The F-35 itself is actually three different aircraft built around the same basic airframe, engine, and systems. The F-35A is the Air Force air attack variant, the F-35B is the VSTOL Marine Corps variant, and the F-35C is the Navy carrier-based variant. If we had already retired every plane the F-35 is supposed to be replacing, there might be cause for concern. But as it stands, we have retired none, and won’t until the F-35 can begin to act in their stead.

The A-10, for instance, has found new life over the last 12 years in close air support roles, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is often held out as an either/or proposition against the F-35. No one ever claimed that the F-35 was a drop-in replacement for an aircraft like the A-10, and no one could have predicted the success the A-10 would again find in environments not envisioned when the JSF program came into being — though some of this success is overstated, claims otherwise notwithstanding. The Air Force is faced with difficult resource prioritization choices; if the A-10 is that critical, keep it. The debate on the future of CAS isn’t dead.

U.S. Air Force Capt. Brad Matherne, a pilot with the 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, conducts preflight checks inside an F-35A Lightning II aircraft before its first operational training mission April 4, 2013, at Nellis AFB, NV.
U.S. Air Force Capt. Brad Matherne, a pilot with the 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, conducts preflight checks inside an F-35A Lightning II aircraft before its first operational training mission April 4, 2013, at Nellis AFB, NV.

If there are questions as to why we even need a fifth-generation manned multirole fighter with the rise of unmanned systems, cyber, and so on, the answer is an easy one: China and Russia both developed fifth-generation fighters, and the purpose of these aircraft isn’t only in a direct war between the US and either of those nations, but for US or allied military activity in a fight with any other nation using Chinese or Russian military equipment, or being protected by China or Russia. You don’t bring a knife to a gun fight.

The F-35 isn’t just a US platform: it will also be used by the UK, Canada, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Israel, Turkey, Singapore, and perhaps other nations. And the fact is, this is not only our fifth-generation manned fighter, it is likely the last. We cannot afford to have separate systems replace all or even most of the platforms the F-35 is replacing, nor can we simply decide to forgo replacements and extend the life of existing platforms by decades.

The F-35 is our nation’s next generation fighter, and it’s here to stay.

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ki86x1WKPmE]
F-35B ship suitability testing in 2011 aboard USS Wasp (LHD-1)

Dave Schroeder serves as an Information Warfare Officer in the US Navy, and as a tech geek at the University of Wisconsin—Madison. He holds a master’s degree in Information Warfare, and is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). He also manages the Navy IDC Self Synchronization effort. When not defending the F-35, he enjoys arguing on the internet. Follow @daveschroeder and @IDCsync.