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UUVs as Stealthy Logistics Platforms

Guest post for UUV Week by  Steve Weintz.

As potential adversaries sharpen their abilities to deny U.S. forces the freedom to maneuver, they concurrently constrain America’s traditional strength in supporting expeditionary power. Sea-bases bring the logistical “tail” closer to the expeditionary “teeth,” but they must stay outside the reach of A2/AD threats. Submarines remain the stealthiest military platform and will likely remain so for some time to come. In addition to their counter-force and counter-logistics roles, subs have seen limited service as stealth cargo vessels. History demonstrates both the advantages and limitations of submarines as transports. Submarine troop carriers, such as those used in SOF operations, are distinct from submarine freighters; the submarine’s role in supply and sustainment is addressed here. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) will revolutionize minesweeping, intelligence collection, and reconnaissance. But they may also finally deliver on the century-old promise of the submarine as a stealthy logistics platform.

PIC
Deutschland (Launched 1916)

Although early submarine pioneers like Simon Lake saw commercial advantage in subs’ ability to avoid storms and ice, submarines as cargo carriers were first used operationally to counter Britain’s A2/AD strategy against Germany in World War I. The Deutschland and her sister boat Bremen were to be the first of a fleet of submarine blockade-runners whose cargo would sustain the German war effort. Despite her limited payload – only 700 tons – the privately-built Deutschland paid for herself and proved her design concept with her first voyage. But the loss of Bremen and America’s turn against Germany scuttled the project.

Cargo subs were again employed in World War II. The “Yanagi” missions successfully transported strategic materials, key personnel, and advanced technology between Germany and Japan. The Japanese also built and used subs to resupply their island garrisons when Allied forces cut off surface traffic. Their efforts met with limited success – enough to continue subsequent missions but not enough to shift the outcome of the Allied strategy. The Soviet Union also used submarines to sustain forces inside denied areas at Sevastopol and elsewhere. These efforts inspired serious consideration of submarine transports that carried over well into the Cold War. Soviet designers produced detailed concepts for “submarine LSTs” capable of stealthily deploying armor, troops and even aircraft.

Dr. Dwight Messimer, an authority on the Deutschland, points out that cargo subs – with one notable exception – have never really surmounted two key challenges. They have limited capacity compared with surface transports, and their cost and complexity are far greater. If subs are made larger for greater capacity, they forfeit maneuverability, submergence speed, and stealth. If built in greater numbers their expense crowds out other necessary warship construction. The Deutschland and Japan’s large transport subs handled poorly and were vulnerable to anti-submarine attacks. Many cargo subs were converted into attack subs to replace attack-sub losses.

The one notable exception to these difficulties is “cocaine subs” so

A "narco-submarine" is apprehended off Honduras
A “narco-submarine” is apprehended off Honduras

frequently encountered by the US Coast Guard. These rudimentary stealth transports are simple and inexpensive enough to construct in austere anchorages, make little allowance for crew comfort, and have proven successful in penetrating denied US waters. The tremendous value of their cargoes means that only a few of these semi-subs need to run the blockade for their owners’ strategy to succeed.

Logistical submarine designers could potentially overcome their two primary challenges by drawing inspiration from smugglers and from nature. UUVs, like other unmanned platforms, enjoy the advantages gained by dispensing with crew accommodations or life-support

MSub's MASTT
MSub’s MASTT

equipment. Large UUVs built and deployed in large numbers, like cocaine subs and pods of whales, could transport useful volumes of cargo in stealth across vast distances. MSubs’ Mobile Anti-Submarine Training Target (MASTT), currently the largest UUV afloat, offers a glimpse at what such UUVs might look like. At 60 metric tons and 24 meters in length, MASTT is huge by UUV standards but very small compared to most manned subs.

3D printing technology is rapidly expanding, producing larger objects from tougher, more durable materials. Already, prototype systems can print multistory concrete structures and rocket engines made of advanced alloys. It will soon be possible to print large UUV hulls of requisite strength and size in large numbers. Indeed, printed sub and boat hulls were one of the first applications conceived for large-scale 3D printing. Their propulsion systems and guidance systems need not be extremely complex. Scaled-down diesel and air-independent propulsion systems, again mass-produced, should suffice to power such large UUVs. These long-endurance mini-subs would notionally be large enough to accommodate such power-plants.

10 large UUVs of 30 tons’ payload each could autonomously deliver 300 tons of supplies to forward positions in denied areas. 300 tons, while not a great deal in comparison to the “iron mountain” of traditional American military logistics, is nevertheless as much as 5 un-stealthy LCM-8s can deliver.

A “pod” of such UUVs could sail submerged from San Diego, recharging at night on the surface, stop at Pearl Harbor for refueling and continue on their own to forward bases in the Western Pacific.

Their destinations could be sea-bases, SSNs and SSGNs, or special forces units inserted onto remote islands. Cargoes could include food, ammunition, batteries, spare parts, mission-critical equipment, and medical supplies. In all these cases, a need for stealthy logistics – the need to hide the “tail” – would call for sub replenishment versus traditional surface resupply. Depending on the mission, large UUVs could be configured to rendezvous with submerged subs, cache themselves on shallow bottoms, or run aground on beaches. Docking collars similar to those used on deep-submergence rescue vehicles could permit submerged dry transfer of cargo. UUVs could also serve as stealthy ship-to-shore connectors; inflatable lighters and boats could be used to unload surfaced UUVs at night.

When confronted with anti-submarine attacks a “pod” or convoy of such UUVs could submerge and scatter, increasing the likelihood of at least a portion of their cumulative payload arriving at its destination. Some large UUVs in such a “pod” could carry anti-air and anti-ship armament for defense in place of cargo, but such protection entails larger discussions about armed seaborne drones.

A submarine – even a manned nuclear submarine – is not the platform of choice if speed is essential. Airborne resupply can deliver cargoes much more quickly. But not all cargoes need arrive swiftly. The water may always be more opaque than the sky, and larger payloads can be floated than flown. It remains to be seen if large stealthy unmanned transport aircraft can be developed.

While these notions seem fanciful there is nothing about the technology or the concept beyond the current state of the art. Large numbers of unmanned mini-subs could overcome both the capacity and expense limitations that limited the cargo submarine concept in the past. The ability to stealthily supply naval expeditionary forces despite A2/AD opposition would be a powerful force multiplier.

Steve Weintz is a freelance journalist and screenwriter who has written for War is Boring, io9 and other publications.

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles: A Conversation with Chris Rawley

To start our UUV Week, we’re talking with Chris Rawley, owner of the website Naval Drones: Unmanned Naval Systems and author of Unconventional Warfare 2.0. Chris is a surface warfare officer in the US Navy Reserve.

Penguins: They Love UUVs. NSF-funded SeaBED shown.
Penguins: they love UUVs. NSF-funded SeaBED shown.

SD: Thanks for talking with us today, Chris. Let’s get right to it with some initial broad strokes. There’s clearly a great deal of potential out there for UUV platforms, but in a very general sense, what mission areas of those set out by the US Navy’s UUV Master Plan show the most promise in terms of cost effectiveness and practicality?

CR: Thanks Sally. Before I start, I have to provide the disclaimer that I am speaking here in my personal capacity and my comments and opinions do not reflect U.S. Navy or DoD policy. Also, I am by no means an expert in this field, though I have picked up some knowledge the past few of years writing for “Naval Drones,” which was initially established as a marketing tool for a UUV concept I developed. After some fits and starts, my company is currently working on this UUV design with a prototyping firm.

From my perspective, mine countermeasures is the mission area ripest for disruption by unmanned undersea vehicles. As CIMSEC’s readers know, mine clearance involves a painstaking, methodical process of hunting to rule out false positives detected by various sensors or using sweeping gear to activate the mines. Dedicated mine countermeasures ships, though still in service, will eventually be replaced multi-mission platforms embarking UUVs. Most readers know about the Littoral Combat Ship’s dedicated mine countermeasures payload, but pretty much any naval combatant or auxiliary with a margin of payload capacity such as the JHSV can launch UUVs or carry boats or unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that can launch UUVs directly into a mine field at a safe stand-off distance from the mother ship . Multiple UUVs operating together will eventually become faster at mine hunting than dedicated surface ships with sweeping gear or mine-detection sonars. ROVs and UUVs such as the SeaFox can also localize, identify, and neutralize the mines. Though I think the UUV Master plan specifically mentions nine mission areas, besides MCM, at some point UUVs will play a part in pretty much any kind of naval operation one could imagine.

While we continue to wait for the silver bullet of long-endurance propulsion systems, the three areas of UUV development with the most potential I see are payload miniaturization, payload modularity, and swarming algorithms.

USN sailors load a SeaFox MCM UUV (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Colby Drake/Released)
USN sailors load a SeaFox MCM UUV (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Colby Drake/Released)

SD: Let’s talk specifically about UUVs in an ASW capacity. A lot of readers (okay, especially me) are interested in what UUVs can bring to anti-submarine warfare (ASW). In all likelihood, such a platform would need to detect low-frequency signals, demanding a large array and a vehicle to support it. Will there have to be a trade off between the reasonable size of a notional platform (to support such an array) and such a platform’s detection capabilities? Are leave-behind arrays delivered as part of a UUV payload a more desirable option?

CR: Autonomous underwater vehicles such as gliders are already helping to characterize the water column, which as you know is one of the most important foundations of ASW. As far as sub-hunting goes, a large UUV towing a passive array might be one way to do it, though I’m not sure that is feasible for a variety of reasons. Or as you’ve alluded to, a larger UUV could basically become a means to more precisely deploy sonobuoys or emplace arrays on the bottom. What about smaller, more numerous UUVs each carrying a single hydrophone and operating at different depths? Or UUVs able to surface and act as non-acoustic data relays between bottom arrays and ASW aircraft? I think there is certainly room for some R&D and experimentation in this area.

SD: The idea of an UUV with the capacity to surface and communicate as a non-acoustic data relay with an MPRA asset is particularly promising and offers a solution to some of the major complexities of airborne prosecutions. Further, the idea of employing UUVs to deploy hydrophones or arrays at specific depths is a novel turn on a well-established technique. But perhaps getting those assets on-station at the appropriate times would present a difficulty; after all, one of MPRA/airborne ASW’s major advantages is speed and flexibility relative to the target. On to another ASW question: in an increasingly crowded underwater environment, do you think that submarine-launched UUVs will offer more or less stealth to launching platforms? Do you see any applicability for UUVs as a decoy, or would maintaining acoustic superiority for existing and future subs prove a more worthwhile, cost-effective pursuit?

CR: Unlike a sub-fired missile, I’m not sure a UUV will make a launching submarine any less stealthy. To my knowledge, most of the UUVs that have been tested have been “swim out,” so they wouldn’t add much extra acoustic signature to the launch platform. Some sort of acoustic or magnetic decoy UUV does seem like a viable and useful payload for a submarine.

SD: U.S. Submarine-launched UUVs may have somewhat of a compatibility crisis in the coming decades. SSGNs are uniquely suited for UUV operations, but as modified-Ohio class platforms reach the end of their service life in the coming decades, how do you think UUV platforms will fit into the Virginia Payload Module program?

A Naval Sea Systems Command illustration depicting the VPM concept.
A Naval Sea Systems Command illustration depicting the VPM concept.

CR: Though launching and recovering a UUV from a submarine certainly adds an element of “stealthiness” for the UUVs themselves, it also comes with several complications. There are trade-offs in a submarine’s limited tube space – be it torpedo tubes or the VPM – between UUVs and other payloads such as torpedoes and missiles. Moreover, as you note, more submersible vehicles will result in an increasingly crowded operating environment. A manned submarine operating in conjunction with a large number of friendly (and potentially, enemy) UUVs makes waterspace deconfliction challenging and puts a capital ship at risk for a collision, especially as the size and speed of UUVs grows.

But here’s the thing: a UUV is inherently stealthy. Why do we need to launch it from another low signature platform (a submarine) when it can be launched more cheaply and across wider areas (such as shallow water littorals) by more numerous surface vessels or even air platforms?   Where there is no other way to get a shorter ranged UUV into the water column, a submarine may be the answer. To answer your question, we should save limited submarine payload capacity for offensive weapons and insert the majority of UUVs into the battlespace using more affordable means.

SD: Interesting points. I hadn’t considered the idea of mutual interference, and it certainly makes sense to deploy UUV assets from surface or air assets, where space would not be as much of a premium. This is another broad question, but what role do you see for UUVs in developing a cogent strategy to counter A2AD?

CR: UUVs could potentially serve as fire control sensors, decoys, and deception tools during a counter-A2AD campaign. I’ll leave it at that.

SD: Fair enough. One of the most frequently cited criticisms of developing UUV platforms is the inherent difficulty of communication and navigation in an underwater environment, as well as limitations on data links and processing. What is your answer to these criticisms?

CR: The easiest solution is the surface the UUV every now and then to transmit its data and get its bearings. But advances in underwater data modems (both acoustic and non-acoustic), along with autonomy will mitigate some of these challenges

SD: If operating covertly in a denied area, surfacing might be detrimental to the UUVs mission, but no more so than other subsurface assets that might be required to surface to receive or transmit data. But, admittedly, this is a pretty narrow scope to view a very broad potential mission set, and such a concern would not apply to all those potential applications. Let’s talk autonomous vehicles. AUVs operating at a distance will undoubtedly carry the potential for loss or interception. Is there an acceptable level of platform loss or risk operators of UUVs will have to accept?

CR: Sure. I think we will need a variety of UUV types. Some, like Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV), will be large, expensive, and multipurpose. Others will be designed to be single-purpose, affordable, and expendable, while some others will be somewhere in the middle.

SD: Specifically though, do you think that there might be inherent risks to doing business via UUVs that do not exist for manned counterparts? Not necessarily that these risks outweigh the benefits, but, if there are any, they’re worth discussing.

CR: Signal interception is a problem faced with pretty much any platform these days. Even manned aircraft are going to be hard pressed to operate without emissions given how networked everything is.  Many UUV atmospheric signals will be on commercial channels, so hard to differentiate from civilian traffic. As to the technology being recovered by an enemy, that is certainly possible too, and a much higher risk for unmanned vehicles. We’ve learned lessons from UAVs that are applicable in this area.

SD: Great point; the risk for signal interception would likely not be any greater for unmanned platforms, and could be mitigated in similar ways. Let’s scale down a bit. On your blog, you recently discussed possible applications of small-scale UUVs, such as those fielded by the University of Graz’s Collective Cognitive Robots project. What applications do you envision for small-scale UUVs like these operationally?

CR: Search and recovery, especially in inshore waters or the littorals, comes to mind. But also acoustic decoys, and maybe even small, mobile sonobuoys for ASW. I’d love to get some reader feedback on this one actually.

SD: I really look forward to reading what others have to say on this issue as well. I think the MPRA ASW applications are especially promising. Last but certainly not least, let’s discuss the LDUUV program. What is your take on pier-launched or even surface-ship based systems with longer endurance and on-station capabilities?

The U.S. Navy's LDUUV
The U.S. Navy’s LDUUV

CR: For some applications, a pier-launched UUV might be viable. But a Navy’s strength is based on its mobility. So yes, as we seem to agree, surface ships are a pretty viable launch platform for large UUVs. The Naval Special Warfare Command’s Swimmer Delivery Vehicle is an analogy. Of course, they are most stealthy when operated from a submarine, but can also be launched from ships and smaller combatant craft. And depending on the operational range of the LDUUV, surface ships would be fine for many mission profiles. And if you are looking for stealth, the stealthiest platform is the one that hides in plain sight, so not every launch platform has to be a naval vessel.

SD: This has been tremendously interesting discussion! Thank you, Chris, for your time; congratulations on your progress with your own UUV design. We look forward to following its development! Thanks as well to the CIMSEC readers who have followed along. Let’s continue this discussion in the comments section.

Sally DeBoer is an Associate Editor for CIMSEC.

Visit Chris Rawley’s blog at: blog.navaldrones.com

 

 

 

Sea Control 79 – Post-Election UK Defence & Foreign Policy

seacontrol2Hallo, and welcome to the East Atlantic Sea Control post General Election 2015 discussion, please join the host Alex Clarke, and panellists Paul Fisher and Chris Parry as they delve into the murky world of divining what the world of Conservative (Slim) Majority government will mean for defence.
For those wishing to read more on this topic, we highly recommend Alan Hensher’s PTT paper, Defence of the Realm  Alex Clarke’s papers Protecting Exclusive Ecconomic Zones (Part 1 & Part 2) & The Defence Debate – why the UK needs to change the subject  and perhaps go back to listen to a previous podcast in this series…
For those wishing for more information on blue hair day, go to: http://harrisonsfund.com/blue-hair-day.php

 

 

The “Cooperative Strategy” (CS-21/CS-21R): A View from Germany

By Dr. Sebastian Bruns

In mid-March 2015, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard published its new strategy “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready.” This article looks at the new strategy through the prism of Germany, one of the leading industrial powers in the world and a country dependent on unhindered maritime trade routes.

As much as for any other nation, the American sea services remain a benchmark for Germany in terms of operations, standardization, and for combined operations. After all, the United States fields the single global force projection navy: It is the qualitatively largest naval force and the only one that is forward-present or rotating in areas of strategic interest. In addition, the U.S. Navy (and, to a lesser degree, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard) is frequently and proactively used as a foreign policy tool. In short, U.S. sea power helps shape the international security environment for better or for worse. German security policy must heed the political and military implications of where U.S. naval power is being projected (and in some cases, where there is a divergence) in order to play an accordingly responsible and reliable role. As the smallest of the three German military branches, it has often been under the radar of policy-makers and the public. In contrast to the U.S. Navy, for instance, the German Navy has until recently not been understood as a tool of statecraft. Accordingly, German naval operations were, for a long time, more reactive than proactive (which is, certainly, a function of cautious leaders aware of German history as well as of the dynamics of force structure and deployments).

German expeditionary military operations (and by implication, its strategy) by law must be integrated in systems of collective defense or collective security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) firmly bounds Germany and the United States together in a military alliance that is fundamentally maritime in character, although it has been focusing heavily on ground operations for the past decades. Since 1990, Germany’s small navy, grouped around larger frigates and smaller coastal combatants as well as a few state-of-the-art conventionally-powered submarines, has continuously been operating in maritime focus areas as diverse as the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic Sea, and obviously the Baltic Sea and North Sea. It transformed from an escort navy of Cold War days to an increasingly expeditionary navy, as the German military historian Bernard Chiari has characterized it.

German tender FRANKFURT AM MAIN (A 1412) meets U.S. amphibious transport dock MESA VERDE (LPD 19) somewhere between Berlin and Washington.
German tender FRANKFURT AM MAIN (A 1412) meets U.S. amphibious transport dock MESA VERDE (LPD 19) somewhere between Berlin and Washington.

In all of these regions and in various naval operations, cooperation with U.S. naval forces was the norm rather than the exception.[i] European waters moved to the periphery of American geopolitical thinking. Consequently, U.S. naval forward presence in the 6th Fleet area of responsibility diminished significantly after the end of the Cold War. Aircraft carriers, for instances, were often only seen in the Mediterranean when they transited to or from the Persian Gulf. Northern European waters, which saw extended U.S.-led naval presence since “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s, were almost completely empty of U.S. Navy surface warships (with the notable exception of the annual U.S. Baltops exercise in the Baltic Sea, and on-and-off port visits and exercises in between). Together with the changing security environment in Central Europe, in principle this offered new opportunities for the German Navy, which at the time transformed from protecting to projecting force – in doctrine, not in the composition of the fleet.

CS-21 (2007)

To understand the implications for Germany from CS-21R, it is instructive to briefly review the impact of that document’s predecessor, CS-21 (2007). The strategy, which appeared on the eve of the global financial crisis, featured a systemic approach, that is: it emphasized the cooperative nature of naval forces working together to build maritime security regimes in order to protect the globalized system of the exchange of goods, services, and information. Such an approach – highly uncommon for most maritime, much less naval strategies – fared well in principle with Germany. It did so for several reasons: First, it appeared to overcome the unilaterlist notions of the era of President George W. Bush. Second, it emphasized the need to protect the global commons from harm and hardship, and by extension safeguard the sea lanes on which Germany’s industrial power is very dependent. Third, the cooperative nature was in line with German security policy thinking, which has a marked uneasiness towards employing military means and much rather focuses on ‘civilian-military cooperation’, ‘comprehensive approaches’, and a primate of soft power politics (as if sensible sea power would not offer the vast variety of policy measures on the spectrum of conflict). Fourth, the open spirit of CS-21, its deliberately glossy format, and the non-militaristic lingo had potential to appeal to makers and shapers of policy. It is no coincidence that CS-21, not CS-21R or any other U.S. Navy capstone document, remains the yardstick for naval strategy planning and thinking in Germany for the time being.

German navy corvette Braunschweig (F 260) departs Hamburg in December 2006 on its maiden voyage. The vessel is the first-in-class of the K130-type corvettes.

Operationally, maritime counter-terrorism operations (such as Operation Enduring Freedom’s TF 150 off the Horn of Africa, in which Germany actively participated since 2002), maritime capacity-building measures (such as UNIFIL’s maritime task force off the Lebanese coast since 2006) and counter-piracy efforts (with EU NAVFOR Atalanta being stood up in December 2008) appeared to be the dominating naval missions of the period, along with the occasional disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations which CS-21 had elevated to a strategic objective. Such a view fared well in Berlin, and for the navy, it meant a boost in public relevance.

In this view, CS-21 was a very fitting document for the German Navy, which to date does not have a unique capstone document of its own. The systemic maritime strategy published in Washington emphasized seemingly softer naval missions at the perceived expense of warfighting, deterrence, or amphibious landings. Implicitly, in the view of Germany, the U.S. and some other allies would probably still do these things, but the focus clearly was elsewhere.

The German navy frigate FGS Hamburg (F220), left, and the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), right, take on fuel and stores from the Military Sealift Command fast combat support ship USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10), center, during a replenishment-at-sea in the Arabian Sea on March 23, 2013. The Eisenhower, Hamburg and USS Hue City (CG 66), top, are deployed to the 5th Fleet area of responsibility to conduct maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts.
The German navy frigate FGS Hamburg (F220), left, and the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), right, take on fuel and stores from the Military Sealift Command fast combat support ship USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10), center, during a replenishment-at-sea in the Arabian Sea on March 23, 2013. The Eisenhower, Hamburg and USS Hue City (CG 66), top, are deployed to the 5th Fleet area of responsibility to conduct maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts.

While the narrative about the role of naval forces now was increasingly clear to the German public – after all, fighting pirates and other bad guys at sea has a long tradition in Germany, dating back to the days of the Hanseatic League – a severe intellectual disconnect that had developed since 1990 finally surfaced. More than ever, maritime security operations (MSO), although but one of any balanced navy’s many missions, became the key raison d’être for the German Navy. Stripped of the word ‘operations’, ‘maritime security’ (or Maritime Sicherheit in German) increasingly turned into a catch-all term in German policy and military circles to legitimize the current fleet. The paradox consequence: The securitization of the maritime sphere, as Christian Bueger has characterized it, led to an increasingly diluted understanding of risks and naval countermeasures while at the same time producing an unjustified, mind cuffs-like emphasis on MSOs as the sole rationale for German sea power. The consequence could be observed in the 2011 NATO campaign against Libya: For political reasons that reached to the German foreign minister, the frigate Niedersachsen (F 208) was quickly detached from the NATO force which prepared to strike targets in Libya. The change in government after the 2013 general election in Germany set the stage for a slightly different approach.

CS-21R (2015)

CS-21R, the revised version of CS-21, is being phased in a radically changing security environment. The return of geopolitics over the Ukraine-Russia crises, the rise of the “Islamic State” in Syria and Iraq, the outbreak of Ebola in Africa, failing states in the Southern Mediterranean region, increasing tensions in the South-East Asian littorals, the challenging dynamics of an Iranian quest for a nuclear program, the fallout of the currency and debt crisis in Europe, and many more factors provide ample evidence that the world has not turned into a notably more stable, peaceful, and serene place. Germany is slowly, albeit steadily adopting a more robust posture to address such threats and dynamics. Still, until 2014, the Army-focused operations in Afghanistan dominated the German strategic thinking about the use of military force. With the end of combat operations, the German military establishment and parts of the public and the policy elite are reconsidering their country’s role in the international arena. A new “White Book” is currently in development (the first since 2006, and only the third since the end of the Cold War). This process was recently kicked off with a public forum in order to be as inclusive for stakeholders, analysts, and the public alike. For German terms, an open discussion about defense issues is rather revolutionary. Thus, the orchestrated speeches by President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and Secretary of Defense Ursula von der Leyen at the 2014 Munich Security Conference – calling for more robust German engagement, including military means – were remarkable in every way. A 2013 think tank report was outspoken in a similar manner, declaring that Germany’s new power meant a new degree of international responsibility. The 2010 abolition of conscription and (yet another) new organization and orientation of the Bundeswehr by then-Secretary of Defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg have proven to be a fundamental challenge for the service. It has also been demonstrated that against the backdrop of an increasingly violent world, the military is an integral part of German power, and must be treated, organized, funded, and employed accordingly. All of this is important to understand the environment in which CS-21R is made public.

Minehunter FULDA (M 1058), seen here in 2008, and its sister ships may see increased operational relevance now that the Baltic Sea area has once again returned as a maritime focus area with potential for both, cooperation and confrontation (photo: Deutsche Marine)
Minehunter FULDA (M 1058), seen here in 2008, and its sister ships may see increased operational relevance now that the Baltic Sea area has once again returned as a maritime focus area with potential for both, cooperation and confrontation (photo: Deutsche Marine)

It is still too early to call the shots on the true effects and consequences of CS-21R on Germany and the German Navy. CS-21R has received little attention in the media (with the exception of the trade press), and even the handful of German military blogs have remained silent so far. There are at least three aspects that have a direct relevance for Germany.

First, a closer look at the document reveals the inclusion of fiscal dynamics into U.S. naval planning. It is likely that the trend of less U.S. naval presence in Germany’s maritime focus areas has very real implications for what the German Navy may be asked to do. This would, in turn, yield the need to invest better in the Deutsche Marine and raise the budget accordingly in line with established overarching defense requirements. A second, potentially contentious point is the absence of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) as a core strategic capability of the sea services in the new U.S. document. Whereas navies are certainly not built for such operations, as Samuel Huntington already cautioned in his landmark 1954 Proceedings article, such missions provide an opportunity for quick political gains. A response to the on-going migration waves from Northern Africa to Southern Europe using military vessels for search and rescue could be such a measure, even though Germany’s possible participation in would be conditional once again on an international mandate and with the clear understanding that the European littoral states would also shoulder their operational responsibility. Third, CS-21R’s regional approach is centered on the Indo-Asian-Pacific region. These are hardly traditional operating areas for the German Navy, even if the maritime discourse in Germany has been shaped by anti-piracy patrols. Within the framework of “responsibility”, it is conceivable to argue that other nations (and the U.S.) are more responsible for that region, although Germany would potentially be willing to play its part and contribute forces along defined missions (such as in Operation Atalanta or in one of NATO’s four standing naval forces, should the situation require it). The flipside of such an argument is that Germany would have to play a more assertive role in its “home waters” such as the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and by extension the waters surrounding Europe. As for the Baltic Sea, the first few steps are on the horizon, at least in terms of re-focusing strategically and operationally, and taking leadership through collective security management. Whether the capabilities and the political will can follow along, however, remains to be seen. Still, CS-21R and the environment in which it has been published, provides an opportunity for Germany to focus on the value of navies in international security. A stand-alone strategic capstone document would help explain this new role to its allies as well as to the public and to many policy-makers alike.

From another era? The officers and crew of the German destroyer Lütjens (D 185), say goodbye and render honors to USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) by lining the rails in their Dress Blues as they came alongside the ship at sea. The German Sailors, who had become good friends with many of the crew on board Churchill, were flying an American flag at half mast and had hung a homemade banner that read, "We Stand By You." The ships had been conducting joint exercises off the coast of the United Kingdom prior to the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11th.
From another era? The officers and crew of the German destroyer Lütjens (D 185), say goodbye and render honors to USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) by lining the rails in their Dress Blues as they came alongside the ship at sea. The German Sailors, who had become good friends with many of the crew on board Churchill, were flying an American flag at half mast and had hung a homemade banner that read, “We Stand By You.” The ships had been conducting joint exercises off the coast of the United Kingdom prior to the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11th.

[i] In recent years, there has also been an increasing level of integration with German Type F-123/F-124 frigates being part of U.S. Navy carrier strike groups in the Persian Gulf. Other cooperative measures such as the exchange of officers or cooperation in technology issues have been around since the formation of the German Navy after World War II.

Sebastian Bruns recently graduated from the University of Kiel with a PhD in Political Science. He is a Fellow at the Institute for Security Policy, University of Kiel (ISPK)North Atlantic Ocean (July 12, 2004) — The German frigate FGS Niedersachsen (F208), the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land (AS-39), the Turkish frigate TCG Gediz (F495), and the Spanish frigate SPS Alvaro De Bazan (F101) steam together through the Atlantic Ocean while participating in Majestic Eagle 2004., where he works on naval strategy.