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Admiral Canaris: Hitler’s Slippery Spymaster

By CDR Christopher Nelson, USN

Author David Alan Johnson discusses his new book, Admiral Canaris: How Hitler’s Chief of Intelligence Betrayed the Nazis. It is a well-written synthesis of the life of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who served as the chief of military intelligence for Nazi Germany from 1935-1944. While Canaris might be less well-known than some of the more senior Nazi officials from World War II, his unique position and acts of sabotage make him among the most consequential resistance leaders during the war. Admiral Canaris’ excellent skills in deception, subterfuge, political infighting, along with his eventual distaste that turned into hatred of Hitler’s regime, make for a fascinating story.

To begin, provide us with a brief biographical sketch of Admiral Canaris. How do we place him in context among other Nazi and Wehrmacht leaders?

In common with the majority of German leaders during the Hitler era, both political and military, William Canaris had an excellent record as a junior officer during the First World War. He received commendation both as an active officer with the fleet and as an intelligence officer. He was presented with the Iron Cross 1st Class by Kaiser Wilhelm. Most of the leaders of the German forces were also decorated veterans, including Adolf Hitler. Canaris hated the Weimar Republic and the Treaty of Versailles. To Canaris’ way of thinking, the Weimar Republic was a foreign administration that had been forced upon Germany by the Allied powers, and the Versailles Treaty severely limited the size of the German navy and prohibited the building of submarines – Canaris had been a submarine commander during the war. When Hitler became Führer during the 1930s, he promised to re-arm Germany which included rebuilding the German Navy. Along with all other high-ranking German officers at the time, Wilhelm Canaris was in complete agreement with Hitler and his plans for a New Germany. Adolf Hitler was a strong-willed German nationalist who planned to form a new government in Germany, abolish the Versailles Treaty, and create another German fleet, complete with submarines. As far as Canaris was concerned, Hitler was exactly what Germany needed.

What specifically led to Canaris taking charge of the Abwehr – German military intelligence?

Wilhelm Canaris had been the intelligence officer aboard the cruiser Dresden during the First World War, which gave him a working background in that field. But his first link with the Abwehr came in 1934, when he was captain of the battleship Schlesien. Captain Canaris did not get along with his immediate superior, Rear Admiral Max Bastian. In an effort to get rid of Captain Canaris, Admiral Bastian recommended that Canaris be assigned to an administrative post – possibly the Abwehr. But instead, the German admiralty sent Canaris to Fort Sweinemünde, a seaport on the Baltic Sea coast. This turned out to be a dead-end job; Canaris was not happy with this assignment.

But less than a month after reporting for duty at Fort Sweinemünde, Canaris became the beneficiary of a happy accident – the head of the Abwehr, Captain Conrad Patzig, resigned his position because he was not able to get along with the director of the newly-created Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the ambitious Reinhard Heydrich. Before leaving his position, Captain Patzig recommended that Wilhelm Canaris replace him as the Abwehr’s director. Canaris not only had the qualifications for the job but, just as important, he had been friends with Reinhard Heydrich back in 1923, when Heydrich had been a 19-year-old naval cadet aboard Canaris’ training ship. Wilhelm Canaris became the Abwehr chief because of several coincidences. He became the official head of the Abwehr on January 1, 1935.

What made Canaris an exceptional intelligence officer?

Captain Conrad Patzig, Wilhelm Canaris’ predecessor as head of the Abwehr, noted that he did not know of anyone else who had Canaris’ talent for deception and subterfuge – two vital attributes for an intelligence officer, especially in wartime. During the First World War, when he was intelligence officer of the cruiser Dresden, Lieutenant Canaris informed a radio station in Brazil that the Dresden would soon be returning to Germany. He knew that this message would be picked up by British Intelligence. But the Dresden did not go back to Germany; she continued to operate in the vicinity of Montevideo, Uruguay. British Intelligence did not discover the ruse until the Dresden sank two British merchantmen off the coast of Uruguay. The Dresden’s captain was happy to learn that his young intelligence officer had such a talent for duplicity. Canaris would go on to use this talent against Hitler and the Nazi regime in years to come.

How did Canaris balance the Abwehr’s intelligence work with the Nazi Gestapo and Security Service?

He did not “balance” his intelligence work with the other agencies. He basically set out to confuse Hitler and his generals by sending reports that invalidated information supplied by other agencies. This not only served to confuse the high command, but also led to Hitler losing faith in his intelligence services in general. His first opportunity to mislead Hitler came early on during the war, in September 1939. Admiral Canaris advised Hitler that French troops and artillery were gathering in the vicinity of Saarbrücken, which indicated that a French offensive would be taking place nearby. This news took Hither completely by surprise. He replied that he could not imagine a French attack anywhere near Saarbrücken. German defenses were particularly strong in that region, he said, and refused to believe the admiral.

Hitler’s opinion of Canaris would continue to deteriorate as the war went on and Canaris continued to make intelligence “mistakes.” He withheld information regarding “Operation Torch,” the Allied invasion of North Africa, which took place in November 1942. A task force of British and American warships and troop transports sailed right through the Straits of Gibraltar and landed on the North African beaches without the German High command knowing anything about the landings in advance. By the spring of 1943, all Axis forces had either surrendered or had been withdrawn from North Africa. A little over a year later, in January 1944, Admiral Canaris also contributed to the success of the landings at Anzio. He informed Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring that there was no need to fear an Allied invasion anytime in the near future. At that exact moment, about 250 British and American ships were approaching the town of Anzio on the western coast of Italy, carrying 50,000 men of the US Fifth Army and the British Fifteenth Army Group. Anzio was one of the largest amphibious operations of the war. Because of these apparent blunders, Hitler and his generals had lost all faith in the German intelligence services, not just in Admiral Canaris. Canaris had misled and misinformed them too many times.

Let’s dive into the reasons Canaris changed his mind about Hitler and began to subvert Nazi policies and goals. Canaris, initially it sounds, believed stridently in German nationalism and was a supporter of the Nazi regime. But he changed. What happened?

Admiral Canaris’ support of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime began to change during the early part of 1938. This change of heart was brought about by two separate incidents. The first incident involved the deliberate disgracing of Hitler’s highest-ranking general, Werner von Blomberg. General von Blomberg had recently married a much younger woman, Erna Gruhn. Because of von Blomberg’s position as Minister of Defense, the wedding was a leading social event; Adolf Hitler himself was one of the wedding guests. A short time after the wedding, Erna Gruhn was discovered to have quite a vivid police record – she was a convicted prostitute and had also been a model for pornographic photos. When Adolf Hitler was told of this, he was livid with anger, but he also realized that this incident created an opportunity for himself. He demanded von Blomberg’s resignation on the grounds that he had committed an immoral act by marrying a prostitute. After the general submitted his resignation, Hitler assumed his title of Defense Minister. Hitler had been looking for an excuse to solidify his control over the armed forces; the von Blomberg scandal gave him a ready-made excuse. General von Blomberg resigned in January 1938; Adolf Hitler immediately replaced him as supreme commander.

At the same time as the von Blomberg incident, the Wehrmacht’s commander-in-chief was removed from his post as the result of another scandal – this one was completely fabricated. General Werner von Fritsch did not agree with Hitler’s aggressive policy toward the Soviet Union. He was afraid that Hitler’s belligerence would lead to war with Russia, a war he knew Germany could not win. Hitler did not appreciate von Fritsch’s opposition, and decided that the general had to be dismissed from his post.

The method used to dispose of General von Fritsch was both simple and brutal. He was charged with having homosexual relationships, which was a criminal offense in Nazi Germany. A witness testified before both Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring that von Fritsch had a homosexual affair with a young boy in Potsdam. General von Fritsch vehemently denied the charge, and was allowed to be tried by a court of honor. The trial acquitted him of all charges, but the scandal ruined his reputation and ended his career – just as Hitler had planned. The accusations had been a complete set-up. It had been a different Captain von Frisch who had the homosexual affair, not the General von Fritsch. Hitler and the Gestapo knew this, but allowed the charges to be filed just the same. In February 1938, General von Fritsch resigned his position in disgrace. Hitler had taken another step toward solidifying his complete control of all German armed forces.

News of the Blomberg-Fritsch scandal was the leading story throughout Germany, as well as in the international press. American correspondent William L. Shirer was in Vienna at the time and read all about it. “Today’s papers say that Blomberg and Fritsch, the two men who have built up the German army, are out,” he wrote in his diary. “Hitler himself becomes a sort of ‘Supreme War Lord,’ assuming the powers of Minister of Defense.”

Admiral Canaris was absolutely stunned by the news that Hitler had ruined the careers and lives of two of his most senior officers, all for the purpose of supreme command of German forces. Until the Blomberg-Fritsch incident, the admiral admired Hitler and considered him an honorable and patriotic head of state who had restored Germany’s economy and military power. But Canaris no longer trusted Adolf Hitler, that although Hitler made many stirring speeches about Germany, he only had his own self-interest at heart. “This was the time when Canaris began to turn from Hitler,” a friend recalled. “If you have to mark any one event as the crisis of loyalty between Canaris and Hitler, this is it.”

Canaris as a Korvettenkapitän, circa 1924–31. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

But the incident that decisively turned Canaris against Hitler was Kristallnacht, or the “Night of Broken Glass,” which took place on November 9, 1938. On this night, coordinated attacks were carried out against synagogues and Jewish-owned businesses throughout Germany. Hundreds of synagogues were vandalized, along with thousands of Jewish shops and businesses. Fragments of broken glass from smashed windows covered the streets and pavements. The light reflected by the shards reminded bystanders of crystal ornaments, which gave rise to the name “Crystal Night.” Over the years, the name has become synonymous with the barbarity of the Hitler regime.

Along with the Blomberg-Fritsch scandal, Kristallnacht destroyed Admiral Canaris’ faith in both Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. Hitler ruined the lives of two senior officers to promote his own ambition, and now he approved a night of vandalism and destruction that turned world opinion against Germany. Two days after Kristallnacht, the New York Times ran this front-page headline: “Nazis Smash, Loot and Burn Jewish Shops and Temples.” No one knew exactly what Hitler might do next, but Canaris decided that he could no longer allow himself to support Adolf Hitler.

But the admiral did not resign his position as head of the Abwehr to protest Kristallnacht. Instead, he used his rank and authority to smuggle hundreds of refugees out of the Third Reich by disguising them as Abwehr intelligence agents. In 1941, he smuggled 500 Jews out of Nazi-occupied Holland to neutral Spain and Portugal and across the Atlantic Ocean to South America, Mexico, Panama, and other countries. According to some accounts, Canaris’ refugees also entered the United States. All of these evacuees were disguised as Abwehr agents. Some were taught simple codes to make their cover stories more convincing. All passports and other documents were signed by Admiral Canaris himself. The admiral was also responsible for saving the lives of many other Jews and “undesirables” by arranging their escape from Nazi-occupied territory.

What role did Canaris play in the various plots to assassinate Hitler, particularly the July 20th Plot?

Admiral Canaris was well aware of most of the assassination plots against Hitler, but no evidence exists to show that he was directly involved with any of them. At least eight assassination attempts were made since the war began. The first took place on the night of November 8, 1939, at the Bürgerbraükeller in Munich. Hitler was scheduled to make a speech at the beer hall that night, and a bomb was placed behind the speaker’s rostrum by a former inmate of Dachau. Everyone expected Hitler to make one of his usual long-winded speeches, which usually lasted more than an hour but, to the surprise of the audience, he left the building much sooner than expected.  When the time bomb exploded at about 9.30 pm, Hitler had already finished speaking and had left the premises.

Hitler managed to escape all the other assassination attempts, as well, mostly because of what one writer called “the devil’s luck.” In June, 1940, a group of conspirators planned to shoot Hitler while he was attending a victory parade in Paris, but the plan came to nothing when the parade was canceled. A year later, another group of conspirators attempted to kill Hitler during a parade, yet once again, the parade was called off. In March 1943, a bomb was placed aboard Hitler’s airplane while he was traveling through Russia. The bomb featured an acid detonator, which had always proved to be very effective and efficient in the past. But the pilot was forced to climb to a higher altitude than planned to avoid turbulence, and the acid froze in the frigid upper atmosphere. The bomb failed to explode.

Hitler also managed to escape other bomb plots because of luck. One attempt failed when the bomb exploded prematurely. Another effort collapsed when Hitler left an exhibition after staying only a few minutes; he sensed that something was wrong and cut his visit short. Admiral Canaris did not have much faith in these schemes and “did not want to be too much in the picture,” according to one source. His plan for ending Hitler’s dictatorship was to do everything in his power to help make the impending Allied invasion a success. As far as he was concerned, everything else, including bomb plots and assassination attempts, was a complete waste of time and effort.

There were those in London and Washington who shared the admiral’s opinion. Many feared that killing Hitler would only turn him into a martyr, and would encourage right-wing militarists to begin preaching that Germany would have won the war if the Führer had not been murdered by traitors. If Hitler were assassinated, this line of thinking went, his followers would establish a new military dictatorship in 20 or 25 years, a Fourth Reich, and would start another war. This was exactly what Admiral Canaris did not want to happen. Losing the war, and dealing with Hitler and the Nazis after they had been overpowered by the Allied armies, was the only practical way of restoring a German government based on international law, according to Canaris’ point of view.

Canaris (right) confers with top Nazi party officials Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler (left) and Chancellor Joseph Goebbels. 

Canaris had a complex relationship with foreign intelligence services. How did he interact with British intelligence, and what impact did these interactions have on the war?

During the months leading up to D-Day, Admiral Canaris’ activities can be best described as hazy and mysterious. He managed to keep Allied intelligence well informed of reports concerning German defenses in Normandy. No one is exactly sure how he stayed in touch with his contacts in London, but it was probably through acquaintances in Spain. No matter how he accomplished it, the admiral sent a good many reports across to England, priceless information involving the German defense build-up on the coast of Normandy.

An American colonel attached to General Eisenhower’s intelligence staff found out exactly how valuable Admiral Canaris had become to the Allied war effort. The officer in question was Colonel James O. Curtis, who was the only American intelligence evaluator on Eisenhower’s staff. The other three officers were British. The main job of an intelligence evaluator was to read and evaluate each and every report that was received – thousands of reports and pieces of intelligence arrived in London during the period leading up to D-Day – and to determine which were genuine and which were unreliable. Colonel Curtis was on very friendly terms with his British colleagues, but he had the feeling that they were not telling him everything – including details about the sources of the information.

Allied intelligence had its own system of grading information, a system that judged each report based on its credibility. The highest quality reports were graded A-1; the lowest were F-6. Colonel Curtis noticed that a surprising number of reports were being graded A-1. A great deal of A-1 material seemed too accurate and detailed to be true, at least to colonel Curtis’ way of thinking. He refused to believe that all the reports were as accurate as his British associates seemed to think. The three British officers were reluctant to divulge the source of the information until Colonel Curtis insisted. He refused to pass the reports along to American planners at Eisenhower’s headquarters until he knew something about their source.

The head of the department, Colonel E.J. Foord, finally decided to let the American in on their secret. He told Colonel Curtis that the source was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, and went on to say that this disclosure was to be considered Top Secret: “The only reason that I am telling you this is that we want you to regard this information as being priceless and copper-bottomed.” Colonel Foord explained that only a very select few high-ranking individuals – President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, General Eisenhower – knew anything about Admiral Canaris’ activities. Colonel Curtis was taken completely by surprise by this revelation. “I was, at first, afraid to go to sleep in case I talked in my sleep,” he said.

Colonel Curtis wrote about Admiral Canaris’ accomplishments: “His most important service was to give us substantially the complete order of battle plans for the German Army, together with the plans they had worked out for coping with the invasion.” Receiving the Wehrmacht’s listing of divisions and regiments was an enormous asset for Allied intelligence. Piecing together that much information would have taken a great deal of time and effort, if the task could have been managed at all. Instead, intelligence agents were able to put that energy to work on other projects. Delivering the order of battle was one of Admiral Canaris’ major achievements. It gave Allied intelligence priceless information on enemy defenses in Normandy, and proved to be a major contribution toward helping Allied forces win the war.

What were the key reasons for Canaris’s eventual downfall, and how was he discovered to be working against the Nazi regime?

The failed assassination plot of July 20, 1944 made Hitler almost obsessively determined to round up everyone who had any connection at all with the plot, no matter how slight. The Gestapo carried out Hitler’s orders with brutal efficiency. Hundreds of German officers were arrested for complicity in the assassination attempt. About 20 percent of them were executed; many were tortured beforehand.

Admiral Canaris was not involved in the plot, but one of the officers taken into Gestapo custody named Canaris as one of the conspirators. Under the stress of Gestapo questioning, this officer, Colonel Georg Hansen, not only implicated the admiral as a member of the July 20 plot, but also identified him as one of the leaders of the anti-Nazi opposition. Colonel Hansen also said that Canaris was directly responsible for smuggling Jews and other “undesirables” out of German-occupied territory, a disclosure that took his interrogators completely by surprise. On the day after this interrogation, Admiral Canaris was arrested by the Gestapo.

Senior Nazi officials, including Martin Bormann, Hermann Göring, and Bruno Loerzer survey the damaged conference room of the July 20 assassination attempt. (Photo via German National Archives)

While under arrest, Canaris was regularly questioned by Gestapo agents. Most of these interrogators were specialists in either tricking or intimidating their prisoners into telling them what they wanted to know. But the admiral always managed to avoid answering their questions. He sometimes pretended to be a stupid old man, acting as though he did not understand what the agents were asking him. Sometimes he just sidestepped the questions, or replied with an answer that did not make sense. For months, he frustrated the Gestapo with one ruse after another. But the interrogators never gave up. They always had more questions, and kept coming back.

Not all of the prisoners were as resourceful, or as devious, as Admiral Canaris. One of the suspected conspirators told the Gestapo about some files that were being kept in the town of Zossen, about 20 miles south of Berlin, files that were said to contain valuable information about the anti-Hitler movement. The Gestapo immediately went to Zossen, where they discovered several binders in a safe at the Wehrmacht headquarters building. The binders contained several diaries that recorded – in great detail, and in Admiral Canaris’ handwriting – the activities of the anti-Nazi movement since the 1930s. These diaries supplied the Gestapo with all the evidence they needed to hang Admiral Canaris.

No one knows exactly why Canaris kept such a detailed account for so many years. He gave names, dates, and particulars of just about all the activities of the anti-Hitler conspirators. Possibly it may have been to record events for future historians; maybe it was to keep an official record of the corruption of Hitler and the Nazis for a post-war tribunal. Whatever the reason, the diaries have been one of the great mysteries of Admiral Canaris’ enigmatic life.

Sometime during early April, probably April 4, the diaries were handed over to Adolf Hitler. After reading Admiral Canaris’ comments and observations, Hitler ordered the admiral to be given a quick trial and then hanged. Admiral Canaris had been moved to Flossenbürg concentration camp, about a mile from the Czech border, at the beginning of February. Arranging for a quick trial and execution at Flossenbürg was a routine matter.

American soldiers stand at the gates of the Dachau concentration camp after its liberation. (Photo via 42nd “Rainbow” Infantry Division)

What were Canaris’s personal relationships like with his family and close friends during the height of his double life? How did they perceive his actions?

During the war, Admiral Canaris’ closest friends and associates were members of the anti-Hitler movement. Colonel Hans Oster turned against Hitler in 1934, and was involved in Operation Agular. He would be hanged on the same day as Canaris. Hans von Dohnanyi was also disturbed and angered by the Blomberg-Fritsch incident, and took part in Operation Seven. Ulrich von Hassell had been the German ambassador to Italy; he shared Canaris’ thoughts regarding the persecution of Jews and other outcasts. He unsuccessfully attempted to involve the British government in a plot to overthrow Hitler. General Walter Schellenberg remained on friendly terms with the admiral even though he was a high-ranking officer in German intelligence. The two often went horseback riding together. Admiral Canaris’ relationship with friends can best be described as “cautions.” Every one of his friends and acquaintances realized that one misplaced word regarding the admiral might very well result in the arrest of Canaris and very possibly themselves. Not very much is known about the existence of Canaris’ wife and two daughters. They were apparently not involved in any of the admiral’s anti-Hitler activities and remained in the background of Wilhelm Canaris’ life throughout the war. Both daughters, as well as Canaris’ wife, lived for many years after the war ended.

Can you describe the circumstances of Canaris’s arrest, trial, and execution? What was his legacy following his death?

After Admiral Canaris’ diaries were discovered at the beginning of April 1945, which furnished unquestionable proof that he had been a leader in the anti-Nazi resistance for years, his execution followed very quickly. Adolf Hitler issued the order on April 5. By April 8, Canaris was tried, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to death. Following his trial, the admiral was given a brutal interrogation by his SS guards. The guards beat him with their fists, which left him badly bruised and with a broken nose, and returned him to his cell barely able to walk.

On the following morning, Admiral Canaris was hanged. According to another prisoner at Flossenbürg, he died slowly and horribly. He was actually hanged twice – once with an iron collar around his neck, with the noose placed over the collar. After several minutes, he was taken down while still alive. The iron collar was then removed and he was hanged again. This time, he was left hanging until he was dead. Four other prisoners were also hanged that day. The bodies of all five prisoners were burned on a huge bonfire. The wind blew the cremated remains of Admiral Canaris and the others through the bars of the nearby cell windows.

Since he had become head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris managed to smuggle several hundred Jews and other outcasts out of Nazi-occupied territory, right past the Gestapo. He also sent valuable information to the Allies and did everything possible to prevent Adolf Hitler from winning the war. And with a great deal of cunning and an equal amount of good luck, he managed to avoid being discovered. But his luck ran out on July 20, 1944, when he was implicated in the failed Hitler assassination plot. Although he managed to get away with all of his anti-Nazi activities for many years, he was hanged because of a conspiracy in which he played no active part.

Exactly two weeks after Admiral Canaris was hanged, members of the 358th and 359th US infantry regiments arrived at Flossenbürg and liberated the camp. A week after Flossenbürg was liberated, and three weeks after the admiral was executed, Adolf Hitler committed suicide in his Berlin chancellery. He shot himself on April 30; his bride, Eva Braun, swallowed poison. Seven days later, during the early hours of May 7, Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allied powers and the Third Reich ceased to exist. The end came too late to save thousands of inmates who died in the concentration camps, but the mass murders had finally ended. Admiral Canaris could be well satisfied that he had done his part in saving many political and religious prisoners from places like Flossenbürg.

Memorial at Flossenbürg concentration camp to the German resistance members executed on 9 April 1945. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

David Alan Johnson is the author of fourteen books, including The Last Weeks of Abraham Lincoln and Decided on the Battlefield: Grant, Sherman, Lincoln, and the Election of 1864.

Commander Christopher Nelson, USN, is a career naval intelligence officer and a frequent contributor to CIMSEC. The questions and comments here are his own and not necessarily those endorsed by the Department of the Defense or the United States Navy.

Featured Image: Adolf Hitler and his entourage visiting the Eiffel Tower in Paris on June 23, 1940, following the occupation of France by the Nazis. (Photo via German Federal Archives)

Chris Hemler on Delivering Destruction and Triphibious Fire Support in the Pacific War

By Dmitry Filipoff

Chris Hemler spoke with CIMSEC to discuss his book, Delivering Destruction: American Firepower and Amphibious Assault from Tarawa to Iwo Jima. In this book, Hemler examines the development of American amphibious fire support doctrine during WWII and offers insightful analysis on wartime organizational learning.

In this discussion, Hemler discusses the challenges of developing combined arms warfighting doctrine, key organizational constructs that facilitated flexible command-and-control of amphibious fire support, and the fundamental principles that fostered adaptation in war.

Why investigate this topic and publish a book on it?

The short answer is that I have always been fascinated by the Pacific War – the naval character of the conflict, the great distances involved, the incredible industrial production required, and many more captivating themes. In addition, my operational experience in the U.S. Marine Corps has given me a firsthand perspective on the difficulties and obstacles involved in amphibious operations. So when I combined my interests, my curiosity, and my experiences with a story that I felt was missing from the World War II scholarship, I had my project.

What role did triphibious fire support play in the American operational approach in the Pacific War?

First, maybe a note on semantics. I stumbled into the word “triphibious” during my research, and I’ll be honest, it wasn’t love at first sight. But over time, the word grew on me. And before long, it took on a dominant role in my project and eventually my book. It is an important word that allows us to look at the Pacific War with a different lens and it is the single most important word in Delivering Destruction. In order to seize the hardened islands of the Central and Western Pacific, American forces had to master triphibious fire support. And I think that is a very important storyline to cover when we discuss the war.

Triphibious fire support – the combined application of heavy firepower delivered by air, land, and sea to support amphibious invasion – was essential. It was an indispensable function for Nimitz’s Central Pacific campaign. While the ground units, air support, and naval gunfire elements have all received individual recognition before, it was truly the combination – the synergy – of these various capabilities that allowed the Americans to advance at the rate they did and triumph in the way they did. Triphibious fire support, and namely the combined arms coordination and integration of that support, was an essential ingredient of success in the Pacific War.

The traditional historiography of the war, and indeed the films and television series that cover the war, do an excellent job acknowledging the infantrymen, artillerymen, naval aviators, and others that enabled victory against Japan. But often lost in that narrative – a narrative typically defined by individual warfare communities and individual skills – is the synergy of those various communities. And that’s the storyline that Delivering Destruction provides.

Waves of American landing craft approach the island of Iwo Jima, 1945. (U.S. Navy photo)

You discuss the triphibious doctrinal innovation that occurred during the interwar period, and how it fell far short of what was needed in wartime. Why did the fleet exercises and doctrinal development of the interwar period not deliver an effective triphibious fire support system in time for the war?

That is a really important question, and one that I have taken very seriously in my work. I don’t want to be unfairly critical of the interwar Navy and Marine Corps, but it is essential that we learn from the success and the shortfalls of the interwar period. And while the interwar triumphs are well-cataloged, the failures are much less acknowledged. While the naval services spent a great deal of time and attention addressing their concerns over landing craft, logistics, and other amphibious matters, they did not dedicate sufficient attention to the coordination of triphibious firepower. Therefore they did not appreciate the full complexity and difficulty of the challenge they faced.

Planners of the 1920s and 30s thought an awful lot about how to get to the beach, but they did not adequately address staying on the beach. They did not acknowledge the firepower requirements, careful coordination, and mature tactics that would spell success. This left the interwar Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEXs) entirely unrealistic in the coordination and delivery of firepower. To preserve the safety of their troops, most landing forces trained on separate islands from the naval gunfire ships. Umpires used wooden targets ashore to represent enemy bunkers, and naval gunfire officers confirmed their misplaced confidence in “area bombing” methods, which were replaced by more rigorous precision bombing techniques developed during the war. These artificialities led one Marine pilot to label his FLEX as “little more realistic than a map problem.”

Some servicemembers did voice concerns, but they formed only a minority opinion, and their critique had little effect. The result left American naval forces unprepared for the full task that lay before them – effectively integrating and coordinating not only distinct forces, but distinct forms of firepower, during a contested seaborne assault.

Why was the triphibious experience at Tarawa so challenging yet so instructive?

Prior “ignorance” is one explanation. That is the word the accomplished naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison used in his study of the Tarawa attack. To be certain, the Marines knew that Betio Island, the Japanese stronghold of the atoll, was very well-defended. Japanese troops had more than 500 concrete bunkers and a frightening web of mines, barbed wire, and machine gun and mortar positions.

That intelligence aside, the Marines were quite confident as they rode ashore. Unchallenged confidence in the naval gun reigned supreme. The Americans’ three-hour naval bombardment prior to the landing was a stunning display. Three battleships, four heavy cruisers, and nearly two dozen destroyers delivered ordnance ranging in caliber from three inches to fourteen inches. As one admiral briefed his peers before the battle, “Gentlemen, we will not neutralize Betio Island. We will not destroy it. We will obliterate it.” Needless to say, that was far from what transpired, as Tarawa turned out to be a brutal experience for the Marines despite the preparatory bombardment.

November 22, 1943 – The northwestern end of Betio Island during the Battle of Tarawa, with beach red 1 at left and green beach in center and right. Several LVTs and a Japanese landing craft are on the beach. Several coastal defense guns are also visible. (Photo via U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

Those hard experiences became cherished lessons that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps integrated into their planning and preparation for the remainder of the war. Just as Guadalcanal had introduced them to the zeal and determination of their Japanese enemy, so Tarawa introduced them to the full challenge of the amphibious assault. By noting and then addressing their impractically rigid fire support timelines, unsuited communications gear, and deficiencies in coordination at the beachhead, it was the American response to the trauma of Tarawa that proved crucial to the subsequent campaigns of the war.

How would you describe the system of operational learning and the various feedback loops that matured this capability? How did they process lessons from major battles, anticipate challenges, and incorporate new doctrine and training into the force in the leadup to future battles?

In this case, the answer is twofold. Bottom-up adaptation drove much of the Americans’ progress throughout the war. In the book, I mention the names and post-battle efforts of junior and mid-level officers that are, almost exclusively, missing from the war’s narrative. These were the leaders on the front lines observing operations in real time, analyzing the Americans’ performance, and delivering professional critique to improve upon their methods. They constantly iterated on firing techniques, ship positioning, communications, and cross-unit culture. Men like Navy Lieutenant Charles Corben, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Donald Weller, and Marine Colonel Vernon Megee are not household names, but their contributions compel recognition. These men belong to Paul Kennedy’s “engineers of victory” – the individuals that fostered critical change and adaptation at the working level in wartime.

But it wasn’t all grassroots adaptation. The V Amphibious Corps also exercised a healthy dose of bureaucracy in the form of patient and persistent administrative work. Following each individual campaign, staff representatives produced after-action tomes averaging more than 1,000 pages. After the battle for Iwo Jima, their report ran to an astonishing 1,600 pages. In these organizational reflections, the V Corps commented on everything from manning arrangements to communications to ammunition projections. Coupled with the ad hoc evolution of their units and more junior leaders, these efforts fed a continuous feedback loop that helped the Navy and Marines improve at each and every juncture. 

You trace the development of the JASCO coordination teams that were central to managing triphibious fires. What role did these specialized teams serve and how did they evolve throughout the war?

They JASCOs were critical to the Americans’ ability to seize – and more importantly hold – a defended beach. The Joint Assault Signal Company construct emerged in late 1943, fueled in part by the costly lessons of the attack on Tarawa. They were designed to bring the disparate components of the task force together, help blend the distinct cultures of the triphibious arms, and provide an administrative headquarters for the fielding, training, planning, and integration of fire support.

By virtue of their mandate, the JASCOs became the most important actor in both managing and improving triphibious fires throughout the war. Over time – and through proven battlefield performances – they built a remarkable reputation. They embedded themselves within the landing forces they served, and they also built strong relationships with other representatives of the naval task force, often through personal liaison, shipboard conferences, and enduring relationships. The JASCOs matured from “suspicious stranger” in the early days of the war to a trusted teammate by 1945. They became the human network and organizational construct that enabled effective fire support across the V Amphibious Corps.

The development of this capability was hampered by differences in culture and operating practices, including between communities and between services. What differences had to be managed to mature these combined arms teams and capabilities?

American forces had to overcome several cultural hurdles in order to achieve their fullest potential as a naval combined arms force in the Pacific. Many of these hurdles flowed not from willful obstinance, but from divergent understandings and perspectives on operational priorities, risk tolerance, and more. In most cases, U.S. Sailors and Marines were not trying to thwart coordination, but their distinct assumptions and tactical concerns occasionally clashed, thereby splintering the cohesion and combat effectiveness of the force.

Throughout the interwar years, and into the early campaigns of the conflict, many senior Navy officers remained opposed to amphibious warfare, in spirit if not in word. From their perspective, any prioritization of or preference for amphibious operations compromised the proper identity of the fleet, anchored in conventional surface forces and decisive engagements at sea. Furthermore, the mobility constraints of supporting a landing force in a particular place for an extended period invited foolish risk upon the naval task force, which prided itself on constant mobility.

Troops encountered cultural friction at the tactical level as well. In the Gilbert and Marshall Islands offensives, American aviators encouraged their counterparts on the ground to accord greater respect to prearranged timelines and support agreements. In a pilot’s mind, the timeline was supreme. From their earliest indoctrination in aviation culture, pilots were directed to monitor precise metrics such as launch schedules, altitude readings, and fuel levels that yielded timelines for aviation operations. Such precise data dictated the support that a naval pilot could provide to the infantrymen below.

On the other hand, the ground units making their way ashore against tides, headwinds, and problematic coral reefs – to say nothing of the enemy forces firing projectiles at them – were taught to anticipate chaos and uncertainty. Valuing flexibility, adaptability, and resourcefulness, the culture of the landing force provided a stark contrast to the aviator’s preference for methodical action.

The story of the V Amphibious Corps in the Central Pacific is very much a story of these cultures learning to coexist. And learning to not only acknowledge but appreciate the values and perspectives of adjacent units and communities. Neither tribe was incorrect. The real-time application of triphibious fires required aspects of both mindsets, according to the circumstances, requirements, and resources at hand. Only in the tailored combination of these cultures and of these fires did the V Amphibious Corps find ultimate victory.

March 27, 1945 – An LSM (R) sending rockets to the shores of the Pokishi Shima, near Okinawa, during the pre-invasion bombardment. (U.S. Navy photo)

Triphibious fire support consists of the fires delivered by naval and air forces, as well as the organic artillery of the amphibious landing force. How do these different types of fires and delivery systems cover each other’s weaknesses and form a combined arms system?

Delivering Destruction is not meant to be a highly technical study nor a deep comparison of the nuances inherent to each delivery system. But without a doubt, the book introduces the reader to the general capabilities and constraints of the various platforms and the synergy they create when employed together.

The campaigns of the Central Pacific certainly revealed the complementary strengths and weaknesses of naval, air, and field artillery fires. Naval gunfire provided consistent and sustained coverage during landing operations, and its capacity for high-volume fire support made it the backbone of the Americans’ island assaults. In particular, as naval gunfire officers learned from and improved upon their early experiences in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, naval gunfire ships positioned themselves closer and closer to shore in order to provide the most precise and destructive fires possible to the forces fighting ashore. This is how the admiral and naval gunfire advocate Richard “Close-In” Conolly got his fantastic nickname.

For their part, American aviators provided a more mobile platform capable of striking much deeper into enemy territory. Although most of the V Corps’ objectives were not large enough to make distance a significant consideration, air support proved particularly valuable against reverse-slope targets, which often presented a challenge for naval gunners (from the attacker’s perspective, reverse-slope targets lay on the far slope of a hill or mountain, making them more difficult both to identify and strike).

Environmental conditions presented different challenges to air and naval forces, meaning that one or the other might enjoy a particular advantage on a particular day. While aircraft could be grounded on account of visibility or cloud cover, ships were most often disrupted by poor sea states driven by wave activity, swells, and wind. In general, naval gunfire proved much more resilient in the face of poor weather, but performance could be more nuanced according to the local conditions of a specific location or operation.

Field artillery provided yet its own combination of strengths and weaknesses, whereby it could provide sustained, high-tempo fire support so long as its ammunition allowed. Mobility was certainly more challenging for the field artillerymen, especially in the constrained beacheads of most Pacific War battles, where maneuver space was limited and terrain often problematic. 

You point to how triphibious fire support was fundamentally a human endeavor, something that could not be mastered through a formulaic approach alone. How was the human element critical for maturing this capability, and how should formulaic aspects compliment the human element?

The technology and the mathematics have to work, they are essential. Shell-fuze combinations, aircraft payloads, and firing solutions are all critical matters. And they are quite scientific. But those formulaic aspects must provide for tailored application and adaptation to the battlefield of human combat that is inherently marked by uncertainty, disorder, and friction. The battle is far from over just because you mastered your math homework. In combined arms, formulas are necessary but insufficient.

The human teamwork and artful execution behind triphibious firepower was decisive in the Pacific. The way that U.S. Sailors and Marines brought these capabilities together, experimented and iterated on new tactics from 1943 to 1945, and combined their weapons and their expertise to achieve creative solutions on the battlefield was quite remarkable. The evolution of air support control and authority during the war, the amalgamation of service branch cultures and priorities over three years, and the careful synchronization of a “rolling” naval barrage during the assault on Iwo Jima are but a few examples of the creative firepower achievements in the war. And those achievements point to the primacy of the human, not the scientific, element.

March 27, 1944 – Joint Assault Signal Company troops use a field radio during amphibious training maneuvers. (U.S. Army Signal Corps photograph).

How could these lessons apply to the main contingency many are considering today, a Taiwan invasion? Both in terms of the joint fires that could support the invasion, and those that could stop it?

I am far from an expert on emerging weapon systems or the potential scenarios in the Western Pacific today. But what I can reflect on are a few principles that helped the V Amphibious Corps fight its way across the Pacific in the 1940s. And these principles are not just fire support principles – I am convinced they are fundamental principles of collaboration. Whether military units or civilian organizations, joint service operations or multinational alliances, island assaults or shipbuilding challenges, these are principles that help divergent groups come together to solve complex, high-stakes problems:

Nothing teaches like experience. The Navy and Marine Corps made laudable progress during the interwar period. They experimented with important concepts and advanced several important platforms that would play a role in their success against Japan. But in the realm of supporting arms coordination, their theories were proven incomplete. Their training scenarios left much to be desired. Namely, they failed to interrogate their firepower integration efforts, the communication networks that would allow for success, and the troops that would bring aerial, naval, and ground-based fires together. Part failure of imagination and part insufficient self-critique, the Americans began the war with confident theories but little practical experience. Interwar shadow boxing didn’t do the trick, and the opening bouts of the war laid bare the United States’ deficiencies. In the case of triphibious firepower, nothing taught like actual experience.

Awareness feeds decision-making. Arguably the greatest contribution that the Joint Assault Signal Companies (JASCOs) made to the success of the V Amphibious Corps was an increased awareness of the battlefield throughout the assault. By connecting front-line spotters, offshore gunners, overhead pilots, and battlefield commanders (read, decision-makers), the JASCOs delivered unprecedented awareness to American forces. This awareness allowed staff officers and commanders to make informed judgments in real time and refine their command-and-control. It allowed them to triage the most pressing situations in the battle. This awareness then allowed commanders to apply the most appropriate (or most available) fire support solution to the given situation. Great leaders – and great teams – must have a strong sense of awareness throughout their environment, whether that’s a battlefield, a basketball court, or a dynamic industry.

Familiarity strengthens outcomes. Over time, the awareness that helped to shape better targeting in triphibious fire support also increased the familiarity and shared knowledge between the specialized troops of the V Corps. And that familiarity bred a stronger fire support cycle from start to finish. As infantrymen gained a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of naval gunfire support or close air support, they became more informed users of that firepower. They learned which targets, terrain, distances, and conditions made for a better (or worse) fire support mission. Through the same shared experiences, naval officers, pilots, and artillerymen increased their familiarity with infantry tactics, needs, and challenges. As the V Corps troops evolved in their understanding of and appreciation for their fellow troops – whoever they were – the team got better.

Redundancy is essential. This combined arms principle is ancient, but that makes it no less critical. Improving the efficiency and integration of triphibious firepower allowed the V Corps to build organic redundancy into its firepower solutions. No matter the circumstantial challenges –enemy reinforcements, hardened positions, defenses-in-depth, coral reef impediments, problematic weather – the Americans had not only sufficient but redundant fires. If an artilleryman could not reach a target, then a pilot could. And that translated to a tremendous advantage for the Americans, particularly by late 1944 and 1945. Redundant fire support could overcome a variety of mistakes or weaknesses on the battlefield, just as redundant skills and effective cross-training can help any team through a tough season or unanticipated challenge.

It is through these principles that triphibious fire support matured and eventually contributed to ultimate victory in the Pacific.

Dr. Chris Hemler spent ten years on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, holding posts with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and U.S. Naval Academy Marine Detachment. He holds a PhD in military history from Texas A&M University and is the author of Delivering Destruction: American Firepower and Amphibious Assault from Tarawa to Iwo Jima(Naval Institute Press, 2023). Chris currently serves as a Professor of Naval Studies at the U.S. Naval Community College and a Marine reservist with the Marine Corps History Division. He resides in Annapolis, Maryland with his wife and two children.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@Cimsec.org.

Featured Image: April 1, 1945 – The battleship USS Tennessee bombards Okinawa with her 14/50 main battery guns as LVTs in the foreground carry troops to the invasion beaches. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph)

Sea Control 547 – What the Wild Sea Can Be with Dr. Helen Scales

By Jared Samuelson

Dr. Helen Scales joins the program to discuss the future of the world’s oceans and the environmental threats that they face.

Helen Scales, PhD, is a marine biologist, writer, and broadcaster. She is the author of many books about the ocean including The Brilliant Abyss and Spirals in Time, and the children’s books What a Shell Can Tell and Scientists in the Wild. She writes for National Geographic Magazine, the Guardian, and New Scientist, among others. She teaches at Cambridge University, is a storytelling ambassador for the Save Our Seas Foundation, and science advisor for the marine conservation charity Sea Changers.

Download Sea Control 547 – What the Wild Sea Can Be with Dr. Helen Scales

Links

Jared Samuelson is Co-Host and Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Marie Williams.

DMO and the Firepower Revolution: Evolving the Carrier and Surface Force Relationship

By Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.)

Introduction

39 years ago, in the October 1985 issue of USNI Proceedings, then-LCDR Joe Benkert and I questioned how the Navy structured the relationship between the carrier force and the surface fleet:

“Do non-carrier surface warships have any strategic significance? To listen to discussions of maritime strategy and naval force structure in the public arena, one would think that the only general-purpose naval forces with strategic significance in their own right are carrier-launched aircraft and nuclear-powered attack submarines, and that surface combatants are simply integral parts of larger, carrier-dominated structures. Reminiscent of Peggy Lee’s song, ‘Is that all there is?” Are surface combatants simply supporting players, or do they have a larger strategic role?”…the Maritime strategy suggests that naval forces would move forward as early as possible to take decisive, offensive action to neutralize the Soviet Navy and pressure the Soviet flanks. This strategy envi­sions the Soviet fleet being neutralized mostly by attack submarines and carrier-based aviation. The principal role for surface combatants in this task lies in providing de­fense for aircraft carriers.”

Is that still all there is? Fast forward to 2024 where we may be witnessing a role reversal. Are we reaching a point in which the surface fleet, with the long-range Maritime Strike Tomahawk missile, will become the preferred platform-weapon combination for U.S. anti-ship warfare? Could this subsequently shift the role of the aircraft carrier and its air wing to being the supporting platforms rather than the supported?

The looming introduction of VLS-capable anti-ship missiles across a wide range of untapped force structure within the Navy and the joint force deserves to trigger a rethink of the fleet’s combined arms doctrine, especially between the surface fleet and the carriers. The U.S. Navy is about to experience a historic firepower revolution, and it needs to think deeply about the implications.

Making Sense of the Firepower Revolution

CDR Jeff Vandenengel argues in his recently published book, Questioning the Carrier: Opportunities in Fleet Design for the U.S. Navy, that aircraft carriers are too vulnerable in certain threat environments to take on the strike warfare role, and that the surface fleet’s offensive potential has been hamstrung by traditional doctrinal roles that relegated it to supporting the carrier defensively. Vandenengel and others have argued that the age of the carrier has been surpassed by the age of the missile, which has become the principally dominant weapon in modern naval warfare. The question is whether the combined arms doctrine that integrates the various naval communities into a fleet has adapted to make the most of the principal weapon of the era.

The lethality of the anti-ship missile has greatly exacerbated the intense attrition that has long characterized naval combat and set it apart from other warfare domains. As Captain Wayne Hughes argued,

“It is demonstrable both by history and theory that not only has a small net advantage in force often been decisive in naval battles, but the slightly inferior force tends to lose with very little to show… every strategist must know the relative fighting value of his navy – so carefully nurtured and expensive to build and maintain in peacetime. When committed in battle, the heart of a fleet can be cut out in an afternoon.”

In war at sea, a slight tactical disadvantage in striking power can quickly snowball into major losses, strongly encouraging navies to make the absolute most of the dominant weapons of their era. As Dmitry Filipoff has argued:

“…no other service needs to be more invested in tactical superiority and solid warfighting doctrine than navies. If a carrier strike group falls prey to a single missile salvo, that’s about seven thousand lives and $20 billion dollars that is lost in a matter of minutes. By comparison, those numbers would get you about 2,000 tanks, but there is no plausible combat scenario where two thousand tanks are destroyed in a couple minutes. Modern naval warfare is an absolutely brutal form of combat, and because of that, nobody stands to lose so much so quicky from their tactical shortfalls than navies. In naval warfare especially, tactical shortfalls can rapidly escalate into strategic liabilities…”1

Accordingly, the Navy’s warfighting concept of DMO should be developing a better understanding of how fleet warfare is evolving with respect to the wide proliferation of long-range anti-ship firepower across both the force structure of the U.S. military and its rivals. Lying at the core of this transformation is the point that the Maritime Strike Tomahawk possesses a combination of traits that are especially suited for mass anti-ship fires – long range, broad platform compatibility, and eventually steep inventory depth. While several other new anti-ship missiles are also joining the joint force, including SM-6 and the Naval Strike Missile, no other anti-ship missile in the U.S. inventory fields this specific combination of mass firing traits to the same degree as MST. And arguably no other community will field this decisive weapon to the same extent as the surface fleet. This historic evolution in the U.S. Navy’s striking power should have major effects on the roles and missions of the aircraft carrier, its air wing, and the fleet as a whole.

Evolving Firepower, Evolving Roles

The air wing has a range of limits, including the range of its aircraft, the range of its anti-ship missiles, the wide scope of missions the air wing may have to perform simultaneously, the time it takes to arm and launch sizeable strike packages, and of course the risk that can be reasonably tolerated by putting carriers within reach of certain high-end targets. Long-range anti-ship missiles based on the surface force offer a useful alternative for circumventing some of these limits and risks, and providing a much more expansive array of options for fighting enemy fleets.

But the carrier will still be needed to leverage this wide scope of new firepower. An alternative combined arms relationship is offered in Filipoff’s “Fighting DMO” series. The carrier air wing can serve as a force multiplier to this potent mass firing capability by fulfilling the information demands required to take full advantage of the long range of these weapons and their broad scope of distribution across a theater. Carrier aircraft such as the F-35 can take the lead in penetrating the contested battlespace and facilitating the striking power of entire fleets. As Filipoff has argued: “aircraft are going to be very critical for managing the breadth of the offensive kill chain. This can go from scouting for targets, cueing fires against them, maneuvering those fires, and assessing those fires’ effectiveness.” As carrier aircraft call in anti-ship fires from across the joint force, they can be postured to provide crucial retargeting updates to in-flight salvos based on the dynamic awareness offered by sensor fusion, and allow aircraft to shepherd anti-ship missiles into cohesive volumes of fire against enemy fleets.

Sailors taxi an F-35C Lightning II, assigned to the “Argonauts” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 147, on the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), on Jan. 22, 2022. (US Navy Photo)

The ability of the carrier air wing to provide offensive information support for the maritime fires killchain is significantly enhanced by the sensor fusion and networking capabilities possessed by 5th generation F-35 aircraft. F-35 fighters possess multiple datalink options to share data with dissimilar platforms, such as F/A-18s and E-2Ds. These datalinks could also be used to dynamically command anti-ship missiles to fly various waypoints, flying formations, and sensor postures to maximize effectiveness in a complex battlespace. The P-8 community can also provide valuable command and control functions for the maritime fires process, and offer aerial C2 options that are not tethered to the location or risk profile of a carrier.

Aircraft can be empowered with the command-and-control of significant amounts of anti-ship firepower in the moments that could decide fleet battles. It is through these roles that the carrier can still very much serve as a decisive capital ship by focusing on the critical currency of modern warfare – information advantage.

Conclusion

Given the range advantage of surface fleet-based missiles, the range limitations of the carrier air wing, and the vulnerability of the carrier in certain threat environments, the role of the carrier and its air wing should evolve in tandem with the U.S. Navy’s changing firepower. The carrier and its air wing should serve as the force quarterback that scouts wide spaces, cues surface ship fires against targets, and provides crucial in-flight retargeting support to those salvos on their way through a contested battlespace. In this method, the air wing can be empowered to deliver much more than the force of the carrier – it can deliver the force of entire fleets.

This is only one possible concept of operations for harnessing the new possibilities that are on the horizon. The fundamental issue at hand is whether the Navy will truly recognize it is in the midst of one of the most sweeping transformations in offensive anti-ship firepower in its history, and whether it will give serious consideration to shifting the combined arms doctrine that has long defined how the fleet intends to fight. The U.S. Navy’s warfighting concepts, including DMO, should be the driving force behind experimenting with these alternatives and eventually articulating what these new combined arms roles should be. The firepower revolution and the DMO concept are also happening in the context of the Navy’s growing emphasis on fleet-level warfare and Maritime Operations Centers. All of these elements must be thoughtfully integrated, especially with respect to reforming combined arms relations to maximize the fleet’s overall striking power. That is the ultimate end, not elevating one platform’s primacy or another’s.

Captain R. Robinson “Robby” Harris commanded USS Conolly (DD-979) and Destroyer Squadron 32. Ashore he served as Executive Director of the CNO Executive Panel. He was a CNO Fellow in CNO Strategic Studies Group XII.

References

1. This quote is from a presentation delivered by Filipoff to the Strategy Discussion Group (SDG) and used here with permission.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (June 13, 2021) Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105), front, and Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transit the Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Olympia O. McCoy)