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History, Theory

Expanding the Naval Canon: Fernando de Oliveira and the 1st Treatise on Maritime Strategy

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Every community has a canon that best encapsulates the genealogy of personalities, ideas, and events that shape the way the community sees itself and is perceived by others. The naval community is no exception. This article suggests that an important monograph has been overlooked in that canon: Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” published in 1555. It is the oldest treatise on maritime strategy.

The naval lore and the mainstream canon
Maritime strategy and war at sea have long occupied the minds of sailors and statesmen. The scholarly study of maritime strategy, however, is a relatively recent endeavour. Its roots in the modern western tradition are found in the United Kingdom during the latter half of the 1800s.

Authors such as the Colomb brothers, Sir John Laughton, and, more famously, Sir Julian Corbett were among the first to muster a robust understanding of strategy in discussions of naval problems. The United States soon followed suit as Alfred Mahan, William Sims, and Willis Abbot, among others, penned numerous other works to an increasingly sophisticated naval lore.

Not surprisingly, the standard account of the disciplinary evolution of maritime strategy and naval affairs reflects this Anglo-Saxon outlook. This account is taught in naval academies and some civilian universities around the world, further reinforcing the existing canon. Other influences surely contribute to the debate, including Jomini and Beaufre, and even ancient Greeks, such as Thucydides and Themistocles, but by and large the naval lore is founded on works dealing with the British and American experiences at sea.

Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” (1555)

In its rise to become the first global maritime empire, Portugal had to develop an understanding of maritime strategy that enabled the achievement of its political aims. Like Britain’s Corbett and America’s Mahan, Portugal’s greatest maritime strategist was Fernando de Oliveira. Writing at the peak of Portuguese power, Oliveira put in writing the foundations of that global empire.

Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” (Arte da Guerra do Mar), published in Coimbra in 1555, stands as the oldest treatise on maritime strategy. Oliveira himself acknowledges that very little had been written on the subject; he only refers to Vegetius (4th century AD) for his important but sparse insights into naval warfare. In historical context, Oliveira wrote this treatise three centuries before Corbett, Mahan, and others acquired the habit of thinking strategically about naval warfare. So what can we find in Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea”?

Frontispiece of the original "Arte da Guerra do Mar" (1555), by Fernando de Oliveira.
Frontispiece of the original “Arte da Guerra do Mar” (1555), by Fernando de Oliveira.

The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the principles of war at sea whereas the second explores its conduct. Each part has fifteen chapters. The genius of Oliveira’s work is found not merely in his (dated) analysis of Portugal’s 16th century navy, but, more importantly, in his comprehensive grasp of the (perennial) foundations of maritime power. The chapters focus on topics such as just war theory, strategic theory, leadership, shipbuilding, logistics, personnel recruitment and retention, and military readiness. And this is just in the first half. The second part goes on to tackle force structure, situational awareness, oceanography, and intelligence, among other topics.

These are obviously modern terms to describe very old phenomena. However, the challenges of 16th century naval power are not dissimilar to those of today’s navies whose countries depend on the sea for wealth and prestige. Oliveira, like Corbett and Mahan, was aware of this and expressed it in the opening pages of the treatise. Discussing naval matters, the author argues, “is a useful and necessary matter, particularly for the people of this land [Portugal] who now fare more at sea than others, whereby they gain many profits and honour, and also run the risk of losing it all, if they do not preserve it […].” This verdict ought to resonate contemporary strategists from nations such as the United States, Britain, and Japan, but also those strategists whose countries have maritime ambitions, such as China and India.

Fernando de Oliveira (or Fernão de Oliveira) was an interesting man living in interesting times. A true polymath educated in a Catholic seminary, it soon became evident that God had other plans for him. Oliveira dwelled in the maritime community of Lisbon, then as now a capital with an umbilical connection to the sea, learning key skills that made him a valuable asset for any navy. These skills included: navigation (he became a pilot aboard a French warship in expeditions against British commerce); shipbuilding (two English kings coveted his counsel whilst a prisoner of war in London); negotiation (he led a prisoner exchange when a Portuguese military expedition to north Africa failed; and possibly espionage (some sources mention his spying for the Portuguese Crown in negotiations with the Vatican).

In between his adventures, Oliveira wrote invaluable works that rival “The Art of War at Sea” in scope and insight. These include the world’s first encyclopaedic treatise on navigation and shipbuilding entitled Ars Nautica (ca. 1570), which he later expanded into the first treatise on naval architecture, Livro da Fabrica das Naos (ca. 1580), the first book on Portuguese grammar, Grammatica da Lingoagem Portuguesa (1536), and one of the first books on Portuguese history, Historea de Portugal (ca. 1581). These works attest to Oliveira’s genius. Unlike Corbett, who entertained a career as a novelist at first, Oliveira made a lasting literary contribution to fields beyond maritime strategy.

Conclusions
There is every reason for Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” to become compulsory reading for sailors, mariners, strategists, historians, and laymen with an interest in the complexity of conflict at sea. I will highlight only four of them.
First, the book is a distant yet direct ancestor to the current mainstream canon of maritime strategy. Incorporating this source into the canon and submitting it to academic scrutiny will help illuminate the origins of Western maritime strategic thought.
Second, there is an inherent value in studying Oliveira’s work in the context of naval warfare in the age of sail, particularly Portugal’s path toward a global maritime empire.
Third, the book retains great relevance for current debates on maritime strategy. Oliveira’s thoughts on the building, maintenance, and deployment of navies in the pursuit of policy can inform decision-makers, analysts, and the larger policy community on the often misunderstood nature and character of naval warfare.
Fourth, “The Art of War at Sea” can foster a debate on broader issues of strategy and power in light of existing scholarship on just war theory, military leadership, defence economics, and so forth.

In conclusion, it is high time for the naval community to retrieve Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” from the dustbin of history. My current efforts to translate the treatise to English will hopefully set this process in motion.

 

Tiago Mauricio is a WSD-Handa non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. He holds an MA in War Studies from King’s College London and is continuing his studies at Waseda University, after spending two years as a researcher at Kyoto University, Japan. He is currently translating Fernando de Oliveira’s Arte da Guerra do Mar (1555) to English.

Capability Analysis, Global Analysis

Call for Articles, Non-Navies Week: 29 JUL-2 AUG

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CIMSEC is having a Non-Navies Week from 29 July to 2 August as a first step in a longer series on specific non-navies. Delve into this list of non-navy navies with us.

Mainstream policy discussions of navies and maritime law enforcement often consider the denizens of the high seas to be a pliant polity – passive actors being defended, disrupted, or directed by the might of global or local security networks. However, national fleets and their individual warships are not the only ones with the agency to effect global politics and security.

Some topics we have covered at length – pirates and the Private Military Contractors that have risen up in opposition – but we have only scratched the surface.

Commercial enterpirses pursue the possibility of massive drone-ships, bringing new possibilities and vulnerabilities as our virtual network and our trade network grow closer together. Remember those pirates?

Fishing fleets have their own interests and controls – their operations and movement impacting global politics from the Gibraltar to the South China Sea. Sometimes inadvertant, sometimes purposeful, their movements can motivate states or global institutions – from territorial disuptes, to security, to environmental concerns.

Activists attempted to plant Chinese flags on the Senkaku Islands, which are controlled by Japan, as an assertion of the Chinese regime's sovereignty over the uninhabited islands. (Jingcai Mingren/Weibo.com)
Activists planting Chinese flags on Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. (Jingcai Mingren/Weibo.com)

Ever-better organized and equipped activists are taking to the high-seas, battling whalers or even states. From the Sea Shepards to the “amphibious landings” of Japanese and Chinese activists in the Senkakus, civilians are taking the politics to sea. Somalian piracy actually started as activism, fisherman-come-vigilantes.

Terrorists are an unfortunate reality on the high seas, from the category of at-sea terrorist attacks to the use of amphibious operations as vectors for attack from Israel to Mumbai. Some groups, such as the Tamil Tiger’s “Sea Tigers”, even went so far as be considered a possible real-world naval force.

Colombian authorities discovered this fully functional narco-submarine in 2011. The vessel could carry 8 tons of cocaine and has a range of 8,000 miles. The submarine is similar to the Colombian Navy's own tactical sub, except this one has an interior bathroom and larger beds, sailors said. (Juan Manuel Barrero Bueno/Miami Herald/MCT)
Colombian authorities discovered this fully functional narco-submarine in 2011. The vessel could carry 8 tons of cocaine and has a range of 8,000 miles. The submarine is similar to the Colombian Navy’s own tactical sub, except this one has an interior bathroom and larger beds, sailors said. (Juan Manuel Barrero Bueno/Miami Herald/MCT)

Around the raucus political conflicts flows the silent  schemes of smugglers, black marketeers, and human traffickers. From drug runners to sanction busters, admirals are not the only ones trying to mask their position. Criminal enterprises conduct their own air-sea battle, even operating submarines to smuggle goods.

map_strategic_passages
Shipping density data adapted from National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, A Global Map of Human Impacts to Marine Ecosystems.

The almost clinicically precise maps of the sea lines of communication would lead one to think that the oceans are a tame and organized place. Hardly. The sea is as alive with merchants, combatants, and all number of active players creating their own order and chaos.

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Global Analysis

The ISPS-Code and Maritime Terrorism

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By Lars H. Bergqvist

As a response to the 9/11 attacks, the International Ship and Port Security code (ISPS) came in to force 1st July 2004. Thus, 10 years have passed, since merchant ships in international trade and the ports they are calling, were required to be certified to a certain security standard.

Background

Most legislation in the maritime world is initiated by some kind of maritime disaster or accident. The Titanic catastrophe, where many passengers and crew members perished due to the fact that there were not enough lifeboats, gave birth to international safety regulations.(1) The MARPOL-convention came in to force a few years after a serious oil pollution, caused by the grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon on rocks near the Isles of Scilly.(2) Further, despite proper rules and regulations, a very high number of accidents caused the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to implement the International Safety Management Code (ISM).(3)

Contrary to previous conventions and codes, the creation of the ISPS-code was caused by a disaster that happened ashore, when hijacked aircrafts on the 11th of September 2001 flew into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, destroyed part of Pentagon and crashed on a field in Pennsylvania.

In peace time, to facilitate trade, merchant ships have traditionally been entering territorial waters and ports without much hindrance. The embarkation of port authorities, with clearance and free pratique granted has occurred once the ship was alongside a berth or at a customary anchorage.

With such an easy access to seaports, security experts were of the opinion that merchant ships could be used as a tool by terrorists. Different scenarios were developed, where merchant ships were means of transportation of terrorists and their weapons, or that the ship in its own right was a weapon. An example given was the risk of gas ships being hijacked and blown up in busy seaports.

Urgently, legislation was needed to protect both merchant ships and seaports.

Implementation

At a Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), held at IMO headquarters in December 2002, The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code was adopted.

A code written and adopted, just in little more than one year after 9/11, must have been some kind of record. The time period from adoption to enforcement was also very short, only 18 months had passed when the Code came into force on the 1st of July 2004.

During that one and a half year some 50,000 ships were certified, and hundreds of thousands of seafarers and office personnel were educated for their new roles as Ship Security Officers (SSO) and Company Security Officers (CSO). An equally daunting task, port facilities on all continents, with personnel, should be certified and educated.

However, extraordinary times demand extraordinary measures and with a concerted effort from all stake holders in the shipping industry, the ISPS-code was properly enforced.(4)

What is maritime security?

Maritime security has always been a part of commercial shipping. Piracy is as old as shipping itself and stowaways is hardly a new problem either. During wars, the merchant marine has been an integral part of the war effort, being a vital support line for warring nations in need of weapons, food, oil and other commodities.(5)

Thus, war, piracy and stowaways are threats that the shipping industry has been dealing with for a long time. Administrations and ship owners´ associations have for decades been issuing regulations and instructions in an attempt to assist seafarers to deal with the perils.

For example, during the cold war, all Swedish ships were by the Swedish Maritime Administration issued with an instruction about how to act during crisis and war.

Some 30 years ago, with the appearance of modern piracy, the International Maritime Organization(6) and the International Chamber of Shipping(7) issued guidelines.

In 1957, an international convention relating to stowaways was adopted, although not yet in force (8), and there are policies issued about how to deal with stowaways.(9)

However, any specific instructions, how to protect a ship against terrorists, prior to the ISPS-code, were never issued. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which was agreed upon after the spectacular hijacking of Achille Lauro, was only addressing punishment of acts that could threaten the safety of maritime navigation.(10)

Maritime terrorism before ISPS-code (before 1 July 2004)

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific(11) has offered an extensive definition for maritime terrorism:

“…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.”

Similar to the ISPS-code, not only ships are considered as objects for maritime terrorism, but also port facilities.

Maritime terrorism is not rampant, nevertheless there have been a steady flow of incidents during the last 50 years. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland(12) is an open-source database on global terrorist incidents (including maritime), covering events from 1970 through 2012.

From 11th June to 1970 to 1st July 2004, there were 212 maritime terrorism incidents. However, most of those incidents were on rather low level, like the incident with GTD ID: 200112120005; “12/12/2001: Members of People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) set up an illegal checkpoint along the Cauca River near Magangue, Sucre, Colombia. The rebels stopped a canoe traveling along the river and abducted nine of the passengers. Three people were released the next day. Specific motive is unknown.”

Still there are some significant incidents that got an extensive media coverage.

–          Santa Maria: The hijacking of the Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria is considered to be first case of maritime terrorism. On January 22, 1961, 24 leftist Portuguese terrorists hijacked the luxury cruise liner. The ship was carrying 600 passengers and a crew of 300. The would-be hijackers embarked the vessel as passengers at the port of La Guairá in Venezuela and on the Dutch island of Curacao, with weapons hidden in their suitcases. The terrorists took over command of the vessel, but eventually surrendered when they were given political asylum in Brazil.(13)

–          Sounion: A few years prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon, in March 1973 the Greek passenger ship Sounion sunk in the port of Beirut. A limpet mine was attached to the ship`s hull by Palestinian terrorists while ship was in dock, with the aim of blowing up the ship once at sea. Due to the interference of a Swedish undercover agent based in Lebanon, the departure was delayed, passengers could disembark and the ship sunk while still alongside the berth.(14)

–          Shadow V; A fishing boat owned by the former First Sealord and last Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten. In September 1979, while onboard the boat in waters near his summer home on Ireland, a bomb planted by the Irish Republican Army exploded and killed him.

 –          Rainbow Warrior; A Greenpeace ship sunk by the French foreign intelligence service in the port of Auckland, New Zealand, July 1985. Not an act of terrorism as such, but two French secret service agents was found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison by the New Zealand court of law.

–          Achille Lauro; InOctober 1985,the passenger ship while on a cruise in the Mediterranean, was hijacked by four terrorists from Palestine Liberation Front, off the coast of Egypt. After only two days of negotiation, but after they had killed an elderly American passenger, the hijackers gave up when they were promised political asylum in Tunisia. However, justice was swift, as US warplanes forced the Egyptian airliner carrying the hijackers to land in Italy.

As a result of the hijacking, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) was developed and adopted.

–          The Tanker War; With something that can be refer to as state terrorism, both sides attacked shipping in the Persian Gulf, mainly tankers, during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. According to sources more than 400 seamen were killed and 340 ships were attacked, during the conflict.(15),(16)

–          The Tamil Tigers; During the civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the latter was involved in maritime terrorism with its Sea Tigers brigade. The brigade was accused of hijacking several vessels in waters off the coast of Sri Lanka, including Irish Mona (in August 1995), Princess Wave (in August 1996), Athena (in May 1997), Misen (in July 1997), Morong Bong (in July 1997), MV Cordiality (in Sept 1997) and Princess Kash (in August 1998).(17) One spectacular act of maritime terrorism was the suicide attack on the tanker Silk Pride. (18)

–          USS Cole; Although a warship, the modus operandi used by the attackers was kind of a harbinger, when in October 2000, a small craft laden with explosive commanded by Al Qaeda suicide bombers hit the US Navy destroyer. The attack killed 17 sailors and wounded another 42.

–          M/T Limburg; In October 2002, the French owned crude oil carrier was attacked when approaching an offshore terminal off the coast of Yemen. An explosive-laden boat rammed the hull of the tanker, causing an explosion followed by fire.(19)

 –          Superferry 14; Regrettably, the ferries of the Philippines have a very bad safety record. Also, the maritime security record has been tarnished. The February 2004 terrorist attack on

Superferry 14 caused the death of 116 persons.(20) Suicide bombers from the Al Qaeda linked

Abu Sayyaf group, using a boat loaded with explosives, were the perpetrators.

Maritime terrorism after ISPS-code (after 1st July 2004)

Supporters of the ISPS-code may argue that the code has been successful since there have been no serious maritime terrorist attacks since the implementation.

Detractors may argue that the code did not help much in protecting seafarers against the menace of modern day piracy.

Whatever opinion someone may have, the code was developed to protect the international community against terrorism, and as such it has been a success. Piracy and terrorism are different crimes, needing different approaches. And, according to conventional wisdom, the link between terrorist and pirates is very weak.

Although a positive impact on the security situation by the Code, there have been some serious incidents.

–          Don Ramon; The second maritime terrorist attack by Abu Sayyaf took place in August 2005 onboard the passenger ship Don Ramon in Filipino waters. Terrorist had placed a timed bomb beneath gas cylinders in the ship`s galley, causing the ship to sink and wounding 30 passengers.(21)

 

–          M Star; In July 2010, the Japanese owned very large crude oil carrier experienced an explosion when transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Although no craft was sighted, the explosion made a large dent in the hull, parts of accommodation were slightly damaged and one crewmember was injured. After two days, the terrorist group Brigades of Abdullah Azzam claimed responsibility.(22)

–          Yemen, level 3; In August 2013, due to a high level of activity by Al Qaeda affiliated groups in Yemen, the Government of United Kingdom raised the ISPS security level to level 3 for British flagged ships in Yemeni territorial waters. A serious situation indeed, since an elevation to level 3 was unprecedented since the ISPS code was introduced in 2004.(23)

 

–          Cosco Asia; In September 2013, while on transit in the Suez Canal, the Chinese owned container vessel under the flag of Panama, was hit by a rocket propelled grenade. The ship sustained only minor damages, and there were no casualties. An Islamist group named Al-Furqan claimed responsibility for the attack.(24) Although a minor attack, it was of great concern for the Egyptian government, due to the economic importance of the Canal. To increase security, a protective wall along the Canal is in the process of being constructed.(25)

The future of the code

Like with all new regulations, ISPS-code was initially met with some skepticism from the end users, i.e. the seafarers. However, the code is now an accepted part of shipping, and the advantages are being appreciated.

Obviously, the code can be modified to the better, by catering more for the threat of piracy and stowaways that are much more of real threats than terrorism.

IMO has listed some of the remaining challenges; (26)

  1. Lack of national legislation/guidelines on ISPS code implementation.
  2. ISPS code as a mean to address all maritime security threats.
  3. Deciding on an appropriate risk assessments methodology.
  4. Dissemination of good practices on port facility security.
  5. Who audits the auditor?
  6. Ships` encountering difficulties after calling a high-risk port.

Lars H. Bergqvist is a Swedish master mariner and a reserve officer in the Royal Swedish Navy.

Footnotes

  1. http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofSOLAS/Pages/default.aspx
  2. http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofMARPOL/Pages/default.aspx
  3. http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/ismcode1993.html
  4. http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/instruments/pages/ispscode.aspx
  5. Sometimes referred to as “The Fourth Service”.
  6. Resolution A.545(13), “Measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.” http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=22356&filename=A545(13).pdf
  7. International Shipping Federation/International Chamber of Shipping published in 1986 the first edition of “Pirates and Armed Robbers: A Master’s Guide.”
  8. International Convention Relating to Stowaways 1957 (“Brussels Convention”).
  9. http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/453/Stowaways.pdf
  10. http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx
  11. http://www.cscap.org/
  12. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
  13. http://www.maritimeprofessional.com/Blogs/Maritime-Musings/December-2011/Hijacking-of-the-SS-Santa-Maria.aspx
  14. http://jcpa.org/article/mikael-tossavainen-on-theyll-die-anyway-ten-years-in-the-swedish-intelligence-service/
  15. war http://www.amazon.com/Tanker-Wars-Iran-Iraq-1980-1988-International/dp/186064032X
  16. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap14.pdf
  17. Dr Vijay Sakhuja, South Asia Analysis group, SEA PIRACY IN SOUTH ASIA
  18. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/30/slanka.tiger.attack/
  19. http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/limburg_oil_tanker_attacked.htm
  20. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/philippines0707/background/2.htm#_Toc168986107
  21. http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/dsd/research/researchgroups/corbett/corbettpaper8.pdf
  22. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/06/japanese-oil-tanker-terrorist-explosives
  23. http://www.rederi.no/nrweb/cms.nsf/($all)/AE4BD4693E6CD476C1257BC00026E77C?OpenDocument&qnfl=Nrprint
  24. http://news.usni.org/2013/09/05/video-terrorists-rocket-commercial-ship-suez-canal
  25. http://www.skuld.com/topics/voyage–port-risks/port-news/africa/egypt-construction-of-security-wall-along-the-suez-canal/
  26. http://www.seasecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/IMO-Presentation-SAMI-PORT-SECURITY.pdf

 

 

 

 

Capability Analysis, Podcast

Sea Control 43: RADM Rowden – Sea Control, LCS, and DDG 1000

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seacontrol2We are joined by RADM Rowden: OPNAV N96 (CNO’s Director for Surface Warfare), future Commander, Surface Forces, and author of the CIMSEC Article Surface Warfare: Taking the Offensive. We discuss his concepts for Sea Control, the development of LCS, perspectives on DDG 1000, and his plans as incoming Commander, Surface Forces.

DOWNLOAD: RADM Rowden – Sea Control, LCS, DDG 1000

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