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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

Bear, Dragon & Eagle: Russian, Chinese & U.S. Military Strategies

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week by Chad M. Pillai

Last year, I wrote about “The Return of Great Power Politics” and described an emerging multi-polarity and its impact on the global security environment. Since then, the updated Russian Military Doctrine, Chinese Military Strategy, the U.S. National Military Strategy were all released. Each has its own distinct characteristics that illuminate each nation’s perception of its global power and that of its primary threats. While there has been commentary on a possible Sino-Russian block balancing the U.S. hegemonic position, the jockeying for global power, position, and prestige is far more complicated. As such, I offer a comparative analysis of the three military doctrines/strategies and how they relate to one another.

The Bear Reawakens but Remains Paranoid

A woman reaches into her bag, which rests on a fallen Soviet hammer-and-sickle on a Moscow street in 1991, Getty Images
A woman reaches into her bag, which rests on a fallen Soviet hammer-and-sickle on a Moscow street in 1991, Getty Images

Russian President Putin described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geo-political disaster of the 20th Century. It ushered in an era of weakness and shame for the Russian people as NATO expanded eastward next to the Russian border. During this period, the Russian military performed poorly in Chechnya and much of its infrastructure and human capital degenerated. However, since Putin’s rise to power, he has charted a new course for Russia, promising to re-establish the global respect it once had during the Soviet period.

The 2014 Russian Military Doctrine reflects this new optimism while remaining true to the Russian historical paranoia about its security. It clearly identifies NATO, and by extension the U.S., as its primary security threat. This includes the presence of NATO in Afghanistan and U.S. forces operating from regions considered within the traditional spheres of influence of previous Russian empires. Because of their realization of their conventional force inferiority compared to the West, the Russian doctrine emphasizes the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of an aggressive conventional force act by the West that makes nuclear escalation necessary – an ambiguous red-line that undermines the US policy of escalation dominance. To regain its influence in its immediate border region (to include Ukraine), Russia has employed an unconventional war strategy to keep the conflict below the boiling point for a western response while simultaneously exercising its heavy conventional forces and deployment of theater ballistic missiles as deterrence towards NATO. Simultaneously, Russia is expanding its military capability in the arctic region and sees naval cooperation with China in the Pacific and India in the Indian Ocean. Russia’s military doctrine does not view China as a military threat and states areas of cooperation with China on regional counter-terrorism through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, as China grows more powerful, Russia may need to relook the threat to its eastern frontier; especially as recent Russian policy attempts to counter the PRC essentially squatting its way to de facto control over parts of Siberia.

The rest of the document focuses on how the Russian Military and Defense establishment will rebuild itself. It focuses on reforming its military command and control structures, developing professional expeditionary forces, and investing in advanced technologies for cyber, ISR, precision strike, and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). Additionally, it calls for reform of Russia’s defense industrial sector, patriotic indoctrination of the Russian people, and greater cooperation with bordering states representing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and SCO. The document reflects the reawakening of the Russian Bear from the nightmare of the post-Soviet collapse as it seeks to remind the world of its place among the great powers of the global order.

The Dragon’s Ascent

“Illustration of the Decapitation of Violent Chinese Soldiers” by Utagawa Kokunimasa, Public Domain.
“Illustration of the Decapitation of Violent Chinese Soldiers” by Utagawa Kokunimasa, Public Domain.

The Chinese Military Strategy reflects the Chinese Dream to repair the damage of the Century of Humiliation and regain a position atop the global order by the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party’s defeat of the Nationalists. Its growing confidence and the perceived decline of U.S. hegemonic power is evident in its analysis of the world order when it states, “Global trends toward multi-polarity and economic globalization are intensifying, and an information society is rapidly coming into being.” China views the U.S. and its allies and partners as the primary threats to its ascent in the global order. According to Henry Kissinger’s book World Order, the Chinese had no say in the development of the post-WWII order and now seek to modify it “with Chinese Characteristics” according to their Neo-Confucius Tributary Hierarchal world view where China was called the Middle Kingdom for a reason.

The Chinese Military Strategy serves to safeguard the nation’s core interests while preparing to assume a greater global role in security matters. Its Strategic Guideline for Active Defense lays out the goal of updating its operational doctrines to ensure combat forces are integrated to “prevail in system-vs-system operations featuring information dominance, precision strike, and joint operations.” As a result of the Chinese studying U.S. joint operations since the 1991 Gulf War, the Chinese appear on the path of counter-optimizing against U.S. Joint Operational Doctrine (especially the “Joint Anti-Air Raid campaign”). This PRC strategy culminates a 75-year evolution of the People’s Liberation Army from securing the Communist Party of China, to securing China from invaders and disruptors, to an unprecedented role as guarantor of access to the global markets upon which China’s economy depends.

Chinese Carrier Liaoning, PLAN Photo.
Chinese Carrier Liaoning, PLAN Photo.

To gain the initiative, the Chinese seek to “proactively plan for military struggle in all directions and domains, and grasp the opportunities to accelerate military building, reform, and development.” To achieve its ends, the People’s Liberation Army is directed to “elevate its capabilities for precise, multi-dimensional, trans-theater, and multi-functional and sustainable operations.” The Navy was directed to shift towards an “Open Seas Protection” approach, build an effective marine force, and be capable of “strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support.” The Air Force was directed to shift its focus from “territorial defense to both defense and offense, and build an air-space defense force structure that can meet the requirements of ‘informationized’ operations.” It also recognizes its critical security elements of cyber, space, and nuclear forces. Finally, the Chinese recognize the need to plan for military operations other than war ranging from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The Chinese strategy recognizes the need for security cooperation to create “a security environment favorable to China’s peaceful development.” It articulates the need to maintain cooperation with the Russian military within a framework of a comprehensive strategic partnership while maintaining ties with the U.S. military that conform to a new model of “major-country relations.” The difference in language reflects China’s view that they are more on par with the U.S. in global standing and that the Russians are simply regional partners.

China’s strategic position is shaped by having the world’s second largest economy and, unlike the U.S., a worldview that doesn’t see Russia as a military threat – though the PRC has historically calibrated its rhetoric on Russia to its correlation of military forces, so Russian activism in the Pacific could quickly change China’s rhetoric. Like Russia, however, China’s economy is experiencing a slowdown that may threaten its ability to increase military spending due to domestic pressures to alleviate rising unemployment. Also like Russia, demographic pressures are likely to force more internal investment as China’s working population moves from wage earners to pensioners and transitions to a new working cohort that is severely constrained by the aftermath of the one-child policy. For now, though, the PRC appears to recognize that there is a unique window of opportunity to reassert itself as the Middle Kingdom.

Exhausted Eagle

The tone of the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) is one of an exhausted super power engaged in the preservation of a global order increasingly threatened by state and non-state actors. It asserts that “we now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and trans-regional networks of sub-state groups – all taking advantage of rapid technological change.” The NMS articulates the threat that both Russia and China represent; however, unlike the Chinese and Russians, it clearly articulates the threat posed by Iran, North Korea, non-state actors such as ISIL, and cyber. These threats fall in line with Chairman Dempsey’s 2-2-2-1 construct describing the global security environment: two heavyweights (Russia and China); two middleweights (Iran and North Korea); Al Qaeda and trans-national criminal networks; and cyber.

To address the emergent security environment, the NMS specifies three national military objectives: (1) Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries; (2) Disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations; and (3) Strengthen our global network of allies and partners. The NMS enumerates 12 prioritized joint force missions ranging from maintaining a nuclear deterrent to security cooperation within the global integrated operations construct. In an increasing fiscally constrained environment, the NSM list the mission of “strengthening partners is fundamental to our security, building strategic depth for our national defense.” While the NMS acknowledges the potential negative impact of sequestration on the defense budget, it fails to specify what trade-offs it will make in the face of these pressures, such as placing less emphasis on developing a global network to ensure remaining available forces are capable of achieving the deter, deny, defeat state adversaries.

F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, USAF Photo.
F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, USAF Photo.

To address the growing risk and fiscal constraints, the NMS list three areas of Joint Force initiatives: (1) producing creative, adaptive leaders; (2) adopting efficient, dynamic processes; and (3) developing flexible, interoperable capabilities. Of these, adopting efficient, dynamic processes will be the most important as the Department of Defense will continue to struggle with balancing the capabilities required and available resources. As the nation struggles to reduce its financial debt, the DoD needs to demonstrate greater efficiency in resource management in light of two decades of program mismanagement ranging from the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

The Eagle, is exhausted by 14 years of continual conflict with violent extremist groups. Even as it attempts to contain the global terrorist threat, it faces traditional-state challengers seeking to re-align the global order. These challenges coupled with domestic political gridlock and fiscal mismanagement will continue to stress the U.S.’s ability to maintain its position.

Areas of Convergence and Divergence

The Russian, Chinese, and U.S. National Military Strategies have three areas of convergence where cooperation among the powers is possible. All three national military doctrines/strategies recognize the threat from violent terrorist organizations such as ISIL/Daesh – both the direct threat and the indirect threat via similar or affiliated groups such as Chechnyan extremists and Uighur separatists – and all three nations seek their destruction. However, unlike the U.S., Russia and China will not commit significant resources to combat ISIL/Daesh. In fact, it serves their longer term interests to allow the U.S. to take the lead against ISIL/Daesh and further erode its resource base in the effort. Further, all three powers agree on the dangers caused by trans-regional criminal and narco-trafficking groups that cause instability in places like Afghanistan and the Central Asian States. Finally, all three powers recognize the danger from the proliferation of WMD falling into the hands of terrorist organizations but have different views on the threats posed by nation states such as Iran and North Korea.

There are two significant areas of divergence between the three powers. The strategies and the national interests of the Russians, Chinese, and U.S. will more seriously diverge in the Central Asian States as all three powers compete for influence and access to tap into the region’s economic potential. While Russia may accept Chinese economic development in the region, it may react negatively to any Chinese military engagement or posture to protect its core economic interests. Both Russia and China are wary of a long-term US presence in the region fearing that any counter-terrorism posture could be refocused on serving as a military platform against either state. A second area of divergence will be the emerging importance of the Arctic. While Russia is actively building its military capability for the arctic region, the U.S. published a strategy in 2013 highlighting the importance of the region and the need to work with its key Arctic Allies such as Canada and Norway. China is also looking northward in the race for natural resources by actively engaging with the Nordic Nations and Irish, signing a joint statement with Russia on shipping access, and becoming a member of the Arctic Council in 2013.

Conclusion

Bear-Dragon-EagleAs a multi-polar moment approaches, understanding the military strategies of the key players will be of utmost importance. Unlike the Cold War’s bi-polar world, the Bear, the Dragon, and the Eagle will simultaneously seek cooperation while posturing to deter the others. Additionally, each will have to develop new relations with other emerging regional powers such as Iran and India who will play increased roles in the global order. As a result, each will have to place a greater emphasis on balance between its external national security and domestic responsibilities. And the global power whose economic and political foundation collapses first from the competitive strain will be displaced with unforeseeable global consequences.

Major Chad M. Pillai is an Army Strategist currently assigned to MacDill Air Force Base.  He previously served assignments at the Army’s Capability Integration Center (ARCIC), ISAF Commander’s Action Group (CAG), Speechwriter to the Army Chief of Staff, and as a Strategic Planner at the Army’s War Plans Division.  MAJ Pillai has published articles in Infinity Journal, War on the Rocks, Small Wars Journal, Military Review, The Strategy Bridge, and Offiziere.Ch.  He received his Masters in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 2009. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: U.S. & Chinese Strategic Views

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week by Daniel M. Hartnett

A Comparison of U.S. and Chinese Views of the International Strategic Environment

Within approximately a month of each other this year, both China and the United States published official documents detailing their respective views of the current security environment.  China’s assessment was captured in its 9th biennial defense white paper, published in late May, and officially titled China’s Military Strategy. The U.S. view is presented in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015 (hereafter, U.S. National Military Strategy), published in June. The authoritative nature of each document provides an interesting opportunity to comparatively assess how both nations see the international military and security situation, more clearly understand their similarities and differences, and draw out any relevant implications.

Before comparing the views contained within the two documents, however, it is important to clarify that this is not a perfect comparison. Although both documents are official and therefore represent the approved views of the respective government, they are not exact equivalents. China’s defense white paper, while drafted by the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is actually coordinated with and vetted by China’s foreign policy making community, to most importantly include the Chinese Communist Party.1 Therefore, it represents the view of the Chinese Party-State, not just the PLA.  On the other side of the ledger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for producing the U.S. National Military Strategy. This document draws closely from other U.S. government statements, most importantly from the President’s National Security Strategy. However, ultimately the U.S. National Military Strategy is a U.S. military document, not a whole-of-government product. As a result, comparing it with China’s Military Strategy is imperfect at best. However, such an exercise is still of value, particularly given the authoritativeness of the two documents combined with the general lack of publicly released official Chinese statements on national defense issues.    

Going forward with this imperfect yet still useful comparison of these two views on the international security situation yields four findings of interest. First, both documents describe the international security situation as experiencing great change. According to the U.S. National Military Strategy, “complexity and rapid change characterize the strategic environment, driven by globalization, the diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts.” China’s defense white paper paints a similar picture, stating that “profound changes are taking place in the international situation.” Although China’s Military Strategy is silent on what is causing these changes, it does assert that the changes in question are changes to the international balance of power, global governance structure, and Asia-Pacific geostrategic landscape, as well as an increase in international economic, military, and technological competition.

Second, although they both maintain the international system is in flux, the two documents disagree about the impact these changes will have.  The U.S. National Military Strategy takes a more pessimistic view, stating that these changes are giving rise to a host of problems. As General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, writes in the foreword to the U.S. National Military Strategy, “today’s global security environment is the most unpredictable I have seen in 40 years of service,” and that “global disorder has significantly increased while [U.S.] comparative military advantage has begun to erode.” Concerns noted include increasing societal tensions, resource competition, political instability, military challenges, and non-traditional security concerns. More concerning, the document also asserts that the risk of “U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing” [emphasis added].

DengXiaopingTime_1979
Deng Xiaoping, Time Man of the Year in 1979

China’s assessment, on the other hand, is more positive. It asserts that overall the international situation is good, although it also recognizes that some problems exist. For example, the document maintains that “peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times,” continuing a basic position held since the mid-1980s when then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping took China off the constant pre-war footing of Mao Zedong.2 That doesn’t mean that China’s Military Strategy doesn’t recognize the existence of international problems; the document notes such issues as “hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism,” as well as increasing competition for power and interests, international terrorism, and ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes. However, it does assert that “the forces for peace are on the rise, [and] so are the factors against war,” and as a result, a major war is unlikely and the “international situation is expected to remain generally peaceful”—although minor conflicts and wars can occur.  More importantly, China’s Military Strategy states explicitly that China confronts a “generally favorable external environment,” something the document claims is a prerequisite for China’s continued development.

Third, the two documents focus on different levels of the international system. The U.S. National Military Strategy, for example, squarely assesses the international situation from a global perspective. For example, the four countries mentioned by name as revisionist (Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China) span much of the globe. Similarly, when discussing the threat of violent extremist organizations, the document notes this is a global concern (although it does highlight the Middle East and North Africa for exceptional concern). Furthermore, the U.S. National Military Strategy explicitly rejects the notion of emphasizing any one region or issue, stating that “the U.S. military does not have the luxury of focusing on one challenge to the exclusion of others.”

In contrast, China’s Military Strategy emphasizes China’s periphery, and in particular the maritime areas of the western Pacific Ocean. Although global issues are mentioned, they are done so only briefly and ambiguously. Instead, China’s Military Strategy mainly discusses regional concerns. Concerns noted include the U.S. rebalance to Asia, especially efforts to strengthen the U.S. military presence and alliances in the region; Japan’s ongoing adjustments to its defense policy; tensions on the Korean Peninsula; relations with Taiwan; and extremist movements that could spill over China’s borders. Of particular note is China’s focus on maritime concerns, such as the growing tensions concerning its disputed claims in the East and South China seas, U.S. special reconnaissance operations, and alleged outside interference in China’s maritime disputes. The only non-peripheral concern expressly noted in the document reflects the recognition that China’s growing overseas interests are creating new security issues, such as sea lane security and the security of Chinese foreign investments and overseas citizens. 

SouthChinaSeaReclamation-Economist
Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, Economist.

Fourth, each document portrays the other country as part of the problem.  According to China’s Military Strategy, the increase in China’s peripheral insecurity is partially due to U.S. actions in the region, such as the U.S. rebalance to Asia and its interference in China’s maritime disputes with other East Asia states. For its part, the U.S. National Military Strategy also explicitly calls out China, stating that its “aggressive land reclamation efforts” in the South China Sea could allow the PLA to position forces “astride vital international sea lanes.” As a result, “China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region.” This mutual finger pointing in order to assign blame for tensions in the South China Sea exemplifies what Dr. David M. Finkelstein, director of CNA’s China Studies division, has referred to as a “perception gap” between China and the United States on regional security concerns.

From this simple comparison of the two authoritative documents, it is easy to see that a large divide exists between the U.S. and Chinese views on security issues.  While the United States sees the rapidly changing international systems as a potential concern, China sees it as an opportunity for continued development. The U.S. focus on the global level is indicative of its position as an established global power with global interests. Conversely, China’s focus, although gradually expanding to the international level, emphasizes the East Asia region, reflecting that Beijing continues to be primarily concerned with its immediate periphery. Each country also sees the other as part of the problem, especially in the case of the South China Sea issue.

Ultimately this difference in views should not be shocking since both countries have their own set of national interests and related concerns. The more important questions, however, are: Is it possible, as some claim, to bridge these differences and build “mutual trust” between the two militaries? Or will asymmetries of interest on certain issues prevent reaching a peaceful accord? Can the two militaries reach a middle ground on issues where they see the other as the main culprit? For this author, it would seem a difficult challenge, for as the Truman-era senior bureaucrat Rufus F. Miles said in the late 1940s, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”3

Daniel Hartnett is a research scientist with CNA’s China Studies division, as well as a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council. He can be followed at @dmhartnett. The views expressed in this article are his alone.

[1] Daniel M. Hartnett, “China’s 2012 Defense White Paper: Panel Discussion Report,” CNA Conference Proceeding (September 2013), p. i.

[2] For an interesting read on China’s military reforms during the Deng era, see Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 523-552.

[3] Rufus F. Miles, “The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law,” Public Administration Review Vol. 38, No. 5 (Sep. – Oct., 1978), pp. 399-403.

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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

The Influence of Han Feizi on China’s Defence Policy

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Guest post for Chinese Military Strategy Week by Paul Pryce

There is much of concern in China’s Military Strategy white paper released by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in May 2015. In particular, the notion of active defense extolled in the document arguably poses a far greater threat to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region than the reinterpretation of Article 9 in Japan’s Constitution. Coupled with other recent developments in the formulation and expression of China’s defense policy, there is a startling willingness to resort to the threat of force in order to resolve disputes. In July 2015, a meeting of the Central Military Commission announced that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) requires a stealth-capable strategic bomber with a minimum range of 8,000 kilometers and the capacity to carry a payload of more than 10 tons of air-to-ground munitions. Although this envisioned replacement to the Xian H-6K bomber would still have a range and payload capacity less than the Northrup Grumman B-2 Spirit that has been in service with the United States Air Force (USAF) for almost two decades as of this writing, the extended range would allow China’s bomber fleet to reach as far as Guam or Japan’s Northern Territories, also known as the Kuril Islands.

Xu Qiliang (L), vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, salutes China's President Xi Jinping (C) during the closing ceremony of the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, March 13, 2014. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon
Xu Qiliang (L), vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, salutes China’s President Xi Jinping (C) during the closing ceremony of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, March 13, 2014.

This saber-rattling can be explained in part by examining a school of thought that has risen to prominence together with the People’s Republic of China’s fifth generation of leadership, of which Xi Jinping is a part. Since Mao Zedong, Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin promoted the virtues of Confucianism and frequently quoted from Confucian works in their public remarks. With an emphasis on community-mindedness and obligations to the authority of the state, Confucius seemed to offer the philosophical justification for the entrenchment of the Communist Party of China in all areas of Chinese life. But there has been a noticeable departure from this tradition under Xi Jinping, who has relied heavily upon references to the works of Han Feizi.

Han Feizi
Han Feizi, Public Domain

Believed to have lived from 280 to 233 BC, Han Feizi was one of the founding thinkers of Legalism, a meritocratic ideology that came into being during the Warring States period of China’s history and was formally adopted by the victorious Qin state. Han Feizi has been called China’s Machiavelli, concerned more so with the efficiency of the state than with any over-arching moral or ethical questions. One passage from Han Feizi’s essay “The Eight Villainies,” a quote the fifth generation of leadership has apparently taken to heart, reads, “It is customary with a ruler that, if his state is small, he will do the bidding of larger states, and his army is weak, he will stand in fear of stronger armies. When the larger states come with demands, the small state must consent; when stronger armies appear, the weak army must submit.” Han Feizi does not comment on whether the doctrine of might makes right ought to be; he simply regards it as a natural and unavoidable consequence of a system in which different actors hold varying levels of power. There is also no apparent role for soft power in Han Feizi’s worldview – the strength of a ruler and his state is directly tied to military strength.

The memory of foreign occupation looms large for many Chinese leaders. In 2010, a diplomatic spat emerged when Chinese officials asked visiting British dignitaries to remove their poppies, worn to commemorate Remembrance Day and the Commonwealth’s war dead, because it allegedly reminded them of the Opium Wars. Xi Jinping himself often evokes the century of humiliation and the supposed role of the Communist Party of China in restoring national independence. If we regard Chinese history from the 1840s to the 1940s in the Legalist context, China was made subservient because it was militarily weak in relation to global powers like the United Kingdom, France, Russia, the United States, and others. If the weak must do the bidding of the strong and China is militarily weak in comparison to American hyperpower, the conventional thinking among the members of the Central Military Commission is that the gap must be closed or else it will only be a matter of time before the United States dictates to China once again.

PLAAF Xian H-6M makes a turn over Changzhou city, Jiangsu. Creative Commons.
PLAAF Xian H-6M makes a turn over Changzhou city, Jiangsu. Wikimedia Creative Commons.

One need not look far for examples of this anxiety about the capability gap. Xu Qiliang, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, wrote in 2013 that the People’s Liberation Army cannot currently meet the needs of national security and requires rapid modernization to contend with “the world’s advanced militaries”. Even though China already possesses the means to deter military aggression from any of its neighbors, it is apparent that the fifth generation of leadership still regards China as vulnerable unless it has an equivalency to every tool in the United States’ security toolbox. After all, it is telling that Xu Qiliang does not regard China as one of the world’s advanced militaries even though the PLAAF’s contingent of Xian H-6K bombers places China in a very exclusive club – only the United States, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom can also boast having strategic bombers at their disposal.

It is also worth noting how the presentation of the most recent Chinese Military Strategy reflects Han Feizi’s thought. In another of his works, The Difficulties of Persuasion, Han Feizi writes that, “If you wish to urge a policy of peaceful coexistence, then be sure to expound it in terms of lofty ideals, but also hint that it is commensurate with the ruler’s personal interests.” Just as the white paper advances the ideas of active defense and bottom-line thinking, it also emphasizes China’s commitment to participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions, the role of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, and appeals to such values as “the peaceful settlement of disputes.” This reflects a growing awareness on the part of Chinese officials that the rest of the world is paying attention to what kind of actor China might become in the 21st century. The message, in many respects, is that the Chinese Dream is inclusive – other nations and societies can benefit from China pursuing its own national interests, such as the investment and increased security that might come to Djibouti through the proposed establishment of a PLAN base there.

It is vital that those studying or interacting with Chinese policymakers to consider the historical context for China’s policies and their ideological framework. The China threat narrative considers Chinese strategy within a strictly neo-realist prism that supposes conflict will inevitably arise from a shift in polarity in international politics. Rather, Xi Jinping and Xu Qiliang can be best understood by consulting Han Feizi. As such, the explicit reference to China in the United States’ most recent maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, might not help matters. It indicates to the Chinese political leadership that Han Feizi’s view of international politics endures more than two millennia later – the strong will continue to dictate to the weak, and so the United States will continue to determine the outcome of any territorial dispute in the South China Sea or East China Sea so long as the capability gap with China persists. An appeal to lofty ideals in the U.S.-China relationship, rather than explicit reference to geopolitical changes, could have spoken to the fifth generation of leadership on a deeper level without alienating the US’ Asia-Pacific allies. For its part, the National Military Strategy of the U.S. released in June 2015 goes some way toward accomplishing this, balancing criticism of China’s actions in the South China Sea with assertions that the U.S. “support[s] China’s rise.”

It may be that the revised maritime strategy adopts a harsher tone toward China in order to generate political will among other countries to participate in what the original Cooperative Strategy termed the Global Maritime Partnership. By distinguishing the U.S. from China as far as adherence with international maritime law is concerned, the U.S. Navy demonstrates that it can be a more reliable partner than PLAN to such countries as the Philippines and Vietnam. Nonetheless, with China participating meaningfully in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) and other multilateral venues, there must be consistency in the message delivered by the U.S. at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels. Security in the Asia-Pacific region will not benefit from mixed signals delivered by any actor.

Paul Pryce is Political Advisor to the Consul-General of Japan in Calgary and a Research Analyst at the Atlantic Council of Canada. The views expressed in this article are his own.

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Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

Call for Articles: Chinese Military Strategy Week, 3-7 Aug 15

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Week Dates: 3-7 Aug 15
Articles Due: 29 Jul 15
Article Length: 500-1500 Words
Submit to: nextwar(at)cimsec(dot)org

In a watershed moment, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense recently published a white paper on the Chinese Military Strategy (with an English-language version made available and published almost immediately by USNI News). This document lays out a policy for future Chinese military engagement with the world, proclaiming the centrality of active defense as the essence of the Chinese Communist Party’s military strategic thought and then describing an approach for implementing this military policy in the air, cyber, land, and maritime domains. This document comes at a particularly interesting time as General Martin Dempsey, Chairman on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has since approved a new National Military Strategy for the United States, a strategy that names China explicitly as culpable for increased tension in the Asia-Pacific region and establishes an explicit interactive dynamic between the Chinese and U.S. strategies. While this is not the first time a U.S. National Military Strategy names China as a consideration, the shift in tone here is noteworthy.

During the first week of August, CIMSEC will host a series focused on exploring the relationship between the new Chinese military strategy and the strategic policies of the United States and others. Of particular interest are the dynamics of symmetry and asymmetry in their respective National Military Strategies (ideological, technological, doctrinal, coalitional, etc.); the implicit and explicit assumptions in each; the potentially divergent social and political purposes of such documents given their sources; and the implications for the other elements of national power in China, the United States, and the other actors (state and otherwise) in the international system. If the United States and China were to pursue their stated military strategies in whole or in part, what are the implications for their relative and absolute advantage? What are the acknowledged and unacknowledged risks for each in their stated policies?

Contributions should be between 500 and 1500 words in length and submitted no later than 29 July 2015. Publication reviews will also be accepted.

Eric Murphy is a Strategist and Operations Research Analyst with the United States Air Force and a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

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