Tag Archives: China

An Embarrassing Fact: The Legal Basis of the PRC East China Sea ADIZ

By Chang Ching

Two years ago on this day, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China issued a statement on establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. According to “the Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” three PRC domestic laws and administrative rules were addressed as the basis of the East China Sea ADIZ within the following text:

The government of the People’s Republic of China announces the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in accordance with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense (March 14, 1997), the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation (October 30, 1995) and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China (July 27, 2001). The zone includes the airspace within the area enclosed by China’s outer limit of the territorial sea and the following six points: 33º11’N (North Latitude) and 121º47’E (East Longitude), 33º11’N and 125º00’E, 31º00’N and 128º20’E, 25º38’N and 125º00’E, 24º45’N and 123º00’E, 26º44’N and 120º58’E.

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It is highly unlikely that the East China Sea ADIZ may effectively terminate all the foreign air reconnaissance maneuvers.

Further, based on this government statement, China’s Ministry of National Defense issued an announcement of the aircraft identification rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Republic of China as the following text:

The Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, now announces the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone as follows:

First, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must abide by these rules.

Second, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must provide the following means of identification:

  1. Flight plan identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should report the flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of China.
  2. Radio identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ.
  3. Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with the secondary radar transponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire course.
  4. Logo identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of their registration identification in accordance with related international treaties.

Third, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.

Fourth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China is the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.

Fifth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China is responsible for the explanation of these rules.

Sixth, these rules will come into force at 10 a.m. November 23, 2013.

For the most part, military observers and political commentators have analyzed the matter from the political dimension. What is lacking is an examination of the validity of these three PRC domestic laws and rules as well as their association with the PRC government statement and the subsequent aircraft identification rules. 

After reviewing the three laws and rules, i.e. the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China, noted by the PRC East China Sea ADIZ statement (hereafter, the statement) and the associated aircraft identification rules, we may conclude the following flaws:

First, the effective dates of these three laws and rules noted by the statement are indeed questionable.

For the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense, it was initially put into force on March 14, 1997, as noted by the statement. Likewise, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation was originally put into effect on October 30, 1995, also noted by the statement. Nevertheless, according to the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending Some Laws” issued by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on August 27, 2009 and subsequently put into effect by the “Order No.18 of the President of the People’s Republic of China”, the Article 48 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense was revised. Similarly, contents or wordings of the Article 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199 and 200 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation were also revised by the same amending process and government document. Hence, the effective dates of these two laws noted by the statement were definitely incorrect after the law amendment process.

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The original map attached to the PRC East China Sea ADIZ government statement.

Moreover, the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China was not initially put into force as noted by the statement. It was first jointly issued by the PRC State Council and the PRC Central Military Commission on July 24, 2000, by the “Decree No. 288 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China” after a large scale revision from its progenitor with the identical title established by the same two institutions on April 21, 1977.

Based on two separate documents but with the same titles known as the “Decision of the State Council and the Central Military Commission on Amending the General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China”, it was subsequently twice amended on July 27, 2001 and October 18, 2007. Also, the revised rules were put into force by the “Decree No. 312 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China” and “Decree No. 509 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China” on August 1, 2001 and November 22, 2007, accordingly. We therefore may notice that the effective date of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China noted by the statement was neither the initial effective date of the rule nor the latest effective date of the rule.

Based on the survey results already mentioned , we may conclude that the validity and legality of the judiciary documents cited by the statement is undeniably questionable. The quality of this government statement is poor.

Second, the jurisdiction associated with the contents noted by these three laws and rules as compared with the airspace defined by the PRC East China Sea ADIZ can also be problematic. The jurisdiction defined by the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense is basically illusive. It does note with the territorial airspace in its text. Yet, the substantial content of this law has never specifically mentioned its jurisdiction may extend to any air defense identification zone. Likewise, the Article 2 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation does declare the PRC’s exclusive sovereign rights over its territorial airspace. Many other articles of this law also repeatedly address its jurisdiction over the PRC territorial airspace. By the principle of ratione loci, we may clearly identify the jurisdiction defined by this law never was intended to extend to the airspace over the East China Sea.

A screenshot from a video posted on the website of China's Ministry of National Defense shows a Japanese fighter jet following Chinese fighter jet. (Handout)
The PRC East China Sea ADIZ is not a hollow statement. The Substantial interception maneuvers toward the JMSDF MPA by the PLAAF fighters.

On the other hand, according to the Chapter 13 and the Article 173 of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation, its jurisdiction does cover those foreign aircrafts or other flying objects within its territorial airspace. Also, by the terms noted in its Article 182, its jurisdiction may extend to certain search and rescue areas out of its territory. Nonetheless, such search and rescue areas are governed by the international treaties and totally irrelevant with any air defense identification zone.

Basically, the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China is the administrative rule originated from the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation. This is exactly the reason why the Article 1 of this rule specifically noted its jurisdiction only covering those aviation activities within the PRC’s territory. However, the Article 2 of the same rule also extends its jurisdiction over those units and persons with the ownership of the aircrafts as well as the personnel relevant to the aviation activities and the activities themselves. There are numerous articles of this rule repeatedly addressing its jurisdiction and objectives involved in the activities within this airspace as well as the aviation activities themselves.

The only exception regarding the jurisdiction out of its territorial airspace ever appeared in this rule is the Article 121 of Chapter XII titled with Supplementary Provisions: “In regard to the aircraft of the People’s Republic of China operating over the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones or high seas beyond the territorial waters of the People’s Republic of China, where the provisions of an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China are different from the provisions of these Rules, the provisions of that international treaty shall apply, except the provisions for which reservation has been declared by the People’s Republic of China.” According to the content noted above, its jurisdiction may only cover the aircraft with the PRC nationality registration. It does not authorize any jurisdiction over foreign aircraft out of its territorial airspace.

After reviewing the content of these three laws and rules, we may very confidently believe that there is no basis of jurisdiction over the East China Sea ADIZ ever granted by them. This is another solid evidence of staff work negligence.

Third, terms or any substantial contents noted by these three laws and rules are never associated with the airspace defined by the statement or the aircraft identification rules requested by the PRC Defense Ministry announcement. The term of the ADIZ itself was never specifically defined by these three legal documents since it never ever appeared in any text of them. Further, for those means of identification demanded by the PRC Defense Ministry announcement, no corresponding regulation has ever been noted in these three laws and rules. Of course, Article 167 and 168 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation as well as Article 39 and 90 of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China are noted with the term of flight plan, yet, the substantial content is totally irrelevant with the flight plan identification within the PRC East China Sea ADIZ.

As for the radio identification, the term does appear in the text of the Article 10, 88 and 90 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation for eight times and in the Article 48, 57, 60, 87, 95, 101 and 105 of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China for a total of thirteen times. Again, the context of these applications is not relevant to the East China Sea ADIZ identification procedures. The term of secondary radar transponder noted by the transponder identification section of the PRC Defense Ministry announcement of identification rules is never noted in these three legal documents. Last but not least, for the logo identification, the term “logo” itself is mentioned by the Article 8, 58, 61 and 85 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation five times but the contexts are not substantially associated with the East China Sea ADIZ identification procedures.

Likewise, it was also noted by Article 24, 41 and 47 of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China for six times. The content of the Article 24 and 47 is totally unrelated to the logo of any aircraft. Only the Article 41, “Aircraft operating within the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall bear distinct identification marks. Aircraft without identification marks are forbidden such flight. Aircraft without identification marks shall, when in need of such flight due to special circumstances, be subject to approval by the Air Force of the People’s Liberation Army. The identification marks of aircraft shall be subject to approval in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State,” the content is seemingly in accordance with the East China Sea ADIZ identification rule. Nonetheless, the jurisdiction of the Article 41 is only within the PRC territory, which is not the airspace defined by the East China Sea ADIZ.

It is noteworthy that there are various airspaces defined by these three laws and rules. Apart from the search and rescue areas mentioned above, the only other airspace that has the coverage out of the PRC territorial airspace is the “Flight Information Region” noted in the Article 30 and the Article 85 to Article 88 of the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China. The significance of the Flight Information Region is clearly defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization. It is totally different from ADIZ declared by any nation in the world. No confusion can happen between these two terms.

The PRC government statements on establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone and the Defense Ministry announcement of the aircraft identification rules within this ADIZ are fundamentally reckless. The PRC East China Sea ADIZ has already existed for almost two years. Can we ask the following questions?

Does the PRC adopt this ADIZ to expand its sovereign claim as many political accusations ever predicted? Does this ADIZ successfully expand the PRC sphere of influence as many commentators ever actively speculated? Does this ADIZ pave the solid foundation for the PLA to exercise its airpower above the East China Sea as many military experts assessed? Do expanding PRC military air activities associate with the mechanism of this ADIZ? How much national pride is substantially acquired after establishing this ADIZ? Whether this ADIZ actually serves the functions as the PRC government originally claimed? And finally, do we fairly and comprehensively judge this issue by excluding our prejudice first?

All readers may have their own answer to these questions. We should never forget that the biased vision may only cause distortion of the fact and creating confusions that hindering us to see the reality. Whether we may fairly observe and assess the regime in Beijing does matter to our future strategic options and welfare.

Chang Ching is a Research Fellow with the Society for Strategic Studies, Republic of China. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Narratives Today: Claims in the South China Sea

By Peter Marino

Geopolitical developments continue apace in the South China Sea, as other states start to mount a more comprehensive challenge to China’s unilateral claims of sovereignty. The US Navy has begun what it promises will be continued and regular Freedom of Navigation Operations near China’s island-building projects. Meanwhile the ICJ at the Hague has decided to weigh in on the issue by agreeing to hear a case brought by the Philippines against China. Globalogues takes a look.

Peter Marino holds an MSc in Global Politics from The London School of Economics and is a graduate of Norwich University. He lived in Shanghai from 2003 to 2008 and served as head of China development for London-based Aurigon, Ltd. He founded and sold Quaternion, a political risk startup, and is currently establishing a new Think Tank for International Affairs aimed at promoting engagement with the “Millennial Generation.” He also produces Globalogues, a video blog with commentary on global politics and economics. The views expressed in this article are his own.

October Member Round-Up Part Two

Welcome to Part Two of the October 2015 Member Round-Up, covering the second two weeks of the month. Over the past two weeks the U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea have dominated the attention of the maritime security community. Although the incident was a significant development in the region, CIMSEC members have focused on several other international maritime issues in addition to the FONOPS. These issues include Russian operations in the Middle East, Canada’s blue-water naval capabilities, strategic alliances in the Indo-Pacific and features of the U.S. Navy’s procurement strategy requirements.

Beginning the Round-Up at The National Interest, Scott Cheney-Peters discusses the necessity of U.S. FONOPS directed at China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea. Mr. Cheney-Peters explains that the U.S. position was twofold; it was critical to uphold commonsense interpretation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea while also reassuring commitment to regional allies concerned with China’s growing military capabilities. Mr. Cheney-Peters also explains the FONOPS repercussions and implications in an article at Sputnik.

Bryan Clark is interviewed at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments concerning the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation maneuvers and the potential consequences of such operations. He explains the possibility that these U.S. operations may initiate FONOPS response equivalents off the U.S. West Coast from PLA-N vessels. However, Mr. Clark also notes that inaction would abandon sovereignty disputes over the artificial islands ceding the region to the Chinese, a circumstance at odds with regional U.S. interests.

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China’s new airstrip built over Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea (CSIS image)

Mira Rapp-Hooper, at Lawfare, explains the U.S. FONOPS in the South China Sea through an international law context. The objective of her article is to outline the key legal and factual features of freedom of navigation while accurately describing the relationship between the military operation itself and maritime law. Also following a legal perspective, Alex Calvo for The Asia-Pacific Journal provides a comprehensive analysis on the ongoing legal dispute in the South China Sea. Mr. Calvo explains that the arbitration case currently being held in the Netherlands will contribute to the future dynamic of the entire South China Sea region and the ability for international law to resolve territorial conflicts peacefully and without recourse to military options.

Concluding the Round-Up’s discussion on the South China Sea FONOPS, James Goldrick at The Interpreter discusses the political and strategic need for Australia to assert freedom of operation throughout China’s artificial island network and its corresponding contested waters. Mr. Goldrick maintains that Australia should dispatch a naval force to operate in the vicinity of the Chinese artificial islands to demonstrate commitment to upholding international law and support for regional allied interests.

Darshana Baruah, at Offiziere, discusses the developing relationship in the Indo-Pacific between India and Australia. The article explains that the recent completion of the first bilateral naval exercises between the two countries indicates an aim to strengthen interoperability between their respective navies for the purpose of increased maritime security. Further to this, Ms. Baruah identifies the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and the rise of China as having contributed to geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, which has resulted in strategic opportunities for Indo-Pacific actors to collaborate in bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

Bryan Clark, before the House Armed Services Seapower and Power Projection Forces Subcommittee, argued that the U.S. Navy must increase development of advanced undersea systems to sustain American dominance in undersea operations. Mr. Clark explains that U.S. undersea warfare capabilities face the threat of being effectively challenged as a result of new detection technologies and quieter submarine fleets being developed by U.S. competitors.

To conclude Part Two of the October Member Round-Up, Ken Hansen for The Conference of Defense Associations Institute discusses the loss of Canada’s two primary logistical ships and the implications the loss will have on the Navy’s operations. Mr. Hansen explains that the decommissioning of the HMCS Preserver and the major fire onboard the HMCS Protecteur has entirely eliminated the Navy’s ability to conduct global force projection operations due to a lack of at-sea replenishment. Mr. Hansen explains that the Canadian Navy has acquired Spanish and Chilean logistical ships for temporary use for blue-water training operations and to maintain task group readiness throughout the logistical ship replacement process.

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the second part of October:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honours Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies and defence policy and management.

South China Sea: International Arbitration moves forward as PAC rules on Jurisdiction

By Alex Calvo

Introduction: the Philippines’ International Arbitration Case moves Forward

Despite Beijing’s refusal to take part in the proceedings, on 29 October the Court of Permanent Arbitration (PCA) issued a ruling on jurisdiction and admissibility of the UNCLOS arbitration case launched by the Philippines against China. The Court unanimously decided that it had jurisdiction concerning seven of the fifteen claims put forward by Manila, with a decision on a further seven to be reached when considering their merits. The ruling by the PAC is thus a major victory for Manila and maritime democracies, since China’s view that the Philippines had promised to pursue only negotiations, and her assertion that no decision could be taken on maritime zones until delimitation had taken place, were rejected. While the decision on the merits of the case will have to wait until at least next year, and a ruling in favor of Manila does not guarantee in and by itself that Beijing will comply, this is nevertheless a major step forward for the notion that it is right plus might and not just might in isolation, which will determine the future of this vital sea.

Some Highlights from the Court’s Decision

The following are some of the potentially most relevant aspects of the Court’s decision, with the page in brackets for ease of reference.

First of all, the PRC is squarely treated as the defendant, notwithstanding the fact she is refusing to take part in the proceedings. Thus “The Parties to this arbitration are the Republic of the Philippines (the “Philippines”) and the People’s Republic of China (“China”)” (p. vii). To justify this, the Court cites Art 9 of Annex VII to the Convention, saying that “the non-participation of China does not bar this Tribunal from proceeding with the arbitration. China is still a party to the arbitration, and pursuant to the terms of Article 296(1) of the Convention and Article 11 of Annex VII, it shall be bound by any award the Tribunal issues” (p. 11). While this does not necessarily imply an ultimate ruling in favor of Manila, as stressed by the Court (“The Tribunal does not simply adopt the Philippines’ claims, and there can be no default judgment as a result of China’s non-appearance”), it amounts to a major defeat for Beijing, which has seen her stress on bilateral negotiations and position that Manila had agreed to exclusively pursue such venue dismissed. Furthermore, it also means that the view that Manila’s case implied (even if just implicitly) territorial delimitation and thus fell squarely within the PRC’s derogation from compulsory arbitration in such matters has also been defeated. This makes it more difficult for China to proceed as in the recent past with a gradual yet relentless expansion, where reclamation and militarization went hand in hand with appeals to dialogue and negotiation and repeated promises of respect for freedom of navigation and overflight. Thus, either China tones down her actions and becomes more pragmatic and conciliatory, as some observers believe she may, or she chooses to nakedly ignore international rules and institutions, as Japan did following the Manchurian Incident and subsequent Lytton Report and Stimson Doctrine.

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Concerning China’s non-participation, the PAC explicitly acknowledge the 7 December 2014 position paper, not only referring to it but stating that its publication “facilitated the Tribunal’s task to some extent”. Thus, for the benefit of justice and the concept of equality of arms between the parties, the Court has clearly taken a pragmatic approach towards China’s decision to approach the PAC indirectly, not making a submission but instead publishing a position paper laying down her views and her response to the Philippines’ demands. This was already clear, as explained in the decision, when this summer on holding hearings on jurisdiction the Court provided the PRC “with daily transcripts and all documents submitted during the course” of those hearings. In a way we could see perhaps all this as evidence of some sort of pragmatic arrangement, or gentlemen’s agreement, whereby Beijing did not formally take part in the proceedings but was still informed in detail and had the chance to make her views known to the Court. As the ruling notes, “The Position Paper has since been followed by two letters from the Chinese Ambassador addressed to the members of the Tribunal and by regular public statements of Chinese officials that touch on the arbitration” (p. 41). This could of course go on in the next stage, as the Court deliberates on the merits. Beijing may stay aloof from the proceedings, as she has announced she will, while still interacting with the Court on a semi-official basis. However, this just means delaying the moment when Beijing, should the final ruling go against her, will have to decide whether to comply or not with that decision. In that case, even if the PRC’s leadership chooses pragmatism and accommodation, the CCP may find itself a prisoner of its own rhetoric, and the many years during which it has been telling the Chinese population that the country had “indisputable sovereignty” over the whole of the South China Sea. Thus, accepting the ruling may be no easy matter for Beijing, even if the will is there.

Concerning Bejing’s claims that the case amounts to an abuse of right, the Court rejects it, saying that “China has not made an application to the Tribunal pursuant to Article 294(1) of the Convention”, which would force it to decide whether it was the case, and “the Tribunal is therefore under no obligation to follow the procedure outlined in Article 294(2)”. Furthermore, the ruling states that “the procedure is appropriate in only the most blatant cases of abuse or harassment”, which is not the situation in the current proceedings (p. 43). Therefore, the PAC chooses instead to focus on jurisdiction. China may have considered that submitting an application under Article 294 UNCLOS would definitely be considered to amount to taking part in the proceedings. An alternative explanation is that Beijing preferred not to risk losing an early battle by having the Court formally determine that the case did not constitute an abuse of right, choosing instead to simply use this term to criticize it in the political arena.

With regard to Beijing’s contention that it is impossible to rule on the exercise of maritime rights before first ruling on the underlying territorial dispute, the Court is adamant that this is not the case, stating instead that it “does not see that any of the Philippines’ Submissions require an implicit determination of sovereignty” (p. 59-60). This notion that it is possible to first determine the interpretation of UNCLOS and whether a party’s actions conform to it, while leaving territorial delimitation to later negotiations or (non-compulsory) arbitration could be compared to the idea (put into practice by Taiwan and Japan in their Senkaku Islands fisheries agreement) that it is possible to first jointly manage and exploit natural resources, while again leaving territorial delimitation for later. This is a reminder of how the Philippines’ arbitration case and Taiwan’s East China Sea initiative (and its child, the Senkaku fisheries agreement with Japan), taken together, may point the way forward to a peaceful, international law-based approach to maritime territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific Region. An informal Manila-Taipei-Tokyo democratic triangle may emerge as the seed around which a wider informal coalition may emerge, although of course for this to be effective its reach cannot be limited to the diplomatic and legal arenas. One thing is to stress the rule of law at sea and peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, another to wishfully think that this can take place without the possibility of resorting to force if necessary. National security and collective security are the other side of the coin, without which international law and the rule of law at sea cannot thrive and ultimately prevail.

The Tribunal notes, in line with long-standing comments by observers and other states, that “China has not, as far as the Tribunal is aware, clarified the nature or scope of its claimed historic rights. Nor has China clarified its understanding of the meaning of the ‘nine-dash line’ set out on the

map accompanying its Notes Verbales of 7 May 2009” (p. 62). This was precisely the motivation behind the US State Department’s Limits in the Seas issue No 143 devoted to Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Thus, although this is a matter reserved for the decision on the merits of the case, we could read the PAC’s ruling on jurisdiction as saying that the nine-dash line must be translated into claims under UNCLOS, since the Convention does not recognize any such concept. This makes it clear that Beijing is facing an uphill battle in seeking to convince the court that the nine-dash line can indeed be made to fit into UNCLOS. However, there is always the possibility that in its final ruling the Court will not declare the line as such to be contrary to UNCLOS, as requested by the Philippines, but instead take a softer, more pragmatic approach, and say that while not illegal per se, its meaning must be clarified by resort to those concepts such as the territorial sea and the EEZ laid down in the Convention. While the impact of such a ruling would not be as spectacular, it may be a way of avoiding cornering Beijing, leaving room for later negotiations and compromise, instead of making Beijing lose face in no uncertain terms. Such a ruling would allow both sides to claim victory. We should remember, in this regard, that international tribunals must often walk a fine line between the wish to uphold international law, and the need to ensure its effective implementation. Thus, rather than a perfect ruling with close to zero chances of settling the matter, the PAC may prefer a less than perfect text that can be used as a stepping stone towards a final settlement of the dispute.

Also interesting is the fact that the Court considers that no intervention by a third party is necessary in the proceedings, thus reinforcing the view that territorial delimitation is not at stake. This again is in line with Manila’s position, while not following “the Chinese Ambassador’s First Letter”, where he “did express serious concern and opposition to a procedure of ‘intervention by other States’”, in reference to Vietnam, “as being ‘inconsistent with the general practices of international arbitration’” (p. 73). Hanoi’s role in the proceedings, not formally a party but having made her own statement and attended this summer’s proceedings, shows how, and this is one of the aspects of the case which clearly worries China, the arbitration proceedings, although strictly speaking bilateral, have attracted not only the support of a wide range of countries, but limited participation by some of them. Taken together, it could facilitate cooperation among these countries, and furthermore could support the notion that China is the odd man out, and not just another claimant, in the South China Sea.

Concerning China’s assertion that the Philippines had agreed not to pursue arbitration, by among others signing the 2002 DOC (Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea), the Court considers that its “language is not consistent with the creation of new obligations but rather restates existing obligations pending agreement on a Code that eventually would set out new obligations”, adding that it basically reaffirms existing obligations and exhorts parties to create others at some point in the future (p. 83). Thus, the Court concludes that “the DOC was not intended to be a legally binding agreement with respect to dispute resolution”, and uses contemporary documents to support the view that it was instead “an aspirational political document”. In doing so, the PAC stresses statements by China herself, such as that in August 2000 by a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, who said that the “Code of Conduct will be a political document to promote good neighbourliness and regional stability instead of a legal document to solve specific disputes” (p. 84). This is significant at many levels. On the one hand it illustrates a very important general principle of international law, that someone cannot go against his own acts. On the other, it exposes the shallowness of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the South China Sea in recent years, full of smoke and grand sounding statements but rather short on substance. Other claimants may be wary of openly calling Beijing’s bluff for fear of appearing disrespectful, but the Court minces no words in its ruling on jurisdiction, providing a detailed explanation of why the long list of statements, agreements, and contacts, do not amount to much at the end of the day, and clearly constitute no bar to the arbitration proceedings, since at no stage have the Philippines and Beijing agreed to forgo this road.

Finally, we should note that out of 15 submissions by the Philippines, the Court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider seven, and concerning another seven it reserved consideration of its jurisdiction to the merits phase. In one (15, concerning the request of a declaration that “China shall desist from further unlawful claims and activities”), the Court “DIRECTS the Philippines to clarify the content and narrow the scope of its Submission” and also reserves consideration of its jurisdiction to the merits phase. The ruling states that “the claims and activities to which this

Submission could potentially relate are unclear from the Philippines pleadings to date” (p. 147). Since, out of 15 submissions, not one has been determined at this stage to be ultra vires (beyond the powers of) the Court, it is difficult to overstate the degree to which this constitutes a major victory for the Philippines. Having said that, we should remember that this arbitration case, and more generally appeals to international law, the rule of law at sea, and peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, are only an aspect of Manila’s strategy to deal with Chinese expansionism. They should not be seen in isolation, but rather in conjunction with rearmament, and stronger bilateral and multilateral relations with fellow maritime democracies. Unless the Philippines can upgrade their military, regaining lost capacities such as combat jets, and being able to deal with the different levels of warfare (including non-lethal force at sea), a victory in the final stage of this legal battle may end up being little more than a footnote in history books.

Taiwan’s Reaction

MOFA spokesperson Eleanor Wang said that “The Republic of China government’s determination to defend the country’s sovereignty and maritime rights over the four island chains in the South China Sea is not open to question”, adding that her department was closely following developments in the arbitration case, and would respond as necessary. The Republic of China is not a party to UNCLOS, but Taipei has urged the different parties involved to respect international law, including this convention.

Taiwanese views on the issue are important for a number of reasons. First of all because the ROC is one of the claimants, and controls Itu Aba (Taiping) Island. Second, since PRC claims and in particular the famous “Nine-dash line” and its successors originated in the ROC, which the PRC claims to have legally superseded. Third, given that in spite of the previous point Taipei has been moving away from these maximalist positions, both in theory and practice. Fourth, because the Island launched an East China Sea Peace initiative, followed by a fisheries agreement with Japan concerning the Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diayutai, and both could be a template for the South China Sea. Finally, because one of the points that irritated Beijing, as clear from the Chinese 7 December 2014 position paper, was the Philippines’ alleged deviation from a “One China” policy in her arbitration suit against the PRC.

Taiwan may not be recognized by the UN and most countries in the world, and actually still has to decide whether to recognize herself, but the dispute over the South China Sea is intimately connected to that over the Island. After proving that democracy and Sinic culture are compatible, Taiwan is now showing how the latter can also coexist side by side with the rule of law and a pragmatic approach to territorial disputes.

Beijing insists the case is outside UNCLOS compulsory arbitration.

The PCA ruling prompted a strong reaction by Beijing, with the PRC’s Foreign Affairs Ministry insisting in refusing to recognize the court and take part in the proceedings. We should note, however, that as explained China has not stayed completely aloof from the case, since on 7 December 2014 she issued a position paper explaining her views and the reasons why she believed the case should be dismissed. In a statement dated 30 October, the MOFA said the ruling was “null and void, and has no binding effect on China”, and warned that the case would damage “the integrity and authority of the UNCLOS”. The text said that “With regard to territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, China will not accept any solution imposed on it or any unilateral resort to a third-party dispute settlement”. It also slammed the case as a “political provocation under the cloak of law”, stressing that China’s position, explained in her position paper, was “clear and explicit, and will not change”. Beijing once again underlined that she considered the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) to mean Manila had agreed to exclusively resort to “negotiations and consultations”.

While none of this comes as a surprise, it is not clear yet whether the ruling will contribute to a change in Chinese policy. Beijing may wait for the ruling on the merits, while completing the construction of military and dual-use facilities in her artificial islands and avoiding major incidents, keeping a lower profile. She may, on the other hand, declare an ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone). Either way, China may seek some accommodation with other littoral states, in order to prevent ASEAN from coordinating effectively and to limit the potential damage to her reputation that could result from appearing too inflexible. In the longer run, China may seek to either shape rules and institutions like UNCLOS and the PAC, or devise an alternative more to her liking. The first option could imply building an informal coalition with countries also keen to expand the rights of coastal states in their EEZs. However, at least two obstacles loom large, namely the unclear nature of Chinese claims (which may go much further than that) and the fact that some potential allies also happen to be rival claimants. The recent FONOP (freedom of navigation operation) in the South China Sea by USS Lassen has been supported by a number of regional states, even those like Vietnam who are also targeted by Washington’s freedom of navigation program. The second, more radical, option, would involve setting up an alternative institutional framework, as Beijing is gradually doing in the international financial arena with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the possible development of a RMB payments system independent of Swift.

Conclusions

Manila has won a victory in the first stage of the legal battle aimed at arresting Beijing’s expansion in the South China Sea. Although, as stressed by the Court, this does not prejudge the final decision on the merits of the case, major pillars of the PRC’s narrative, such as the alleged agreement with other countries to pursue negotiations only, have been blown out of the water. Faced with this, China may choose to ignore a decision in favor of Manila, thus putting a further dent on her prestige as a country respectful of international law and other nations, or seek some sort of accommodation, saving face while making some concessions. Some voices believe that China may already be starting to act in a more conciliatory manner, in the wake of the ruling on jurisdiction. However, flexibility may not be compatible with a public opinion that has repeatedly been told the South China Sea was “indisputably” Chinese, and which may turn on any leader ready to make concessions. Concerning the Philippines, even if success at this stage is repeated when the Court rules on the merits of the case, she needs to keep working on rearmament and stronger bilateral and multilateral relations with fellow maritime democracies and Vietnam, since otherwise the Court’s final ruling may amount to little more than a symbolic victory. Taiwan, not a party to UNCLOS, is however a very important actor in this dispute, and her East China Sea Peace Initiative and subsequent fisheries agreement with Japan may be vindicated if an arbitration ruling is followed by a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea dispute, or at least an agreement to set aside territorial claims while jointly managing resources and moving forward with confidence-building measures.

Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan), focuses on security and defence policy, international law, and military history, in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. A member of Taiwan’s South China Sea Think-Tank and CIMSEC (The Center for International Maritime Security), his previous work on the South China Sea includes “China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and International Arbitration in the South China Sea”, The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Volume 13, Issue 42, No. 2, 26 October 2015, available at http://japanfocus.org/-Alex-Calvo/4391/article.pdf He tweets at Alex__Calvo and his work can be found at https://nagoya-u.academia.edu/AlexCalvo