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China’s Reactions to the Arbitration Ruling Will Lead It Into Battles It Won’t Win, Part I

September 6, 2016 Guest Author 3 Comments

The following is a two-part series on China’s possible reactions to the Arbitration Ruling in its dispute with the Philippines. In Part I, the military implications of China’s recent and possible future actions are analyzed. Part II will look at the likely outcome of China using economic and legal leverage to register its displeasure with the ruling.

By Mark E. Rosen

The Arbitration Panel’s ruling against China on July 12 was a stinging blow to China’s international prestige. China advanced a narrative that it had historic rights to nearly the entirety of the South China Sea (SCS), and that it could prevent states like the Philippines and Vietnam from fishing in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and drilling for oil near their coasts. China also maintained, through its actions, the right to engage in island building and fishing practices which caused severe damage to the marine environment. Since these activities occurred inside of its Nine Dashed Line Claim (9DL), China felt justified in these “internal matters” and told its neighbors in almost evangelical terms that the SCS is their patrimony and that no country or international body has a right to mess in their domestic affairs. On all these counts, the Tribunal disagreed and issued a strong rebuke of China’s activities.

The few positive signs that China is receptive to peaceful resolution and has moved past the ruling have been overtaken by a number of very disturbing trends which, regardless of which path China ultimately takes, puts it on a collision course with Japan, the United States, or even a much broader group of states. Unless something dramatic emerges as a result of the secret conclave in Beidaihe, the negative developments seem to overwhelmingly demonstrate that China’s gaze is only focused on settling scores with the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, because these states are responsible for its legal embarrassment and loss of face within ASEAN.

China’s Negative Reactions to the Ruling

Immediately after the ruling, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a detailed repudiation of the ruling on July 12; declaring that the ruling was “null and void,” “has no binding force,” and that “China neither accepts nor recognizes it.” It also stated that the Philippine’s actions in filing the action were “unilateral” and a “violation of international law,” because the Philippines deviated from its legal commitment in the 2002 ASEAN Declaration of Conduct (DOC) to resolve differences via negotiations. China, in the same breath, reaffirmed its commitment to international law and to peace and stability in the South China Sea. Two days later, the Chinese state media declared the permanent court of arbitration a “puppet” of external forces and that “China will take all necessary measures to protect its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.” Since then, the following developments have taken place:

On July 13, China sent civilian aircraft to two new airports on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. This action was taken in spite of the Tribunal’s ruling that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation and part of the Philippine continental shelf, and Subi Reef is a low tide elevation and part of the territorial sea of Itu Aba. In both cases, low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated by China.
On July 13, China’s vice foreign minister asserted, “If our security is being threatened, of course we have the right to demarcate a [air defense identification] zone.”
On July 15, China posted images of its recent overflight of the highly contested Scarborough Shoal by nuclear capable H-6K bombers (and escorts) and announced that such patrols would be a “Regular Practice.” This announcement came the same day as the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson was visiting his Chinese counterpart, Adm. Wu Shengli.
On July 18, Press reports cited Adm. Wu Shengli as warning the U.S. CNO that future U.S. freedom of navigation operations “will only backfire” and that Beijing will complete its planned land reclamation and reef reclamation and has made “sufficient preparations” to deal with any sovereignty infringements.
On July 19, China’s vice minister of commerce Gao Yan told reporters that trade relations between China and the Philippines were “mutually beneficial,” and added that the government did not endorse calls within China to boycott Philippine products. There were also reports of Chinese activities smashing iPhones and massing protests in front of KFC restaurants in several cities.
On July 24, ASEAN failed to achieve consensus to issue a statement on the Tribunal decision after China’s ally, Cambodia, broke away from a consensus document that was being proposed by the Philippines, Vietnam, and others.
On July 25, the United States, Australia, and Japan held a Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and issued a statement expressing “their strong support for the rule of law and called on China and the Philippines to abide by the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award of July 12 in the Philippines-China arbitration, which is final and legally binding on both parties.” The ministers also expressed opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo including future land reclamation activities.
On July 27, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the Trilateral statement and charged that the statement was not constructive and was “fanning the flames.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang also charged that the U.S., Australia, and Japan have been adopting double standards towards international law which they adopt when it “fits their needs.”
On July 28, The Chinese Defense Ministry announced plans to hold a joint military exercise with Russia in the SCS in September; the first such bilateral exercise in that body of water.
On August 1, China held a significant live fire drill in the East China Sea (ECS) that included the firing of “dozens” of missiles and torpedoes. (AP, Aug 2, 2016). There were also reports that six PRC coast guard vessels and over 200 fishing vessels swarmed in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
On August 2, Japan’s Ministry of Defense published a white paper describing China’s position on the SCS an object of “deep concern.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called Japan’s paper “full of malice,” “lousy clichés,” and “irresponsible” and a smokescreen to obscure Japan’s expansionist arms policies. This exchange of statements was then followed by North Korea’s firing of a ballistic missile into Japan’s EEZ on August 3. When the UN Security Council sought to condemn North Korea’s actions, China “curtailed” the Security Council’s actions.
On August 2, China’s Supreme People’s Court clarified China’s 2014 Fishing Regulation to the effect that those that engage in illegal activities inside of the waters claimed by China will be arrested and tried as criminals. This decision settled past differences of opinion as to whether China’s EEZ and Territorial Seas empowered Chinese officials to pursue criminal liability for those involved in illegal hunting or fishing in China’s jurisdictional seas. The practical import is that fishing within the 9DL area will be met with vessel seizure and imprisonment.
On August 2, Malaysia joined Indonesia in announcing that they would sink any foreign ships that are fishing in their claimed waters. This statement was a veiled threat to China that had allowed its “fishing militia” to fish in waters claimed by both countries.
On August 6, China sent bombers and fighter jets on patrol in the vicinity of “Scarborough Shoals.” China announced that these flights would be a “regular practice” to “normalize South China Sea combat patrols” to safeguard its sovereignty interests.

Converging Flash Points

Much like current U.S. presidential campaign antics, it is hard to imagine what is likely to happen next in the high stakes poker game being played out in Asian waters. Taking into account what has happened to date and where China believes that it has leverage, there are three possible ways in which China might lash out: military, economic, and legal.

Possible Military Moves by China: The Senkakus

The statements by China’s Chief of the Naval Staff and its military activity near the Senkakus suggest that China is employing tactics of intimidation to get Japan to back away from its recent statements over the Tribunal’s decision. It may also be the case that the presence of swarming vessels in and around the Senkakus and the North Korean missile shot (presumably with tacit PRC approval) suggest that China is trying to goad Japan to militarily respond or back off its claims.

The Senkakus have always been the powder keg of Asia because it features the two leading powers in Asia: one ascending and one arguably in decline both competing on the world stage. Both are rivals for dominance over a tiny scrap of land and associated maritime space which, given the implications for access to fisheries and oil and gas, is not irrational. This is somewhat ironic because the Tribunal decision in China v. the Philippines takes away much of the incentive for the two states to fight over these rocks since they would be enclaved within the continental shelf of one of the two states; most likely Japan. In that case, the rocks themselves and the surrounding territorial sea have much less value that the large continental shelf projections of each country and aren’t worth fighting over. (See, Fixing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Problem Once and For All ).

It is somewhat curious that China is lashing out at Japan, given that the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue has been rather quiet until recently and the SCS is China’s current problem. Regardless, China would do well to revisit its strategic objectives, especially since the United States declared in April of 2014 that Japan is the lawful administrator of the islands and are within the scope of Article 5 of the 1961 Mutual Defense Treaty. The reaffirmation of solidarity between U.S., Australia, and Japan in the July 25 Trilateral declaration likely provides Tokyo the fortitude it needs to militarily respond if China continues to operate provocatively near the Senkakus.

Another important point in this calculus is Japanese President Shinzo Abe. Abe stated in 2015 that Japan is a “maritime state” and can “only ensure its own peace and security by actively engaging in efforts to make the entire world a more peaceful and secure place.” Japan’s record 2016 military budget of roughly $42 billion is further evidence of that goal. Japan has a combatant fleet of 131 vessels, including 3 aircraft carriers, 43 destroyers, and 17 submarines using frontline U.S. tactics and systems. China has substantially more hulls and submarines, but most naval analysts interviewed by the author cite the excellent Japanese submarine force as a likely game changer.

Japan’s Izumo-class helicopter destroyer. (AFP)

More important is the will to fight. Japan, as noted, has been greatly increasing its military spending even though its economy has been in the doldrums. According to the OECD, output growth has been slowed by a drop in demand from China and other Asian countries and by sluggish private consumption. This indicates that if Japan is pushed to the point that it must militarily respond, it has three valid reasons for using instant and overwhelming force now. First, Japan’s economy is too fragile to become involved in a protracted war with China. It would need to win fast and win big to reestablish economic dominance within Asia. If China is not dealt a mortal blow and forced to capitulate, it will use its economic leverage to coerce states to suspend trading with Japan. Japan’s trading economy cannot easily weather a suspension of its trade relations – even if the U.S. and Australia remain in their corner. Second, Japan cannot win a military war of attrition with China: it suffers from a lack of hulls, aircraft, personnel, and production capacity.

Like Israel did in the 1967 six-day attack on Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, Japan would feel compelled to use its current qualitative advantages to deliver a massive blow to Chinese maritime and air forces to dissuade Beijing from further military incursions in the ECS. In a few years, the military edge could shift to China because of its massive building plans. Third, Japanese domestic politics today would likely support a massive strike. This starts with Japan’s new self-defense law which entered into force in March of 2016 and allows Japan to engage in limited coalition warfare. Also, a 2012 Public Opinion Poll by the Cabinet Office shows a nose-dive in Japanese attitudes towards China. According to a 2013 paper by Stimson Center Analyst Yuki Tatsumi Chinese economic ascendancy has been a source of friction as has been the influx of Chinese citizens into Japan as members of the workforce or as tourists. People complain of the increases in crime by Chinese living and working in Japan and bad manners. Finally, the Japanese public is extremely well read and are likely becoming unnerved and physically threatened by the constant scrambling of Japanese fighters (200 times alone in April – June) to intercept Chinese aircraft, ballistic missile tests by China’s “Puppet” in Pyongyang, and live fire exercises in the Senkakus.

China needs to ask itself what it is trying to achieve in the ECS. If its intent is to beat Tokyo into submission or lure it into a limited and protracted war of attrition to undermine public support for Abe, it seems very unlikely that Tokyo will take the bait. However, if its intent is to successfully provoke a full-scale military attack, they are likely to be very disappointed, particularly since U.S. forces will be present to backstop the protection of Japan’s homeland. They may also be gravely miscalculating that Japan will only respond to Beijing’s move in a piecemeal fashion. Japan has an excellent and professional Navy – especially its submarine force – and could deliver a knock-out punch to much of China’s maritime forces.

Possible Military Moves by China: An Actual or De Facto South China Sea ADIZ

Until the combat patrols on August 6 near Scarborough Shoal, Beijing’s recent attention seemed focused on the East China Sea. However, while Chinese threats to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS seemed to have died down, the possibility cannot be reasonably excluded. The question then becomes: does an ADIZ advance China’s campaign to assert its sovereignty in the South China Sea? If China concludes that an ADIZ will send the correct signal that it has sovereignty claims in the SCS, the next concerns are the likely responses and whether or not they can succeed.

The United States was the first country to establish an ADIZ during the height of the Cold War as a way of providing notice to Soviet flights entering the zone near the United States that the United States reserved the right to undertake a radio challenge or dispatch fighter aircraft to ascertain the incoming flights course and intentions if it was not flying on a predetermined flight plan. The United States now has four ADIZs in operation: the U.S. ADIZ (Continental U.S.); Alaska ADIZ, Guam ADIZ, and Hawaii ADIZ. Upwards of 20 other countries have established these zones adjacent to their coastlines. These zones do not seek to restrict freedoms of navigation or overflight; their sole purpose is to ascertain a particular flights intention to reassure the coastal state that no surprise attack is being launched. When China established its ADIZ in late 2013 over the contested Senkaku islands, it was diplomatically protested because it was overbroad and inappropriate to defend an uninhabited rock as a sort of occupation measure. China’s ECS ADIZ was also criticized for including civil aircraft flying on established flight plans.

b3e25813c74de1b6ec8eb95e24543ca2_0 — China’s ECS ADIZ declared in November 2013. (Wire Agencies, BBC, Yonhap News)

ADIZs have no explicit foundation in UNCLOS or other international instruments, yet they are regarded as customary and lawful when used for the limited purpose of identifying aircraft near a country’s coastline, not to deny such aircraft their lawful rights of overflight. For this reason, the United States and other countries protested the Chinese ADIZ, since it was established to “control and react to aircraft entering the zone” and warned that aircraft flying in the ECS Zone “must comply” with the requirements to provide detailed identification data and “comply with the instructions” of the zone controller.

The same legal issues in China’s ECS zone would apply in a SCS Zone. Depending on how it was actually constituted, it would certainly be provocative because it is not associated mainland protection but rather protection of mostly uninhabited rocks and islets from surprise attack. As it relates to military aircraft lawfully operating in the SCS, there is a fear that China will seek to limit military flights to corridors that they can instrument and hold at risk with missiles. There are also the impacts of a large SCS ADIZ and the impact on civil aviation. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the South China Sea is a “Main Truck” for all traffic on “all routes” and there are concerns that added reporting and routing by Chinese civil authorities will impede international air traffic.

The last possibility is that China, through deeds and action, will establish a de facto ADIZ as an adjunct of its promised combat air patrols. It might simply declare that all aircraft flying in the SCS have to provide flight information to Chinese Military authorities or risk interception or being shot down.

In the last analysis, if China were to establish an actual or de facto ADIZ encompassing the SCS and used the same sort of rules as its ECS ADIZ, the United States will almost certainly protest the action and fly combat aircraft into those portions of the ADIZ which are illegitimate. Australia and France are two other states that are also unlikely to stand idly by if a SCS ADIZ is established because of Australia’s longstanding commitment to UNCLOS, order at sea, and also because of the verbal barrage which it received from China following the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue statement. Also, this support from Australia is consistent with the U.S./Australia Security Treaty of 1952 in which security guarantees are triggered by an “armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties.” Finally, France announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue Forum in June that it would, on its own right, conduct “regular and visible” patrols in the South China Sea. This is logical, because France frequently operates in those waters in conjunction with the protection of its vast South Pacific Territories. The French defense minister has also urged the EU to also join in these patrols to reinforce “a rules-based maritime order.” Great Britain, Vietnam, and India are other countries voicing public support for the ruling and could conceivably contribute to a “FON Coalition.”

If China goes forward with an ADIZ, it is very reasonable to expect that the United States, France, Australia and even Japan will mount FON-like operations to protest with the zone’s establishment. If these operations are “regular and visible” as suggested by France, China would need to ask itself whether or not it is is achieving its political objectives when foreign aircraft can operate with impunity in their new ADIZ. Also, if China continues to engage in persistent combat patrols around Scarborough Shoal, then a declaration that the United States that regards Scarborough to be within the scope of the “metropolitan territory” of the Philippines under Article V of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty is both possible and a fresh challenge to Beijing that would cause it embarrassment.

China puts itself greatly at risk if it moves forward with an ADIZ or something resembling it given the widespread international support for the Tribunal Ruling, abhorrence with China’s behavior towards its neighbors, and general concern that China’s bad behavior be deterred. Now that the U.S. has bed down rights in five bases in the Philippines adjacent to the South China Sea, it has gained a significant military advantage in being able to operate fixed wing combat aircraft from land locations to conduct its own FON operations or combat patrols that don’t put a carrier at risk. China’s ADIZ gamble might have paid off if only the United States were involved so that it could “declare victory” in a future contacts with U.S. ships or aircraft such as the EP3 incident. However, given the threat dynamic and the potential to trigger alliance support from Australia and France, China will hopefully conclude that it will be biting off more than it can chew by going down the ADIZ path or, as noted above, further provoking Japan in the East China Sea.

A maritime and international lawyer, Mark E. Rosen is the SVP and General Counsel of CNA and holds an adjunct faculty appointment at George Washington School of Law. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of CNA or any of its sponsors.

Featured Image:Japanese submarine Oyashio arrives at the former U.S. naval base in Subic bay. (AFP)

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis

Riding A New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia

September 1, 2016 Guest Author Leave a comment

By Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson

On 21 July 2013, several dozen Sansha City “residents” stood before the city government building and swore oaths during an inspection by Mayor Xiao Jie (肖杰) and his military counterpart Garrison Commander Cai Xihong (蔡喜宏). Clad in militia uniforms and toting Type-56 assault rifles, the Sansha Maritime Militia was officially established to uphold Chinese interests throughout the Paracels and beyond. According to the Garrison Commander, Sansha City’s Maritime Militia are given five major missions in China’s struggle for maritime rights protection: regular declarations of sovereignty, conducting reconnaissance and patrols, cooperating with maritime law enforcement, participating in marine rescue, and supporting combat operations. They also repel foreign fishing vessels, safeguard islands and reefs, and provide disaster relief for civilians living there. Such missions represent important, evolving roles for the militia as China seeks to reinforce its claims to the South China Sea. Sansha’s Maritime Militia is on the frontlines of this effort given the municipality’s responsibility for administering all Chinese-claimed features in the South China Sea.

We previously examined in depth the maritime militia forces of Sanya, Danzhou, and Tanmen (Parts One and Two). No examination of the maritime militia of Hainan Province would be complete, however, without scrutinizing the Sansha Maritime Militia. As China’s newest, southernmost municipality, Sansha City is a critical node in China’s South China Sea strategy. Given its responsibility to administer all of China’s claimed features within the nine-dashed line by Beijing, Sansha lies at the apex of Chinese civilian presence in the South China Sea and efforts to exercise administrative control over China’s claimed waters. To better grasp the range of tools China uses to achieve such control, deeper understanding of Sansha’s Maritime Militia is necessary.

Most importantly, recent organizational developments concerning the Sansha Maritime Militia demonstrate a new professionalization and militarization of China’s elite maritime militia forces. Indicators of increased professionalization include hiring recently separated veterans, standardization and enhancement of training, and in some cases lack of clear fishing responsibilities in return for payment of salaries. Key indicators of increased militarization include preparations to make small arms rapidly available to deploying units according to mission requirements, construction of new bases, deployment for non-commercial purposes, and introduction of new classes of vessels with dedicated weapons and ammunition storage rooms, reinforced hulls, and water cannons.

Significantly, the Sansha Maritime Militia is being created from scratch using personnel that receive extremely generous guaranteed salaries—seemingly independent of any fishing or marine industrial activity on their part, a dedicated arrangement that we have not seen elsewhere. This represents a significant departure from what we have described previously regarding the maritime militias at Sanya, Danzhou, and Tanmen. These militias were formed and evolved over years if not decades, drawing upon the community’s resident skills and resources. The majority of such militia members engaged in fundamentally civilian economic activities with occasional additional purposes assigned through a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chain of command, including military law enforcement-style activities. While these three elite militias remain important to Chinese “rights protection” activities, Sansha City’s new, purpose-built militia may in the future be even more so.

With logistics and maintenance facilities, as well as family housing, Woody Island has been transformed into something akin to a regional hub base. Other facilities in the Paracels offer the Sansha Maritime Militia sites to deploy for rotational operations. The Sansha Maritime Militia’s organizational structure is increasingly military-like. It is formally organized and operated in a joint, three-layer structure that incorporates China’s three major sea forces, with maritime militia forces on the front line, Coast Guard forces on the second line, and China’s naval and military forces as a third line backstop. Finally, the Sansha Maritime Militia may have front-line responsibilities in the Spratlys in addition to its responsibilities in the Paracels. Alternatively, it may serve as a model for the development of another new leading militia specific to that area, much as the Sansha Maritime Militia seems to have drawn inspiration in part from the Tanmen Maritime Militia. Sansha City Mayor Xiao, who led a delegation to inspect the Tanmen Maritime Militia on 15 November 2013, is in fact a former Party Chief of Qionghai City—the county level city that administers Tanmen Township. He served there from May 2000 to July 2002, which placed him in a position of responsibility for the development of the Tanmen Maritime Militia. This experience likely gave him some degree of familiarity with the dynamics of local militia building, skills that may later have assisted him during the buildup of the Sansha Maritime Militia.

mmilitia2 — Sansha Maritime Militia conducting a nighttime inspection of a vessel whose crew was deemed guilty of “rights infringement and illegal fishing.” (National Defense)

The Sansha municipality and a divisional-level PLA garrison were created on 24 July 2012. This involved reorganizing what were previously small “Paracels Militia” (西沙民兵) platoons established by the Paracels Working Committee into the new Sansha Maritime Militia. Lu Le, a Paracels Militia member since 2003, proclaimed that the reorganization catalyzed considerable change, including greater intensity and specialization in training. The scattered fishing communities that live permanently and semi-permanently in the Paracels often hail from different areas, raising challenges for maritime militia organization. The fishermen were not steadily present on the islands and returned to disparate cities along China coasts. To preserve cohesion among the maritime militia and among the residents on the islands, the Sansha City government provides fishermen with stipends and other material support to encourage sustained habitation there. In early 2016 Mayor Xiao stated that the Sansha City government spends ten million RMB (approx. $1.5 million USD) annually to support fishermen transitioning to more permanent livelihoods on the islands in response to deteriorating fish stocks and declining incomes. The government pays stipends to people living on the islands in amounts varying by their island of residence. For example, each person living in the Crescent Group earns 45 RMB ($6.79 USD) per person a day, providing they stay on the islands for 180 days of the year. Those residing on Mischief Reef for 150 days of the year earn 80 RMB ($12.07 USD) per day. Various government-provided benefits foster a more permanent population and generate a relatively stable community from which ranks of the maritime militia can be drawn.

Efforts to populate the islands have benefited the maritime militia. The force was relatively small when Sansha City was established, with only two maritime militia companies—each responsible for protecting a portion of the islands and reefs in the Paracels. Expanding mission requirements led to an expanded force. Now there are six maritime militia companies with more than 1,800 personnel and 100 fishing vessels. Sansha fishermen have also joined a “law enforcement coordinating team” composed of 30 personnel and five boats. Between its inception and June 2015, the Sansha Maritime Militia conducted 228 missions to report information, expel foreign fishing vessels, prevent foreigners from landing on the islands, and conduct rights protection and stability maintenance.

According to Garrison Commander Cai Xihong, Sansha City’s civilian and military leaders and the maritime militia were recognized for their role in what they refer to as the “Zhongjiannan Security Operation” (中建南安保行动). Chinese maritime forces conducted these maneuvers south of Triton Island when China’s HYSY-981 oil rig was placed in the Zhongjiannan Basin in May 2014. The Sansha City and Garrison leadership established a sea command post and sent a command and coordination group to the China Coast Guard’s “forward command post at sea” (海上前线指挥所) to coordinate efforts among the maritime militia and other task forces operating in the “theater” (战区). While confrontation erupted around HYSY-981, Sansha’s Maritime Militia forces were also engaged in protecting other areas of the Paracels from encroachment by foreign fishing vessels. In support of this “security operation,” militia members reportedly confiscated short-wave radios and binoculars from detained foreign fishing vessels.

As has been observed in other operations involving China’s maritime militia, the former Guangzhou Military Region issued mobilization orders to local commands in Hainan Province which in turn mobilized maritime militia units from various localities to participate in this security operation. Sansha City’s close proximity to the site of the Chinese operation around HYSY-981 suggests the reason why the theater command required Sansha City to commit Maritime Militia resources to the joint effort. While coordination occurred and the Sansha Maritime Militia reportedly completed its portion of the operation, it remains unclear exactly what tasks Sansha’s Maritime Militia performed.

Assembling a New Fleet

While stationing militia units on the islands and reefs and using the militia units to patrol around them remain priorities, efforts are underway to establish a state-owned maritime militia fishing fleet that can work in more distant waters at the behest of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Accordingly, the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company (三沙市渔业发展有限公司) was established in February 2015. Authoritative sources demonstrate that this company is explicitly meant to serve as a maritime militia organization to “develop maritime rights protection capabilities” for Sansha City.

According to an article in the June issue of National Defense magazine, the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company will organize its vessels into maritime militia units as follows. “The fisheries company will form a flotilla (支队), subsidiaries will set up squadrons (大队), production [groups] will set up companies (中队), and individual vessels will be squads (区队).” (The characters of each unit-level are included because of inconsistent translation of Chinese terminology for units.) The fisheries company will also establish its own People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD), primarily responsible for managing the “steel-hulled militia fishing vessels.” This fisheries company is different from more commercially oriented fishing enterprises that apply to enter the maritime militia. An online job recruitment posting for this company notes that hiring military veterans is a priority for all positions on board each vessel and offers substantial salaries. Paying a salary represents a departure from the widespread practice by which income is paid as a share of the vessel’s catch plus fuel supplements and performance bonuses. This departure suggests two things. First, that China is professionalizing some units of the maritime militia. And second, that the parent companies may essentially be front organizations, rather than primarily commercial enterprises.

Under this new rubric, ‘patriotism’ pays well for Sansha militiamen. For example, the position of crewmen (水手) advertises an annual salary of 90,000 RMB ($13,494 USD). This compares very favorably to the average annual net income of a Hainanese fishermen, which stands at only 13,081 RMB ($1,961 USD) according to China’s 2014 Fisheries Yearbook. The same posting advertises an annual salary of 170,000 RMB ($25,489 USD) for captains, which is highly competitive by Chinese standards and provides far greater purchasing power than the same salary in the United States or another Western economy. Each advertisement also offers insurance, retirement, medical, unemployment and living benefits for every position, referred to as “five social insurance and one housing fund” (五险一金) according to the standards of similar enterprises under Hainan’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. Regular maritime militiamen are typically compensated by local governments for income lost due to service or training, and incentivized with preferential treatment, Party membership, subsidies and potential pensions; but do not receive a salary. Thus, compensation for regular maritime militia units does not match the compensation of a salaried position aboard these new vessels. Furthermore, when juxtaposed with the salary of a second lieutenant (Platoon Leader) in the PLA Ground Force of around 36,000 RMB ($5,413 USD) as reported by the People’s Daily, the relatively high salaries advertised by the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company indicate that China is devoting tremendous resources to hire professional maritime militia personnel.

As reform of the PLA forces the retirement or separation of 300,000 of its personnel, positions in the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company offer continued service, a competitive salary, and robust social welfare benefits, seemingly without relation to any catch performance. The career trajectories of two individuals who are current Sansha Maritime Militia members—Xu Zhuang (许状) and Liu Jianqiang (刘坚强)—serve as useful examples. Xu served in Fisheries Law Enforcement starting in 1994, but applied to join the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company in 2014. He won the position of captain within the newly forming militia fleet. When Xu led a trip to the Spratlys in November 2013, he reported a foreign fishing vessel approaching one of the PRC features and assisted maritime law enforcement forces in expelling the vessel. Liu served in a PLA Army vessel transport unit until he was demobilized three years ago. He has since joined the ranks of the Sansha Maritime Militia.

Although construction has not yet started, one proposal submitted to the Hainan Provincial Government in early 2015 reveals a great deal about plans to build up this state-owned militia fishing fleet. The proposal involves development of a new port to act as a strategic rear area for Sansha City, specifically to act as a logistics base for the 84 militia fishing vessels allocated to Sansha City by Hainan Provincial authorities. According to the proposal, ten of these vessels were delivered in 2015, with 70 more expected to be delivered in 2016. Concerned about the fragile environment of Woody Island and the inability of Hainan’s other fishing ports to support this large militia fleet, the proposal makes a case for the appropriation of 20 sq. km of coastal land in Wenchang City’s Puqian Township on Hainan Island’s northern coast, to be designated as a strategic rear area for Sansha City. Hainan Governor Liu Cigui, deputy governor Mao Chaofeng (head of the leading small group overseeing the project) and Sansha City Mayor Xiao Jie have all verified that this project is receiving “special preferential policies.” Currently in the planning phase, the project is also included in the 2016 Hainan Provincial Government Work Report. That the project is included in these reports indicates high political support for the project’s construction as part of a larger plan to develop the Mulan Bay area. The port facility will likely be equipped to support the operations of the Sansha Maritime Militia fleet, with specifics yet to be determined.

Until the new port is built, the militia fleet remains based out of the various fishing ports of Hainan. For example, the Yazhou Central Fishing Harbor that opened 1 August 2016 provides ample mooring for some of the Sansha Maritime Militia. The link embedded here contains aerial footage of the fleet moored at Yazhou Central Fishing Harbor.

18 June 2016: Newly-built fishing vessels for Sansha City moored at Yazhou Central Fishing Harbor. Note the exterior hull reinforcements and mast-mounted water cannons. Image source: Hainan Government — 18 June 2016: Newly-built fishing vessels for Sansha City moored at Yazhou Central Fishing Harbor. Note the exterior hull reinforcements and mast-mounted water cannons. (Hainan Government)

mmilitia4 — Map depicting locations mentioned in this article. Source of original baseline image: Sansha City Government.

In keeping with his position as local Party-State leader, Mayor Xiao Jie appears to be spearheading development of the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company. In October 2015, Xiao hosted a forum with prominent private fishing companies from Hainan and other provinces to foster cooperation and learn from their experience. One of the six key points Xiao made was to strengthen cooperation in maritime rights protection. In demonstrating his leadership role, Xiao inspected the company in early July 2016. Reflecting the PLA practice of having political instructors of company-sized units also serve as company Party branch secretaries, political instructor Zhang Jun (one of the company Party branch secretaries) pledged to resolutely execute the guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the Central Party while working in the South China Sea. With six of the company’s Party branch secretaries in his meeting room, Xiao emphasized the fishing company’s responsibility to protect China’s maritime rights and interests. This structure of six Party branch secretaries corresponds to the six company-sized units of maritime militia reported by Garrison Commander Cai in June 2015, further indicating that the Sansha Fisheries Development Company is a dedicated, professional maritime militia organization.

28 June 2016: Sansha City Mayor Xiao holds a meeting with Party Secretaries of the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company. Image source: Sansha City Government — 28 June 2016: Sansha City Mayor Xiao holds a meeting with Party Secretaries of the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company. (Sansha City Government)

Photos of newly-built Chinese fishing vessels with hull designators “Qiongsanshayu” (琼三沙渔), indicating that they are fishing vessels belonging to Sansha City, have recently received attention on Chinese Internet websites. They look quite different from the average Chinese fishing vessel, bearing comparatively robust hull designs with additional rub strakes (“rub-rails”) welded onto the hull’s steel plating aft of the bow. Such pronounced rub strakes are generally uncommon on Chinese fishing vessel hulls and appear to be added to mitigate damage from potential collisions. These vessels also possess mast-mounted water cannons. Both features could facilitate more aggressive close-in tactics, such as shouldering, ramming, and spraying. For instance, Captain Lu Wei of Sansha City’s Comprehensive Law Enforcement Ship No. 2 complained in May 2015 of difficulties in pursuing foreign fishing vessels as they are no longer permitted to board and inspect them. His only resort is to issue verbal warnings and to use the ship’s water cannon, which, due to the limited agility of his larger ship, is unable to stay on target. Luckily for Lu and his colleagues, Sansha Maritime Militia units are equipped to fill this gap in “maritime rights protection.” They are able to continuously harass foreign vessels with water cannons thanks to their tighter turning radii and shallower draughts, allowing them to sustain such harassment even when foreign vessels seek refuge in the shallows surrounding disputed features. Demonstrating additional official demand for maritime militia vessel capabilities, Hainan Provincial Military District Commander Zhang Jian wrote in the October 2015 edition of National Defense that priorities for fishing vessels in the maritime militia will be based on larger displacement steel-hulled boats that can reach higher speeds and can sustain collisions (抗冲撞). Existing Chinese fishing vessels already clearly outclassed Vietnamese fishing vessels when they clashed near the HYSY-981 oil rig in May 2014. The features of these new vessels can further ensure that neighboring states’ fishing fleets are repelled successfully in future confrontations.

One of the shipyards constructing Sansha’s Maritime Militia fleet is a subsidiary of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. Chongqing Chuandong Shipbuilding Industry Co., Ltd. (重庆川东重工船舶有限公司), located in Sichuan Province far up the Yangzi River, has constructed a large number of Sansha City’s new fleet of fishing vessels. Several navigational warnings issued by China’s Maritime Safety Administration indicated that the twelve hulls listed below left the shipyard and were towed down stream between 16 December 2015 and 3 February 2016, a span of less than two months.

Sansha City Fishing Vessels Departing Chuandong Shipyard

Hull Classification

Date of Departure

16 December 2015

31 December 2015

20 January 2016

22 January 2016

1 February 2016

At least two additional shipyards launched vessels for Sansha City from Guangdong Province—the Huangpu Wenchong Shipyard (中船黄埔文冲船舶有限公司) in Guangzhou and the Xijiang Shipyard (中船西江造船有限公司) in Liuzhou. Both are subsidiaries of China State Shipbuilding Corporation. The two vessels produced by the Wenchong Shipyard, a well-known builder of surface warships for the PLA Navy (PLAN), are the first fishing vessels ever to be produced there. At this rate of production, many if not most of Sansha City’s 84 new fishing vessels will be delivered by the end of 2016. Although an accurate appraisal of the total number of vessels already delivered is difficult, AIS reports from Marine Traffic dating to December 2015 show reported positions of 29 vessels with the name “Qiongsanshayu.”

mmilitia1 — On 14 July 2016, the Sansha City Maritime Safety Administration held its first “Sea-Air Three Dimensional’ Joint Rescue Exercise” in waters north of Woody Island. The newly-built militia fishing vessels “Qiongsanshayu 00111” and “Qiongsanshayu 00310” can be seen participating directly in the firefighting and rescue exercise. (Dagong Bao)

The shipbuilding technology service company Guangzhou Taicheng Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd. (广州市泰诚船舶工业有限公司) provided interior furnishing for the vessels produced at the Xijiang and Wenchong Shipyards. The page displaying its furnishing work for a vessel produced by the Xijiang Shipyard describes a “weapons and equipment room” (武备室) and “ammunition store” (弹药库) on the main deck of the vessel. Additionally, the image below appeared in a June 2015 feature article on Sansha City in National Defense showing Sansha Maritime Militia members loading crates labeled “light weapons” (轻武器) onto one of the newly delivered fishing vessels. While China’s Maritime Militia is ostensibly an unarmed force, it is apparent that, at a minimum, preparations are underway to arm at least some of its vessels.

Sansha Maritime Militia participate in exercises to load materials on their vessels. 32-kg crates labeled “light weapons” are shown being loaded with cranes. The exercises were also featured on the Guangzhou Military Region Website in September 2015. Image source: National Defense — Sansha Maritime Militia participate in exercises to load materials on their vessels. 32-kg crates labeled “light weapons” are shown being loaded with cranes. The exercises were also featured on the Guangzhou Military Region Website in September 2015. (National Defense)

A new fleet of vessels is only as effective as its crew. Operating on the front-lines of disputed maritime claims, Sansha’s Maritime Militia will need enhanced training and discipline to conduct its assigned missions. Garrison Commander Cai explains that personnel receive training collectively and in smaller groups while stationed on islands, covering topics such political education, reconnaissance, rescue, “assisting in rights protection” and “shooting at sea.” Sansha Garrison Chief of Staff Li Zhaofeng told reporters in January 2016 that Sansha Maritime Militiamen were sent to a training base in Northern Hainan to receive military training. According to Li, they must pass evaluations in subjects on navigation, communications, fishing practices, and legal regulations before they are allowed to sea. Such efforts will be necessary for the maritime militia units to be effective enough to integrate with PLAN and CCG vessels to execute joint defense of China’s maritime claims.

Building a Militia Network to Defend Outposts

An important priority after Sansha City was established was to form the civil-military institutional structures for Party leadership and national defense building in the South China Sea. Institutions established by Sansha City include its National Defense Mobilization Committee (国防动员委员会), Ocean Defense Committee (海防委员会), Military Facility Security Committee (军事设施保护委员会), and a Double-Support Work Leading Small Group (双拥工作领导小组). A routine of military affairs meetings (议军会) also began. “Double Support,” short for “support the army and give preferential treatment to military families, and support the government and cherish the people” (拥军优属拥政爱民), is a policy based on a reciprocal civil-military relationship whereby military and local civilian work units reinforce each other. For example, military units can assist in local construction projects while local governments help facilitate military exercises. These arrangements help ensure Party control over the military in Sansha City, facilitate Party-State-Military cooperation in military-related construction efforts throughout Chinese-occupied features in the South China Sea, and foster valuable synergies between PLA forces and the civilian population. Present at many of these meetings, Sansha City Mayor Xiao Jie is fulfilling his responsibility as First Party Secretary of the PLA Garrison’s Party Committee. He must work alongside Garrison Commander Cai Xihong and Political Commissar Liao Chaoyi (廖朝毅) to ensure that local military work and construction of the reserves is included in the city’s overall planning, which prominently features matters related to Sansha’s Maritime Militia. There may be no other city in present-day China where the military and civilian populations are so closely linked. Sansha has a high troop-to-civilian ratio stemming from the city’s extremely small population. Not surprisingly, the resources of the central government and military are critical to Sansha City’s development. These dynamics won Sansha City the title of “National Double-Support Model City”—an award for municipalities that provide exceptional support for the military—received by Mayor Xiao in Beijing on 29 July 2016.

An important role for militia units based in China’s border and coastal regions is the participation in military-police-civilian joint defense (军警民联防), a concept included in three of China’s recent Defense White Papers (2013, 2010, 2006). Joint military-police-civilian defense applies Mao Zedong’s People’s War concept to the peacetime security of border and coastal regions through combined use of the PLA, local security or law enforcement forces, and the militia. Sansha City organizes its border and coastal defense in the form of joint defense involving the Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia. Such efforts aim to improve coordination between the military and local forces to create three lines of operation for maritime rights protection—a “first line of militia, a second line of administrative law enforcement, supported by a third line of the military.” Manning a first line to advance China’s objectives while limiting escalation, maritime militia forces can confront foreign vessels under support provided by China’s Navy and Coast Guard. Employment of this three-tiered structure of force demonstrates an official institutionalized approach to integrating China’s three sea forces. This concept is the subject of ongoing discussion in the PLA and is already put into practice by such localities as Sansha City. Given the concept’s evolving status, it is unclear how successful it would be if executed as envisioned as a full spectrum of operations. One particular weakness may be command and control in real time in a contested environment.

Essential to managing the maritime militia, PAFDs were reportedly established on several South China Sea islands in January 2015, each of which reports to the Sansha City Garrison. Proliferating in step with the expansion of PRC grass roots governance structures, they are located on three Paracels features: Woody Island (永兴岛), Tree Island (赵述岛), and Drummond Island (晋卿岛). Further south in the Spratlys, a PAFD was established at Fiery Cross Reef (永暑礁). Subordinate to China’s Provincial Military Command system, PAFDs are the local PLA organs established in military sub-districts, counties, cities, districts, townships, and enterprises that are responsible for local PLA recruitment and registration work, supporting demobilized troops, and organizing and training the militia. The scant population inhabiting Woody Island and other PRC-occupied features means these PAFDs must be primarily engaged in militia and defense mobilization-related work, rather than conducting the PLA’s grassroots work with the masses. Operational command of the militia belongs to Sansha City Garrison, while the PAFDs are responsible for the regular command and training of Sansha’s Maritime Militia. Additional PAFDs may be established in the future on other PRC-occupied Spratly features. Mischief Reef, for instance, hosts a maritime militia “flag-raising squad,” indicating that elements of the Sansha Maritime Militia are already stationed there.

Sansha City has devoted considerable resources to bolstering its joint defense infrastructure on the islands and reefs in the Paracels. According to Mayor Xiao, Sansha has invested over 40 million RMB ($6 million USD) to construct a joint defense command center, officially beginning construction on 25 July 2015. It provides joint command, training, management and “combat readiness materials storage” (战备物资存储) functions. The project supports information sharing and provides the facilities for the unified organization of maritime law enforcement. Some personnel of the Sansha Maritime Militia are receiving training on how to man this joint defense command center, as depicted below. The exact extent to which command and control is exercised over forces in the South China Sea from this center remains unclear.

23 January 2015: Sansha Government Website features its maritime militia operating workstations of the “Naval, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia Joint Defense System.” Image source: Sansha City Government — 23 January 2015: Sansha Government Website features its maritime militia operating workstations of the “Naval, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia Joint Defense System.” (Sansha City Government)

Local militiamen are assigned the important task of manning militia outposts (民兵哨所) established in border and coastal areas around the country. From these outposts, militia units conduct patrols and defensive missions, and monitor the surrounding areas. Such outposts help secure China’s remote regions and act as eyes and ears for the PLA. On the edge of China’s contemporary frontier, Sansha City’s military authorities are also building militia outposts to secure PRC-controlled islands and reef areas. On 24 July 2015, Sansha City built its first “informatized ocean defense militia outpost” (信息化海防民兵哨所). It is manned around the clock by the maritime militia stationed on Tree Island. This militia outpost supplies data to the joint defense command center on Woody Island and is supported by growing communications infrastructure throughout PRC-occupied islands in the South China Sea. The outpost also reportedly tracks targets in the surrounding seas using AIS, marine radar, and video surveillance. These outposts are built within multi-purpose buildings that also house the PAFDs. Sansha’s civilian and military authorities plan to construct more militia outposts to “upgrade capabilities in maritime rights protection, administrative control of sea areas, and emergency response and rescue.” Drummond Island has also completed its militia outpost and PAFD building and has been approved as a future logistics base. In short, these military functions are being performed by organized professional units often dressed as civilians.

Recent Image of Tree Island and construction of its militia outpost (large red building) and pier. Image source: Chinese Internet Bulletin Board System (BBS) — Recent image of Tree Island and construction of its militia outpost (large red building) and pier. (Chinese Internet Bulletin Board System (BBS)

28 July 2016: Drummond Island finishes construction of its PAFD and militia outpost multipurpose building. Image source: Macao Daily — 28 July 2016: Drummond Island finishes construction of its PAFD and militia outpost multipurpose building. (Macao Daily)

Documentation of Sansha Maritime Militia activities and infrastructure in the Paracels Island Group is relatively clear. Chinese open sources reveal much less about related activities in the Spratlys, especially on or around the features China built up since 2014. The PRC has stated clearly that these outposts will support China’s fishing industry, but has not acknowledged the existence of China’s Maritime Militia within this context.

Conclusion: The One to Watch

As this dynamic unfolds, the Sansha Maritime Militia and its newly assembled fleet of dedicated vessels is the most important unit to watch. By decree, it is responsible for patrolling and defending China-claimed features in the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal, and the Spratlys. In future incidents involving the maritime militia in the South China Sea, the Sansha Maritime Militia will likely be the ‘go-to’ unit that Chinese authorities will entrust to enforce claims and confront foreign vessels. Sansha City is making great strides to construct a maritime militia capable of manning and defending PRC-occupied features and venturing into the surrounding seas to uphold China’s maritime claims backed up by the PLAN and China Coast Guard.

In preparing to fulfill these sweeping responsibilities, the Sansha City Militia is even more militarized in structure, forces, and character than its elite counterparts in Sanya, Danzhou, and Tanmen.

This elite, professional unit is formally integrated into a joint operational structure incorporating all three of China’s major sea forces: the maritime militia, Coast Guard, and Navy. Within this layered conglomerate, Sansha’s Maritime Militia is charged with operating at the front lines and engaging foreign vessels directly, ideally achieving Beijing’s objectives without the other two forces needing to intervene. To this end, it is being professionalized and militarized to an unprecedented degree.

This series covering Hainan Province’s Maritime Militia explores key local units in-depth, exposing much of the details of this inadequately understood tool China uses to uphold and further its maritime claims. The next and final article will examine Hainan’s development of the maritime militia at the provincial military district level, and provide insight into the future course and trajectory of China’s Maritime Militia.

Conor Kennedy is a research assistant in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received his MA at the Johns Hopkins University – Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a Professor of Strategy in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the Naval War College Review’s Editorial Board. He is an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and an expert contributor to the Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time Report. In 2013, while deployed in the Pacific as a Regional Security Education Program scholar aboard USS Nimitz, he delivered twenty-five hours of presentations. Erickson is the author of Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown Foundation, 2013). He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University. Erickson blogs at www.andrewerickson.com and www.chinasignpost.com. The views expressed here are Erickson’s alone and do not represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: Two to three different classes of these fishing vessels are in production, although their functional differences remain unclear. The vessel depicted above is produced in fewer numbers and with a significantly different design, suggesting a functional specialization. Image source: Twitter.

Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: July 2016 Part Two

August 26, 2016 Guest Author Leave a comment

By Sam Cohen

Welcome to Part Two of the July 2016 members’ roundup. Throughout the second part of July, CIMSEC members examined several international maritime security issues including joint Russian and Chinese military exercises in the South China Sea, the Royal Canadian Air Force’s procurement options for a new search-and-rescue aircraft, the relationship between free trade and security dynamics in the South China Sea, Russia’s offer to fulfill India’s tender for a multirole nuclear aircraft carrier, and Germany’s evolving military and strategic priorities. Read Part One here.

Kyle Mizokami, for Popular Mechanics, reviews the U.S. Navy’s failed Harpoon anti-ship missile test during a sinking drill at the RIMPAC 2016 multinational naval exercises. During the sinking operation, the littoral combat ship USS Coronado launched a Harpoon 1C missile at the retired frigate USS Crommelin, which was 20 miles away. He explains that that the Navy is investigating why the missile was lost from radar contact and never impacted the target ship. The missile exercise reflects the Navy’s continued testing of various missile systems in an attempt to update and improve the fleets’ surface-to-surface warfare capability. He notes that the Navy will likely adopt the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Norwegian Naval Strike Missile or the Harpoon Block II+ as the next-generation surface-to-surface combat missile for the fleet’s surface ships.

Sam LaGrone, for U.S. Naval Institute News, discusses the upcoming joint Russian and Chinese military exercises set be conducted near the South China Sea in September. Joint Sea 2016 follows last years joint exercise – Joint Sea 2015 II – held off of Russia’s Pacific coast in August, where over 20 ships from the two navies conducted joint training that included anti-submarine warfare, live fire drills, air defense training, and a 400 marine amphibious landing. He adds that in addition to last year’s Pacific drills, joint exercises were also conducted in the Mediterranean Sea, while cooperation in the Black Sea region was also apparent with two Chinese frigates visiting the Russian Novorossiysk naval base stationed near Crimea.

Harry Kazianis, at The National Interest, discusses China’s imminent response to the South China Sea arbitration ruling in relation to the upcoming G-20 Summit Beijing is set to host on September 4-5 in the city of Hangzhou. He suggests that leading up to the summit Beijing will limit contentious actions in the South China Sea as to not risk any drama at the gathering of world leaders or risk positioning themselves where losing face during the summit’s proceedings is a possibility. He adds that China may be timing their next major South China Sea move for the post-summit months when the soon-to-leave Obama administration will be uninterested in jumping into an Asia-Pacific crisis in addition to the U.S. public being preoccupied with developments in the American election cycle. He notes that if China were to declare a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) or start reclamation work at Scarborough Shoal, the U.S. will be unlikely to have the political unity or willpower to respond effectively to Beijing’s actions.

Paul Pryce, for the NATO Association of Canada, provides an analysis on the three aircraft the Canadian government is considering for procurement as the country’s new Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) aircraft – the C295W from Airbus Defence, the C-27J Spartan from Alenia, and the KC-390 from Embraer. The search for a new SAR aircraft to replace the country’s aging CC-115 Buffalo fleet has been ongoing since a Request for Proposal (RFP) was released by Public Services and Procurement Canada in 2002. He explains that each of the aircraft being considered are similar enough in size and design to the CC-115 Buffalo that it would not be difficult for Royal Canadian aircrews to adapt to operating them and that each plane has significantly greater range and payload capacity than the Buffalos. He adds that these capability improvements will be especially beneficial for search-and-rescue operations in the remote northern regions of Canada.

Robert Farley, for The Diplomat, examines India’s pending decision of whether to accept or not to accept Russia’s offer to construct a multirole nuclear aircraft carrier for the country’s Navy. He explains that very few countries have the capacity to build a modern, nuclear aircraft carrier, and that there are few countries willing to export such technology. He also adds that Russia has played a major role in India’s naval aviation program having modernized the INS Vikramaditya, and having supplied the Indian Navy with carrier aircraft. Russian shipbuilders and military planners are likely familiar with Indian Navy carrier needs and specifications. From the opposite perspective, he argues that Russia’s lack of recent nuclear propelled surface vessel construction should deter India from awarding Russia the contract. He adds that if India were to rely on an export option for its next carrier (INS Vishal), it risks losing the shipbuilding expertise and capacity that it has begun to develop with the construction of the carrier INS Vikrant – a capacity that is critical for India’s long-term maritime interests.

Members at CIMSEC were active elsewhere during the second part of July:

Sebastian Bruns, at The War on the Rocks, provides an overview of Germany’s 2016 white book on defense, security and the future role of the country’s armed services. He notes that the document reflects a changing strategic mindset in Germany, with the resurgence of Russia and military conflict on European flanks, large amounts of immigration, the EU crises, and the rise of Islamic extremism all factoring into account.
Natalie Sambhi participated in the Center for Strategic and International Studies Sixth Annual South China Sea Conference where she was a member of a panel discussion on military modernization and capacity building.
Robert Thomas, at CAPX, offers analysis on free trade and the South China Sea, emphasizing the importance of understanding the regional security dynamics that threaten the sea’s trade routes and supporting global markets and economies.
Bryan McGrath, at The War on the Rocks, makes public a letter he wrote to a national security colleague who is interested in joining the Trump national security team. In the letter, he strongly advises against jumping in with Trump for several reasons, including the likelihood that his security policies would be disastrous for the United States and would likely strain the reputation of those who surround him throughout his leadership.
Mina Pollmann, at The Diplomat, discusses Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party victory in Japan’s Upper House elections on July 10. She explains how Abe framed the election as a vote concerning the economy and the incompetence of his party’s rivals during their term in power from 2009 – 2012, as opposed to sensitive issues such as constitutional revision and security issues.
ADM James Stavridis joined CNN to discuss why the coup in Turkey failed and what it means for the world moving forward. He explains how the coup will have adverse affects on the strength of the NATO ally, benefit ISIS and worsen the situation in an already turbulent region.
Christian Davenport, at The Washington Post, provides an overview of the status update the Air Force released concerning the F-35’s combat readiness. He explains that after 15 years and over $400 billion dollars, years of delays, cost overruns and controversy, the aircraft will be ready for combat deployment.
Dave Majumdar, for The National Interest, explains how the Marine Corps will be purchasing the majority of the Department of the Navy’s (DON) planned fleet of 680 Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and that the service’s aviation assets will likely be the Navy’s major sea-based power projection force by the 2030s.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies, international law and defense policy.

Featured Image: Chinese and Russian naval vessels participate in the Joint Sea-2014 naval drill outside Shanghai on the East China Sea, May 24, 2014 (Reuters / China Daily)

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis

The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares

August 25, 2016 Guest Author Leave a comment

This piece was originally published by The Jamestown Foundation, and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Elsa Kania

Beijing’s response to the unfavorable South China Sea arbitration outcome has highlighted an important aspect of its military strategy, the “three warfares” (三战). Consisting of public opinion warfare (舆论战), psychological warfare (心理战), and legal warfare (法律战), the three warfares have been critical components of China’s strategic approach in the South China Sea and beyond. In peacetime and wartime alike, the application of the three warfares is intended to control the prevailing discourse and influence perceptions in a way that advances China’s interests, while compromising the capability of opponents to respond.

Beijing has sought to delegitimize the arbitration process and achieved some success in undermining the coalescence of consensus in support of the ruling, while engaging in coercive signaling and deniable attempts to punish the Philippines. China’s response has also included “regularized” “combat readiness patrols” over the South China Sea by H-6K bombers, as well as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against Philippine government websites (China Military Online, August 6; China Military Online, July 19; InterAksyon, July 15). Consistently, Beijing has attempted to advance narratives that frame itself as the upholder of international law, while claiming that the U.S. is to blame for the “militarization” of the South China Sea (China Military Online, June 23). For instance, official media has frequently characterized the arbitration process as a “farce,” and China’s ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai, has argued that the arbitration case would “undermine the authority and effectiveness of international law,” justifying China’s rejection of it as a defense of “international justice and the true spirit of international law” (Xinhua, July 12; PRC Embassy to the U.S., July 13).

These aspects of Beijing’s response should be contextualized by China’s theoretical framework for the “three warfares.” Beyond the South China Sea, this approach has been manifest in a variety of recent cases, including also the East China Sea dispute, China’s opposition to THAAD, and intensifying pressures on Taiwan. The PLA’s evolving strategic thinking on the three warfares, which is linked to its emphasis on information warfare, could influence its efforts to utilize such techniques in future contingencies.

Progression of the PLA’s Approach to Three Warfares:

Although the three warfares constitute a relatively recent addition to Chinese strategy, the PLA’s approach to public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare has been formalized and already advanced considerably. Based on the 2003 and 2010 Political Work Regulations (政治工作条例), the three warfares, under the aegis of “wartime political work” (战时政治工作), were the responsibility of the General Political Department of the former General Staff Department, which, through the recent organizational reforms, has become the Political Work Department (政治工作部), subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC) (CPC.com.cn, December 5, 2003; China Brief, February 4). In 2005, the CMC ratified—and the former General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armaments Department jointly promulgated—official guidelines (gangyao, 纲要, literally “outline” or “essentials”) for public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare, officially incorporating the concepts into the PLA’s education, training, and preparation for military struggle. [1] While these gangyao themselves are not publically available, the open-source PLA literature on the three warfares, which dates back to the mid-2000s, constitutes a valuable resource for analysis and comparison. [2]

Several recent texts present authoritative perspectives on the three warfares and illustrate the extent of their integration into the PLA’s strategic thinking and officers’ curricula. These include the latest editions of influential PLA texts on military strategy, the 2013 Academy of Military Science (AMS) edition of Science of Military Strategy (SMS, 战略学) and the 2015 National Defense University (NDU) SMS, as well as teaching material used by the NDU, An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare (舆论战心理战法律战概论). [3] Based on these texts, China’s use of the three warfares constitutes a perceptual preparation of the battlefield that is seen as critical to advancing its interests during both peace and war.

Three Takes on the Three Warfares:

2013 Science of Military Strategy:

The 2013 AMS SMS highlighted the significance of the three warfares as a force multiplier in military operations and political or diplomatic scenarios alike. [4] In particular, the text introduced the concept of huayuquan (话语权) through the use of information, belief, and mentality (信息一信仰一心智). Although, in more general or colloquial usage, the term might seem to imply the “right to speak” or “freedom of speech,” the quan (权) in this context apparently alludes not to rights (权利) but rather to power or authority (权力). In this regard, the concept refers to the capability to control the narrative in a given scenario and might therefore be translated as “discursive power.” [5] To contest huayuaquan requires “the integrated usage” of public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. These three warfare operations should be complementary and mutually reinforcing in future wars or in political and diplomatic struggle.

According to the text, the use of the three warfares in a particular circumstance should be adapted based on the operational context and intended outcome. In particular, the authors argue that achieving international sympathy and support, while diplomatically seizing the initiative, can “provide a powerful pillar to support the whole operational activity.” For instance, if the operational intention must be hidden, the use of propaganda to influence public opinion can reinforce the stratagem of “making a feint to the east and attacking in the west” (声东击西). [6] So too, three warfare operations can have a strong “psychological frightening force” (心理震慑力) against an adversary. Although this text does not define the three warfares or discuss their usage in further detail, this focus on their importance, including in deception, indicates recognition of their potential utility in a range of circumstances.

2014 Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare:

This 2014 text, which serves as discipline teaching materials (学科教材) for the NDU, presented a comprehensive overview of the three warfares, including their primary missions, historical development, theoretical foundation, basic principles, implementation, and tactics. [7] The text illustrates the NDU’s sustained efforts to develop a “science of the three warfares” (“三战”学), which are considered a “major innovation” in the PLA’s political work, and to integrate the concepts into its curriculum. [8] This is informed by the study of variety of traditional, ideological, and contemporary precedents, from the ancient Chinese emphasis on the use of “strategems” (谋略) to the U.S. military’s perceived engagement in analogous practices. At a basic level, the primary purpose of the three warfares is to influence and target the adversary’s psychology through the utilization of particular information and the media as “weapons.” In particular, the three warfares are seen as critical to increasing the PLA’s “soft power” (软实力) and contributing to its success in future wars. As warfare has evolved toward greater “informationization” (信息化), the three warfares have evidently achieved a “breakthrough” beyond their “traditional scope and model,” becoming an “organic” aspect of national strategy and warfare.

While the three warfares “permeate” the “whole course” of military struggle, their functions have also expanded and are relevant to the PLA’s increasingly “diversified” military missions. In particular, the relevant functions include:

· control of public opinion (舆论控制)

· blunting an adversary’s determination (意志挫伤)

· transformation of emotion (情感转化)

· psychological guidance (心智诱导)

· collapse of (an adversary’s) organization (组织瓦解)

· psychological defense (心理防御)

· restriction through law (法律制约)

In more general terms, the primary missions are to seize the “decisive opportunity” (先机) for controlling public opinion, organize psychological offense and defense, engage in legal struggle, and fight for popular will and public opinion. Under the aegis of these missions, this requires efforts to unify military and civilian thinking, divide the enemy into factions, weaken the enemy’s combat power, and organize legal offensives.

According to the text, the implementation of the three warfares should be guided by certain basic principles. These emphasize integration with national political and diplomatic struggle; revolving around the launching of military operations; rapidly taking advantage of the “decisive opportunity” (先机); engaging in offense and defense, with an emphasis on offense; and the integration of peace and warfare (平战结合). Such principles imply advancing a highly coordinated approach that involves proactive peacetime preparation of the perceptual domain in order to enable the PLA to rapidly seize the initiative in a crisis or conflict scenario.

In its entirety, this NDU text highlights the PLA’s focus on these informational, non-kinetic aspects of modern warfare and its extensive efforts to formulate a complex theoretical approach, with a focus on implementation, education, training, and the construction of specialized forces. Beyond the traditional applications of the three warfares, the text also displays efforts to innovate in the application of these concepts to new contexts, such as counterterrorism and stability protection (反恐维稳), international peacekeeping, protecting transportation and escort (保交护航), and closing and controlling borders (封边控边).

2015 Science of Military Strategy:

The 2015 NDU SMS provides an overview of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare and guidance regarding their implementation. According to the text, public opinion warfare involves using public opinion as a weapon by propagandizing through various forms of media in order to weaken the adversary’s “will to fight” (战斗意志), while ensuring strength of will and unity among civilian and military views on one’s own side. Psychological warfare seeks to undermine an adversary’s combat power, resolve, and decision-making, while exacerbating internal disputes to cause the enemy to divide into factions (阵营). Legal warfare envisions use of all aspects of the law, including national law, international law, and the laws of war, in order to secure seizing “legal principle superiority” (法理优势) and delegitimize an adversary. Each of the three warfares operates in the perceptual domain (认知领域) and relies upon information for its efficacy.

The 2015 SMS emphasizes the “tight connection” of three warfares as an “integrated whole” that should be utilized synthetically. From the authors’ perspective, public opinion warfare and legal warfare primarily operate at the strategic level of warfare, whereas psychological warfare is often implemented at the campaign and tactical levels. If effectively implemented, the three warfares have the potential to establish favorable conditions for battlefield success and eventual victory.

For public opinion warfare, the requirements outlined are to “demoralize one’s opponent by a show of strength” (先声夺人), “create momentum to control the situation” (造势控局), “assail strategic points” (抨击要害), and “seek the avoidance of injury” (趋利避害). In particular, it is critical to be the first to release information in a contingency and actively guide public opinion in order to achieve and preserve the initiative on the “public opinion battlefield.” Beyond efforts to exploit an adversary’s shortcomings, the opponent’s attempts to engage in public opinion warfare must also be countered. For example, this approach is reflected in Beijing’s attempts to influence domestic and international public opinion with regard to the U.S. role in Asia—including claiming that the U.S. is at fault for regional tensions and the “militarization” of maritime territorial disputes, while frequently denouncing U.S. “hegemony” and pursuit of “absolute security.”

The principles articulated for psychological warfare focus on “integrating [psychological attacks] and armed attacks with each other” (与武力打击相结合), “carrying out offense and defense at the same time, with offense as the priority” (攻防并举以攻为主), and “synthetically using multiple forms of forces” (综合运用各种力量). In this regard, psychological warfare is envisioned as closely integrated with all forms and stages of military operations in order to intensify the efficacy of conventional attacks. The implementation of psychological warfare should also focus on taking advantage of “opportune moments” and “striking first” to seize the initiative, based on the efforts of multiple forms of psychological warfare forces, including those from the armed forces, reserves, and society. For instance, the intensification of psychological pressures against and attempted intimidation of Taiwan at times of tension or crisis, especially recently during Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency, reflects the application of such an approach, which has been carried out by the PLA’s “Three Warfares Base,” Base 311 in Fuzhou (Taiwan Link, August 8).

The implementation of legal warfare, which seeks to provide legal support to operational success, is informed by the principles to “protect national interests as the highest standard” (以维护国家利益为最高准则), “respect the basic principles of the law” (尊重法律的基本准则), “carry out [legal warfare] that centers upon military operations” (围绕军事行动展开), and “seize standards [and] flexibly use [them]” (把握规范灵活运用). This approach emphasizes the necessity of a nuanced understanding of relevant domestic and international law in order to engage in “legal struggle” and achieve the initiative. In the context of the South China Sea dispute, this has involved the utilization of rather tortuous interpretations of international law to oppose the Philippines’ position and seek to delegitimize the arbitration process.

Conclusion

Based on these texts, the PLA perceives public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare as of distinctive strategic and operational significance, and the three warfares are evidently being incorporated more systematically into its overall thinking on military strategy. While the conceptualization of the three warfares in these recent texts builds upon the prior PLA literature and thinking on the concepts, these sources particularly highlight the complementarities among the three warfares and the importance of their synthetic integration with conventional military operations. This approach is also informed by the PLA’s concerns about countering the perceived “ideological assaults” (意识形态攻击) of “hostile forces” via the Internet (PLA Daily, August 12). In practice, this involves attempts to take advantage of prior peacetime preparation of this perceptual battlefield to establish favorable conditions for going on the offensive to seize the initiative. Since this is a dimension of strategic competition in which China has already demonstrated the efficacy of its efforts, understanding the three warfares will continue to have immediate, real-world relevance.

Looking forward, the PLA’s future approach to the three warfares could continue to evolve in accordance with its recent and ongoing strategic, doctrinal, and also organizational changes. Beyond the recent changes in Chinese military strategy, with the 2014 revision of the PLA’s military strategic guidelines (fangzhen, 方针), overdue changes to its operational regulations (作战条令) or doctrine also seem to be occurring (China Brief, April 21). The PLA appears to remain in the process of working toward the official promulgation of a fifth-generation doctrine, and the underlying campaign outlines (战役纲要) and combat regulations (战斗条令) might include revised guidance for the implementation of the three warfares, given the recent focus on advancing the PLA’s three warfares “science.” Despite the limitations of the available sources, these three texts present the latest available perspectives on the PLA’s evolving strategic thinking on the three warfares and thus can inform analyses of the PLA’s implementation of these concepts.

Elsa Kania is a recent graduate of Harvard College and currently works as an analyst at the Long Term Strategy Group.

Endnotes

1. Wu Jieming [吴杰明] and Liu Zhifu [刘志富], An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, [and] Legal Warfare [舆论战心理战法律战概论], National Defense University Press, 2014, p. 1.

2. For prior discussions of the three warfares, see prior analyses, including: Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049, October 14, 2013. “China: The Three Warfares,” prepared for Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessment, by Professor Stefan Halper, May 2013. Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare,” Heritage Foundation, May 21 2012. Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion Warfare and the Need for a Robust American Response,” Heritage Foundation, November 26, 2012. Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge,” Heritage Foundation, July 12, 2013.

3. The Science of Military Strategy (SMS) is an authoritative text, typically used as teaching materials for senior PLA officers, that articulates the PLA’s thinking on military strategy in multiple domains and contexts. The latest AMS edition of SMS was the focus of a recent book (Joe McReynolds, China’s Evolving Military Strategy, Jamestown Foundation, 2016), but there has been less published analysis on the 2015 NDU text thus far. Since the AMS plays a more direct role in the formulation of military strategy, the 2013 SMS text might be more authoritative than the 2015 NDU edition. Nonetheless, this NDU text also presents a more recent and perhaps reasonably influential perspective that merits closer examination. Concurrently, it is important to recall that such works are primarily theoretical and reflect the viewpoints of these influential institutions, rather than the PLA as a whole. Given such caveats, these texts’ respective content on the three warfares should not be taken as official articulations of the PLA’s strategic or doctrinal approach but rather constitute more theoretical discussions of the concepts that can inform future analysis of these topics.

4. Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department [军事科学院军事战略研究部], eds.,The Science of Military Strategy [战略学]. Military Science Press, 2013, p. 131.

5. John Costello and Peter Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese Information Operations,” in Joe McReynolds, China’s Evolving Military Strategy, Jamestown Foundation, 2016.

6. This particular saying from the Thirty-Six Stratagems, which has been variously attributed to Sun Tzu and Zhuge Liang, seems to have originated from various aspects of Chinese written and oral military history.

7. Wu Jieming [吴杰明] and Liu Zhifu [刘志富], An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, [and] Legal Warfare [舆论战心理战法律战概论], National Defense University Press, 2014, pp. 1–7, 14–20, 62–69, 121–132, 133–143, 226.

8. The text was formulated with high-level support from NDU starting from 2009 and authored by a committee of scholars under the leadership of two relatively senior NDU professors as a culmination of that process.

9. Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], eds., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学]. National Defense University Press, 2015, pp. 216–218.

Featured Image: BEIJING, CHINA – SEPTEMBER 03: Chinese missiles are seen on trucks as they drive next to Tiananmen Square and the Great Hall of the People during a military parade on September 3, 2015 in Beijing, China. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

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