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NATO Week

Strengthening Unity of Effort in the Atlantic: Lessons from Wargaming

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NATO Naval Power Week

By Walter Berbrick and Terence Nicholas 

Based on our experience designing and analyzing recent Naval War College wargames in the Euro-Atlantic theater, U.S. and NATO maritime forces face several challenges in maintaining readiness, enhancing lethality, and accelerating decision-making—core priorities underscored by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. The North Atlantic and High North are increasingly contested, as Russian submarine operations and grey zone activities intensify and China extends its influence deeper into strategically critical Atlantic corridors.

There are several areas where greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces could enhance warfighting readiness and crisis response. These include streamlining command relationships, enhancing maritime domain awareness, harmonizing rules of engagement, strengthening maritime logistics, integrating NATO into North American defense planning, and improving amphibious force employment. While NATO navies bring significant capability to bear, optimizing these areas will ensure that the alliance is positioned to deter aggression, enhance decision advantage, and maintain maritime superiority in an increasingly complex and contested security environment.

This article offers insights and recommendations based on our wargaming experience to help U.S. and NATO naval leaders strengthen operational integration, refine force employment, and better prepare for future maritime challenges in the Euro-Atlantic theater.

Streamline Unity of Effort in the Atlantic and High North

With multiple U.S. and NATO maritime commands operating across the Atlantic and High North, there is a valuable opportunity to enhance unity of effort by refining command relationships, synchronizing force employment, and accelerating decision-making. Effective coordination among U.S. Naval Forces North (NAVNORTH), U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM), and Striking Forces NATO (SFN) ensures that Allied maritime forces can operate seamlessly in a contested environment. Wargame insights consistently emphasize the importance of shared mission awareness, mission command, and persistent training to reinforce operational alignment and clarify multinational naval task force responsibilities.

Recent initiatives have bolstered deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic theater, such as the establishment of a second maneuver fleet under NAVEUR’s temporary control and a forward deployed expeditionary Maritime Operations Center (MOC) in Europe. These efforts have improved multi-echelon coordination and operational flexibility between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, demonstrating the benefits of closer integration. Additionally, refining command integration between SFN and MARCOM—two key NATO maritime components—presents a further opportunity to strengthen transatlantic force employment. SFN, responsible for high-end maritime strike capabilities, reports directly to SACEUR, while MARCOM serves as both NATO’s Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) and the Maritime Component Commander for multiple Joint Force Commands (JFCs). Ensuring secure communications, clear command authorities, and persistent joint training will enhance NATO’s ability to employ maritime forces rapidly and effectively at the task force and task group levels.

Another key step toward greater unity of effort is elevating JFC Norfolk to a 4-star command. As NATO’s only transatlantic operational command, JFC Norfolk serves a vital role in linking U.S. and NATO maritime operations, yet its current structure requires balancing U.S. and Allied priorities across multiple echelons. Elevating JFC Norfolk would enhance command focus on transatlantic operations, improve decision-making agility, and better align command relationships within NATO’s maritime architecture. Most importantly, structuring Allied maritime commands for crises and conflict—rather than peacetime—will ensure standing U.S. and NATO maritime forces and planners are ready and integrated to deter aggression and respond decisively in the Atlantic and High North.

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness and Situational Awareness

U.S. and NATO maritime forces have a unique opportunity to sharpen their maritime domain awareness (MDA) and situational awareness by strengthening intelligence-sharing and coordination across the Atlantic and High North. Both forces field some of the world’s most advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, but their full potential can only be realized through seamless integration of policies, technologies, and operational procedures. Enhancing coordination between key commands—NAVEUR, NAVNORTH, MARCOM, and SFN—will create a more comprehensive and real-time picture of the maritime battlespace, enabling faster threat detection, more agile decision-making, and greater operational effectiveness in contested environments.

A critical step toward this goal is developing a federated Common Operating Picture (COP) that integrates multi-domain sensor data from both U.S. and NATO maritime forces. This approach would reduce ISR fragmentation, allowing commanders to detect, track, and respond to threats with greater speed and precision. Whether countering adversary submarine movements, grey-zone activities, or long-range maritime threats, a more connected ISR network would enhance decision-making, improve force employment, and reinforce deterrence, ensuring NATO and U.S. maritime forces maintain a strategic advantage in dynamic operational theaters.

However, technology alone is not the answer. Persistent joint training, operational scenario-driven wargames, and multinational staff exchanges will be essential to refining intelligence-sharing processes and breaking down procedural barriers. Regular stress-testing of ISR coordination in realistic threat conditions will enhance interoperability, clarify authorities, and increase confidence across the alliance. By taking these steps, U.S. and NATO maritime forces will build a more unified, resilient, and responsive transatlantic naval force—one that can anticipate, deter, and decisively respond to emerging threats in an increasingly contested maritime security environment.

Maximizing Authorities and Rules of Engagement 

In fast-moving maritime operations, commanders need the ability to act swiftly and in sync with their allies. U.S. and NATO forces operate under different Rules of Engagement (ROE) and authorities, but instead of seeing this as a constraint, there’s an opportunity to leverage these differences to enhance operational agility. A deeper understanding of how each nation’s approval processes work—who can authorize what and when—can reduce delays, increase interoperability, and open the door to more flexible force employment. When commanders operate with shared awareness of authorities, they are better equipped to act decisively and prevent adversaries from exploiting procedural gaps.

Expanding this understanding is a practical step toward greater coordination and combat effectiveness. If commanders know when and how NATO and U.S. assets can operate under each other’s authorities, they can more effectively integrate forces in real time. For example, U.S. and NATO surface and submarine forces could be tasked interchangeably in a crisis, making force posture more dynamic and responsive. Instead of working around bureaucratic seams, commanders could focus on maximizing the collective strength of the alliance to deter and respond to threats with greater speed and cohesion.

To further streamline decision-making, establishing pre-approved Crisis Response Options and real-time coordination cells would allow forces to act immediately when needed. Setting clear engagement triggers across all warfare domains—surface, subsurface, air, cyber, and electronic warfare—would synchronize responses across NATO and U.S. maritime forces, closing decision-making gaps that adversaries might otherwise exploit. Aligning ROE where possible, increasing transparency of authorities, and enabling faster approvals will ensure that U.S. and NATO maritime forces can operate as a unified force, projecting deterrence and strength in an increasingly complex security environment.

Enhancing Operational Resilience

Sustaining maritime operations in the Atlantic and High North is not just about moving fuel, munitions, and supplies—it’s about ensuring forces can stay in the fight when and where they’re needed most. The ability to rapidly resupply ships at sea, repair battle damage, and sustain operations away from fixed infrastructure is what separates an agile, combat-ready force from one that risks being sidelined when it matters most. Wargaming has provided a valuable way to stress-test sustainment strategies, identify weak points before they become real-world problems, and explore new ways to keep fleets operational in contested environments.

A major takeaway from these efforts is the importance of stronger coordination between key sustainment commands like NAVNORTH, NAVEUR, MARCOM, and SFN. In fast-moving operations, small misalignments in logistics planning can lead to big problems. Establishing dedicated logistics coordination cells and integrating sustainment planning more deeply into operational decision-making can help ensure the right resources are available at the right time. The more aligned NATO and U.S. sustainment efforts become, the better prepared forces will be to sustain prolonged operations across the Atlantic.

Another critical piece is expeditionary logistics—the ability to keep ships on station without having to pull back to port for resupply and repairs. While the U.S. has made significant advances in vertical replenishment (VERTREP) and at-sea rearming, many NATO warships still rely on fixed facilities, which limits flexibility. Expanding interoperability in afloat logistics, forward-deploying repair capabilities, and developing mobile resupply facilities will keep ships in the fight longer. Additionally, prepositioning sustainment stockpiles across North America and Europe will help reduce dependence on major ports and ensure forces remain operational regardless of access challenges. Logistics isn’t just a support function—it’s a warfighting necessity. The ability to sustain combat operations anytime, anywhere will be a decisive factor in maintaining maritime superiority in the Atlantic.

Expanding U.S.-NATO Naval Integration for North American Defense

As security dynamics in the Atlantic and High North continue to evolve, there is a growing opportunity to strengthen U.S.-NATO naval integration and expand cooperation in North American defense. Traditionally, NATO’s maritime forces have focused on collective defense under Article 5, while homeland defense responsibilities have remained largely within national command structures. However, as adversaries increase activity across the Atlantic, greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces can enhance deterrence, improve crisis response, and provide more flexible force employment options.

One way to achieve this is by better integrating NATO maritime forces into existing U.S. defense planning and operations. Coordination among NAVNORTH, MARCOM, and SFN has often been episodic rather than institutionalized, making it more reactive than proactive. By establishing routine collaboration, expanding NATO’s operational footprint in the Western Atlantic and Arctic, and refining joint maritime situational awareness, NATO and U.S. commanders alike can improve force synchronization and enhance maritime domain awareness. This approach would allow for faster response times, increased interoperability, and a stronger deterrent posture in the event of a crisis.

There are several practical steps that could further this integration. Embedding NATO liaison officers within NAVNORTH and NORTHCOM would improve real-time coordination, intelligence sharing, and joint maritime-air defense planning. Additionally, posturing NATO naval and air assets for homeland defense missions in the North Atlantic and Arctic would provide an immediate and credible deterrent while ensuring NATO forces are better aligned with U.S. homeland defense efforts. Expanding NATO’s ISR capabilities—such as maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and early warning systems—into NAVNORTH’s defense networks would significantly strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), reducing strategic surprise and improving early threat detection.

Looking ahead, the current rotation of Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) between JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples means that JFC Norfolk lacks dedicated forces assigned during competition, limiting its ability to establish a continuous deterrent presence and provide a rapid response in the Atlantic and High North. Given the operational demands in both European and transatlantic theaters, relying solely on the existing SNMG rotation is insufficient to maintain persistent maritime presence and readiness. To address this, SACEUR should consider establishing an additional SNMG and a dedicated Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) detachment under JFC Norfolk. This would ensure a standing force capable of sustained ASW, surface warfare, and air defense operations in the Western Atlantic and Arctic, reinforcing NATO’s ability to deter aggression and respond swiftly to emerging threats.

Strengthening U.S.-NATO Amphibious Integration

As maritime security threats evolve, U.S. and NATO amphibious forces have a unique opportunity to enhance integration, ensuring they are prepared for rapid employment in contested littorals. NATO fields highly capable amphibious units—including the U.S. Marine Corps, UK Royal Marines, Dutch Korps Mariners, and French, Italian, and Spanish Marine forces—yet their combined employment under NATO command remains a work in progress. Without a standardized framework for command relationships, questions around operational and tactical control can arise, creating opportunities to refine how these forces are assigned, tasked, and employed in competition, crisis, and conflict.

With near-peer competitors and regional actors expanding anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the ability to project power and secure key maritime terrain is becoming more critical. Wargame insights have highlighted how U.S. and NATO amphibious forces could serve as a key element of deterrence, enabling fleet maneuver while limiting adversary freedom of action. At the same time, the current NATO command structure—where Striking Forces NATO (SFN) oversees high-end strike capabilities and MARCOM serves as the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC)—presents an opportunity to clarify how amphibious forces integrate into larger NATO maritime operations. Further alignment with Joint Force Commanders in Norfolk, Naples, and Brunssum will ensure these forces are positioned for effective and decisive employment.

To strengthen interoperability and readiness, aligning amphibious operations within a cohesive U.S.-NATO framework will be essential. This includes refining mission requirements across the continuum of competition, crisis, and conflict, as well as integrating these forces into routine joint planning, training, and execution cycles. Regular multinational exercises, wargames, and professional military education programs will reinforce interoperability, build familiarity between U.S. and NATO amphibious units, and enhance their ability to respond rapidly when called upon. By institutionalizing these efforts, NATO’s amphibious forces will be better prepared to operate as a unified, combat-ready force capable of deterring aggression and securing key maritime terrain in crises and conflict.

Way Ahead

Wargaming has long been a powerful tool for refining strategy, testing assumptions, and strengthening operational effectiveness. Over the past several years, we’ve seen firsthand how it can shape real-world planning and decision-making. By stress-testing command structures, exploring new approaches to force employment, and fostering greater integration between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, wargames have directly informed adjustments that enhance unity of effort across the Atlantic. These insights have helped refine coordination among key commands, sharpen deterrence, and improve readiness to respond to emerging threats in an increasingly complex security environment.

Looking ahead, there is an opportunity to build on this momentum by further aligning command structures, intelligence-sharing, sustainment networks, and amphibious operations. As the maritime domain becomes more contested, ensuring seamless coordination between U.S. and NATO forces will be essential for maintaining freedom of movement, deterring aggression, and preparing for high-end conflict. Strengthening transatlantic maritime integration will not only enhance crisis response but also enable a more agile and lethal force, ready to operate across the spectrum of competition and conflict.

To sustain maritime superiority, the focus must remain on proactive planning, persistent training, and continued investment in warfighting capabilities. As adversaries seek to exploit operational seams, U.S. and NATO forces must stay ahead by reinforcing their deterrent posture and refining how they fight together. Through deliberate efforts to streamline command relationships, improve operational integration, and expand warfighting capabilities, the alliance will ensure it is ready—not just to compete, but to prevail in any future conflict.

Dr. Walter Berbrick is a senior military analyst with Netsimco, a Saalex Company, and the Lead Analyst of Euro-Atlantic Wargame Series for Commander, Naval Forces Europe & Africa. He served 15 years on the Naval War College’s faculty, leading the research design and analysis for the Trans-Atlantic Maritime Command and Control (TAMC2) wargame series from 2019 to 2024.

Dr. Terence Nicholas is an Assistant Professor in the Wargaming Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College. He currently serves as the Lead Designer of Euro-Atlantic Wargame Series for Commander, Naval Forces Europe & Africa.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official positions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any other U.S. government organization. Wargames, including the TAMC2 series described here, are not predictive and do not forecast future events; they serve as independent analytical research events intended to provide insights and inform decision-making.

Featured Image: HMS Prince of Wales and the embarked Air Wing leads NATO maritime forces as part of Joint Warrior 24-1, part of NATO’s Steadfast Defender exercise series. (Photo by UK Ministry of Defence)

Current Operations, Future Tech

NAFAC: The 4th Battle for the Atlantic and Technology’s Impact on Warfighting

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By Sally DeBoer

For the past fifty-six years, the United States Naval Academy has hosted the Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference (NAFAC). NAFAC, planned and executed by the midshipmen themselves, brings together outstanding undergraduate delegates as well as notable speakers, scholars, and subject matter experts from around the nation and the world to discuss a current and relevant international relations issue. The theme for this year’s conference, A New Era of Great Power Competition?, seeks to explore the shifting dynamics of the international system, challenges to a U.S. – led world order, the nature of potential future conflicts, the challenge of proto-peer competitors and rising  as well as what steps the U.S. might take to remain the primary arbiter of the international system at large. As this topic is of great interest to CIMSEC’s readership, we are proud to partner with NAFAC in this, their 57th year, to bring you a series of real-time posts from the day’s events in Annapolis, MD. CIMSEC would like to recognize MIDN 1/C Charlotte Asdal, NAFAC Director, and her staff for allowing us to participate in this year’s events and for inviting our readership to virtually share in the week’s rich academic environment.

Robert H. McKinney Address – Vice Admiral James Foggo, III, Director, Navy Staff and Former Commander 6th Fleet

“The greatest leaders must be educated broadly.” – Gen. George Olmstead

Vice Admiral James Foggo III addressed midshipmen and delegates Thursday morning, the last day of the NAFAC conference. The address, bolstered by personal anecdotes, videos, and photographs from the Navy Staff Director and former 6th Fleet Commander, largely addressed the question of great power competition from the perspective of the United States’ relationship with the Russian Federation. The admiral’s address familiarized the audience with recent history and current operations within the Mediterranean, Arctic, Baltic and beyond, informing the day’s discussion on the evolution of great power competition in the coming decades.

What Makes a Great Power?

To begin, VADM Foggo was careful to define the terms used in answering the question: Are we in a new era of great power competition? The admiral expressed confidence that the United States remains the greatest nation in the world, providing exposition on what makes the United States a great power.  Great powers, he explained, go beyond the sum of their people, economic, or military strength to offer ideas, opportunity, and leadership, using their power to affect change for the world’s weakest and most vulnerable populations. Russia, he went on to conclude, is not by this definition a great power – their “sum” qualifies the Federation as a major power, but their actions, primarily enacted in self-interest, disqualify them from great power status.  Understanding this distinction is crucial.

The 4th Battle for the Atlantic

VADM Foggo provided helpful historical context for the historical relationship between the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and the United States. The First Battle for the Atlantic, he explained, occurred during the course of World War One, while the Second, where the United States and her allies defeated axis powers relentless undersea tactics with “grit, resolution, the submarine detection system, and the lend-lease program to Britain.” The third battle, he explained, occurred during the course of the Cold War. An unclassified report based on the 3rd Battle Innovation Project commissioned by the United States Submarine Force on the contribution of U.S. undersea assets to U.S. victory in the Cold War concluded with the following sentiment: “someday, we may face a 4th Battle of the Atlantic.” VADM Foggo asserted that we are, indeed, in the midst of this battle now. The admiral and his co-author Alarik Fritz of the Center for Naval Analysis, collected their thoughts in an article published by the United States Naval Institute,  “The 4th Battle for the Atlantic.”

Rising Tensions 

VADM Foggo characterized the aforementioned 4th Battle for the Atlantic though a series of examples and anecdotes. Beginning with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, the United States exercised its responsibility as a great power to seek to deescalate tensions and compromise where possible by pursuing the Reset policy with the Russian Federation. This policy, he explained, did not work as intended. In 2014, the U.S. was once again surprised by Russia’s aggressive and illegal actions in Ukraine. This unjustified action, he went on, is an example of why Russia is not a great power, but rather only a major power. This action partially inspired the “back to basics” policy for U.S. defense thinkers and policymakers called for by ADM Greenert.

Admiral Foggo recommended several books to the audience, including ONI’s Russian Navy report, which he emphasized was a “must read” for tomorrow’s defense and foreign policy leaders.

Continued Vigilance

VADM Foggo explored a few key areas where Russia is challenging U.S. and allied interests, providing tangible examples. In the Arctic, he explained, Russians currently operate seven former Cold War bases at company- and battalion- strength units with an endurance of a year or more. Russia has militarized the Arctic, which concerns the U.S. and our allies, particularly the Norwegians, regarding restricted access to international waters. To drive this point home, the admiral displayed a photograph of the Russian flag planted at the geographical North Pole, moved there by a Russian submersible.

https://gfycat.com/EmbarrassedJitteryGoldfinch

U.S. Navy ship encounters aggressive Russian aircraft in Baltic Sea, April 12, 2016. (U.S. European Command)

Given the venue of the conference, VADM Foggo appropriately addressed his professional experience with aggressive actions by the Russian Federation at sea. Beginning with the Su-24 flyby of the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) in the Black Sea, during which, he emphasized, the wingtip of the Russian aircraft was no more than 30 feet from the deck of the destroyer, the Russian Naval forces escalated tensions in response to U.S. presence in Russia’s adjacent international waters and beyond. The admiral explained the import of strategic communication to gain the moral high ground, which the U.S. achieved by declassifying and releasing an image of the Su-24 narrowly off the bridge wing of the Donald Cook, along with diplomatic protest and meaningful presence in the form of BALTOPS 2016.

“49 Ships Became 52”

BALTOPS is a NATO exercise to improve and display the interoperability of allied forces. The 2016 exercise communicated a clear strategic message; the exercise boasted three amphibious landing operations (versus the previous year’s two), extensive anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations with three allied submarines and maritime patrol and reconnaissance (MPRA) aircraft, and more. In an effective anecdote that illustrated the Russian response to the exercise, the admiral shared that when reviewing photos from the PHOTOEX conducted during BALTOPS, 52 ships appeared in the photograph – 49 allied vessels, two Russian destroyers, and a Russian AGI. “49 ships, he recalled, became 52.” Tellingly, the Russian response to the success of the strategic messaging of the exercise included “a Stalin-like purge of Russian commanders in the Baltic Fleet,” due to their unwillingness to challenge western ships. Further reinforcing the point, VADM Foggo shared moreexamples of his interactions with Russian counterparts in multilateral and bilateral discussions.

Looking Forward – “The Surest Guarantee of Peace”

The tone of VADM Foggo’s remarks was one of stark realism, but also optimism as well. The admiral expressed confidence in the forces that were under his command, but reiterated to the audience of future diplomatic and military leaders the crucial nature of continued vigilance and continued action in support of the United States’ responsibilities as a great power. He included a timely example – the recent strikes on a Syrian airbase in response to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. “Great powers react, but they react proportionally,” the VADM concluded, expressing belief in the possibility that such actions can bring compromise – a concept, he said, a great power should pursue and prioritize.

Technology and Cyber-Competition Panel

Note: The following information is paraphrased from the panelists’ remarks – their thoughts, remarks, and research are their own and are reproduced here for the information of our audience only.

Panelists Brigadier General Greg Touhill, USAF (ret.), the First Federal Chief of Information Security Officer, Mr. August Cole, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and co-author of Ghost Fleet, and Dr. Nicol Turner-Lee, Fellow at the Center for Technology and Innovation at the Brookings Institution, were given the opportunity to provide open-ended remarks before the question and answer portion of the panel.

A Strategic Framework for Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is a provocative issue, and General Touhill used his opening remarks to dispel some common rumors about the cyber realm. This is not a technology issue, he went on, but a risk management issue; it is an instrinsic facet of [the United States’] national economy and security to be sensitive to the protection of our technology, information, and competitive advantage. Cybersecurity, he explained, is not all about the tech, but rather about the information. When considering cyber strategy, the General contended that a direct, simple strategy is best and most likely to be effectively executed. To this end, he outlined five lines of effort:

  • Harden the workforce: risk exposure is tremendous, as our culture, norms, and economy rely on automated information systems – this includes home, federal, and corporate entities
  • You can’t defend what you don’t know you have. Information is an asset, and should be treated as such.
  • Within five years, every business will be conducting asset inventory and valuation of its information as any other asset – some entities within the Federal Government, he explained, may not appreciate the value of their information and may not even realize they have it.
  • Do the right things, the right way, at the right time: Cyber hygiene is great, but has to be applied smartly – 85 percent of breaches, he explained, are due to improper patching of common vulnerabilities. The basics come first – stakeholders should update apps, OS, and apply other simple fixes. Care and due diligence is required.
  • Investment. The General introduced “Touhill’s Law,” which contends that one human years accounts for twenty five “computer” years – by this math, some machines in the federal government architecture are several thousand years old. Depreciation and recapitalization are key; from a strategic standpoint, neglecting this reality is a failure.
  • It’s all about the risk. In a contemporary sense, much of the risk is deferred to server management teams and IT, and decisions on that risk are not being made at the right levels.

The general indicated a desperate need for a cogent strategic cyber framework on which to operate and that these five lines of effort are a good foundation for such a framework.

Fiction’s Role in Challenging Assumptions

August Cole, a noted analyst and fiction author, began by recounting the impact that Tom Clancy’s 1986 thriller Red Storm Rising had on his life. As a fiction author, he went on the explain, his job is to think the unthinkable, devoting intellectual energy and professional attention to considering tomorrow’s conflict from a multitude of perspectives. Fiction, Cole explained, allows us to consider an adversaries perspective and confront our own biases to present a bigger truth.

Cole and his co-author Peter Signer’s novel Ghost Fleet addresses the rise of China – the book starts a conversation in an engaging way that captured the authors’ imagination. The writing process caused the authors to confront some uncomfortable truths. The American way of war, he said, is predicated on technical superiority that isn’t necessarily in line with our evolving reality. The reliance on tech creates a vulnerability, and through the lens of great power competition, we should be thinking about the difference between our assumptions about conflict and how conflict will actually be. One must challenge their assumptions, and resist the urge to fall in love with their own investments.

Information as a Commodity and Vulnerability

As a policy analyst and social scientist, Dr. Turner-Lee looks to understand behaviors that are overlaid with technology – she has focused on what we need to do to create equitable access to technology. Tech, she explained, is changing the nature of human behavior and increasing vulnerabilities. We must consider, she said, how we are contributing to the evolution of the tech ecosystem from the realm of consumption to an entity that effects the fabric of national security. What we understand as being “simple” actually isn’t, and what started as a privacy discussion has evolved into a security issue. When considering social media, Dr. Turner-Lee went on, it is interesting to see how 140 characters can become the catalyst for campaigns that threaten national security.

Dr. Turner-Lee  mentioned the concept of pushback from technology companies against government requests for information and policies that need to be engaged to address this. There is a role, she explained, for the military to identifies vulnerabilities, while companies are appointing chief privacy officers and innovation officers, while lastly, the research community needs people to understand how information has become a commodity. As researchers, she explained, she and her colleagues are trying to find vulnerability and understand the impact on our national economy by looking at the nature of human behavior prescribing the right policies to ensure threats are minimized.

Given the current security landscape for cyber, what do you see as the greatest cyber threats facing the U.S.?

Brig. Get Touhill explained that at the Department of Homeland Security, they binned threats into 6 groups:

  • Vandals – frequent and common
  • Burglars – financially motivated and prevalent 
  • Muggers – this includes hacks like SONY as well as cyber-bullies
  • Spies – can be either insiders or traditional political-military threat looking to gain a competitive edge by stealing intellectual property.
  • Sabatuers – pernicious, difficult to find, and could be, for example, an individual who is fired but retains access to a system.
  • Negligent Users – This group constitutes the greatest threat. This group includes the careless, negligent, and indifferent in our own ranks.

China has been evidently and aggressively pursuing AI, hypersonic, quantum computing, and other next-generation technology – what does this mean for our assumption about the American way of war over the next several decades?

August Cole explained that the U.S. must directly confront the assumption that we will always have the edge of technical superiority – this may very well remain true, he said, but we cannot count on it. From a PRC military point of view, they look to not only acquire capabilities but further their knowledge on how best to employ them. We must, he went on, work to connect information and technology that we would not instinctively put in the same basket by considering, for instance, the battlefield implications of a hack on a healthcare provider who serviced military personnel. Technology, he explained, will alter the relationship between power and people, and understanding this connection is complex and difficult. Fiction allows us to synthesize these realms in a way that may be difficult otherwise – and appreciate the operational implications.

How has social media impacted our ability to monitor and address national security threats?

Dr. Turner-Lee began by exploring the implication of emerging social media tools that do not curate data (think Snapchat), explaining that as encryption technology has become more sophisticated, it has further complicated the national security problem. Nicole referred to “permission-less innovation,” meaning that the tech community continues to innovate in ways that cannot be controlled and this innovation is sometimes disruptive. Social media, she went on, is not always designed with privacy in mind, and enacting privacy policies has been reactionary for many companies.

Turner-Lee addressed the general hesitation of users to hand over or allow the collection of their information – personal data, she said, is seen as just that – personal – and companies promote this quality in their tech. For instance, she alluded to the current lawsuit between Twitter and the federal government over the identities of disruptive Twitter accounts. The disconnect between privacy and security, she concluded, can sometimes constitute a weakness.

The moderator pointed out that while tech has developed, policy has lagged. Mr. Cole added that the “internet of things” provides a corollary to this. Further development of wearable or say-to-day tech that generates and collects data automatically has national security implications. He provided an example in the domain of land warfare, suggesting that operators could notionally create a digital map based on device feedback. The data and processing power to make these analytics will exist, he affirmed, but we haven’t considered it.

Dr. Turner-Lee further elaborated that machine-to-machine interactions, which are based on algorithms that predict what you will or will not do, sustain a threat to national security when those algorithms are incorrect or tampered with. For instance, autonomous vehicles could be hacked and directed in a way that makes them a vehicular bomb. Overcoming machine-to-machine bias is very difficult and constitutes a security risk proportional to our dependence on machine-to-machine tech. This is a space, she said, with many vulnerabilities, driving itself in ways we are unaware of.

Conclusion

The final day of NAFAC 2017 proved a fitting end to three days of intense discussion and consideration on the topic of a new era of great power competition. VADM Foggo’s address brought a much needed operational perspective to the delegates and attendees, relaying the seriousness and immediate applicability of the question at hand, particularly for those midshipmen who will be serving aboard operational vessels in just a few short months. Further, the Technology and Cyber-Competition panel provided much needed context for the changing nature of tomorrow’s conflicts, challenging many long-held assumptions about the way of war.

Our representatives were impressed with the diligence, research, and creative thought participants brought to the round table panels. Readers can look for select publications from the Round Tables next week, when CIMSEC will share outstanding research essays from delegates. CIMSEC is extremely grateful to the United States Naval Academy, MIDN Charlotte Asdal and her NAFAC staff, and senior advisors and moderators for allowing us to participate in this year’s conference and share the great value of this discussion with our readership.

Until next year!

Sally DeBoer is the President of CIMSEC for 2016-2017. She can be reached at [email protected].

Featured Image: A CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter flies ahead of the amphibious assault ship USS Peleliu (LHA-5) after conducting helocast operations at Pyramid Rock Beach, Marine Corps Base Hawaii. The helocast was part of a final amphibious assault during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Matthew Callahan/Released)