Future Tech

What Can the Navy Learn from Netflix?

5 Comments

Or: How the Military Can Use a Content Delivery Network (CDN)
By ENS William McGough, USN

ENS William McGough will speak at the San Diego chapter of Disruptive Thinkers on Monday, September 23rd at 7pm at the Co-merge workspace.  This post was inspired by a question on the application for this year’s U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC): “If you had $1 million and 18 months to change the Navy, what would you do, and how would you accomplish it?” We will be running additional innovative ideas in this series in conjunction with the CRIC’s new discussion forum “The Whiteboard.”
——————————————————————————————————————————-

NetflixWhat is a CDN?
Several years ago, leading internet companies began to encounter a problem.  As broadband internet became increasingly available, consumers’ demand for digital content likewise increased.  However, in spite of the new speed afforded by end-users’ high-speed connections, content providers found it difficult to supply their data at the high-speed rates consumers could now handle and expected.

This problem resulted from the way the internet is organized.  There is no direct connection between your computer and the server hosting the website you are accessing.  Instead, an indirect connection is established via several intermediate servers.  A similar arrangement is found in air travel, in the same way you might connect through a “hub” airport to fly to a regional airport not serviced by a direct flight.  As in the analogy, the actual travel between hubs is quite rapid, occurring at the speed of light via fiber-optic connections. However, delay occurs at the hubs in a process called switching, where incoming data is analyzed for completeness and then retransmitted along the best-calculated path to its destination.

To solve this problem, the technology industry borrowed a technique from the military: forward staging/basing.  Militaries often send soldiers and supplies to a base near an area of anticipated action (so that the troops can arrive on final station rapidly and with very little advance notice).  Similarly, technology companies began to set up geographically-distributed servers which could transmit their content to nearby end-users much more rapidly than a more-distant central server could.  These servers became known as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs).  To use Netflix as an example, the company has even begun placing its CDN servers directly in the offices of local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) creating an almost-direct connection between their customers and their content.

Why does the Navy need a CDN?
At the time of writing, the rapid delivery of high-definition TV programs was not one of the CNO’s three tenets, nor could it be found in his more-exhaustive Sailing Directions.  So, this raises the question: why would the Navy want or need a CDN? The answer is simple. Bandwidth at sea is very limited and demand for bandwidth is ever-increasing.

There are two potential approaches to this problem: 1) launch newer satellites in greater numbers or 2) make smarter use of bandwidth.  In any fiscal environment, let alone a constrained one, the Navy/DoD can only afford to launch a limited number of billion-dollar communications satellites.  Therefore, it is prudent to examine how to maximize the use of existing bandwidth.  And, as internet-based companies have learned, the best way to maximize existing bandwidth is to employ a CDN.

What could a Navy CDN do?
1.Eliminate the duplicate transmission of data
Instead of transmitting a file to a ship every time a user on that ship requests it, a CDN server aboard the ship would cache (store) the file after it is originally downloaded, and deliver the file directly across the ship’s local network to any users who subsequently requested it.  (Instead of retrieving the same file from the internet every time it was requested.)  The end-user would notice no difference, except that the file would load considerably faster if they were not the first person to access it.

For example, every year sailors are required to complete online training in several areas (such as sexual-assault prevention and information security).  If a sailor is deployed when the training is due, they will access the training presentation via ship’s internet.  Without a CDN, all 5,500 sailors aboard an aircraft carrier might each download identical copies of the presentation across the ship’s limited internet connection (consequently slowing the connection speed to a crawl).  With a CDN, that multimedia-rich presentation would be downloaded only once across the ship’s internet connection.  The 5,500 sailors would then access it across the ship’s much faster Local Area Network (LAN).  Messages indicating that each sailor had completed a training module would still have to be sent across the internet connection for each sailor; however, these messages are extremely small in size and so do not constitute a great problem – even when multiplied by 5,500.  While some sailors achieve the bandwidth advantage by manually downloading frequently used files and storing them on a ship’s LAN “sharedrive,” a CDN can greatly reduce the administrative burden of such a method.    

2.Smarter Content Delivery

a. Offline-download:
Placing a CDN server on a ship or submarine would enable new methods of delivery – especially for the “Silent Service.”  Surface ships typically have some degree of internet connectivity; however, submarines only have internet connectivity a minority of the time (typically while surfaced – their least-favorite state).  If a submariner wanted to download a new publication or training file, they would have to wait until their boat next surfaced, quickly navigate the internet to find the correct file, and download it completely before they submerged (and lost connectivity).

However, with a CDN server, a sailor could request a file be downloaded when the internet was next available (which might be while he/she was otherwise engaged).  If the file was only partially downloaded during the first period of connectivity, the incomplete file could be retained by the CDN server and the remainder downloaded during the next period(s) of connectivity.  The sailor could then access the complete file, even when his/her ship had no internet access.

This would be similar to emailing a person on shore and asking them to send a reply email with the requested file attached.  However, use of a CDN as described would have such advantages as being faster (as it is automated) and not being subject to the attachment-size limits of email.

b. Content Subscription:
Similarly, a ship’s CDN server could automatically download the latest version of a file (such as a reference publication) made available on the Navy’s shore-based CDN server.
• Ships in different fleets and of different classes could be subscribed to relevant files by shore commands.
• Each ship could subscribe to additional content as desired.
• When an update to an existing file is sent, the shore-based CDN server would calculate and transmit a diff file (a file describing the difference between the original file and the updated version).  Upon receiving the diff file, the ship-based CDN server would patch (combine) the existing file with the diff file to recreate the updated version.  This would save bandwidth by eliminating the transmission of all of the content which remained the same across the two versions of the files.  (In the case of long publications with minor revisions, this savings would be substantial.)  This would also eliminate the need to physically mail to ships CDs with revised publications that were too big to email or otherwise download in their entirety.
• Content updates could be scheduled during hours when bandwidth utilization is minimal (e.g. during the midwatch).

Impetus for a Navy CDN:
Implementing a Content Delivery Network will not provide the Navy with a new warfighting capability in the way a new weapons system would.  However, at minimal cost – my rough back-of-the-envelope calculations estimate $100,000 for total software development, $2,500 for hardware per ship, the cost of day’s worth of contractor labor per ship, plus the additional government contract mark-up – it would eliminate a great deal of time wasted on administrative distractions and offer new support capabilities for submarines.

What is the Navy Doing?
At the time of writing, the Navy is implementing a service with many of the CDN features described above: the Navy Information Application Product Suite (NIAPS).  This service has been used, for example, to allow consolidated and offline access to online training materials through a program called “NKO at Sea”.

Potential for Future Development
If development of the NIAPS CDN service continues and is successful, there is great potential for it to serve as the platform for a new generation of web-applications which would replace the Navy’s current myriad of outdated and poorly-designed software packages (or even, as this author argues for, a single web service progressively integrating all of these features into a single system).  When combined with proposed on-ship WiFi networks, these applications could allow sailors efficiently complete work from anywhere onboard ship, regardless of internet connectivity.  Although this may not sound like a great technological breakthrough for the military, it has great potential to free the Navy from the burdens of its paperwork while retaining the high-standards said paperwork was created to maintain.

William is a Surface Warfare Officer assigned to USS Shiloh (CG-67).  He received his commission through the Naval ROTC program at the University of Notre Dame from where he graduated with a B.S. in Computer Science.  He has eight years of experience designing websites and web applications on a freelance basis.

Capability Analysis

The Odessa Network

3 Comments
Unlike the Odessa File, there are no Nazis in the Odessa Network
Unlike the Odessa File, there are no Nazis in the Odessa Network

The think-tank C4ADS recently published a new study, The Odessa Network: Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers, which analyzed commercial maritime networks linked to the Russian state and their involvement in arms shipments, particularly those to Bashar al-Assad’s forces in Syria fighting in that ongoing Civil War.

The report received some additional publicity when it formed the meat of a 7 September Washington Post story, with discussion especially devoted towards the report’s analysis of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, claiming that vessels likely carrying arms from the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk were turning off AIS when traveling to Syria.

The analysis conducted by Tom Wallace and Farley Mesko is certainly interesting and provides an in-depth look at commercial maritime networks and practices not generally seen outside of specialist literature on the shipping industry.  The work does leave some questions unanswered and makes unwarranted conclusions based on the available data, however:

  • The piece goes into great detail to lay out the various networks that Russia uses to ship arms, composed of interlocking companies headed and/or controlled by individuals with links to the state.  What’s unclear is why that should be considered unusual or bad.  Shell companies, convoluted ownership, and Flags of Convenience are commonplace for a variety reasons (many business-related) in the maritime industry.  It is not much of a “So What” to reveal that cronies in the maritime industry would be the facilitators used by Putin’s Russia to ship weapons to a pariah state. (Of note for those interested in topics like Flags of Convenience, Rodney Carlisle’s Sovereignty for Sale is a good read which explains the creation of the famous Panamanian and Liberian registries and provides context on why ship “ownership” is rarely straightforward in the maritime industry).
  • Russian arms shipments to Assad’s forces in Syria are clearly “bad,” but the implication in the Odessa Network study is that not only is Russia doing something bad, but that they are also doing it in a particularly devious and underhanded way.  The data provided by Wallace and Mesko only proves, however, that Russia is choosing to use “discreet” means to ship weapons to Syria.  It’s not clear that the Odessa Network’s ties to the Russian state or its business practices are that particularly egregious or unusual within the maritime industry.
  • The authors look at both publicly available data regarding Russian arms shipments as well as AIS data.  According to available data for ships/shipments, they note that “publicly known maritime weapons shipments from Russia to Syria” departed from “northern Russian ports of St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad.”  They then claim, however, based on the curious absence of AIS data for Russian ships in the eastern Mediterranean originating in Oktyabrsk, that there is “a strong circumstantial case that these ships and companies are moving weapons or other sensitive cargo to the Assad regime.”  The argument is inconsistent.  On one hand they make a case that operational security concerns or potential EU pressure on the Ukrainian government is stopping the use of Oktyabrsk as a transshipment site for Syria-bound arms, while on the other hand claiming that nefarious Russian intent is demonstrated by ships originating in Oktyabrsk deliberately not broadcasting AIS data when traveling to Syria.  Can both these assertions be true at the same time?
  • While certainly suspicious, is it actually illegal to turn off AIS as these Russia ships have allegedly done? The authors point out that there is the possibility that data may not be available in certain locations due to a lack of receivers, but also note that the eastern Mediterranean is not exactly an isolated area, and that AIS on these ships seems to work quite well everywhere else in the world.  According to the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO), “all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and all passenger ships irrespective of size” shall “maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.”  These rules were implemented as part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).  Although there is no real chance that these rules could be enforced against Russian ships since they are adopted and enforced by IMO member states themselves, are these ships doing something illegal by not using AIS properly?  Could operators of these vessels be subject to penalties?  Could enforcement of these rules be a round-about way to stop Russian arms shipments to Syria?

Despite my minor criticism above, this sort of analysis is welcome and could be applied to a variety of other maritime issues.  More publicly available detailed network analysis of the commercial networks benefiting from oil theft in West Africa or Somali piracy  could provide new, non-kinetic policy or law enforcement options in the fight against these illicit activities afloat.  Similarly, the methods toward which Iran has been driven by sanctions to facilitate its oil exports could be a useful subject of interest to analysts and policy-makers alike.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a Naval Intelligence officer currently serving on the OPNAV staff. He has previously served at Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2).  The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

Current Operations

Crisis: Danger and Opportunity

1 Comment

One of the definitions of Crisis as an Ideogram is “Danger, mixed with Opportunity.”

You're well on your Wei.
You’re well on your Wei.

Woe betide nation-states and actors unable to navigate this tricky path. For the government of the Philippines, China, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), recent events have been a poster child for this concept, as evidenced by the dual crises at Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal and ashore in Zamboanga City.

The Zamboanga Crisis shows how maritime power is very much an enabler for non-state actors (NSAs). The entire Sulu island chain is one very large ratline; porous and a challenging region to monitor. The Moro National Liberation Front, as do many other NSAs, takes good advantage of the geography and the lack of patrol enforcement and coordination between the Philippines and Malaysia – easily slipping across the borders uncontested. The absence of law and order, as well as numerous informal economies make it ubiquitous that inhabitants travel in large, and in most cases armed groups. As a result, Nur Misuari’s MNLF was not only able to thrive in Sulu following the 1996 peace talks, but he was also able to build a large, and by all reports, well-equipped following in Malaysia’s Sabah peninsula. Undoubtedly, the thin security situation on the water and coastlines helped facilitate unhampered movement of his personnel as well as transshipment of logistics and arms.

It’s been all opportunity and no danger for China. The PRC is using Panatag Shoals as an expansion of it’s Nine-Dash Line Plan to gain control over what is considered integral territory.  Capitalizing upon ASEAN’s inability to reach consensus on security and cooperation over contested territory, China likely will  remain in physical possession of the seized islands well inside the Philippine EEZ. Beijing also benefits through Manila’s struggles to build a Credible Defense in a time of economic challenges, and is counting upon the lack of clear focus on Pacific foreign policy by the Obama Administration. The mixed signals of the “Pivot to the Pacific” coupled with US Secretary of Defense Hagel’s reiteration about US neutrality on issues of sovereignty are all green lights as far as the Chinese are concerned.

For Nur Misuari and the MNLF, the Zamboanga City attack is a last gasp. A lot of peril, but with corresponding big stakes. Having been locked out of the ongoing OIC talks, the aging but defiant Islamist revolutionary has nothing to lose. The attack is an attempt to bring attention back to his organization’s unresolved demands and buy him a seat at the table. The attack would have been more successful had he not chosen to use the densely trafficked (and monitored) Basilan Strait to land part of his troops on mainland MIndanao.

Strait up the middle!
Strait up the middle!

Even with a dearth of assets, Philippine Navy and National Police elements could not help but note a company-size movement on boats speedier and more well-equipped than local fishing traffic.  This miscalculation apparently threw the rebels’ timetable off as the insurgents already ashore were forced into a series of skirmishes in barangays (neighborhoods), short of their ultimate goal of taking the entire city. Misuari’s trump card may still be played; over 4,000 fighters encamped in Malaysia’s Sabah peninsula. If the MNLF chooses to restart fighting amongst the Palm Plantations, the resulting refugee crisis alone could overwhelm what little control both nations have over the area.

For the Armed Forces of the Philippines and in particular, the Navy, it’s been a mixed outcome. On the one hand, the fortuitous success of detecting MNLF movements spoiled what could have been a prominent rebel victory in government-held areas. On the other, PN  Flag Officer-in-Command Jose Luis Alvano is tasked with an impossible mission – to remove over eleven tons of concrete from Panatag with no assets or funding, AND keep the Shoals in Philippine hands. It’s the peak of Monsoon Season, and one of his only two platforms with enough range, speed and on-station endurance is in drydock until October. Confronting China Marine Surveillance with Navy ships brings it’s own set of concerns, and Defense Minister Voltaire Gazmin publicly admitted there’s no way to keep possession of the Shoals without occupying them – an intention that current capabilities cannot support.

Finally, for the Aquino Administration, there’s nothing like a rebel uprising as teachable moments:

Lesson 1: Infowars matter – the lack of maturity around how to handle Social Media coverage of the event is painfully evident – from broken boots, troops short of rations, to operational security and hobby-shop drones

Philippine Army Drone over Zamboanga - courtesy Yahoo! News
Philippine Army Drone over Zamboanga – courtesy Yahoo! News

– the government is learning how to manage crisis communications effectively in a school of hard knocks. At least Zamboanga City’s Twitter account was warning residents to stand clear of impending air strikes.

Lesson 2: Your enemies could be next to you, not in front of you. Prior to the conflict, Representative Rudolfo Biazon, Chairman of the House Committee on Security and National Defense, had been questioning all the big-ticket Modernization items the Administration was obtaining. Biazon’s soapbox issue is ditching the conventional arms purchases and focus more on Counter-insurgency (COIN) assets that could double up in times of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Recovery (HADR). The crisis can only provide more fodder for his call.  But that pales next to Vice-President Jejomar Binay’s trangression; unilaterally brokering a failed cease-fire with Misuari without Presidential authorization, all for the sake of grandstanding. Reputedly, Binay is seeking to distinguish himself from Aquino as part of a presidential election bid in 2016.

The bright light for the Administration is the quick and effective response to the MNLF attack – locking down a security cordon in Mindanao and preventing any escape, while balancing a difficult urban combat situation exacerbated by hostage-taking and literal town-burning.

Zamboanga City showing damage from the fighting. Courtesy GMA News/Samhyr
Zamboanga City showing damage from the fighting. Courtesy GMA News/Samhyr

But Panatag Shoals beckons like the hazard that it is, both from a navigational as well as foreign policy viewpoint. Aquino has shown willingness to confront the Chinese in the past, but without capabilities, all he can do is present an inconvenience to Beijing’s aspirations. His most powerful option is to compel international condemnation through the UNCLOS tribunal and hopefully bring China to the table over a real and substantive Code of Conduct.

Juramentado is the pseudonym for Armando J. Heredia, a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries.  The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Current Operations

The Siege in Zamboanga City

Leave a comment
Zamboanga City Hall (Wikimedia Commons)
Zamboanga City Hall (Wikimedia Commons)

Despite regular coverage of ongoing events in Zamboanga City by both the Philippine and world press, there is still bafflingly little information available regarding the invasion and possible attempted takeover of the city on the southeastern tip of the island of Mindanao by fighters from a faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).  Recent reports from the Armed Forces of the Philippines on 16 September claimed that “70 percent of the coastal areas in Zamboanga City that were occupied by Muslim rebels” had been recaptured by Monday, with military “and special police forces” having “killed or arrested more than 100” rebels occupying “five coastal villages” after what has been described as a “foiled attempt” at occupying the city hall (or an attempt to raise the rebels’ flag) on 8 September.  82,000 of the approximately 1 million Zamboanga residents had been forced from their homes due to the fighting.

The Philippine Navy’s response

The Philippine military’s maritime forces have been very much involved in the response to the attacks in Zamboanga, with an afloat encounter between the rebels and AFP Navy Special Operations personnel at sea being described in most reports as the initial event of the standoff.  The unit most likely involved in that incident was Naval Special Operations Unit Six (NAVSOU 6), the component of the Philippine Naval Special Operations Group (NAVSOG), based out of Naval Station Romulo Espaldon in Zamboanga City and under the operational control of Naval Forces Western Mindanao (NFWM), the naval component of the AFP’s Western Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM), the command responsible for military operations in the Sulu Archipelago and the western half of Mindanao.  According to the AFP, ships and troops already based in Zamboanga have been augmented by “4 units provided by the Naval Special Operations Group” and 300 Marines.

Who is responsible?

A faction of the MNLF has been blamed for these events in most reports.  The MNLF was originally founded in the 1960s and represented a variety of Muslim ethnic groups resident in the southern Philippines.  Since its early years the group has been led by Nur Misuari, a native of Jolo Island (although Misuari is a Sama, not a Tausug like most Jolo residents).  The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) separated from the MNLF in the late 1970s, with much of the split between the two groups being reflecting ethnic differences (the MILF is typically strongest in Maranao and Maguindanao area on Minadanao, with Tausugs from Jolo forming the backbone of the MNLF). The Al Qaeda-linked terrorist (and criminal) group Aby Sayyaf is itself an early-nineties splinter from the MNLF by natives of Jolo and Basilan.

In 1996 the Philippine government and the MNLF negotiated a peace that established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), composed of Muslim-majority provinces in the Sulu Archipelago (Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi Tawi) and on mainland Mindanao.  Nur Misuari became the first governor of the ARMM and MNLF cadres were to be incorporated into the Philippine military.  However, by 2001 he had been pushed out of his leadership role within the MNLF and, seeing the writing on the wall, led a an armed revolt on Jolo against both the remaining MNLF leadership and the Philippine government and military.  After fleeing to Malaysia Misuari was arrested and deported back to the Philippines, remaining in custody until 2008.  The forces of what has since been called the “Misuari Breakaway Group” (MBG) or “Misuari Renegade Group” (MRG) has been led by Habier Malik,  who has also been identified as the leader of the Zamboanga attacks in much of the reporting.

Conflict between the MILF and MNLF has been sparked again in the last year due to the announcement last October that Manila and the MILF had reached their own peace agreement, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which essentially replaces the MNLF-dominated ARMM by a new entity that will presumably be controlled by the MILF.  Since the Framework was announced in 2012, there has been a variety of attempts to embarrass the government of Philippine President Benigno Aquino III.  The most high profile, and bizarre, event was the February “stand-off” between followers of the Sultan of Sulu and Malaysian authorities in Sabah, on Borneo.  Misuari “extended his support” to this venture and in August, “declared the independence of Mindanao and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Republik, which included Mindanao, Palawan in southwestern Philippines and Sabah in Malaysia.”  Although Misuari has been widely blamed for the last week’s events in Zamboanga, his involvement is still unclear, with the Zamboanga City mayor stating that Misuari had “disowned” Habier Malik and the attack, while his lawyer has said that Misuari “was directing the MNLF fighters’ movements.”

A Violent History

Violence in Jolo and Zamboanga City has often been entwined.  The 2010 bombing at the Zamboanga City airport that killed two people has generally been described as an attempted assassination against the governor of Jolo.  In October 2002 a US Army soldier was killed in a bombing in Zamboanga City, and in 2009 two additional US soldiers were killed in an IED attack on Jolo that was attributed to the MNLF and the “Bangsamoro National Liberation Army.”  Zamboanga City and the surrounding areas have been the site of numerous high-profile kidnappings against foreigners.  An invasion on the scale of these most recent attacks, however, does seem like a significant escalation.  It is likely an act of desperation by Misuari’s faction of the MNLF, but it is still unclear what they expected to achieve by taking the fight off Jolo, unlike in 2001.

 What does this mean for the USA?

I attempted to weigh the relative success or failure of US counter-terrorism in the Philippines in an article in Small Wars Journal last year, with the predictable conclusion that the results were mixed. Of note, NAVSOU 6 is one of the units that has received training from US Special Operations Forces.  Despite linkages between the various Muslim terrorist, nationalist, or rebel groups in the southern Philippines, however, the US has focused its activities to supporting the Philippine military in its fight against groups like Abu Sayyaf, not groups like the MNLF and MILF.  With peace with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf on the decline, however, it seems that fallout from politics is more likely to be a source of discord in the Philippines than Al Qaeda-linked extremist groups.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a Naval Intelligence officer currently serving on the OPNAV staff.  He has previously served at Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2).  In 2010 he deployed as the Intelligence Officer for Task Force Archipelago, the Naval Special Warfare component of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines.  The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.