The Southern Mediterranean Immigration Crisis: a European Way Out

The Italian (yellow) and Maltese (red) SAR. The red exclamation point marks one of the latest incidents, where more than 100 immigrants died at sea. Below a zoomed image of the same map (Source: Repubblica.it and Google Maps)
The Italian (yellow) and Maltese (red) SAR. The red exclamation point marks one of the latest incidents, where more than 100 immigrants died at sea. Below a zoomed image of the same map (Source: Repubblica.it and Google Maps)

felix2After the recent tragedies in the Southern Mediterranean Sea (SouthMed), when several improvised vessels – transporting illegal immigrants to the coasts of Italy and Malta – sank, resulting in the death of several hundred immigrants, the issue of migration flows crossing the SouthMed has resurfaced to the international stage. Italian Prime Minister Letta offered an unprecented, and not well received, official apology for the loss of lives at sea, promising more surveillance in the area and, most importantly, to bring the matter to the forthcoming October meeting of the European Council.

The situation was briefly discussed, with the promise of an improved commitment of the EU, especially through its border control agency, FRONTEX, in supporting the Italian struggle in the SouthMed.[1] Unfortunately – although one may say luckily for those States which don’t wish to be entangled in expensive border control operations – the issue was overshadowed by the NSA scandal, with the well-known protests by several European leaders.

Returning to the matter at hand, Italy has promptly launched Operazione Mare Nostrum[2], deploying 6 additional ships and supporting aircrafts for enhanced surveillance operations in the SouthMed, in particular:

 

–          The San Marco, San Giorgio-class amphibious assault ship (7790 tons), command ship;

–          2 Frigates Maestrale-class (3100 tons);

–          2 Patrol ships Comandanti-class (1500 tons);

–          1 Transport Ship Gorgona-class (630 tons)

–          For airborne surveillance, 1 Long-range Maritime Patrol Aircraft Breguet Atlantic, 1 Predator, 1 Patrol Aircraft P-180, 2 EH101 helicopters, 4 Agusta-Bell 212 helicopters and 1 Search and Rescue helicopter HH-139 SAR.[3]

At the same time, reports of a possible agreement with the Finnish Coast Guard surfaced, with Finland sending technical and equipment support to Italy. Moreover, FRONTEX is reportedly going to send financial help to Italy, for its ongoing operations and future endeavors. In practical terms, it appears that the European response to the issue is, at least in the short-term, fairly adequate. It is also apparent that a definitive solution to the crisis will require a more substantial commitment to the area and to the stability of the States on the Southern end of the Mediterranean.

Although it is clear that the EU should undertake a more substantial role in a long-term solution, it is also clear that many within the EU would be more than happy to commit to conciliatory statements and visits (the last visit to Lampedusa by the President of the Commission Barroso and the Italian Prime Minister Letta was welcomed by protests) rather than action.[4] What many commentators, especially those who accuse Italy of negligence and complicity in such tragedies, forget is that Italy’s borders facing illegal immigration are completely maritime, thus increasing the costs and risks for surveillance and assistance. Moreover, illegal immigration activities carried at sea entail a completely different set of technical, juridical and even physical problems that are unknown to land borders. The current practice of the individuals transporting illegal immigrants is that of reaching the Search and Rescue Areas (SAR) of Italy and Malta,[5] then disabling their boats and sending a distress call to the Italian authorities, which are then legally bound to locate and rescue them. Once the Italian Navy or Coast Guard reaches the distressed vessel, it is either towed or its passengers taken on board by Italian ships and carried to Lampedusa. There the illegal immigrants are screened and given the possibility to apply for asylum or to be repatriated. As an obvious consequence, the current crisis has completely overwhelmed the processing centers in the small island, thus sparking protests by both Lampedusa’s residents and the “interned” immigrants. For these reasons, Italy has been in “crisis mode” for more than a decade in its SouthMed area, and it is not likely to overcome this issue on its own. It must be underlined that only the incredible efforts of the Italian Coast Guard, Navy and Guardia di Finanza[6] have made it so that these tragedies at sea are exceptional, rather than the norm, saving more than 30000 illegal immigrants since January 2013.[7]

It is apparent that a solution to the current situation needs to pass through an improvement in the internal situation of the States of origin of the migrants, or at least in the ports where they board to try to reach Europe.[8] In previous maritime-borne immigration crises (such as those stemming from the Balkans in the 90s), only an improvement in the countries of provenience eventually blocked the immigration flows. In practical terms though, the effort for stabilizing Libya and improving the feeble governmental structures in Tunisia has to come from the EU. Firstly because of its calling to put together European interests in the protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and second because the EU is the sole entity with both the political and budgetary power to face the matter head-on. Nevertheless, one of the most renowned issues in EU foreign policy is the need for unanimity decisions by all its Member States, and today –  as in the foreseeable future – consensus on a substantial commitment to the security and safety situation of the SouthMed appears unlikely. This does not mean that all avenues for the EU are closed. Despite the need for a unanimous decision on major shifts in foreign policy, there are a series of institutions and bodies which can help in practice – even better than a European Council deliberation – on the matter. The EU Commission Development and Cooperation Directorate General (DG DEVCO) has the power to initiate development projects with third States, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) has the capabilities and connections to analyze and establish the policy priorities in the SouthMed. Moreover, the vice-President of the Commission (the second in ranking in the institution) also happens to be the Head of the EEAS (as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), thus a coordinated effort is indeed possible.[9] Lastly, various integrated surveillance systems (e.g. SeaBILLA)[10] are under study, with the objective of putting together the European Union Member States maritime control systems and authorities for an enhanced cooperation in the area of sea-monitoring. While FRONTEX is going to financially support the Italian Navy and Coast Guard and the possible agreement with Finland will bring more vessels and personnel to the area, much more is needed on the Southern end of the Mediterranean Sea.

It is in the nature of an institution such as the EU to work on consensus, and such consensus is often forged on the wave of public support driven by exceptional events, such as the tragedies in the SouthMed. Nevertheless, it is also in the nature of such institutions to respond to public pressure with conciliatory remarks and provisional policies, avoiding politically complicated high-level negotiations. Whether the EU leadership will put its supportive statements into practice remains to be seen, but it is apparent that the time of temporary responses to endemic crises is over.

Matteo Quattrocchi holds a LL.M. from Georgetown Law as well as a Master’s Degree in European and International Law from Luiss in Rome, Italy. He is currently a Junior Researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies, after having worked in the NGO and private sector and taught in Rome and Washington, D.C. He is specialized in International and National Security Law and Policies, EU-Asia Relations and Maritime Security Law and Policies.



[1] European Council Conclusions, 25 October 2013, find at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/139197.pdf

[2] As a side note, many Human Rights organizations have protested the name of the operation, claiming it has a colonialist sound to it, as Mare Nostrum was the name the Romans gave to the Mediterranean, literally meaning “our sea”, a term also often used during the 1910s expansion of the Italian Reign. The author believes that any further comment on such “protests” is merely a waste of bytes (although at least not of ink and paper).

[3] Gianandrea Gaiani, Operazione Mare Nostrum, Analis Difesa, 22 October 2013,find at http://www.analisidifesa.it/2013/10/operazione-mare-nostrum/ and the Italian Navy website, http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/thefleet/Pagine/default.aspx

[4] EU leaders rebuff calls for action on Europe’s migration crisis, Reuters, 25 October 2013. Find at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/25/us-eu-migrants-idUSBRE99O0NB20131025

[5] There is a long-standing diplomatic row between Italy and Malta, as in theory most of the ships that end up being towed to Lampedusa are rescued within the Maltese SAR. Italy has requested Malta to limit its SAR to its actual capabilities, but Malta has staunchly refused to this day. Moreover, Malta applies UNCLOS to the letter, allowing migrant vessels freedom of passage in its controlled waters. When a distress call is sent, Maltese authorities often refer to the Italian Coast Guard (even within their SAR), claiming that they don’t have the technical capability to rescue the vessels or that they are closer to Lampedusa. When a distressed vessel is rescued within the Maltese SAR, Italy requests to make port in Malta, but such requests are generally refused, claiming that Italian structures are better suited to sheltering distressed vessels and their passengers.

[6] This is Italy’s Customs and Border Police, which has also jurisdiction over tax frauds (hence the name Finance Guard).

[7] Italian Coast Guard General Command, News Release, 9 October 2013, find at http://www.guardiacostiera.it/dalcomandogenerale/documents/notizia_20131009084556.pdf

[8] Hugh Williamson and Judith Sunderland, Shipwrecked. No Easy Fix For Europe’s Asylum Policy, Foreign Affairs, 24 October 2013. Find at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140223/hugh-williamson-and-judith-sunderland/shipwrecked

[9] The EU has created a Task Force for the SouthMed in 2011, pairing the EEAS, the Commission, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The current state of the SouthMed does not speak up for the results of this task force. For more information please see HR Catherine Ashton sets up Task Force

for the Southern Mediterranean, EEAS, 7 June 2011 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-688_en.htm

[10] For more information please visit http://www.seabilla.eu/cms/seabilla

Events Week of 12-18 November 2013

Events Week of 12 – 18 November 2013

 A roundup of events we think our readers may find interesting. Inclusion does not equal calendarendorsement, all descriptions are the events’ own. Think of one we should include? Email Grant at [email protected].

12 November 2013 – Washington, DC – The Atlantic Council“NATO’s Deterrence and Collective Defense”

13 November 2013 – Washington, DC – 10th Annual Disruptive Thinkers Technologies Conference

14 November 2013 – India – The Diplomat“International Conference on Future Challenges in Earth Sciences for Energy and Mineral Resources”.

14 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Foundation for Innovation and Discovery “Implementing Innovation”.

14 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Brookings Institute“Israel’s Economy and Security in a Changing Middle East”.

14 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Carnegie“China’s Views on Prompt Global Strike”

14 November 2013 – Washington, DC – SAIS-JHU“History, Sovereignty, and International Law: China’s East China Sea and South China Sea Territorial Disputes and Implications for Taiwan”

15 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Atlantic Council“Cyber Conflict and War: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow”

16 November 2013 – India – The Diplomat“Global Maritime International Conference”.

18 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Hudson Institute“Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding”.

Longer-Term

20 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Brookings Institute CIMSEC’s DC Chapter Monthly Informal Meet-up at Bluejacket Brewery

20 November 2013 – Brisbane, Australia – Royal United Services Institute of Australia“Veils, Boots, and Bullets – Australian Military Nurses”

21 November 2013 – Sydney, Australia – Lowy Institute for International Policy“The Future of American Policy in the Asia Pacific Region

21 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Hudson Institute“Taiwan and the US: Shared Strategic Interests”

25 November 2013 – Washington, DC – Cato Institute“Rethinking U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy”.

25 November 2013 – London – King’s College“Russia and the Caspian Sea: Projecting Power or Competing for Influence?”

26 November 2013 – Canberra, Australia – Kokoda Foundation“Researching Australia’s Future Security Challenges”

03 December 2013 – Washington, DC – CSIS“World Energy Outlook”

10 December 2013 – Washington, DC – USNI2013 Defense Forum Washington: Shaping the New Maritime Strategy and Navigating the Budget Gap Reality.

17-18 December 2013 – Washington, DC – Center for Strategic and International StudiesPONI Series: The PONI Conference Series, now in its tenth year, offers an opportunity for rising experts in the field to present findings from their research in order to advance the broader discussion on nuclear weapons issues. It also seeks to provide a venue for interaction among people from different sectors and for mid-career and senior members of the community to mentor their junior counterparts.

14-16 January 2014 – Washington, DC – Maritime Administration“National Maritime Strategy Symposium: Cargo Opportunities and Sealift Capacity”.

Sea Control 8: Sacred Cows and Amphibians

CIMSEC-LogoCDR Salamander joins Matt and Grant for a podcast on writing as a member of the military, anonymity, and some sacred cows military planners hold dear: benefits, high-end systems, equal budgeting, etc… Join us for Episode 8, Sacred Cows and Amphibians (Download).

Articles from Sacred Cows Week:
Quantity over Quality (Michael Madrid)
Holy Bovine, Batman! Sacred Sailors! (Matt McLaughlin)
American Defense Policy: 8 Reality Checks (Martin Skold)
Ain’t Ready for Marines Yet? The Sacred Cow of British Army Organization (Alex Blackford)
SSBN(X): Sacred Cow for a Reason (Grant Greenwell)
Why the United States Should Merge Its Ground Forces (Jeong Lee)
Sacred Cow: Military Pay and Benefits By the Numbers (Richard Mosier)

Sea Control comes out every Monday. Don’t forget to subscribe on Itunes and Xbox Music!

Typhoon Haiyan – 48 Hours After

PAF C-130s and a Sokol helicopter (background) at the battered Tacloban City Airport. Image Credit: Reuters
PAF C-130s and a Sokol helicopter (background) at the battered Tacloban City Airport. Image Credit: Reuters

Super Typhoon Haiyan tore through the Central Visayas area of the Philippines, not only leveling Tacloban City where she made first landfall, but ripped through the islands of Samar and Leyte, Northern Cebu and the Panay provinces and swiped Busuanga Island, on her way out to the Western Philippine Sea. One apt description of Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) was “easily a Category 4 Hurricane, but combined with a tornado having a hundred-mile wide damage path .”

The impacted area is about the size of West Virginia, but with the added complication of being scattered islands and archipelagos, relying on key transit points including airports, seaports and vital roads and bridges that are mostly inoperable. Thanks to a storm surge of up to 24 feet, much of the infrastructure may remain closed or damaged for months. Reports of casualties vary, but victim narratives backed by initial media coverage and official government tallies seem to confirm that at least over one hundred people lost their lives in the storm. That number is likely to rise as contact is re-established with the harder-hit outlying areas. As of the time of this article’s publication, the storm made landfalls over 5 islands, displacing over 600,000 people, destroying or damaging at least 20,000 homes and structures.

The Philippine Government had sufficient warning and heeding past incidents, pre-positioned relief supplies and began mandatory evacuations of residents into emergency shelters such as stadiums and other sturdy structures. No one was prepared however, for the immense damage wrought by winds close to 190 miles per hour with gusts exceeding that figure, along with flash flooding and storm surges that easily came to rooftop levels in most locations. Possibly the only saving grace is the speed of the storm that wrought those winds also made a quick transit of the Visayas region.

With Haiyan now well off-shore and threatening the Vietnamese coast, damage assessment efforts have begun. A generous outpouring of international aid both near and far, and deployment of US Navy units out of Japan will bolster current government operations to bring immediate relief. The challenge is that the entire area is dark, literally. A complete power and communications blackout has hampered efforts to reach both major population centers and the the more isolated townships and villages. Tacloban City airport was devastated, but some reports indicate that the runway is mostly intact. Initial sorties by the Philippine Air Force were focused on delivering electrical generators and sufficient communications gear to replace what was lost on the ground and re-establish links to unaffected areas of the country. Based on media photos, a few PAF C-130s and Sokol utility helicopters were seen on the battered and congested ramp, but the lack of electrical power, damage to the control tower and fueling areas will severely limit the number of flights the airport can handle in the coming days. Sealift support by the Philippine Navy includes up to 20 vessels, most notably the hard-working Bacolod City-class Logistical Landing Craft, a familiar sight from recent crises such as the Bohol earthquake and the Zamboanga City uprising. Overall, the government committed a goodly portion of it’s military and civilian assets and personnel prior to Haiyan’s arrival, to quickly deal with the aftermath. This comprehensive effort is being managed through the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), the equivalent to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Perhaps the only benefit of this natural disaster was the temporary cessation of the standoff at Ayungin Shoals – the Philippine Marines aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre safely rode out the storms, as did many other of the small, isolated detachments in the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or as the contested Spratleys are known. The Chinese Maritime Surveillance ships quickly moved out ahead of the oncoming tempest for safer harbor.

As with any major Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Recovery (HA/DR) operation, the bulk of relief supplies will have to be sent via ship or ground. Most roads remain blocked by fallen trees and other debris, with the critical San Juanico bridge linking Leyte, where Tacloban City is located, with it’s Northern neighbor Samar, currently under safety evaluation. This vital road link between the two islands is the only way road-bound supplies can reach the impact zone. Tacloban Seaport is blocked, mostly by debris and ships wrecked and washed ashore by the typhoon’s powerful waves. The San Juanico strait is barely navigable, and the bottom which is littered with World War II shipwrecks are now further cluttered by new victims. Assuming the port can be cleared, this will force relief vessels to either pass north through the San Bernardino Straits and swing around Samar or south through the Surigao Straits into Leyte Gulf, adding miles to an already long voyage.

In a scene eerily reminiscent of the days following Hurricane Katrina, lawlessness and looting have broken out in the major population centers, with President Benigno Aquino III resisting calls to impose martial law, despite some local governments ceding effective control and operations back to Manila due to manpower shortages. Government forces are starting to arrive to deliver both aid and establish law and order. The coming weeks will be the critical time, as efforts to rebuild, restore power, establish potable water sources and housing will be racing the clock against starvation, disease and exposure to the elements.

How to help:

NBC Summary Page of Relief Operations
CNN Summary Page of Relief Operations

Juramentado is the pseudonym for Armando J. Heredia, a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.