Rejoinder to “Ears Open, Mouth Shut”

CRICJon’s recent blog seriously, and rightfully questions the semantics of innovation.   He obviously has spent a good deal of time thinking about what the Navy is trying to do well beyond what is merely signified by the word ‘innovation.’  

 
Buzzwords have plagued the Navy, every organization, and even society for probably as long as language has existed.  It’s easy to throw out a single word or phrase that summarizes a vast concept such as ‘innovation’ does–certainly there are wealthy authors who’ve made their living doing just that.  As, I am fairly certain that a significant portion of the issue we grapple with today is the language that is regularly found concerning this subject, I will refrain from using the word ‘innovation’ henceforth, neither any other overly used catch phrase to denote what the the current generations of the Navy have embarked upon in the last few years.  
 
Historically, the CRIC and CRIC[x] aren’t radically different from what has ever been done. Sailors tend to not give enough credit to the methods the Navy has utilized time and time again to improve its war fighting abilities.  As long ago as 1833, these words were spoken: 

 

We, the Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, in order to promote the diffusion of useful knowledge,- to foster a spirit of harmony and a community of interest in the service, and to cement the links which unite us as professional brethren, have formed ourselves into a Society, to be denominated “The United States Naval Lyceum.”

 
An ad hoc organization, not too dissimilar to what’s being done with CIMSEC today, of interested and like-minded maritime professionals compelled to advance professional knowledge and competence.  Indeed, the Lyceum is the predecessor to the United States Naval Institute.  
 
Perhaps it’s that the human condition is predicated upon being ashore, that causes Sailors to almost innately seek out the otherwise alien knowledge of how to live, flight, and secure victory at sea.   Anything being done by those wearing the uniform today is only derivative of what has been done before us.  Each generation of sailor merely has a unique combination of geopolitical realities, emerging technologies, social temperament to hash through in finding a way forward for their Navy.  
 
Our deckplates have been a consistent hub of building upon professional knowledge, the doings of Sims in developing a better way to shoot.  With Nimitz and company in developing underway replenishment, Moffett and Curtis developing naval aviation.  TheTurtle, the Hunley, the unique build of the original Six Frigates.  How the United States Navy has done business has been anything but business as usual, as defined by other maritime powers.  We are not unique, today is not different from yesterday.  It’s probably a safe assumption that Sims would chuckle to himself were he privy to today’s Navy, as it would be familiar to him. 
 
What the Navy is today, is a mere continuation of what Sailors have always been.  The internet, and this vaunted information age has not changed the substance of the Navy or its Sailors.  Rather, what has changed – what is unique in our ‘realities, technologies, and temperament’ – is how we communicate the ideas sailors pursue in bettering and distinguishing the Navy from other maritime powers.  Quite simply, communication is the genesis of substance.  One person, one ship, one command with a better way of doing something isn’t of much use to the Navy–one person, or one ship will not win a war.  In other words, being “selfish” is only the first step. While surely the first step is where bettering our services begins, enabling others to follow that lead is vital.  Indeed, that was the entire reason for being with the Naval Lyceum, as it is the purpose for the Lyceum’s progeny The US Naval Institute, as it is also the purpose with the CNO’s Innovation Cell ‘to promote the diffusion of useful knowledge’ to the wider Fleet.  
 
More over, communication isn’t done with by shutting one’s mouth.  Communication is an exchange, a conversation. Both one’s mouth and ears must be open in order to communicate.   Despite the promises of the internet to rapidly change the world, cultures still change at a generational pace.  The senior levels of the Navy telling its sailors that change is beneficial and wanted, is a previous generation enabling the subsequent generation of leaders to adopt a methodology they, so late in their careers, can only slightly grasp at.  What is being promulgated by the Navy in their campaign is only something we’ve always in significant ways done.  It has never had to be forced, nor is it being forced now.  
 
Rather, the opportunity to act upon a good idea is being expanded.  The road blocks to communicate up the chain of command and across the Navy are being removed.  Starting with Sims having to personally write Roosevelt. We now approach a reality where mid-level support for maturing an idea is provided, ensuring critical thinking, and that something from the mouth of a petty officer sounds useful to an admiral’s ears.  
 
What is certainly not being forced is how the CRIC is going about its business, or even what its business will become.  Each member has their own discreet project that is decided upon by the CRIC member alone.  The method utilized in pursuing that project is mentored and advice is offered, but all leg work is done by the member their self.  What’s more is that any money for that project is found by the member promoting their project to entities that may want to literally buy-in to their proposal.  
 
For the CRIC, the goals are actually rather modest.  In terms of 3D printing, there is little hyperbole in simply seeking to work through such mundane notions of how divisions aboard ship could share a single 3D printer, or how shore infrastructure must support a unique capability like 3D printing.  Such an effort is building a little, and testing a lot; with hopefully placing the Navy at the ready for when 3D printing truly matures.  
 
The CRIC is not an end in and of itself.  Indeed, regional and local meet-ups sponsored CIMSEC and conferences like West are crucial to the success of the CRIC, and on a more granular level to every Sailor which wishes to help improve their Navy.  The hope for the maturation of CRIC and CRIC[x] is a construct through which ideas can move and find the right Sailor, in the right place, at the right time so that they, and the Navy can do the best with ‘what they have, where they are.’  

Singapore: German Subs’ Strategic Value

Congratulations, Singapore! In 2020, the city-state will operate the Indo-Pacific’s most advanced, non-nuclear-powered submarines. For China, these submarines present a challenge, however for Germany the deal provides the potential for greater security policy access to maritime Asia.

Type 218

Type_214_1
The Type 214, predeccesor to the Type 218SG

In early December, German shipbuilder Thyssen announced that Singapore’s navy had contracted two Type 218SG U-boats, a variety previously unknown. While the Type 216 concept has been in public discussion Type 218 had not. As it seems, Type 218SG is an improved version of Type 214, adjusted to Singapore’s specific needs, thus the “SG” suffix. Given its size and operational profile, Type 214/218SG subs are very well suited for operations in coastal waters, such as those around Singapore. Thyssen’s offered Type 216 concept is would have been too large.

Thanks to the air-independent propulsion (AIP) fuel cells the U-boat operates almost noiselessly like a nuclear-powered submarine, but without the heat signature caused by the reactor. In consequence, by 2020, Singapore will receive the most advanced non-nuclear-powered submarines in the Indo-Pacific.

Why Singapore Needs U-boats

Lately, international attention has largely been on aircraft carriers and, through China’s ADIZ, with air forces. However, Asia’s arms race takes pace underwater as much as it does on the surface. China is expanding its fleet of nuclear and conventionally powered attack submarines in quality and quantity and the U.S. will commission even more new Virginia-class nuclear subs.

Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, the Philippines, and Pakistan all maintain programs to start, modernize, or expand their submarine fleets. South Korea has already been a customer of Germany’s submarines. Especially small countries, who are missing the resources and capacities for large expeditionary fleets, will respond to China’s increasing capabilities by expanding of their submarine forces.

The U.S. and Britain will favor ally Singapore’s procurement of top-of-the-line German U-boats, but the purchase will certainly not please China’s navy. All Chinese warships underway to the Indian Ocean by the far-most economic route have to pass the shallow waters around Singapore, thereby coming in range of the barely detectable 218s.

The purchase of a German product also helps keep Singapore’s fleet interoperable with Western navies. For the West this is advantageous in the event that continued Chinese “assertiveness,” spurs the formation of new coalitions in Southeast Asia. Japan is already pursuing that track. Given China’s desire to establish an ADIZ in the South China Sea, at least one aircraft carrier would have to transit to the south of the South China Sea to enforce it. China’s fighter jets lack the range to launch from the mainland and aerial refueling capabilities are too immature. Thus, Singapore’s Type 218s would pose a serious challenge to any Chinese carrier task force.

How far China has advanced in sonar techniques and submarine detection is hard to say. If German Type 212s can make their way through the anti-sub-defense of a U.S. aircraft carrier, the even more advanced 218s should have no major difficulty embarrassing the Chinese navy.

Yet just two 218s will not be enough because Singapore’s navy also has an Endurance-class LPD and surface warships to protect. One rule applies to warships as well as submarines: one at sea, one in the yard, and one developing its readiness. Of course, the Singaporeans know that. Thus, given a successful program development, we will likely see an order of a second tranche.

Strategic Value for Germany

The announced deal is also a win for Germany. Besides the good deal for the German defense industry, the secured jobs, and the revenue, the deal’s strategic value must also be examined. By purchasing amphibious landing ships, new frigates and the F-35, Singapore, with its central geo-strategic location, is on the way to become a military powerhouse. It is therefore in the interests of a maritime trade-dependent nation like Germany, to have good relations with Singapore, as it inhabits one of the world’s most important ports.

Germany has not yet had any maritime security access east of the Malacca Strait in Southeast Asia. Even its role in the Indian Ocean has remained unusually limited. With the further pace-taking maritime arms-race in Southeast Asia, Germany now has a bright foot in the door. In addition, Singapore will become dependent after 2020 on German spare part deliveries.

It should be noted that a submarine deal with South Korea, to this day, has not produced any immediate strategic value or results in practical security policy. Through two customers instead of one that could change, especially as Germany pursues additional export deals in the region.

In addition to the potential for these lucrative arcontracts, Germany has an interest in a stable, peaceful maritime arc running from Singapore and Vladivostok. China’s re-armament, coupled with a more assertive military doctrine, and its aggressive enforcement ensures the opposite. Since one can doubt U.S. resolve thanks to the Obama Administration and the federal budget, the countries of the region must be able to balance China’s rise, at least partially, by themselves. Therefore, German-built subs can surely do their share.

Felix Seidler is a fellow at the Institute for Security Policy, University of Kiel, Germany, and runs the site Seidlers-Sicherheitspolitik.net (Seidler’s Security Policy).

Follow Felix on Twitter: @SeidersSiPo

Arctic: The Final Frontier

The Arctic environment is changing. These changes can have a major impact on the national security of the nations that border it. New regions of the globe that have never been easily accessible to mankind are now presenting the opportunity to greatly increase economic, political, and military interactions within the Arctic region. Natural resources that have never before been tapped are beginning to be accessible, and shorter and faster routes for shipping of goods and resources are opening.

Uncertainty remains as to the rate and extent of the changing Arctic climate as well as how fast human activity will increase in the area, but what is clear is that both are happening and will continue to happen. History shows that when new global economic opportunities present themselves, the competition for resources and territory can result in conflict. The United States must recognize this and work collaboratively with other nations to develop agreements and understandings within the region. This potential shift in the global geographic and economic picture shows a need for a strategy to meet these security challenges that the United States is currently unprepared and ill-equipped to address.

Does this mean I am going to see you around here more often?
Does this mean I am going to see you around here more often?

Assigning U.S. Northern Command as the single advocate for Arctic capabilities within the DoD in 2011 was a first step in addressing this lack of an Arctic strategy. This is a new region that presents unique problems and opportunities; therefore a tailored approach is necessary for addressing national security concerns while promoting and preserving international stability.

As the United States moves forward as an international partner within the Arctic it is important to continuously remain mindful that there are two sides to this new accessibility to resources. On one side are greater opportunities for international cooperation and strengthening of relationships with current and new partner nations. On the other side there is now an increased potential for dispute and conflict centered on claims to resources and territory. Disagreements among Arctic nations can have a destabilizing effect on the region, so promoting stability in accordance with international laws and norms is within the strategic interests of the United States.

The free navigation through international seas and straits for all peaceful nations continues to be a core aspect of U.S. maritime strategy. This policy should be no different within the changing environment of the Arctic. New sea-lanes are emerging that have the potential to greatly reduce shipping distances and help promote economic growth for all nations. These new sea-lanes are international straits within global commons and the United States must remain within a position to protect these sea-lines as they continue to evolve.

Hey Evgeni, I'll race you from Severomorsk to Vladivastok.
Hey Evgeni, I’ll race you from Severomorsk to Vladivastok.

The Arctic will continue to take on greater economic importance and as a result requires a comprehensive strategy that includes enhancements in our strategic capabilities. Current capabilities in the region – both in terms of technology and force structure – were developed without the Arctic playing much of a role in global matters. The United States is currently facing a great challenge, which if approached and managed properly can in fact be a great opportunity.

The United States is one of a very few nations that directly borders the Arctic. This means that the security of the Arctic is a strategic area directly related to the security of the United States. With the impression of more significant and immediate threats driving greater levels of attention to other areas of responsibility, such as the Middle-East or the Asia-Pacific region, it is only natural overlook, even unintentionally, other areas impacting national security like the Arctic. At the national level, the United States must determine the appropriate security framework to effectively evaluate all emerging security concerns within the region. This framework should utilize the unmatched capabilities and capacities of the military to ensure the United States is in a position to support cooperation among other friendly nations in the region.

Even with a strategy emphasizing the importance of the Arctic region on the global stage, the United States currently lacks the capabilities necessary to ensure it continues to play a leadership role in international affairs in the region. The most directly applicable capabilities would be maritime domain awareness (MDA), search and rescue (SAR), maritime interdiction, humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR), and air and missile defense (AMD). These capabilities must fuse with key cooperative partnerships with inter-agency as well as other friendly Arctic nations. This primary goal should be to ensure safety, security, and stability within the region. The right capabilities coupled with support from partners and fused together with effective communications will continue to convey that the United States plays an active and positive role within the Arctic and will continue to for the foreseeable future.

Acquisition decisions will be made to address the core mission areas within the Arctic. Vital to enabling any of these capabilities is the acquisition and proper maintenance of icebreakers to enable operations within the region today. Current capability levels do not even begin to adequately ensure safe and continued operations within the Arctic. A more robust icebreaker capacity and capability is essential to maintaining national presence within the region, enabling military operations, and thus preserving national and economic interests. The United States is significantly behind the icebreaking capabilities of other Arctic nations and this is a gap which must be filled to remain competitive in the region.

Part of the responsibility inherent with assuming a leadership role on the international stage is not only having the capability to respond to conflict if the need arises, but to also have the capability to extend a helping hand if necessary. Even with the changing climate, the Arctic is still an inhospitable place which can be more prone to accidents at sea, which can be more dangerous than in other areas of the world. These simple facts necessitate the United States’ possession of a capable SAR capability in the Arctic.

Current SAR capabilities are based on significantly lower levels of human activity in the region. As shipping, fishing, and drilling activities increase, available SAR capabilities will continue to fall further behind the needs. In more hospitable climates, response times of hours or even days may be acceptable. In the Arctic this is not the case. It is vital to credibility within the region that the United States enhances SAR capabilities through evaluating operating base locations and procurement of specialized equipment to include the navigation and communication infrastructure to make them a credible capability.

As the Arctic climate evolves faster than other more environmentally stable regions, it is even more important to continuously reevaluate posture and capabilities to prevent being caught off guard. Every effort is necessary to be ready in the Arctic at any time.

LT Jason H. Chuma is a U.S. Navy submarine officer who has deployed to the U.S. 4th Fleet and U.S. 6th Fleet areas of responsibility. He is a graduate of the Citadel, holds a master’s degree from Old Dominion University, and has completed the Intermediate Command and Staff Course from the U.S. Naval War College. His current assignment is to the Navy Warfare Development Command where he serves as a member of the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell. He can be followed on Twitter @Jason_Chuma

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

CRIC Podcast: Fostering a Culture of Innovation

safe_imageApropos of the most recent episode of Sea Control, Scott has given me an opportunity to introduce the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC) podcast to the readers of cimsec.org. The CRIC is an organization of 15 junior officers and enlisted. Our goal is to empower and enable emerging U.S. Naval leaders to rapidly create, develop and implement disruptive solutions that tackle warfighter needs while advocating for, and inspiring, deckplate innovation throughout the Fleet.

Part of fostering a culture of innovation is bringing stories of innovation, as well as information on the projects that are being worked on, out into the open. With that said, the CRIC podcast has been created. The CRIC podcast features discussions with innovators and CRIC members across the Fleet, both military and civilian, and shares their stories and projects. If Sea Control is the Economist, we’re Wired! (And if you’re enjoying Sea Control, you can help spread the word by going on iTunes, subscribing, and rating them the star review you think they deserve [ed. note: obviously 5 stars each])

We hope you’ll take a moment to check out the CRIC podcast on iTunes (also available here: http://navycric.libsyn.com/rss). Also, if you’re interested in further information about the CRIC, we can be found on facebook and twitter: @navycric.

We don’t pretend to know all the answers, but we’re not afraid to ask the tough questions and encourage our shipmates to innovate and keep the American spirit alive in our military.

Jeff Anderson is an electronics technician assigned to LCS 2 (USS Independence). The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.