CIMSEC’s First UK Chapter Meet-up Recap

External view of Stonehouse Barracks

In early November, the UK Chapter of CIMSEC hosted its first official meet-up at Stonehouse Royal Marine Barracks in Plymouth. The atmosphere was very lively and the air was thick with intense discussion and debate about a range of maritime and security issues including international counter-piracy strategy, the modern utility of aircraft carriers, the role of the Royal Marines and the even the future of the British military itself. Whilst some of us had come only a short distance, several people had journeyed from hundreds of miles away to attend the gathering. Yet all of us were there to meet each other, make new friends, talk and ultimately indulge our mutual interest of maritime security.

As well as being part of CIMSEC’s editorial staff I am also the UK Chapter President. As I am sure other chapter presidents will tell you, organising events can be ‘challenging’. Trying to find mutually suitable dates, arranging meet-up times, the prospect of travel and accommodation and the task of coordinating it all, is a difficult (but a highly rewarding) process, yet in my case the biggest issue was venue. The members of the UK Chapter are scattered across the country and to get maximum attendance at our first official event I wanted a venue with a distinct maritime or military significance. A venue that would stand-out and encourage people to get in their cars! Yet where was to I find such a place? Happily this was solved with the help of a very good friend of mine WO1 (RSM) Steph Moran RM and the generosity of 30 Commando Royal Marines who invited us into the Sergeants Mess at Stonehouse Barracks where we were welcomed with open arms!

Before moving on to discus the event itself, I would like to briefly tell you more about the venue and its significance. Like many British military establishments Stonehouse Barracks has a prestigious history. It was constructed in 1781 and the first troops occupied the barracks in 1783. Over the years, successive wars have resulted in several extensions of Stonehouse Barracks, notably; the Crimea War of the 1850’s which demanded further accommodation, when the East Block was extended and in 1882, the year of the Anglo-Egyptian War, the resplendent Globe theatre was constructed. To this day Her Majesty’s Royal Marines, as their cap badge depicts, are still deployed in conflict situations across the globe. Their Barracks, although progressively updated, still displays the architectural heritage of the 19th century, with the essence of the Corps ingrained in its stonework. With this backdrop the CIMSEC UK Chapter hosted its inaugural event.

Inside the Sgts Mess

As well as its location this event was also fairly unique in that it was held over the course of two days. The first night (Saturday) was spent with everyone getting to know each other, enjoying the buffet and facilities of the Mess and debating a wide variety of issues. After talking long into the evening it was with regret that some of our number had to depart but most of us retired to the rooms, each of which had its own military character, kindly arranged by RSM Moran prepared for us by the Mess staff.

UK Chapter meet-up 09-11-14 Wreath laying
From left to right: Unknown Royal Navy Lt Cmdr, Dr. Alexander Clarke and author (Chris Stockdale-Garbutt)
Plymouth Naval Memorial

Sunday morning (Remembrance Sunday) was met with reveille, a room inspection and a parade ground muster, well not quite! We were actually greeted in the Mess by a very convivial breakfast made for us by Mess stewards. Without exception everyone opted for the traditional ‘Full-English’, which was absolutely superb. After breakfast we all walked down to the city to join the Royal Marines and thousands of other service personnel and civilians for the Remembrance Day Services being held on Plymouth Hoe. After observing the traditional two minute silence and singing the National Anthem (God Save the Queen) Dr Alexander Clarke (fellow CIMSEC member/contributor and Principal Researcher with the Phoenix Think Tank) and I, laid wreaths at the base of the Plymouth Naval Memorial on behalf of our respective groups in honour of the fallen. Each of us who attended had our own personal memories of those who had served or given the ultimate sacrifice, allowing us to enjoy liberty today.

Over the years I have attended and participated in a number of Remembrance Services, yet this year [2014] has been a particularly poignant and special time. I have shared this important day with many remarkable people standing on the Hoe and walked amidst the shadow of men and women who have fallen in conflict. For many nations across the globe this year marks the centenary of the beginning of the First World War but also recognises the  many thousands of men and women that have fallen since that time. Each year the names of the fallen in conflict in that year are read out, let us hope that the time will come when those names eventually fall silent.

I would like to express my sincerest thanks to everyone who attended the event, it was really good to meet to with you all and I hope to see you again in the New Year. I would also like to give special thanks to RSM Moran and all the staff of the Sgt’s Mess at 30 Commando Brigade for their kindness and hospitality in making the first official meet-up of the CIMSEC such a memorable event.

Group shot of some of the members.’ From left to right: RSM Steph Moran, Stefan Schilling, me, Dr Alexander Clarke, Geoff Farmiloe and Alan ‘Willie’ Thornewil.
‘Group shot of some of the members.’ From left to right: RSM Steph Moran, Stefan Schilling, author, Dr Alexander Clarke, Geoff Farmiloe and Alan ‘Willie’ Thornewil.

We have been invited back to Stonehouse for a future event and I am planning on hosting a meeting there during the early part of 2015. As well as arranging this, I’m the throes of organising several other events and will be sure to keep everyone posted as to the details, so for those UK members who could not attend this time, I very much hope you’ll be able to come to one of these meet-ups. I look forward very much to meeting with you.

Finally, if anyone would like to suggest a venue for the UK Chapter, please contact me on cjstockdalegarbutt@gmail.com

About the author:

Chris Stockdale-Garbutt

Chris Stockdale-Garbutt holds B.A (Hons.) in History and an M.A. in Applied Strategy and International Security from the University of Plymouth and the Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth Strategy and Security Studies Group. He joined CIMSEC in December 2013 and takes an active role within CIMSEC, serving as an associate editor, a panelist on the East Atlantic Sea Control podcast and UK Chapter President. He is currently studying for a PhD in maritime peace and stability operations with the Defense Studies Department at King’s College London.

 

 

 

More Nukes Doesn’t Always Mean Better Deterrence

In a short article recently published by The National Interest, Xunchao Zhang argues that blockade is an effective means for the U.S. Navy to conduct a war against China because of its reliance on oil imports and then proposes that China has two options for countering a blockade strategy: vulnerability-reducing and conflict-avoiding. He dismisses the first because the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) does not have the capacity to escort oil tanker convoys half-way round the world and China’s overland pipelines would be vulnerable to US strikes. Zhang therefore argues that a policy of avoiding conflict with the United States entirely is the only means for China to counteract a US blockade strategy. Key to this, he claims, is strengthening the Chinese nuclear deterrent and renouncing the No-First-Use policy. Only then will the Chinese nuclear deterrent be sufficient to prevent conflict with the United States and avoid a blockade which would likely be crippling. But this argument misses a fundamental point about deterrence and any US use of blockade in a war with China.

Jugular of the economy

Deterrence is about avoiding war. Zhang argues that by strengthening the Chinese nuclear arsenal, the likelihood of war with the United States would decrease, thereby countering the threat of an American blockade. However, the United States is already unlikely to initiate a war, for numerous reasons. What Zhang calls China’s “minimal nuclear deterrent”, the possible world economic consequences, lack of domestic support for such an endeavor, and the historical unwillingness of the United States to be seen as the aggressor all combine to deter the US from attacking China. Any U.S.-China war would be initiated by China, and therefore a strengthening in the Chinese nuclear arsenal, to include abandoning No-First-Use, does not make a compelling case that the likelihood of war with the United States would be decreased. At best it would have no effect, and at worst it would put the Chinese leadership in a position where a stronger nuclear deterrent could simply increase the attractiveness of conducting a conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella.

 Furthermore, if a conflict-avoiding policy fails, an expanded nuclear arsenal would be useless in stopping the United States from imposing a blockade. Nuclear deterrence operates even in the context of war. It is unlikely that China would turn their nuclear weapons against the United States when under even a crippling blockade because the United States could respond overwhelmingly. A severe economic decline would be difficult to face, but nuclear weapons raining down on Beijing and Shanghai are on an entirely different plane. The incentive to not escalate to the point of nuclear warfare would be significant, and both sides understand this. The United States would have free reign to conduct the blockade without concern of nuclear escalation because of mutual deterrence.

Recent events support this view. In the context of the Ukraine Crisis, the United States has leveraged sanctions against Russia, which has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, without fear of escalation. Another one or 10,000 Russian nuclear weapons would not change the fact that economic disruption is very different from physical destruction. If the possible effects of a blockade are as serious as Zhang argues, a strengthened nuclear deterrent is not the way to counter it.

Zhang is correct, however, to argue that China’s best way to counteract a potential blockade by the U.S. Navy is to avoid war entirely. Oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan are highly vulnerable. Hitting fixed targets with precision weapons is a skill the United States military has very nearly perfected, with strikes this summer in Syria from carrier-based aircraft and Tomahawk-toting surface ships again proving the point. He also correctly assesses the PLA Navy as insufficient to protect its maritime trade routes. It has no experience conducting convoy operations and has limited, if slowly improving, antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Despite the effort expended to deploy a task force off Somalia, China does not have the capacity to support the number and array of forces necessary to defend its trade routes.

Not your grandpa’s U-Boot

Furthermore, the geography of East Asia contains numerous maritime chokepoints, U.S. submarines are fast, quiet, and have incredible endurance, the U.S. surface fleet has decades of experience conducting maritime interdiction in some of the same waters it would blockade, and the United States has the ability to intercept maritime traffic far outside the range of PLAN capabilities, interdicting oil tankers at their source in the Persian Gulf. While Air-Sea battle in the face of A2/AD capabilities requires the development of any number of new weapons systems, the U.S. Navy has the capacity now and for the foreseeable future to cripple the Chinese economy in the event of war, at ranges far outside those of any existing or upcoming A2/AD capabilities. There is no simple panacea for China to overcome the threat of blockade in the event of war, but Zhang does get it right when he says that China’s best option is to avoid conflict entirely.

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Ian Sundstrom is a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy and holds a master’s degree in War Studies from King’s College London. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the United States Department of Defense.

Member Round-Up Part 7

Good evening CIMSECians and welcome back to another edition of the Member Round-Up. Our members have had a busy few weeks posting on a variety of security topics. We have shared a few of them here with you for some light reading before the holiday season.

Patrick Truffer returns this week with an article featured on the Swiss security policy blog, Offiziere. His piece on ‘traditional’ Russian institutions, such as the Orthodox Church, as well as Russian language, culture and identity, feature heavily in President Putin’s rhetoric. This is a must-read for observers and analysts who may not be well-versed in Russian culture. Without this understanding, according to Patrick, it may make Russian foreign policy appear irrational.

INS Arihant during its launch in 2009.
INS Arihant during its launch in 2009.

Bringing the subject back to the topic of submarines,  The National Interest’s managing editor, Zachary Keck, returns with two posts for this week’s round-up. The first post reports that India began the first-of-class sea trials for INS Arihant, India’s first ever indigenous ballistic missile nuclear submarine.

The second post reports that the Philippines wishes to continue along the same veins as other Asian nations and procure three of its own submarines. Whilst no official statement has been made regarding which submarine the Navy will procure, given the number of submarines proliferating in the region this new development will most likely be a prominent feature in any upcoming analysis of maritime security in the region.

BEFORE JUTLAND: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914-February 1915.  Source: USNI Press
BEFORE JUTLAND: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914-February 1915.
Source: USNI Press

James Goldrick also returns this week with two contributions. His analysis of the US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, and the recent announcement by outgoing SECDEF Chuck Hagel to continue plans to purchase the remaining 20 ships, first featured on the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s The Strategist blog here. It can also be accessed on The National Interest’s websitebefore jutland. Also, for those who are interested in all things historical (and naval) before jutlandJames Goldrick’s latest book, Before Jutland, will be available circa May 2015 through USNI Press. It provides an historical analysis of one of the key periods in naval operations during the First World War.

Over at The Daily Beast, CIMSECian Dave Majumdar, reports that several Pentagon insiders are concerned that potential adversaries, such as Russia or China, have the capability to counter any competitive advantage that the US’ latest stealth fighters may have in their long-range missiles. The article can be accessed here.

As always we continue to look for works published by CIMSEC members. If you have published, or know of another member who has published recently, please email dmp@cimsec.org so that we can promote your work. Keep an eye out for the next Round-Up in the new year.

Gabon’s Growing Navy

Kership-class OPV
2 Kership-class OPVs are on order for Gabon

2014 has been a significant year for African maritime forces. As the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea endures, many African countries have been rapidly expanding their maritime forces. Of particular interest are the procurements made by those states which are not typically counted among Africa’s leading military powers. In June 2014, small but oil-rich Equatorial Guinea unveiled a jury-rigged frigate to lead its emerging naval force. But now Equatorial Guinea’s southern neighbour, Gabon, is also looking to expand its navy.

Gabon’s coastline is substantially longer than that of Equatorial Guinea, stretching out to 885 kilometres total as compared to the latter’s 296 kilometres. But the Gabonese have long had only eight small patrol vessels and a single fast attack craft to rely upon for coastal defence. While attending the Euronaval 2014 exhibition in October, however, Gabonese officials decided to acquire two new offshore patrol vessels from France, both of which boast impressive features that should greatly expand Gabon’s maritime capabilities.

This procurement was not made on a whim. In July 2013, Gabon became the most southerly African victim of piracy when an oil tanker was hijacked off the Gabonese coast. The 24-member crew was unharmed and the tanker – minus some of its cargo – was released in Nigerian waters five days later. This experience doubtless led Gabonese officials to consider the security of the country’s coast and in particular, Port Gentil. This is one of Gabon’s most important port, through which much of Gabon’s oil and lumber exports pass amounting to roughly $6.8 billion each year.

Port Gent
Port Gentil

With the emergence of Equatorial Guinea as a maritime power and Gabon’s force expansion, the security of the Gulf of Guinea’s southern end will be greatly improved. It is now the northern end of the Gulf which will require greater attention in regional efforts against piracy. In particular, the Togolese and Beninese coasts represent a gap in the defences. The Togolese Navy currently consists of two patrol boats, while Benin has turned to private military contractors to secure its main port of Cotonou. These small states lack the resources and personnel to support professional naval forces on the scale of neighbouring Nigeria or Ghana.

West African pirates have a demonstrated capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, relocating to where patrols are less frequent. In order to avoid Beninese and Togolese waters’ becoming a safe refuge for the region’s pirates, it may be necessary for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote joint patrols by the maritime forces of its member states. Although this certainly would not apply to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea – both are members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – such joint patrols could help to plug the gaps, bringing together Beninese and Nigerian vessels to patrol Benin’s coastal waters. This increased presence could serve to deter even the most determined pirates.

There are some hopeful signs that West Africa may be moving in this direction. In June 2013, an ambitious summit in Cameroon led to the adoption by the ECOWAS member states of two important documents: a Code of Conduct on Counter-Piracy Efforts, and a Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Security. A month later, naval chiefs from thirteen West African countries gathered in the port city of Calabar, Nigeria, to further articulate a regional counter-piracy strategy and exchange best practices. This dialogue may be precisely what is needed to bring about defence sharing, or at least the intensification of joint patrols.

Paul Pryce is a Research Analyst at the NATO Council of Canada. With degrees in political science from universities in both Canada and Estonia, he has previously worked as a Research Fellow at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. His research interests are diverse and include maritime security, NATO affairs, and African regional integration.

This article originally appeared at the NATO Council of Canada and was cross-posted by permission.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.