Long Reads

On Books: An Interview with VADM James P. “Phil” Wisecup, USN(ret)

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Vice Admiral James Wisecup recently sat down with me to chat about books and how they have shaped him throughout his career.  It was a wide-ranging discussion — covering everything from poetry, science-fiction, history, and some of his favorite authors.  Following our conversation, I purchased some of the recommendations he offers below.  Suddenly, my stack of books to read has become much, much taller.

The interview has been edited for style and length.

What do you think the state of reading is in the naval profession today?

I think everybody knows they should be reading.  I think that many naval officers are voracious readers. I’ve talked to a few of my friends in the last couple of weeks.  And one of the first things we always ask each other is: “What are you reading?” In the normal life of an active naval officer, you have to carve that time out to read, no one is going to give it to you.  If you are going to work those long days then you have to cultivate it in yourself.  And it is a lifelong thing if you do.  In formal education you can develop that, but you know, the naval officers’ ability to carve that time out to read is a personal thing, you either do or you don’t.  Unfortunately, everybody doesn’t make time to read.

What are three of your favorite biographies?  And why?

One is J.O. Richardson’s On the Treadmill To Pearl

Admiral James O. Richardson. He was relieved in 1941, shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral James O. Richardson. He was relieved in 1941, shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Harbor.  Richardson was the fleet commander before Husband Kimmel.  Richardson got across the breakers with FDR over whether the fleet should stay out in Pearl Harbor and watch it diminish little by little, because there was no place to train — or to bring it back to United States for training.  Richardson wanted to bring the fleet back to the U.S.  Well, in the end, Roosevelt wanted to leave the Fleet out in Hawaii, so Richardson was asked to retire.  He was relieved by Husband Kimmel.  That’s one book I like.  I also enjoy the biography of Admiral Spruance, The Quiet Warrior.  Another book that I like is Eric Larrabee’s Commander in Chief.  Larrabee’s chapter on FDR is excellent.  All three of those books are great.   

What books do you think are timeless — ones that you would recommend to officers from ensign to admiral?  

The first book that appealed to me when I was a young officer was a book of collected essays by Jonathan Swift.  I read them when I was in my frigate wardroom.   This was years ago. These were the days before TV.  In that book was an essay he wrote on good manners and good breading.  I encourage you to read it.  It’s very interesting.  And it is where I developed some of my philosophy, some of my thinking.  The key thing he says in there, is that the person with the best manners is the person who makes others feel at ease.  When people think about manners they think about how they hold their fork, and sit, etc. But in the end what it really has to do with is a way of being.  Whether you want to put the other person at ease or make them tense. I have also recently been reading books about the Greeks.  Of course, part of that started when I was at the naval war college, with Thucydides.  J.E. Lendon wrote a book called Song Of Wrath.  And it is another take on the Peloponnesian War, and it is very interesting.   I like short stories, myself.  One is a collection of stories by Richard McKenna called The Left-Handed Monkey Wrench. It’s a hard to find book. Richard McKenna wrote the well-known book called The Sand Pebbles. Well, The Left-Handed Monkey Wrench is a series of stories that he tells of essentially the old Navy.  But what the book really is, is a book that talks about people.  That’s whats interesting about it in my view.  A lot of these kinds of stories are still relevant today because the people are still the central piece of the Navy.  Even though we work with machines — and we work a lot with machines — it is still about the stories you tell are rarely about the machines.  They are mostly about what people do.  

The Admiral's at work library.
The Admiral’s at work library.

There’s an author named Robert Harris who has written two books on the Romans, one is called Imperium the other is called Conspirata.  One of my heroes is Cicero.  While he wasn’t a perfect man, Harris tells the story of how Cicero rooted out corruption in many places. He also tells the story as his rise as a magistrate.  What you really see from reading these types of stories is that human nature is unchanging over time.  As I’ve read more-and-more of the classics, that’s what I’ve learned.  There is a book by Steven Pressfield called The Tides of War where he talks about Alcibiades.  It’s interesting because he basically says about Alcibiades is that “the Spartans understood battle, Alcibiades understood the rest.”  I reread that and I thought it was very interesting. Steven Pressfield has also written three nonfiction books that are very interesting.  The one I like the most is Do the Work.  There are times where you have to simply buckle down and work.  And if you know Pressfield’s story, you know he never had it easy.

That’s right.  I believe Pressfield wrote The Legend of Bagger Vance while living out of his car?

Yes, that’s absolutely right.  It’s a great story.

Other books that you think are timeless?

The other book that I came across — and this was in 1990, after Desert Storm — I came across the Norton Book of Modern War, edited by Paul Fussell. After I read it I wrote a letter to him.  This was in the days before e-mail.  He wrote me back on a postcard; he was in the imperial war museum doing research.  I was coming back from Desert Storm and I found Fussell’s book in Hong Kong, and I sent him a short note.  

Paul Fussell postcard

Another timeless book is Jacob Needleman’s The American Soul. Needleman is a philosopher out at the University of San Francisco.  One of the interesting things in this book is the preamble. He has a great quote in the book on how we shouldn’t take the U.S. for granted.  He has great anecdotes in this book about why the U.S. has become the country it is today.  There is also a great story later in the book about George Washington that people must read — the Michael Widman story about Euphrata.  It’s a story that goes to the American Soul.  Joseph Ellis’ Founding Brothers is also a great book.  One of the stories in there is the story about how Washington D.C. became the nation’s capital, in a story called “The Dinner.”

You’ve had a long and distinguished career.  Did you use books to prepare you for any of the jobs you have entered?

I didn’t necessarily use my reading to help me prepare for the job I was going into.  But often I came across books that were helpful when I was in a particular job.  Here’s an example, War and Politics by Bernard Brodie, which falls in the timeless category, and every naval officer should read this.  He writes this in 1973, and it really lays out the difference between the political and the military.  In the first chapter, Brodie asks the question, quoting Ferdinand Foch — “What’s the war about?”  Someone has to be able to explain what a war is about.  In the end, it’s up to the politicians to decide what is worth fighting for, and then explain that to everybody.

I also like to reread a section in The Thin Red Line, by James Jones.  And a movie was also made about it.  It is about World War II and Guadalcanal.  It’s one of those books in which there is fighting, but it also talks about risk.  What’s worth it?  In other words, the captain in the book doesn’t want to take his men to attack a machine gun nest, because he doesn’t want to get them killed.  There is some interesting dialogue in that book about what is worth it.

What book or writers did you think were great stylists that helped you with your own writing?

I love George Orwell.  His essays are very interesting.  He wrote a book called Why I Write.  It’s a little Penguin book, only about 120 pages. But it is a great book.  I’ve read most of his stuff and really enjoy it.

Do you enjoy poetry?

I do. In the Fussell book there is a good bit of poetry.  And some from the First World War; in it there is some from every war.  Robert Graves, Siegfried Sassoon, they are all in there.  There’s also some World War II poetry, like “The Ball Turret Gunner,” for example.  Fussell has included poetry in there all the way up to Vietnam.  So yes, I do like poetry.

If you could only choose one book to take with you, a book that you would come back to over-and-over again, what book would that be?

It is Paul Fussell’s book.  I’ve read it and reread it.  There are a lot of short stories in there, which are what I like.  Another book that I must mention is Hemingway’s book, called Men at War, which came out in the forties.  It is a selection of Hemingway’s favorite war stories.  He included, in its entirety, Stephen Crane’s The Red Badge of Courage.  I like Hemingway’s short stories as well.

Do you enjoy fiction?

Oh yes.  I particularly like William Gibson’s science fiction.  And those books over there, those are some of the books in the Harry Turtledove series — for example, Legion of Videssos — which I was reading with my son.

What’s your oldest book in your library?

Oh, that is at home.  It’s a book of Joseph Conrad’s short stories.  

Sir — Thank you for your time, I enjoyed it.

Thank you.  I enjoyed talking with you.

Vice Admiral Wisecup is the Director of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group, assuming the position on 1 October 2013. He is from Piqua, Ohio. A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he served 36 years of active duty service. He earned his Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Southern California, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998, and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg, France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.

 At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge (CG 50) during Operation Desert Storm. As commanding officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for Inspirational Leadership. He served as commander, Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation Enduring Freedom after 9/11. His last sea assignment was commander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group).

Ashore, Wisecup was assigned to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, served as force planner and ship scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, and served as action officer for Navy Headquarters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a CNO fellow on the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as director, White House Situation Room, and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea. He served as the 52nd president of the U.S. Naval War College.  

Lieutenant Commander Christopher Nelson is CIMSEC’s book review editor.  Readers interested in reviewing books for CIMSEC can contact him at books@cimsec.org.

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis, Europe, Global Analysis, History

Return of the Clandestine Merchant Raider?

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By Chuck Hill

Since before recorded history, merchant vessels have been adapted for offensive purposes by navies, pirates, and privateers to destroy enemy commerce or to launch attacks ashore. Frequently they employed disguise and deception. The UK employed Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) during the 1982 Falklands War, the Malaysian Navy has converted two container ships into pirate hunters, and the US Navy has leased ships to support special operations, but I think the last time they were used to attack commerce was WWII. By the end 1943, it appeared that technology, primarily in the form of reliable radios, plus robust challenge-and-reply procedures, a comprehensive naval control of shipping organization, and a seemingly impervious blockade of the German coast, had made this type of  warfare very dangerous, but new technology may now be working in favor of using converted merchant ships as clandestine warships.

The German Experience

During World Wars I and II, the German Navy achieved considerable success using armed merchant ships as clandestine merchant raiders. At small cost they sank or captured a large number of allied merchant vessels, tied down a number of warships searching for the raiders, and even managed to sink allied warships.

In World War I, three raiders, Wolf, Moewe, and Seeadler (a full rigged sailing ship), sank or captured 78 ships totaling 323,644 tons. In addition to the merchant ships they captured or sank directly, merchant raiders proved effective mine layers. One victim of a mine laid by the raider Moewe was the pre-dreadnought battleship EdwardVII, sunk on 6 January, 1915.

In World War II nine German Merchant raiders, Atlantis, Komet, Kormoran, Michel, Orion, Pinguin, Stier, Thor, and Widder, sank or captured 129 ships, totaling 800,661 tons. While this pales in comparison to the sinkings by U-boats, they were far more effective than the regular navy surface raiders, including the vaunted pocket battleships, heavy cruisers, and battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, that managed to sink or captured only 59, totaling 232,633 tons. The merchant raider Kormoran even managed to torpedo and sink the light cruiser HMAS Sidney, before the Kormoran herself was also sunk.

Typically, the raiders of WWII were equipped with six obsolescent 5.9″ guns and large numbers of torpedoes to allow ships to be sunk rapidly. Most were also equipped with aircraft and some with torpedo boats.  They were also equipped to change their appearance while underway.

Several of their voyages were extraordinarily long. Michel’s first voyage was 346 days. Orion’s was 510 days. Thor was away 329 days and managed to sink HMS Voltaire, an armed merchant cruiser. Pinguin for 357 days. Komet for 512 days. Kormoran for 350 days before her fatal encounter with HMAS Sydney. The ships were refueled and rearmed by supporting vessels that also took their prisoners. Raiders were also used to resupply submarines.

Perhaps surprisingly, none of these WWII raiders were underway when the war began, when they might have been most effective. They were sortied in two waves in 1940 and 1942.

End of the Merchant Raider

Despite their successes, by the time the last German raider at sea was sunk on 7 September, 1943, by a US submarine shortly after it had sortied from Japan, it had become impossible for ships to sortie from Germany and make it to open sea. Komet and a tenth raider were both sunk attempting to do so.  Three of the nine, Atlantis, Pinguin, and Kormoran, were sunk in distant seas by British cruisers. One, Stier, was sunk by the Naval Armed Guard on the Liberty ship Stephen Hopkins. One was destroyed by a nearby explosion while moored in Yokohama. Two, Orion and Widder,  survived their career as raiders long enough to return to Germany and be repurposed.

Rebirth–Weapons and Sensors, Old and New

Technological changes in the form of containerized cruise missiles, satellites and UAVs and other Unmanned Vehicles may have made the merchant cruiser once again a viable option.

Cruise missiles mean that the raider no longer needs to come with visible range of the their victim. With sufficient range and use of way points, the shooter can be over 100 miles from its victim and the missile can come from any direction, not necessarily from the direction of the raider. Plus they can now attack land targets as well as ships. The US has begun to think seriously about the threat of a cruise missile attack on the US and innocent looking container ships are a possible source.

UAVs can provide over the horizon targeting and are likely to be undetected by the target.

Satellites may help or hurt potential raiders. If they have the support of satellites, it may help them find their pray. If the defenders are sufficiently sophisticated (and they are looking in the right place) they may be able to recognize a missile launch as the first step in finding, fixing and destroying the raider.

Similarly the Automatic Identification System may help the raider or the defender. It may help the raider find targets, but it may also help the defender react more swiftly to an attack or help him identify the raider from among all the other ships in the area. There is always the possibility the information may be bogus. Unmanned Surface Vessels might be used to create false targets. We might want to plan for a system of encrypted information for contingencies. Limiting use of the systems is an option that may require careful consideration.

Mines are still potentially effective. The large carrying capacity of cargo ships means they could potentially lay large mine fields. A raider could knowing a war will start soon might lay a large field to be activated when hostilities begin. If hostilities have already begun, the raider is unlikely approach a port closely enough to lay the mines itself, but mobile mines already exist, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles or even simple semi-submersible unmanned vessels that can lay an minefield should be relatively easy technology.

China, Perpetrator or Target

From an American point of view, China with its huge merchant fleet and large inventory of cruise missile may appear a possible user of Merchant Raiders, but their large merchant fleet and need to import may also make them vulnerable to this this type of warfare if employed by weaker nations.

We know China has a Naval Militia. that will allow them to rapidly increase the size of their naval force. China has recently said it would require its ship builders to incorporate features that would make them usable for military purposes in wartime. These requirements are to be applied to five categories of vessels – container, roll-on/roll-off, multipurpose, bulk carrier and break bulk.  What these additional features are to be, is not clear. This could mean upgraded communications, either external or internal. It could mean improved survivability, greater speed, or foundations for weapons upgrades. They may only be thinking of using these ships to support amphibious operations, but these improvements may also make a large number of ships potential merchant raiders.

China’s large merchant fleet and need to import raw materials may make her vulnerable to Guerre d’Course. In the kind of low intensity conflict we have seen between China and her neighbors, it has seemed China has had all the advantages, but if they are pushed too far, China’s neighbors might see this form of warfare as a way to push back.

Non-State Actors

There is also the possibility of terrorist organizations attempting something similar, but they are more likely to attack highly visible targets of a symbolic nature, such as port facilities or major warships. Cruise missile could of course be used to attack major landmarks. They may also be less interested in living to fight another day.

Conclusion: I don’t think we have seen the end of offensive use of Merchant vessels.

Sources:

Addendum:

Some photos of vessels that are being used for military purposes:

MSC has chartered the MV Craigside to support SOCOM requirements. It is undergoing conversion in Mobile.

SD Victoria lifts boats and supports crews for UK Special Forces (SBS and SAS).

Malaysian auxiliary warship Bunga Mas Lima

Chuck retired from the Coast Guard after 22 years service. Assignments included four ships, Rescue Coordination Center New Orleans, CG HQ, Fleet Training Group San Diego, Naval War College, and Maritime Defense Zone Pacific/Pacific Area Ops/Readiness/Plans. Along the way he became the first Coast Guard officer to complete the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) course and also completed the Naval Control of Shipping course. He has had a life-long interest in naval ships and history.

Capability Analysis

Where is the U.S. Navy Going To Put Them All? (Part Three)

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Where is the U.S. Navy Going To Put Them All?

Part 3: Two New Ship Classes.

Sketch by Jan Musil. Hand drawn on quarter-inch graph paper. Each square equals twenty by twenty feet.

This article, the third of the series, presents two ship classes that can be used to take to sea the various UAVs, UUVs and buoys suggested in the previous two articles. These ships can provide the space needed to operate, maintain and hangar the equipment as well as house the necessary sailors. Read Part One, Part Two.

The first class, the CVLN (carrier aviation light, nuclear powered), is intended to operate with the two main carrier task forces, providing a home for the many ISR drones, UUVs, UAVs and buoys needed in the increasingly dangerous A2AD environment and to prosecute ASW. The second suggested class, the AORH (auxiliary oiler replenishment helicopter), is intentionally designed to routinely operate far from a CSG, frequently in association with either allied or local navies. The AORH is expressly designed to carry out a wide variety of missions with substantially lower initial construction costs and lower lifetime operating costs.

CVLN class

The intent of the CVLN class is to provide a deep blue sea platform that can operate, in fact come to be seen as needed to operate, with the two primary carrier task forces the U.S. Navy operates. Currently these task forces are almost always on station in the Western Pacific or the Gulf region. Adding a CVLN to the task force provides a home for the ISR drones, so useful in a contested A2AD environment as well as a home for the additional ASW assets the UUVs and Fire Scouts bring to the fleet.

By making the new platform nuclear powered the ship will be able to keep up with the CVNs, in both a strategic as well as a tactical sense. If the President suddenly needs a carrier strike group hundreds or thousands of miles away from their current position, the CVLN will be a fast complement to the CSG. A CVLN that can keep up with the CSGs affords the task force some very useful ASW protection both in transit and upon arrival. In addition, it will provide a permanent arc of ISR drones on the search, locate, transmit and target mission.

As for the tactical use of speed, in naval combat close almost always doesn’t count, and being able to accelerate over a 5-15 minute period at nuclear powered speeds can be just enough to survive an incoming strike. And once more, it allows the CVLN to keep up with the CVNs.

While building a nuclear powered CVLN is of course more expensive initially, once lifetime construction, operating and maintenance costs are considered, it should be notably less costly than an oil powered ship. Installing two of the existing nuclear reactors in use with the new CVNs aboard should provide plenty of power to move 45k tons around effectively and efficiently.

An obvious existing ship class to consider as a starting point for the new CVLN is the existing LHA/LHD design, but tweaked to accommodate nuclear power. If a canted flight deck and catapult were deemed necessary another alternative would be to revisit the old Midway class for design ideas.

CVLN Equipment

So how should the CVLN be equipped? A ski jump or canted flight deck should certainly be considered, although even if the ISR drone is fixed wing it should be small enough to launch off an LHD-style ship. If some of the modified S-3 Vikings or new refueling drones are going to be carried, then the extra expense of a canted flight deck will have to be incurred. Either way, the following, rather basic list of desired equipment should provide the reader with a good idea of what the CVLN will be accomplishing.

The navy should investigate whether it is practical to install one railgun, probably on the fight deck just before the island, aboard a CVLN. Obvious problems to be solved include insuring enough power is available, providing the space for the needed large capacitor just below the railgun and meeting the usual cost-to-benefit analysis applied to any new feature sent to sea.

2 CIWS mounted fore and aft and at least one RAM missile launcher for anti-missile defense are necessities.

15+ ISR drones with traditional jet engines or upgraded Osprey tilt-rotors are needed to execute the search, locate, network and target mission.

4+ UUVs plus the needed docking/launching buoys needed to get them in and out of the water.

15+ Fire Scouts and around 75 ASW oriented TIF Buoys.

4+ Seahawks

1 SAR team with associated equipment.

AORH class

The second suggested choice for the U.S. Navy to add is a ship class based on a modified AOR sized and double hulled design without a full flight deck, approximately 25k tons and oil powered. This class is intended to provide very substantial helicopter and VTOL launching and servicing capabilities, for ASW, amphibious, special-ops or other missions and then executing these missions over the years alongside a large variety of allied nation navies; hence the built in patrol boat capabilities as well as at least one UNREP station port and starboard.

The AORH is a solution to use, at a much lower cost than a CVLN in locations where a carrier task force is not present across the globe, especially in the Arctic, South China Sea, Gulf region and perhaps Northeastern Asia. These are obvious locations to homeport one of each of these ships permanently, but a standard rotation of three ships, perhaps only two ice-strengthened ones are needed for the Arctic, should be built for each requirement.

Reading the list of suggested equipment and capabilities below should provide a good grasp of the variety of missions, and not just ASW or amphibious, this class of ships will be capable of. The abilities this class will provide will substantially augment the small surface force combatants nations in the area already possess.

There has not been a great deal published on what the newly designated Arctic Command is going to deploy. Or do. As far as the U.S. Navy is concerned, my suggestion is to use ice-strengthened versions of what we already have and focus on the only realistic threat, submarines, that the fleet is likely to encounter up there. Let the Air Force provide air cover and if it comes to it, aerial strike capabilities out of Alaska or Greenland. As for ASW or ASuW capabilities, a task force composed of an AORH serving as flagship, 2-3 of the new ASW frigates, a Los Angeles class SSN and a Coast Guard icebreaker on an as needed basis should be ample to meet the nations needs up there.

As for more substantial portions of the fleet, there simply are not enough targets to justify the routine presence of a CCG or DDG. As for an amphibious ship, the American taxpayer as well as our Arctic neighbors should be asking just who we intend to invade up there. There simply is no need for these kinds of assets.

Operating in the Arctic is a new reality that the U.S. Navy has to add to its long list missions to accomplish. But a very limited list of ice-strengthened surface assets concentrating on the ASW mission, a SSN and Air Force provided top cover should handily do the job.

AORH equipment

Once more the following, rather basic list, of desired equipment should provide the reader with a good idea of what the double hulled, AORH should be equipped with.

A gun of some sort and since we have lots of 5-inch guns available one of these will probably be installed. One of the OTO-Melara 76mm family would also function well, possibly even be preferable over the 5-inch gun.

4 CIWS and at least 2 RAM missile launchers, and room for more should be considered if feasible. These are not going to be stealthy ships; they will be sailing in harm’s way, often in littoral waters and WILL be considered high value targets.

4+ ISR drones IF fitted with the new engine upgrade for the Osprey, allowing them to function as a VTOL capable airframe. Without VTOL capabilities the AORH will operate with the ScanEagle like the rest of the fleet.

4+ UUV drones plus the needed docking/launching buoys needed to get them in and out of the water.

15+ Fire Scouts and around 75 ASW oriented TIF Buoys.

4+ Seahawks

Flagship capable in the sense of having both working as well as berthing space aboard for a small task force commander’s team, which will occasionally be multinational.

1 SAR team with associated equipment.

This class will almost certainly be tasked from time to time with hosting Seals and Special Operations teams and their equipment as they come and go on their missions. Ample berthing, operating and maintenance spaces need to be designed into the class. In addition, room for the necessary crane capacity should be available to handle:

2 25’ Mark V.1 Patrol Boats and 2 Mark VI 85’ Patrol Boats

OR

4-6+ Mark V.1 Patrol Boats

The ability to berth and support a company of Marines.

The ability to support the operations of 2-4 of the Marines CH-53E/K helicopters.

Plus the ability to berth and operate on a add something, drop something off basis, whatever additional helicopters or small amphibs the Marine Corp might want to bring aboard.

Summation

The new abilities unmanned flight brings to the fleet are potentially very useful. But as discussed above, achieving the benefits frequently requires the use of the new drones in quantity. The suggested ship classes are two possible ways to get the needed UAVs, UUVs and buoys into the fleet. Another choice is certainly possible though and now is a good time to start discussing the topic.

In the next article we will examine how the Navy can add the railgun to the fleet in quantity and make use of its distinctive qualities in an effective manner. Read Part Four here.

Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran, disenchanted ex-corporate middle manager and long time entrepreneur currently working as an author of science fiction novels. He is also a long-standing student of navies in general, post-1930 ship construction thinking, design hopes versus actual results and fleet composition debates of the twentieth century.

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Global Analysis

‘Sea-based’ PLA Navy may not need ‘String of Pearls’

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In May 2015, China released it biennial 2014 Defence White Paper titled ‘China’s Military Strategy’. It indicates that the PLA Navy would undertake a more proactive protection of its interests in ‘open waters’, which implies – albeit implicitly – the waters of the Indian Ocean. The White Paper also brings to the fore PLA Navy’s strategy for the ‘sustenance’ of the forward-deployed naval platforms in these waters through “strategic prepositioning”. What precisely does this mean?

Until lately, strategic analysts worldwide were smitten by the concept of ‘String of Pearls’ propounded in 2005 by Booz Allen Hamilton – a US based think-tank. The scholarly extrapolation of China’s increasing geopolitical and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) led to the prognosis that its port and maritime infrastructure projects in the IOR were precursors to China eventually establishing military bases in the region. In case of an armed conflict, such overseas military bases would be valuable for China to protect its strategic interests in the interests, particularly its crude-oil imports. These bases could provide logistics support the Chinese maritime-military forces in the region inter alia in terms of machinery and equipment spare-parts, technical services and ammunition depots, besides general replenishment of fuel, food and water. Analysts in India generally took the lead in the academic inquiry into the potential of the Chinese military bases in the IOR.

China's Sting of Pearls in Indian Ocean
China’s Sting of Pearls in Indian Ocean

Rattled by the String of Pearls ‘theory’, Beijing decried the military-strategic connotation of its financial and technical assistance to the IOR countries; and devoted much intellectual capital to prove that its intent was only economic and commercial. Among its efforts in this direction, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) published the June 2013 Blue Book called ‘Development Report in the Indian Ocean’. The Blue Book said that China has no maritime (-military) strategy for the Indian Ocean. The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) concept initiated by President Xi Jinping later that year in October 2013 was used to reinforce the message that China sought only economic objectives in the IOR.

However, analysts and the media – particularly in India – persisted upon China’s doctrinal intent to develop military bases in the IOR, averring that the MSR was only a ‘reincarnation’ of the ‘String of Pearls’ concept. Notably, the Indians are not the only ones wary of the potential of PLA Navy’s use of the maritime facilities in the IOR. Notwithstanding the strategic convergence between Indonesia’s ‘global maritime axis’ and China’s MSR concepts, eminent Indonesian statesmen have advised Jakarta to be cautious since the maritime infrastructure being constructed through MSR could be used by China for ‘military penetration’.

In July 2015, news-reports indicated that Maldives was encouraging foreign entities to own its island territories to undertake land reclamation. Coming amidst the growing anxieties caused by China’s controversial “island-building” activities in the South China Sea, this reinforced the theory of ‘Chinese military bases’ in the Indian Ocean. Even while Maldives is under severe strain of the long-term effects of sea-level rise caused by climate change, its government is unlikely to be ignorant of the near-term adverse geopolitical and security consequences of permitting Chinese military bases on its territory. Besides, it is most unlikely that the Chinese would need such bases anyway.

Since 2011, China has been seeking a hub-and-spoke logistics support agreements with the IOR countries like Seychelles and Djibouti. Undeniably, therefore, China is seeking access facilities in the Indian Ocean, whether known by the ‘String of Pearls’ nomenclature, or fructified through the ‘MSR Concept’. Some more bilateral pacts may be added over time. However, these are not potential Chinese ‘military bases’, but agreements for peace-time replenishment of fuel, food and water for Chinese naval units, something that even India has forged with many countries, including those in the western Pacific littoral.

China’s intent to sustain its naval forces in the Indian Ocean through the concept of ‘sea-basing’ has not been widely noted. The concept refers to a naval capability to undertake overseas military missions of expeditionary nature without reliance on land-based operational logistics and command and control infrastructure, either of home bases or the overseas bases. The concept was developed by the US expeditionary forces, largely due to the increasing constraints to maintain overseas military bases, besides for catering to the emerging concepts of amphibious warfare.

This high probability of the PLA Navy’s resort to ‘sea-basing’ concept is supported by its July 2015 induction of the first ‘Mobile Landing Platform’ (MLP) similar to the US design. The U.S. expeditionary forces are themselves new to the MLP concept. China is also known to be building naval Logistic Support Ships with roll-on, roll-off (ro-ro) design and bow and stern ramps optimised for amphibious operations.

The number of the PLA Navy’s advanced underway replenishment ships is also increasing. Notably, media reports indicate that in June 2015, China launched its fifth Type 903A replenishment ship, and more are under construction. With these six new replenishment vessels added to the older fleet tankers, the PLA Navy is clearly being given the means to support distant missions in the IOR.

PLA Navy's Type 093A Large Replenishment Ship
PLA Navy’s Type 093A Large Replenishment Ship

PLA Navy’s own increasing sea-based logistics capability could be supplemented by the capacity of state-owned commercial ships, following the implementation of the new guidelines for building merchant ships to conform to naval standards. These guidelines called “Technical Standards for New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements” were approved by the Chinese government in June 2015. The guidelines lay down not only the provisions to requisition civilian ships for naval missions, but also how future construction of Chinese merchant vessels would need to adhere to naval specifications.

China is also formulating a ‘National Defense Transport Law’ to cover the additional financial costs of shipbuilding and insurance for employment for military missions. These commercial vessels are quite numerous. According to statistics from China’s Ministry of Transportation, in 2014, about 2,600 ships are capable of ocean transport, which represents a major element of asymmetry with any major navy operating in the Indian Ocean. The US Navy’s 31 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) of its Military Sealift Command (MSC) pales in comparison.

The concept of ‘military base’ necessary for executing a full-fledged armed conflict may be a thing of the past. Politico-military manoeuvres in short-of-war situations are more contemporary. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, a maritime-military strategy that combines ‘peacetime replenishment’ with ‘sea-basing’ may be more than adequate for Beijing to meet its national-strategic objectives in the IOR.

Captain Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD is the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com.

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Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.