An Underwater Cloud

By Alix Willemez

What is the Cloud?

Do you know where your computer data is stored? Generally not. Previously, servers were located within companies. According to Didier Renard, director of Cloudwatt, a French company specialized in cloud computing founded in 2012 by Orange and Thales, said that “in the early 1990s, when computer engineers were making the network architecture diagrams where you had to place equipment such as servers, they drew a cloud whenever they rose out of corporate networks.”

What was then the exception has now become the rule. In most cases, IT infrastructures are outsourced. We save all our documents online on sites like Google, iCloud, Dropbox etc. For a few euros, you can buy storage megabytes. If this article was read by millions of readers, CIMSEC should subscribe to such services so that our website could meet the demand. The cloud is clearly essential to the functioning of the Internet.

Unfortunately, these outsourced data centers contain many servers that generate a lot of heat. If it is too high, servers fail to function properly. That is why they are usually located in very cold places like Alaska and Finland (Google) or Sweden (Facebook).

DataCenter_MG_6336
A data center. Source: ABB.

Facebook also created a data center in Clonee, Ireland, where there is significant wind energy resources and Google based its servers in Hamina, Finland, where the company uses sea water for cooling.The goal is always to reduce energy costs to cool the servers.

These data centers also consume a lot of electricity. Indeed, they facilitate strong economic growth, because they are also large consumers of electricity and oil for their operation and cooling. Those located in France account for 9% of the total electricity consumption. In the US, data centers owned by Google and Facebook consume as much power as a city of 250,000 inhabitants.

The Natick Project and the Leona Philpot Prototype

Eager to reduce energy consumption in its data centers, market leader Microsoft has been working for three years on a project called Microsoft Natick. This is to determine the technical feasibility of a new type of data center that could be submerged at the bottom of the ocean. A first prototype of 17 tons, the Leona Philpot (named after a character in the Xbox game Halo Nation -you must be geek to understand everything!), has been immersed in over thirty meters off California. The idea began in February 2013 Sean James, a Microsoft employee and a former submariner in the US Navy. This article then caught the eye of Norm Whitaker, another Microsoft executive who had served in DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). In 2014, Whitaker created a team within the NEXT unit of Microsoft (New Experiences and Technologies) to launch the project Natick. This represents a technological and energy challenge.

During deployment in 2015, the Leona Philpot prototype was powered by onshore electricity, but now the plan is for it to harness tidal energy and wave energy in order to supply electricity. In addition, at thirty meters deep, the cold surrounding seawater would lower its temperature and thus prevent overheating.

Finally, these data centers would be located near the coast, where most of the world population lives (50% of the US population lives within 200 kilometers of the sea), which would accelerate computer data transmission. This is why Leona Philpot was located 1 kilometer off the coast between August and November 2015.

Microsoft’s aim is therefore to diminish the distance and thus the latency-that is to say the time taken by certain data to get from the source to destination-between the place where the data is stored and final users.

Microsoft
Microsoft’s Project Natick. Source: Microsoft.

According to Whitaker, it would be possible to deploy a submarine data center within 90 days versus two years for a land-based data center. This could allow a rapid response to demand, particularly during natural disasters or when organizing a large event such as the World Cup.

After a deployment cycle of five years, which corresponds to the life of the computers it embarks, the Leona Philpot would be removed, the computers renewed and the prototype would be returned to water. The submarine data center could then run between ten and twenty years without the need for on-site personnel. It would then be recovered and recycled. But making data center fully resistant to the marine environment presents major technical difficulties.

What could Microsoft do in case of failure, breakdown or leak in the prototype? We must also take into account the usual parameters such as currents, corrosion, wildlife, marine traffic, pressure, humidity, etc. Leona Philpot is well equipped with a hundred sensors to track the daily state of the data center and computers in it, but the slightest incident could turn into a real rescue mission.

Testing of the prototype will be extended. This first conclusive test has allowed Microsoft to launch the construction of three similar prototypes. Microsoft plans further tests in 2016, particularly in Florida and the North Sea. The research group is designing a submarine system that will be three times larger and will be coupled to an alternative energy system that has not yet been chosen.

What Environmental Impact?

The Microsoft team says that marine life has quickly adapted to the presence of the prototype. But some are concerned about whether the presence of data centers in the ocean could warm it up. The Natick program could perhaps help Microsoft get back in the ranking by Greenpeace on the environmental impact of data centers. However, if data centers flourish under the sea, maritime traffic will have to adapt. The sea is clearly becoming a very busy economical place!

Alix previously served as a French Navy’s Deputy Bureau Chief for State Action at Sea, New Caledonia Maritime Zone and as a policy advisor to the New Zealand Consul General in New Caledonia. She now works in the marine renewable energy sector and is currently writing her PhD on the laws regarding the exploitation of marine energies and deep sea minerals (by the way, if you know anything about that, please contact her at newcaledonia@cimsec.org).

Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners

Whaley, Barton. Practice to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016, 256pp. $39.95.41ZXSXxYabL._SX331_BO1,204,203,200_

By LT Robert “Jake” Bebber USN

Lawrence Freedman opens his magisterial tome “Strategy: A History” identifying the elemental features of strategy across time as “deception, coalition formation and the instrumental use of violence.”[i] It is no surprise that “deception” is the first essential element of strategy. “War is uncertain business,” as Whaley notes in his opening introduction, and “deception is the only weapon that a warrior can wield that, to the extent it succeeds, will impose uncertainty and the element of surprise on the opponent.” Deception is ultimately about surprising one’s enemy.

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Much has been written about deception and its importance in war, and Dr. Barton Whaley (1928-2013) is almost certainly one of the preeminent authorities on the matter. However, it is one thing to appreciate the importance of deception and entirely another to craft deception operations in support of military plans. Thankfully, Dr. Whaley has left us with a guide. Practise to Deceive [ii] is designed with the planners themselves in mind, providing insight into the type of thinking and procedures that make successful and unsuccessful deception planners. Early on, Whaley identifies the central role of commanders in deception planning and addresses important command and control issues, such as whether deception planning is best handled by the intelligence or operations cells in a military organization.

Those who work as physicians are said to “practice medicine” which conveys an important point. You may go to medical school, be awarded a medical degree and receive a license to work as a physician, but what truly makes you a good doctor is the constant repetition and experience of clinical practice. Deception is no different. A military course on deception planning is only the beginning. One must constantly practice and refine techniques, learn and study the art and science behind it. Since deception is ultimately about manipulating your opponent’s mind, the best practitioners are those who are well read in a broad variety of fields such as the natural sciences, biology, history, and psychology. Skills and knowledge atrophy over time. Indeed, from a broadly cultural perspective, Whaley notes entire tribes, countries and civilizations experience patterns of discontinuities, and in effect, have to relearn and rebuild from scratch. Our natural stereotypes about civilizations such as ancient Byzantium or modern China are “flat out wrong.”

Whaley’s analysis seeks to identify common traits of deception planners over time and provides useful observations. Excellence in deception is independent of rank, branch of service, or even military service. Deception planners tend to operate in small teams drawn from diverse backgrounds and experiences. They tend to have acute insight into both the enemy and their own side. Since the opportunities to actually use deception in war are rare over time, the study of past experience is critical. Finally – and probably most important – commanders must play an active part in deception planning. Ultimately, deception planning supports the commander’s goals and objectives, so his participation is key.

Practise to Deceive helps by providing the reader with 88 case studies of deception plans and operations. The book examines these cases from the perspective of the planners themselves. These case studies are broken up into four sections: cases of those who were in the early part of their career or new to deception, more experienced planners in specific operations, cases of how planners “sold” their commanders on deception plans, and finally deception planning at the institutional level. Most of these case studies are short, just three to ten pages in length.

In the later chapters, Whaley outlines the ten planning steps required for deception. These steps will lead the planner to determine what he wants the enemy to perceive and how he wants the enemy to react, considering the tools at his disposal. It lays out not only what the planner does but also how the planner thinks. In many ways, these steps mimic steps in writing creative fiction, storytelling, or screen play writing. Writing a deception plan is about leading an audience to reach a conclusion of the author’s choice. It just so happens that the author wants the audience to reach the wrong conclusion and ultimately be surprised.

It should come as no surprise to learn that Dr. Whaley’s life was more than just practicing and writing about military deception. He was an expert magician and lifetime member of the Magic Castle in Los Angeles and the International Brotherhood of Magicians, and a prize winning author on the subject. He brought his interest to the military in 2004, hosting workshops at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, on magic and the military.

Bart_Whaley
The author, Dr. Barton Whaley, passed away in 2013.

Whaley’s life and work should leave our senior military and national security leaders wondering whether our country is continuing to develop the talent and tools to practice good deception. This is critical to ensure not only that we can deceive our adversaries, but also help prevent us from being deceived (counter-deception). Deception, as both a practice and an art, is not something that one can master in a short time. It requires unique individuals who have to be recruited, trained, cultivated, and provided the opportunity to practice their craft. To practice deception, we must better incorporate deception planning and operations into exercises, training and war-games at all levels from tactical to strategic. Whaley concludes Practise to Deceive with this same advice, recommending that the U.S. consider the Israeli model to train both deception and counter-deception. History suggests that constantly having to relearn deception whole cloth comes at great cost. Ideally, we will take steps to keep the butcher’s bill small. Dr. Barton Whaley’s book is an excellent place to start.

LT Robert “Jake” Bebber USN is an information warfare officer assigned to the staff of U.S. Cyber Command. The views expressed here do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy or U.S. Cyber Command. He welcomes your comments at [email protected].

[i] Lawrence Freedman. Strategy: A History (Oxford University Press: New York, 2013).

[ii] The book uses the British spelling of “Practise” instead of the American spelling.

[iii] From Dr. Barton Whaley’s obituary, available at: http://obits.dignitymemorial.com/dignity-memorial/obituary-print.aspx?n=Barton-Whaley&lc=6922&pid=166273115&mid=5624174

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China’s Arctic Engagements: Differentiating Reality From Apprehension

The following article was originally featured by the Conference for Defense Associations Institute. It is republished with permission, and may be read in its original form here.

CDA Institute Security & Defence Blogger Adam MacDonald, an independent scholar on Canadian foreign policy and Asia-​Pacific security, looks at China’s approach to the Arctic.

China’s increasing Arctic engagements overall have been welcomed by the region’s stakeholders. There are, however, arguments in the media and some academic quarters that China’s growing involvement threatens to destabilize the region. Beijing, despite the absence of Arctic territory, is unilaterally asserting itself into the regional institutional architecture, challenging the pre-​eminent role of the Arctic states and their sovereign rights, while their ‘Arctic envy’ to secure regional shipping lanes and resources currently is manifested through political and economic manoeuvring. In the future China may become more forceful in these endeavours, including possible military deployments in the North.

Much of these commentaries are imprecise and speculating at best, largely ignoring the pathways and processes China’s Arctic endeavours have evolved. Lack of specifics on how and why China constitutes a threat to the region, also, demonstrate these arguments derive from the more generalized (yet still problematic) ‘Assertive China’ narratives which have become dominate in Western analyses of Chinese foreign policy. Clearly, China is actively trying to alter the power dynamics in its immediate environment of East Asia. But it is premature to talk of a revisionist challenge to the international system writ large guiding the entirety of Beijing’s foreign engagements. Before assigning China’s Arctic activities to an underlying revisionist agenda, therefore, it is important to further analyze the lines of engagement Beijing is actually pursuing.

China does not have an official Arctic Policy due to the low importance of the region within their broader foreign policy strategy, which is focused on immediate access to resources. The Arctic, though, is an area of long-​term interest motivating Chinese leaders to begin a ‘nascent stage of formulation’ in terms of constructing a regional strategy. Chinese academia, media and the military, also, have become more vocal and engaged in this process.

China’s Arctic engagements originate from and are still dominated by scientific research projects, specifically pertaining to climatic and regional weather phenomenon. These endeavours have increased significantly over the past decade including the 2004 establishment of the Yellow River Station in Spitsbergen, Norway; the creation of the China-​Nordic Research Center in Shanghai in 2013; and the construction of an Aurora Station in Iceland. China, as well, is looking to establish an Arctic research centre in Canada and is building a second scientific icebreaker in conjunction with Finland. Some commentators are quick to dismiss Beijing’s scientific endeavours as camouflaging other more malign political goals, but one should not dismiss the fact that China faces massive environmental and climate change challenges, which motivates much of their scientific and climate work internationally.

Bilateral economic relations is the second line of China’s Arctic engagements. Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa remain Beijing prioritized regions for resource acquisition but the Arctic states, particularly the Nordic countries, have developed robust resource development projects with China. The strongest of these relationships is with Iceland, where China signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2013 and was awarded its first exploration license in the region for oil in the Dreki area. Chinese companies, as well, have invested billions into mineral-​rich Greenland, a protectorate of Denmark. These relations, however, have not been entirely unproblematic. Iceland’s parliament blocked a land-​purchase deal of a Chinese developer due to concerns over what the land would be used for and investments in Greenland have caused local anxieties over Chinese dominance in the economy, including the possible (but overhyped) importation of thousands of Chinese workers. China has also made inroads into the Canadian and particularly Russian energy markets, the latter following the post-​Crimea sanctions régime that left Moscow short of capital and partners for Arctic resource development. But Ottawa and Moscow, more so than the Nordic states, are wary of the consequences of Chinese economic activities in the North. China’s ability and willingness, however, to invest significantly in these remote areas (particularly Greenland), requiring possibly decades of development before profitable returns are generated, motivates many Arctic stakeholders to engage Chinese companies despite concerns about their government ties and overall environmental and labour standards.

China, finally, has been energetic in gaining entry into the Arctic governance structure and acceptance as a legitimate and non-​threatening stakeholder. After two failed attempts, in 2013 China (along with a host of other Asian countries) were accepted by the Arctic Council, the pre-​eminent regional organization, as Permanent Observers. Despite having no voting rights, Permanent Observers are allowed to take part in seminar discussions and participate in the organization’s working groups. One of the major conditions China (and other applicants) had to meet was acceptance of the Nuuk Criteria which includes acknowledging the pre-​eminent role and responsibility of Arctic states in regional affairs; their sovereignty and sovereign rights; and recognizing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the legal régime governing the Arctic. This measure alleviated concerns associated with a more active China by showing their willingness to abide by the rules and conditions of the regional régime.

Chinese leaders, nevertheless, do assert that the Arctic possess certain trans-​regional characteristics which necessitate the involvement of non-​Arctic states (a position held by a number of other Asian states) and as a ‘Near Arctic State’ has a legitimate role to play. Despite some frictions, including over issues of extended maritime zoning claims by the Arctic coastal states which China sees a possibly marginalizing non-​Arctic states access to the North, Beijing has decided to become part of the regional structure and not attempt to create parallel organizations and mechanisms to pursue its interests.

Contrary to portrayals of China as an assertive and bellicose outsider, Beijing’s actions have been conducted through legal and accepted channels, including participating at a low and non-​intrusive level in the regional political architecture. Acknowledging the differences between Beijing and some Arctic actors over issues of maritime rights and the role of non-​Arctic states in regional governance, there is very little evidence of China becoming more aggressive in these pursuits. The Arctic, furthermore, is a stable region characterized by an ever evolving rule-​bound régime populated by developed states, including the world’s two nuclear superpowers, and the absence of war and failed states: conditions which heavily influence the pathways and processes China is and will pursue their interests in the future.

China’s interests in the Arctic, furthermore, align with their broader foreign policy goals of diversifying energy and resources suppliers, securing trade routes and becoming more active in global and regional governance instruments commensurate with their growing great power status and role. Speculations of China’s ‘aggressive’ posturing in the Arctic, however, will undoubtedly continue to inaccurately colour any discussion of the rising power’s actions in the Arctic; far more than any other Non-​Arctic, and particularly Asian, state involved in the region.

Adam P. MacDonald is an independent academic whose work focuses on Canadian foreign policy in Asia, Chinese naval developments, and the ongoing political transition in Myanmar. He can be reached at [email protected]. (Image courtesy: alexshakun​.blogspot​.com.)

Pakistan’s Navy: A Quick Look

By Alex Calvo

Traditionally the junior service, operating in the Army’s shadow and receiving a ten percent share of the 2015 defence budget of $6.6 billion, Pakistan’s Navy personnel numbers more than 22,000 active, plus 5,000 in the reserve. This secondary role stands in contrast with the economy’s dependence on the sea, with the port city of Karachi contributing 25 percent of GDP and the proposed China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) raising the country’s maritime profile even further.

Much of the Navy’s backbone, including its seven submarines, five French-made ‘Khalid’ class conventional hunter-killer (SSKs) acquired in the 1990s plus two ‘Hashmat’ class SSKs from the 1970s, is nearing retirement. The Navy is working to acquire new surface and undersea combatants, boosting domestic shipbuilding in the process and in cooperation with Beijing.

Plans include procuring an additional four 3000-ton F-22P/’Zulfiqar’ (Sword) class frigates with improved sensors and weapons (including HQ-17 surface-to-air missiles, developed from Russia’s Tor 1/SA-N-9), as well as six Type-022 Houbei stealth catamaran missile boats. State-owned shipbuilder Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) is responsible for these programs, and is expanding its facilities with a new foundry, manufacturing areas, and two dry docks of 26,000 and 18,000 dead weight tons, spread over 71 acres. Islamabad had been hoping to procure six Perry-class frigates from the US on easy terms, but congressional hostility has prompted greater reliance on China, a country heavily committed at all levels to Pakistan, being a key to Beijing’s strategy of securing access to the Indian Ocean and keeping New Delhi distracted by a regional rival.

Sword class frigate of the Pakistani Navy.
Sword class frigate of the Pakistani Navy.

Karachi is the traditional home of the Pakistani Navy, and remains of the utmost importance, despite diversification into other bases, among them PNS Siddique (in Turbat, in the south-west, close to the strategic deepwater port of Gwadar and the border with Iran), Pasni, and Jinnah Naval Base (also in the south-west). Asked whether security is considered by the Pakistani Navy as a reason to push for further diversification away from the city, Zoha Waseem (PhD Candidate at King’s College London and an expert in Pakistani security and policing) explains that “the situation in Karachi in terms of the ongoing operation is linked with the need of the military to keep investing in Karachi. The construction of military bases, infrastructure, and training centres and accommodation does not appear to be decreasing. Karachi is an ATM machine, and a prime location for any stakeholder to have its assets here.”

PNS Badr, a British-built Type-21 frigate, was decommissioned in 2014. Despite being the junior service and the country facing a difficult fiscal position, Pakistan's Navy has been pushing for ambitious plans in terms of both surface and undersea combatants. Source Flickr.
PNS Badr, a British-built Type-21 frigate, was decommissioned in 2014. Despite being the junior service and the country facing a difficult fiscal position, Pakistan’s Navy has been pushing for ambitious plans in terms of both surface and undersea combatants. Source Flickr.

While new ships are seen as essential in terms of maritime security and the fight against piracy, it is Pakistani plans to acquire new submarines that have met with the greatest concern in New Delhi. In March 2015, Islamabad announced plans to procure eight new Chinese submarines, and in October 2015 confirmed that four would be purchased from Beijing and four built at KSEW. The package includes a training centre in Karachi and probably includes access to China’s Beidou-II (BDS-2) satellite navigation network. Thanks to similar designs, Beijing, in turn, gets to enjoy the necessary maintenance personnel and facilities enabling her to operate her own submarines much more efficiently in the Indian Ocean, home to vital SLOCs (sea lanes of communication) for China. Ideally the Navy would like a total of 12 new boats. These Chinese-designed submarines will probably be based on the air independent propulsion (AIP) equipped Type 39B Yuan SSK (known as S-20 in its export version). Displacing 2,300 tons, they can fire both cruise missiles and 533 mm torpedoes, and can also deploy mines and special forces. Pakistan, already working on a version of the National Defence Complex Babur missile capable of launch from her old Khalid submarines, sees the S-20 as more than a conventional platform, although preventing an Indian blockade is certainly a major goal in and by itself. A sea-based deterrent would provide Islamabad with a second strike capability, while avoiding perceptions of falling behind India in the nuclear sphere. The resulting improvement in survivability is seen by Mansoor Ahmed (Stanton Nuclear Security junior faculty fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center), as providing greater strategic stability to South Asia, given that India could not be sure of completely destroying Pakistani nuclear forces and thus escape unacceptable damage herself.

Work on a sea-based deterrent may also be closely linked to the Navy’s status within the military. According to Scott Cheney-Peters (US Navy reserve officer and CIMSEC founder) “Unless Pakistan’s Navy can develop an at-sea strategic nuclear deterrent it is likely to remain the ‘junior service.’ This means it has a strong institutional incentive to pursue an SLBM second-strike capability. But just as this incentive may not be enough to bring the capability to fruition any time soon, so the second-capability may not be enough to remove the perception of the Navy as a junior partner in the nation’s armed forces.”

Alex Calvo is a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan) focusing on security and defence policy, international law, and military history in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. A member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and Taiwan’s South China Sea Think-Tank, he is currently writing a book about Asia’s role and contribution to the Allied victory in the Great War. He tweets @Alex__Calvo and his work can be found here.

Featured Image: MAYPORT, Fla. (Aug. 31, 2010) Pakistan sailors parade their country’s colors during the decommissioning ceremony of the guided-missile frigate USS McInerney (FFG 8) at Naval Station Mayport. During the ceremony, McInerney was commissioned into the Pakistan navy as PNS Alamgir (F 260). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Gary Granger Jr./Released).

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.