The Uruguayan Navy: Preparing for the 21st century

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

In a speech to commemorate the service’s sea day (Día de la Fuerza de Mar) on August 21, Uruguayan Navy Captain Daniel Di Bono stated, “Starting today, it is time to start writing another page of this story. Ours, [the story] of the older ones, those of the Frigates, the Minesweepers, the [marine research vessel] Vanguardia, is already coming to an end. The period of modern, agile, and flexible ocean patrol vessels, coastal patrol vessels, and scientific vessels is approaching.”

Navies constantly evolve due to new challenges, objectives, visions, and realities. However, analysts rarely witness a sharp evolution of a Navy and its fleet. The Uruguayan Navy is undergoing that process, and as a reliable U.S. ally, Washington needs to understand what is going on and why.

Out With the Old, In With the New

For decades, the Uruguayan Navy operated one of the oldest fleets in South America. Aside from landlocked Bolivia and Paraguay and not considering Guyana and Suriname (more generally associated with the Caribbean), Uruguay is the only South American country that does not possess submarines. The fleet’s flagship is the Luneburg-class logistics vessel ROU 04 General Artigas, launched in the 1960s. The service has decommissioned several in recent years, including its only frigate, the former ROU 01 Uruguay – formerly Portugal’s Comandante Joao Belo (F480). In other words, currently, the Navy has no main combat ships.

On the other hand, the service is receiving new(ish) vessels. In late 2022, the Uruguayan Navy commissioned three Marine Protector-class patrol boats formerly operated by the United States Coast Guard. The three ships are already operating across Uruguayan waters: ROU 14 Río Arapey, ROU 15 Río de la Plata, and ROU 16 Río Yaguarón. Moreover, after around a decade of negotiations, brand-new ships are on the horizon. In July, the Ministry of Defense announced that two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) will be purchased from a Spanish shipyard. Crucially, the OPVs will be capable of carrying helicopters, an ability that the fleet currently lacks.

Three former Coast Guard cutters, now serving the Uruguay Navy as ROU-14 Rio Arapey, ROU-15 Rio de La Plata and ROU-16 Rio Yaguaron, stop at Coast Guard Sector San Juan Sept. 24, 2022, during their more than two-month transit from Baltimore to Uruguay. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Capt. Robert Pirone)

Uruguay is scheduled to hold general elections in October 2024. Therefore, one can only hope that the OPV acquisition will be confirmed and all necessary agreements signed so the deal does not fall victim to traditional election-related debates and delays.

Evolving Challenges

A fact mentioned earlier deserves more analysis – the Uruguayan Navy does not possess subs and currently does operate heavy warships in its fleet. As discussed in Captain Di Bono’s speech, that era is ending for this service. Geopolitics is a reason for this statement: Uruguay borders two countries, Argentina and Brazil, and bilateral relations are quite strong. For example, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has donated M41C Walker Bulldog tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery platforms to the Uruguayan Army. The likelihood of an inter-state war is minimal; therefore, as the Uruguayan officials have also stated, the Navy’s necessity to operate cruisers and minesweepers is similarly minimal. Dr. Andrea Resende, associate professor at Brazil’s University Center of Belo Horizonte (UNIBH), explained to CIMSEC that “there is some tension between Argentina and Uruguay, however not like in the previous decades. Yet, Brazil has always played a third party during conflicts and tensions in the region because the stability of its borders frontiers depends on a peaceful environment.”

To promote close military relations, from September 11-15, the navies of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay carried out a new iteration of an academic exercise on trilateral warfare (Juego de Guerra Trilateral) in Carrasco, Uruguay. “The Trilateral War Game, carried out annually, was designed to allow interaction in the formulation, analysis and solution of international crisis problems in the South Atlantic region, based on a fictitious situation, using naval forces,” explains the Argentine Navy’s publication Gaceta Maritima.

Nowadays, the Uruguayan Navy is evolving into a smaller, faster, more modern fleet. What are its challenges? Controlling the country’s vast maritime waters is critical to combat illegal, unreported, or unregulated (IUU) fishing and other maritime crimes like drug trafficking and smuggling. In other words, protecting Uruguay’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from non-interstate threats is critical.

Having OPVs that carry helicopters will also be helpful for interdiction operations and search-and-rescue missions. Smaller craft can also operate along some of Uruguay’s rivers for security and patrol operations and to participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions. It is worth noting that the Navy has created a tactical operations center (Centro de Operaciones Tácticas: COT) that oversees the deployment of surface and aerial assets to combat illegal maritime activities.

Dr. Resende warned of a potential spillover effect from the other side of the Atlantic: “While piracy, robbery, and hijacking are major problems in the Gulf of Guinea, they can overflow across the entire region, so there is a need for the South Atlantic navies to be ready and to participate in joint exercises and operations,” to maintain their readiness and to be able to work together. In other words, having a smaller fleet does not mean giving up some capabilities, particularly regarding maritime law enforcement and patrol.

With that said, there will always be a need for heavier, more specialized ships. Science is a good reason for having them. The Uruguayan Navy has an active role in scientific and oceanographic research, but unfortunately, the scientific vessel ROU 22 Oyarvide was decommissioned in 2022 without a replacement ready. While not a priority as compared to the OPVs, Montevideo must assign financial assets to acquire a new scientific vessel soon. Moreover, Uruguay has a robust presence in Antarctica, and General Artigas participated in the country’s recent 2022/2023 Antarctic campaign. Upon its return to Montevideo in February, Defense Minister Javier García noted, “[Artigas] was a ship that had not sailed since 2018, which was overhauled, the things that needed to be fixed were fixed, and it once again provided an essential service in an Antarctic mission.” In other words, the Uruguayan Navy has a critical role in scientific operations across Uruguayan and Antarctic waters; therefore, scientific and polar-capable vessels must be components of the future fleet.

The service has yet to disclose when the ancient Artigas will be decommissioned. The ship is currently the fleet’s heaviest vessel, so a similar platform will be needed to replace it for local transportation operations and Uruguay’s future Antarctic campaigns.

Montevideo-Washington Relations: Moving Forward

Finally, a word about U.S.-Uruguay naval relations is necessary. They may not be as constant as the U.S. Navy’s and U.S. Coast Guard’s presence across the Greater Caribbean, but they exist. The donation of the Marine Protector vessels to the Uruguayan Navy and helicopters to the Uruguayan Air Force over the past two years are an excellent example of close bilateral defense relations.

Moreover, in February, the U.S. Coast Guard Legend-class cutter Stone’s (WMSL-758) visit to Montevideo port coincided with the 70th anniversary of the mutual defense cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 1953. “The agreement served as the foundation for the long history of cooperation between the two democracies in defense equipment, training, and peacekeeping operations around the world that continues to thrive today,” explained the U.S. embassy in Uruguay in a press release.

Given the ongoing war in Ukraine (and news of successful attacks against Russian ships and submarines), tensions with China, and regular incidents at sea with Iran, it may appear puzzling for Washington that a Navy can operate without frigates or submarines. However, the geopolitics of Latin America and the Caribbean differ from other areas of the world. In particular, inter-state relations between Uruguay with Argentina and Brazil remain strong in the South Atlantic. The participation in joint exercises by these three militaries is an effective confidence-building mechanism.

“One can never predict the future [but a military service must be] prepared for whatever may come. And this is the case for Uruguay. Even if we live in a relative state of peace, the maritime space is threatened daily with cyberattacks, IUU fishing, piracy, and illegal trafficking,” concluded Dr. Resende. Smaller but faster and more modern ships, with more interdiction and surveillance capabilities, will be the pillars of the Uruguayan Navy’s fleet in the 21st century. The threats may be changing, but the mission remains the same.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

Featured Image: The Uruguayan naval frigate Uruguay (ROU 1) transits the Atlantic Ocean. (Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel Barker.)

Sea Control 475 – Island Campaigns and the Founding of the PLA Navy with Dr. Toshi Yoshihara

By Walker Mills

The program is joined by Dr. Toshi Yoshihara, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He discusses his latest book, Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy. He is also the co-author of Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.

Download Sea Control 475 – Island Campaigns and the Founding of the PLA Navy with Dr. Toshi Yoshihara

Links

1. Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, second edition, by Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, USNI Books, 2018. 

2. Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, by Toshi Yoshihara, Georgetown University Press, 2022. 

3. “China’s Lessons from the Pacific War and Implications for Future Warfighting,” by Toshi Yoshihara, CIMSEC, March 22, 2023. 

4. “China as a Composite Land-Sea Power: A Geostrategic Concept Revisited,” by Toshi Yoshihara, CIMSEC, January 6, 2021.

5. “How China has Overtaken Japan in Naval Power and Why It Matters,” by Toshi Yoshihara, CIMSEC, June 22, 2020.

6. “Assessing the Military Balance in the Western Pacific with Dr. Toshi Yoshihara,” by Cris Lee, CIMSEC, November 5, 2018.

7. Sea Control 288: Chinese Civilian Shipping and the Threat to Taiwan with Tom Shugart, CIMSEC, October 28, 2021. 

Walker Mills is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Brian Kurukulasuriya.

Sea Control 474 – AUKUS, Naval Procurement, and Grand Strategy with Dr. Jonathan Caverley

By Dr. Ed Salo

Dr. Jonathan Caverley joins the program to discuss AUKUS and what happens when naval procurement drives grand strategy. Jonathan is professor of strategic and operational research at the United States Naval War College.

Download Sea Control 474 – AUKUS, Naval Procurement, and Grand Strategy with Dr. Jonathan Caverley


Links

1. AUKUS: When naval procurement drives grand strategy, by Dr. Jonathan Caverley, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, September 2023.

Dr. Ed Salo is  Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Brian Kurukulasuriya.

China is Fighting the Third Opium War with Fish

By Dr. Ian Ralby

In the 19th Century, the British East India Company was buying up huge amounts of Chinese goods – tea, silk, porcelain and more – but China was not interested in buying anything from Britain. As a way of balancing the accounts, Britain began smuggling opium from India into China, and demanding payment for it in silver. Not only did this help balance the trade accounts and create an insatiable drug dependency, it helped fund British naval and military buildups. Disaffected by the arrangement, the Chinese sought to push back, leading to the two Opium Wars. Thanks in part to the silver from the Opium trade, the technological superiority of European military might at that time resulted in China being easily defeated in both wars, and forced to accept woefully unfavorable trade terms as part of the peace. This led to the “Century of Humiliation” for China. Even after the Cultural Revolution, President Xi Jinping has been fond of historical narratives surrounding Chinese greatness, as well as Chinese grievances. Indeed, “historical fishing grounds” have been the basis for China’s legally unfounded nine (or ten) dash line claim over territory in the South China Sea. There can be no doubt that President Xi and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party remember the Century of Humiliation and the tactics that characterized it.

New reporting from The Outlaw Ocean Project in The New Yorker indicates that China has adapted the British tactics of the Opium Wars to use fish as trade-based leverage to undermine the United States and its allies. While the context is quite different – the concept is similar. Setting aside the major role China plays in the opioid crisis that has taken the lives of more Americans than the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam combined, China is reaping huge economic benefits by selling fish to the United States in a manner that is directly funding its military and diplomatic buildups to be able to out compete the United States. Indeed, the Outlaw Ocean team has even traced Chinese-caught and processed fish to U.S. military bases, not to mention school cafeterias. And the revelations that people – often from third countries – have likely died in the process of catching this fish, and others, namely Uyghur minorities who have been enslaved to process this fish, add to the pernicious dynamics of this operation. Just as the British once resorted to criminality and degradation of human beings to fund their military, the Chinese have followed suit.

One of the lighthearted, albeit relevant, parts of the Outlaw Ocean’s reporting was the revelation that squid was unpopular in the United States until it was renamed “calamari” to make it sound more appealing. Now calamari appears on menus across the country and the remarkable demand for it – particularly breaded and fried – has driven China to become the world’s largest supplier of it. Yet how many conversations about the horrors of slavery have occurred while consuming fried calamari produced by slave labor?

It is clear that the Outlaw Ocean Project based some of their work on the detailed efforts of academics and practitioners to look into the implications of subsidies. China’s use of subsidies has propelled its Distant Water Fleet (DWF) to fish around the globe and in the process, disrupt both ecosystems and economies. Indeed, this issue has been years in the making, and diligent research from scholars like Dr. Tabitha Mallory has shown just how problematic this dynamic is in terms of both ocean sustainability and broader economic and social impacts. But it goes even further.

As has been expressed, the DWF is being used for much more than just catching fish. It is an information and intelligence collection source, a tool for hybrid aggression, and part of a strategy to “own the oceans by adverse possession.” In many ways, it is the main action arm of China’s efforts to build what amounts to an oceanic empire over the 70 percent of the earth that is covered in water. But this new reporting by the Outlaw Ocean Project reveals how the United States public is financing China’s aggression toward the United States. Not only are American children eating fish fingers made by Uyghur slaves, but public institutions in America are channeling their resources toward products that are financing China’s hostility. This is the dynamic of the Opium Wars that China has replicated. China’s production and targeted sale of fentanyl and other opioids may look and seem like the principal analogy to the Opium Wars, but the fish and all the major benefits the DWF provides to China’s efforts for military superiority are actually the main parallel.

Armed with this reporting, the U.S. should muster a whole-of-society response to this Chinese effort. If the U.S. is serious about “Great Power Competition,” it at least needs to stop scoring “own goals” by funding and emboldening the main competitor. But from the standpoints of both defense and security, these issues cannot be overlooked or marginalized. China is using its DWF globally in a manner that accrues tremendous benefits to the Chinese armed forces. The least that can be done is stop buying fish caught by the DWF and processed by enslaved Uyghurs and serving it on U.S. military bases. The U.S. should heed the famous line from Karl Marx – “The last capitalist we hang shall be the one who sold us the rope.” It may also be worth returning to the history of the first two Opium Wars to see if there are any strategic lessons the U.S. can glean in countering Chinese efforts to win the third one.

Dr. Ian Ralby is CEO of I.R. Consilium, a family firm with leading expertise in maritime and resource security. A maritime lawyer by background, Dr. Ralby has worked in more than 90 countries around the world and is an advisor to various US government agencies and international organizations.

Featured Image: A Japanese fisheries patrol boat intercepts a Chinese fishing boat. (Japanese government photo)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.