Submarine Rescue Forensics: Lessons from the ARA San Juan (S-42) Tragedy

By Andrew Song

In the race against time, recent history demonstrates that technology remains limited for submarine search and rescue efforts. The November 2017 disappearance of the Argentinian Navy submarine, the ARA San Juan (S-42), highlights the particular hardship confronting submarine recovery. After completing a naval exercise near Tierra del Fuego, the diesel-electric submarine ARA San Juan (S-42) departed from the city of Ushuaia to return to its home port in Mar de Plata. The boat transmitted its last signal on November 15th, 2017 and its failure to report twice to its command the next day prompted an international search and rescue operation starting November 17th.1 This case study examines the limits of aquatic-based forensic methods along with institutional shortcomings that inhibited the investigation. It furthermore underlines how contemporary submarine search tools – for rescue, post-mishap investigation, or espionage – remain underdeveloped and require further attention.

Searching for the ARA San Juan (S-42)

On its one-year anniversary of the San Juan’s disappearance, Ocean Infinity – an American private seabed explorer company contracted by Buenos Aires – located the missing submarine 270 nautical miles off Argentina’s nearest coastal city at a depth of 2,976 feet – roughly three times the nominal test depth.2 Photographs taken by Ocean Infinity’s ROVs portrayed a compromised hull with propellers and a bow section discernibly separated.3 Although presumed beforehand, the imagery eliminated any possibilities that there had been survivors on the ARA San Juan.

Revisiting the initial search operations on the 17th sheds light into the immediate challenges of the submarine search and rescue operations. Argentinian Navy helicopters, U.S Navy P-8A Poseidon, and NASA P-3 Orion aircraft began search efforts with sonobuoys that possessed limited range, but which could be rapidly and widely deployed. It became apparent that space and time disadvantaged the emergency responders: The initial search box was larger than the size of Iraq.4 The ARA San Juan only had a submerged oxygen supply of seven days, giving a five-day rescue window after the last communication. Moreover, the remoteness of the search area and the tardiness in support diminished the probability of success. Over 11 countries sent nine ships and 13 aircraft to the search area, but the additional manpower and vessels arrived by November 21st (T-3 rescue window), requiring aerial-deployed sonobuoys to spearhead localization efforts – not side-scan sonars. 5 These sonobuoys offered a medium to hear distress transmissions from submarine, including via active sonar, underwater telephone, echo sounder, emergency location beacons, and hull tapping.

Other obstacles included unfavorable weather conditions. In the rescue window, investigators battled swells that reached 10 meters and wind speeds in the South Atlantic recorded around 100km/h.6 Yet, the most disappointing element to the abrupt search operation was the abundance of false signatures. In the critical rescue window, multiple incidents hindered search progress by draining resources from follow-up investigations. Table 1 summarizes these sources of hope that were later met with frustration.7

Table 1: Summary of False Leads and Later Determined True Origin

Date Observed IncidentLater Determined CauseLocation
NOV 20Satellite Calls on same frequency used by San JuanCommercial VesselUnspecified
NOV 21Faulty identification of possible banging on metal from passive sonarBiological Unspecified
NOV 21Magnetic anomaly with heat signatureEquipment 430km from coast
NOV 213 Flares seen in vicinity of last locationNot Same Color FlaresUnspecified
NOV 22Object found near area of San Juan’s last signal Unrelated debris 270km from coast

The Argentinian Navy declared the rescue aspect of the search operation to be over on November 30th, 2017 after planners eliminated an extreme survival situation. At its height, the search operation constituted over 4,000 personnel from over 13 countries and surveyed over 200,000 square miles.8 On November 16th, 2018, a Houston-based hydrographic survey company, Ocean Infinity, used a Norwegian multipurpose ship to investigate a possible ping on the San Juan’s potential position in the middle of a sea canyon.9 Finally, Ocean Infinity confirmed discovery of the San Juan on November 17th, 2018 and handed over data and visual evidence of the wreckage for forensic investigators to determine cause. Ocean Infinity’s use of five autonomous undersea vehicles (AUVs) for exploring the wreck site suggested that extensive use of AUVs was integral to the mission’s success.

Argentine Navy photos showing the submarine’s bow section, sail, and propeller that were torn off in the implosion. (Argentine Navy photo)

Forensic Shortcomings and New Questions

In the case of the San Juan’s disappearance, investigators must ask themselves about failures in the search phase and prescribe future procedures to avoid such pitfalls. The disappearance of the ARA San Juan disturbingly mirrors the loss of the Kursk in 2003, apart from the evidence that the Kursk had initial survivors post-implosion. First, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna did detect a hydro-acoustic anomaly from its Ascension Island and Crozet Island stations that seemed consistent with an underwater explosion on November 15th around 30 nautical miles from the San Juan’s last known bearing in the morning.10

Unfortunately, the CTBTO’s automatic processing algorithm used to detect nuclear explosions did not flag the registration of the two hydrophone station’s recording.47 In an effort to minimize false alarms, the CTBTO incidentally failed to exploit data that could have been used towards the calculation of a coverage ellipse for the San Juan. CTBTO could have directed their waveform analysts to immediately deploy their standard iterative dual correspondence (IDC) automatic localization algorithm to produce a spatial diagram of the detonation’s coordinates from iterative minimization of the origin time and azimuth residuals from the seismic data.

This had been done before as Koper details how four land-based seismometers detected the Kursk’s torpedo misfire on August 10th, 2000.11 Collation of the data in the Kursk case allowed for there to be a preliminary ellipse-shaped search parameter for the Kursk. The ARA San Juan’s implosion likely mimicked features of the Kursk’s explosion – compressive first motion, significant variation and high ratio of Sn to Lg, and shear wave generation in the seismic record. The oversight in the hydroacoustic anomaly, although eventually rectified through manual processing, caused the CTBTO to inform Argentina on November 22nd about a possible localization tardy in the search phase.12 Earlier consultation between Argentina and CTBTO and better automated processing for significant non-nuclear seismic events could have produced a more refined search box sooner.

State capabilities also hampered search execution. Ocean Infinity discovered the San Juan in a grid site that had a 90 percent probability of wreckage to be found – at the beginning of search planning.13 Argentinian officials defended themselves by stating that sub-canyons presented a hazard that its Navy could not outmaneuver. In other words, even if the crew was deemed to be alive, Argentina lacked methods and technology like a McCann Rescue Chamber or Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRVs) required for a delicate retrieval operation. This deflection of blame, however, shared no merit as U.S operators from Undersea Rescue Command in San Diego arrived with Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System and a tethered Pressurized Rescue Module Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) in only two days.14

Comodoro Rivadavia, Argentina (Nov. 26, 2017) U.S. Navy Undersea Rescue Command (URC) sailors and Argentine construction workers prepare the motor vessel Sophie Siem for the installation of the Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System (SRDRS) which operates the deep diving rescue vehicle, the Pressurized Rescue Module (PRM). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Christopher Lange)

Lastly, the relegation and sidelining of side-scan sonar and UUVs contributed to inefficiency and lack of coverage. Tardiness in the arrival of logistical support signified that these methods could not be practically implemented so total blame could not be place on the planners. Absence in information regarding scenarios and hypotheses did not allow for Bayesian search strategies to be fully utilized, although submarine officers blame a short-circuit in the battery tray in the prow due to water intake from the submarine’s snorkel as a precedent event to the suspected implosion.

That being said, forensic investigators still confront distinct challenges irrelevant to traditional geophysical investigations. Unlike terrestrial-based forensics, pre-established knowledge of a local maritime environment is sparse. Scientists have mapped 1/5th of the sea floor to modern standards with 100m resolution, but that means almost 290 million square kilometers of seafloor – twice the surface area of Mars – has not yet been surveyed. The absence of existing charts, therefore, necessitates simultaneous 4-D mapping of the area.15 Submarine debris are unidentifiable in satellite and aerial images due to surface opacity and the extreme depth of wrecks. Stratification conceals wrecks and clearing sedimentary buildup becomes extremely complicated due to sheer volume. An onsite “walk-over” survey, as described by Fenning and Donnelly in their description of geophysical methodologies, is simply impossible in a marine environment.16 Acidity and pH levels of the water also influence rates of decomposition, and must be considered for a simulation in the casualty scenario. In the future, the undersea recovery field must overcome these variables in order to find any success in submarine search and rescue.

A screenshot showing the wreckage of the ARA San Juan laying 920 meters below the surface. (Argentine Navy photo)

The loss of the ARA San Juan devastated the Argentinian public and had harmful repercussions on its naval service. Not only did Argentina lose 44 sailors, but one of the San Juan’s crewmembers was the first female submarine officer (Lieutenant Eliana Krawczyk) in Argentina’s history.17 Federal policemen raided the Navy’s headquarters for document requisition to piece together culpability and allocate responsibility. Argentina’s Minister of Defense unceremoniously fired Marcelo Srur, the Navy’s Chief of the General Staff, and the events surrounding the ARA San Juan’s mission — tracking British assets near the Falkland Islands — was publicly leaked by an Argentinian media source, further embarrassing the Navy.18

Conclusion

The task of finding lost submarines is an enigma complicated even further by the very reason these boats exist: to be undetectable assets for national security. Unlike their geologist peers, marine forensic investigators rely on robotics and invisible sound waves as surrogate sensors to hands and eyes. The development of side-scan sonar systems, and the consolidation of UUVs for search operations and site verification amalgamate the practice of maritime search into a forensic field heavily invested and intertwined with technological innovation. When establishing an inaugural search parameter, best practices in Bayesian search strategy call for officers and scientists to weigh qualitative hypotheses in order to allocate priorities to search boxes that will offer maximum efficiency.

The ARA San Juan represents a recent case, where these methods did not seem utilized to the fullest capacity. Prior success in the history of these methodologies being used for finding WWII vessels demonstrate that perhaps governments must rethink quick reaction plans to lost submarines. In order to save lives and honor the gravesites of individuals lost in times of conflict, advancement of these methods and a reevaluation of the ARA San Juan’s loss will be beneficial for the global submarine community and for navies around the world.

Ensign Andrew Song is a U.S. Navy submarine officer assigned to the USS San Francisco (MTS-711). His past publications have appeared in peer-reviewed military journals and outlets including Military Review, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, USNI Proceedings, Yale Review for International Studies and the Wall Street Journal. He graduated from Yale University with a B.A. in Global Affairs.

Endnotes

1. Politi, Daniel; Londoño, Ernesto (30 November 2017). “Hope for Argentina Submarine Crew Fades”The New York Times. Nov 30, 2017.

2. “First photos of submarine emerge as families implore Argentine government to recover wreck”NewsComAu. 18 November 2018.

3. “ARA San Juan.” Ocean Infinity, June 16, 2020. https://oceaninfinity.com/projects/ara-san-juan/.

4. Kirby, John. “Argentine Navy Says Sounds Detected Aren’t from Missing Sub.” CNN. Cable News Network, November 21, 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/americas/argentina-missing-submarine/index.html.

5. Ibid.

6. Pecoraro, Natalia. “El Fuerte Viento Demora El Operativo y Complica Las Tareas De Rescate.” La Nación, November 26, 2017. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/el-fuerte-viento-demora-el-operativo-y-complica-las-tareas-de-rescate-nid2085829/.

7. “Avanza Un Operativo Donde Hace 8 Días Se Detectó Una ‘Anomalía Hidroacústica.’” Télam, November 23, 2017. https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201711/225405-ara-san-juan-busqueda-armada-argentina-ruido-anomalia-hidroacustica.html (2) Goni, Uki. “Argentina’s Navy Says Fresh Noises Are Not from Missing Submarine.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, November 21, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/20/missing-argentina-submarine-running-out-of-air-as-search-enters-critical-phase.

8. “San Juan Submarine: ‘Explosion’ Dashes Crew Survival Hopes.” BBC News. BBC, November 23, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42100620.

9. “ARA San Juan.” Ocean Infinity, June 16, 2020. https://oceaninfinity.com/projects/ara-san-juan/.

10. Nielsen, P.L., Zampolli, M., Le Bras, R. “CTBTO’s Data and Analysis Pertaining to the Search for the Missing Argentine Submarine ARA San Juan.” Pure Appl. Geophys. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00024-020-02445-9. January 31 2020.

11. Koper, K. D., et al., 2001. Forensic seismology and the sinking of the Kursk, Eos, 82, 45-46.

12. Politi, Daniel, and Mihir Zaveri. “Argentina Minister Says Country without Means to Rescue Submarine.” thestar.com, November 17, 2018. https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/11/17/missing-argentine-submarine-found-at-bottom-of-atlantic-one-year-after-disappearance.html.

13. Ibid.

14. “Argentina Missing Navy Submarine: Search Stepped Up.” BBC News. BBC, November 18, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42030560.

15. Amos, Jonathan. “One-Fifth of Earth’s Ocean Floor Is Now Mapped.” BBC News. BBC, June 20, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-53119686.

16. Fenning, P. J., Donnelly, L. J., 2004. Geophysical techniques for forensic investigation. Geological Society of London Special Publications, 232, 11-20.

17. Argentina: Wreck of ARA San Juan Submarine Found after One Year . Al Jazeera English, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxufaPwlTOA.

18. Gidget Fuentes, Special Correspondent. “Specialized Undersea Rescue Force on Call to Aid Submariners in Trouble.” Seapower, October 20, 2020. https://seapowermagazine.org/specialized-undersea-rescue-force-on-call-to-aid-submariners-in-trouble/.

Featured Image: The ARA San Juan of the Argentine Navy. (Argentine Navy photo)

Notes to the New CNO Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past two weeks, CIMSEC featured short articles submitted in response to our Call for Notes to the New CNO. In this special series, authors conveyed their thoughts on what they believe are the most pressing issues for the U.S. Navy’s new top leader, Acting Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti.

Authors recommended new naval strategies and approaches to force design, as well as specific efforts to manage personnel retention issues. Authors also offered recommendations on how the Navy can become a better learning organization and seize opportunities posed by emerging capabilities. The U.S. Navy’s new leadership is confronting myriad challenges that could affect the Navy’s competitiveness for years to come.

The featured authors are listed below, and we thank them for their excellent contributions. This is an independent CIMSEC initiative and is not produced in partnership with any U.S. Navy organization or entity.

The United States Navy Needs an Operational Level of War Strategy to Inform Fleet Design,” by Steve Wills

“Admiral Lisa Franchetti should take the initiative to develop a comprehensive, operational level of war maritime strategy that will determine fleet missions, which will subsequently inform a specific fleet size and force design. Forging a stronger connection between warfighting strategy and force design will remain among the most pressing matters for the leadership of the United States Navy.”

Create a New Doctrine for Applying Learning Strategies to Warfighting Challenges,” by CDR Paul Nickell

“A revised NDP-1 will go beyond teaching warfare principles as an instrument of national power. Indeed, it would provide a timeless model for how to approach complex warfighting challenges with specific learning strategies and campaigns.”

Focus on Culture for Success in the AI Era,” by Harrison Schramm

“Successful AI culture is a departure from Navy norms. Military culture is based around assured success, but compared to aviation or weaponeering, AI requires far more failure before reaching success.”

Dusting Off the Z-Gram: Getting Real with Recruiting and Retention,” by Lt. Sam Strauss

“The traditional benefits of naval service – adventure, camaraderie, leadership experience, stable pay, and robust benefits – no longer match the costs associated with a sea-going career. While this may not be the case for every Sailor, personnel numbers indicate a strong correlation. So what do we do?”

Counter China’s Goal of Displacing American Command of the Sea,” by Robert C. Rubel

“To support its goals, China is creating a navy that it hopes can directly challenge the U.S. Navy for supremacy on the world ocean, something the USSR never aspired to do. The combination of China’s economic and industrial power, and its sweeping global objectives, presents the U.S. with a new and more difficult challenge that previous approaches to security will not properly address.”

Empowering Division Officers and Enhancing Sailor Stability,” by Lt. Upton Wallace

“These two areas of focus – empowering division officers and enhancing sailor stability – are interconnected. A more empowered division officer will better understand and address the unique needs of their sailors, including their need for stability. More content and stable sailors will be more responsive to their officers, creating a more trusting and effective chain of command.”

Revamp Force Design for Sea Control and Joint Integration,” by Commanders Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch and Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine

“The Navy needs to divorce itself from its affinity of conceiving capability as a function of traditional naval platforms, such as surface combatants or range-hobbled carrier air wings, and pursue a more holistic concept.”

The Navy Must Rediscover its Roots and Recommit to Small Combatants,” by Victor Sussman

“The Navy must recommit to the vital role of small ships in meeting its obligations. A commitment to smaller combatants offers benefits for naval operations, the supporting industrial base, and for leadership development.”

Capitalize on Allied Capabilities to Succeed at Sea – A View from Spain,” by Gonzalo Vazquez

“With an increasingly complex strategic environment, and a fleet struggling to meet its many operational requirements, the next CNO must strive to find new ways to capitalize on allied naval capabilities to succeed at sea. Prominent options include strengthening naval cooperation with partners to ensure a permanent presence in all strategically relevant theaters, and bolstering the sharing of naval knowledge among allied naval war colleges.”

Rebalance the Fleet Toward Being a Truly Expeditionary Navy,” by Anthony Cowden

“Today we have a forward-based navy, not an expeditionary navy. This distinction is important for remaining competitive against modern threats and guiding force design.”

Organize Campaigns of Learning and Reshape the Defense Analysis Paradigm,” by John Hanley

“Whether it is maintenance and administration, training and education, at-sea exercises, engagement with adversaries and partners (e.g., FONOPS), or creating antifragile naval architectures, if the participants are simply box-checking rather than learning, the effort is falling short. The Navy must be more deliberate about being a learning organization and how it structures its campaigns of learning.”

Empowering Enlisted Sailors: The Imperative for Expanded Educational Opportunities in the U.S. Navy,” by Petty Officer 2nd Class Richard Rodgers

“In the pursuit of maritime superiority, the U.S. Navy must prioritize the education and empowerment of its enlisted Sailors. These dedicated individuals are the backbone of the U.S. Navy, and their success directly contributes to the U.S. Navy’s overall readiness and effectiveness. By reinforcing and expanding educational opportunities for enlisted Sailors, the U.S. Navy can ensure that they become full, active, and informed participants in the mission.”

Get Real Get Better about Digital HR for Sailors,” by Artem Sherbinin and Daniel Stefanus

“Consistent errors in their HR experience, often driven by these unreliable digital HR tools, push many Sailors out of the service. Sailors’ digital HR experience is not a quality of service or quality of life issue. Getting HR digital implementation right is a warfighting and readiness imperative.”

Down Select and Commit To Uncrewed Surface Systems,” by LCDR U.H. (Jack) Rowley (ret.)

“After almost a decade of demonstrating the capabilities of MUSVs, the Navy has been slow to establish programs of record to populate the fleet with these workhorses. The Navy should now shift its efforts from prototyping to serial production, given how these vessels have demonstrated their potential.”

Man The Fleet and Reduce Sailor Exhaustion,” by Capt. John Cordle (ret.)

“In the end, it comes down to setting firm priorities and making the tradeoffs. The best weapons in the world will fall short if they are manned by overworked and exhausted Sailors.”

Sailors Matter Most: Incentivize Education and Cultivate Learning Leaders,” by Sean F. X. Barrett, Mie Augier, and William F. Mullen, III

“All members of the sea services must help maintain and hone their intellectual edge. They must be able to out-think and out-learn any opponent, especially in dynamic and rapidly changing situations. This is their greatest advantage, but it is also perishable. If it is neglected due to other priorities, it will atrophy and wither away.”

Lead the Fight Against Climate Change and Transnational Crime in the Indian Ocean,” by Commander Amila Prasanga, Sri Lankan Navy

“Climate change is transforming the security landscape in the Indian Ocean. It is having a profound impact in fomenting transnational maritime crimes, particularly illegal fishing, human smuggling, drug trafficking, and piracy. Island states are specifically vulnerable to these crimes, which often exploit their maritime boundaries and limited capacity. Recognizing these strategic vulnerabilities and their potential to destabilize the region is paramount.”

Prototype the Bi-Modal Naval Force,” by Shelley Gallup

“The bi-modal fleet structure includes a combination of small, crewed, and autonomous systems working as a networked flotilla. The crewed LMACCs and uncrewed autonomous surface vessels can be built and armed for much lower costs and greater capability than the cost of building one or two more destroyers or frigates. In this systems view, it is the holistic flotilla network that is the capability, rather than the individual platform.”

Improve the Culture and Mechanisms of Naval Learning,” by Commander Art Valeri

“A key contributor to unit success includes the intentional creation of organizational and cultural environments conducive to learning. The ability to learn is arguably the main attribute with the potential to produce warfighting victory.”

Ask the Public for Material Sacrifice to Narrow the Civ-Mil Divide,” by Michael D. Purzycki

Even the people of a famously tax-averse country like the United States might accept financial sacrifice to help the troops. While today’s Americans do not have to sacrifice to nearly the extent the World War II generation did, direct requests for contribution to the armed services could help revive some of the spirit of America’s greatest military triumph.”

Be Mindful of JADC2’s Emission Risks,” by Richard Mosier

The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept is totally dependent on radiofrequency (RF) communications to connect military assets across the space, air, land, and sea domains. This plethora of RF emissions from U.S. radars, communications systems, data links, and navigation aids presents a lucrative signals intelligence target that could undermine JADC2.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org

Featured Image: WASHINGTON (Sep. 14, 2023) – Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti answers questions from members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during her confirmation hearing at the Dirksen Senate Office Building. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Amanda R. Gray)

Be Mindful of JADC2’s Emission Risks

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Richard Mosier

The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept is totally dependent on radiofrequency (RF) communications to connect military assets across the space, air, land, and sea domains. This plethora of RF emissions from U.S. radars, communications systems, data links, and navigation aids presents a lucrative signals intelligence target that could undermine JADC2.

While net-centric concepts such as JADC2 enjoy broad endorsement, the elephant in the room is the underlying risk associated with adversary intelligence collection and exploitation. RF emissions present the best source for channeling enemy wide-area search, classification, and tracking. If U.S. emissions are sufficiently frequent, they provide the basis for maintaining the track continuity required for targeting long-range anti-ship missile strikes. The U.S. should not underestimate the ability of adversaries to take full advantage of the RF opportunity presented by U.S. net-centric operations.

In contrast with the JADC2 concept, service concepts such as Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) are based on the force being hard-to-find. Recognizing the risk of enemy exploitation of RF emissions, the hard-to-find objective is achieved in large measure through operating in RF silence.

The JADC2 net-centric concept and concepts based on being hard-to-find both make sense, but need to be made more complementary. If the enemy does not know where U.S. units are located, the strategy would be to operate in RF silence to remain hard-to-find, thereby avoiding premature engagements and maintaining the advantage of surprise. When the hard-to-find strategy fails and the U.S. force is facing attack, the strategy would be to rapidly transition to unconstrained RF emissions to leverage the substantial advantage of net-centric operations.

The Navy should request that the Defense Intelligence Agency conduct an assessment, with Navy, NSA, and NRO participation, of the risk of Chinese exploitation of JADC2 RF emissions. If the risk is assessed as high, it would serve to persuade JADC2 advocates of the risks of enemy exploitation of RF emissions, the necessity to conduct some phases of operations in RF silence, and the need for modifications to the JADC2 concept to integrate both.

Richard Mosier is a retired defense contractor systems engineer, Naval Flight Officer, OPNAV N2 civilian analyst, and OSD SES 4 responsible for oversight of tactical intelligence systems and leadership of major defense analyses on UAVs, signals intelligence, and C4ISR.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Feb. 18, 2019) An E-2D Hawkeye assigned to the “Bluetails” of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) 121 performs an arrested landing on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Amber Smalley/Released)

Ask the Public for Material Sacrifice to Narrow the Civ-Mil Divide

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Michael D. Purzycki

The civilian-military divide is often framed as a problem of cultural misunderstanding. And certainly, in an era where most Americans have not served in the military, it is natural that those who have served would feel misunderstood by those whose safety and freedom they defend. However, there is another aspect of the divide, one that if addressed forthrightly by military leadership, can narrow the gap in a more tangible way.

Given that the military is one of the most highly regarded public institutions in American society, its members are well-positioned to ask for material sacrifice from the general public. This would give civilians a chance to go beyond saying, “Thank you for your service,” and contribute in a financially meaningful way to the nation’s defenses. In an era of frequent budgetary uncertainty, any step that could help ensure a reliably funded military is worth considering.

For example, the Navy could point to the amount of petroleum it would need at its disposal to fight and win a conflict with the People’s Liberation Army over the fate of Taiwan. It could then ask Congress for a specific number of barrels of petroleum to be taken out of the civilian economy and added to Navy reserves, to ensure there is no gap between the fuel needed and the fuel available for contingencies. In the process of this request, it could quantify the increase in gasoline prices American drivers could expect to experience. Similar initiatives could be applied to other militarily significant resources and assets.

Even the people of a famously tax-averse country like the United States might accept financial sacrifice to help the troops. While today’s Americans do not have to sacrifice to nearly the extent the World War II generation did, direct requests for contribution to the armed services could help revive some of the spirit of America’s greatest military triumph. Evoking past Americans’ experience of rationing, Victory Gardens, war bonds, and the introduction of income tax withholding, while asking today’s Americans to endure a little pain at the pump, could narrow the civ-mil divide as well as help prepare the nation for future major conflict. As politically difficult as requests for sacrifice from ordinary Americans will be, scrambling to adequately resource America’s defenses in the midst of a war would likely be even more difficult.

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. In addition to CIMSEC, he has been published in Divergent Options, Merion West, the Washington Monthly, Wisdom of Crowds, Charged Affairs, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki. The views expressed here are his own.

Featured Image: SEA OF JAPAN (Oct. 3, 2023) Sailors load a MK-46 torpedo into a surface vessel torpedo tube on the boat deck aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup (DDG 86) while conducting routine operations in the Sea of Japan, October 3. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Donavan K. Patubo)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.