Events

Aug CIMSEC DC Meet-Up: Lightning Rounds

Leave a comment

By Scott Cheney-Peters

The (never-ending) rumble of thunder means it’s time for CIMSEC’s Summer Lightning Rounds: 5 minute presentations by CIMSEC members on their current work in the maritime security world or maritime security challenges they’re grappling with.  Join us at Ireland’s Four Courts’ Cottage Bar to mingle, hear fine folks sharing a bit of their interests or work from across the maritime spectrum, or consider discussing a bit of your own.

If you’re interested in participating as a presenter or would like to RSVP, please contact johnjordanklein@aol.com. All are welcome.

Time: Monday, 27 Aug, 5:30-7:00pm; presentations will begin approximately 6:00.

Place: Ireland’s Four Courts 2051 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA (Courthouse Metro stop on the Orange/Silver Line). 

Capability Analysis

Insights from the National Training Center’s Opposing Force, Pt. 3

Leave a comment

Read Part One, Part Two of this series.

By Colonel John D. Rosenberger

It Is How the OPFOR Prepares for Combat Operations

How a unit prepares to execute its mission directly affects the battle outcome. The OPFOR has learned this and devotes most of its available time preparing for battle, not planning.

Once the operations order is issued, the preparation phase for combat begins. The regimental commander gives everybody a ten minute break; then all commanders return and backbrief him, which assures the commander that all subordinate commanders clearly understand what he expects them to do and achieve, when he expects them to do it, and where he expects them to do it. In short, he checks to ensure all subordinate commanders understand his intent.

Immediately after backbriefs, the regimental staff assembles and conducts staff rehearsals of each course of action. The chief of staff leads a mapboard exercise, placed flat with all staff officers surrounding, and they literally fight each battle from beginning to end, reviewing the employment and synchronization of every element of the combined-arms team, by phase of the operation. They rehearse every action each staff officer will take, and every action they must supervise for the commander during the battle given any course of action.

For example, they rehearse when and where rockets and close air support will be employed against high-payoff targets during Phase I fires, what positions they must occupy to place the batteries within range, when they must move to occupy in sufficient time to accomplish their task, and the number of volleys required to achieve expected effects. They rehearse when and where scatterable minefields will be employed to ensure reserves are interdicted prior to the enemy commander’s decision to commit them. They rehearse where artillery batteries from the division artillery group must be positioned, and the trigger point for shooting nonpersistent chemicals against forces at the point of penetration, just prior to closure of the forward detachment. They rehearse when the jamming systems will begin jamming enemy fire support FM nets to achieve maximum disruption and force protection. Watch this process and it’s easy to see why OPFOR staffs are considered an element of combat power whose performance is key to success. It is their hard work in the planning and preparation phases which sets conditions for synchronization of the combined-arms team, and ensures it is preserved during battle.

While this is going on, subordinate commanders are back at their units issuing oral operations orders to their units, with every vehicle commander in attendance, always supported by hastily constructed terrain boards which facilitate quick visualization of what they are expected to do, and how they will do it.

Seven to eight hours after the regimental order is issued, the regiment conducts a regimental combined-arms rehearsal-a disciplined battle drill that affords the opportunity to conduct detailed rehearsals of at least two, usually three, courses of action in a two-hour period. Attendants are the regimental commander and staff, all commanders of subordinate units, and all team commanders in the regimental reconnaissance company. The chief of operations directs the rehearsal, the chief of staff adjudicates the outcome of engagements by phase, and the regimental commander observes intently to ensure synchronization is correct, his intent is clearly understood, and all units are doing exactly what he expects them to do, when and where he expects them to do it.

The rehearsal is conducted on a large-scale terrain board, configured to scale, with known and expected enemy forces indicated by markers, and all regimental graphic control measures. On the board are the chief of reconnaissance, chief of rockets and artillery, chief of air direction, chief of signal, and all subordinate commanders-only those leaders who command and direct forces in battle. The rehearsal always begins with a detailed depiction of how the reconnaissance company will conduct their tasks to achieve their purpose. Recon team leaders physically move along the infiltration routes they’ve chosen, describing their actions en route, the observation posts they will establish, what critical information they will acquire, and the fire support targets they are responsible for shooting. Once it is clear to all how observation of the regiment’s entire battlespace will be established, the rest of the combined-arms team follows and briefs their actions in detail, beginning with their statement of task and purpose.

The value of this rehearsal method cannot be overemphasized. It is critical to successful accomplishment of the mission. While the operations order and graphics may be clear, the battle really doesn’t come to life in the minds of subordinate leaders until they rehearse together as a team. In the rehearsal, they can visualize the employment of the entire combined-arms team, understand the key elements of synchronization that must be achieved, and clearly see how their unit fits into the operational concept relative to their teammates. Everybody knows what everybody else is doing. This produces a powerful synergy, seldom matched by their opponents.

Finally, after the regimental rehearsal, subordinate commanders return to their units and conduct their own detailed rehearsals with every leader in their unit present, not just the officers. All vehicle/crew commanders participate in the unit rehearsal. This technique guarantees complete knowledge of the operation through the ranks of the unit, and ensures the execution of the mission is not affected by loss of the company commander, platoon leaders or platoon sergeants. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a junior sergeant or corporal commanding a platoon or a company at the end of a battle, organizing his remaining force on the objective.

Meanwhile, and equally important, as the officers work through the orders and rehearsal process, the NCOs across the regiment are conducting detailed inspections of their equipment and soldiers ensuring both are prepared for combat. Hundreds of things are checked and double-checked to ensure all is ready: fluid levels, track tension, radios, fire control systems, maps and graphics, nightvision devices, boresight, ammunition, weapons, the list goes on.

The point to this discussion is that extensive and detailed preparation for combat, conducted by the officers and NCOs of an organization, is also indispensable to achieving the full combat potential of a unit. Incidentally, this preparatory process is seldom embedded with discipline throughout the brigade task forces the OPFOR oppose-another substantial advantage the OPFOR enjoys. Here’s the final reason.

It Is How the OPFOR Executes and Controls Combat Operations

Although their planning and preparation techniques and procedures create the ability for the OPFOR to win their battles before they fight them, there are certain techniques employed during the execution of battle which also serve as means of achieving the full combat potential of the combined-aims team. First and foremost is the regiment’s aggressive conduct of reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

The first condition any commander must set on the battlefield, if he wants to win, is the ability to see through the depths of the battlefield. If any reconnaissance team fails to reach its assigned observation post, a replacement team is immediately dispatched to replace it, or other teams are repositioned to reestablish coverage of that portion of the battlefield. In contrast, the brigade task forces they oppose are inadequately equipped with reconnaissance capability and have been for years. Brigades have never been provided the reconnaissance forces and capabilities necessary to establish and maintain complete and continual observation of their battlespace. From the OPFOR’s perspective, it’s the most serious organizational flaw and warfighting deficiency in our brigade task forces today. The OPFOR knows, through hard experience, that effective reconnaissance and surveillance are the key to success during execution of the battle, and remain the most powerful of many advantages they enjoy over their opponents.

Equally as important as reconnaissance, the OPFOR establishes multiple FM radio retransmission teams on terrain which will ensure FM communications capability is provided through the depth and width of the battlespace. Immediate, responsive FM communications are absolutely required to sustain common situational awareness, prevent fratricide, preserve flexibility, control the tempo of operations, and preserve synchronization of the combined-arms team in the close fight. If you can’t talk, you can’t fight on the modem battlefield. It makes no difference if you can see the battlefield in perfect detail. Forces at the tactical level of war cannot be accurately employed without sustained, reliable, instantaneous real-time communications.

Another key to the remarkable synchronization the OPFOR is able to achieve, and consequently its overwhelming combat power, is the use of a small staff to control the combined-arms team, and preserve synchronization. Positioned forward, working out of a one-vehicle command post, off one map, are the chief of staff, chief of reconnaissance, chief of rockets and artillery, and chief of air direction. This small team, the same team that planned and rehearsed the operation, orchestrates the entire battle, thereby freeing the regimental commander to move to a position where he can see the critical events unfold on the battlefield, see his decision points, and control the employment of his force as the situation develops. This technique of command and control-a small, mobile staff, armed with near-perfect situational awareness, empowered to direct the combined-arms team – virtually ensures the regimental commander can operate at a tempo of decisionmaking his opponent cannot match, and a level of synchronization his opponent cannot match.

Having said this, nothing is quite so influential to the outcome of a battle as the constant crosstalk between all commanders and the regimental staff. Listen to the regimental battle command net during a fight, and what you hear is a constant exchange of information between subordinate commanders. Occasionally, you will hear the regimental commander on the net, usually to seek clarification, or get specific information required to make his anticipated decisions, or issue the one or two decisions he must make during the course of battle. Most of the time, you will hear adjacent and following commanders talking to one another describing the enemy and friendly situation as it unfolds on the battlefield. Often, you will hear regimental reconnaissance leaders passing them critical information about enemy actions. That’s it. The regimental commander spends most of his time eavesdropping on his net, tracking the progress of the fight from the voices of his most trusted agents, his commanders on the ground. The chief of staff does the same thing, picking up his cues from commanders’ descriptions, and directing employment of lethal and nonlethal fires at the time and place required to set conditions for their success.

This cross-talk between commanders and staff is the principal reason the OPFOR is able to sustain accurate, real-time situational awareness of what’s happening on the battlefield. Nothing is more important during the execution of battle, amid the smoke, confusion and chaos. If a commander can see his battlefield, see the strength and disposition of his enemy, and see the strength and disposition of his own forces in near-real time, he can’t be whipped, if he has a speck of tactical competence and the forces available to win. Moreover, cross-talk virtually eliminates fratricide within the combined-arms team. Through eavesdropping, everyone knows where everyone else is located on the battlefield.

And finally, when all else fails, when subordinate units lose communications, when the key leaders are killed or injured, all units continue to fight guided by the commander’s intent-the overarching concept of what all must do to achieve success. Commander’s intent is an indispensable means of imposing control on the battlefield. Many battles are won each year based solely on adherence to commander’s intent, stated up front in the planning process, and reiterated to all leaders in the preparation phase. Leaders know what to do, what must be accomplished, and they do it, despite the fact they can’t talk to their commander.

In sum, techniques for imposing control and maintaining common situational awareness during the execution of operations are also key to achieving the full combat potential of a combined-arms team. It is disturbing that few of these techniques are observed or routinely practiced by brigade combined-arms teams the OPFOR opposes. This takes lots of training as one team under actual field conditions. Our brigade task forces do not have the opportunity under the conditions we serve in today.

Implications for Our Army and Landpower in the 21st Century

How does the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (the OPFOR) develop and sustain its ability to fight and defeat its opponents in almost every battle at the National Training Center? How does the regiment, fighting with 1960s-1970s technology, routinely defeat brigade task forces equipped with the most modem weapon systems and technology our Army can provide? How can the regiment do it given the same soldiers, the same personnel turbulence (about 40 percent turnover each year), the same leader development challenges, and the oldest fighting equipment in the active Army? There are the answers. There are the insights. From my perspective, the implications for our Army today and into the 21st century are profound. Why? Because the conditions which have afforded the opportunity for the OPFOR at NTC to achieve its full combat potential do not exist in our active Army today.

As an Army, we don’t organize the way we intend to fight. We have decided to bring the full weight and combat power of the combined-aims team to bear at brigade level, yet we don’t organize the brigade as a combined-aims team. It doesn’t matter that much for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, but it matters in combat. It’s the only way to achieve the full combat potential of the enormous investments we’ve made in combat systems and capabilities. Although nobody can match us on the current battlefield, we’re far less effective than we can be.

We don’t train anymore with the rigor and frequency in the field necessary to develop and sustain full combat potential. Shortage of money, shortage of time, shortage of leaders and soldiers, peacekeeping operations and other factors conspire against us and deny us the ability to train soldiers, leaders and units at the frequency necessary to develop and sustain proficiency in mission essential tasks. For that matter, we don’t measure our combat readiness in terms of our ability to accomplish our mission-essential tasks, which is a direct function of the frequency with which we train. We measure it in terms of the number of leaders and soldiers we have, the amount of equipment we have, the maintenance posture of equipment, and available training resources. Granted these are components of readiness, but it is training that tums these resources into combat capability, and it’s the frequency of training that develops and sustains a unit’s full combat potential.

We don’t train and certify that combat-arms commanders and their staffs at battalion and brigade level have the knowledge, skill, ability and intuition to employ a combined-arms team in combat before we place them in those critical positions. None must prove their competence through objective examination of any kind. It’s not a requirement for selection. Moreover, we have no training programs within our Army which will develop and provide our soldiers fully competent combined-arms commanders, S-2s (intelligence officers), S-3s (operations officers), S-4s (logistics officers), fire support officers, and other key members of combined-arms battalion and brigade staffs. It’s ironic. We wouldn’t let a surgeon touch us with a knife unless we were absolutely sure he or she had earned the credentials and was certified competent and skilled by tough, rigorous board certification. Yet we entrust the lives of our soldiers to officers who are not required to undergo equivalent competency evaluation. Consequently, we are far from being what we can be and need to be to achieve the full combat potential of the soldiers we lead.

We teach our officers to plan combat operations, but we don’t teach commander and staff teams how to win our battles before we fight them, nor how to set conditions for effective synchronization of the combined-arms team during the planning process. At advance courses, Combined Alms and Services Staff School (CAS3), and Command and General Staff College (CGSC) we teach officers how to conduct METI-T analysis and write a five-paragraph order, complete with a dozen annexes, but we don’t teach them how to synchronize employment of the combined-arms team-the most critical outcome which must emerge from the planning process; the thing that brings the full combat potential of the force to bear on the battlefield. Nor do we train and teach the critical preparation and execution techniques the OPFOR has learned and continues to employ, which are really nothing more than what our best warfighting units learned to do in combat throughout the last half of this century. We’re good, but we can be better.

Also implied in this essay is the pressing need for our Army to develop new organizational, resource and training strategies which can restore or create the conditions we need to achieve our full combat potential in the years ahead. In short, we must strive to create the same conditions the OPFOR enjoys-conditions which have become unique in the force. No positive enhancement in our combat capability will occur unless we do. It matters little if we throw Crusader gun systems, the tactical internet or Comanche helicopters into the force. They will lie there only as combat potential. Their effective employment and effectiveness on the battlefield will hinge upon a couple of imperatives. First, it will hinge upon mastery of the fundamentals of warfighting at crew and small-unit level, the opportunity to learn these fundamentals under realistic field conditions, and training at the frequency necessary to develop and sustain performance standards. In turn, this demands and compels us to change the way we measure combat readiness. Second, it will hinge upon combined-arms commanders and staffs who possess a proven complement of tactical knowledge, skill, ability and intuition, derived through long experience. We will have to change the way we develop and train combined-arms commanders and warfighting staffs.

In conclusion, in the context of this essay the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment-the Opposing Force at the NTC- serves only as an example of what our Army can be and illuminates many of the components of warfighting necessary for a combined-arms team to achieve its full combat potential at the tactical level of war. You can choose to dismiss, agree with or dispute these things. But one thing is certain. If we ignore the insights provided by the soldiers and leaders of our OPFOR regiment these past few years, then we will be far less than we can be. We will fall far short of our full combat potential, and we just might jeopardize our landpower dominance in the years ahead. Let’s roll up our sleeves.

Colonel Rosenberger is currently serving as Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA.

The above was originally published by the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute for Land Warfare Studies as a part of its Landpower Essay Series. Read it in its original form here.

Featured Image: Troopers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment perform coordinated training operations in support of highlighting the U.S. Army to the Fox Sports Network on 26 OCT, 2013 here at Fort Irwin, Calif. (Photo taken by Capt. Chad E. Cooper, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Public Affairs Officer)

Capability Analysis, Europe

Should the U.S. Arm Ukraine with Anti-Ship Missiles?

2 Comments

By Mykola Bielieskov

When it comes to U.S. military-technical assistance for Ukraine in the context of Russian aggression, sharing the Javelin anti-tank guided missile with the Ukrainian Ground Forces is what is typically mentioned. And at the beginning of March 2018 the U.S. State Department gave its approval for the provision of this kind of weaponry to Kyiv. There is nothing surprising in this, since the land forces of Ukraine bear the main burden of confronting and deterring further Russian aggression. However, today it is necessary to start talking about the needs of the other branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine given the challenges facing them.

A Navy Adrift

The situation in the Ukrainian Navy is close to a catastrophic one. The Russian Federation’s occupation of the Crimea in 2014 especially negatively affected the fighting capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy as nearly 80 percent of the fleet was lost due to capture and defection. In fact, four corvettes (Lutsk, Khmelnitsky, Ternopil, Prydniprov’ia), two minesweepers (Chernigiv, Cherkasy), the large landing ship Konstantin Olshansky, and the submarine Zaporozhye were captured by Russian forces. In addition, Russian occupants captured and never returned up to 15 auxiliary vessels.

The urgent need for platforms in the Ukrainian Navy could be solved by Western country transfers to Kyiv of older ships, which are decommissioned or near retirement. Actually, from time-to-time this idea is voiced by certain American experts. The U.S. government, among other things, is ready to provide the Ukrainian Navy with two coastal guards ships of the Island class. They, in contrast to Ukrainian artillery boats of the Gyurza-M class, have better seaworthiness and greater autonomy. However, the simple transfer of platforms can only partly solve the problems the Ukrainian Navy faces today. Getting Western ships can solve the problem with minesweepers or auxiliary vessels. However, the main question remains unaddressed: how could the Ukrainian Navy counter attempts by the Russian Federation to use its domination of the Black Sea for further aggression?

As the result of Russian aggression Ukraine lost in Crimea ground-based anti-ship platforms, which were armed with Termit anti-ship cruise missiles. Similarly, after the Crimea occupation, the missile boat Pryluky was returned to Ukrainian authorities but lacked its two Termit anti-ship missiles.

Today the Ukrainian Navy is not able to properly counteract possible attempts by the Russian Black Sea Fleet to carry out an amphibious landing operation. In this contest it is necessary to recall that in 2014-2015 the Security Service of Ukraine exposed and broke down covert attempts to create the so-called secessionist Bessarabian People’s Republic. This fictional republic was going to be based on territories of a southern part of the Odessa oblast. In the event of the establishment of this illicit territory, the Russian Black Sea Fleet would have had the opportunity to freely land the necessary troops and to maintain sea lines of communication with a new pseudo-state bordering western Ukraine along with occupied Crimea. Ukraine in this case could not have prevented such contingencies, since the Navy does not have the necessary anti-ship capabilities to destroy combat and landing enemy vessels.

Although Ukraine is developing its own anti-ship cruise missile Neptune, the first public test of which took place in late January 2018, the system is still nascent. The relevant sea-based risks and threats for Ukraine still exist. In addition, the question is how many Neptune missiles Ukraine will be able to purchase annually for their Navy, given that the entire budget for modernization and procurement of equipment is only $600 million this fiscal year.

As a result, it is urgently necessary to start a dialogue on the possibility of transfer to Ukraine of American Harpoon anti-ship missiles with the necessary equipment for guidance and data exchange systems. The U.S. military budget for 2018 FY provides for the allocation of up to $200 million to enhance Ukraine’s defense capabilities, including the possibility of using these funds for purchase of coastal defense radars, minelayers, minesweepers, and littoral ships. This document captures a change in the paradigm of thinking and awareness in the Pentagon of Ukraine’s vulnerability to threats from the sea. However, as has been said above, only vessels or even radar systems will not be enough to remedy the shortfall.

The U.S. Navy is currently developing new generations of anti-ship missiles (LRASM, Tomahawk, and SM-6 anti-ship variants) that have much longer range than the current Harpoon anti-ship missile. However, in the context of a closed sea like the Black Sea, it will be enough for Ukrainian Navy to deploy the latest modification of the Harpoon missile – the Block II ER+. The radius of this modification is up to 134 nautical miles or 250 km. It is notable that the Ukrainian anti-ship missile “Neptune” will have a similar range. It is also indicative that Finland is considering the Harpoon Block II ER + as the main weapon for the future four frigates of the 2020 project, which will operate in the similarly constrained Baltic Sea.

An F/A-18 carries the new Harpoon Block II+ missile during a free flight test Nov. 18 at Point Mugu’s Sea Range in California. The Navy plans to deliver the Block II+ variant to the fleet in 2017. (U.S. Navy photo)

The transfer to Ukraine of Harpoon Block II ER+ anti-ship cruise missiles and related equipment, together with their installation on future fleet and land-based anti-ship platforms, will not only eliminate significant gaps in the country’s defense capabilities. It will also help secure the safety of maritime trade, on which the economy of Ukraine depends critically. This decision will allow the United States to solve several important security issues in the Black Sea region at once. All this happens when the U.S. Navy has the smallest number of ships in almost a century (283 ships), and it faces the need for a permanent presence in numerous parts across the world’s oceans, including the Black Sea Basin. Strengthening the capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy will reduce the need for such presence. In addition, strengthening the anti-ship component of the Ukrainian armed forces will make its Navy a truly important component in any joint NATO Black Sea Fleet, an idea which has been discussed for several years. Today, the Ukrainian Navy cannot actually be an effective contributor to the joint efforts of the littoral states to contain the Russian Federation in the Black Sea basin. Ultimately, the presence of Harpoon Block II ER+ missiles together with the necessary radars and information exchange systems with other NATO countries will enable, in practice, to enhance the interoperability of the Ukrainian armed forces with NATO partners. In this way, it will contribute to the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and the fulfillment of the tasks of the Strategic Defense Bulletin.

Conclusion

Ukraine today, given the need of countering threats from the sea, is in a situation where the need for U.S. anti-ship missiles is much more important than obtaining Javelin ATGMs. The U.S. Defense Department’s budget for 2018 FY records the understanding that Washington should help Ukraine counteract not only land-based but also maritime threats that are actually much sharper, given the current state of the Ukrainian Navy. However, only the acquisition of appropriate anti-ship missiles such as the Harpoon Block II ER+ will enable the Ukrainian Navy to effectively counter the growing capabilities of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea. Such a bold decision will strengthen security in this part of the world, reduce the need for the United States to be constantly present, and make Ukraine a true contributor to Black Sea security.

Mykola Bielieskov is the Deputy Executive Director at the Institute of World Policy.

Featured Image: Day of the Ukranian Navy Ceremony, July 2016. (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine)

Future War, Strategic Outlook

Leading Military Innovation, Past and Present

1 Comment

By Mie Augier and Wayne Hughes

Introduction

Recently, senior decision makers and leaders, including the CNO, CMC, and SecNav, have expressed a belief in the centrality of military innovation and adaptation, and many commentators in think tanks and the press are promoting more military innovation for future readiness. Implicitly or explicitly, enthusiasms for innovation usually take one of the three following forms: emphasizing the nature of innovative thinking, the achievement of new innovations in military organizations, and establishing a culture of innovation.ii

These are overlapping issues. Recognizing their importance and talking about them is an essential beginning, because all three are needed, and they are intertwined. In this brief paper we intend to provide a discussion of, first, some aspects of the nature of innovation and why it is difficult; second, how successful organizations have innovated and adapted in the past; and third, the nature of thinking and action that undergirds innovation.iii

The Nature of Innovation

Doing things differently is difficult; but the heart of innovation is about first seeing things differently which is just as hard. Both involve making decisions under uncertainty and ambiguity, and embracing risk. There is a natural human instinct and inclination to want certainty about the future, but predicting a future is like “driving in the dark” as former Secretary of Navy Richard Danzig put it in 2011.iv If we base our decision-making on unrealistic assumptions about uncertainty, we are not likely to get things right. In addition, trying to base innovation on a predictable future can lead to endless debate because the discussions are unresolvable and will go on without end. Moreover, from the record of the past, the consensus of experts will be unreliable. N. N. Taleb in The Black Swan described the need to respond to unforeseeable events. P. E. Tetlock in Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? offered conclusive evidence that an expert’s power of prediction ten years in the future was “worse than that of a dart throwing monkey,” in other words, less reliable than a random choice.v 

Regardless, battle-changing innovations do happen. Here are three ways to help us cope with, perhaps even embrace, an unpredictable future:

Thinking about alternative futures. Thinking about alternative futures is a powerful way of enabling decision-making under uncertainty pioneered by Herman Kahn, and put into productive use by Andrew Marshall in many of his Office of Net Assessment studies. The reward of exploring alternative futures is the chance to uncover and adopt a strategy, new technologies, and new tactics suitable for all or most of them. For example, our future with China may be collaboration, competition, confrontation, or different kinds and levels of conflict. This has many implications, including that it may be possible to design one fleet that imperfectly supports an adaptive maritime strategy to keep the peace and support our East Asia allies.vi

Looking at historical trends. In addition to thinking about possible futures, looking at our pasts and our history to identify trends can be a useful way to navigate the seas of uncertainty. For example, the approach in Fleet Tactics and Naval Operationsvii  is to identify trends and constants in naval history. Because trends are likely to continue, they can guide the development of new tactics and technologies. For example, the trend toward smaller, faster, and more efficient computers and their growing applications is one that has a profound influence on information warfare. “COTS” (commercial off-the-shelf) technologies have had the biggest effect on computer technology. The same kind of influence and eventual dominance of commercially developed control systems is now affecting the growing power and flexibility of UAVs.

Studying successful innovations from the past.  Understanding the evolutionary processes enabling innovation can be useful indicators of what might work in the future, and how implementing innovation has proceeded, usually along a winding road. While it is tempting to look to business for learning how to innovate, there is much to learn from past innovation in many military organizations’ histories, indicating also that non-linear forward progress is the norm for effecting innovations.viii For example, aircraft carriers were developed before their coming dominance at sea was fully appreciated. Tanks had a checkered history: The British invented them; the French built high quality ones in large numbers; but the Germans exploited their tactical advantages with a new operational application, the Blitzkrieg. Vertical lift aircraft were notably inferior to propeller and jet-propelled aircraft, yet they revolutionized air and ground warfare.ix 

Note that great achievements at the combat level usually require both new technologies and new tactics, which are like two sides of a coin and often best enabled if guided by new concepts and new ways of thinking. Leaders must learn how to marry the quite different personalities of technologists and seagoing officers to accomplish big advancements.

Achieving Innovation in Military Organizations

Most innovations take place in organizations, or need organizations to generate new inventions. Organizations can help and encourage, but sometimes stifle, innovation. As organizations age and grow (and most military organizations are both quite large and old) they first develop routines, rules, and structures to improve efficiencies and get things done, but then the rules and bureaucratic processes often take a life of their own and multiply, resulting in organizational calcification.

As Secretary Gates perceptively noted in his discussion of why our bureaucracies often fail:  “[L]eaders … often encounter entrenched cultures that make real change difficult, as well as lower-level organizations resistant to guidance from the top, determined to preserve their piece of the cake and their status. Trimming organizational deadwood can be as challenging in the business world as in public institutions. It is a rare soul who has not been frustrated and maddened by multiple business bureaucracies—not to mention disastrous business decisions that cost jobs and create economic turmoil and heartache.”x

Commercial organizations and think tanks offer examples of innovative research (RAND in the 1950s and the early Bell Labs come to mind), and they can provide important inputs to military organizations and innovations. We can undoubtedly learn from how they organized and facilitated innovative research. But military organizations are not think tanks, whose product is thought and writing. Military organizations must also plan and act. Military organizations are different from commercial organizations, too. Both have an important competitive/interactive aspect. Businesses gain and maintain competitive advantages by making and selling competitive products. Military organizations need to gain and maintain competitive advantages too, but they are designed to destroy an enemy’s will to fight and his means of war. Despite the differences, there are things we can learn from studying the organizational mechanisms that have successfully supported innovation in different contexts, such as reducing administrative overhead, decentralizing the decision-making, and trying to avoid empowering middle managers with too many layers of approval. An example of the relevance of this approach in a military organization was Commandant and General Al Gray’s transformation of the USMC with a maneuver warfare way of thinking.xi He worked toward freeing up the people with ideas and protecting them from paperwork and bureaucracy. We also note that Secretary Mattis’ emphasis on combat readiness is intended to free people from unnecessary training and administration.xii

Organizations have adapted to changes in warfare in the past, as we suggested above with aircraft carriers, precision-guided weapons, and the atomic bomb. These innovations were not merely passive responses to change: many proactively created changes in warfare. Speaking about uncertainty and risk, someone once said, “If you can predict the future then I can’t change it.” Interestingly, many of the most important innovations helped shape a future by imposing change on the enemy, exploiting enemy weaknesses, and building on our strengths.xiii

Successful past innovations were often focused geographically with a specific enemy in mind. For example, the development of Marine amphibious assault doctrine and the vessels to achieve it grew out of Major Earl “Pete” Ellis’ study of the Pacific Islands and atolls the Marines knew they would have to seize in the event of war with Japan. The Israeli Navy swiftly developed small missile combatants armed with Gabriel missiles after the sinking (in 1967) of the destroyer Eilat with ASCMs fired from small, Soviet-built, Egyptian-operated, Osa and Komar missile boats. In just six years from a cold start, the Israeli Navy obtained the ships and trained crews to defeat the Egyptian and Syrian navies in the 1973 War. It was a great shock to the enemy and changed the nature of naval war in coastal waters.

The Importance of Nurturing Innovative Thinkers

Not everyone in the organization should be an innovative thinker. Many must excel in planning with existing capabilities and fighting. Most people prefer to do what they know they do best, and they can often easily measure and see the results of their work. Innovative thinking requires experimenting with what one does not know best and sometimes not at all. The fruits of such work are often more distant and uncertain. Organizations, to be adaptive, need both exploration with new ideas and ways of thinking (leading to new capabilities in the long run) and exploitation of existing ones. A problem arises when planners do not appreciate the necessary contribution of a few precious disruptive and innovative thinkers.xiv But if innovators alone dominate, then there is no one to plan the development, implementation, and tactics to exploit an innovation, often in ways quite different from the original intent.xv Leaders must know how to recognize, nurture, and listen to innovative thinkers and suppress bureaucratic impediments to “thinking differently.”

How do our organizations attract and make room for them, and cultivate innovators in organizations to help the constructive application of disruptive thinking? By attracting and fostering the careers of the future Arleigh Burkes, Al Grays, and Hyman Rickovers who have bold ideas. A few relevant aspects:

Recognizing and making room for disruptive talent. There is a great need to be open to creative individuals, those with ideas that may challenge the system and managers at times. As Colonel John Boyd noted in his testimony on military transformation: “First, we need to understand that throughout history the difference between brilliantly performing armies and mediocre ones has always depended on a small handful of combat leaders. Naturally, the military that manages to nurture a tiny handful of brilliant, innovative officers .. achieves great results… On the other hand, a military that suppresses said brilliant and unconventional young officers among them, who I might add tend to make life uncomfortable for seniors, is forced to grind out rigid, predictable battles with much blood and mountains of material.”xvi 

Creating unusual mixing. One can help fight against the organizational bureaucratic inertia by mixing teams of people in unconventional ways. Doing so demands creative leadership because there are centripetal forces at work. People gravitate toward those who are most like themselves, but we often learn more by interacting with those unlike ourselves. In academic and military educational institutions, leaders can take proactive roles in “mixing” people who may otherwise gravitate toward the institutional and intellectual comfort of those with the same beliefs.

The concepts and words we use matter. Successful military slogans like “distributed lethality” applied by the Surface Navy today has shown the way to innovative development in an organization that leads to unified technological and tactical development. “Attack effectively first” is another simple slogan of naval warfare with many applications that have been verified by past success in battle. The slogan has many nuanced implications and is a clue to how to win at sea today. It can guide technological, tactical, and organizational development in the future. The Revolution in Military Affairs is another identifier of technologies and tactics that had profound effects on all modern warfare and a concept that was intended to also emphasize the underlying intellectual and organizational changes needed, not just the technology.xvii 

Achieving Innovation in the Navy 

Innovation cannot be reduced to a check-off list, a blueprint, or a manual to guide creativity. Military doctrine manuals provide for unified strategic planning and tactical cooperation. That is different from innovation. Contrast Edison’s development of the electric light bulb with the multifaceted development of the Polaris submarine and missile under the leadership of CNO Arleigh Burke, who had the inspired idea,  the actions by Red Raborn in developing the missile, and Hyman Rickover in developing the submarine. Contrast both with the strange history of the development the tank in 1917 and its several applications to armored warfare. There is no one single process to guide success.

However, there are things naval leaders can do to foster innovative thinking and make their organizations more prepared to adopt new tactics and technology, including:

Guard against a no-defect mentality and fear of failure. The only way never to make a mistake is to never make a decision, in other words to do nothing perfectly. Innovative thinking will never be right all the time, so there has to be a system that encourages variations in ideas in order to swiftly accept, adopt, and assimilate the good variations.xviii Ironically, avoiding failures can lead to loss of opportunities to learn from failures and evolve. The advancement of naval aviation in the 1920s and 1930s is a case study in learning from false starts and failures while rapidly progressing to readiness for World War II. Senior leaders must also actively protect disruptive thinkers.

Have organizational structures in place to recognize innovative thinking that doesn’t fit the mold of preconception. The common mistake is preparing to fight the last war. Instead when a promising advancement is discovered, create shortcuts under a sense of urgency to get around the bureaucratic system. The early success of Navy Special Projects offices in the 1950s illustrates this, and so does the empowerment of Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer to develop the Aegis combat system by the Surface Navy leadership of Vice Admiral James Doyle.  

Emphasize that the most important characteristic to foster innovation is people. Advancement comes not from processes; or disciplinary lenses, or the “how to” manuals, or even advances in technology. The most important element in organizations and in warfare is the human element. As former Marine Corps Commandant General Robert Barrow noted, “In any institution or undertaking, the importance of people transcends all else.”xix Marine Combat University President General Bowers also noted (in his discussion of Wilson and Barrow), “You can get everything else wrong, but if you get the people right, you will be all right. Whereas you can get everything else right, but if you get the people wrong, you are going to be in trouble.”xx Leaders must proactively constrain middle managers who maintain the status quo with a “spreadsheet” mentality. 

Recognize and reward the best leadership styles. In addition to realizing that the most important element is the people chosen, we need leaders who stick their necks out for those willing to experiment and do things differently and provide top cover for the people who are implementing the new ideas, technologies, and tactics. In particular, leaders can help on issues such as: 

Experimentation. Experiment at sea with prototypes and first generation designs in the full expectation that second and third generation designs must be built to correct the early mistakes and smooth out shortcomings. Experiments can also lead to innovative ways in how organizations think and fight. Marine Generals Al Gray and Charles Krulak led many experiments in the early days of maneuver warfare before the concept was fully developed and adopted, experiments that were both intellectual, organizational, and operational.xxi 

Exploiting the creativity of youth by “getting out of the way.” Here are wise words regarding cyberwar from a Navy lieutenant: “The most talented graduate students at the best U. S. computer science and engineering schools are said to be those who leave before graduation in order to pursue venture capital or other commercial opportunities . . . [to pursue excellence in the Navy] administratively and organizationally reduce the various forms of friction that would inhibit those [young] individuals and teams within their cyber forces from innovating, developing, and deploying capabilities faster than the adversary force.”xxii Talented youth will be prominent in cyber war evolution, just as they rose to prominence in computer technology, as youthful combat leaders like William B. Cushing and J. E. B. Stuart in wartime, or as youthful classical music composers like W. A. Mozart and Felix Mendelssohn.

Building an organizational culture to support innovation and reward risk takers. It goes without saying there are limits and achieving a balance is one of the most challenging skills of leadership. Nevertheless, it is a lot easier to suppress innovation and risk-taking than to grow it. Leaders must be particular attentive to the handful of people who are willing to take risks and protect the intelligent risk-takers from thoughtless suppression because they are willing to dare.

Broadening peoples’ minds. Foster curiosity in the midst of good discipline. Cultivating open minds is a key responsibility of our military educational institutions. Retired VADM Patricia Tracey in an interview noted last year, while reflecting on her exceptional career, extolled her time in graduate school: “[E]ducation is about how does it all fit together? . . . How might you think about doing things differently?  . . .  I say just that time out in a thought-provoking environment to consolidate everything that you’ve experienced and draw meaning from it and expectations for what’s next . . . is invaluable to somebody who’s at some point going to have to deal in massive uncertainty.”xxiii The University of Chicago under Robert Hutchins actively promoted broad reading that helped broaden civilian minds. Military innovative thinkers such as General Gray and Secretary Mattis are famously avid (and broad) readers. Mattis said in 2003 when asked about the importance of reading, that while reading doesn’t give you all the answers, it lights up the path ahead and enables us to understand and learn from the past.xxiv

Conclusion

Secretary Danzig’s metaphor of “driving in the dark” is very relevant to the road to improve innovation amidst uncertainty, and it will not be a straight highway. Yet, notwithstanding the difficult nature of innovation and the inhibiting organizational processes that often suppress it, past successes suggest that we can indeed nurture innovators and grow innovations in the U.S. Navy. This will unavoidably accompanied by bruising the status quo ways of thinking. We have not discussed every aspect of success. Further dimensions to explore include how our educational institutions must help build more innovative and interdisciplinary thinking, and examining past attempts to innovate, including the failures, with an eye for their strategic, organizational, and tactical implications. 

Dr. Mie Augier is associate professor at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. She is interested in strategy, organizations, innovation, leadership, and how to educate strategic and innovative thinkers.

Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (Ret.) served thirty years on active duty, commanding a minesweeper, a destroyer, and a large training command. In retirement has taught, done research, and served as a Dean at the Naval Postgraduate School for over thirty years. He is a distinguished author of the U.S. Naval Institute.

Footnotes

i We dedicate this paper to Andrew W. Marshall, who continues to inspire us and who has tirelessly worked to improve innovation and innovative thinking in our organizations. We are grateful for the comments from Jim March, BGen William Bowers, VADM Ronald Route, and Andy Marshall on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors were produced without help.

ii We should also mention that while we draw mostly on Navy and USMC examples, other services have also begun important discussions on the topic, see for example: https://www.army.mil/article/173386/making_innovation_happen

iii Although our paper is largely conceptual in order to provide insights into the dynamics making innovation difficult but possible, we also include some practical examples / anecdotes on the basis of past success. Obviously, more research and reflections on the topic is needed, but we hope to indicate at least part of foundation and some fruitful lines along which progress can be made.

iv See, R. Danzig : “Driving in the Dark”, available here: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/driving-in-the-dark-ten-propositions-about-prediction-and-national-security

v Military leaders have also made similar points. Robert Gates for instance noted to West Point cadets: “When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more — we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.” Secretary Jim Mattis (then General) also noted in a testimony to the arms services committee in 2011: “I think, as we look toward the future, I have been a horrible prophet. I have never fought anywhere I expected to in all my years.” These (and other) examples of our prediction capabilities noted here: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/16/100-right-0-of-the-time/

vi Forces for such a strategy must demonstrate that we can deny China’s commerce and sink the PLA’s warships in its own home waters with a capability that takes the offensive in China’s Seas with highly distributable forces.

vii Naval Institute Press, April 2018

viii In particular given that the organizations ability to experiment and adapt to new innovations may be quite different in business and military organizations. This is not to say that we don’t think there is plenty to be learned from business organizations – for example, minimizing red tape, bureaucratic chain reactions and paperwork is clearly something business is better at. But when it comes to understanding how to implement innovations, as well as understanding the dynamics of the larger strategic environment and the adoption of innovations, studying military examples from the past might provide useful information (see, for instance, Williamson Murray and Allan Millet’s book on “Military Innovation in the Interwar Period”).

ix Other examples include: Nuclear ICBM’s changed all aspects of warfare. Cruise Missiles are teaming with and sometimes replacing strike aircraft because of their great range and endurance. UAV’s and Autonomous Aerial Vehicles combined with cyber warfare technologies are changing the nature of warfare as we write.

x R. Gates (2016): A Passion for Leadership, p. 5.

xi A discussion of the USMC maneuver way of thinking and its history is available here: http://grc-usmcu.libguides.com/c.php?g=756767&p=5426039.

xii https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2017/07/25/mattis-get-unnecessary-training-off-warfighters-backs/

xiii This also implies that we must spend a great deal of time trying to understand how our opponents think and how their organizations work, in addition to observing what they do.

xiv Organization scholar James March has long warned that this is a typical ‘competency trap’ of organizations and that we should pay particular attention to trying to nurture and nudge those willing to explore (see J. March, “Exploration and Exploitation in organizational learning”, Organization Science, 1991).

xv Designer of Predator, Abraham Karem, noted that his drones were built for the cold war, but its various employments has expanded seemingly without limit. https://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/the-man-who-invented-the-predator-3970502/

xvi As Colonel John Boyd noted in his testimony on military transformation: “First, we need to understand that throughout history the difference between brilliantly performing armies and mediocre ones has always depended on a small handful of combat leaders. Naturally, the military that managers nurture a tiny handful of brilliant, innovative officers combat command achieves great results. … On the other hand, a military that suppresses said brilliant and unconventional young officers among them, who I might add tend to make life uncomfortable for seniors, is forced to grind out rigid, predictable battles with much blood and mountains of material.” The testimony available here: https://www.c-span.org/video/?17753-1/us-military-reform-oper-desert-storm

xvii Another example is the maneuver warfare of ideas, for years debated and discussed among Marines including writing (in a series of Gazette articles), to help clarify important dimensions of the concepts and ideas.

xviii As recognized for instance in the USMC Commandant’s call for innovative and disruptive thinkers: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2016/03/04/commandant-looks-to-disruptive-thinkers-to-fix-corps-problems/

xix As quoted in “Commandants of the Marine Corps”, edited by Allan Millet and Jack Shulinson, US Naval Institute Press, 2004, p. 456.

xx See BGen Bowers lecture on USMC commandants Wilson and Barrow and the reforms they led: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJZCBg_SDLY

xxi A panel discussion of the history and some relevant aspects of maneuver thinking is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RL4__NVYByw

xxii LT. T. B. Meadors (USN), First Gain the Victory: Six Strategic Considerations for Naval Cyber Forces, 2017, prepared for and disseminated by VADM Jan Tighe, USN, Deputy CNO for Information Warfare and Director of Naval Intelligence, p. 7.

xxiii Military Operations Research, V22, N1, 2017; page 75.

xxiv http://www.strifeblog.org/2013/05/07/with-rifle-and-bibliography-general-mattis-on-professional-reading/. A great discussion of the importance of broad reading in the military profession in general is P. v. Riper (2006): “The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine’s View”. In W. Murray & H. Sinnrich (eds): The Past as Prologue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Featured Image: The X-47B on the deck of the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) on Nov. 10, 2013. US Navy Photo

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.