Capability Analysis

Contested Ship-to-Shore Movement, Pt. 2: Firepower Overmatch

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Part One of this series focused on the role of quantity in contested ship-to-shore movement. Read it here.

By Josh Abbey

The age of battleships laying broadsides into beaches may have been over when the USS Iowa was decommissioned, but the increasing threat of anti-ship missiles and A2/AD may draw a curtain on the modern surface combatant doing likewise. For a contested ship-to-shore movement to be successful at the shore overmatch is required at the landing zone both in terms of quantity of troops and firepower. Unable to conjure enough firepower out on the beach due to obvious constraints, extensive supporting firepower must come from the air and the sea.

Contesting the Beach in the Modern Age

Anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles are a constant and pervasive complication to ship-to-shore movement against a well-equipped foe. Prior to the creation of precision weapons amphibious fleets could often stage just over the horizon or even closer. Now amphibious fleets can be challenged from land more than 100 miles out to sea.1 The increasing range and speed of anti-ship missiles necessitate over-the-horizon capabilities for amphibious fleets to operate safely.2 Increasingly capable integrated air defense systems also greatly threaten the viability of fire support from the air.3 A2/AD strategies can situate long-range artillery and rocket batteries within air defense bubbles, forming extensive threat zones while using unmanned vehicles for ISR. The proliferation of ASMs and SAMs means even some non-state actors can hold amphibious fleets at risk further out to sea. For example, Hezbollah posses Noor anti-ship missiles with a range of 75 miles,4 and for state actors the range is even greater.5

Modern missile systems present a major problem to ship-to-shore movement in that they can also force out of range what little exists of gun-based fire support from ships. Given how anti-ship missiles may be fielded in fewer numbers than anti-air missiles, ships may find themselves providing fire support when aircraft cannot. Even so, the land attack cruise missiles they may contribute could also be held at risk by anti-air systems, and where closing the range to use guns more effectively could put ships at risk from smaller, anti-armor guided weapons.6

In any case accurate fire support is vital and in high demand. Naval gunfire support played a considerable role in Vietnam and particularly in the Falklands, enabling small British units to combat larger Argentine forces.7 However, the transition from gunfire to missiles as the default weapon of modern ships decreases the availability of fire support. Navies are unlikely to fire expensive munitions such as a Tomahawk missile to destroy a machine gun emplacement or a vehicle, whereas gunfire can be brought to bear on numerous targets of opportunity. Ships also carry limited numbers of land attack missiles due to the need to maintain a diverse inventory of missiles for a variety of multi-domain threats. In a contested theater one would also be loath to expend many Tomahawks on minor land targets a short distance away. Land attack missiles may be able to carry some of the burden for amphibious troops, but if fired at a great distance out to sea the long flight time for subsonic missiles is hardly ideal for troops in contact.11 These cruise missiles would also likely need some form of in-flight retargeting support to ensure their precision.  

The sea denial aspect of certain precision weapons can be mitigated to an extent by extending the range of gun-based fire support. These capabilities can include the Advanced Gun System firing the Long-Range Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP) which can reach out to over 70 nautical miles.8 However, the cost of the LRLAP makes this exception prohibitively expensive. One LRAP at approximately $800,000 is around half the cost of a Tomahawk missile.9 One could purchase 11 guided Excalibur shells for that price able to hit targets over 30 miles away or 266 precision guidance kits for M549 shells and reach out to over 15 miles away.10

Spent shell casings from a naval gunfire support mission by HMS Cardiff (D108) on the night of 5 June, 1982, as part of the Falklands War. Photograph was taken the morning after on 6 June, also the top of her charred Sea Dart launcher can be seen bottom right. She fired 277 rounds that night and also shot down AAC 656 Squadron Gazelle XX377 in ‘Blue on Blue’ friendly fire incident killing four British servicemen. (Wikimedia Commons)

Airpower to an extent has filled the vacuum gunfire or cruise missiles cannot. In the Falklands campaign for example, airstrikes from Harrier jets helped make up for the lack of gunfire support.11 However, air defense systems have become increasingly sophisticated and potent. As they will continue to grow in capability and proliferate amongst state and non-state actors, aircraft operating in A2/AD environments will be restricted to more advanced platforms.12 Rotary wing aircraft could be of little value if their ships have been forced out to sea by anti-ship missiles since the combat radius of many rotary wing attack aircraft is around 120 nautical miles.13 Instead, viable firepower support will be best provided via tube artillery, rockets, or cheaper missile systems that can operate closer to shore.

While surface combatants can undertake the task of providing fire support the range of most current gun systems places them well within the range of ASMs as well as tube and rocket artillery.14 It is unlikely one would take an Arleigh Burke or Type 45 destroyer into such an environment. Instead, cheaper and more expendable gun or missile boats carrying missiles like the Spike NLOS or ALAS, rocket artillery systems, or advanced naval guns will need to provide the firepower required. GMLRS equipped boats, capable of firing the ground-launched Small Diameter Bomb, the Deep Strike Missile, the Alternative Warhead, and other munitions could provide a powerful mix of close-in fire support and deeper interdiction fires. However, the key vulnerability of missile or rocket artillery boats will be logistical sustainment. These indirect fire systems could be used from the flight decks of larger ships as an intermediate measure.15

Such craft will also require point defense systems for survivability. This is a necessity to provide survivability for ship-to-shore connector because one can expect increasingly precise artillery and rocket systems. Laser-guided munitions capable of striking moving targets and top attack munitions such as the BAE Bofors 155 BONUS or SMArt 155 will be capable of significant devastation. It is conceivable that counter-battery fire can be swapped between defending land-based artillery and ships providing fire support for an invading force as artillery grows more precise.

Once visible on the horizon direct fire systems like anti-tank guided missiles can target landing craft and their fire support assets. Thus, hard and soft counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) systems, air defense, and active protection systems like Trophy will need to be equipped by both connectors and the vessels providing their fire support. Transit times to the shore will place both under fire for considerable lengths of time and sustaining close fire support for an amphibious force will be highly risky.

Conclusion

In an A2/AD environment ship-based fire support may often be limited to the unattractive option of cruise missiles given current capabilities and threats. Cheaper long-range missile and artillery systems will need to become more available in order to provide the requisite fire support to develop overmatch. One potential solution is the utilization of cheaper gun and missile boats that can be risked close in to shore to provide fire support and to project an area of point-based air defense around the approaching landing craft to increase survivability. In any case amphibious flotillas will require plenty of firepower and protection so as not to be disabled before arriving on the beach, but providing fire support against modern threats involves complicated and frequently unfavorable tradeoffs.

Josh Abbey is a research intern at the Royal United Services Institute of Victoria. He is studying a Bachelor of Arts at the University of Melbourne, majoring in history and philosophy. He is interested in military history and strategy, international security and analyzing future trends in strategy, capabilities and conflict.

References

[1] Andrew Feickert, Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 6.

[2] Bryan Clark and Jesse Sloman, Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in an Era of Precision Weapons (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2016), I.

[3] Carlo Kopp, “Proliferation of Advanced Air Defence Systems,” Defence Today (2010): 27. “Surviving the Modern Integrated Air Defence System”, Carlo Kopp, Air Power Australia, 2009, accessed, July 1, 2018,  http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-02.html#mozTocId418713. Jeff Harrigan and Max Marosko, “Fifth Generation Air Combat Maintaining the Joint Force Advantage”, JAPCC Journal 24, spring/summer (2017): 54.

[4] “Hezbollah” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, accessed June 30, 2018, http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/non-state-actors/hezbollah/.

[5] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015), 10.

[6] “For Want of a Broadside: Why The Marines Need More Naval Fire Support,” Vince DePinto, CIMSEC, accessed July 3, 2018, https://cimsec.org/want-broadside-marines-need-naval-fire-support/31347.

[7] Carter A. Malkasian, Charting the Pathway to OMFTS A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations From 1941 to the Present (Virginia: CNA, 2002), 41.

[8] “The 155mm Advanced Gun System-Lite (AGS-L) for DDG-51 Flight III,” Brent Weyer and Al Panek, BAE Systems, accessed July 10, 2018, https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2012/armaments/Tuesday14034weyer.pdf

[9] “Navy Planning on Not Buying More LRLAP Rounds for Zumwalt Class,” Sam LaGrone, USNI News, accessed July 14, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2016/11/07/navy-planning-not-buying-lrlap-rounds. Chief Technical Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System (Washington, D.C: Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense, 2017), 63.

[10] Michael Craig Harris, Is Tube Artillery a Viable Fire Support Platform for the United States Military on the Battlefields of the Future? (Alabama: Air War College, 2017), 22. “XM 982/Excalibur,” BAE Systems, accessed July 16, 2018, https://www.baesystems.com/en/download-en/20151124114142/1434555562238.pdf. Peter J., “XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) Overview,” Burke and Anthony Pergolizzi, Fuze Conference, accessed July 19, 2018, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.386.3598&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

[11] Earl H. Tilford, “Air Power Lessons,” in Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States, eds. Bruce Watson and Peter Dunn (Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 45.

[12] Carlo Kopp, “Proliferation of Advanced Air Defence Systems,” Defence Today (2010): 27. “Surviving the Modern Integrated Air Defence System”, Carlo Kopp, Air Power Australia, 2009, accessed, July 1, 2018,  http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-02.html#mozTocId418713. Harrigan and Marosko, “Fifth Generation Air Combat Maintaining the Joint Force Advantage,” 54.

[13] “For Want of a Broadside: Why The Marines Need More Naval Fire Support,” Vince DePinto, CIMSEC, accessed July 3, 2018, https://cimsec.org/want-broadside-marines-need-naval-fire-support/31347.

[14] “Mk 45 Mod 4 Naval Gun System,” BAE Systems, accessed July 20, 2018, https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/mk-45-mod-4-naval-gun-system. John Matsumura, Randall Steeb, and John Gordon IV, Assessment of Crusader: The Army’s Next Self-Propelled Howitzer and Resupply Vehicle (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998), 10.

[15] “For Want of a Broadside: Why The Marines Need More Naval Fire Support,” Vince DePinto, CIMSEC, accessed July 3, 2018, https://cimsec.org/want-broadside-marines-need-naval-fire-support/31347.

Featured Image: 180729-M-QH615-0222 MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII (July 29, 2018) AAV-P7/A1 assault amphibious vehicles assigned to Combat Assault Company, 3rd Marine Regiment, unload service members during an amphibious landing demonstration as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise at Pyramid Rock Beach on Marine Corps Base Hawaii July 29, 2018. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Aaron S. Patterson/Released)

Cyber War, Space

Why It Is Time For a U.S. Cyber Force

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By Dave Schroeder and Travis Howard

The proposal to create a U.S. Space Force has cyber professionals wondering about the government’s national security priorities. While spaceborne threats are very real — some of which cannot be suitably described in a public forum — the threats posed in cyberspace have been all too real for over a decade, and include everything from nuisance hacks by nation-states, to the weaponization of social media, to establishing beachheads on our nation’s electric grid, or the internet routers in your own home.

Since 2009, incremental improvements have been made to the nation’s ability to operate in cyberspace during this period. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) — first subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command, and then elevated to a Unified Combatant Command (UCC) — and the formation of the 133 teams that comprise the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) are chief amongst them.

Yet despite all of the money and attention that has been thrown at the “cyber problem” and for all of the increased authorities and appropriations from Congress, the nation’s offensive and defensive cyber capabilities suffer from inefficiency and a lack of a unified approach, slow to non-existent progress in even the most basic of cybersecurity efforts, and a short leash that is inconsistent with the agility of actors and adversaries in cyberspace. Our adversaries continue to attack our diplomatic, information, military, economic, and political systems at speeds never before seen.

The discourse surrounding the formation of a dedicated service for space defense has captured the American imagination, and for good reason. Since World War II, America has shown her ingenuity and innovation, and the success of the U.S. Air Force provides a historical model for how a combat-ready, specialized fighting force can be built around a new warfighting domain. However, a force structure has already taken shape within the U.S. military that would logically translate to its own service, and the operational culture it would both allow and cultivate would greatly enhance the effectiveness of national security.

It is past time to form the U.S. Cyber Force (USCF) as a separate branch of the United States Armed Forces.

America’s Position in Cyberspace is Challenged Daily — but it can be Strengthened

It’s no surprise that a wider breadth of adversaries can do more harm to American interests through cyberspace than through space, and for far less cost. In the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War — the cyber “ghosts” of which are still alive and well in 2018 — Bill Woodcock, the research director of the Packet Clearing House observed, “You could fund an entire cyberwarfare campaign for the cost of replacing a tank tread, so you would be foolish not to.”

Deterring and responding to Russian hybrid warfare in cyberspace, countering Chinese cyber theft of U.S. intellectual property, shutting down state and non-state actor attacks, defending American critical infrastructure — including the very machinations of our democracy, such as voting and political discourse and even cyber defense of U.S. space assets are just some of the heavy-lift missions that would occupy a U.S. Cyber Force.

Admiral (retired) Jim Stavridis recently described four ways for the U.S. and allied nations to counter challenges like the weaponization of social media and multifaceted information warfare campaigns on Western democracy: public-private cooperation, better technical defenses, publicly revealing the nature of the attacks (attribution), and debunking information attacks as they happen. A dedicated U.S. Cyber Force, with the proper ways and means to do so, could accomplish all of these things, and be a major stakeholder from day one.

Admiral (ret.) Mike Rogers, former Director, National Security Agency (NSA)/Chief, Central Security Service (CSS) and Commander, USCYBERCOM, in his 2017 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned against prematurely severing the coupling of cyber operations and intelligence that has been the hallmark of any success the U.S. has thus far enjoyed in cyberspace. General Paul Nakasone, the current DIRNSA/CHCSS and Commander, USCYBERCOM, made the same recommendation in August 2018. Despite increased resourcing of USCYBERCOM by both Congress and the Executive Branch, operational authorities in cyberspace are hamstrung by concerns about blending Title 10 military operations with Title 50 intelligence activities, along with negative public perception of the NSA. The relationship between USCYBERCOM and NSA requires a complicated (and classified) explanation, but blending cyber operations with rapid, fused intelligence is vital, and go hand-in-hand — to separate them completely would be to take the leash that already exists around USCYBERCOM’s neck and tie their hands with it as well. Offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace are two sides of the same coin — and intelligence is the alloy between them. Standing up a U.S. Cyber Force would also enable a deliberate re-imagining of this unique symbiosis, and a chance to — very carefully — lay out lines of authority, accountability, and oversight, to both prevent overreach and justifiably earn public trust.

The above challenges could be addressed in part by refining the existing structures and processes, but the real sticking point in USCYBERCOM’s sustainment of fully operational cyber forces lies in how we build forces ready to be employed. Force generation of the CMF through the various armed services’ manning, training, and equipping (MT&E) their own cyber warriors is an inefficient and weak model to sustain a combat ready force in this highly-specialized and fast-moving mission area.

Cyber resources play second-fiddle to service-specific domain resourcing; for example, the Department of the Navy has an existential imperative to resource the maritime domain such as shipbuilding and warplanes, especially during a time of great power competition. The cyber mission is secondary at best, and that’s not the Navy’s fault. It just simply isn’t what the Navy is built or tasked to do. This same reality exists for our other military services. Cyber will always be synergistic and a force multiplier within and across all domains, necessitating the need for the services to retain their existing internal cyber operations efforts, but feeding the joint CMF is ultimately unsustainable: the CMF must sustain itself.

The Cyber Force is Already Taking Shape

USCYBERCOM, NSA, the 133 teams comprising Cyber Mission Force — are approaching full operational capability in 2019 — and the operational and strategic doctrine they have collectively developed can now more easily transition to a separate service construct that more fully realizes their potential within the joint force. There is a strong correlation here with how the U.S. Army Air Force became the U.S. Air Force, with strong support in Congress and the approval of President Truman. The DoD has begun revising civilian leadership and building upon cyber subject matter expertise, as well, with the creation of the Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) to the Secretary of Defense — a position that Congress not only agreed with but strengthened in the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Such a position, and his or her staff, could transition to a Secretary of the Cyber Force.

The footprint would be small, and room in Washington would need to be carved out for it, but the beginnings are already there. Cyber “culture” — recruiting, retention, and operations — as well as service authorities (blending Title 10 and Title 50 smartly, not the blurry “Title 60” joked about in Beltway intelligence circles) would all benefit from the Cyber Force becoming its own service branch.

Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of a separate cyber branch of the armed forces is the disruptive innovation that would be allowed to flourish beyond the DoD’s traditional model of incremental improvement and glacial acquisition. The cyber domain, in particular, requires constant reinvention of techniques, tools, and skillsets to stay at the cutting edge. In the early 2000s, operating in a cyber-secure environment was thought to mean a restrictive firewall policy coupled with client-based anti-virus software. In 2018, we are developing human-machine teaming techniques that blend automation and smart notifications to fight and learn at machine speed. Likewise, the traditional acquisition cycle of military equipment, often taking 4-6 years before prototyping, just doesn’t fit in the cyber domain.

In short, the “cyber culture” is an incubator for innovation and disruptive thinking, and there are professionals chomping at the bit for the chance to be a part of a team that comes up with new ideas to break norms. A dedicated acquisition agency for cyber would be an incubator for baked-in cybersecurity controls and techniques across the entire DoD acquisition community. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) — recently shedding its Experimental “x” — is proving that something as simple as colocation with innovation hubs like California’s Silicon Valley and Austin, Texas, and a willingness to openly engage these partners, can deliver innovative outcomes on cyber acquisition and much more. Similarly, the Cyber Force must be free to exist where cyber innovation lives and thrives. 

Creating the USCF has other benefits that would be felt throughout the military. The Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, relieved of the burden of feeding the offensive and national CMF and paying their share of the joint-force cyber bill, can better focus on their core warfighting domains. This doesn’t absolve them of the need for cybersecurity at all levels of acquisition, but a USCF can be an even greater advocate and force-multiplier for DoD cybersecurity efforts. Services can and should retain their service-specific Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs), which could be manned, trained, equipped, and tactically assigned to their service but also maintain ties into the USCF for operations, intelligence, and reachback. Smart policies and a unity of effort can pay big dividends here, as the services would naturally look to such an organization as the resident experts.

Extreme Challenges with Existing Forces

Much has been made of the extensive difficulties faced by our military services for the recruiting and retention of cyber expertise in uniform. Brig. Gen. Joseph McGee, Deputy Commanding General (Operations), Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), described an example in which a talented cyber prospect “realized he’d make about the same as a first lieutenant as he would in a part-time job at Dell.” Examples like this are repeated over and over from entry-level to senior positions, and everything in between, on issues from pay to culture. In the military, being a cyber expert is like being a fish out of water.

The service cyber and personnel chiefs have made a clear case before the Armed Services Committees of both houses of Congress for the urgent need for flexibility on issues such as rank and career path for cyber experts specifically. Cyber needs were repeatedly cited as the rationale for the need for changes to restrictive military personnel laws. Many of these items were indeed addressed in the Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), with provisions which may now be implemented by each service in what is hailed as the biggest overhaul to the military personnel system in decades:

  • Allow O-2 to O-6 to serve up to 40 years without promotions, or continue service members in these grades if not selected for promotion at a statutory board
  • Ability for service members to not be considered at promotion boards “with service secretary approval” — for instance, to stay in “hands on keyboard” roles
  • No need to meet 20 years creditable service by age 62 for new accessions (no need for age limit or age waiver above 42 years old for direct commissions)
  • Direct commissions or temporary promotion up to O-6 for critical cyber skills

But even these provisions do not go far enough, and the services are not obligated to implement them. When the challenges of pay, accessions at higher rank, physical fitness, or military standards in other areas come up, invariably some common questions are raised.

A common question is why don’t we focus on using civilians or contractors? In the case of naval officers, why don’t we make them Staff Corps (instead of Restricted Line), like doctors and lawyers who perform specialized functions but need “rank for pay” and/or “rank for status?” What about enlisted specialists versus commissioned officers?

The answer to the first question is easy in that we do use civilians and contractors across the military, extensively. The reason this is a problem is that we also need the expertise in uniform, for the same legal and authorities reasons we don’t use civilians or contractors to drive ships, lead troops, launch missiles, fly planes, and conduct raids.

As for making them Staff Corps officers or equivalent in the other services, the Navy, for instance, has been talking about going the other direction: making officers in the Navy Information Warfare community designators (18XX) unrestricted line, instead of restricted line, like their warfare counterparts, or doing away with the unrestricted line vs. restricted line distinction altogether. This is a matter of protracted debate, but the reality is that some activities, like offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) and electronic attack (EA), are already considered forms of fires under Title 10 right now — thus requiring the requisite presence of commissioned officers responsible and accountable for the employment of these capabilities. The employment of OCO creates military effects for the commander, and may someday be not just a supporting effort, or even a main effort, but the only effort, in a military operation.  

Under the Navy’s Information Warfare Commander Afloat Concept, for the first time the Information Warfare Commander of a Carrier Strike Group, the Navy’s chief mechanism for projecting power, can be a 18XX Officer instead of a URL Officer. If anything, we’re shifting more toward URL, or “URL-like”, and the reality of the information realm as a warfighting domain is only becoming more true as time goes on, if not already true as it stands today.

So what about our enlisted members? They’re doing the work. Right now. And the brightest among them are often leaving for greener pastures. But still for reasons of authorities, we still need commissioned officers who are themselves cyber leaders, subject matter experts, and practitioners.

None of this is to say that direct commissioning of individuals with no prior service as officers up to O-6 is the only solution, or that it would not create new problems as it solves others. But these problems and all of the concerns about culture shock and discord in the ranks can also be solved with a distinct U.S. Cyber Force which accesses, promotes, and creates career paths for its officers as needed to carry out its missions, using the full scope of flexibility and personnel authority now granted in the FY19 NDAA.

Another major challenge is the lack of utilization of our reserve components. Many members of our reserve force have multiple graduate degrees and 10-15 years or more of experience, usually in management and leadership roles, in information technology and cybersecurity. We have individuals in GS/GG-14/15 or equivalent contractor and other positions, who are doing this work, every day, across the Department of Defense (DOD), the Intelligence Community (IC), academia, and industry.

Yet reservists are currently accessed at O-1 (O-2 under a new ARCYBER program), need to spend 3-5 years in training before they are even qualified to mobilize, or for the active components to use in virtually any operational or active duty capacity. And that’s after doing usually a year or more of non-mobilization active duty, for which nearly all employers don’t give differential pay because of existing employment policies, including in federal GS/GG positions.

We have very limited mechanisms and funding sources to even put reservists on active duty at NSA or USCYBERCOM, where our service cyber leadership repeatedly states we need people the most. And in the rare instances we manage to put people on some type of active duty in a cyber role in their area of expertise, it often is not a “mobilization” under the law — which means a person is now an O-2 or O-3, and with that “level” of perceived authority and experience to those around them. And they often just left their civilian job where they are recognized as a leader and expert — and easily make $200k a year.

National Security Operations Center (NSOC) c. 1985 — National Cryptologic Museum

Most people appreciate that you can’t just magically appear as an O-6, and have the same depth, breadth, and subtlety of experience and knowledge as a O-6 with 25 years in uniform. Yet these O-6s, as well as general and flag officers, routinely retire and assume senior leadership positions in all manner of public and private civilian organizations where “they don’t know the culture” — because they’re leaders.

So while a person off the street doesn’t have the same level of understanding of the military culture, it’s incorrect to say they can’t innovate and lead on cyber matters — to include in uniform as a commissioned officer. We’re not so special to imply that you can’t lead people and do the critical work of our nation, in uniform, unless you’ve “put in your time” in a rigid career path. It’s time to change our thinking, and to establish a military service to support the realities of that shift.

Recommendations

The call for a dedicated cyber branch of the U.S. Armed Forces is not new. Admiral (ret.) Jim Stavridis and Mr. David Weinstein argued for it quite passionately in 2014, calling on national leaders to embrace cyber innovation and imploring us to “not wait 20 years to realize it.” Great strides have been made in the four years since that argument was made, and we are closer than ever to realizing this vision. It will take a focused effort by Congress and the president to make this happen, as it did with the U.S. Army Air Forces becoming the U.S. Air Force in 1947. A tall order, perhaps, in today’s political environment, but not impossible, especially given the desire to compromise on issues of national defense and when both Republicans and Democrats alike are seeking wins in this column.

To summarize: the threat is eating our lunch, USCYBERCOM and the CMF are nearly ready to transition to their own service branch, and the benefits of doing so are numerous:

  • Sensible use of resources spent on cyberspace operations
  • An incubator of disruptive and rapid innovation in the cyber domain
  • Improved oversight and accountability by policy and under U.S. Code
  • More efficient and sustainable force generation and talent retention
  • Better alignment of service-specific core competencies across all warfighting domains
  • Synergy with a unified space commander (such as cyber protection of satellite constellations)

The United States House of Representatives recently ordered the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to begin an assessment on DoD cyberspace operations as part of the FY19 NDAA. This study, due to Congress in 2019, should prove enlightening and may become a foundational effort that could be built upon to explore the feasibility of establishing the U.S. Cyber Force as a new branch of the Armed Forces. Congress could order this as soon as FY21, with the Cyber Force fully established by the mid-2020s (blazingly fast by federal government standards, but no faster than the proposed Space Force).

Conclusion

The President has also now relaxed rules around offensive cyberspace operations, perceiving the urgent need to respond more quickly to cyber threats and cyber warfare directed at the United States. We have a great stepping stone in USCYBERCOM, but with no plans to take it to the next step, even a dedicated combatant commander for the cyber domain will face challenges with the above issues for the duration of its lifespan. Similar to how we are just becoming aware of space as a distinct warfighting domain, cyber has already been a warfighting domain since the beginning of the 21st century. The time for a U.S. Cyber Force is now. The threat in cyberspace, and our underwhelming response to it thus far, cannot wait.

Travis Howard is an active duty Navy Information Professional Officer. He holds advanced degrees and certifications in cybersecurity policy and business administration, and has over 18 years of enlisted and commissioned experience in surface and information warfare, information systems, and cybersecurity. Connect with him on LinkedIn.

Dave Schroeder served as a Navy Cryptologic Warfare Officer and Navy Space Cadre, and is Program Manager for IWCsync. He serves as a senior strategist and cyber subject matter expert at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He holds master’s degrees in cybersecurity policy and information warfare, and is a graduate of the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School. Find him on Twitter or LinkedIn.

The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, the United States Government, or the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Featured Image:  National Security Operations Center floor at the National Security Agency in 2012 (Wikimedia Commons)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Is the Belt and Road Initiative Too Big to Fail? Pt. 1

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What could and should the United States do if the Belt and Road Initiative collapses? 

By Tuan Pham and Grant Newsham

More and more China Watchers, to include these two observers in Japan, are having increasing doubts about the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s trillion-dollar wide-ranging infrastructure enterprise that spans across Asia, Africa, Europe, Oceania, and the Americas to elevate Chinese global economic and political standing. The grandiose national plan seeks to make a lot of money, acquire more resources, gain additional power, and expand influence to advance Beijing’s strategic ambitions of national rejuvenation (the Chinese Dream) and ultimately global preeminence – or even better, dominance. So what if these pundits are correct and the possibly over-leveraged BRI continues to underperform and not deliver the promised returns, receive increasing political backlash (buyer’s remorse over crushing debt burdens), and eventually collapses? What are then the ensuing opportunities and challenges for America?

This two-part series is a thought exercise to engender strategic thought, dialogue, and planning on this possibility. Part one starts with making a case for a BRI bubble that may burst. In part two, each author individually offers his perspective on what America could and should do (and conversely not do) as the result thereof.      

A BRI Bubble

There are growing concerns of a BRI bubble that may burst, and that China’s hurried and reckless BRI investments through the years are beginning to drag down its already slowing domestic economy. Beijing reportedly is applying the brakes. Chinese officials are now expressing qualms that Chinese corporations need to be cautious on how much they lend under the flagship project, but interestingly are not mentioning how much state funding is being expended on the BRI.

Nonetheless, Beijing reportedly has begun a comprehensive accounting of how many deals have already been done, on what financial terms, and with which countries. Beijing has also tightened capital and exchange controls to better manage BRI investments out of concerns over China’s domestic financial conditions. Altogether, the moves are intended to rein in the “wild west” investing environment, hedge against an uncertain Chinese economic outlook, and curtail the worrying capital flows outside the country. Since last year, Beijing appears to be trying to bolster an apparent lagging enthusiasm for the BRI.

However, to fully understand the nature, scope, and extent of the problem, it is best to start at the beginning. In the early 2000s, Beijing implemented the “Go Out” policy, which incentivized Chinese corporations to seek business ventures abroad by providing easy credit, cheap loans, and attractive financial guarantees from China’s national banks. Ten years later, stimulated by the government-sponsored BRI and fueled by relaxed financing, Chinese firms undertook even more speculative investments based on the flawed assumptions that the BRI was too big to fail and the central government will simply bail them out if they do fail. Not surprisingly, many of these risky BRI projects have underperformed and incurred massive debts and the impacts for the Chinese banks, and through them the Chinese economy, are now becoming evident. That is why Beijing has been assertively (and some might say desperately) cajoling (pressing) other countries and international organizations to invest in the BRI – and take on some, or most, of the risk.

China’s Economic Stagnation

Many observers have long worried that the BRI (with its hidden nationalist agenda and geo-political implications) represents an economic and political power play by Beijing, buttressed by its vast monetary reserves and driven by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) preoccupation with realizing its long-term goal of achieving global influence and ultimately global preeminence. But even with its immense economic power (second only to the United States), China still has its limits. Its economy is showing signs of slowing, and it is in a nascent trade war with the United States. At the same time, Beijing is struggling to tame its own mounting debt problems – problems that international lending and domestic spending sprees haven’t helped – and may even be letting up on its campaign to arrest debt growth as it faces a weakening economy at home and escalating trade tensions abroad.

Weeks before the onset of the trade war, a government-affiliated Chinese think tank, the National Institute for Finance Development, warned of impending financial panic potentially leading to financial crisis. It pointed to this year’s cascade of bond defaults, tightened liquidity, declining stock markets, and weakening Yuan. The report added that U.S. interest rate hikes and a looming trade war suggest that “the Chinese people are very likely to experience a financial panic very soon,” and that Beijing had best come up with a crisis management plan to deal with the panic.

The Chinese stock market lost two trillion dollars in value in the last six months, a worrisome economic indicator for Beijing, particularly in the midst of a destabilizing trade war that is beginning to increasingly impact the Chinese economy. The CCP’s claim to unopposed rule explicitly and implicitly depends on economic performance (prosperity), and an underperforming market is a poor reflection of its governing competence and by extension its political legitimacy. A bearish Chinese stock market is also a psychological reflection of how the Chinese people think of their current and future economic prospects. If so, once public doubt builds and takes hold, the wave of pessimism could intensify and spread, and if left unchecked become pervasive fear and panic.

Trade War Wildcard

The ongoing Sino-U.S. trade war is proving to be a propaganda quagmire for Chinese President Xi Jinping and the CCP, both on the domestic and international fronts. Regarding the former, they lose “face” if they say nothing or too little and they face public anger and political risk if they say too much and cannot deliver on their promises. As for the latter, Xi may have realized that jingoistic rhetoric may not be helpful and may even be counterproductive to ending the trade war on favorable terms and instead undermines Beijing’s carefully crafted international image as a defender of global trade.

The official CCP response to the trade war has aimed at depicting China and the Chinese economy as being strong enough to cope with a trade war. Yet, Beijing’s statistics bureau has reportedly published inaccurate economic data to bolster the arguably false impression that the Chinese economy is handling U.S. trade pressures well. Indeed, the CCP might be in more distress at this point if the world realizes that it has been exaggerating (bluffing) about its economic strengths and capacities to withstand a trade war, as evident by its continued “optimistic and suspect” gross domestic product (GDP) outlook despite lack of corroborating economic data and growing skepticism of Beijing’s statistical methodology.

All in all, the trade war has cornered Xi and the CCP as is evident by the changing and inconsistent public messaging and media censorship to control domestic narratives. If they cannot cope with the trade war and lose control of the aforesaid narratives, then their control over Chinese society might diminish while undermining Xi and the Party’s power and authority. If so, expect even fewer civil liberties, greater censorship, and more draconian crackdowns in the coming months to restore the CCP’s grip on public order and confidence in Xi’s leadership. The latter apparently showing some political vulnerabilities in the form of a surprising rebuke at home and telling personal affirmation of the need for resolute leadership. In recent weeks, Beijing’s government, intellectual, and media have been rife with “rumors” over leadership discontent with Xi – particularly over his bold power consolidation and brazen rollback of collective leadership norms, mismanagement of the all-important bilateral relations with Washington, and poor handling of the ongoing trade conflict with the United States.         

Beijing has also embarked on an aggressive media campaign to influence foreign audiences (sharp power). The latest being a short satirical video by the China Global Television Network (international offshoot of state-owned broadcaster China’s Central Television), mocking President Trump and highlighting many of China’s concerns (grievances) in the ongoing trade dispute; and an op-ed piece in the Los Angeles Times, pushing the narrative that “the American people need to hear the truth about U.S.-China trade, instead of Trump’s charges of bad faith…despite what the president says, trade is free and fair, and these 10 points explain why.” They are:

(1) Although China, as a developing country, has higher tariffs on U.S. goods than the United States does on Chinese goods, its tariffs are still lower than those of many other developing countries.

(2) As for goods coming into the United States, inexpensive Chinese imports have helped the U.S. middle class.

(3) It isn’t Chinese barriers but U.S. export controls that limit our economic exchange.

(4) Trade deficit numbers can be deceiving.

(5) When American protectionists talk about the trade deficit with China, they deliberately ignore the U.S. surplus in “service trade.”

(6) Another thing protectionists deliberately ignore is that the sales of U.S. companies in China have surpassed $500 billion.

(7) In 2017, China’s external payment of intellectual property fees reached $28.6 billion, 15 times more than when it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. U.S. intellectual property owners are the biggest beneficiaries.   

(8) No laws or regulations compel technology transfers; joint ventures are based on deal-by-deal negotiations and some U.S. companies are willing to transfer technology for Chinese market access.

(9) President Trump wants to stop “Made in China 2025,” the state-subsidized plan to modernize Chinese industries, and he charges China with “state capitalism.” However, Chinese subsidies are not out of line with WTO regulations, and they are available to foreign-funded enterprises too.

(10) China’s trade practices are generally in compliance with WTO rules. 

This is of course better characterized as Chinese “advocacy” rife with half-truths and questionable assertions rather than a fair-minded assessment. Hopefully it is not taken at face value.

Conclusion

This concludes a short discourse on why the BRI bubble may burst. The dialogue sets the conditions for further discussion in part two on what America could and should do (and conversely not do) as the result thereof.     

Tuan Pham is widely published in national security affairs and international relations. Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine Officer and a Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies. The personal views expressed therein are their own.

Featured Image: A Chinese flag flies over Tashkurgan, a small town at the front line of the $62bn China-Pakistan economic corridor (Cpec). (Tom Phillips for the Guardian)

Capability Analysis

Contested Ship-to-Shore Movement, Pt. 1: The Role of Quantity

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By Josh Abbey

Few navies are disposed to undertake ship-to-shore movement in a contested environment.1 With the exception of very powerful nations such as the U.S., few nations have the number of troops and equipment necessary for success against moderate opposition. Contested ship-to-shore movement presupposes that landing craft and aircraft will be engaged while moving to and at the landing location. Achieving air and naval superiority is a significant factor in this calculus, however, so does the size and firepower of the landing force and those who may oppose them.2 The role of quantity in contested ship-to-shore movement undertaken by surface craft is especially key.

No amphibious force is likely to survive a contested assault without significant losses.3 Yet few can deliver the volume of troops to generate force overmatch against a foe while accounting for potential casualties. The majority of amphibious fleets are too small to generate overmatch by quantity alone. Such a task requires vast amphibious fleets. In the Gulf War, it took 31 amphibious ships to muster an assault force of 17,800 marines, 39 tanks, 96 mobile TOW antitank missile systems, 112 amphibious assault vehicles, 52 light armored vehicles, 52 artillery pieces, 63 attack aircraft, and six infantry battalions.4 Excluding the U.S., for nations with amphibious capabilities, the average amphibious fleet size is just two ships (refer to table 1).5 An amphibious fleet such as Australia’s can only embark 2,600 troops in two Canberra-class landing helicopter docks and one dock landing ship, HMAS Choules.6 An unsupported landing force of this size would face a serious struggle if opposed by even a few battalions.

The number of troops and vehicles that can be delivered per wave severely worsens the problem of successful ship-to-shore movement. Again, Australia’s amphibious capacity shall serve as the example as its three-ship Amphibious Ready Group is representative of many first-rate nations’ amphibious fleets. A Canberra-class warship can embark four LCM-1Es, whilst HMAS Choules can carry one LCM-1E.7 With each LCM-1E able to carry 170 troops, the nine LCM-1Es can deploy approximately 1500 troops in one wave.8 However, it is unlikely they would be utilized in this way. Carrying vehicles and equipment in waves while deploying troops in tactical formations would likely decrease the rate of troops delivered. Defenders can likely bring a greater proportion of their force to bear compared to amphibious troops that are limited by their rate of delivery. And, while vehicles such as an Abrams tank or even a Stryker can deliver considerable firepower, they must be able to get off the beach to make way for follow-on assets. Beaches can condense landing troops into denser formations and where targeting buildup locations will be a priority for any defender. Unless the landing location is suitable to allow vehicles to quickly get off the beach, they present attractive stationary targets that are less able to influence affairs much beyond the shoreline.

MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII (July 30, 2016) A Royal Australian Navy LHD Landing Craft, transports Australian, New Zealand, Tongan, and U.S. armed forces to Marine Corps Training Area Bellows during Rim of the Pacific 2016 in Hawaii. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. William L. Holdaway/Released)

Infantry will play a major role in the initial ship-to-shore movement because of greater freedom of movement and ability to disperse. However, embarked troops do not equate to immediate combat manpower on the beach.  It is problematic that troops must disembark and find a favorable tactical disposition before they can bring their full influence to bear, a process that is unlikely to be as rapid as desired. Further, utilizing landing craft with high capacities such as LCMs, with a capacity of 170, or an LCU 1700 which can carry 350 troops, presents a small number of highly dense targets.9 If it only deployed from embarked landing craft Australia’s entire amphibious landing force could present just nine targets. An opponent could counter this force before it lands with a handful of guided missiles or several accurate barrages of cluster or airburst artillery.

Key: Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) Landing Platform Dock (LPD) Landing Ship Dock (LSD) Landing Ship Logistics (LSL) Landing Ship Tank (LST) Landing Ship Medium (LSM) Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) (Source: The Military Balance, 118, 1 (2018): 49-396.)

While landing craft and amphibious fleets can deploy a reasonable number of troops from the surface they can be effectively opposed by far fewer troops using modern weapons. Utilizing smaller landing craft in greater numbers would increase the number of targets an enemy must account for, and dilute a defender’s efforts. Increasing the number of landing craft also decreases the time it takes for troops to influence combat by speeding up debarkation. In effect, increasing the number of exits can increase the space through which troops can disembark and achieve greater flow of deployment. These changes would increase the effectiveness of the force embarked by deploying them into combat faster and likely with less casualties.

Conclusion

Quite simply to generate overmatch via the quantity of troops amphibious fleets must go big or go home. They also, by way of contradiction in terms of landing craft, must go little if they wish to quickly generate a reasonable number of combat-ready troops at the landing location rapidly. Small numbers of slow-deploying troops can easily be victim to defeat in detail. Generating overmatch at the landing location will then be more a matter of greater firepower and less the the quantity of assets for navies with small amphibious fleets. However, credibly confronting reasonably-sized adversaries in a contested ship-to-shore context will be limited to coalition operations or large nations such as the U.S. for the foreseeable future.

Part 2 of this series will focus on firepower overmatch.

Josh Abbey is a research intern at the Royal United Services Institute of Victoria. He is studying a Bachelor of Arts at the University of Melbourne, majoring in history and philosophy. He is interested in military history and strategy, international security and analyzing future trends in strategy, capabilities and conflict.

References

1. See Table 1.1

2. Michael Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, 2 (2000): 4.

3. B. Martin, Amphibious Operations in Contested Environments: Insights from Analytic Work (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 9.

4. Michael F. Applegate, Naval Forces: Valuable Beyond the Sum of Their Parts (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993), 5.

5. See Table 1.1

6. Ken Gleiman and Peter Dean, Beyond 2017: the Australian Defence Force and amphibious warfare (Canberra: APSI, 2015), 24.

7. “Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD),” Navy, accessed July 25, 2018, http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd. “HMAS Choules,” Navy, accessed July 24, 2018, http://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-choules.

8. “Lanchas de desembarco LCM-1E” Navantia, accessed July 24, 2018, https://www.navantia.es/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lineas_act/Fichas_antiguas%20espa%C3%B1ol/lanchas.pdf.

9. “Landing Craft, Mechanized and Utility – LCM / LCU,” America’s Navy, accessed July 25, 2018, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1600&ct=4.

Featured Image: 180729-M-FA245-1234 MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII (July 29, 2018) U.S. Marines push toward an objective on Pyramid Rock Beach during an amphibious landing demonstration as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise on Marine Corps Base Hawaii July 29, 2018. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Adam Montera)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.