Podcast

Sea Control 184 – Chokepoints and Littorals with Dr. Heather Venable and Director Valerie Jackson

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By Jared Samuelson

Brute Krulak Center for Creativity and Innovation Director Valerie Jackson and Dr. Heather Venable join me to discuss the lessons learned from CIMSEC’s Project Trident Chokepoints and Littorals Week! We’ll be discussing whether chokepoints are still relevant, mine warfare, chokepoints as a temporal phenomenon, and the importance of presence.

Download Sea Control 184 – Chokepoints and Littorals with Dr. Heather Venable and Director Valerie Jackson

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Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

Jared Samuelson is the Senior Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at [email protected].
Podcast

Sea Control 183 – The Bilgepumps

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By Alex Clarke

Alert and cover your ears it’s another historically informed maritime current events podcast inbound! Or… Bilgepumps this week is what three naval geeks who have found a particularly tasty cake shop would sound like if recorded.

So what is episode three about? Well the #Bilgepumps team are talking about the matrix, China in the East and South China Seas again as they’re just the front that never stops giving, lasers, dronenoughts, Plan Z and auxiliaries. And that’s just the headlines, the rest is oh so much history, with possibly a lot of cynicism.

#Bilgepumps is a new series and new avenue, although it may no longer have the new car smell. While we’re getting the impression it’s liked, we still very much want to hear any comments, topic suggestions, or ideas for artwork. Please tweet them at the Bilgepump crew (with #Bilgepump) at Alex (@AC_NavalHistory), Drach (@Drachinifel), and Jamie (@Armouredcarrier). Or you can comment on our Youtube channels (listed down below). 

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Alex Clarke is host of the Bilge Pumps series on the Sea Control podcast.

Contact the Sea Control podcast at [email protected]. 
Editorial, Middle East

Why Yemen Matters

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By Jimmy Drennan

Introduction

On Sunday, Yemeni separatists known as the Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized 64 billion riyals ($260M USD) from a convoy belonging to the Central Bank of Yemen. This follows their withdrawal in April from a fragile treaty and declaration of autonomy in the southern port city of Aden. The STC’s proclamation threatens to throw Yemen into a fresh phase of bloody turmoil, even as the unmitigated spread of COVID-19 could devolve the world’s worst humanitarian crisis into catastrophe. Meanwhile, talks to end the war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels of northwestern Yemen drag on, with the Houthis indicating they may attempt to take pivotal territory in the oil-rich city of Marib. Why does any of this matter?

The stability of Yemen is not, in and of itself, one of our core national interests. Yet we continue to aid the Saudis in their war against the Houthis. Supported by international navies, we continue to patrol international waters in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. We are still pursuing Al Qaeda and ISIS throughout poorly governed regions in Yemen. Why? The answer is pragmatism.

While it is not practical, nor advisable, for the United States to commit blood and treasure to unilaterally resolve Yemen’s civil war, the instability that spills over Yemen’s borders threatens American interests. Now, with the STC potentially pitting its Emirati backers against the Saudis, who recognize the Republic of Yemen Government led by exiled President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, the risk of Yemen’s festering instability igniting a larger regional conflict is greater than ever.

A Proxy Conflict Turns Central

Although a proxy war between Arab states, both of whom the United States relies on for critical military and economic access, would implicitly run counter to American interests, a hypothetical regional conflict still doesn’t explain why Yemen matters today. Even now, instability overflows from Yemen in the form of ballistic missiles, suicide drones, unmanned explosive speedboats, anti-ship cruise missiles, and sea mines. These attacks by the Houthis are generally aimed at the Saudi-led coalition (which does not include the United States), but the use of these weapons near international shipping lanes in the southern Red Sea threaten core national interests in maintaining the free flow of global commerce. The Houthis have credibly threatened to contest the Strait of Bab al Mandeb by attacking international shipping in recent years, including American warships in 2016 – which prompted swift retaliatory action against the launch sites. The strait is the sole southern gateway to the Suez Canal and therefore a strategic chokepoint for maritime trade between Europe and Asia, obviating the need to make the costly and time-consuming trip around the Cape of Good Hope.

Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks in Saudi Arabia and the UAE threaten critical energy infrastructure, not to mention American citizens and military forces throughout the region. When considering the risk of regional Arab-on-Arab conflict, threats to freedom of navigation, and attacks on Arab energy infrastructure, another question harkens back to Ancient Rome with the Latin “cui bono?” Who benefits? In every case, the answer is Iran.

Iran publicly supports the Houthi effort to overthrow Yemen’s Hadi-led government. Having a proxy on Saudi Arabia’s southern border, or at least a like-minded partner with whom it can supply advanced conventional weapons, is of obvious benefit to Tehran. Arming the Houthis with anti-shipping weaponry allows Iran to threaten a second global maritime chokepoint, a crucial economic “ace in the hole” in its existential fight against the administration’s maximum pressure campaign. The United States, its international partners, and the United Nations have repeatedly exposed Iran’s illicit arms shipments to the Houthis; however, international sentiment is so heavily slanted against the Saudis (due largely to the early conduct of their air campaign) that Iran can quietly refute the allegations while the anti-Saudi narrative continues to resonate on Capitol Hill and social media. Meanwhile, the Houthis block humanitarian aid shipments and hold them for ransom as millions of Yemenis starve, and the world barely notices.

Iran has also learned valuable lessons on how to employ its growing arsenal in the event of a direct conflict with Saudi Arabia or the United States. In 2019, the British Government warned that Iran was using Yemen as a missile testing ground. “We’ve seen the UN panel of experts talk about the new Kamikaze drones that are coming out of Iran, we’ve had the Badr-1, which is the missile system that looks like a V2, being launched into Saudi Arabia and we have seen from technical reports that the enhancements that are being applied to that war by Iran are considerable,” Labour MP Graham Jones said.

In Yemen, Iran has deftly exerted influence below the threshold that would trigger direct U.S. retaliation, just as it has done in the Arabian Gulf over the last three decades since the Tanker War. The United States may lack the incentive to retaliate or intervene in Yemen, but ignores the failed state at its own peril. The most pragmatic approach is to help the Saudis focus on the primary source of instability in Yemen. Iran threatens Saudi Arabia from the east, north, and south, and now, with the STC’s declaration of autonomy, Tehran has the opportunity to further spread instability and division throughout the Gulf Cooperation Council states, which will only be exacerbated by global economic strain. Iran employed a similar tactic with Qatar in 2017, and now Turkey (whose relationship with Iran is ambiguous at best) appears to be joining with Qatar to finance the Muslim Brotherhood in southen Yemen.

A strategy explicitly focused on isolating the Houthis from Iranian support – militarily, diplomatically, and economically – would dramatically alter the Houthi and Iranian strategic calculus. The U.S. could organize an international effort to interdict illicit arms shipments through the Gulf of Aden (irrespective of origin). It must continue to expose Iranian malign influence in western Yemen, and work to disrupt and eventually quell Houthi revenue streams coming from Iran. Even with these efforts stability may still not “break out” in Yemen, and the Houthis are not likely to surrender the political and territorial gains they’ve earned over the last five years.  

However, as Saudi efforts shift upstream to stem the flow of Iranian aid at its source, the Houthis’ ability, and intent, to threaten American interests in partner nations and the international commons would significantly diminish. Supporting the Saudis in isolating the Houthis from Iran is pragmatic because it balances necessity with available resources and political will. Political support from Congress will be more forthcoming by shifting the focus away from western Yemen itself toward stabilizing the international commons, and broadening the scope to an international effort to eliminate illicit arms shipments and destabilizing influence.

Conclusion

Yemen and Saudi Arabia may be toxic topics in Washington, but ignoring them could be disastrous. If COVID-19 is the domino that turns a humanitarian crisis into widespread fatalities, the United States may be compelled to intervene at great cost and risk. In the event of armed conflict with Iran, western Yemen would be a second front and a second contested maritime chokepoint. Not only would ignoring Yemen allow threats to American interests to grow, it would jeopardize U.S. influence over a key partner in the global energy market. The Saudis demonstrated their clout in April by flooding the market with oil to punish Russia for refusing earlier cuts, with analysts predicting they will win the price war. On Easter, President Trump negotiated a deal for the Saudis to cut production, and while COVID-19 impacts continue to dominate the market, American influence on Saudi Arabia proved critical in softening the blow. Despite our progress toward energy independence, our relationship with the Saudis is still a major factor in our economic health.

Ultimately, the Holy Grail for securing American interests in the Middle East is for partner nations to provide for their own defense. Saudi Arabia is already a cultural and economic heavyweight, and its Vision 2030 has the potential to gradually bring it more in line with western Democratic ideals, and to improve its security and defense institutions. A functional Arab regional security architecture is among the greatest of Iranian fears. In Yemen, the United States can send a strong message to Iran and invest in Saudi Arabia’s future as a regional security leader and sustainably secure American interests more broadly. By doing more now the U.S. can do less in the Middle East in the future.

Iran certainly sees opportunity to sow further instability in the wake of the STC’s separatist declaration in Aden. Tehran will gauge Washington’s reaction closely, and the penalty for inaction on our part could be severe. It is time to decide whether Yemen matters more to us, or more to Tehran.

Jimmy Drennan is the President of CIMSEC. Contact him at [email protected]. These views are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of any government agency.

Featured Image: South-southwest-looking, high-oblique photograph taken during the Hubble Space telescope’s STS-61 servicing mission shows the southwestern Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea. (NASA photo)

Chokepoints and Littorals Week

Strategic Chokepoints and Littorals Week Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

During these past two weeks, CIMSEC featured a wide array of publications on strategic maritime chokepoints and littorals, submitted in response to our call for articles issued in partnership with the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity of U.S. Marine Corps University. This turned out to be one of the most packed CIMSEC topic weeks in recent memory, and one of the most insightful.

Maritime chokepoints and littorals remain strategic areas of interest in global strategy and potential warfighting campaigns. CIMSEC contributors pointed to a number of themes that can shape strategic calculations with respect to these critical geographic features.

Chokepoints and littorals magnify the influence of nearby states, who often by other measurements of national power are seen as lesser nations relative to major states. Yet in times of conflict or crisis, it is major states who could very well come to depend on these littoral nations for critical support and access, nations whose political sensitivities can powerfully constrain diplomatic and warfighting options for great powers. Even non-state actors, such as insurgents or pirates, can force multinational responses and contingency planning through small-scale actions in a chokepoint of global import.

Another major theme authors touched upon was the role of strategic chokepoints and littorals in emerging American warfighting concepts, particularly those of the U.S. Marine Corps that encompass archipelagic defense. As the Marine Corps transforms into a stand-in force that can hold the line against a great power while enabling follow-on access from friendly forces, it will have to master schemes of fire and maneuver across the vast array of chokepoints and littorals within Western Pacific island chains. Some authors envisioned the Marines as an anti-shipping force, with a few touching on the vital role mine warfare in particular can play in contesting chokepoints and manipulating an adversary’s avenues of access, while also bemoaning U.S. naval forces’ longstanding lack of interest in offensive mining. As U.S. forces develop new warfighting concepts for the Pacific, it is clear that open-ocean combat and fighting for chokepoints and littorals are two sides of the same coin. As 21st century great power competition begins to take shape, one can look to the world’s coastlines to find its major contours.

Authors also challenged traditional ideas of chokepoints being fixed geographic areas, whose influence is as supposedly permanent as their location. And yet the world is witnessing major changes that are redefining the chokepoint and its value. The Arctic is melting away, revealing a complex mosaic of chokepoints and littorals that will lend themselves toward new lines of communication for global commerce, as well as new zones of competition. Chokepoints may also emerge not as geographic features, but as more abstract zones that develop within the seams of operational concepts, intelligence collection abilities, diplomatic clout, and even in in the information environment. Their constraining effect remains the same, but the ability to adjust to their influence becomes much more complex than simply being in the right place at the right time.

Strategic chokepoints and littorals will continue to have major influence on world events, both in peace and in conflict. Today as thousands of ships sail through these narrow channels and naval forces traverse nearby waters, the access these zones create may have become an assumed feature of global activity. But should that access come under threat or become outright contested, the vital importance these areas will hold will become all too apparent, and in the form of consequences that could ripple across the globe.

Below are the articles that featured during the extended topic week, with excerpts. We thank these authors for their excellent contributions.

Sea Control 180 – Narrow Seas: The Black Sea with Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret.) by Jared Samuelson

Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret.), former commander, U.S. Army Europe, stops by the podcast to discuss lessons learned from the exercise Defender 2020, Russia’s Black Sea strategy, and the importance of the Black Sea to NATO. 

“Let Me Get this Strait: The Turkish Straits Question Revisited” by Paul Pryce

Since 1936, the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, hereinafter referred to as the Montreux Convention, has allowed for the peaceful flow of commerce through the Turkish Straits. However, recent calls from Turkish and Russian policy circles for revisions to the Montreux Convention should be cause for concern, as these proposals threaten to either spur a naval arms race in the Black Sea region or look to exploit the Straits as a geostrategic chokepoint.

“The Assumption of Access in the Western Pacific” by Elee Wakim and Blake Herzinger

The cornerstone of this power projection complex in the western Pacific is forward deployed military forces, which are in turn enabled by the availability of proximate and friendly basing in theater. However, the ability of the United States to sustainably conduct expeditionary operations in the strategic chokepoints and littorals of Asia could crumble in the absence of the allied access it has come to rely on.

“Mine the Littorals and Chokepoints: Mine Warfare in Support of Sea Control” by Major Brian Kerg, USMC

While DMO and EABO provide the essential building blocks of sea control and denial, their deterrent power can be exponentially increased through the integration of mine warfare. Whether deployed between EABs by ExMIW companies, activated from UFPs and maneuvered into place as the situation dictates, or fired into shallow waters with the modified Quickstrike-ER and moved as required by C2 systems, MIW is the most promising yet underdeveloped capability for today’s maritime strategists.

“There are no Strategic Chokepoints” by Captain Jamie McGrath, USN (ret.)

Military strategists often speak as Fisher did of strategic chokepoints, believing them to have significant geopolitical value and act as epicenters for maritime strategy, where the control of which is considered vital for success in maritime conflict. But are these chokepoints truly strategic? Does the success of a nation’s maritime strategy actually hinge on the control or loss of control of these narrow seas?

“An Emerging Strategic Geometry – Thawing Chokepoints and Littorals in the Arctic” by Robert C. Rasmussen

The ongoing transformation of the Arctic from an inaccessible frozen wasteland to an accessible and untapped reserve creates not only a new contested space, but will create new strategic chokepoints and littoral operating environments. The United States, in concert with its allies, will need to invest in the ability to access and secure this environment in order to maintain sovereignty and security in this new world.

“The Strategic Littoral Geography of Southeast Asia” by Pete McPhail, Arthur Speyer, Bret Rodgers, Steve Ostrosky, Jesse Burns, and Dan Marquis

The INDOPACOM AOR continues to be a primary focus of U.S. naval forces, and the area is of central importance to China. This map describes the strategic importance of Southeast Asian littoral geography to China’s interests. By studying the map the user sees correlations between China’s diplomatic and economic investments and chokepoint geography.

“Chiseled in Space: Temporary, Non-Geographic Chokepoints in the Battle of the Atlantic” by Heather Venable

Much can be gained, then, by conceptualizing chokepoints more broadly as areas of temporary advantage that may be created or destroyed through the application of either new capabilities or existing ones in ingenuous ways to create an outsized advantage. In the case of the Battle of the Atlantic, these types of chokepoints resulted in the greatest strategic effect. 

“Thinking Like a Pirate: Contesting Southeast Asia’s Chokepoints” by Drake Long

The chokepoints and littorals surrounding Indonesian and Philippine waters would make for excellent forward positioning for a Marine Corps stand-in force. It would provide a critical bulwark for U.S. force posture in the Pacific by facilitating access for follow-on forces from allied Australia, and access into the South China and Philippine Seas.

“Sea Control 181 – The ‘Amphibious’ 8th in the Pacific War” with Jared Samuelson, Major General Pat Donahoe, and Don Chisholm

Major General Pat Donahoe, Deputy Commander for Operations, U.S. 8th Army, and Prof. Don Chisholm of the U.S. Naval War College join us to discuss why the 8th Army is known as “the Amphibious 8th,” the campaign through the southern Philippines in World War II, Admiral Daniel Barbey, and the different amphibious cultures that emerged during the war.

“Sink ‘Em All: Envisioning Marine Corps Maritime Interdiction” by Dustin League and Dan Justice

The drone circling overhead continued to pace them, repeating its message, its demands growing increasingly terse and harsh. The ship’s master counted no less than three times his vessel was threatened with lethal force with never a blip on the radar to indicate a closing vessel or aircraft. Open seas, open skies, and toothless demands. Twenty-five minutes after the initial challenge, two long-range anti-ship missiles, their telemetry continually updated by the overhead drone, slammed into the Píng Jìng De Hǎi Yáng.

“Seeing the World Through Points” by Captain H. Clifton Hamilton, USMC

Strategic chokepoints and littorals are the arena of current and future power struggles. Great power competition is layered within these maritime and littoral domains. To a lesser extent, but still consequential, are the potential actions of regional and non-state actors capable of causing disruption along maritime chokepoints and littoral zones. The United States will be required to address multi-layered challenges to its maritime dominance in these areas while also fulfilling the role of humanitarian and the facilitator of free and open commerce.

“Guarding the Gates: Is International Naval Control of the Bab Al Mandeb Feasible?” by Elizabeth White

Many a discussion of the Bab Al Mandeb Strait starts with the translation from the Arabic name (Gate of Tears) as an introduction to the chokepoint’s woes. They are not wrong to do so. The Gate of Tears seems to be a place of permanent melancholy, surrounded by a depressing miasma of conflict, state failure, famine, crime, and now global pandemic. Unfortunately for all concerned, it is also the key trading route between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

“Developing Security in a White Water World: Preparing for the Arctic” by Ian Birdwell

The Arctic is changing physically and the security dimensions of the region are changing along with it. The region will not be ice-free overnight, and the United States is not without partners in addressing those changing strategic considerations. It behooves the United States to not pursue a hardline balancing arrangement against Russian militarization and instead pursue what it has been doing for some time, preparing for the potential of Arctic operations across all service branches.

“Does Tomorrow Ever Truly Die?” by Capt. John Holmes, USMC

My cinematic reveries were interrupted when it became apparent that 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies, starring Pierce Brosnan as the titular hero, was a lot closer to our current reality than I had ever expected. Themes of great power competition, technological proliferation, state and non-state conflict, media manipulation, and conflict in the strategic waterways and littorals, which may have seemed somewhat out of place in 1997, feel all too prescient in 2020. 

“Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Mine Warfare in Littoral Control” by Mark Howard

Naval mines have the ability to shape the battlespace, manage vertical escalation of hostilities, act as cost-effective force multipliers, and are a proven coercive diplomatic tool that can have deep psychological and strategic impact. With advancements in naval mines and the changing naval threat environment, the USMC should reconsider the role of mine warfare to explore how it may complement nascent force development and warfighting concepts.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: SUEZ CANAL (March 16, 2013) The aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) transits the Suez Canal. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Kameren Guy Hodnett/Released)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.