Red Sea Topic Week

By Dirk Siebels

The importance of maritime trade is often highlighted to justify naval spending and operations. When commercial traffic in the Red Sea started to be impacted by Houthi attacks, countless statements were subsequently issued that included the percentage of world trade or specific types of cargoes that are normally moved through this area. Maritime trade did not come to a standstill despite the threat. Ships were – and still are – re-routed around Africa to avoid Red Sea passages. While a longer route is more expensive, it is important to consider that maritime transport in general is extremely efficient – and therefore cheap. Freight rates have accordingly stabilised as shipping companies settled into a ‘new normal.’

Operations of international naval forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have been hampered by various shortcomings. On the tactical and operational level, problems have included ammunition shortages, a lack of coordination between allied nations, as well as deficient equipment. Despite the negative headlines, naval forces can also point to large numbers of intercepted missiles and drones, as well as dozens of escorts of merchant ships.

Launching a multinational operation with little time for preparation and planning to counter an unprecedented threat is no small feat. It would be unreasonable to expect neither mistakes nor problems. At the same time, it is questionable at best whether the current naval operations can become a success on the strategic level. So far, military interventions responding to Houthi attacks have been characterized by complicated coordination on the political level, virtually non-existent broader engagement with Houthi leaders, as well as a lack of clearly identified – and achievable – aims. Moreover, cooperation between naval forces and commercial shipping is limited and often confusing in execution. This aspect is particularly problematic, considering that naval operations were launched as a direct response to Houthi attacks against merchant vessels.

One important question is whether military operations have had an impact on merchant shipping through the Red Sea and what the outlook now is. Finding answers requires a detailed look at figures for maritime traffic.

Maritime Traffic Patterns

The number of merchant ship transits through the Bab el Mandeb has declined considerably due to Houthi attacks. By mid-December, many container lines declared that most or all of their ships would be re-routed around the Cape of Good Hope. Figure 1 shows that the announcement was followed by an immediate drop in container ships passing the Bab el Mandeb. While that does not mean that all container traffic in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has stopped, most vessels which are still transiting the Bab el Mandeb are relatively small and mostly trading within the region.

The decline for other ship types has been more gradual, likely due to the fact that the container market is heavily concentrated. In this sector of the shipping industry, the five largest companies control almost two-thirds of the entire market. In other sectors, notably in the bulk carrier and tanker markets, concentration is much less significant. Many companies of all sizes therefore have to consider the risk levels to their vessels before deciding whether or not to transit through the Red Sea.

So far, military operations have not led to a recovery in maritime traffic levels. Instead, traffic figures have been relatively stable since mid-January at between 40 to 50 percent of Bab el Mandeb transits compared to the same period during the previous year (Figure 2).

The fact that there have been very little changes to current traffic levels between January and April highlights how operators of commercial vessels remain hesitant about a full return to the Red Sea. Whether that is due to the current level of military operations or the apparent lack of additional efforts to negotiate with Houthi leaders is open for debate.

In this context, it is interesting that the EU-led Operation Aspides has been hailed as a major success. On April 8, EU representatives stated that 68 merchant vessels had been escorted since the beginning of the operation. However, that amounts to less than two ships per day, compared with the 30 to 40 ships transiting the Bab el Mandeb per day even at the current level of traffic. No similar statistics have been provided for Operation Prosperity Guardian, but the numbers are very unlikely to be significantly higher.

Moreover, naval forces have recommended that ship operators should consider Red Sea transits with AIS switched off. EU naval forces have tried to underline this recommendation with an alarming statistic: “Around 80% of vessels that have been hit had AIS .”

Whether this is really useful advice is at least questionable. Despite naval recommendations to the contrary, more than 90 percent of merchant ships are transiting the Bab el Mandeb with AIS switched on. The situation has not changed significantly over time either, shown in Figure 3.

Political Considerations

In combination with the broader regional context, political decision-makers are left with a complicated dilemma. Should there be a military response against the Houthi attacks? Should military operations be purely defensive? Would strikes against Houthi targets lead to another escalation in the Middle East?

There is still no definitive agreement about the answers to these and related questions. The U.S. government launched Operation Prosperity Guardian already in December with a defensive mandate. Despite its multinational character, countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia were unwilling to contribute. Several European countries also decided against participating in the U.S.-led operation and ultimately agreed on the EU-led Operation Aspides, launched in February with a stricter defensive focus. Meanwhile, U.S. forces launched military strikes against Houthi forces. In some cases, these were supported by other nations, yet offensive actions are part of a separate operation (Poseidon Archer). This separation is purely political as offensive actions are not supported by all countries participating in Prosperity Guardian.

Houthi attacks are a challenge to freedom of navigation. The actual extent of this challenge, however, is open for debate. Since the beginning of the Houthi campaign in November, the U.S. and several other governments have frequently stated that the attacks against merchant ships have been “indiscriminate.” Houthi forces have publicly stated their targeting parameters and initially wanted to target ships which are directly owned by Israeli companies. Such vessels quickly stopped Red Sea transits, leading the Houthis in early December to expand their potential targets to ships trading with Israel. Military strikes by American and British forces in January then led to another expansion of the potential targets to merchant ships owned by U.S. and UK companies. Some attacks were very likely carried out based on outdated commercial information about individual ships. Overall, this has resulted in a situation where the threat level for merchant vessels is closely linked to individual characteristics while all ship operators have to take the potential for collateral damage into account.

It should be noted that the reassuring presence of warships must be better coordinated. With MSCHOA and UKMTO, there are two reporting centers responsible for broadly the same region. Neither center has a full picture which includes all attacks or attempted attacks by Houthi forces since November. In addition, neither center even acknowledges the presence of another reporting center in their frequent updates to the shipping industry. The question of cooperation between MSCHOA and UKMTO has been a more or less theoretical question for many years. In the current situation, it deserves concrete resolution.

Conclusion

Naval missions to counter the threat posed by Houthi attacks may be worthwhile operations, particularly from the perspective of seafarers who rarely have a choice whether they want to transit the Red Sea. However, many of the military operations so far have been tactically focused on day-to-day operations, and much less focused on affecting the longer-term outlook. The number of ships which have been escorted has been highlighted as a success, yet many of these ships arguably would have transited anyway. More importantly, Houthi forces have firmly established the threat of drone and missile attacks, and shipping traffic is still about half of what it was before the Houthis began their attacks.

It is very likely that a longer-term mission would be necessary to meaningfully reduce the threat posed by the Houthis. But would it be possible to verify that the threat for merchant ships has been reduced enough – and how much of a reduction is enough to begin with?

Navies have been able to show their capabilities in an operational context and identify valuable lessons learned. Success on the tactical level, however, is very different from the strategic level which would include a return to normal levels of commercial traffic in the Red Sea. As it stands, it is impossible to predict when a sustainable increase in maritime traffic will take place. Such an increase, however, will very likely be based on commercial considerations rather than on the presence of warships. Frigates and destroyers may be reassuring to seafarers, yet they are unable to intercept every incoming missile or drone. More importantly, the current level of naval operations is not sustainable in the long term. Other solutions to address the threat are needed.

Dr. Dirk Siebels is a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, a Denmark-based security intelligence company. The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity.

Featured Image: Red Sea (Jan. 31, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87), sails in the Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chris Krucke)

Red Sea Topic Week

By Commander Amila Prasanga, Sri Lankan Navy

A New Threat Looms

The Red Sea, a narrow waterway snaking between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, serves as a vital route for global trade. Significant energy resources transit the Red Sea, including an estimated 12 percent of total seaborne-traded oil in the first half of 2023, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments that account for about 8 percent of worldwide LNG trade. However, this crucial passage now faces a new and unexpected threat – Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) deployed by the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

The Houthis’ use of UUVs marks a significant escalation in the ongoing Red Sea crisis. These submersible drones, while not as sophisticated as military submarines, pose a significant challenge to naval operations designed primarily to counter surface and aerial threats. The emergence of the Houthi UUVs threat necessitates a comprehensive reassessment of the naval defense strategies and tactics being employed in the Red Sea.

How can coalition forces adapt Red Sea operations to enhance undersea defense against unconventional threats such as Houthi UUVs? What steps are required to restore stability in the Red Sea region, emphasizing a decisive response to the Houthi UUVs threat? Furthermore, how must global navies adapt their warfighting techniques to effectively counter the distinct challenges posed by these emerging undersea threats?

By effectively addressing these critical questions, the international community can ensure the safety of vital sea lanes in the Red Sea and establish a framework for countering emerging undersea threats in the future.

Houthi UUV Capabilities and the Evolving Threat

The Houthi rebels in Yemen have injected a new and unsettling element into the Red Sea’s already tense security landscape. In March three undersea telecommunication cables were cut in the Red Sea, which the Houthis have denied doing, but nonetheless suggests a contested undersea domain. While details about Houthi UUVs remain murky, open-source intelligence suggests they are likely commercially-adapted or relatively unsophisticated submersible drones. Despite their presumed lack of sophistication compared to military submarines, these low-cost UUVs pose a significant threat due to several key factors.

The operational range and payload capacity of Houthi UUVs are currently unknown. However, even a modest range, measured in tens of miles, could enable them to target commercial shipping within the Red Sea. Their potential payload could include mines, torpedoes, or explosives packed into the hull, possibly enough to inflict significant damage on unsuspecting commercial vessels.

Houthi UUVs likely lack sophisticated guidance and targeting systems compared to military-grade undersea drones. They may rely on basic GPS or pre-programmed routes, as well as wire guidance. However, this simplicity can also make them difficult to detect and eliminate before they reach their targets.

Traditional naval defenses designed to counter surface and aerial threats are largely ineffective against undersea drones. Sonar technology and undersea surveillance systems are crucial for detecting and tracking UUVs. The preferable escort and maneuver patterns of warships searching for undersea threats may be at odds with the operational patterns that optimize air defense coverage, potentially creating difficult tradeoffs and tensions. This can create a significant challenge for the international coalition forces operating in the Red Sea.

The impact of Houthi UUVs extends far beyond potential damage to individual ships. The very presence of undersea threats is disruptive, given how the stealth of undersea platforms can magnify the effects of their operations and substantially shape the behaviors of those under threat. According to a recent report by the Global Trade Research Institute, even minor disruptions to Red Sea shipping could have a cascading effect on economies in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The specter of undersea threats can stimulate outsized uncertainty and risk, potentially driving up insurance costs and impacting global supply chains further.

Responses and Challenges in a Multi-Domain Environment

Faced with Houthi UUVs lurking beneath the waves, the international coalition in the Red Sea is grappling with a new and demanding challenge. However, the coalition is not without options. There are various strategies and capabilities that can be employed by coalition forces.

Mine Countermeasures warships (MCMs) are crucial for clearing mines potentially deployed by the Houthis, which can be deployed by the UUVs in sea lanes and also deployed near the UUV launch sites. The sonar and mine disposal capabilities of MCM ships can play a vital role in safeguarding sea lanes and improving undersea domain awareness.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities can be adapted to the UUV fight, including sonobuoys, towed array sonars, dipping sonars, and deployable hydrophone arrays. These tools can help create a more comprehensive undersea surveillance network in the Red Sea and gather critical intelligence on the telltale signatures of UUVs. An undersea surveillance network can be useful for cueing UUV hunters toward detections, rather than relying hunters to find UUVs using only their organic sensors.

The information-intensive nature of surveilling the complex undersea domain demands thoughtful approaches to intelligence coordination. Information sharing and collaboration among coalition members is critical for locating Houthi UUVs. Real-time data exchange can help predict potential attacks and enable a more coordinated response. Faster reaction times and improved targeting capabilities could potentially be used to intercept Houthi support vessels or launch platforms before they deploy UUVs. Ultimately coalition forces can aspire to strike Houthi UUVs before they are ever deployed by degrading their enabling infrastructure.

Despite the possibility of adaptation, current undersea surveillance capabilities may not be optimal for detecting low-signature Houthi UUVs, particularly in the acoustic environment of the Red Sea. The maritime shipping that continues to transit may transmit significant sound into the undersea environment that complicates UUV hunting, especially as a UUV nears a target merchant vessel. Advanced undersea drones and sensor networks specifically designed for UUV detection are urgently needed. Employing new tactics for UUV detection, engagement, and neutralization will require tailored training and exercises that realistically simulate hostile UUV encounters.

Conclusion

The Red Sea crisis serves as a pivotal moment in the evolution of maritime security. The lessons learned here – the importance of adapting naval power, the dangers of escalation, and the necessity of international cooperation – will reverberate far beyond the shores of this strategically vital waterway. By embracing innovation, fostering collaboration, and developing effective strategies for the undersea battlefield, the international community can ensure the safety and security of global trade routes and navigate the challenges of the 21st-century maritime security landscape.

Forces must consider what adaptations can meet the emerging UUV threat. Investing in cutting-edge drone detection and undersea surveillance systems is crucial for creating a comprehensive UUV defense network. Research and development efforts should focus on advanced sonar technologies and autonomous undersea vehicles (AUVs) specifically designed for UUVs countermeasures. Improved intelligence gathering and information sharing among coalition partners is essential for tracking UUVs and anticipating potential attacks. This includes intelligence cooperation with regional partners and leveraging advanced surveillance technologies.

The Red Sea crisis underscores the importance of international cooperation in addressing emerging maritime threats. Sharing best practices, conducting joint training exercises, and fostering closer collaboration on technology development are all crucial steps towards a more robust response to UUVs. The Houthi UUV threat offers a stark reminder of the need for continuous adaptation and innovation in the realm of naval warfare. Long-theorized unmanned undersea threats have now arrived.

Commander Amila Prasanga, Sri Lankan Navy, is Military Research Officer at the Institute of National Security Studies, the premier Sri Lankan think tank on national security, established and functioning under the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence. The opinions expressed are his own and are not necessarily reflective of the official views of the institute or the Ministry of Defence.

Featured Image: A Remus 600 UUV being operated by U.S. Navy sailors. (U.S. Navy photo by Capt. Gary Loten-Beckford).

Red Sea Topic Week

By Dr. Bonnie Johnson

The recent crisis in the Red Sea has escalated from Houthi drone and missile attacks on commercial ships to a major Iranian-led, Houthi-supported barrage (300+ aerial threats) against Israel. U.S. Navy and coalition partner warships have intercepted numerous missiles and drones to protect commercial shipping and support Israel’s Iron Dome to successfully defeat Iran’s latest barrage attack. The Navy and coalition are using kinetic weapons – guns and missiles – to intercept the threats.

The Navy and coalition partners have been remarkably successful at thwarting the attacks so far, but at great cost that will be challenging to sustain. According to a recent CRS report, the current events in the Red Sea raise two serious problems: the Navy’s “depth of magazine” that is being taxed, and the highly asymmetric “cost exchange ratio” between the Navy’s expensive missiles and the inexpensive threats they are intercepting. A ship’s “depth of magazine” refers to its limited number of missiles and gun ammunition, which when depleted, requires the ship to be reloaded. This takes considerable time, including travel to a safe reloading area.

The “cost exchange ratio” refers to the large differential between the procurement costs for the Navy’s air defense missiles and the adversary’s relatively inexpensive offensive drones and missiles. The CRS report estimates that the Navy’s air defense missiles range from “several hundred thousand dollars to a few million dollars per missile, depending on the type.” These costs stand in stark contrast to estimates of Houthi Iranian-made drones launched by the dozen that can “cost as little as a few thousand dollars.”

Wes Rumbaugh of CSIS adds the caveat that the cost exchange ratio is an insufficient measure of the real cost and operational considerations of conflicts. He points out the often-underappreciated complexities of defensive missile requirements that must provide precision guidance and exceptional maneuverability, the complex decisions that commanders must make to defend a region, and the value of the defended assets which include lives, expensive ships, and the broader economic impacts of attacks on commercial shipping. He also mentions how the escort mission in the Red Sea requires area defense capabilities that offer better range than point defense capabilities, where attacks often necessitate the use of expensive munitions to protect distant ships on short notice.

There is a high likelihood of wider proliferation and increased use of Red Sea crisis-inspired threats by more terrorist groups and nations over time. The recent attacks have wreaked havoc on regional stability, disrupted shipping, causing terror, escalating the conflict, and potentially normalizing attacks on shipping. The attacking capabilities are relatively easy and inexpensive to acquire and employ. Some fraction of the threats may fail to launch, maneuver, or impact their intended targets, but this can be compensated for by launching many of them simultaneously or over time. Adversaries may realize the asymmetric advantage of depleting warship arsenals and running up expensive price tabs, and purposely use many low-cost, crude threats to gradually reduce defenses through wave attacks. Peer competitor nations may also adopt this strategy and opt for swarms of inexpensive unmanned systems instead of more sophisticated missiles.

Noticeably absent are directed energy (DE) weapons, which multiple senior leaders have called for in response to the Red Sea attacks. The Navy’s SWO boss, Vice Adm. Brendan McLane, has expressed frustration over the lack of DE weapons, including lasers and high-power microwaves to counter the threats in the Red Sea. McLane wants to see industry speed up the development of DE weapons for integration onto warships. The commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Michael Kurilla, has also voiced the need for DE weapons, explaining that they are especially needed to counter swarm threats as part of a layered defense. Admiral Chris Grady, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also recently expressed interest in DE weapons to improve the cost exchange of air defense.

Operational DE weapons can help tackle the magazine depth and cost exchange challenges posed by threats. Laser weapons offer the potential for speed-of-light defense against threats with their focused beams – blinding sensors or burning through materials. HPM devices transmit a wider cone of microwave radiation that can damage a threat’s electronics. As with all capabilities, DE systems have their natural limitations and are therefore seen as weapons that could complement existing ship kinetic weapons rather than replace them. Shipboard DE weapons will provide closer range point defense – or self-defense of the ship or surface action group.

To provide area defense, as is needed in the Red Sea crisis, many DE weapons will have to be widely distributed on surface vessels or be integrated onto aerial platforms for coordinated operations. According to James Black of RAND, costs as low as $13 per shot are estimated for some laser weapons—basically the cost of providing power during lasing. Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren estimates similarly low costs per shot for HPMs. DE weapons have unlimited magazines in the sense they are not running out of ammunition. They can be fired repeatedly, limited by a different set of factors like power and cooling cycles, the time it takes to lase or irradiate targets and slew weapons to engage targets, and environmental effects that can lessen the effects of the DE weapons.

DE weapons are coming of age. Studies conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) assess the pace of advancement and future warfare implications of technology, including the role of DE in future naval weapons. A team of NPS students developed a historical timeline of progress and milestones of the five different types of DE: lasers, particle beams, electromagnetic pulses, microwaves, and millimeter waves (shown in Figure 1). The color shading indicates the evolution from early-growth and development to current prototyping in four of the five types of DE and current stagnation in particle beam applications. Decades of discoveries and inventions have led to the recent era of rapid development, prototyping, and demonstration of these highly complex systems. Rapid advancements are being made in supporting technologies, such as the power and cooling systems to meet size and weight needs, adaptive optics for atmospheric effects and precision targeting, and integration onto platforms and with combat systems. The rise of unmanned threats, such as those in the Red Sea crisis, is helping push lasers and microwave devices over a final set of operationalization hurdles to deployment. 

A family of DE systems is coming of age across the services. The Navy’s High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) system, designed to interdict drones, is being tested on a destroyer platform and is a “bit beyond” the experimentation phase and primed for growth according to Navy Secretary Carlos Tel Toro. The Navy’s Optical Dazzling Interdictor-Navy (ODIN) system has deployed on eight ships as a softkill system than can blind the sensors of drones. The Marine Corps is developing the LOCUST laser weapon system which will be integrated on tactical vehicles. The Army is developing 300 kW-class laser weapons as part of their Indirect Fire Protection Capability – High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL) program. Arguably, the Air Force is tackling the most vexing application, integrating DE weapons on aircraft with their Airborne High Energy Laser (AHEL) and Self-protect High Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) programs. Aerial platforms for DE weapons are key to expanding beyond point defense tactics (self-defense at close ranges) to providing defense for an area, as is needed for protecting the Red Sea region.

HPM devices are maturing at a similar pace. Eric Teger describes the Directed Energy Front-Line Electromagnetic neutralization and Defeat (DEFEND) HPM prototype preparing for near-term field testing by the Navy, Air Force, and OSD. DEFEND is the size of a large CONEX maritime shipping container which could fit onto a ship or be towed by a vehicle. Future advancement will focus on decreasing its size, weight, and power.

Preparing adolescent DE systems for adulthood requires a push to get them across the “Valley of Death” – an often difficult transition from the development to the acquisition community. This is reflected in the possible price tag of $1 billion for the Navy’s first laser weapon program of record. Cost studies are underway to weigh the potential benefits of future low-cost-per-shot with the additional development costs still required to produce the weapons, and the recent unit production cost estimates of $100-200 million for an operational shipboard laser weapon depending on the power level. A challenge to analyzing the overall costs of laser weapons is the absence of previous, long-term programs of record to provide historical data.

In terms of technological advances for crossing the “Valley of Death,” much of what is needed lies in continued testing and evaluation, operationalization, and providing training and education. Efforts are underway for prototyping, demonstrations, range testing, and evaluation of system capabilities and limitations in operational environments. The current DE family of systems are in different stages of maturity, ranging from low Technology Readiness Levels (TRL 3-5) for future systems like the 300kW laser or the airborne laser, to TRL 7-8 for systems like ODIN and HELIOS that are recently demonstrating capability at sea. As systems reach higher TRLs, there remains a significant effort required to transition the systems to ensure they are safe, reliable, usable, and fit to perform as intended in operations. Technological maturity must be complimented by extensive tactical development. More analysis is needed to fully develop DE concepts of employment and how they affect broader tactics and doctrine. These types of analysis can inform additional DE maturation focus areas as identified and described in Table 1.

Table 1 – DE Maturation Focus Areas for Crossing the Valley of Death

Focus areas for DE maturation	Descriptions
SWAP-C (Size, Weight, Power and Cost)	Further reduce the size and weight of DE systems; reduce the amount of power and cooling needed.
Platform integration	Increase and improve the platform integration options for DE systems. Design and tailor host platforms specifically for DE weapon systems; design power, cooling, optics, targeting, etc. to best support DE systems and their associated SWAP-C needs.
Combat system integration	Integrate the command-and-control functions of DE systems with the existing host platform combat systems.
Automated decision aids	Provide artificial intelligence-enabled automated decision tools to support the complex process of operating DE systems
Coordination with kinetic weapons	Fully understand how DE weapons can complement kinetic weapons; develop layered defense engagement strategies for a large variety of likely threat scenarios.
Point defense and area defense	Continue to develop DE weapons for point defense (closer-range self-defense), but also develop concepts of operation for the coordinated use of multiple distributed DE weapons and DE weapons on aerial platforms to provide defensive capabilities for an area.
Engagement doctrine	Develop effective engagement shot doctrine to support coordinated and layered defense use of DE systems in coordination with kinetic weapons.
Safety and deconfliction	Provide DE system deconfliction to ensure the use of DE systems does not inadvertently fire at friendly, civilian, and unintended forces, systems, and platforms. Ensure that laser systems do not blind humans, such as pilots of manned platforms.
DE system sustainment	Plan and prepare to operate and sustain DE systems including maintenance, repair, and logistics.
Training and education	Provide training for warfighters and system operators; provide education to increase and inform the DE community of developers, users, evaluators, engineers, managers, maintainers, and acquisition community.

Conclusion

The recent Red Sea crisis is forcing the Navy to reckon with the rate at which it adopts DE weapons. The crisis has shown that the asymmetric threat is real. The Navy is facing serious challenges with magazine depth and cost exchange ratios as the fleet depletes expensive munitions to counter vastly cheaper threats. The use of cheap drones and missiles is likely to proliferate over time, increasing the potential for the Navy to face numerous low-cost wave attacks alongside more sophisticated threats.

DE weapons offer a potential solution to both the depth of magazine and cost exchange ratio challenges, but only after the technologies cross the “Valley of Death.” A major final growth spurt is required to push the adolescent DE systems into adulthood. The systems must undergo enough operational evaluation to ensure their fitness as safe, reliable, and maintainable capabilities that perform as intended. The DE community and tactical centers of excellence must conduct comprehensive concept of operations and employment analyses to understand how these systems will be effectively used in coordination with kinetic weapon systems. DE systems must be fully integrated with platforms to meet SWAP-C requirements and be operated as part of host combat systems. All of this comes with a sizeable development price tag. The return on investment will be realized as laser weapons and microwave devices come of age and defeat threats with their unlimited magazines and low costs per shot.

Bonnie Johnson is a professor of Systems Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School. She leads interdisciplinary systems research to explore advanced technologies as engineered solutions for warfighters. She studies the implications of emerging technology on future warfare, specializing in directed energy systems and artificial intelligence.

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Featured Image: November 2014 – The U.S. Navy Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15) conducts an operational demonstration of the Office of Naval Research (ONR)-sponsored Laser Weapon System (LaWS) while deployed to the Arabian Gulf.