MOSA Redux: Modular Acquisition is New Again

By Jason Thomas

What is old is new again, and Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) is no different. MOSA is an acquisition and design approach consisting of a technical and business architecture that supports using system interfaces compliant with widely supported and consensus-based standards, to the extent that standards are available and suitable.1 Despite being a concept and approach important for defense systems for decades, adoption and implementation have been sporadic at best. There are many proposed benefits of implementing a MOSA, but program teams are often left with more questions than answers, including starting counts, what to include, and does it apply to their program. There needs to be a better understanding of the history of MOSA, and some common program challenges deserve to be addressed in detail. Forthcoming guidance from the Department of the Navy can help show the path forward.

The first use of “open standards” in defense acquisition was when the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology formally established the Open Systems Joint Task Force in 1994 via a memorandum.2 The memorandum highlighted the commitment to use performance and commercial specifications and standards, and wanted to further emphasize that commitment by using “open systems” specifications and standards in acquisition to the greatest extent practical.

A decade later, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5000.1, which provides management policies and procedures for managing all acquisition programs, had language included for MOSA.3 The directive stated that “Acquisition programs shall be managed through the application of a systems engineering approach that optimizes total system performance and minimizes total ownership costs. A modular, open-systems approach shall be employed, where feasible.” The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2017 is where MOSA was formally established in law as a requirement for defense weapons systems. The language defined which systems were affected and at which acquisition milestones, the purported benefits of including MOSA as part of program development, sustainment, and fielded operations, and the important technical and business considerations.

The law also made an important wording change, namely that MOSA would be applied “where practicable” instead of the earlier guidance of “practical.” Practicability is not about want, desire, or whether it applies, but more on the feasibility of implementation. In 2019, the Service Secretaries jointly published a memo directing their respective Service Acquisition Executives to “publish specific implementation guidance” for acquisition programs, because victory in future conflict may heavily depend on sharing information across systems using standard interfaces.4 

A Recent Resurgence?

Despite the previously posited benefits of MOSA, defense leaders find themselves reaffirming MOSA as a priority across the services.5 Recently, MOSA or its elements have been called out in recently proposed legislation. The Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense (FoRGED) Act identifies key sections for removal and modifications to facilitate the department’s ability to meet the intent of MOSA.6 Similarly, the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery (SPEED) Act discusses modularity and faster acquisitions to meet emerging threats and address mission needs.7

In SecWar Pete Hegseth’s confirmation hearing, he emphasized the importance and need for modular system designs to address evolving threats, and emphasized the importance of having modular systems and the advantages they provide in upgrading and fielding capabilities quickly.8 With the recent announcement of the Air Force’s newest fighter aircraft, the F-47, the President, Secretary of War, and Air Force Chief of Staff all made comments about the adaptability of the platform throughout its service life.9

The benefits of MOSA are also being realized through the evolutionary tactics by Ukrainian forces in their ongoing war with Russia, where modular, open designs are enabling rapid adaptation on the battlefield.10 Lastly, the acquisition community is observing contract protests favoring requirement to include MOSA in proposals and contracts.11 Clearly, MOSA is not going away and appears to be growing in importance and popular backing.

Misconceptions Against Adopting a MOSA

If something is objectively better, then ideally there is little to prevent it from becoming the new standard way of doing business. But with any ‘new’ concept, some level of pushback is to be expected, particularly when the change is not well understood. There are common arguments and concerns on the applicability of implementing MOSA that need to be settled.

“Lifecycle Phase”

A common argument is related to the lifecycle phase the program is in or the size of the program, therefore saying MOSA is not applicable or practicable. “I’m too late in the lifecycle to implement a MOSA” is a common argument for a program to raise when discussing MOSA, and it is a fair one in certain cases. How does a program manager, engineering team, or other stakeholder inject a MOSA once the system is completed, tested, and fielded? What about the contract structure or negotiated data rights? The program must consider the mission objectives of their system, the technology improvements relevant to their system, all missions the system contributes to joint operations, and the contractual and sustainment posture over the course of the remaining life of the system.

The discussion surrounding this argument can be summarized in the “practical” vs “practicable” distinction. If a weapon system is complete and fielded, it should have a system-level architecture. The architecture will highlight key interfaces internally or externally. Analysis will report on how system requirements were verified and satisfied via measures of performance from testing based on that architecture. These are all fundamental building blocks for MOSA adoption because they each describe the system, the behaviors of the systems, and what is expected from each component. The program team should know the system well enough to anticipate when the inevitable service life extension or obsolescence challenges will arise.

Historical experience suggests that weapon systems are usually required to remain fielded beyond their initially intended service lives. The decision to extend the service life of a weapon system is dependent on the material condition of the system, its effectiveness, supportability, and the external resource constraints such as budget or personnel. Traditionally, each program or program office has a technology or capability roadmap that details capability enhancements from science and technology initiatives that are being tracked or planned to support growth and modernization. Service life modernization or pre-planned program improvements are an opportune time for the original fielded system to take advantage of a MOSA during those requirement engineering efforts. The laws surrounding budgets and continuing resolutions make MOSA more attractive since the inability to initiate new start programs plays a key role in system acquisition and ultimately delivered capability. Even if the program is late in its lifecycle, MOSA is often still practicable.

“MOSA will add cost to the Program”

The total cost of a major acquisition program is measured as either Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), which is the total procurement cost of a program divided by the number of units procured, or the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) which adds in the costs of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) for the program. Adopting a MOSA will not only drive down costs from reuse of the non-recurring engineering (NRE) design and development costs, but also the laboratory, integration, and operational testing. This can allow a program to separate functions into specific modules, and if they are reusing the technical details or the technical version is unchanged, there is a significant reduction in costs. Furthermore, by leveraging commercial technologies through the use of open, common standards, programs would be postured to be more proactive rather than reactive in how they plan for upgrades. One needs to consider the full lifecycle costs of how a program is managed, including contract actions, development timelines, and testing, and the burden they can put on resources if operating in a more reactive approach.

“We don’t have the resources to design MOSA in”

During the design and development of any weapon system, requirements definition, decomposition, and architectural design work are required. As a design matures, test events are conducted, planning and product support crystalizes, and these same skills are used whether a program adopts a MOSA or not. The first key difference is the level of engagement across the program team in executing a MOSA. Those adopting a MOSA benefit from a stronger alignment between the various disciplines, resulting in a more robust solution. Another added benefit is the enhancement of the skillsets developed by the workforce due to more rigorous design work and sustainment planning. Teams are required to evaluate more options, think more deliberately and understand the impacts of the various courses of action where they may not have had to consider if they were not adopting a MOSA.

The second main difference comes from the level of resources required after initially fielding the system due to capability needs, mission performance, obsolescence, or as other pressures manifest. Fundamentally, the analysis and work are no different if MOSA is “designed in” or not, and therefore a MOSA does not require additional resources. If a MOSA is adopted, resources are postured for efficient and effective use when upgrades or enhancements are sought or present themselves due to an active demand signal to the industrial base to address mission needs.

“My system architecture isn’t based on modularity”

This argument typically follows a presumption of not using one of the MOSA “enabling standards” such as the Future Airborne Combat Environment (FACE), Open Mission Systems (OMS)/Universal Command and Control Interface (UCI), Sensor Open Systems Architecture (SOSA), or something similar. Every system is developed with some level of architecture that identifies and articulates the system components, how they are organized, and how they relate to one another. Architectural views of a system and their artifacts for weapon systems are mandated in law and required for various technical and acquisition reviews to assess the maturity of the system as it develops Modularity, or components of a system built on modules, is inherent in nearly all systems. Circuit cards, avionics boxes, sensor components, software algorithms, wiring bundles, and more are all modular components within a system. Modularity is critical when failure analysis or supportability analysis are conducted and have a direct impact on system safety and maintainability. If a given system is not designed with open standards, that is a different argument, and one that must be supported in a business case analysis.

Affordability and capability over the lifecycle of a program are assessment criteria in technical and acquisition reviews and should be documented and well-reasoned. If a system is not modular today, it does not mean that will remain the case into the future. MOSA practicability must be addressed throughout the lifecycle.

“MOSA will delay my program”

When asked about how he would accelerate program timelines and reduce costs during his confirmation hearing, then-nominee Hegseth said he would focus on investing in the industrial base, understand the threats we are going to face in the future, and use “off-the-shelf technologies or standard designs [and] modular designs.” This “acquisition churn” is the result of many factors, but it is inherently easier to address with the proactive posture MOSA offers. Having a MOSA incentivizes the program to more proactively focus resources on delivering relevant and timely outcomes for the force. That focus prevents delay, rather than adds to the risk of it. Absent modular, open designs a program is more likely to become subject to frequent scrutiny from oversight bodies, which in turn requires the program team to spend more time justifying the program’s initial requirements and planning for how the program will address oversight concerns.

“MOSA is another unfunded requirement”

This argument and its cousin, “we didn’t generate a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for it,” are arguably red herrings. MOSA is in law as a requirement for defense acquisition programs for consideration and assessment for practicability. The requirements are further codified in technical and acquisition assessment criteria as a weapon system matures and advances through the acquisition process. The perception that MOSA is something that is added onto the system to make it more expensive, instead of a fundamental design approach that ensures the program remains relevant, is a misconception that needs to be clarified with better awareness and education.

The Navy’s Approach to MOSA

MOSA is a strategic imperative for the Navy. As such, it is taking a holistic and enterprise view in strategy, planning, and implementation. The Navy has several focus areas for implementation and execution, including Education and Training, a Collaborative Digital Environment, Updating Policy, Processes, and Guidance, and Outreach and Engagement. These areas will culminate in a Department of the Navy MOSA Guidebook v2, expected to release in the coming months.

Updating Policy, Processes, and Guidance

The Navy is reviewing and making changes to all policy and guidance where MOSA is either identified or ought to be included to ensure programs are supported in their MOSA journey. While MOSA is identified in multiple acquisition and technical documents, the Navy is taking additional steps to provide better traceability and consistency across policy, and also in technical disciplines across the entire lifecycle and acquisition pathways. The Navy is ensuring that regardless of where a program is in its lifecycle, the discipline (i.e. engineering, logistics, program management, testing, budgeting, etc.), or the acquisition pathway (Major Acquisition Program, Middle Tier Acquisition, Software Pathway, etc.) the available guidance and support is consistent and understandable. Furthermore, by aligning the Department’s MOSA strategy with acquisition policy, the Navy will align the enterprise and maximize efficiency and effectiveness.

Education and Training

People are our number one advantage. The top priority is ensuring our talented workforce has a firm understanding of what a MOSA is, the planning and implementation considerations, and how it informs the way they design and deliver capabilities. This requires a review of current MOSA education coursework, professional material, and other media that support the DON’s desired end-state for a MOSA-savvy workforce. The DON is developing new methodologies for business case analysis for a MOSA to facilitate conversations across disciplines supporting our programs, as well as resource sponsors, policymakers, industry, and academia. Furthermore, education will cover opportunities for overlapping topics such as Intellectual Property and Data Rights, Right to Repair, Interoperability, Digital Engineering, and Reference Architectures.

In his book Legacy, James Kerr wrote, “the best teams have a culture of accountability.”12 Accountability surrounding MOSA will be enabled when all the requisite disciplines are involved, share the same understanding and playbook, have defined expectations, and are supported throughout the process.

Collaborative Digital Environment

The Navy has established a Collaborative Digital Environment to serve as the authoritative source for the Department of the Navy approach to MOSA. The environment sources policy and guidance documents, training content, terminology, standards, a repository for modular system interfaces, and other references to support programs so they can achieve their objectives relative to MOSA. This site is accessible to anyone with a common access card to facilitate learning and dissemination. The site is hosted in the same environment used for the Naval Integrated Modeling Environment, an enterprise service to enable integrated modeling.

Conclusion

MOSA can increase combat capability, mission effectives, and mission readiness. The Department of the Navy is taking an enterprise-wide, systems engineering view of modular open systems, where each program is better positioned because of the strategic investments made from those who came before. By adopting a modular open systems approach, we can rapidly field emerging technologies, enhance our industrial base, interoperate with our allies and partners, and strengthen deterrence. When a program adopts a MOSA, our adversaries must consider a wider range of capabilities they need to address. When multiple programs adopt a MOSA, U.S. collective strength increases supporting our goal of peace through strength.

The Navy is making a concerted effort to communicate with the myriads of stakeholders regarding its MOSA strategy. Regardless of their footprint in the industrial base, there is a place for them at the table. The message is clear – the Navy is fully embracing modular open systems in its weapons systems as a warfighting imperative.

Jason Thomas serves as lead for Systems Engineering for the Department of the Navy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test and Engineering. He is the Department’s lead for MOSA and is leading efforts across the service, and partnering with other services, OSW, and other stakeholders. 

These views are presented here in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the official views of the DOW, its components, or the DON.

References

1. Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, “Implementing a Modular Open Systems Approach in Department of Defense Programs,” February 2025.

2. Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Acquisition of Weapon Systems Electronics Using Open Systems Specifications and Standards,” November 29, 1994.

3. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “DODD 5000.1: The Defense Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003.

4. Spencer R., Esper, M., Wilson, H., “Modular Open Systems Approaches for our Weapons Systems is a Warfighting Imperative.” January 9, 2019.

5. Briggs, Connie, “Prominent Leaders Queue for MOSA Summit 2025.” August 21, 2025. https://navalaviationnews.navy.mil/Editorial-Staff-Tools/Article-Submission/Article/4281635/prominent-navy-leaders-queue-for-mosa-summit-2025/

6. Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense Act of 2025, 118th Congress (2025). https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/5618/text/is

7. Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery Act, 118th Congress (2025). https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/speed_act_full_text.pdf

8. Confirmation hearing transcript of Peter Hegseth, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 14, 2025, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01-14-25_nom-transcript.pdf.

9. “Air Force Awards Contract for Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) Platform, F-47,” Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, March 21, 2025, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4131345/air-force-awards-contract-for-next-generation-air-dominance-ngad-platform-f-47/. 

10. Bondar, K. (2025). Ukraine’s future vision and current capabilities for waging AI-Enabled autonomous warfare. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-future-vision-and-current-capabilities-waging-ai-enabled-autonomous-warfare

11. U.S. Army. (2025). Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA). In CRS Reports. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12771/IF12771.7.pdf

12. Kerr, J. (2013). Legacy. Constable & Robinson.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Dec. 6, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) conducts a replenishment-at-sea with the Henry J. Kaiser-class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO 187). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Joey Sitter)

Bring Out the Knives: A Programmatic Night Court for the Surface Navy

By Chris Rielage

Time is our critical resource now. The Navy knows that we have a few scant years before we face major risk for an invasion of Taiwan. In the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) headquarters in San Diego, countdown clocks on the wall measure the days before mid-2027 arrives. The force is in a dead sprint, not a marathon – and we need to throw off excess weight.

To meet the challenge of war with China, the surface force has been driving hard towards more tactical competence. New equipment is rapidly hitting the fleet. New simulators are being built around the world. New cohorts of Warfare Tactics Instructors (WTIs) are graduating. SMWDC is even expanding the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC) to boost and standardize tactical knowledge across the surface force.

All of this looks good on paper. But when these efforts reach the ships, they collide with the tight schedules of sailors who count the hours in the day and often come up short. Sailors already work an average of 88.3 hours a week while underway. Where will the time for these warfighting reforms come from?

If sailors are already fully occupied and their schedules are overflowing, it hardly matters how good the new simulators or WTIs are. The present system of time allocation in the surface fleet is not a deliberate product of a warfighting-centric focus, but rather an unchecked process of creeping administrative overload. When new tacticians and training tools hit the fleet, they are eclipsed and diluted by a vast array of miscellaneous requirements. The leaders of the surface force must launch an effort to systematically protect time for tactics by aggressively pruning other requirements, or else these new efforts will fall short.

Guarding the Fleet’s Time

Thankfully, a model for how to do this already exists – a “night court.” Twice, Secretaries of Defense have convened night courts, which are rapid reviews of large groups of programs by a top official to aggressively triage acquisition programs. Most recently, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper convened a night court for both the Army and the larger Pentagon in 2019. In the process, Secretary Esper refocused billions of dollars to better fund reform efforts. In the defense world, night courts like this are also occasionally called “zero-based reviews.” The difference is subtle – a zero-based review starts from a clean slate and adds programs that are considered the most necessary, while a night court starts with the existing plan and cuts out excess.

The term “night court” will be used here, but the Navy could reasonably use either method. The end goal is the same. Senior admirals should review every program that owns a fraction of a sailor’s day, and ruthlessly remove the ones that, as the Secretary of War wrote recently, get in the way of “winning our Nation’s wars without distraction.” 

Are there truly programs the fleet can afford to cut? Certainly. Consider the Fall Protection program. Warships are expected to:

  • Appoint a Fall Protection Program Manager and several “Competent Persons” to run the program. 
  • Send those individuals to school – three days for the program manager and four days for each Competent Person. These individuals are usually senior Combat Systems personnel, already hard-pressed to maintain equipment and train for war.
  • Develop a command instruction for fall protection and rescue plans for a fall.
  • Perform a shipwide inspection for hazardous areas – anywhere with any height over four feet – and make design changes to the ship to remove the hazard. When this is impossible (which is usually the case on warships), post warning signs.
  • Train end users – any sailor who might go near a height over four feet – on the program. 
  • Regularly inspect the program, and be prepared for outside assessors to audit it.

The Department of the Navy’s Fall Protection instruction, which outlines these requirements, is 185 pages long – twice as long as many of the surface fleet’s latest tactical publications. 

We all agree that stopping falls is good in the abstract. No one wants to see a shipmate get injured. However, the truth is that the fleet simply cannot afford to spend precious time like this when pressing warfighting demands are calling. Sailors are continuously ensnared by programs, well-intentioned but ultimately misguided, that detract from fundamental tactical work. Warships do not have two crews – one that handles programs and one that handles combat. We face a zero-sum game with our time. Every minute that a sailor spends on an administrative program is a minute not spent on sharpening combat skills. 

Leading the Night Court

Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific (CNSP) – the surface fleet’s Type Commander (TYCOM) – is best placed to run this night court. Not only is CNSP close enough to ships to personally speak to the urgency of the problem, they also have the senior authority to directly cut many programs. CNSP has the holistic perspective to rebalance the time allocations of the surface force, understanding both the urgency of the strategic situation and which administrative requirements do truly matter. No one leader can remove every detrimental program alone. Fall Protection, for example, will require congressional action to exempt warships from OSHA. CNSP is senior enough, however, to cut a wide swath using the span of their own authority, and to advocate for the changes that require departmental or congressional authority. 

CNSP is not the only path to success, but it is the simplest. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) or Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) could also build a programmatic night court – more directly replicating the acquisition night court that Secretary Esper created – but they are too distant from the fleet. The more echelons a leader is removed from a problem, the more they face what public economist Anthony Downs called a “message-distortion problem.” In any large bureaucracy, each layer of the chain of command, even when completely well-intentioned, naturally filters out some portion of any message as it works its way up. This feature of large bureaucracies makes the Navy’s most senior leaders ill-placed to judge which programs should be removed to improve time allocations at the deckplate level. Not only is CNSP closer to the fleet, senior leaders at CNSP have bypass mechanisms – tours, direct conversations with sailors, and a network on the waterfront – available to get to the core of each program’s value. Instead of leading it directly, the CNO and SECNAV are better suited to act as senior champions for a TYCOM-led night court.

The Night Court Process

The night court should go through three phases. First, measurement. Surface force leaders need to understand every program that takes up a sailor’s time. The team that runs the night court should be careful here. If they turn this information-gathering step into yet another tasker for ships, they may actually make the problem worse. The better answer is to put three or four SWO-qualified officers who have just departed sea tours in a room, and have them brainstorm a list of every requirement they encountered. Start the night court off of that rough draft, and only afterwards follow up with more comprehensive studies and requests for information. The goal is to move quickly, not to waste a year waiting for a formal – and quickly outdated – product.

The next step is adjudication. Each program must defend its existence to the night court. The key here is that program owners must not simply explain that a problem exists, but convince CNSP that their program meaningfully addresses the problem. Using Fall Protection again as an example, it is not good enough to list fall statistics – the Fall Protection team must convince CNSP that their program stops falls without putting an undue burden on ships.

Once the night court judges against a program, the last and hardest step is removal. The night court should identify the source of the program requirement, and if it is within CNSP’s influence, cut it directly. If the requirement is imposed on the surface fleet by a higher authority like congress, CNSP should push them for reform. Some of this work will generate natural friction amongst stakeholders. To build support, the night court should aggressively publicize how many hours of fleet time it saves, emphasize how many pages of administrative requirements it has cut, and cultivate support from combat-focused leaders who can speak to the warfighting benefits.

The goal is that, in the long run, regular night court reviews – perhaps every 1-2 years – cease to be radical. Ideally, guarding sailors’ time to emphasize warfighting will become a standard part of how the surface fleet operates and conceives of its identity: a more austere and focused force, supported by a more disciplined bureaucracy.

Dragging the Fleet Down

If surface force leaders like CNSP do not do the work of cutting time requirements, more time will not magically appear. Instead, the task of prioritizing will fall to unit commanders, junior officers, and chiefs. They will be forced to make changes within the margins of a system overflowing with years of creeping administrative overload, which has long surpassed the available time of sailors. The best of them will be honest about the fact that they cannot do everything, and accept hits to their record in exchange for a ruthless prioritization of combat skills. Ships with strong warfighting focus will fail more administrative inspections, earn fewer awards, and look worse on paper. Those leaders – the ones willing to be honest – will be winnowed out by a personnel system that does not appreciate nuance. The remaining leaders will take dishonesty as a norm and even an unavoidable price to be paid in exchange for career security. They will superficially hit their required administrative wickets at the cost of lethality. The Army War College report “Lying to Ourselves” famously described this dynamic within its own service, and the surface fleet is just as prone to it. Our failure to control excess time demands on ships yields an overflowing system that incentivizes dishonesty.

At this late hour, we cannot keep everything. When a crew member falls overboard, we teach them to immediately shed their steel-toed boots. Boots are normally vital – they keep our sailors safe in a shipboard industrial environment. But in the crisis of a man overboard, they drag sailors down. Our peacetime programs are the same. We can shed weight now, or we can drown in wartime.

LT Chris Rielage is a SWO and ASW/SUW WTI onboard USS CARL M LEVIN (DDG 120) in the Pacific. His publications have previously appeared in USNI’s Proceedings and CIMSEC. These opinions are expressed in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views or policies of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. government.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (May 3, 2017) Rear Adm. James Bynum, commander of Carrier Strike Group (CCSG) 9 addresses the Wardroom of the guided-missile destroyer USS Sampson (DDG) 102, during a Group Sail training unit exercise (GRUSL). (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Bill M. Sanders/Released)

Sea Control 587: 20 Years After the Military Response to Hurricane Katrina

By J. Overton

Elaine Helm joins the program to reflect on the 20th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, and her time as a journalist embedded with the U.S. military during their response and recovery operations in New Orleans and Houston.

Elaine Helm is a communications professional and former journalist who lives and works in the Seattle area. She was the military reporter for the Kitsap Sun and the founder and editor of the pioneering Northwest Navy News site. 

Download Sea Control 587: 20 Years After the Military Response to Hurricane Katrina

Links

1. Elaine Helm Linkedin.

J. Overton is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

Jonathan Selling edited and produced this episode.

The Playing Fields: Sports and Warfighting Readiness

By Phil Bozzelli and Paul Giarra

The Duke of Wellington’s aphorism “The Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton,” has been widely accepted as a validation of sports and their greater relevance to warfighting and victory. We take that statement at face value but go further.

Using the renewed emphasis upon warfighting within the defense and naval establishments, we propose that sports at our service academies, especially the U.S. Naval Academy, do more than provide venues for exercise or competition. Rather, those activities and their participants should be an integral part of the warfighting curriculum of those institutions just as everything else there should be.

This theme leverages the basic relationships between sports and warfighting. In the former one needs to know and understand himself, his teammates and his opponents. It is no different in warfare, where the stakes are higher and therefore the knowing and understanding of one’s self, allies and enemies is of even greater importance for success. Warfare thinking and action are focused upon the international environment.

The global population has embraced sports as a way to improve understanding and relations between nations. The Olympics are the most obvious manifestation of this reality. We have all witnessed how this venue has become, over the decades, a demonstration of either national pride, wealth, political ideology, or a combination of all as well as other positives and negatives. These gatherings have, as a minimum, permitted an up-close and extended engagement by and among the individual athletes themselves.

America does bring foreign officers to the U.S. for training and education exchange programs. Some exchanges involve officers at the more senior levels whose thinking has already been largely shaped and is done in a generally formal classroom environment. This schooling process includes little participation of America’s less friendly counterparts and for the most part it takes place on American soil.

USNA has 33 varsity sports at the national competition level and 25 intramural and club sports for those not competing at the varsity level. America’s other service academies operate similar programs (e.g. West Point offers 25 varsity sports and 28 intramural and club teams). All midshipmen (and cadets) are engaged in one or more sports or athletic activities, but essentially all on the domestic scene.

This sporting, intramural, and club scene is dynamic not only in content but in venue and physicality. The digital age has introduced E-Sports, gaming and wargaming as competitive processes that fill stadiums and require superb hand-eye coordination analogous to that of professional basketball players but while seated at a computer screen. The games have transitioned from general games to those that mimic live sports as well and they too have transitioned to international levels of competition monitored by its version of the NCAA (Global Esports Federation – GEF). Similarly, the military-focused wargaming genre has joined this digital competitive environment.

The National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ) manages to field 37 sports at various levels (even including traditional American sports like football, basketball, etc.). USNA (and USMA) have about the same number of students as at the NDAC with the major difference being that the NDAJ offers a three-year education to future officers of all services before they go on to separate one-year schools for their individual militaries.

To varying degrees, militaries have officer-based sporting teams at different levels of skill within and without the primary service school. The Indian Navy has the largest naval academy in Asia and offers at least nine sporting teams. The Royal Navy, in addition to sports teams at its Naval School, fields a vast variety of teams throughout its naval establishment. China’s PLAN sporting focus, as can be determined from afar, appears to be more of a utilitarian team building type, although it does field a seriously respected rugby team. Interestingly, the PLA has not lagged in joining the digital age of competition, with E-Sports and wargaming popular among its military and civilian schools.

The various USNA teams should engage internationally with their friendly and not-so-friendly international military equivalents. The numbers of USNA teams provides significant engagement opportunities at varying appropriate skill levels dispersed over the entire calendar year. An environment exists where competition can be fair and appropriate as well as useful to help produce the warfighting leadership of the future. This proposed international engagement via sports far exceeds that international experience available to midshipmen from any other current program. It is on the international fields and seas where these officers will engage in war and peace.

We do not wish to engage here in a debate regarding how strong the warfighting focus has been of the USNA in recent years. However, it is clear that “warfighting” is currently being emphasized. The newly installed Secretary of Defense has made clear his focus and emphasis is upon warfighting and war readiness. This echoes the previous Chief of Naval Operations in her 2024 Navigation Plan for its “Warfighting Navy” headline and focus.

There is a renewed awareness and focus upon warfighting ability and readiness as the primary, if not singular, mechanism for maintaining peace. As one of the nation’s commissioning sources of naval officers the burden is upon USNA not only to support but to lead in this warfighting mission via its classrooms, dormitories and playing fields.

We are not starting from ground zero. The USNA offshore sailing team recently competed and won at the Ecole Navale International Sailing Week Competition, and in May 2024 the USNA had part of its men and women rugby teams participate in a State Department sponsored Rugby 7 tour of Fiji, Samoa and Tonga. We are proposing an organized expansion of these efforts not just for the sport but for the inherent benefit it brings to America’s national security via the education of its future Naval leaders in meeting the USNA mission that the naval officer “must be a great deal more.”

August 23, 2025 – U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Luis Camacho, Scrumhal for the U.S. Marine Corps Men’s 7s Rugby team scores the winning try against the U.S. Coast Guard team. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Theodore Lee)

Our interest in this subject came about when we became involved on the periphery of an invitation from the NDAJ’s four-star level civilian head to the USNA rugby team, via its coach, for the team to join in a rugby tournament at the NDAJ that would include teams from the NDAJ, the UK (Royal Naval College) and France (Ecole Navale). USNA’s Rugby team’s schedule and other factors (e.g., financing, event timing, NCAA rules etc.) precluded USNA participation.

We must first call attention to and highlight the significance of this NDAJ rugby initiative given the historical political and societal factors operating in that nation. We see sports related thinking as a “big deal.” The NDAJ rugby initiative not only reinforces the transnational utility of sports but offers a focused interpersonal engagement vehicle for military forces – friendly and not – which the U.S. and U.S. Navy should leap upon and expand. The more important aspect is the engagement with non-friendly nations.

The NDAJ and USNA catalog of sports is more typical than not of what exists at the world’s various service academies. Further, and more importantly, is the global shift in military attitudes exemplified by the Japanese government’s more visible foreign policy on the world’s stage to include this invitation to both the USN and its major seagoing allies via their officer producing schools.

Our contention is that it is all about warfighting to include having the necessary warfighting skills to achieve success without war. In the words of Wellington, “Not all naval battles are fought at sea!” Once one accepts this dictum, the tradeoffs required in terms of time and funding between these events and more traditional activities of Midshipmen (e.g. summer cruises) can be more equitably evaluated.

The “whys” for doing this are probably limited more by experience than imagination, so we list but a few of the more obvious. Whether one is a “globalist” or not, the reality is that America’s military has been involved globally since its founding and this is especially true of its sea services – the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard – whose officers are expected to function as diplomats in their international engagements, even at junior levels. Doing this well requires more international engagement sooner and over a longer period of service time.

The history of the world and certainly that of America from its beginning has made clear the need for supporters, friends, allies, partners regardless of whether the objective is military, political, economic or diplomatic. Whether that non-American shows up as a ship in our formation, a soldier in an adjacent fox hole, an article in some foreign media, a vote in some organizational chamber, some piece of needed foreign real estate or overflight, a trading partner or lender or simply an unpretentious “flag” among many – we all know and accept this need and the utility of someone to satisfy it. Perhaps, even more importantly, we appreciate that we must nurture these relationships if they are to be maintained or improved upon. For the military officer, this is not about “good will” or “friendships” it is about what is required in terms of knowledge about both allies and possible enemies.

For the naval officer this relationship between knowledge and warfighting is lifelong and consistent. It begins at USNA with its motto Ex Scientia Tridens (From Knowledge Sea Power), engraved on every USNA graduate’s class ring. It continues and is reinforced with the U.S. Naval War College motto of Viribus Mari Victoria (Victory through Sea Power); and these academic guidons become seagoing reality in the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s Ready power for peace.

The authors’ experiences have been that there has been and remains a great deal of ignorance and misunderstanding of what transpires in the minds and cultures of others. This deficiency occurs at all institutional levels, public and private. Therefore, being able to make critical judgments regarding what others present becomes ever more important as the pace and sourcing of information is growing exponentially. While critical thinking ability is essential for the domestic environment as well, our focus is warfighting wherein both the opponents and allies will be foreign.

A major, if not the greatest, impediment to international success and a contributor to contentions has been ignorance or misunderstanding of the history, culture, motivations, beliefs, psychology of others. A deficiency compounded in this modern era where English is the new global lingua franca. Because American “culture” (e.g. Apple, pop music, entertainment) is dispersed to the furthest corners of the globe and all are joined together via the Internet and social media, we therefore assume, incorrectly, that others think and are motivated as we are.

Despite varying bloody, military conflicts since World War II’s VJ day, the vast majority of America’s military effort, and especially that of its Navy, has been on peaceful non-kinetic engagement with neutrals, friends, allies, opponents, competitors around the world. All of these actions are either directly or indirectly pointed to enhancing that warfighting prowess to be there when needed and be visible and accepted so as not to be needed.

Although the NDAJ and rugby were the impetus for this article, the opportunities are more extensive and the demand pressing enough that the U.S. and especially the U.S. Navy should take a leadership role in making this happen using the hype created by the Olympics, international athletic competition, and the ever-present forces necessitating “gray zone” engagement. As demonstrated repeatedly, sports allow engagements where otherwise precluded by politics.

This puts the NDAJ invitation in a different light, not just as a friendly school-to-school athletic challenge, but as an opportunity for international exposure, country-to-country understanding, and bonding with friends and allies. And to emphasize the earlier points, this is not just about Japan or Rugby but the broader opportunities across all sports and all nations for a deliberate military to military engagement program in a different sort of classroom and “battlefield.”

Clearly, there are requirements that would have to be met, such as funding, carving out time in already packed academic and sports schedules, and meeting NCAA restrictions. Held against the international opportunities for building personal and professional relationships and improving understanding among all parties, these are not obstacles, but simply the cost of doing business. It is probably not an exaggeration to state that all that takes place in the lives of Midshipmen is geared to turning them into competent naval officers, citizens, and leaders. Consequently, the time allocated to these various endeavors is justified and valid as is the funding, regardless of its source (e.g. government budgets, donations, alumni funding, sports revenue etc.)

These are all costs that need to be sourced. However heavy the financing thumb is on the scale, it should be balanced by potential gains, financial and otherwise. Depending upon where and how these contests are conducted there is the opportunity for revenue such as from advertising, broadcasting and tours. Neither USNA nor the U.S. government itself are novices in this category. On that same counterweight side of the scale are the intangible benefits of image, recruiting across the board, good will, cultural understanding and messaging all done via the more acceptable and less intrusive vehicle of sport.

Although this proposal is directed at the junior levels of the military, our experience has been that a shared background of military service provides a degree of basic rapport that often does not exist between the military and civilian of even the same nation. This is especially true for the sea services where the impartiality of the seas, winds and skies allows one ship’s captain to readily baseline himself with another regardless of nationality. Similarly, competitive athletes at all ages have this shared understanding among their international colleagues. A boxer or wrestler or oarsman or whatever knows, appreciates and has a common foundation with his fellow competitor regardless of nationality because the common vigor of the shared sport transcends borders. Thus, there is an important starting framework from which to go forward – shared naval schooling background combined with common sporting experience.

Basically, getting to “Yes” will include understanding by U.S. leaders that this is both an internal and external political – military issue of great significance. We recommend the following:

1. Begin with “Of course we will participate” and find a way.

2. Start early, quickly and small – focus upon a successful beginning.

3. As with the launching of ships, it is important to “grease the skids” at all stakeholder levels, from coaches to national governments to funders to help ensure success

4. Following on to the NDAJ receptivity and initiative regarding Rugby, Rugby may be the logical beginning; however, pursuing this as the first step may violate the above idea of “early, quickly and small.”

5. The U.S., U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Naval Academy have so many options in terms of sports, timing, venues (domestic and international), and opponents that it is difficult to see an obstacle to an early success once the decision is made to participate.

6. There are several way to fund this program: Academy supporters, athletic and team supporters, patrons, corporations, U.S. DOD and non-DOD funds.

7. Planning around academic year class schedules is difficult, but not impossible. Summer cruises can be designed around team participation as is done now for major sports; venue selection can facilitate the time required for the event. Therefore, we see this as a year-round activity.

8. Treat this program the same as Olympic team participation. There are clear precedents for scheduling and funding for military personnel.

9. Recommendation 1, above, to participate, is not enough: Lead!

Finding a way requires the collaboration of many parties. However, the leadership initiative rests with the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy who has authority for the human resources required for this program and whose staff includes an International Engagement Office, which may need expansion in both depth and breadth to develop and execute a successful program.

There will be various arguments as to why the above is either too difficult or unnecessary. We address three:

1: NCAA rules: important enough to USNA’s Division 1 status and all that goes with it to have a compliance officer on the USNA Athletic Association staff to ensure the coaches adhere to the rules. However, as any tourist to Annapolis will see on display in either a souvenir shop or on the back of a midshipman tee shirt the logo “USNA, not college”. Within and without the USNA, there needs to be a reminder that the service academies have a purpose that goes beyond and sometimes conflicts with that of just being a major educational institution. Further, there are NCAA rules, such as the transfer portal entry, that the USNA is not able to employ. If the USNA becomes serious about executing this proposal, working the NCAA rules process to satisfy all requirements is probably achievable.

2: USNA’s to-do list: that USNA’s superintendent has much to do and adding something else such as this to that work list is counterproductive. The US government and the US Navy furnishes the Superintendent with a significant sized staff to include an already existing International Engagement Officer. We acknowledge that there is no shortage of projects being thrust upon the USNA leadership; however, we think all these endeavors, whether new or traditional, first need to be evaluated and prioritized accordingly by the leadership, writ large, before being rejected. As addressed above, we see the USNA’s primary mission as being that of educating and training entry level naval officers in a manner consistent with the missions of the operating fleet and its other educational institutions. Under this logic every opportunity to educate midshipmen within the framework of warfighting makes sense as an element of the USNA mission.

3: Vehicles, such as CISM (International Military Sports Council) already exist to do such: therefore, use that mechanism rather than something new or different. For reasons best known to USNA, the institution has had no noticeable participation via CISM. Those reasons would certainly have included obstacles such as the NCAA rules, financial support, schedules etc.

While useful in part within that structure, the NDAJ rugby invitation and its acceptance by others sends the message that other vehicles exist, are used and are probably preferred. The recent USNA sailing competition in France and the USNA Rugby 7 tour of some of the South Pacific islands are but two examples. Perhaps most importantly are the objective and who leads.

The objective is to enhance warfighting prowess of America’s Naval Forces. Objectives of such institutions as CISM (The ultimate goal is to contribute to world peace by uniting armed forces through sports. The motto under which we operate is “Friendship through Sport) or even that motivating the USNA Rugby 7 tour of the South Pacific (“to enhancing our partnership with the Pacific Islands and the respective governments to achieve our shared vision for a resilient Pacific Islands region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity) are all well and good but should not and cannot be the objectives of military forces. We say this with full appreciation that a competent warfighting military force can certainly help produce the environment for these other outcomes, as reflected in the US Seventh Fleet’s maxim “ready seapower for peace,” but the operative action is power – seapower and warfighting ability.

The ability of America’s military to perform its primary function – defense of the United States and its objectives – will, as always, depend upon the skills and willingness of its military leaders to lead – to lead internally and externally. Without denigrating the utility, value, importance of friends, allies and international cooperation, the reality – welcomed or not – is that the external world for the foreseeable future is looking to and expecting U.S. leadership. Therefore, we expect America and its naval leadership to lead here as well.

We close with this reminder – “Not all naval battles are fought at sea!”

Captain Phil Bozzelli, USN (Ret.) is a retired Surface Warfare Officer who served as Defense Attache in Rome.

Commander Paul Giarra, USN (Ret.) served as a Navy pilot, attended the National War College-equivalent National Institute for Defence Studies in Tokyo, and was a varsity lightweight oarsman at Harvard.

Photo: Members of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard Men’s 7s Rugby teams contest for possession of the ball during a scrum, Aug. 22, 2025. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Theodore Lee)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.