By Michael Hanson

The world took note of the meteoric growth of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), both in size and capability. Specifically, the PLA and PLAN’s amphibious capabilities development is impressive and alarming. According to many experts, the reason for this rapid development is the forceful reintegration of the island of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China (PRC).¹ Analysts argue that a PLA cross-strait amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be the largest amphibious assault in history, greater in scale and complexity than invasions of Normandy and Okinawa, the largest amphibious operations in each theater during World War II.²

A cross-strait operation would be a serious challenge for a world-class military. Though the Chinese military is quickly reaching peer status with the United States military in many areas, the PLA is not currently ready for a daunting amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The PLA remains untested. Chinese leaders will likely subject their prototype to a series of test runs before committing to such a fateful mission. History and current events show small wars and limited interventions serve as useful training grounds to develop the leadership, processes, and capabilities of military forces for larger designs. At present, North Korean troops are active participants in the war in Ukraine to presumably gain combat experience of their own.³ Likewise, before China embarks on a major war, it will likely hone its edge in small ones.

According to the renowned military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart, “A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been one of the most difficult operations of war.”⁴ To establish a lodgment, not only does the offensive force have to overcome a defending force, but significant geographic and climatic factors. Once successfully seizing a beachhead, the attacker must break out from it and begin a land campaign in which it can still meet defeat if it does not have adequate logistics to sustain its campaign. Even once ashore, the challenges of sustaining a campaign overseas are significantly greater than doing so overland. It is for these reasons that successful amphibious campaigns have been the domain of a relatively few militaries in modern history.

China seeks to join the small pantheon of militaries effective at amphibious operations. However, China’s military last combat experience occurred during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. In that conflict Vietnamese militias stymied Chinese offensive thrusts while the bulk of Vietnam’s People’s Revolutionary Army was simultaneously engaged in Cambodia. Though the Chinese never officially acknowledged their casualty figures, independent estimates contend China suffered up to 25,000 killed in action and 37,000 wounded in the month-long war.⁵

The PLA made enormous strides in the 45 years since its last war. In 1979, China possessed a peasant army organized and equipped for what Mao Zedong called “Peoples’ War,” or guerrilla war.⁶ However, modern conflict changed China’s calculus. Following the American overwhelming triumph in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, China embarked on a massive military modernization.⁷ Chinese President Xi Jinping, recently charged the PLA to prepare for war, even uttering the words “dare to fight” during a visit to the Eastern Theater Command, the military district responsible for Taiwan.^8,9 Experts assert President Xi is referring to forceful reunification of Taiwan.¹⁰

Before undertaking such an enormous and consequential operation the PLA must demonstrate its proficiency. China has conducted numerous exercises and drills, but these displays of military might will not prove sufficient. ¹¹ The crucible of real combat must test PLA leadership, units, and operational methods before attempting an invasion of Taiwan. China’s adversaries should remain attuned to China’s engagement in small wars as means to advance political objectives and test its forces in preparation for a Taiwan invasion.

Contingency operations provide a wealth of knowledge and experience. For these reasons, these limited engagements serve as the most effective training operations. Indeed, throughout history countries have used active battlefields as schoolhouses for improving their combat capabilities, especially engaging in small wars to prepare for a larger one.

From 1937 to 1939, civil war raged in Spain and outside powers supplied troops and equipment to both sides. Though volunteers came to Spain from around the world, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union provided support with the express purpose of gaining knowledge and experience, and testing equipment and doctrinal methods with an eye on the future. Germany, rearming from the severe restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, exploited this opportunity to test its new tanks and airplanes, while employing new concepts.¹² Germany’s famed Condor Legion, a unit consisting of both air and ground elements, was the vessel that gave some 19,000 German soldiers and airmen experience in a warzone.¹³ This was to be an investment that would pay off handsomely in a few short years.

As German arms and ideas were subjected to experimentation in Spain, the Wehrmacht learned other valuable lessons during Adolf Hitler’s bloodless conquests. In Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, as well as its annexations of Austria, the Sudetenland, the rest of Czechoslovakia, and finally Klaipeda, the Wehrmacht gained valuable experience in these unopposed invasions. These campaigns without battles allowed the German military to execute planned movements to seize objectives and secure key terrain and critical infrastructure. The Germans employed tactical and operational methods to set conditions for mutual support when contested. Though the Germans faced little opposition, they experienced other friction and fog inherent in war. In the process of working through these challenges, the Germans profited enormously, specifically in the areas of mobilization, deployment, logistics, and command and control.¹⁴

The United States, in fact, has a long history of developing its military in small wars close to home, but perhaps the most notable are in the period between the world wars known as the Banana Wars. Many American senior commanders in World War II cut their teeth as junior officers in these Latin American interventions, from the soldiers who chased Pancho Villa on the Mexican Border just before World War I, to the Marines who fought bandits in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua during the interwar period. More notable than the personalities who served in these small wars are the lessons in warfighting they brought back with them, such as the Marine development of close air support to tactics in jungle fighting that the “Old Breed” passed to their new recruits in preparation for Guadalcanal.¹⁵

More recent small-scale interventions in America’s near abroad have had notable impacts on the American military as well. Early confusion in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada exposed gaps in intelligence, planning, and joint interoperability in execution that helped instigate the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act which dictate high level organizations and processes to this day.¹⁶ On the other hand, the rapid success of Operation Just Cause in Panama seemed to validate doctrinal planning and training methods.¹⁷ Both short and decisive operations did much to improve America’s military stature in the rough wake of the Vietnam War.

Other countries have learned from limited adventures abroad as well. The severe shortcomings of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia with its rusty leftover Soviet military served as a wake-up call to President Vladimir Putin. The poor performance of Russian leaders, personnel, units, equipment, and procedures led to massive overhaul of the Russian Army, with a modernization program to upgrade all of these areas of disappointment.¹⁸ After several years of development, President Putin utilized Syria as a testing ground for new Russian weapons as well as a stage to advertise their capabilities to the world.¹⁹ The results of this build-up, combined with Russia’s initial proxy war in Ukraine, served to convince the world of a daunting Russian military machine, an image that was only dashed when Putin squandered these reforms with his ill-advised and poorly planned conventional invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Yet while the Russian war machine is bogged down in cratered and shell-blasted Ukrainian landscapes reminiscent of the battlefields of World War I, China continues developing its own capabilities. Chinese military spending rose significantly in 2024 to $236 billion.²⁰ Recent Chinese developments include the 2022 launch of a Type-003 Fujian aircraft carrier, comparable to an American Nimitz class super carrier.²¹ In addition to this crown jewel of power projection, the PRC launched their fourth Type 075 Helicopter Landing Dock (LHD) ship, comparable to the American Tarawa and Wasp class amphibious ships, and other amphibious dock landing ships that complement this platform to round out the Amphibious Ready Group construct.²² Like the American Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), these acquisitions give China a suite of crisis response and power projection capabilities. They have even built several classes of at-sea replenishment ships to support their fleet far from home waters.²³

The question remains whether platforms similar to Nimitz class aircraft carriers, Tarawa/Wasp Class helicopter ships, and underway replenishment ships are necessary for a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan when the island is already within range of airfields on the Chinese mainland. More likely these are intended for power projection in their near abroad. In other words, the world may witness a coming era of Chinese gunboat diplomacy and small war interventions similar to the Banana Wars during the period of rising American hegemony. With over $1 trillion invested since 2013 and as of 2023, 147 countries signing on to the Belt and Road Initiative, China has lots of opportunities to intervene in overseas contingencies to defend its national interests.²⁴ In line with former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s call for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct “new historic missions,” the PLAN is already at work flexing its muscles abroad.²⁵

Since 2009 the PLAN has participated in international counter-piracy operations in areas such as the Gulf of Aden, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Arabian Sea.²⁶ Since the start of the Israel-Gaza War, the PLAN dispatched naval forces to the region following Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the waters off of Yemen.²⁷ While the PLAN routinely operates from a military base in Djibouti, one expert warns this outpost will only be the first of many Chinese overseas military bases.^{28, 29} Yet Chinese involvement in multilateral military missions extend to the land as well.

In recent years, over 2,000 Chinese troops deployed to conflict zones in Mali, Darfur, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.³⁰ These deployments are not a recent developments. Since 1992, China has deployed over 50,000 troops to no less than 29 United Nations peacekeeping missions, losing 24 killed in these operations.³¹ Of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China contributes the most personnel to UN missions. President Xi Jinping offered to provide 8,000 troops to a United Nations standby force in 2015.³² As Chinese sailors, soldiers, and airmen gain experience in overseas contingencies, the Chinese military builds its capability to pursue larger missions, like an invasion of Taiwan.

Conclusion

The world has time before China could attempt to use force to bring Taiwan under its heel. However, every year that passes, they increase their readiness. Drills and training exercises certainly increase a military’s abilities. However, only so much can be learned in sterile, controlled training environments. China will likely test its military might in small wars before embarking on a larger one. The world should take note of China’s entry and actions during a small war. When the People’s Republic of China does engage in a small war, the world will know China is preparing for the forceful reunification of Taiwan.

Major Michael A. Hanson, USMC, is an Infantry Officer serving at The Basic School, where the Marine Corps trains its lieutenants and warrant officers in character, officership, and the skills required of a provisional rifle platoon commander. He is also a member of the Connecting File, a Substack newsletter that shares material on tactics, techniques, procedures, and leadership for Marines at the infantry battalion level and below.

References

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[2] Council on Foreign Relations. “Why China Would Struggle To Invade Taiwan.” https://www.cfr.org/article/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan. Accessed March 26, 2024.

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Featured Image: Rigged with combat loads, paratroopers assigned to a brigade under the Chinese PLA Army file into a Mi-171E transport helicopter during a parachute training exercise in September 2025. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn/by Hu Qiwu)