Strategy

A Tale of Two Seas: The Caribbean and South China Sea in Great Power Perspective

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By Akshat Patel

The South China Sea is to China as the Caribbean Sea is to the United States. Just as the United States repeatedly thwarted European powers from the Caribbean throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, China intends to thwart an American presence in the South China Sea in this century.1 In 1962, the ambitions of two superpowers reached a crescendo in the form of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Along the same lines, the ambitions of two of today’s great powers are resulting in skirmishes across the South China Sea. In the same way that the clash in the Caribbean was a deciding factor in who the victor of the Cold War would be, American maritime superiority will be decided in large part by who the reigning power in the South China Sea will be.

The parallels between Soviet-U.S. relations vis-à-vis the Caribbean and China-U.S. relations vis-à-vis the South China Sea are as striking as they are instructive. The Red Navy’s mistakes in its transatlantic ventures serve as salutary course corrections for the U.S. Navy’s transpacific undertakings today.

Then, as Now

By the twentieth century, the United States had established itself as the dominant power in the Americas. Politically stable and economically vibrant, the United States overshadowed the smaller republics of the Caribbean. Blessed with two adjacent oceans and two peaceful neighbors, the United States was virtually immune to a land-based invasion. The only way for a foreign power to establish a foothold in the American hemisphere was through the Caribbean. While “the Caribbean was the natural maritime extension of the continental United States, it was also the part of America’s security environment most vulnerable to European attack,” notes Robert Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.2

In October of 1962, the Soviet Union attempted to exploit this potential American vulnerability through Cuba. The Soviets wanted to establish a naval base and station land-based nuclear missiles on the island nation. President Kennedy ordered an embargo around Cuba to expunge Soviet ambitions from the Caribbean and compelled Khrushchev to blink in the ultimate staring contest. In exchange for withdrawing nuclear missiles from Cuba, the Soviets extracted a public promise to not invade Cuba and a private promise to withdraw American nuclear missiles from Turkey.3 Both sides avoided direct conflict by reaching an agreement that neither desired. The Soviets surrendered their Caribbean aspirations and the United States surrendered its Cuban advances. 

China enjoys many of the same benefits of geography as the United States. Surrounded by natural barriers to aggression such as frigid Siberia, the Gobi Desert, the impenetrable Himalayas, and the lush forests of Vietnam and Laos, China is largely shielded from terrestrial attack. Just like the United States, China’s vulnerability is to the southeast. Not only do most Chinese live near the coast, but the South China Sea serves as their primary economic lifeline.4 The straits of Malacca, Makassar, Sunda, and Luzon all pour into the South China Basin and control both China’s energy supplies from the Middle East and its exports to the West.5 Just as the Caribbean is littered with small island nations eclipsed by a colossal United States, the South China Sea is peppered with littoral states over which China casts a large shadow.

The fallout over control of an American sea of 1.5 million square miles foreshadowed the rest of that great-power competition – the Cold War. Similarly, the contest for an Asian sea of comparable proportions will act as a bellwether for the great-power competition taking place today. Five claimants occupy almost 70 different atolls and have built more than 90 different outposts in the South China Sea.6 With 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands, 7 in the Spratly Islands, and 3,200 acres of newly constructed land, China is by far the most aggressive player in the area.7 Malaysian, Philippine, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese maritime claims have been brushed to the wayside while China charges forward to secure its “blue national soil.”8 China is aware of its vulnerability to the southeast and stands to gain immensely by shielding against it. By turning the South China Sea into a Chinese enclave, Beijing would not only safeguard the lives and livelihood of its citizens, but would also create a strategic disadvantage for the United States. The South China Sea is a conduit linking the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Chinese control of that critical juncture would jeopardize American maritime dominance. Lucrative global trade routes would cease to be international common grounds and the redoubts of allied nations would fall under a Chinese penumbra. American merchants would be subject to harassment by the Chinese coast guard and the U.S. Navy would no longer be able to crisscross the Indo-Pacific theater with impunity.

To circumvent China’s efforts to dominate the South China Sea, American naval policy is rightly learning from Soviet efforts. By maintaining naval bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam while simultaneously encouraging a naval buildup in Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the United States is building a multilateral coalition to check Chinese forays into the Pacific.9 As the Soviet Union attempted to tamp down American influence in the Americas through Cuba, the United States is curbing Chinese influence in Asia through Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations.

Empowering the Right Platform

When Che Guevara expressed concern at the Soviet gambit in the Caribbean, Soviet Minister of Defense Rodion Malinovsky replied, “There will be no big reaction from the U.S. side.”10 The Soviet defense minister expected little retaliation from the United States because, as he viewed it, he was exercising soft power by bringing Cuba into the fold. As the term “Cold War” reminds us, neither side was ever interested in a full-fledged, direct, violent conflict; instead, the Cold War was a great-power competition in which both sides tried to undermine the other through maximum power projection while suffering minimal losses. To project this power, the Soviets wanted to permanently station an entire fleet in the Caribbean: two cruisers, four destroyers, eleven diesel electric submarines, and two submarine tenders.11 But, at the last minute, the Soviets changed their plans. Instead, they sent forth four covert Foxtrot-class diesel submarines as the vanguard of the Red Fleet.12

The reigning Soviet naval doctrine prioritized submarines over surface ships. In 1956, Khrushchev stated that “submarines were the most suitable naval weapon and they would receive emphasis in the future development of the Soviet Navy.”13 As a result, new construction of major surface vessels was virtually terminated under his premiership.14 According to a 2017 CIA analysis of the Soviet Navy, “Khrushchev declared surface naval forces…no longer useful and predicted they would soon become obsolete.”15 Motivated by advances in technology, the Soviets wanted to reduce overall military manpower and costs by replacing a large surface fleet with a more effective, smaller submarine fleet.16 In other words, they prioritized a denser more capable force over a more numerous, less capable one.

By attempting a transatlantic overture to the Caribbean, the Soviets made the right geopolitical decision. By sending submarines, they made the wrong tactical decision. Submarines are mobile, undersea intelligence gatherers packed with brutish lethality. They are about “sheer aggression,” not power projection.17 They are best suited to spy and wreak havoc, not as conspicuous icons of power. By deploying covert submarines to the Caribbean, the Soviets were guaranteed to alarm Americans and provoke a strong response. President Kennedy ordered a maximum Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) effort to track and surface the submarines.18 The Soviets were not harmlessly posturing by deploying submarines within sailing distance of Florida while simultaneously stationing land based nuclear missiles at America’s doorstep. They were committing an act of belligerence that the Unites States met with force. The Atlantic Fleet mobilized to detect and ferret out the furtive aggressors. As Defense Minister Malinovsky’s comment suggests, the bold step to Cuba was never supposed to culminate into the hair-raising crisis that it did. His intention was to assert Soviet dominance without causing an international scene. This is exactly the United States’ objective in the South China Sea today.

To maintain American primacy in the South China Sea, Chinese maritime ambitions must be curtailed without devolving into the grand standoff that occurred in the Caribbean. Submarines should not be the U.S. Navy’s primary tools in this great-power competition. Because of the raw aggression that submarines communicate, they are ill-suited for missions that display military power and best suited for missions that exercise military power. The surface fleet’s strengths are altogether opposite.

Aircraft carriers, simultaneously symbols of national power and of national prestige, are excellent tools for communicating power, but a ruinously costly platform to lose.19 Losing a symbol of national pride would deal irreparable damage to the national psyche. The U.S. Navy must look to its destroyers and cruisers as the primary combatants of this great-power competition. While not as awe-inspiring as an aircraft carrier, they are still an excellent form of communication. The U.S. Navy has rightly increased destroyer and cruiser freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, and it must continue this upward trajectory.20 By regularly challenging expansive Chinese claims, Washington must continue to signal Beijing that the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake. Frequent FONOPs through contested sea lanes go much farther in projecting maritime strength, communicating intentions, and deterring aggression than stealthy submarine deployments. To do this effectively, and not repeat Soviet mistakes, the United States needs a larger surface fleet.

The battle of ‘capability vs. numbers’ is a perennial struggle that has haunted the minds of American naval policy wonks for decades. Examined holistically, there is a clear winner. “The trend towards fewer, more capable ships is both unarguable and . . . inexorable,” notes Admiral John Ellis, former Commander of United States Strategic Command.21 Over the past twenty-five years, the number of ships in the U.S. Navy has decreased by nearly half while the demands placed on the American fleet remain the same.22 “Today, that means twice the percentage of the fleet is deployed than was at the height of the Cold War,” notes ex-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead.23 At the same time, the Congressional Budget Office recently determined that the Navy is only able to fulfill 60 percent of deployments requested by combatant commanders.24 In short, at some point, numbers do matter. Simple math dictates that if the U.S. Navy has fewer ships, either they need to be deployed more often or they must be asked to execute fewer missions. The Navy must stem its unrelenting pursuit of a leaner, cutting-edge fleet. Naval budgeteers must be willing to substitute a pricey aircraft carrier for a dozen more destroyers or cruisers. Vulnerable aircraft-carriers and stealthy submarines will not be the heroes that secure American maritime superiority, it will be destroyers and cruisers.

Together, not Alone

The Cuban missile crisis of 58 years ago stands as the most studied event of the nuclear era—so much so that there are essays about why we should stop writing essays about it.25 Yet, until fall 2002, American national security experts were not aware that the four Foxtrot-class diesel submarines deployed to Cuba had been armed with nuclear-tipped torpedoes.26 The CIA’s four intelligence reports on Soviet arms buildup leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis categorically ruled out the presence of nuclear weapons in the Caribbean.27 Instead of preparing Americans for the possibility of nuclear catastrophe, intelligence reports based on complacent assumptions made the discovery of this fact all the more shocking. In short, the Soviet Union caught the United States flat-footed.

Handicapped by the technology of the time and oblivious to the presence of tactical nuclear weapons, the U.S. Navy decided to release a Notice to Mariners (NTM) detailing how depth charges would be used to peacefully signal the submarines to surface. Moscow never sent an acknowledgement of receiving the NTM.29 Upon detecting the nuclear torpedo laden B-59, American naval forces started dropping depth charges in accordance with the NTM. Unaware of American intentions, suffering from inhospitable conditions and agitated by the subsurface explosions, Captain Savitsky gave the order to ready the nuclear torpedo: “We’re gonna blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all—we will not become the shame of the fleet.”30 It is because cooler heads prevailed on the B-59 that day that the Caribbean was not subject to a nuclear explosion. Second Captain Vasily Arkhipov overruled Captain Savitsky and prevented the opening shot of a nuclear war.

Now as then, complacency continues to surprise and compel the United States into ad hoc, reactive measures. In 2012, both China and the Philippines swarmed a collection of rocks and reefs known as Scarborough Shoal. Up until then, both countries claimed the Shoal as theirs, but it was under de facto Philippine control. 550 nautical miles from the closest Chinese land mass and 124 nautical miles from the main Philippine island of Luzon, the Scarborough Shoal episode exemplifies China’s ambitions in the South China Sea.31 To mediate their dispute, the United States hastily brokered a bilateral agreement for both sides to retreat and, in effect, return control to the Philippines. Only one side held to its word. China used the agreement to deceive the Philippines into retreating while maintaining its presence. Without American reprisal or condemnation, China has since then controlled Scarborough Shoal.

The United States must not let the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) bully China’s neighbors. Unlike Khrushchev’s about-face with Castro, the United States must stand steadfast beside its allies. Despite increased FONOPs in the South China Sea, a recent public opinion poll of ASEAN citizens indicated that almost two-thirds of respondents believed U.S. engagement with ASEAN nations had declined. Another one-third said they had little to no confidence in the U.S. as a strategic partner and provider of regional security.32 The United States must reaffirm its commitment to the South China region through military sales, combined exercises, and economic empowerment. It is much harder to reverse a change in the status quo than to maintain it through deterrence. By turning the cause of American maritime dominance into a multilateral quest, China’s unilateral offensives will be rendered moot. 

One More Time

The Soviet Union was not defeated through armed conflict; it was defeated through persistent coercion. As the United States negotiates its presence in the South China Sea, and by extension its maritime dominance, it must rely on the same strategy that overwhelmed the Soviet Union while not resurrecting Soviet mistakes. The Soviet decision to forsake their surface fleet and their allies precipitated their withdrawal from the Caribbean, which in turn forecasted their global retreat and eventual downfall. The United States must simultaneously lean on its surface fleet and its ASEAN allies to maintain its position as the bailiff of the world’s saltwater commons.

Sun Tzu pithily remarked that the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. We have done it once before, now we must do it again.

LT Akshat Patel is a Submarine Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the Department of Defense. 

Endnotes

1. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (W. W. Norton, New York, 2001), 401.

2. Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: the South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2015), 278.

3. Noam Chomsky, “Cuban Missile Crisis: How the US Played Russian Roulette with Nuclear War,” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, October 15, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/15/cuban-missile-crisis-russian-roulette.

4. George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 2009), 153.

5. Ibid.

6. “Occupation and Island Building,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (Center for Strategic and International Studies), accessed April 25, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/

7. “China Island Tracker,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (Center for Strategic and International Studies), accessed April 25, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/

8. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 60.

9. Ibid., 75.

10. Svetlana V Savranskaya, “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28:2 (April 2005): 236, doi: 10.1080/01402390500088312.

11. Raymond Garthoff, “New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev, Nuclear Weapons, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Cold War International History Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998): 253.

12. Ryurik A Ketov, Captain 1st Rank, Russian Navy (retired), “The Cuban Missile Crisis as Seen Through a Periscope,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28:2 (April 2005): 218, doi: 10.1080/01402390500088304.

13. Soviet Navy: Intelligence and Analysis During the Cold War (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017), 12.

14. Ibid., 7.

15. Ibid., 12.

16. Ibid., 8.

17. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 71.

18. Svetlana V Savranskaya, “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 249.

19. “Aircraft-carriers are big, expensive, vulnerable – and popular,” The Economist, November 2019; Jeff Vandenengel, “Too Big to Sink,” Proceedings, May 2017.

20. Zack Cooper et al. “America’s Freedom of Navigation Operations Are Lost at Sea,” Foreign Policy, January 2019.

21. James O. Ellis, Admiral, U.S. Navy (retired), “Rightsize the Navy,” Hoover Digest (Summer 2018): 49.

22. Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy (retired), “A Stretched Navy and A Fiscal Disconnect” Strategika 47 (January 2018).

23. Ibid.

24. Ellis, “Rightsize the Navy,” 51.

25. Eliot A. Cohen, “Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis,” National Interest, Winter 1985/86.

26. Svetlana V Savranskaya, “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis.”

27. Amy B. Zegart, “October Surprises,” Hoover Digest (Fall 2013): 50.

28. Svetlana V Savranskaya, “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 249.

29. Ibid., 250.

30. Ibid., 246.

31. Gordon G. Chang, “A China Policy That Works – For America” Strategika 41 (May 2017).

32. Jack Kim et al. “Southeast Asia wary of China’s Belt and Road project, skeptical of U.S.: survey,” last modified January 6, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-singapore-idUSKCN1P00GP.

Featured Image: A P2V Neptune U.S. patrol plane flies over a Soviet freighter during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Infrastructure and Trade Week

Maritime Infrastructure and Trade Week Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC featured a series of pieces submitted in response to our call for articles on maritime infrastructure and trade, issued in partnership with Maersk Line, Limited as a part of Project Trident.

Authors highlighted the dynamic and ever-evolving nature of the global maritime system. A burgeoning volume of maritime trade and commercial vessels is traversing the world’s oceans and driving globalization to new heights. Maritime infrastructure is being upgraded time and time again in a bid to keep pace. But as the global community reaps the benefits of maritime exchange, the scope of threats is becoming more multi-faceted. 

The deep interconnectedness of global maritime infrastructure is paralleled by the close connectivity of its cyber dimensions. Cybersecurity for maritime facilities remains a point of concern for global shipping firms and those who depend on their supply chains. Meanwhile, efforts to decarbonize maritime infrastructure, especially shipbuilding, will lend themselves toward an uneasy transition away from traditional fuel sources. China’s globe-spanning efforts to invest and procure maritime infrastructure is raising eyebrows and underscoring the nation’s commitment to becoming a global maritime superpower. The question of how China could use these assets to employ coercive leverage remains a concern. And as the blockage caused by the Ever Given demonstrates, an incident involving a single ship in a critical maritime space can grab headlines, choke off billions in trade, and send far-reaching disruptions into economies.

While threats are changing and the maritime system is rapidly growing, an important constant endures. Growing global prosperity is inseparable from maritime infrastructure and trade, and careful tending of the maritime system will prove indispensable for continued human progress. 

Below are the authors who featured during the topic week. We thank them for their excellent contributions.

“Soft Cyber Law Makes Port Facilities Soft Cyber Targets,” by CDR Michael C. Petta

“This U.S. mandate is a hard law, both clear and enforceable. To meaningfully address known cybersecurity vulnerabilities across the world’s port facilities, the member states of the IMO should collaborate and amend Part A of the ISPS Code to include a similar mandate. By hardening the law in this way, member states can establish a consistent, uniform enforcement framework and thus, begin to harden port facilities against cyberattacks.”

“How the Decarbonization Dilemma Will Impact Shipbuilding and Great Power Competition,” by Benjamin Clark

“…the security-related risks of the United States pursuing decarbonization merit further scrutiny, especially with respect to decarbonization’s impact on the shipbuilding industrial base and its ability to contribute in a protracted great power conflict.”

“PRC Investments in Global Maritime Infrastructure: Implications for Port Access,” by John Bradford

“The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has embarked on a massive investment spree and established a meaningful stake in the control of global maritime infrastructure…There is growing concern that the PRC has, or could, use its investments to deny infrastructure access to its rivals.”

“All of One Company: The Need to Forge a Stronger Bond Between Navies and Commercial Shipping,” by Peter Cook

“Major powers are never going to be able to significantly alter the ratio of warships to commercial vessels, so they must seriously revisit the strategy for how the protection of trade is conducted in peace and in conflict.”

“The Ship that Launched 1,000 Memes and Nearly Destroyed 12 percent of World Trade,” by Dr. Salvatore R. Mercogliano

“… ships traveling between Europe and Asia piled up in the anchorages off Port Said and Suez, hoping that the Suez Canal Authority, and eventually SMIT Salvage, could clear the containership and allow a resumption of normal trade. Her removal after six days opened the floodgate of vessels looking to traverse the canal and resume the international flow of goods and allow military vessels…to perform their missions. But behind the veneer of memes and jokes the grounding of Ever Given exposed the fragile nature of global trade and the maritime infrastructure that supports it.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: The Port of Los Angeles (Photo by Michael Justice)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Envisioning a Dystopian Future in the South China Sea

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By Capt. Tuan N. Pham, USN

The setting is the South China Sea (SCS) in 2035. On the Chinese island of Mischief Reef, Senior Captain Chen, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Spratly Islands Commander, considers a Philippines Navy request to conduct a quarterly search and rescue drill in the vicinity of the Chinese island of Scarborough Shoal. At the Philippines Navy HQ in Manila, Captain Arroyo goes over the details of the naval drill and approves its execution pending authorization from the PLAN. Near the Chinese island of San Cay in the middle of the SCS, a lone Vietnamese fishing boat evades a China’s Coast Guard (CCG) patrol craft. The fishing boat captain knows full well the penalties for illegal fishing in Chinese waters – arrest, confiscation, fine, and imprisonment. At the Petronas Corporate HQ in Kuala Lumpur, a Malaysian vice president negotiates a proposed joint development project in the vicinity of the Chinese islands of Natuna with a Chinese counterpart from China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation. Inside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat Building in Jakarta, the staff reworks next month’s meeting agenda based on guidance from Beijing.

While conjectural now, the SCS as China’s de facto home waters may become a reality in a few years. If so, the dystopian future represents a blatant contravention of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and another blow to the weakening rules-based liberal international order that has provided global prosperity and security for over 70 years. The risk is too high to defer action or do nothing on the wishful hope of Chinese benevolence. The time to act is now. It is much easier to slow or stop a large boulder rolling down a steep hill near the top than wait until it gains speed and momentum near the bottom. Inaction, or worse yet, retrenchment further reinforces the ingrained Chinese belief that it is an unstoppable rising power, and the United States is an irreversible waning power.

Beijing’s Gambit

Under the cover of the coronavirus (COVID) pandemic, China took advantage of the outbreak to expand and strengthen its administrative control and jurisdictional authority over the disputed and contested waters and intimidate regional neighbors to acquiesce to its national will. But Beijing misread the geopolitical landscape in 2020 and miscalculated its response. Chinese leaders wrongly assumed that the region and the international community would be distracted with and weakened by COVID, and that they could advance their national interests in the SCS with acceptable political and military risks and costs.

At the onset of COVID, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping may have thought something along these lines:

“As the regional countries, the United States, and the international community look inward to deal with the global pandemic and the force readiness of the U.S. Navy (USN) and its allies in the Pacific appears impacted by COVID, now may be an opportune time to advance China’s interests in the SCS. I anticipate a serious backlash from the world as our COVID misinformation campaign fails, so better to have something to bargain with later. I may also have to remind the people that only the CCP and PLA under my leadership can defend Chinese national interests, particularly when it comes to national unity [territorial integrity] and rejuvenation [Chinese Dream].”

Pursue Cumulative Strategy

Although the U.S.-led regional and international response temporarily checked the increased Chinese aggression in the SCS, it will not alter China’s long-term revanchist design for the international waterway or influence its revisionist global ambitions. To do that, the United States should heed Sun Tzu and pursue an enduring cumulative strategy – a series of connected actions that, when taken together, asymmetrically attacks China’s strategy, undermines China’s developing regional partnerships, and prompts China to overreact and overreach. Firstly, the United States should help the other claimants expand and strengthen their footprints in the SCS and advance resource exploration and development in collaboration with multinational corporations and other state actors. Secondly, the United States should promote and support more legal challenges to China’s excessive maritime claims and ratify UNCLOS to better pursue that avenue. Thirdly, the United States should make more investments in maritime domain awareness (MDA) and law enforcement (LE) capabilities for the other claimants and ASEAN countries bordering the SCS. Lastly, the United States should increase and enhance persistent and collective maritime presence in the SCS to include holding the next biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in the strategic waterway.

Why Act

In the context of the SCS, Chinese overreach is any action that empowers Beijing to dictate who can occupy territories, exploit resources, and conduct commercial and military activities in the disputed and contested waters (as illustrated in the dystopian vignette), undermining the rule of law and necessitating a strong response from the United States and the international community. These overreactions include but are not limited to declaring and enforcing an air defense identification zone; requiring notification of (and perhaps permission for) transits and operations; demanding consultation with (and perhaps approval from) Beijing for any hydrocarbon exploration and development; regulating fishing throughout the SCS; policing the SCS as territorial waters; seizing and militarizing the Natuna Islands, militarizing Scarborough Shoal, and further militarizing the Paracel and Spratly Islands (strategic control points within the SCS); demilitarizing the other SCS claimants; and barring ASEAN countries from military activities outside of ASEAN.

The Chinese overreach, or overreactions, may further push the SCS claimants, other ASEAN countries (though not ASEAN as a whole), and the international community to take a more assertive stance against Beijing. The nature, scope, and extent of the pushback may buy more time for Washington to reverse the erosion of U.S. military advantages and unfavorable trends in the SCS, and for the enduring Chinese domestic problems to further weaken the fragile Chinese economy that underpins its maritime activities locally in the SCS and its coercion globally. These potential effects overlap in time, space, force, and value. From a regional perspective, a strengthened America with confident allies and partners advances a maturing Free and Open Indo-Pacific. From a global perspective, actions that uphold global rules and norms reinforce the weakening rules-based liberal international order.

What and How to Act

While some of the following proposed actions have been discussed individually before, both by myself and others, they have not been wholly framed in this targeted, synchronized, and integrated purpose and manner. They span the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power and are consistent with the U.S. National Defense and National Military Strategies to counter malign influence: “Compete, deter, and win below the level of armed conflict; and be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable, and strengthen U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.” They asymmetrically attack China’s strategy and undermine its developing partnerships in the SCS by imposing more costs (economic), winning the narratives (information), encouraging greater restraints (diplomatic), and denying the benefits or objectives thereof (military).

As Sun Tzu said: “The supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy, next best is to disrupt his alliances, next best is to attack his army, the worst policy is to attack his cities.” It makes more strategic sense to counter Beijing by undercutting its strategy and undermining its regional relations: Operate and compete in the gray zone. Challenge China just below the threshold of armed conflict, but avoid conflict altogether. It is more advantageous and less costly to take risks and deter a conflict than to pay the price of actually fighting one.

Impose More Costs

The most effective and enduring way to dissuade and deter Beijing in the SCS is to impact its economy (pocketbook). This can be done by helping the other claimants expand and strengthen their military, basing, and infrastructure footprints and advance their resource exploration and development in the strategic waterway, thereby raising China’s operating costs in the SCS. China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan occupy nearly 70 disputed reefs and islets spread across the SCS. China far exceeds them in terms of reclaimed land, built infrastructures, and fielded intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) and power projection capabilities, but these local advantages come at substantial economic and political costs. To level the playing field, the U.S. should assist the other claimants to reclaim more land and improve infrastructures on their internationally recognized maritime claims. By focusing on the recognized geographic features within their exclusive economic zones (EEZ), the other claimants would steer clear of any inconsistency with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) fourth ruling that “China aggravated and extended the disputes through its dredging, artificial island-building, and construction activities.”

Another “escalate to de-escalate” strategy option is to promote more oil and gas exploration and development with multinational corporations and other state actors like Russia’s Rosneft and Gazprom, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Japan’s Idemitsu Kosan and Teikoku Oil, and Exxon Mobil. By internationalizing and diversifying the SCS issue, Beijing could be compelled to compromise and cooperate with the other claimants for peaceful and equitable sharing of the vast oil and gas resources under the SCS. While there is no specific provision in UNCLOS requiring state-to-state cooperation to manage oil and gas resources, certain UNCLOS articles offer mechanisms to encourage compromise and cooperation in resource development. This development could be done equitably and consistently with international laws and the domestic laws of all involved claimants. 

Win the Narratives

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and the other ASEAN countries are pushing back in the SCS and pressuring China on the long-stalled SCS Code of Conduct which is set to finalize this year. They were encouraged by Vietnam as the 2020 ASEAN Chair, Vietnam’s strong response to Chinese encroachments into its EEZ in 2020, Hanoi’s consideration to take Beijing to the PCA, and the release of Vietnam’s 2019 Defense White Paper. The fleeting geostrategic conditions present yet another opportunity for America to actively promote and support more legal challenges to China’s excessive maritime claims in the SCS. Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur, and the other SCS claimants could leverage the legal precedent set by the 2016 PCA ruling in favor of Manila and submit their challenges to the PCA for arbitration. Washington should encourage these legal challenges, but to be more effective, America must first ratify UNCLOS if its support is to have international legitimacy and be taken seriously by the other claimants. Washington should also encourage a multilateral “grand bargain” for the other claimants to settle their disputes with each other, and thereby providing a united front to China’s excessive maritime claims.

Encourage Greater Restraints

An integral part of the diplomatic initiatives surrounding the SCS is shared situational awareness of the destabilizing Chinese activities therein. It is in the interest of the SCS claimants and ASEAN countries at large to “maintain MDA of their national maritime boundaries as well as of the adjacent international waterways.” They would largely welcome the transparency. Transparency promotes consensus, enables individual and collective responses, mitigates Chinese information operations against them and within ASEAN itself, and strengthens deterrence against Chinese activities below the threshold of armed conflict. Persistent ISR may also give pause to Beijing if it knows that it is being monitored and that its actions are attributable. Put simply, the other claimants and ASEAN countries cannot act collectively without first knowing what, how, where, and when to act.

Another key diplomatic component to stymie Beijing’s efforts to exert increasing administrative control and jurisdictional authority over the SCS is to build up regional LE capabilities and capacities in terms of people (training), processes (tactics), and things (equipment) and prevent China from dominating the LE domain – as the recently passed CCG law might portend. The new Chinese law authorizes the CCG to demolish foreign constructions on Chinese-claimed maritime features (which implies all such Chinese-claimed maritime features within the SCS) and allows the use of weapons against foreign vessels in carrying out these sovereignty operations. The CCG also has been given the authority to board, search, detain, and expel foreign vessels, and arrest individuals suspected of violating Chinese maritime laws (which implies greater authority over international maritime laws) in the waters under Chinese jurisdiction (which means the whole SCS).

Deny the Benefits or Objectives

The U.S. should deny Beijing’s objectives in the SCS, or at least diminish the benefits of its actions therein. There is still much value in continuing to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims through a deliberate and calibrated campaign of persistent presence operations – transits and overflights, exercises, and freedom of navigation operations (FONOP). In 2019, the USN conducted nine FONOPs, an inaugural U.S.-ASEAN maritime exercise, annual Cooperation Afloat and Readiness and Training drills, and several combined and multinational naval operations. In 2020, the USN conducted 11 FONOPs, a dual-carrier strike group operation, and a trilateral maritime exercise with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Navy (RAN). To date in 2021, the USN has conducted two FONOPs, a dual-carrier strike group operation, an expeditionary strike group operation, and a bilateral maritime exercise with the RAN. The number of FONOPs in 2019 and 2020 is a dramatic turnaround from the previous years (2015 – two, 2016 – three, 2017 – six, 2018 – five) in terms of operational tempo – despite the COVID impact in 2020.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has also oriented itself toward China by deploying more cutters and personnel to the region to help train their coast guards. With its developing “regional partnerships and extensive experience strengthening maritime LE regimes,” the USCG is well suited and postured to address the growing need for greater maritime governance in the disputed and contested waters. The United States’ allies and partners have likewise stepped up their presence and operations in the SCS in support of freedom of navigation (FON) – most notably Japan, Australia, India, United Kingdom, and France. Failing to conduct these lawful and routine operations in the aftermath of the landmark 2016 PCA ruling sends the wrong strategic signals to Beijing. The right strategic signals moving forward are more combined and multinational operations and exercises that underscore the universal maritime right of all nations to “fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits.”

The United States should hold the next RIMPAC exercise in the SCS. The exercise would push back against China’s unilateral militarization of the strategic waterway, reinforce the legal standing of the PCA ruling that invalidated Beijing’s excessive maritime claims, underscore the universal importance of the rule of law and compliance with global norms, and demonstrate that the United States and like-minded nations are willing to collectively stand up for their national interests and shared values. The nature and scope of the exercise could be calibrated to achieve the desired objective. That objective may only require a portion of the exercise to be held in the SCS.

Too Little or Too Much

 For those who view the actions as too little, Washington has more options to dissuade and deter Beijing in the SCS: Build an enduring framework of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements with ASEAN countries to bind the United States to the regional economies and keep them from moving more toward economic alternatives like the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Belt and Road Initiative, and Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership. Lay the groundwork for a regionally-sponsored and -led independent environmental assessment detailing the impact of the damaging Chinese dredging, artificial-island building, and over-fishing to the fragile marine ecosystems. Upgrade the bilateral relationships with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia to strategic partnerships, and advance and accelerate the development of the Quadrilateral Security Framework. Lastly, draw a sharp comparison between Chinese divergent sovereignty positions on and convergent “gray zone” activities in the SCS and the Arctic Ocean to heighten the growing Russian and Nordic concerns of the latter. Then triangulate and bring Russia into the SCS fray to further internationalize and diversify the strategic waterway and asymmetrically check China’s growing Arctic ambitions. These options were not explored for brevity but should be considered in future strategy re-assessment on how best to influence and deter Beijing in the SCS.

Some view these actions as too much, fearing that the recommendations risk pushing Xi (and the CCP) over an invisible red line drawn by “fear, honor, and interest.” The key to the cumulative strategy is for Washington to retain escalation dominance, freedom of movement, and strategic initiative to impose its will on Beijing. As Sun Tzu said, “the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.” Washington should seek to impose costs, deny benefits (objectives), encourage restraints, and win the narratives so that the only acceptable strategic calculus for Beijing is to curb or abandon its ambitious and expansive enterprise in the SCS. Like a rheostat, this diversified approach can adjust the “how” to achieve the desired “what.” The strategy must also offer off-ramps throughout the continuum of competition so that Xi (and the CCP) can spin the domestic narratives and save face with the Chinese people. The strategic objective is deterrence, not regime change. The desired end state is to negotiate terms from a position of advantage like during the U.S.-China trade war. China respects resoluteness (strength) and disrespects vacillation (weakness).

Act Now

It is clear that the status quo or retrenchment will have negative consequences for the United States, the region, and the world. It is equally clear that Washington must act now to turn the tides in the SCS and avert a dystopian future when Beijing exerts administrative control and jurisdictional authority of the strategic waterway. The outlined proposals provide a range of DIME options to prompt overreach by Beijing. Such overreaction may cause regional countries, and the greater global community, to view China’s destabilizing actions for what they truly are – a threat to the rules-based liberal international order.

Captain Tuan Pham is a maritime strategist, strategic planner, naval researcher, and China Hand with 20 years of experience in the Indo-Pacific. The views expressed here are personal and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the U.S. Government or U.S. Navy.

Feature Photo: The Philippine Coast Guard reported that despite repeated demands by Manila that Chinese ships leave Whitsun Reef, at least 240 Chinese vessels remained in the area and surrounding waters. Photo credit: Philippine Coast Guard, 16 Apr 2021.

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Sea Control 248 – Russia’s Baltic Fleet with Jonas Kjellén and Anders Larsson

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By Jared Samuelson

Swedish Institute for Defence Studies author Jonas Kjellén and Swedish Defence University’s Anders Larsson join the program to discuss Jonas’s most recent report on the Russian Baltic Fleet, to include the fleet’s unique organization, its historic relationship with St. Petersburg, the 2016 leadership purge, and more.

Download Sea Control 248 – Russia’s Baltic Fleet with Jonas Kjellén and Anders Larsson

2. Russian Electronic Warfare the role of Electronic Warfare within the Armed Forces, by Jonas Kjellén, FOI, September 2018.

Jared Samuelson is Executive Producer and Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at [email protected].

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.