Flotilla SITREP: Marine Corps Transformation, Warfighting Culture, and Lying to Ourselves

By Dmitry Filipoff

This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will be discussing the latest in naval force development and topics concerning warfighting culture and institutional barriers to excellence. 

Down below is a look at the invites for our upcoming April discussions. The Flotilla will be holding discussions on the ongoing transformation of the Marine Corps, improving feedback in warfighting culture, and the themes of the Lying to Ourselves report that was recently republished on CIMSEC. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive the invites to our upcoming off-the-record April sessions.

Last month the Flotilla held sessions on the Russia-Ukraine war, the Navy’s first F-35C deployment, and the standup of the first Marine Littoral Regiment. These conversations generated robust discussion on current events and naval force development, and helped connect likeminded navalists focused on these issues.

Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.

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Upcoming Sessions

Stand-In Forces and Transforming the Marine Corps

The Marine Corps is in the midst of a transformation. After decades of focus on low-end conflicts in the Middle East, Marine Corps leadership is looking to transform elements of the force into units that can hold the line against China in forward island chains. But this transformation is not without internal friction and much uncertainty. What are the merits of the concepts of EABO and stand-in forces? How can the Marines better implement these concepts? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the ongoing transformation of the Marine Corps.

Read Ahead: “Stand-in Forces: Adapt or Perish,” by ACMC General Eric Smith, USMC and “Jeopardizing national security: What is happening to our Marine Corps?” by Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, USMC (ret.)
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Developing Feedback Culture for Warfighters

Warfighting culture demands healthy and robust feedback mechanisms to ensure professional growth and pursue tactical excellence. But organizational culture can often stifle feedback and allow issues to fester or go unresolved. How can warfighters give better feedback? How can leaders create an atmosphere where feedback is encouraged and delivered constructively? Join us to discuss how to improve feedback in warfighting culture.

Read Ahead: “Encourage a Feedback Culture,” by LCDR Andrew Poulin
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Lying To Ourselves and Navigating Zero Defect Culture

Overwhelming requirements and zero-defect imperatives can combine to erode culture and norms of trust that are critical for warfighting effectiveness. How can warfighters better navigate these contradictions and dilemmas? How can leaders change the broader conditions that yield these dynamics? How can warfighters interpret the extent of their responsibility and agency in these circumstances? Join us to discuss these questions and more.

Read Ahead: “Lying To Ourselves,” by Dr. Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen Gerras (Parts One, Two, Three).
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Completed March Sessions

Russia-Ukraine War

Major conflict has broken out between Russia and Ukraine. Russia is receiving broad international condemnation and punishment while embattled Ukraine is earning widespread support. How may this conflict play out over the coming weeks and months? How could NATO respond and reinforce itself? Join us to discuss the many dimensions of this new major European conflict.

Read Ahead: Michael Kofman thread on Russian military effectiveness so far.
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Navy’s First F-35C Deployment

The Navy just completed its first ever deployment of the F-35C onboard the USS Carl Vinson. With this new aircraft comes an opportunity to reform the carrier air wing, including with respect to tactics, composition, and concepts of operation. How can the Navy make the most of the F-35C and adapt the air wing of the future to field this new platform? What challenges may the Navy face in transitioning much of naval aviation to the F-35? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the Navy’s fielding of this fifth-generation aircraft.

Read Aheads: Three takeaways from the US Navy’s first F-35C deployment,” by Megan Eckstein

What it is Like to Fly an F-35: Interviews with Three F-35 Pilots,” by Kris Osborn
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Standing Up the First Marine Littoral Regiment

The Marine Corps is ushering in a wave of reform to make itself more capable in great power competition. Among these reforms is a new formation — the Marine Littoral Regiment. MLRs will be a centerpiece of the new EABO and DMO warfighting concepts, and are intended to employ a variety of novel capabilities and tactics. How could the Marines make full use of the MLRs and fully implement the new formation? What challenges must be managed in transforming Marine units into these new littoral regiments? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the implementation of Marine Littoral Regiments.

Read Ahead: Standup of Marine littoral regiment will usher new gear into Pacific theater,” by Megan Eckstein
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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at [email protected].

Lying to Ourselves, Part Three

This monograph was originally published by the Army War College under the title Lying To Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here. It deserves to be noted that the described themes and dynamics are not solely limited to the specific military service being examined.

Read Part One, Part Two.

By Dr. Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen J. Gerras

Lying to Ourselves

It may be that this monograph has merely identified a phenomenon that has existed quietly in the Army (and in most large bureaucracies) since time immemorial. It may be that lying to the “little old lady in tennis shoes” in order to clear post, fudging a trusted NCO’s weight on an NCOER, or writing off a CONEX of surplus Oakleys is emblematic of actions that the Army will seldom discuss, but will always tolerate. Perhaps the stereotypical supply sergeant’s response of “You don’t want to know” will always be the proper response to the question of “Where did this stuff come from?” It could be that as long as dishonesty and deceit are restricted to the trivial and bothersome aspects of the Army, the status quo represents the best way to deal with an out of control, overbearing Army bureaucracy. After all, dishonesty in the Army is not new. For example, in the summer of 1970, researchers at the U.S. Army War College published the Study on Military Professionalism which found that, “Inaccurate reporting—rampant throughout the Army and perceived by every grade level sampled from O-2 through O-7—is significant.”18 The report quoted a captain who, at the height of the Vietnam War, stated that, “It’s necessary today, to lie, cheat, and steal to meet the impossible demands of higher officers or continue to meet the statistical requirements.”19

Acquiescence to the status quo because the Army has been dogged by the same problems in the past, however, ignores several potentially destructive implications of the current culture. First, while discussions revealed that nearly all officers were confident in their ability to correctly determine which requirements were trivial or nonsensical, those judgments can vary widely across individuals and groups. For example, some officers offered that not reporting a negligent discharge (ND) was a common example of acceptable lying, especially when it was a simple mistake and easily remedied without getting higher headquarters involved. Other officers, particularly those in the combat arms, insisted that an ND was a serious breach of discipline and leaders were duty bound to send a report upward. Similarly, some officers were aghast that anyone would submit inaccurate or incomplete storyboards, while others were much more accepting of less-than-precise submissions. Confusion and inconsistency across the force result from allowing individual interpretations to determine where to delineate the bounds of acceptable dishonesty. As one captain astutely noted:

“I think a real danger—since it’s unsaid and it’s not out there— is [that] we’re requiring every single person at every single level to make their own determination on what they want to lie about. Because we’re all setting a different standard and because we can’t talk about it, we’re obviously going to have the potential for the guys who take it too far.”

Tolerating a level of dishonesty in areas deemed trivial or unimportant also results in the degradation of the trust that is vital to the military profession. Once the bar of ethical standards is lowered, the malleability of those standards becomes a rationale for other unethical decisions. For example, one officer explained why CERP money was easily misused:

“I think the reason why we have an easier time accepting that CERP money might be used by people falsely is because you look at the institutional Army and see all the fraud, waste, and abuse that happens at every level.”

The slippery slope of ethical compromise is a real and legitimate danger to the assumption of truth in the profession. Noted ethicist Sissella Bok explains this threat in more detail:

“Of course, we know that many lies are trivial. But since we, when lied to, have no way to judge which lies are the trivial ones, and since we have no confidence that liars will restrict themselves to just such trivial lies, the perspective of the deceived leads us to be wary of all deception.”20

Just as it is imprudent to expect absolute impeccability from the officer corps, it is also foolhardy to condone a casual view of deceit and duplicity in the ranks. Disregarding the pervasive dishonesty throughout the Army leads to the eventual conclusion that nothing and no one can be trusted. As Saint Augustine wisely noted, “When regard for truth has been broken down or even slightly weakened, all things remain doubtful.”21

Making excuses for an acceptable level of dishonesty also provides cover for deception that is less nobly motivated. While difficult to admit, many officers acutely feel the pressure of peer competition influencing their ethical decisions. As one officer pointed out:

“You’re a bad leader and you failed if you didn’t get everyone through the hour-long human trafficking thing. All the other company commanders in the United States Army somehow managed to do it and you’re gonna be the only guy that didn’t do it because you [truthfully] reported 85%.”

Careerism is a potent force that serves as a catalyst for dishonesty. The current downsizing intensifies the competition in the ranks with very few officers desiring to be “alone on the island.” In the words of one candid officer:

“We’re all kind of vultures. The one guy [who told the truth] – get him. He exposed himself. And no one wants to stand out. We all see reductions are being made. If you’re looking to do this [stay in the Army] for a long period of time, your intent is to appease the person above you. Just like the person you’re appeasing made that decision a long time ago.”

Convincing ourselves that deceitfulness in the Army is mostly well-intentioned altruism serves to mask the caustic effects of lying, cheating, or stealing for self-advancement. As a very perceptive captain observed:

“In our own eyes and our perspective, we do things for the right reasons. When you really come down to it [though], the big question is that while you may be saying you did it for the good of your men, or you did it for the right reasons, how is that different at the end of the day from someone who didn’t?”

The gravest peril of the tacit acceptance of dishonesty, however, is the facilitation of hypocrisy in Army leaders. The Army as a profession speaks of values, integrity, and honor. The Army as an organization practices zero defects, pencil-whipping, and checking the box. Army leaders are situated between the two identities—parroting the talking points of the latest Army Profession Campaign while placating the Army bureaucracy or civilian overseers by telling them what they want to hear. As a result, Army leaders learn to talk of one world while living in another. A major described the current trend:

“It’s getting to the point where you’re almost rewarded for being somebody you’re not. That’s a dangerous situation especially now as we downsize. We’re creating an environment where everything is too rosy because everyone is afraid to paint the true picture. You just wonder where it will break, when it will fall apart.”

At the strategic level, it is this hypocrisy that allows senior Army leaders to unconcernedly shift a billion dollars to overseas contingency operations funding to minimize the base budget or to brief as fact the number of sexual assault response coordinators when the data are obviously suspect. At the operational level, it is this self-deception that makes it easy for leaders to dismiss equivocation and false reports to “bad” units and attribute pencil-whipping and fudging to “weak” leaders. At the tactical level, it is this duplicity that allows leaders to “feed the beast” bogus information while maintaining a self-identity of someone who does not lie, cheat, or steal.

Confronting the Truth

While the preceding pages paint a somewhat dire picture, there is still much to be celebrated in the military profession. The military remains a noble profession filled with competent and committed servants of the nation. And yet the profession’s foundation of trust is slowly being eroded by the corrupting influence of duplicity and deceit. Ignoring dishonesty as a minor shortcoming or writing it off as an inevitable aspect of bureaucracy accomplishes nothing. Instead, the Army must take some rather drastic measures in order to correct the current deleterious culture. Three broad recommendations are offered here. Each will be difficult to implement because of the entrenched culture, but each is critical to restoring trust in the Army profession.

Acknowledge the Problem.

Dishonesty is a topic that many in the Army are extremely uncomfortable discussing openly. While junior officers tend to freely describe their struggles in maintaining their integrity in a culture that breeds dishonesty, senior officers are often reluctant to admit their personal failings in front of subordinates (or in the case of very senior officers, their peers). The need to preserve a “professional” appearance is just too strong for many senior officers to personalize their dealings with the Army culture. They can easily lecture about the ideals of integrity and honor, but many find it extremely difficult to admit that they too have encountered (and currently live with) a culture that condones dishonesty. The result is that dishonesty in the Army can be a topic for DFAC lunch table gripe sessions, but seldom for LPDs or addresses by senior leaders. In the meantime, the requirements passed down from higher become more numerous and the slow slide down the ethical slope continues. Until a candid exchange concerning dishonesty begins, the current culture will not improve.

Openly dealing with deception in the Army formation also serves to prevent a subtle hazard of the current situation—hubris. In the past two decades, the Army has dramatically revitalized its status as a profession. There has been a resurgence in analyzing the Army as a profession and examining all the attendant implications. Additionally, polls show that public confidence in the military remains the highest of all American institutions, and it is still common for those in uniform to hear, “Thank you for your service” from complete strangers. Indeed, the professional all-volunteer force has served the nation well in a difficult time of war and conflict.

The effusive public adulation and constant professional self-talk, however, can also lead to excessive pride and self-exaltation. Overconfidence can leave officers—especially those at the senior level—vulnerable to the belief that they are unimperiled by the temptations and snares found at the common level of life. The ease of fudging on a TDY voucher, the enticement of improper gifts, and the allure of an illicit relationship are minimized and discounted as concerns faced by lesser mortals.

Tradition has it that in ancient Rome, a triumphant general would ride in a celebratory procession through the city after a key battlefield victory. Always standing in the chariot behind the general, however, was a slave who whispered into the ear of the general, “Respice post te! Hominem te memento!” meaning “Look behind you! Remember that you are but a man!”22 Acknowledging organizational and individual fallibilities is the first step toward changing the culture of dishonesty plaguing the Army.

Exercise Restraint.

It is no secret that units and individuals are overwhelmed by the amount of requirements and directives placed upon them. Therefore, restraint must be established in the amount of mandatory training passed down to the force. Instead of making lower level leaders decide which mandatory training or directive they will ignore (but still report 100 percent compliance), leaders at the strategic level must shoulder the burden of prioritizing which directives are truly required. Abdicating that responsibility at the senior level understandably avoids the unpleasant task of informing a proponent, stakeholder, or constituent that his or her particular concern is not a top priority in the Army. Additionally, it gives the Army plausible deniability if something does go wrong. But it also leaves leaders at the lowest levels with no choice but to sacrifice their integrity in order to prop up the façade that all is well.

Of course, exercising restraint is difficult in an organization as large as the Army. Each staff, each level of headquarters, and each senior leader that adds a requirement earnestly believes in the importance and necessity of that requirement. Therefore restraint cannot be achieved merely by announcing it and expecting everyone to curb their propensity for new ideas. Instead, restraint will be exercised when a central authority, armed with a clear understanding of the time and resource constrained environment of the Army, examines and vets the entirety of requirements. While AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, is the obvious candidate for this added scrutiny, ALARACTS, policies from major commands, and directives from all headquarters should also be analyzed in regard to their impact on the cumulative load.

Restraint also needs to be introduced into the rampant use of an officer’s integrity for frivolous purposes. Too often, the Army turns to an officer’s integrity to verify compliance of minor concerns instead of other means such as sampling or auditing. For example, requiring all officers to attest on their OERs that they have initiated a multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) in the last 3 years probably has the well-intended purpose of socializing the force to 360° feedback. But the unanticipated outcome has been the diminution of the gravitas of an officer’s signature as rated officers, raters, and senior raters dismiss the requirement as an administrative nuisance rather than an ethical choice. (That the MSAF requirement could be easily verified through automation compounds the problem). The Army must restore the dignity and seriousness of an officer’s word by requiring it for consequential issues rather than incidental administrative requirements.

Lead Truthfully. 

As the institution acknowledges the current situation and begins exercising restraint, leaders at all levels must focus on leading truthfully. Leading truthfully dismantles the façade of mutually agreed deception by putting considerations of the integrity of the profession back into the decision-making process. Thus, at the senior level, leading truthfully may include informing a political appointee that while bath salts are a scourge to American teens, the problem may not merit Army-wide mandatory training until some other topic is removed. Leading truthfully may also include tolerating risk by striving for 100 percent compliance in all areas, but being satisfied when only 85 percent is reported in some. Leading truthfully may also involve brutally honest reporting from subordinates who risk being labeled malcontents or slackers because of their candor.

A focused emphasis on leading truthfully goes beyond inserting an online block of instruction on ethics, scheduling an ethics stand down, or creating an ethics center of excellence. Instead, leading truthfully attempts to preempt ethical fading by examining the moral implications of a leader’s decision first instead of rationalizing them away after the fact. Finally, leading truthfully changes the culture gradually and will only be effective if embraced by all leaders, not just a token few.

The Army profession rests upon a bedrock of trust. That trust continues to be treasured and guarded, but an alternative ethical reality has emerged where junior officers are socialized into believing that pencil-whipping the stats and feeding the beast are not only routine, but expected. This alternative reality is a place where senior officers romanticize the past and convince themselves that they somehow managed to achieve their station in life without tarnishing their own integrity.

Unfortunately, the boundaries of this parallel ethical universe are slowly expanding into more and more of the profession. Ethical fading and rampant rationalizations have allowed leaders to espouse lofty professional values while slogging through the mire of dishonesty and deceit. The end result is a corrosive ethical culture that few acknowledge and even fewer discuss or work to correct. The Army urgently needs to address the corrupting influence of dishonesty in the Army profession. This monograph is but one small step toward initiating that conversation and perhaps stimulating a modicum of action.

Leonard Wong is a research professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. He focuses on the human and organizational dimensions of the military. He is a retired Army officer whose career includes teaching leadership at West Point and serving as an analyst for the Chief of Staff of the Army. His research has led him to locations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Vietnam. He has testified before Congress. Dr. Wong’s work has been highlighted in news media such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, New Yorker, CNN, NPR, PBS, and 60 Minutes. Dr. Wong is a professional engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. from Texas Tech University.

Stephen J. Gerras is a Professor of Behavioral Sciences in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. He served in the Army for over 25 years, including commanding a light infantry company and a transportation battalion, teaching leadership at West Point, and serving as the Chief of Operations and Agreements for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey. Colonel (Ret.) Gerras holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. in industrial and organizational psychology from Penn State University.

Endnotes

18. Study on Military Professionalism, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1970, p. 20.

19. Ibid., p. B-1-28.

20. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, New York: Random House, 1999, 21, (emphasis in the original).

21. Saint Augustine, “On Lying,” Philip Schaff, ed., A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1887, available from libertyfund.org/titles/2273.

22. Tertullian, Apologeticus, Chapter 33, available from tertullian.org/articles/mayor_apologeticum/mayor_apolog eticum_07translation.htm.

Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (July 16, 2020) A sailor stands watch as a phone talker on the bridge of the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)

Sea Control 332 – Voices from the Shoreline with Mike Smylie

By Jared Samuelson

Author Mike Smylie joins the podcast to discuss his book, Voices from the Shoreline, vanishing fisherfolk, and fishing techniques along Britain’s west coast. Mike is a maritime historian specializing in the fishing industry. He has written more than 20 books on the subject.

Download Sea Control 332 – Voices from the Shoreline with Mike Smylie

Links

1. Voices from the Shoreline: The Ancient and Ingenious Traditions of Coastal Fishing, by Mike Smylie, The History Press, November 1, 2021.
2. Kipperland.

Jared Samuelson is Co-Host and Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at [email protected].

This episode was edited and produced by Alexia Bouallagui.

Send Skimmers to the Skirmish: A Case for a Wing-In-Ground Effect Attack Craft

By Michael Knickerbocker

The People’s Liberation Army – Navy, PLA(N), has rapidly modernized and grown their fleet with advanced warships and weapons. China’s fleet expansion and widening air defense system reach threaten the United States’ power projection capability in the Indo-Pacific.1 At the same time, Russian expansion in the Black Sea region has further expanded and entrenched area denial and forward basing capabilities.2 With the reality of flattening, or shrinking budgets, it is imperative that the United States Navy leave no stone unturned in looking for disruptive technologies that continue to tilt the balance of power in their favor.

Modern warships can bring considerable firepower for a mobile platform, but, along with advanced air defense radars, also possess system limitations and watchstander challenges when targeting smaller, more agile, and low to the surface targets.3 A sea-skimming platform in the role of a maritime attack craft could exploit vulnerabilities in system automation, low elevation detection capability, watchstander training, and radar system set-up.4 A wing-in-ground maritime attack craft (WMAC) would present an opportunity to field a cost-effective, survivable asset that can punch above its weight and cost. Such a platform would assist the United States naval battlegroups in attriting adversarial surface platforms and shore-based area denial systems to pursue maritime superiority in a contested environment. The United States Navy should pursue the acquisition, experimenting with, and eventual conversion of commercially produced wing-in-ground craft to fill an anti-surface warfare role until purpose-built designs can be developed, tested, and fielded. 

Potential Mission Roles and Tactics

Wing-in-ground effect craft (WIG) rely on the interaction of physical forces with the water’s surface to allow them to operate only a few meters above the water’s surface, or within one wing’s distance although some WIG craft can operate inside and outside of ground effect.5 They are wind and sea state limited for take-off and landing, but sea state is not as much of a factor once operating in ground-effect.6 WIGs offer a platform that can maneuver close to the surface of the water, exploiting limitations in modern radar systems at speeds over 250 knots and with ranges up to 1000 nautical miles.7 8 They are fast, maneuverable, and could be up to five times as fuel-efficient as aircraft that do not operate in ground effect.9 These characteristics have already sparked the United States Department of Defense’s interest in applying the technology.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has already called for potential designs to explore WIG feasibility and application for the role of strategic sealift.10 There is extreme value in such platforms in a significant conflict in the Indo-Pacific from the aspect of heavy lift and logistical support in a contested environment. But, the Department of the Defense, specifically the Department of the Navy, need not limit the application of WIG platforms to only one role. WIG design potential as a low-cost, shorter production timeline, anti-surface warfare platform should not be ignored. The application of WIG designs should not be about choosing one platform to fill a distinct role. It should be about adopting and applying a disruptive technology that can benefit multiple mission areas. A WMAC would provide a battle group with the ability to mitigate the threat of forward-deployed adversarial surface combatants that are currently able to outrange the United States Navy’s offensive weapon systems. This is a role like previous iterations of missile patrol boats that were removed from inventory in the 1990s. These smaller missile patrol boats had limited sea denial ability due to their smaller size limiting them to calmer seas and closer to shore. Modern systems and the location of the potential fight require a platform that can be taken into contested areas to take the fight to the adversary.

Sea-skimming missiles have long exploited the limited radar horizon of surface ships. Although the open ocean lacks micro-terrain and other means to block line of sight that exist overland for a drone to exploit, the phenomenon of surface scatter coupled with pre-set radar track filters to disregard presumed ‘false tracks’ create an exploitable opportunity. A wing-in-ground craft can take advantage of this sensing gap. By creating unusual track behavior patterns by utilizing combinations of indirect approaches, speed, and altitude outside the normal parameters of current known surface, air (rotary or fixed wing), or missile platforms, stressing radar operators’ proficiency and system track logics. Although systems and trainings will adapt, the initial introduction and novel nature of track behavior control will initially exploit existing detection gaps and stress the capabilities of systems and their operators. With the ability to take off and land within roughly 500 meters, a WMAC could combine its unique track characteristics with indirect, sprint and drift approaches to a target or waypoint.11 This approach would present unique challenges to radar system design, operational set-up, and watchstander training while mitigating the risk of operating within probable surface ducting effects of the adversary’s radar. By starting and stopping ground-effect legs of travel at speeds near predicted system track-filter speed settings, and then altering course while in the water, a WMAC could appear to be a series of false tracks, ostensibly referred to as ‘zoomers’ by watchstanders, while conducting a recon patrol or a maritime strike mission against an identified target. The ability to take off and land within short distances would also increase the survivability of a WMAC when engaged by adversarial missile systems or aircraft when coupled with electronic or physical countermeasures. These countermeasures could include a combination of towed or rocket-launched decoys, camouflage paint schemes, radar absorbent materials, electronic signal repeaters, and avoidance maneuvers. WIG craft would also only need to close targets as much to be within maximum range of their weapons, often on the outer limits of the adversary’s own weapons range increasing their survivability and need to avoid detection.

A WMAC could scout ahead of a battle group to loiter until it detects a signal correlating to a specified target, relay targeting data, engage the target with a combination of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) or high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM), and then evade by maneuvering or attempting to blend in with the ocean surface until it can return to the battlegroup to refuel and re-arm. This application is like that of diesel-electric submarines that use their ability to bottom to position themselves to attack a transiting force or to evade counter-detection and engagement after firing at their target. Include. The ability to launch munitions in support of a battle group and a landing force from off-axis, or forward deployed, adds another dimension to exploit by operational planners. The outfitting of a WMAC should be to degrade or destroy radar equipment on surface combatants. Degrading or destroying combatants is known as “mission kill” which is more than sufficient to meet many potential tactical objectives, especially in a battle waged on the sea in the Indo-Pacific or Black Sea regions. Such objectives, when met, can provide the conditions necessary to flow in larger capital ships to close the enemy force and bring their full combat power to bear in a more permissive environment by attriting adversarial surface combatants in their ability to detect, track, and engage United States naval forces.

Initial WMACs would likely need to embark on amphibious ships to launch utilizing well-decks or crane systems. A potential commercial design for WMAC conversion would be the Wigetworks Airfish-8, roughly 50 feet wide and 60 feet long without modifications to fold-and-stow the wings or tail section. As a frame of reference, a Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) is 48 feet wide and 91 feet long.12 Three WMACs to be loaded in place of two LCACs into a compatible well-deck as found on the San Antonio Class (LPD-17), Harpers Ferry Class (LSD-49), and America Class Flight IIs (LHA-6).13 14 15 A Wasp Class (LHD-1) would be able to embark four WMACs.16 While still utilizing current USS ships, a crane-based option would be the Lewis B Puller Class Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESB).17 ESBs are designed for moving cargo to forward operating areas with a configurable main-loading deck. These ships could potentially embark and deploy between four to six WMACs. Initial designs would implicitly guide tactical employment and embarkation limitations.

Design Considerations for Initial WMAC Conversions

The threat in the Indo-Pacific could require action within the next three years.18 Contractor bids to design, build, and test new platforms typically take much longer than that possible timeframe – not to include placing the design into production, training personnel. To accelerate the acquisition timeline, the Navy should expeditiously acquire existing commercially produced craft. For this theoretical exercise, we will build out a modified Wigetworks Airfish-8.

Singapore-based Wigetworks, produces the Airfish-8, a WIG that can support a two-person crew with six to eight passengers and a total cargo of 1.1 tons. The craft is 56 feet (17.2 meters) long and has a wingspan of just over 49 feet (15 meters), just slightly smaller than an F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet.19 20 The Airfish-8 is limited in speed and range with maximum speed of 106 knots and only 300 nautical mile range while operating at a max above-surface height of just under 23 feet (7 meters) making it suitable for fleet experimentation but not combat operations. Although not in full-scale production yet, Wigetworks indicated that each unit will likely cost around $500,000. Even if this price point is doubled to $1 million, it still provides a low-cost experimental platform.

Operating a WMAC based on the Airfish-8 could be limited to only a pilot and a weapon systems operator. The pilot and weapon systems operator, however, would not require traditional naval flight school since the classification of WIGs as boats. This would allow for these billets to be opened to Chief Warrant Officers or even enlisted ranks like how the Navy currently crews LCACs. This would allow for potential options to include additional fuel, bunks, or equipment racks in the cabin in lieu of passenger seating installed on the commercial use variant. Crew space and bunks would depend upon the decision for operational employment and whether a WMAC would pre-position and drift for extended periods. The current engine design of a gasoline-powered V-8 would likely need to be swapped out with a JP-5 fueled turboprop, which is more powerful and fuel-efficient.

A converted Airfish-8 would likely have one weapon hardpoint per wing considering wing space, weight limitations, and drag calculations for impact to speed and range. The load out would consist of ASCM or HARM. Engineering considerations would have to be considered for potential issues to include weapon weight and minimum launch airspeed requirements to include potential booster modifications depending on the weapons selected for use by a WMAC. Missile options should also not be limited to weapons currently in the United States’ inventory. Partner and allied nations such as France and Norway, among other Western countries, produce ASCMs that are in many ways superior to the limited United States Navy offerings.

A first-generation Airfish-8 WMAC test platform, as described, might cost roughly $5 to $15 million per unit, although cost estimation for prototypes is notoriously difficult. This price-point pales compared to the estimated $81 million per aircraft of the F-35 program.21 Aside from cost, is the reality that more expensive, and thus more complex, platforms usually come with significant lead times for production. Less complex and less expensive platforms would likely come with the advantage of being able to produce at a higher rate which would help with initial fleet inventory numbers as well as replacements for units lost due to accidents or combat.

Conclusion

In obtaining and fielding maritime platforms for use in a potential conflict with China or Russia, cost-effectiveness and speed to fleet are vital to the United States’ security concerns and strategy. The Indo-Pacific theater is a predominantly maritime theater governed by the tyranny of distance and the threat of a rapidly growing, modern Chinese Navy. The Black Sea region saw Russia annex the Crimean Peninsula and built up standing naval forces in the area following by the widely publicized and condemned Russian invasion of Ukraine. If conflict with these peer adversaries come to fruition, we must account for the grim reality of modern combat with equally advanced opposition – the United States will suffer losses. As modern weapons get faster and more lethal, the old belief of United States’ fast and advanced platforms being superior to the opponent will no longer hold true. While WMACs possesses inherent weaknesses when faced with SAM or fighter threats, their ability to scout ahead of a battle group and degrade or destroy the systems on adversarial surface platforms needed to target the battlegroup will justify the risk. A small crew, small price tag, and shorter production timeline for a replacement represent a significantly lower risk than losing a major surface combatant such as a destroyer, cruiser, or even worse, an aircraft carrier.

The reality of the theater and threat has stoked discussions surrounding the applications of wing-in-ground-effect platforms and seaplanes in recent years. But discussion is not enough. The United States Departments of Defense and the Navy need to pursue and field platforms before they are required. Near-term acquisition and modification of commercially produced, proven WIG designs provide a stop-gap measure to field capability to these, and potentially other, key regions until purpose-built military platforms can be designed and tested. This second generation of WMACs should explore hull-form shapes to reduce radar-cross-section, a vertical or catapult launch capability to expand the number of platforms they can embark on, and power plant options to increase range and speed for evasion.

The plausibility and timelines of potential conflict in the Pacific and Eastern Europe involving the United States are tenuous and fluid. The rapid development and deployment of a WMAC would allow the United States Navy to directly counter the growing size and capability of Chinese and Russian forces by exploiting the inherent weaknesses of modern systems. This capability provides additional conventional deterrence to Chinese military aggression vis-à-vis Taiwan and the South China Sea and towards Russian aggression in the Black Sea and Baltic regions.

Wing-in-ground-effect craft provide tremendous potential for strategic lift and other vital mission sets. However, in examining the applicability and effectiveness of the technology, the United States Departments of Defense and the Navy must not overlook the viability and role of smaller, shorter-range platforms. Now is the time to take decisive action that can potentially turn the tide of a future conflict in the Indo-Pacific or the Black Sea regions. To neutralize or deter rising adversaries, the United States Navy must send skimmers to the skirmish.

Commander Michael Knickerbocker is a United States Navy Surface Warfare Officer with previous experience as an AEGIS Combat Systems Officer and Integrated Air Missile Defense Planner. He is currently a Federal Executive Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin conducting independent research into naval equities impacting current national security situations. His research focuses on technology adaptation into maritime strategy as well as maritime trade security assessments and risk identification. The views expressed are those of the individual writing them and do not reflect the official positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, or the University of Texas at Austin.

Endnotes

[1] O’Rourke, Ronald. 2022. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities- Background and Issues for Congress. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.

[2] Gressel, Gustav. 2021. “Waves of Ambition: Russia’s Military Build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea.” European Council for Foreign Relations. September 21. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://ecfr.eu/publication/waves-of-ambition-russias-military-build-up-in-crimea-and-the-black-sea/.

[3]Oyvind Overrein, Andreas Birkeli. 2021. Radar Detection Evaluation Method for Sea Skimming Targets Including Effective Flight Altitude Simulations as Seen by Radar. NATO paper, Brussels: NATO.

[4] White, Ryan. 2021. “What is Sea Skimming? How Effective Sea-Skimmer Missiles?” Naval Post. April 3. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://navalpost.com/anti-ship-missiles-what-is-sea-skimming/.

[5] International Maritime Organization. 2022. “Wing-in-Ground (WIG) Craft.” International Maritime Organization. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Pages/WIG.aspx.

[6] WigetWorks. 2020. Airfish-8 FAQ. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.wigetworks.com/faq#:~:text=It%20has%20a%20higher%20operational,15%20knots%20of%20cross%20wind.

[7] Michael Halloran, Sean O’Meara. 1999. Wing-in-Ground Effect Craft Review. Melbourne: Australia Department of Defence. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA361836.pdf.

[8] Walker Mills, Dylan Phillips-Levine, Joshua Taylor. 2020. “Modern Sea Monsters: Revisiting Wing-in-Ground Effect Craft for the Next Fight.” Proceedings. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/september/modern-sea-monsters.

[9] Ingels-Thompson, David. 2021. “Rethinking SEAD for A2/AD.” Proceedings. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/april/rethinking-sead-a2ad

[10] Katz, Justin. 2021. “DARPA Hopes A Plane Boat Hybrid Can Solve the Pentagon’s Sealift Challenge.” Breaking Defense. August 30. Accessed January 24, 2022.
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/darpa-hopes-a-plane-boat-hybrid-can-the-pentagons-sealift-challenge/.

[11] Department of the Navy. 2020. Airfish-8. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.wigetworks.com/airfish-8.

[12] Department of the Navy. 2021. “Landing Craft, Air Cushioned Fact File.” Navy.com. October 14. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2170004/landing-craft-air-cushion-lcac/

[13] Department of the Navy. 2021. “Amphibious Transport Dock – LPD.” Navy.com. January 21. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.navy.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=724&Article=2222713.

[14] Department of the Navy. 2019. “Dock Landing Ship – LSD.” Navy.com. July 19. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.navy.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=724&Article=2222713.

[15] Department of the Navy. 2021. “Amphibious Assault Ships – LHA(R).” Navy.com. April 15. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.navy.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=724&Article=2169814.

[16] Department of the Navy. 2021. “Amphibious Assault Ships – LHD.” Navy.com. April 15. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.navy.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=724&Article=2169814

[17] Department of the Navy. 2021. “Expeditionary Sea Base – ESB.” Navy.com. January 21. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169994/expeditionary-sea-base-esb

[18] Quinn, Jimmy. 2021. “Beijing’s Taiwan Invasion Timeline: Two Predictions.” National Review. November 8. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/beijings-taiwan-invasion-timeline-two-predictions/.

[19] WigetWorks. 2020. Airfish-8. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.wigetworks.com/airfish-8.

[20] Department of the Navy. 2021. “F/A-18 A-D Hornet and F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet Strike Fighter.” Navy.com. February 4. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2383479/fa-18a-d-hornet-and-fa-18ef-super-hornet-strike-fighter/.

[21] Grazier, Dan. 2020. “Selective Arithmetic to Hide the F-35s True Costs.” Project on Government Oversight. October 21. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/10/selective-arithmetic-to-hide-the-f-35s-true-costs/.

Featured Image: The Wigetworks Airfish 8 aircraft, (Photo via Wigetworks PTE LTD.)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.