By Jared Samuelson
Master Chief Larry Nowell (ret.) joins the program to discuss his Navy career, to include his time at TOPGUN and controlling fighters over Vietnam.
Sea Control 315 – Fighter Control over Vietnam with Master Chief Larry Nowell (ret.)
Jared Samuelson is Co-Host and Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.
This episode was edited and produced by Joshua Groover.
By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command
The Argentine Navy has deployed its two newest offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), ARA Bouchard (P-51) and ARA Piedrabuena (P-52), to monitor an international fishing fleet traveling close to the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) en route to the South Atlantic. While there have been no confirmed reports of these vessels engaging in illegal, unregulated, or unreported (IUU) fishing, recent history suggests that this is occurring or will occur soon.
Putting the new units to good use
Bouchard and Piedrabuena are assigned to the Argentine Navy’s maritime patrol division (División de Patrullado Marítimo: DVPM). Along with a Beechcraft B-200 Super King Air aircraft assigned to the naval air squadron for maritime surveillance (Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Vigilancia Marítima), the two units monitored vessels traveling through the Magellan Strait en route to open seas in the South Atlantic, according to a 23 December press release. After departing from Admiral Zar base in Trelew, Chubut Province, the B-200 flew over “the fishing fleet, in coordination with the patrol boats, maintaining surveillance… of the activities carried out by these ships of different nationalities.”
The support vessel ARA Estrecho de San Carlos (A-22) has reportedly replaced Bouchard as the main vessel assigned to Ushuaia, the capital of Tierra del Fuego province, which is near the Beagle Channel and Argentina’s border with Chile.
Argentina has acquired four Gowind-class OPVs from France, manufactured by Naval Group. The third unit, ARA Storni (P-53), was delivered in October 2021, while the fourth and final ship, ARA Bartolomé Cordero, was launched in September 2021 and will likely be delivered sometime in early 2022. The four units will help the Argentine Navy improve its patrol and surveillance operations.
There have also been developments from a bureaucratic standpoint. In late February 2021, the Ministry of Defence created the Joint Maritime Command (Comando Conjunto Marítimo: CCM) to “patrol and control of [Argentina’s] maritime and fluvial areas.” The MoD announced that starting this past 1 January, the CCM assumed command of surveillance maritime operations, which includes monitoring the international fishing fleet that is sailing near the country’s EEZ.
Good and Bad News
The Argentine Navy will have additional air and surface units in the near future. In late December, the Argentine government announced that the local shipyard Tandanor will construct a new icebreaker for Antarctic operations to replace the aging icebreaker Almirante Irízar (Q-5). In the same month, the Ministry of Defence announced that two refurbished Sikorsky SH-3H Sea King medium helicopters will be acquired to improve capabilities and operations, including search and rescue, in the country’s southern areas and during Antarctic operations. The price of the two helicopters, including personnel training and spare parts, is USD 12.8 million.
Alas, the service still has no operational submarines. Moreover, apart from the four new OPVs, the rest of the fleet has yet to be modernized, which limits the service’s capabilities for constant, long-range patrol operations to monitor illegal activities by the international fishing fleet.
IUU Fishing
Argentina has a history of combating IUU fishing. For example, in 2016, the Mantilla-class patrol boat Prefecto Derbes (GC-28) shot and sank the Chinese fishing vessel Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010. The ship had reportedly ignored warning shots and attempted to flee, only to ram the Argentine patrol vessel. Lu Yan Yuan Yu was reportedly fishing without authorization in Argentina’s EEZ close to Chubut Province.
The author of this article has written several essays for CIMSEC about IUU fishing in Latin American waters (See 2016’s “Latin American Navies Combat Illegal Fishing,” and 2020’s “The Ecuadorian Navy’s Constant Struggle Against IUU Fishing.” Regional cooperation is vital to solving this security challenge, which can be achieved by modernizing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca: TIAR) into a 21st-century agreement that is also tasked with combating IUU fishing. Turning TIAR into TIAR 21, as the author suggested in a July 2021 Regional Insight paper for the William J. Perry Center for hemispheric Defense Studies at the US National Defense University, would be an essential step forward to more effectively monitor South America’s vast waters and prevent the ongoing maritime pillaging of precious marine resources by extra-regional fishing fleets.
An international fishing fleet, comprising vessels from countries such as China, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan, continuously operates throughout South America, moving with the season. For example, the same fleet operated around Ecuador, close to the Galapagos Islands, in July-August 2021, then traveled south through Peru and Ecuador. It is currently crossing the Magellan Strait to operate in the South Atlantic for the Summer months below the Equator. In Argentina, fishing vessels are focused on fishing squid, spider crab (centolla), and crab.
According to a December report by the Argentine daily La Nación, the “fishing season” commenced in early December, as some 180 vessels, “mostly from China,” crossed the Magellan Strait after operating in waters close to Chile and Peru. “By April, there will be approximately 500 ships operating in the area,” explained Major Néstor Alberto Kiferling, head of Argentina’s maritime traffic service. As modern as the Gowind class ships are, the international fishing fleet vastly outnumbers the Argentine Navy’s current capabilities, even with support from aerial units and other vessels.
Conclusion
It has been argued that Argentina is in a better situation vis-à-vis IUU fishing today compared to five years ago. Indeed, the Argentine Navy is putting its two new OPVs to good use by deploying them to the Magellan Strait to monitor the international fishing fleet crossing through the country’s EEZs en route to the South Atlantic. As with many other South American countries, one of Argentina’s major environmental challenges is IUU fishing, But while IUU Fishing is problematic when perpetrated at low-scale by fishing vessels from Argentina or a neighboring country, it can become truly catastrophic when done so by hundreds of international fishing vessels with no interest in preserving the maritime environment.
Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. The views expressed in this article belong the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.
Featured Image: ARA Piedrabuena (P-52) at Piriou’s Concarneau shipyard (Photo Credit: Naval Group)
The terms of this call for articles have been updated. Read the new call for articles here.
Submissions Due: March 4, 2022
Topic Week Dates: March 14-18, 2022
Article Length: 1,000-3,000 words
Submit to: Content@cimsec.org
By Dmitry Filipoff
The current Russia-Ukraine crisis has cast a shadow over Europe as more than 100,000 Russian troops border Ukraine and 140 Russian Navy vessels exercise at sea. Russian naval power, especially forces in the Black Sea, could feature significantly in a major contingency involving Ukraine.
The preservation of Russian naval power featured prominently in the modern origins of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. As the homeport of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol came at risk of being under the control of a western-aligned Ukraine, Russia seized control of the Crimean peninsula in part to preserve its naval power. Now these same forces may be brought to bear against Ukraine in a new European conflict.
What is the state of Russia’s naval power today, and how could its naval forces be brought to bear against Ukraine? Or in an even more dire scenario, against NATO? How are Russian naval capabilities evolving, such as in the undersea domain and with respect to hypersonics? What is Russia’s maritime strategy and how are its maritime interests evolving?
Authors are invited to answer these questions and more as we consider the roles and evolution of Russian naval power and maritime strategy. Send all submissions to Content@cimsec.org.
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.
Featured Image: Russian Navy ships of the Black Sea Fleet. (Photo via Sputnik/Vasily Batanov)
By Dmitry Filipoff
There is even more than usual going on in the world of geopolitics and naval power, to say the least. This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will be looking to discuss current events and recently published, hard-hitting critiques of Navy combat readiness.
Down below is a peek at the invites for our upcoming February discussions. Of special note may be the session on the naval dimensions of the brewing Russia-Ukraine crisis, and how Russian Black Sea naval power could feature in a contingency. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive invites to our upcoming off-the-record February sessions.
Last month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla held sessions focused on the Surface Navy, including discussions on tracking tactical skill in the surface fleet as well as how to maximize shipboard organization for combat effectiveness. These candid conversations revealed opportunities and shortfalls to be addressed, and helped connect like-minded individuals focused on advancing naval warfighting.
Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.
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Upcoming February Sessions
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and The Role of Naval Power in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis
The Russia-Ukraine crisis is brewing with more than 100,000 Russian troops alongside Ukraine’s borders and 140 Russian Navy vessels engaged in exercises. In the event of a significant Russian incursion, how could Russia’s Black Sea Fleet be brought to bear? What operations could be conducted and toward what objectives? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we contemplate the naval dimensions of this major crisis.
Read Ahead: “How Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Could Change the Equation in Ukraine,” by Dr Sidharth Kaushal and Sam Cranny-Evans
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Navy Cryptologic and Cyber Warfare Effectiveness
Cyber warfare has long been heralded by Navy and DoD leaders as a critical force multiplier and major arena of competition. But is the Navy well-structured to seize the opportunity of cyber, or effectively defend itself from threats emanating from this domain? To what extent does the Navy’s cryptologic and cyber communities have the resident expertise, training, and integration to be effective? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the Navy’s cyber effectiveness.
Read Ahead: “Navy Cryptologic Warfare Officers Cannot Do Cyber,” by LCDR Derek Bernsen, USNR
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Going from Short Term “Can-Do” to “Combat Ready”
The Navy has long operated under a “can-do” logic that sought to maximize the availability of the fleet for operational tasking. But after operating under such logic for decades, many fundamentals of combat readiness have atrophied. How can the Navy restore more balance to the relationship between its availability and readiness? What practices have been corroded by can-do culture, and what opportunities could be seized with a culture change? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the effects of “can-do” culture on the Navy’s combat readiness.
Read Ahead: “Change Can-do to Combat Ready,” by LCDR Aaron Marchant, USN
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Completed January Sessions
How to Measure Tactical Skill and Experience in the Surface Fleet
The Surface Navy, with the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) in the lead, is trialing a new system of measuring tactical experience and skill— the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC). What sort of criteria should be used, and what sorts of experience should be tracked? How should this data be used to inform shipboard management and career tracks? Join us to discuss how the surface fleet can better measure tactical skill and harness the data.
Read Ahead: “Surface Navy to Kick Off Program to Track, Assess Sailors Combat Skills,” by Megan Eckstein
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New Shipboard Organizations for Surface Warships
The shipboard organization of surface ships has a direct bearing on leaders’ ability to cultivate tactical proficiency. Could new shipboard organizations and delineations of duties allow leaders to focus more deeply on developing warfighting skills? What could such reorganizations look like and how can they be trialed? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the relationship between shipboard organization and tactical focus in the surface fleet.
Read Ahead: “Time for a New Shipboard Organization,” by Lieutenant Colin Barnard
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Embracing Failure in Warfighter Culture
Failure is a critical part of learning and development. But within certain cultures and organizations, failure can carry a stigma that inhibits its effective use. How can warfighters better embrace failure as a force of learning and progress? How can aversion to failure mask important shortfalls and sideline opportunities to innovate? What is the role of leaders in setting a constructive tone around the value of failure? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the role of failure in furthering warfighting excellence.
Read Ahead: “Embrace the F-Word,” by Captain Roger G. Herbert Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.
