Industrial Base

Useful Lemons

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By Jason Flores Rutledge

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) represents a strong threat to the United States due to its rapid military expansion and destabilizing actions in the Indo-Pacific theater. The Indo-Pacific represents about twenty-seven percent of US trade and is vital to remain accessible to the United States.1,2  Confronting the threat is difficult because of the vast distances and severe timeframes necessary to supply forward operating forces. Conventional means of resupply rely on shipping across that distance and on prepositioned stocks which would run out in short order. According to CSIS wargames, should conflict with the PRC begin, U.S. stockpiles are expected to be depleted within a week after conflict start even if continuous resupply could be guaranteed.3  New options are needed to address these complications involving distance and production.

This article makes two related proposals. First, it advocates the creation of sea-going factories and industrial facilities to secure decisive strategic advantages over the PRC and other future competitors. Such creations would significantly reduce the supply lines for crucial and specialized equipment and weaponry and offer strategic surprise through mobile industrial zones. Second, it proposes that the first incarnations of these new ship classes be adapted from ships presently being refitted or scheduled for decommissioning and will allow such factories and facilities to enter service quickly.

The Growing Threat

First, the PRC is laying disputed claims to many maritime territories. It presently claims the self-governing island of Taiwan.4  It lays claims to the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Reef, which has been determined by international courts as belonging to the Philippines.5  It is also laying claim to the entire South China Sea and its natural resources.6 Backing these claims is unprecedented gains in military production, technology, and increasing aggression. 

On October 12th of 2025, Chinese cutters rammed two commercial Philippine fishing vessels near Thitu Island.7 In early January of 2026, PRC forces surrounded Taiwan and conducted military drills to intimidate Taiwan and regional neighbors.8 Should these agitations continue, and increase resulting in conflict, the geography favors China should the U.S. decide to protect its interests in the region.

In the event of regional conflict, China has very short communication and supply lines in the region whereas the U.S. must cross the vast Pacific Ocean to protect its interests, the sovereignty of allies and partner nations. The U.S. will need combat and sustainment power in theater. U.S. transports are vulnerable to actions that may impede or attempt to destroy them during transit.  With the belief the U.S. has an unmatched technological advantage, that transit time may prove to be the greatest factor in the defeat of the U.S. and those nations who stand with her.

There are options to cope. Examples include prepositioning supplies and producing more cargo ships, but the U.S. should also consider factory ships as a type of force multiplier. 

The Factory Ship

A “factory ship’ is a factory found within the boundaries of a mobile sea-going vessel. Its primary purpose is to exponentially reduce the supply lines for specialized weapons and equipment though it remains reliant on local raw materials.

A factory ship’s simplest incarnation is that of a standard factory with set outputs geared to service specific needs. For example, one could specialize in drone manufacturing or perhaps missile production through traditional methods.  It would also be worth considering outfitting these vessels with additive manufacturing capabilities which allows the creation of virtually anything from the same machinery.

Traditionally, every part of a machine would need repairs and require materials to be kept in stock. Unlike civilian life where a shopping trip can get any automobile part, the military world has limited space to store replacement parts and, like the civilian world, it has no idea what part will break next. The implication being that space is wasted on parts that later turn out to be unneeded, while more urgently required items were in short supply.

Decision makers will find massive advantages by including “additive” manufacturing to allow customized outputs for both land and sea-going assets. Additive manufacturing requires just raw materials to manipulate into needed parts, so there is no wasted space used for excess parts. This has the potential to meet all demands, so long as the raw materials last.

Additionally, the customizable quality of additive manufacturing would allow the vessel to also support allied and partner forces, which use different equipment from U.S. forces. The ability to customize local production to meet sophisticated needs on the spur of the moment represents a powerful advantage that must not be neglected.

The Factory Ship in Use: An Example

In this scenario, the PRC has engaged both Taiwan and the United States in massively bloody battles to determine the island population’s destiny. Several weeks into it, both sides have suffered tremendously in lives lost and vessels sunk. Sensing a strategic victory through their decisive ability to replace ships, the PRC has refused an armistice. Both sides are preparing for the next round of battle by replacing their exhausted supply stocks. The U.S.’ only chance is to strike Chinese shipyards directly as quickly as possible.

Such a maneuver will require supplies needed by land, air, and sea-going forces. All-out efforts are being launched to resupply and re-arm the fleet while still at risk of attack by PRC forces.  There is a factory ship anchored in Port Moresby of Papua New Guinea manufacturing new missiles for the task force while supplies are also coming from Los Angeles, California. In both cases the supply ships of the “USNS Lewis and Clark” class are involved and traveling at their maximum speed of twenty knots.9 The distance from Port Moresby to the operational area is 2,531 nautical miles whereas the distance from Los Angeles , California, USA is 6,533 nautical miles.10 That means the factory ship will help replenish the fleet in just over five days while those from San Diego need over 13 days. This means the factory ship could resupply the fleet two times before the first delivery from the U.S. arrives. With the presence of a factory ship, Gettysburg will be combat ready in ten days; with factory ships the strike happens, without them the PRC once again strikes first. Having a mobile industrial base is greatly advantageous, no matter how specific its output may be.

Industrial Secrecy and a Changing World Situation

Those opposed to factory ships, but who acknowledge the problems regarding supplies and distance, could suggest building additional U.S. owned and operated factories, supply or maintenance centers on foreign soil. This option represents a significant risk of technological compromise and advanced production becoming enemy assets.

States and their industries do change alliances during conflict, either through being overrun by the enemy, defection, or voluntarily switching allegiances. In World War Two, the states of Romania, Bulgaria, Finland and Italy switched sides from the Axis to the Allies as the military and political situation changed.11 In 2016, President Duterte of the Philippines shifted away from a longstanding partnership with the United States and sought to revitalize relations with the PRC.12 Such things must be considered in future force planning.

Conversely, a factory ship has the option of hoisting its anchors and slipping away when the situation begins to turn hostile. The factory ship also represents the opportunity to manufacture sensitive products in allied/partner territories without as many political risks. 

Factory ships could be stationed in international waters, but the loading of raw materials may be difficult, time consuming, and resource intensive; a fact borne out by considering ship-to-ship transfers and the fuel requirements for onloading. While this is an option, foreign port or berthing is preferred.

Design Considerations

A key design feature for every factory ship would be a flight deck though its purpose would differ partly from traditional use. Helipads would be required to support VTOL drones responsible for transporting customized loads to various land formations and ships. Factory ships would also require space for storage and maintenance for aerial assets while navigation systems for unmanned aerial systems (UAS) would be integrated in the ships’ communication and navigation suites.

The U.S. Navy is already experimenting with drones for those supply purposes. According to The EurAsian Times, the U.S. Navy experimented with six drones meant for transporting supplies.13 Trial runs for these experimentations involved ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore deliveries. Considerable time and benefit could be realized by adopting lessons learned from these for the factory ship design and employment. An analysis is recommended to ensure a factory ship meets power generation requirements inherent in its role. Should additional power be required, power plant ships, an innovation discussed later, could be an option.

The Survivability of Factory Ships

A concern would be that a factory ship would tie down other fighting vessels as escorts when they would be desperately needed elsewhere.  A factory ship would indeed depend on other ships for its safety for the extended transit across the Pacific. The factory would sensibly need to travel with a taskforce or surface action group (SAG); however, the factory ship would not be defensively useless.  The factory ship could be retrofitted to bristle with aerial defenses. The flight deck incorporated into its design is an ideal surface for many aerial defenses including those mounted on vehicles. As an example, aerial defense would in part be provided by vehicles like the Avenger, a vehicle that can engage a variety of aerial targets such as drones, aircraft, and even cruise missiles.14 The numerous anchor points on the deck would secure the vehicles from unintended movement. This ideally would defeat everything from aircraft to missiles to ballistic missiles. Therefore, the factory ship would contribute significantly to any taskforce’s survivability.

Though strange, a practical idea would be to station VTOL fighters like the F-35B onboard. The aircraft would defend the factory ship whether at port or in transit for the domains it is suited to address. Also, the F-35 fighters could be kept on land when the factory is at port. This would cure the problem of the jets obstructing the ship’s role as a factory.

Once in a port, the factory ship’s defenses would complement the local area’s capabilities. Many of the aerial defenses could be temporary, i.e. land-going vehicles which could be offloaded and stationed in the surrounding environment. This would also free up deck space for the ship’s industrial roles. This practice would maximize defense during transit and stationing while also maximizing the ship’s industrial role.

As can be seen, the industrial factory ship would not be a burden constantly requiring escorts, and instead, could potentially add to the overall force generating capability to a task force.

Power Plant Ships

Another advantageous innovation is the “power plant” ship, a vessel that powers a given area of industrial might which has lost use of its own power plant due to enemy action, be it by conventional warfare, cyberattack, or sabotage.

Traditionally, cities blessed with the industrial prowess to source the military’s logistical needs have been targeted by the enemy to retard friendly progress. Targeting land-bound power plants serve as a relatively easy way to render entire swaths of such industry inactive, thereby denying friendly forces of the subsistence, support, and weaponry necessary to advance the country’s interests. Coping with the blow usually means accepting the loss in production and the resulting defeats and personnel sacrificed. However, the powerful innovation represented by power plant ships means rapidly restoring industrial might and all the advantages inherent in it, be it strategic or tactical.

In such a situation, a power plant ship would sail urgently into port and have the local power grid attached to it. Within hours vital industry resumes. This is the promise represented by power plant ships.

Power plant ships also open offensive options unimaginable previously. The ability to launch moderate to major offensives is in part limited by the ability to service casualties to prevent unacceptable losses; this is in reference to the “golden hour” when casualties must be serviced or they die.15 Many could state the formula will not be able to be implemented anymore and friendly forces must accept those losses or forego war-winning maneuvers. Forward medical bases can be established near or within enemy territory to support major operations of a surprising nature.  However, a power plant ship can be anchored near shore and power lines run out to the base. This would power modern medical equipment and defensive needs like Patriot batteries. The result is lives saved while giving friendly forces strategic options.          

Immediate Opportunities for Ship Construction

One opportunity to economically create an industrial factory ship is presently available. At the time of this writing, the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis is presently undergoing an extensive overhaul while having its nuclear reactors refueled.16 The work is so difficult that the vessel is not expected to return to service until October 2026. While unfortunate, the delay presents an opportunity.

If feasible, the USS John C. Stennis should be retrofitted into an industrial factory ship. The hull, engine, reactor, and other necessities already exist while space and available tonnage for industrial equipment can be created by removing anything deemed non-essential.

An additional benefit is that the Stennis could also work as a “mobile power plant” thanks to its nuclear reactor. This means it could power its own needs, port equipment and land facilities useful to the factory role. Using the Stennis would be an economical and time sensitive measure given the accelerating PRC threat in the near term. Trading an aircraft carrier for a factory ship may be deemed unwise, yet the need for a factory ship remains.

Good fortune has it that two nuclear powered aircraft carriers are slated for decommissioning in 2026 and 2027, the USS Nimitz and USS Enterprise respectively.17 Repurposing these prestigious vessels represents the unique opportunity to create factory ships without reducing the fleet’s combat value. They would also have all the benefits of the proposed changes to the USS John C. Stennis. However, the U.S. Navy may still not be able to afford the costs.

An excellent alternative is the USNS John Glenn. The John Glenn is an Expeditionary Transfer Dock Ship designed to transfer vast quantities of equipment and fuel to forward depots.18 Emptied out the vessel has 25,000 square feet of cargo space which can be dedicated to manufacturing instead. It also has the integral capacity to haul up to 380,000 gallons of fuel, which would be useful for manufacturing and extended voyages. Further pluses exist in that the vessel already has a vehicle staging area, a vehicle transfer ramp, and large mooring fenders which are features that greatly enhance the “factory” ship role. The best part is that the U.S. Navy officially no longer wants the John Glenn; it is to be decommissioned even though it has years left in its service life.19

Smaller vessels can be used as “power plant ships,” a possibility represented by Ticonderoga class ships. According to Naval News, all these guide-missile cruisers are to be retired by the year 2027.20 The reason for their decommissioning is not because they are too worn out, but because they are too expensive to maintain.21

But what if these vessels were used strategically as sailing power plants? What would the maintenance costs be if they were stripped down? The cost would likely be minimal though they would need to be estimated for the tear down. This is especially true since there would be inevitable costs for stripping away equipment anyway.  However, the resulting maintenance costs would very likely be affordable. That being said, a conventional ship may not suffice.

Another option would be employing a nuclear-powered vessel as a “power plant’ ship. Once again, there is the aforementioned USS Nimitz and USS Enterprise. If not used as factory ships, such vessels would provide substantial and sustained electrical output for use by ports and select industries as power plant ships. Factory ships can be introduced into the Navy quickly and economically no matter which vessels are used, and not all innovations need to be on a grand scale.

Conclusion

This article proposes the creation of sea-going factories and power plant ships to obtain decisive strategic advantages. Advantages range from shortened supply lines to specialized and customized resupply of both land and sea forces. The consideration of factory ships should not be framed as specialized vessels versus generalized ones. Factory ships should be viewed foremost as factories that happen to float and move like ships, and not primarily as ships.

Though such vessels will need to be specifically designed one day, the present threat represented by the PRC can be addressed by refitting unwanted, but functional, vessels into sea-going factory ships. This article strongly urges a study to be performed to decide the feasibility of the pure concept and its rapid implementation through retrofitting existing vessels.

Jason Flores Rutledge is a civilian friend of the US Navy. He has unfortunately been disabled but seeks to contribute to society through his writings. He also hopes to eventually earn an honorary rank. Jason enjoys studying and analyzing wargame theory and practice. Presently, he is working on further enhancing the American military through various means.

References

1. “The United States’ Enduring Commitment to the Indo-Pacific: Marking Two Years Since the Release of the Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Indo-Pacific Strategy”. U.S. Department of State, 09 Feb. 2024, https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Indo-Pacific-Strategy-Second-Anniversary-Fact-Sheet.pdf. Accessed 20 Jan. 2026.

2. “What is the value of US trade overall?”. USA Facts, 01 Jan. 2026, https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-value-of-us-trade/country/united-states/. Accessed 20 Jan. 2026.

3. Jones, Seth. “The U.S. Defense Industrial Base Is Not Prepared for a Possible Conflict with China”. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 Feb. 2023, https://features.csis.org/preparing-the-US-industrial-base-to-deter-conflict-with-China/. Accessed 20 Jan. 2026.

4. BBC News. “China and Taiwan: A really simple guide.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 25 Oct 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59900139.

5. Pompeo, Michael. “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”. U.S. Department of State, 13 July 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2026.

6. Center for Preventive Action. “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 25 Oct 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea.

7. Lariosa, Aaron-Mathhew. “Chinese Cutters Ram Philippine Fishery Vessels in Spratly Islands”. U. S. Naval Institute, 14 Oct. 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/10/14/chinese-cutters-ram-philippine-fishery-vessels-in-spratly-islands. Accessed 14 Jan. 2026.

8. Villarroel, Maria. “China accused of ‘intimidation’ following military drills threatening Taiwan forces”. Microsoft Network, 01 Jan. 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/china-accused-of-intimidation-following-military-drills-threatening-taiwan-forces/ar-AA1TbYw4?ocid=BingNewsVerp. Accessed 15 Jan. 2026.

9. Naval Technology. “Lewis and Clark Class T-AKE Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship.” Last modified 2008. Accessed 21 Oct 2024. https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/lewisandclarke/?cf-view&cf-closed.

10. Sea-Distances.org. “Sea Distances / Port Distances.” Last modified . Accessed 21 Oct 2024. https://sea-distances.org/.

11. Land, Graham. “4 Countries That Switched From the Axis Powers to the Allies”. History Hit, 29 Oct. 2022, https://www.historyhit.com/countries-that-switched-from-the-axis-powers-to-the-allies/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2026.

12. “The Philippines’ Institutionalised Alliance with the
US: Surviving Duterte’s China Appeasement Policy”. National Security Journal, 13 June 2021, https://nationalsecurityjournal.nz/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2021/06/NSJ-2021-March-Wong-Tan.pdf#:~:text=Duterte%20declared%20his%20intent%20to%20chart%20an%20%E2%80%9Cindependent%E2%80%9D,concessions%20in%20Manila%E2%80%99s%20maritime%20sovereignty%20conflict%20with%20Beijing.. Accessed 20 Jan. 2026.

13. Dangwal, Ashish. “RIMPAC 2024: US Navy Draws Lessons On ‘UAV Warfare’ From Ukraine to Counter China in Pacific.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 23 Oct 2026. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/tg-us-navy-integrates-drones-in-naval/.

14. “Avenger Air Defense System”. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 02 July 2020, https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/avenger-air-defense-system/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2026.

15. Smith, Nicola. “Understanding the Golden Hour in Medical Emergencies.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 20 Aug 2025. https://blog.mymedicalchoice.org/2024/03/19/understanding-the-golden-hour-in-medical-emergencies/.

16. Suciu, Peter. “1 Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carrier ‘Will Go Nowhere’ for over 5 Years.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 21 Oct 2024. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/1-nimitz-class-navy-aircraft-carrier-will-go-nowhere-for-over-5-years/ar-AA1otvEc?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=DCTS&cvid=b77661df97aa49e9a31f7f786f010c45&ei=41.

17. Brodsky, Sascha. “The Navy Is Decommissioning Two Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in a Row.” Last modified 2023. Accessed 24 Oct 2024. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a43646315/navy-decommissioning-uss-nimitz-uss-eisenhower/.

18. United States Navy. “. Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD).” Last modified 2024. Accessed 24 Oct 2024. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2226182/expeditionary-transfer-dock-esd/.

19. Shelbourne, Mallory. “New Navy Budget Seeks 6 Battle Force Ships, Decommissions 19 Hulls in FY 2025.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 24 Oct 2025. https://news.usni.org/2024/03/11/new-navy-budget-seeks-6-battle-force-ships-10-decommissions-in-fy-2025.

20. Cavas, Chris. “U.S. Navy’s Cruiser Countdown.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 23 Oct 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/cavasships/2024/06/u-s-navys-cruiser-countdown/#:~:text=Next%20to%20leave%20service%20will%20be%20the%20Vicksburg,71%29%2C%20both%20to%20be%20decommissioned%20in%20fiscal%202027.

21. Lagrone, Sam. “After a Decade of Debate, Cruisers Set to Exit Fleet in 5 Years.” Last modified 2022. Accessed 24 Oct 2024. https://news.usni.org/2022/04/21/navy-plans-for-all-22-ticonderoga-cruisers-to-exit-fleet-in-5-years.

Featured Image: The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Anzio (CG 68) conducts a fueling at sea with the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), May 5. (U.S. Navy photo)

Readiness

Archers Need Arrows: Deficiencies in U.S. Submarine Munitions

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By Alana Davis

In 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) wargamed a conflict between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Reflecting 24 iterations of the wargame, the study weighed if China could succeed in invading Taiwan in 2026 and examined the variables affecting the outcome. Although CSIS concluded that China is unlikely to succeed, it found the result to be highly contingent on posture, weapons, and platforms. Crucially, one of the most determinant factors is U.S. submarine dominance in the undersea domain.

The report recommended prioritizing full-spectrum undersea warfare in planning for a potential large-scale, cross-ocean military conflict. This prioritization reflects the potency of the submarine force: Fast Attack Submarines (SSNs) torpedoing adversary commercial shipping and naval forces as Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) strike key adversary infrastructure with long-range cruise missiles.

But what happens when the archers run out of arrows – when submarines expend their weapons in the first battle of the next war? Does the U.S. have the inventory to support necessary reloads? Are the ports, vessels, and personnel ready to conduct the rapid reloads required to maintain pressure through a protracted war? If the current munitions stagnation continues, the answer is no. The Navy should work with the Department of War (DoW) and Congress to increase weapons supply and reinforce the means to conduct expeditionary submarine weapons transfers.

Recent Weapons Production and Expenditure

The Fiscal Year (FY) 26 Defense Budget prioritizes revitalizing the defense-industrial base with a notable increase in ship and weapons production. The National Defense budget request rose 13% from last year, topping $1 trillion, while the President has called for a $1.5B topline. In December 2025 the DoW announced an expansion of an existing RTX contract to order 219 Block V Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) – the largest order in years, and a nearly 10-fold increase from the 22 planned for purchase in FY25.

Unfortunately, this sharp increase barely covers recent expenditures. The Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group alone expended 125 TLAMs against Houthi targets in Yemen. SSGNs conducted multiple strikes against Houthi Targets and enabled the B-2 Bomber strikes on Isfahan, Iran. Assuming a TLAM stockpile of roughly 4,000, U.S. naval forces in the Middle East depleted this missile’s inventory by 3% in relatively limited strikes against Iran and its proxies. This is a frightening statistic when contemplating the expenditures from all-out war with a near-peer adversary like the PRC. This troubling consideration is not limited to land attack missiles: A House-commissioned CSIS simulation estimates that in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the Navy could run out of long-range anti-ship missiles in less than a week of fighting.

Weapons production and delivery holdups reflect 1990s production halts after the end of the Cold War, unstable procurement continuing into the 2000s, and an increasing scarcity of U.S.-based manufacturing of certain critical parts like rocket motors and processors due to obsolescence challenges. The limited missile inventory is not the only problem. Diminishing submarine weapons on-load readiness stems from aging submarine tenders (ASes), which were commissioned in the 1970s, and the logistical complexities of loading weapons in foreign submarine ports.

What should the DoW and the Navy prioritize to ensure continued lethal armament of the submarine force? Action should include a two-pronged focus: one, creatively and efficiently increasing TLAM and torpedo supply, and two, investigating and investing in the ports and support vessel ability to conduct submarine weapons transfers.

Action 1 – Advance Submarine Munitions Supply

Military leadership and civilian defense experts agree that submarines are a key asset enabling U.S. victory in future naval conflicts. Instead of throwing money broadly towards munitions production, the DoW should prioritize making weapons that the bulk of both U.S. naval forces and U.S. allies can deploy.

The U.S. should focus on TLAMs because they are versatile – launched from SSNs, SSGNs, Ticonderoga-Class cruisers (CGs), and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDGs) – totaling approximately 55 submarines and 83 surface ships. The United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands all use TLAM – greatly increasing weapon production efficacy through scale. For similar reasons, the U.S. should also focus on Mk-48 ADCAP production, utilized by all 69 submarines in the U.S. fleet plus many Australian, Canadian, and Dutch vessels.

Additionally, efforts must be made to expedite weapons stockpile growth through manufacturing contracts and partnerships that encourage “close enough” component solutions rather than perfection. The Navy should be allowed to make minor compromises on weapon specs without compromising safety or viability. In November 2025, the DoW’s Strategic Capabilities Office announced open solicitations for a new, affordable SSN heavyweight torpedo called the Rapid Acquisition Procurable Torpedo (RAPTOR) to augment the Mk-48 ADCAP. Producing a torpedo at $500,000 per weapon vice the current $4 million per weapon is certainly enticing, given the many potential targets, but it does not mean production efforts and methods should slow on parts for the Mk-48 ADCAP. Promoting newer, cheaper technology is key, but continuing production of the tried-and-true ADCAP is also essential.  

Furthermore, if compromises must be made between TLAM and ADCAP production investment, the Navy should prioritize the Mk-48 ADCAP because of its greater efficiency in sinking enemy ships and reinforcing a strategy of deterrence by (sea) denial.

Another production avenue worth investigating is shared weapons production with allies. The U.S. continues to lean on co-manufacturing partnerships with Australia and South Korea to re-supply depleted 155-millimeter artillery shells from the Russo-Ukrainian war. Similar co-production agreements should be signed with Australia and the UK as part of the AUKUS submarine partnership, as well as with Japan for manufacturing of parts for the TLAM and/or the ADCAP. Production of critical weapons and weapons components in strategic foreign locations strengthens U.S. logistics networks and shortens operational timelines. Weapons stockpiling in strategic locations improves deterrence, as allied power projection becomes more credible with the proximity of weapons – though this forward staging must incorporate defense, dispersal, and deception to mitigate against enemy strikes.

Action 2 – Strengthen Submarine Munitions Re-Supply Capability

In the Western Pacific, the U.S. maintains three bases capable of submarine weapons handling of TLAMs and ADCAPs: Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan and Apra Harbor, Guam. Additional foreign port reload sites may include Subic Bay, Philippines; Souda Bay, Greece; Sterling, Australia; and Diego Garcia. These reloads are aided by the two remaining Guam-based submarine tenders, the USS Frank Cable and the USS Emory S. Land, which were specially designed to travel to submarines and assist in conducting weapons transfers, repairs, and nuclear-level maintenance. This small but mighty AS fleet continues to demonstrate its utility, such as in 2022 when the Frank Cable supported the first TLAM reload conducted by a U.S. submarine in Australia on the USS Springfield (SSN-761).

But these tenders are over 45 years old. They have outlived their intended lifespan and their ability to deploy safely comes into greater question with each passing year. As of July 2025, the Pentagon awarded $72.6 million to General Dynamics-NASSCO to continue developing up to three “AS(X)” class submarine tenders. With both existing tenders slated to decommission by 2030, time is quickly running out to replace these unique and valuable assets. Still, a net of only one additional tender by 2030, assuming production deadlines are met, is not enough given that by 2028 the Navy aims to boost submarine production to three SSNs a year (one Columbia Class and two Virginia Class). Further, one must carefully consider where to homeport these assets, focusing on Japan and/or Australia for maximum operational flexibility.

Besides investing in the rapid production of the new AS(X) class, the Navy should invest more in the infrastructure of the submarine bases themselves – namely Apra Harbor, Guam. Apra Harbor relies on the island’s public power authority which supplies energy via import-reliant petroleum plants with 50-year old generators susceptible to natural disaster, not to mention deliberate attacks. The unreliable power supply alone threatens the likelihood of efficient weapons transfer and maintenance stops for submarines on their way to a fight in the Pacific. Additionally, concerns over adequate equipment like heavy-lift cranes and trained personnel to conduct efficient submarine weapons reloads also remain.

The Navy should thoroughly investigate the real capacity of its overseas submarine ports to conduct efficient and safe submarine weapons transfers in a simulated wartime scenario. This analysis should answer the questions: How long does it take to move weapons inventory, re-load equipment and crews, and a submarine tender as applicable to various ports? Which ports lack critical equipment or trained personnel to conduct short-notice reloads? What is each port’s and each tender’s maximum reload ability and fastest reload pace? The last publicly documented transfer of a Mk-48 training shape to a submarine was in 2021 between the Frank Cable and the USS Hampton (SSN 767). Five years may as well be ancient history when facing today’s emerging adversary threats. There must be steady effort to test these vessels and ports in wartime conditions and pace, but compromises can also be made. For example – the Navy may be able to withstand AS(X) delays by ensuring all foreign submarine port call locations have heavy-lift cranes.

Conclusion: Make More of What Works and Make What Works Better

U.S. submarines remain a dominant and lethal force, but in the 21st century, their lethality is jeopardized by two weapons concerns: rapidly depleting TLAM and Mk-48 ADCAP inventories, and inadequate weapons reloading facilities. The solution is not just to throw more money toward the problem. Since FY24 the DoW has invested hundreds of millions into weapons development and submarine tender design. The DoW and U.S. Navy must make more of what works by continuing production of versatile and battle-proven weapons. The United States should make what works better by improving how allied foreign ports and strategic assets can perform in wartime.

For the U.S. submarine fleet to dominate in naval conflict, it must have ample weapons stockpiled in strategic locations with all enabling infrastructure ready to support time-sensitive reloads. The first steps in ensuring continued dominance include: acknowledging the submarine force has critical weapons-related shortfalls, and studying which inventories, which bases, and which production lines are most vulnerable.

Submarines can operate within Surface Weapons Engagement Zones and conduct long-range tactical fires. In a target-dense environment, submarine munitions will deplete rapidly. In a conflict with the PRC, some estimates suggest an SSN will expend its inventory of 20 to 50 torpedoes within two weeks on station, and an SSN or SSGN will launch all their 12 or 154 TLAMs, respectively, within three weeks. At such rates of fire, it is easy to see how weapons inventory and reload pace become critical to continuing, and winning, the future fight.

Archers need arrows. If Congress and the U.S. Navy do not act now to ensure submarines stay armed and ready for battle, munitions problems will only worsen – leaving the force, the fleet, and country more vulnerable.

Lieutenant Alana Davis, U.S. Navy, is a submarine officer serving as a Force Manpower Planner under OPNAV N1 in Arlington, VA. She is a graduate of Harvard University (BA ‘19) and The University of Florida (MBA ‘26). The views presented are hers alone and do not necessarily represent the views of Department of War or the Department of the Navy.

Featured Image: Conceptual drawing of the Virginia-class attack submarine from 2004. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Taiwan’s Layered Air Defence and the Calculus of Deterrence

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By Guarav Sen

In any future Taiwan Strait conflict, the opening phase would be decisive – not because it guarantees victory, but because it shapes escalation, operational momentum, and political decision-making. The identification of a center of gravity in Taiwan’s defense is therefore contingent on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) campaign objectives, which vary across firepower-strike, invasion, and blockade scenarios.

Taiwan’s integrated air defence system functions as a scenario-dependent operational centre of gravity, most clearly in a PLA firepower-strike or decapitation campaign. While unlikely on its own to determine the outcome in all contingencies, integrated air defence plays a central role in shaping the battlespace. An analysis of Taiwan’s air defence is particularly salient as nations assess lessons from the recent U.S. strike and leadership-targeting operations, and recognize that neutralizing defence air systems is a critical enabling capability in invasion and blockade scenarios.

By denying rapid air superiority and preserving Taiwan’s combat power, the integrated air defense complicates efforts to achieve a swift fait accompli and raises the costs and risks of PLA operations.1 This article examines the interplay between integrated air defense and the broader PLA campaign options, assessing how its survivability influences the feasibility of coercion, blockade, and amphibious invasion.

PLA Campaign Logic Across Scenarios

PLA operational planning emphasizes methodical sequencing of action rather than a single decisive engagement. A campaign could shift from initial firepower-strike and paralysis efforts toward a coercive blockade or, if conditions permit, an amphibious invasion. Each option places different demands on air superiority, command and control, and escalation management, making Taiwan’s air defense posture central to shaping the viability of PLA courses of action.

The Opening Salvo: Fire and Electrons

A PLA campaign could begin with a multi-domain strike designed to induce strategic paralysis, rather than a fleet posture offshore that is immediately detectable, attributable, and escalatory.2 Roughly 900 short-range ballistic missiles fielded by the PLA Rocket Force are aimed at Taiwan, alongside hundreds of land-attack cruise missiles and long-range guided rockets. Such weapons place island targets at risk from mainland firing points.

However, as Russia’s campaign against Ukraine demonstrates, even sustained missile and drone saturation struggles to produce strategic paralysis against a defended state and instead yields diminishing returns as air and missile defenses adapt.3 The experience of Ukraine offers a useful comparison. Large-scale saturation attacks using missiles and one-way attack drones have imposed high costs and strained air defenses, but have failed to produce strategic paralysis, instead pushing the conflict toward prolonged attrition as a functional, integrated air defense remains in place.

Concurrent with missile barrages, the PLA Navy Air Force could unleash thousands of precision-strike sorties in the initial days.4 Its Eastern and Southern Theatre Commands already field a modern fleet of over 950 fighters and 300 bombers or attack aircraft.5 This includes J-16 multirole fighters and low-observable J-20s armed with long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles.6 Air bases, ports, radar sites, command-and-control nodes, and surface-to-air missile batteries would be the primary targets in Taiwan to blind, break, and constrain Taiwan at sea and in the air.7

Kinetic barrages will be combined with non-kinetic operations. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would use a combination of electronic warfare and cyber tools to interfere with early warning radars, jam satellite communications, penetrate networks, and use decoys to drain finite interceptor stocks.8 The doctrine of “systems destruction warfare” seeks to collapse an adversary’s operational architecture rather than engage in platform-versus-platform attrition, although they possess the numbers to do so.9

Special Operations, Air Assault, and Shaping Actions

PLA special operations forces and pre-positioned networks would likely focus on targeting critical nodes—air defense command elements, sensors, communications infrastructure, and key political or military leadership—rather than holding terrain. Air assault forces would aim to seize or disrupt airfields, ports, and chokepoints to enable follow-on operations. Low-signature platforms such as helicopters or gyrocopters pose a detection challenge, but remain vulnerable to short-range air defenses, visual acquisition, and networked cueing from integrated sensor systems.

Years of “grey-zone” activity or military actions below the threshold of open conflict set the table. Frequent PLA Air Force air defense identification zone incursions and surrounding naval drills signal, degrade Taiwan’s readiness, and enable ongoing reconnaissance. Every Taiwan radar activation reveals location, frequency, and modes, refining future targeting and prioritization.10 Grey-zone efforts normalize tension, compress warning time, and blur the distinction between exercise and attack, complicating mobilization and defense.11 These preparatory activities negatively shape the environment in which Taiwan’s air defense system must function from the very first hours of conflict.

The Layered Shield: Architecture, Integration, and Vulnerabilities

If Taiwan’s air defense system survives—even in degraded form—it becomes a key enabler of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, a planning framework that emphasizes force preservation, littoral denial, and the destruction of invading forces at the beachhead.12 Amphibious success requires local air superiority.13 A functioning air defense system complicates PLA Air Force air dominance, forcing higher-altitude standoff operations that dilute close air support and defensive fires for landing forces.14

Under this air denial umbrella, Taiwan’s mobile Hsiung Feng anti-ship missile batteries and fast attack craft can turn the Strait into a kill zone.15 Without functioning air defense, China’s air forces could hunt down these dispersed assets; however, with air defense in place, lightly defended support ships are exposed, creating a sustainment dilemma for Beijing. Even in a blockade scenario, the PLA Navy must still sustain persistent surveillance, air–maritime coordination, and enforcement against blockade-running; functions that become more costly and escalation-prone when operating under a surviving, even degraded, Taiwanese air defense. Air defense undermines the notion that a blockade is a low-risk coercive option.

Taiwan has spent decades building one of the world’s most integrated air defense systems, which is designed to detect, track, and engage everything from ballistic missiles to low-flying drones.16 Its philosophy is defense-in-depth with multiple supporting layers. Each layer can be ablative, reducing incoming attacks and protecting key assets, allowing forces to continue fighting.17

Included in these layers, the AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws radar at Leshan provides early warning of incoming ballistic threats from deep within the mainland.18 Pave Paws also feeds into a resilient network of fixed and mobile long-range air-search radars.19

Six E-2K Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft add a flexible, high-altitude “look-down” capability against low-flying cruise missiles and stealthier threats, pushing the detection envelope far into the Taiwan Strait. When integrated with passive sensors and ground-based networks to mitigate the vulnerabilities of emitting systems, together the system forces China to allocate scarce long-range interceptors and strike assets to hunt these platforms rather than employ them elsewhere.20

Taiwan fields multiple layers of medium- and high-altitude air and missile defenses designed to counter aircraft, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles. While some interceptors are optimized for engaging aircraft, the backbone of Taiwan’s ballistic missile defense consists of hit-to-kill interceptors. These interceptors are intended to destroy incoming missiles by kinetic impact rather than proximity detonation. The operationalization of an enhanced upper-tier interceptor, expected in the mid-2020s, is intended to expand the defended battlespace in both range and altitude, strengthening Taiwan’s ability to absorb and attrit large missile salvos in the opening phase of a conflict.

Taiwan’s air defense posture continues to rely on a layered architecture in which a mid-tier capability focuses on engaging aircraft and cruise-missiles, while a dispersed short-range air defense network provides terminal and point defense against low-altitude threats.

Observations from recent high-intensity conflicts, particularly Ukraine’s experience with contested airspace, have reinforced Taiwan’s emphasis on prioritizing the defense of critical assets under conditions of constrained air-surveillance coverage. This has encouraged a defensive posture that relies heavily on high-end interceptors to manage high-value threats. While such a layered approach improves localised situational awareness and asset protection at the tactical level, it also deepens dependence on scarce and costly upper-tier capabilities.

The combined sensors and shooters are operational and integrated within the Republic of China (Taiwan) Air Force Air Defense and Missile Command. Looking ahead, the planned T-Dome project aims to further decentralize command and control by improving sensor–shooter integration and shortening decision-making timelines.21 Rather than relying on a single command node, the system is intended to allow multiple sensors to cue interceptors more flexibly, improving resilience against a decapitation strike.

The systems of the combined forces are integrated so that each sensor can be activated and used to direct fire and engage enemy formations, creating a highly efficient, low-latency tactical engagement core. This is expected to create a far more active tactical posture in anticipation of a decapitation strike or a tactical battle.22

Strategic self-reliance underwrites Taiwan’s defense concept. To offset delays in U.S. arms deliveries and the risk of wartime isolation, National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) has prioritized domestic production. NCSIST’s new goal of producing over 1,000 missiles yearly will be very useful. Programs that are hitting their goals early, such as the TK-3, signal credible sustainment in the wartime scenario and the capacity to sustain wartime operations without immediate U.S. resupply, which enhances deterrence through depth and resilience.23

The Asymmetric Duel: Attrition and Adaptation

Taiwan’s integrated air defense system faces two principal challenges. First is the risk of saturation, as PLA doctrine emphasizes overwhelming defenses through large volumes of drones and missile salvos intended to exhaust interceptors.24 The second are non-kinetic pressures. PLA investments in cyber, electronic warfare, and data manipulation are aimed at degrading, rather than disabling, command-and-control and sensor–shooter links. Experience from Ukraine suggests that such non-kinetic operations can disrupt the effectiveness of air defense and impose friction, but have generally fallen short of paralyzing integrated systems, particularly when defenders employ redundancy, mobility, and rapid adaptation.

The Ukraine war offers lessons for the PLA as it refines drone-swarm tactics to saturate Taiwan’s defenses.25 As in Ukraine, tactics can be used to overcome a numerical disadvantage, including mobility, dispersal, and tactical innovation. Taiwan’s adaptation includes surface-to-air missile mobility, strategic hardening, command-and-control redundancy, and distributed teams equipped with man-portable air defense systems and other weapons to efficiently counter unsophisticated threats. During a blockade or attrition contest, the ability to sustain will be decisive, elevating NCSIST’s role in the mass production of missiles, drones, and spares from a matter of industrial necessity to one necessary for survival.26

Should Taiwan survive the first strike and compel the PLA to transition to an adaptive phase of the conflict marked by a slower tempo, operational improvisation, and iterative adjustment rather than pre-planned shock operations, the possibility of a swift PLA victory is eliminated.

Conclusion: The Shield of Uncertainty

An integrated air defense system is a central enabling pillar that shapes campaigns, denies quick victory, and raises costs. It integrates domestic and foreign systems under a doctrine developed from the lessons of in-depth analysis of contemporary warfare. It is more than the capability to down missiles and aircraft. It aims to withstand the initial strike, disrupt China’s rapid decision-making in a conflict, and force any hostilities into a protracted, expensive war of attrition for Beijing.

This system serves as a multilayered complication for every stage of a potential cross-strait invasion. It denies an adversarial force the critical air superiority necessary to acquire an amphibious assault, and increases the risk of a military blockade. It also supports Taiwan’s more extensive asymmetric defense posture, which relies on dispersed, mobile defense systems. Success, in this context, is measured not by the system’s absolute performance but by its robust, sustained performance under stress and by the cognitive impacts of its existence on Chinese war planners. As such, the integrated air defense has a unique impact, increasing China’s calculative risk and introducing deterrence through the potential of a protracted, destructive war that Beijing is highly unlikely to win.

Gaurav Sen is a Senior Research Fellow at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is the author of The Peril of the Pacific: Military Balance and the Battle for Taiwan. His research interests include Indo-Pacific security, great-power competition, strategic autonomy, and maritime geopolitics.

References

1. Lantes, Korey F. 2024. “’Strategic Disruption’ Can Thwart an Invasion of Taiwan.” Proceedings 150, no. 12 (December 2024). U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/december/strategic-disruption-can-thwart-invasion-taiwan

2. Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. 2023. The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. January 9. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

3. Goldstein, Lyle. 2025. “Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese Invasion.” Defense Priorities, September 2025. https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/target-taiwan-prospects-for-a-chinese-invasion/

4. Ibid.

5. Xu, Tianran. 2025. “Taiwan’s Air and Missile Defence. Part 4: Long-range SAMs versus PLA Offensive Capabilities.” ThoughtRoom – Open Nuclear Network, April 29, 2025. https://platform.opennuclear.org/thoughtroom/quick-takes/taiwans-air-and-missile-defence-part-4-long-range-sams-versus-pla-offensive-capabilities

6. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 2024. Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2024: Key Developments and Trends. London: IISS. May 2024. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library—content–migration/files/publications—free-files/aprsa-2024/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2024.pdf

7. Lin, Sean and Wu Su-wei. 2025. “Taiwan Should Seek to Leverage PLA Satnav System to Counter Drone Threat: Experts.” Focus Taiwan (Central News Agency), September 2, 2025. https://www.focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202509020028

8. Lin, Sean and Wu Su-wei. 2025. “Taiwan Should Seek to Leverage PLA Satnav System to Counter Drone Threat: Experts.” Focus Taiwan (Central News Agency), September 2, 2025. https://www.focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202509020028

9. Wuthnow, Joel. 2025. PLA Systems Attack. Keystone 25-1, January 2025. Available at https://keystone.ndu.edu/Portals/86/PLA%20Systems%20Attack-%20Keystone%2025-1%20Jan%2025.pdf

10. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 2018. China, Global Security & Taiwan. Research Paper. London: IISS. https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2018/09/china-global-security/

11. Goldstein, Lyle. 2025. “Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese Invasion.” Defense Priorities, August 25,   2025. https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/target-taiwan-prospects-for-a-chinese-invasion/

12. Hsi-min, Lee (Adm., Ret.). 2021. Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept: Theory and Practice. Hoover Institution. September 27, 2021. Available at https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/210927_adm_lee_hoover_remarks_draft4.pdf

13. Revels, Matthew. 2023. “Denying Command of the Air: The Future of Taiwan’s Air Defense Strategy.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 6, no. 3 (March–April): 135–44 https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3371516/denying-command-of-the-air-the-future-of-taiwans-air-defense-strategy/

14. “Taiwan’s Air and Missile Defence. Part 4: Long-range SAMs versus PLA offensive capabilities,” Open Nuclear Network, accessed Nov 3, 2025

15. Dotson, John. 2025. “Taiwan’s Defense Policies in Evolution.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 8, no. 1 (Spring 2025). April 21, 2025. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/4164821/taiwans-defense-policies-in-evolution/

16. Xu, Tianran. 2024. “Taiwan’s Air and Missile Defence. Part 1: Tien Kung-1 and Tien Kung-2.” Open Nuclear Network(Thoughtroom). 18 September 2024. https://platform.opennuclear.org/thoughtroom/quick-takes/taiwans-air-and-missile-defence-part-1-tien-kung-1-and-tien-kung-2

17. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2016. Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. Washington, DC: ICS-CERT / NCCIC.

18. Wolff, Christian. 2025. “Strategic Radar Systems — AN/FPS-115 ‘PAVE PAWS’.” RadarTutorial. https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/01.oth/karte004.en.html

19. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. 2018. “AN/FPS-117.” May 1, 2018. https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/an-fps-117/

20. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. 2018. “AN/FPS-117.” May 1, 2018. https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/an-fps-117/

21. Author unknown. 2025. “What is Taiwan’s multi-layered T-Dome air defense system?” The Japan Times, November 30, 2025. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/11/30/asia-pacific/taiwan-air-defense-focus/

22. Author unknown. 2025. “Taiwan President Unveils ‘T-Dome’ Air Defence System to Counter China Threat.” The Hindu, October 10, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/taiwan-president-unveils-t-dome-air-defence-system-to-counter-china-threat/article70146730.ece

23. “Taiwan’s Missile Production Program … Two Years Ahead of Schedule,” Global Taiwan Institute, 2024, accessed Nov 3, 2025.

24. Sen, Gaurav. 2025. “How Taiwan Must Prepare to Face Chinese Drone Saturation.” The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), July 4, 2025. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-taiwan-must-prepare-to-face-chinese-drone-saturation/

25. Ditter, Timothy. 2025. PRC Concepts for UAV Swarms in Future Warfare. Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation. July 2025. https://www.cna.org/reports/2025/07/PRC-Concepts-for-UAV-Swarms-in-Future-Warfare.pdf

26. Grieco, Kelly A., and Hunter Slingbaum. 2025. “Taiwan’s Squandered Defensive Potential.” The Henry L. Stimson Center, September 11, 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/taiwans-squandered-defensive-potential/

Featured Image: A People’s Liberation Army Air Force J-16 escorts a H-6 bomber during a routine deterrence patrol. (Japan Air Self-Defence Force photo)

Force Structure

A Concept of Operations for Achieving a Navy Fleet of 500 Ships

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By Captain George Galdorisi

The U. S. Navy stands at the precipice of a new era of technology advancement. In an address at a military-industry conference, the then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, revealed the Navy’s goal to grow to 500 ships, to include 350 crewed ships and 150 uncrewed maritime vessels. This plan has been dubbed the “hybrid fleet.” In an address at the Reagan National Defense Forum, his successor, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, cited the work of the Navy’s Unmanned Task Force, as well numerous exercises, experiments and demonstrations where uncrewed surface vessels were put in the hands of Sailors and Marines, all designed to advance the journey to achieve the Navy’s hybrid fleet.

More recently, other speeches and interviews addressing the number of uncrewed surface vessels the Navy intends to field culminated in the issuance of the Chief of Naval Operations Force Design 2045, and subsequently the Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy, both of which call for 350 crewed ships and 150 large uncrewed maritime vessels. These documents provide the clearest indication yet of the Navy’s plans for a future fleet populated by large numbers of uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

The reason for this commitment to uncrewed maritime vessels is clear. During the height of the Reagan Defense Buildup in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Navy evolved a strategy to build a “600-ship Navy.” That effort resulted in a total number of Navy ships that reached 594 in 1987. That number has declined steadily during the past three-and-one-half decades, and today the Navy has less than half the number of ships than it had then. However, the rapid growth of the technologies that make uncrewed surface vessels increasingly capable and affordable has provided the Navy with a potential way to put more hulls in the water.

However, the U.S. Congress has been reluctant to authorize the Navy’s planned investment of billions of dollars in USVs until the Service can come up with a concept-of-operations (CONOPS) for using them. Congress has a point. The Navy has announced plans to procure large numbers of uncrewed systems—especially large and medium uncrewed surface vessels—but a CONOPS, in even the most basic form, has not yet emerged. Additionally, while the composition of the future Navy’s crewed vessels is relatively well understood—based on ships being built and being planned—what those uncrewed maritime vessels will look like, let alone what they will do, has yet to be fully determined.

That said, the Navy has taken several actions to define what uncrewed maritime vessels will do and thus accelerate the journey to have uncrewed platforms populate the fleet. These include publishing an Unmanned Campaign Framework, standing up an Unmanned Task Force, establishing Surface Development Squadron One in San Diego and Surface Vessel Division One in Port Hueneme, CA, and conducting a wide range of exercises, experiments and demonstrations where operators have had the opportunity to evaluate uncrewed maritime vessels.

All these initiatives will serve the Navy well in evolving a convincing CONOPS to describe how these innovative platforms can be leveraged to achieve a hybrid fleet and gain a warfighting advantage over high-end adversaries. Fleshing out how this is to be done will require that the Navy describe how these platforms will get to the operating area where they are needed, as well as what missions they will perform once they arrive there.

A key part of this evolving CONOPS will involve integrating crewed ships and uncrewed maritime vessels. This means that both will need to operate as a synergistic fighting force, not all merely steaming together to perform a mission. This will require leveraging emerging technologies that can connect these platforms in a fashion now called man-machine teaming.

U.S. Navy’s Commitment to Uncrewed Maritime Vessels

 It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to detail the reasons for the precipitous decline in the number of crewed ships. Indeed, the most recent Navy Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan details 19 ship decommissionings during this fiscal year, more than the number of ships being commissioned. Many—especially the U.S. Congress—have encouraged the Navy to increase the number of ships it fields. Add to this such factors as the increasing cost to build ships, and especially the cost to man these vessels (Seventy percent of the total ownership costs of surface ships is the cost of personnel to operate these vessels over their lifecycle), and the fact that the Navy is literally wearing these ships out more rapidly than anticipated in order to meet the increasing demands of U.S. Combatant Commanders, and it is easy to see why the Navy has difficulty growing the number of crewed surface vessels. 

The rapid growth of the technologies that make uncrewed surface vessels increasingly capable and affordable has provided the Navy with a potential way to put more hulls in the water. To support these goals regarding large numbers of uncrewed maritime platforms populating the Fleet, the Navy established an Unmanned Task Force to provide stewardship for Navy-wide efforts to accelerate efforts regarding uncrewed systems. From all indications, it seems that for the U.S. Navy, the intent is to go all-in on uncrewed maritime vessels and field a hybrid force of crewed ships and uncrewed maritime systems. Importantly, the intent is to have these uncrewed systems work in conjunction with manned platforms and achieve the goal of manned-unmanned teaming.

In a presentation at a Center for Strategic and International Studies/U.S. Naval Institute forum, Vice Admiral Jimmy Pitts, deputy chief of naval operations for warfighting requirements and capabilities (N9), put the focus on uncrewed maritime systems in these terms: “We are leading the way with unmanned systems. We are leveraging the success of the Navy’s unmanned task force as well as the disruptive capabilities office. Our goal is to get unmanned surface system solutions to the Fleet within the next two years.” Admiral Pitts went on to ask the questions: “What will unmanned systems do operationally? How will they get to the war at sea and littoral operating areas? How will they stay in those areas and remain ready for conflict?”

In an article in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander, Admiral Samuel Paparo, put the emphasis on scaling robotic and autonomous systems in an operational context, noting:

The CNO is focusing on rapidly developing, fielding, and integrating UxSs. These systems will augment the multi-mission conventional force to increase lethality, sensing, and survivability. Project 33 [part of the Navigation Plan] will allow the Navy to operate in more areas with greater capability. Unmanned systems provide the ability to project fires and effects dynamically, at any time, from multiple axes, and with mass.

Recognizing that the United States is in an “AI arms-race” with our peer adversaries, a report by the Navy’s Science and Technology Board: The Path Forward on Unmanned Systems, advises the Navy to fully leverage AI-technologies, noting: “As they design, develop and acquire new systems, DON will want to take advantage of rapidly changing technology such as AI and autonomy.” This builds on the Navy’s desire to lower total operating costs by moving beyond the current “one UxS, multiple joysticks, multiple operators” paradigm module that exists today.

A Concept of Operations for Getting Uncrewed Surface Vessels to the Fight

The concept of operations proposed is to marry various size surface, subsurface and aerial uncrewed vehicles to perform missions that the U.S. Navy has—and will continue to have—as the Hybrid Fleet evolves. The Navy can use evolving large uncrewed surface vessels as a “truck” to move smaller USVs, UUVs and UAVs into the battle space in the increasingly contested littoral environment. The Navy has several alternatives for this platform:

  • The Navy’s program of record LUSV. The Navy envisions these LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons, which would make them the size of a corvette.
  • Unmanned Surface Vessel Division One (USVDIV-1) has stewardship for two surrogates for LUSVs, the Ranger and Nomad, as well as two MUSV prototypes, Sea Hunter and Seahawk. The Navy was sufficiently confident in the operation of its LUSV and MUSV prototypes to deploy them to a recent international Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.
  • The MARTAC T82 Leviathan, a scaled-up version of the T38 Devil Ray, is an MUSV capable of either carrying an approximately 35,000-pound payload or, alternatively, carrying smaller craft and launching them toward the objective area.

While there are a plethora of important Navy missions this integrated combination of uncrewed platforms can accomplish, this article will focus on two: intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and mine countermeasures (MCM). There are many large, medium, small and ultra-small uncrewed systems that can be adopted for these missions. The technical challenge remains that they must be designed to ensure that the multiple sized UxSs associated with these missions can be adapted to work together in a common mission goal. 

Rather than speaking in hypotheticals as to how uncrewed vessels might be employed for these two missions, this article will offer concrete examples, using COTS uncrewed systems that have been employed in recent Navy and Marine Corps events. In each case, these systems not only demonstrated mission accomplishment, but also the hull, mechanical and electrical (HME) attributes and maturity that Congress is demanding.

While there are a wide range of medium uncrewed surface vessels (MUSVs) that can potentially meet the U.S. Navy’s needs, there are three that are furthest along in the development cycle. These MUSVs cover a range of sizes, hull types and capabilities. They are:

  • The Leidos Sea Hunter is the largest of the three. The Sea Hunter is a 132-foot-long trimaran (a central hull with two outriggers). 
  • The Textron monohull Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV), now renamed MCM-USV, features a modular, open architecture design.
  • The Maritime Tactical Systems Inc. (MARTAC), catamaran hull uncrewed surface vessels (USV) include the Devil Ray T24 and T38 craft. The two Devil Ray USVs, along with their smaller MANTAS T12 USV, all feature a modular and open architecture design. 

All of these MUSVs are viable candidates to be part of an integrated uncrewed solution CONOPS. I will use the MANTAS, Devil Ray and Leviathan craft for a number of reasons. First, they come in different sizes with the same HME attributes. Second, the Sea Hunter is simply too large to fit into the LUSVs the Navy is currently considering. Third, the MCM-USV is the MUSV of choice for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine-Countermeasures Mission Package, and all MCM-USVs scheduled to be procured are committed to this program.

If the U.S. Navy wants to keep its multi-billion-dollar capital ships out of harm’s way, it will need to surge uncrewed maritime vessels into the contested battlespace while its crewed ships stay out of range of adversary anti-access (A2/AD) systems. This will require robust command and control systems,

Depending on the size that is ultimately procured, the LUSV can carry several T38 Devil Ray uncrewed surface vessels and deliver them, largely covertly, to a point near the intended area of operations. The T38 can then be sent independently to perform the ISR mission, or alternatively, can launch one or more T12 MANTAS USVs to perform that mission. Building on work conducted by the Navy laboratory community and sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, the T38 or T12 will have the ability to launch unmanned aerial vessels to conduct overhead ISR. 

For the MCM mission, the LUSV can deliver several T38s equipped with mine-hunting and mine-clearing systems (all of which are COTS platforms tested extensively in Navy exercises). These vessels can then undertake the “dull, dirty and dangerous” work previously conducted by Sailors who had to operate in the minefield. Given the large mine inventory of peer and near-peer adversaries, this methodology may well be the only way to clear mines safely.

Operational Scenario for an Integrated Crewed-Uncrewed Mission

This scenario and CONOPS are built around an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) that is underway in the Western Pacific. The ESG is on routine patrol five hundred nautical miles from the nearest landfall. An incident occurs in their operating area and the strike group is requested to (1) obtain reconnaissance of a near-shore littoral area, and (2) determine if the entrance to a specific bay has been mined to prevent ingress. The littoral coastline covers two hundred nautical miles. This area must be reconnoitered within twenty-four hours without the use of air assets.

Command staff decides to dispatch the three LUSVs for the mission. Two LUSVs are each configured with four T38-ISR craft and the third LUSV is configured with four T38-MCM vessels. The single supervisory control station for the three LUSVs is manned in the mothership.

The three LUSV depart the strike group steaming together in a preset autonomous pattern for two hundred and fifty nautical miles to a waypoint that is central to the two hundred nautical mile ISR scan area, two hundred and fifty nautical miles from the shore. At this waypoint, the LUSV will stop and dispatch the smaller T38 craft and then wait at this location for their return. Steaming at a cruise speed of twenty-five knots, the waypoint is reached in about ten hours.

  • Two T38-ISR craft are launched from each of the two LUSVs. The autonomous mission previously downloaded specifies a waypoint location along the coast for each of the four craft. These waypoints are fifty nautical miles apart from each other, indicating that each of the four T38 craft will have an ISR mission of fifty nautical miles to cover.
  • Two T38-MCM craft are launched from the third LUSV. The autonomous mission previously downloaded has them transit independently along different routes to two independent waypoints just offshore of the suspected mine presence area where they will commence mine-like object detection operations.
  • In this manner, each of the six craft will transit independently and autonomously to their next waypoint which will be their mission execution starting point.
  • Transit from the LUSV launch point, depending on route, will be about two hundred and fifty to three hundred nautical miles to their near-shore waypoints. Transit will be at seventy to eighty knots to their mission start waypoint near the coast. Transit time is between four and five hours.
  • The plan is for each of the T38-ISR craft to complete their ISR scan in four to five hours each and for the two T38-MCM craft to jointly scan the bottom and the water column for the presence of mine-like objects in four to five hours at a scan speed of six to eight knots.

The MANTAS and Devil Ray craft transit to the objective area and conduct their ISR and MCM missions. The timeline for the entire mission is as follows:

  • LUSV detach strike group to T38 launch point and launch six T38: – 10-12 hours.
  • T38 transit from launch point to mission ISR/MCM start waypoints: – 4-5 hours.
  • ISR Mission and MCM mission time from start to complete: – 4-5 hours.
  • T38 transit from mission completion point back to LUSV for recovery: – 4-5 hours.
  • LUSV recover T38s and return to strike group formation – 10-12 hours.

Even with the ESG five hundred nautical miles from shore, the strike group commander has the results of the ISR and MCM scan of the shoreline littoral area within approximately twenty-four hours after the departure of the LUSVs from the strike group. 

A Bright Future for Uncrewed Surface Vessels

This is not a platform-specific solution, but rather a concept. When Navy operators see a capability with different size uncrewed COTS platforms in the water successfully performing the missions presented in this article, they will likely press industry to produce even more-capable platforms to perform these tasks. This, in turn, will enable the Navy to field a capable Hybrid Fleet that will be the Navy’s Future Force.

While evolutionary in nature, this disruptive capability delivered using emerging technologies can provide the U.S. Navy with near-term solutions to vexing operational challenges, while demonstrating to a skeptical Congress that the Navy does have a concept-of-operations for the uncrewed systems it wants to procure. 

Captain George Galdorisi (U.S. Navy – retired) is a career naval aviator and national security professional. During his 30-year career he had four tours in command and served as a carrier strike group chief of staff for five years. Additionally, he led the U.S. delegation for military-to-military talks with the Chinese Navy. He is the Emeritus Director of Strategic Assessments and Technical Futures at the Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific. He is the author of seventeen books, including four New York Times bestsellers. His most recent novel, Fire and Ice, was eerily prescient as it foresaw Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Featured Image: T38 Devil Ray USV (Martac photo)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.