Category Archives: New Initiatives

New projects and initiatives at CIMSEC.

Innovation Files: Automated Plan of the Day (autoPOD)

There’s been a big uproar lately about innovation in the Navy throughout message boards and the blogosphere – what is innovation, what it’s not, and what method Big Navy should be taking to jumpstart innovation among the fleet, if any at all.  LT Jon Paris and LT Ben Kohlmann, both of whom are very involved in the conversation, had a great discussion about the topic on CIMSEC’s Sea Control Podcast, hosted by LT Matt Hipple.  LT Paris followed up with an excellent blog post.  While there are some contrasting views, it seems like one thing that’s agreed upon is that the deckplate innovation already occurring in the fleet sometimes doesn’t make it “up and out” or isn’t as publicized as it should be.  In that capacity, LT Hipple, and some members from the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell, offered a challenge to start publishing examples of innovation in the fleet.  I’ve decided to take this up head on in a series of “Innovation Files”.

Nearly every command has a “Plan of the Day” (POD) – a widely distributed one-page agenda with at least the current and following days’ schedule of events.  Depending on the command, certain PODs are very long and many regularly contain dozens of events per day, some at overlapping times.  Early on, I noticed a couple glaring inefficiencies particular to my command.  First was the process – A yeoman would be specifically assigned to “do the POD” for the day, a duty rotated among the junior yeomen that nobody wanted.  This task started by opening the previous day’s POD, changing the date, piling through various e-mails and files on the shared drive, and then writing the new daily schedule by hand.  After an hour or two, it would get routed up to the ship secretary, personnel officer, admin officer, training officer, operations department, various department heads, command master chief (CMC), and some others before finally getting to the XO.  Every position in the chop chain had their own changes and events to add, and it required the yeoman to literally go around the ship looking for each of these people, and then going back and correcting the changes for each correction or addition.  It wasn’t uncommon to print in excess of 15 POD drafts before the final revision.  As you can imagine, POD duties were an all-day event, and since the POD needed to be finalized and signed by the next day, it kept everybody around well into the evening.

After much thought, the XO, personnel officer, and I agreed on a plan to create a public calendar on Microsoft Outlook to streamline the POD process.  However, PODs have a very specific format, and Outlook can print nothing close to the format.  For example, asterisks had to be next to times if the event was to be announced on the 1MC, events had to be in bold lettering if the CO was attending, and everything had to fit on the page in two neat columns.  It wasn’t as simple as hand-copying every single event into the old POD format though; the daily schedule constantly changed throughout the day, and there was no process in place to ensure if any late additions or modifications in Outlook were included in the POD.  This, along with other human errors, severely complicated the process, and made it essentially as inefficient as the old method.  If only there was a better way!

autoPOD-1Introduce the automated POD (autoPOD).  We decided to devise a macro app on top of Microsoft Publisher, a computer publishing tool, to automatically translate events on Outlook into the same easy POD format everyone was used to seeing.  Macros are essentially programs, coded in easy-to-learn VBA (Visual Basic for Applications), that are built on top of application documents (in this case Publisher’s and Outlook’s) meant to automate tasks within these programs.  Because of this attribute, it gets around IT policy requirements, which prohibit the introduction of specific executable programs not pre-approved by SPAWAR.  Microsoft Publisher was chosen over Word because it’s specifically designed to manipulate documents with multiple dynamic text boxes.  Through an appropriate script reference, the app asks the user permission to reach out to any designated public Outlook calendar.  Then all the user has to do is click one button, and it automatically inserts the daily schedule into the POD publication – complete with dates, events, headers, etc.  The layout is easily manipulated by different codes inputted into the appointment screen on Outlook.  For example, for an event to appear “bold”, which indicates the CO is attending, an actual Outlook invitation for that appointment is sent to the CO, which is then designated on the user interface with a specific user name.

autoPOD-2

Along with events, the app supports all sorts of informational headers put in by different users through Outlook tags – for example, the operations officer puts in the appropriate command duty officers and duty sections, and the quartermasters put in sunrise and sunset times into Outlook.  The app supports time structures displayed as “All Day” or “TBD”, and all types of recurring events.  Different permissions (ie: read only, add, or modify/delete) can be granted to different users to modify the Outlook Calendar, and the program is set up for an administrator to view when and who is putting in the events, so it’s not possible to sneak a last minute evolution for the next day without the XO and CMC knowing.

AutoPOD was eventually customized for several other tasks.  By request, we built an automated Plan of the Week (POW) 10-day printable outlook on top of Microsoft Excel for the Planning Board for Training (PB4T), which mimics the POD format each day, for planning purposes.  Other ships had a weekly or monthly outlook summary with important events listed on the back of their POD, and autoPOD was customized for these commands as well, using the “priority” attribute to determine if the item should be displayed on a weekly summary.  We have continuously refined AutoPOD to accommodate every ships’ POD format, meaning there will be little, if any, visible change to the Sailor.  For example, there are options to autoPOD-3modify the font, size, and width for the time and subject columns.  Additionally, it’s designed to be plug-and-play – all contained in one publisher file – so it can be used immediately and without any complicated installation procedures.  Detailed documentation is provided on how to install the program and manipulate the schedule via Outlook.

It is worth noting that the initial concept of autoPOD was not received well in its early stages.  For example, the yeomen were used to a certain way of doing things, and didn’t want to move over from Word to Publisher.  Despite comprehensive training, some department heads and department lead chief petty officers continued to send e-mails to admin with their events, instead of deconflicting and scheduling it themselves in Outlook.  However, after much dedication and patience, everyone slowly acclimated.  The new system is now second nature, and it’s hard to think of how life even functioned in the past.

To date, autoPOD has been distributed to over a dozen ships, across several waterfronts.  It has undoubtedly made the POD process less frustrating, and has saved countless manhours and time, from the junior yeoman who can produce a POD in minutes, to the XO who no longer has to micromanage the process.  Unfortunately, we recently hit a bump in the road when asked to set up the app on a ship that finished an extensive shipwide IT refresh known as a Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) installation.  At the time, CANES strictly restricted ships from creating and using shared calendars, along with other security settings that prevented the app from working properly.  A workaround is in progress, but it illustrates a point that has been brought up in the recent discussions – many Navy policies and procedures are around for valid reasons, but often come at the expense of productivity and innovation.  It’s essential to collaborate between the fleet and appropriate project managers / designers / policymakers to figure out an optimal mix.

Zachary Howitt is a proud American, Naval Officer, and Tech Entrepreneur. He is a designated operations analysis subspecialist and has served in two warships forward-deployed to Yokosuka, Japan. His opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any command.

Ears Open, Mouth Shut: How the Navy Should Really Approach Innovation

HT’s aboard USS George Washington construct a method to fill up multiple water jugs during HADR Operations.

You cannot force innovation.  Especially in the Navy.

This truism is continually repeated, from the ATHENA Project to Navy Warfare Development Command (the Navy’s “Center” for Innovation).  Yet, pushing innovation has become the cause de jour – one that has inspired a clumsy “campaign” which is heavy on rhetoric but light on substance.  I have had a front row seat to this movement, from the beginning until now, where its one product – the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell, or CRIC – is struggling to identify itself, find relevancy, and justify funding.  “What is the Navy missing?”  

 The Heart of the Matter

 What is innovation?

Our friends at Merriam-Webster tell us that to innovate is, “to do something in a new way: to have new ideas about how something can be done.

Precisely,” I scream internally amongst my fellow Starbucks typists.  Innovation is not just sitting around thinking stuff up – it is identifying a problem, often taking a Departure from Specifications, and coming up with a new solution, therefore making your respective process more efficient.  This stands apart from, as some try to compare, the process that brought us our much beloved password keeper: the Post-it Note.  While I wish to claim dictionary-supported victory, Webster continues: “To introduce as, or as if, new.” And here is the rub.  What is the Navy trying to push us to do?  Solve problems or think stuff up? In reality, it is both.  We need to clearly distinguish between innovation, which is the act of finding a new way to solve an identified problem, and creativity, which boils down to investing in our future.  “Semantics,” you say.  I disagree, and I believe that this line in the sand will help organize our service’s efforts more efficiently. When it comes to my definition of innovation, the Navy is spinning its wheels. Innovation will boom when Big Navy opens its ears and shuts its mouth: it must listen, implement, and highlight successful innovations.  

 “Haters Gonna’ Hate”

Why tear down people trying to improve the Navy? Why do you dislike the Innovation Campaign?

These are questions I hear asked by people enamored by flashy websites and new catch-phrases like “disruptive thinkers” or “crowd-sourcing.”  I do not hate innovation – I believe it has a valuable place in our Navy.  I do not hate creativity – I think it has a valuable role in our future.  I do dislike the Navy’s Innovation Campaign, though, because it misses the point of innovation, it blurs the line between innovation and creativity, and because the Navy is taking the wrong approach.

 We do not require a bottom-up invigoration.  Innovation happens where it matters most: at the source of “the problem.”  It does not happen because of symposia or blog posts.  It happens because our people are both creative, and selfish

Guests listen to Admiral Haney speak at the Pacific Rim innovation symposium, held at SPAWAR San Diego in 2012.

Let me explain that last point.

While some see the selfish streak as a bad thing, it is present in every person and can be harnessed.  What does it mean in this context?  It means that our people hate having their time wasted. They are always looking for a better answer to the problem, whether it is using red headlamps on the navigation table instead of those clunky Vietnam-era L-flashlights, or using Excel instead of R-ADM for watch bills.  They are being selfish because they are looking to make their lives easier – they are being innovative because they are finding a new solution to an existing problem.  Campaigns do not inspire these improvements and good deck-plate leadership can corral this so-called selfishness into constructive innovation, and steer clear of gun-decking.

 They are not going to listen anyways, so why should I do anything differently?”  This brings us full circle to the Navy’s current push for innovation.  The Navy wants to capture fresh ideas and the operational experience of our young leaders. To achieve this, Big Navy needs only to stop talking.  No websites or outreach groups are required.  If they listen, they will hear their Fleet being innovative.

 This entire campaign has been a bottom-up effort, trying to rile up the young folks and get them to be more innovative.  I think this is the wrong approach.  The thing that squashes the natural innovation in the Fleet is an unreceptive organization.  “R-ADM is the required software for watch bills.  If you do not use R-ADM, you fail the inspection.”  More effective Excel-based watch bills go into hiding and “clunky,” but approved, R-ADM watch bills are generated specifically for said assessment.  Innovation is squashed.  Other commands fail to learn the successful lessons of their waterfront counterparts because the solution was not “in accordance with.”

Many instructions are written in blood, and while we should not forget that, we should recognize that there is a way to ensure combat superiority and safety, while still applying real-world common sense.  Operators in the Fleet do not need to be patronized.  They just need the Navy to listen, and whenever possible, defer to the operator over dusty publications. When a good idea makes sense, operators need the Navy to implement it and promulgate it to the rest of the Fleet through every available channel – from press releases to school-house curriculums.  The innovation should be made official through integration into instructions and strategic communications – highlight it, not for fame or fortune, but rather, so that a Sailor does not find the problem he just solved, a year later at his next command.

 Innovation is All-Around Us

 Innovation is happening in the Fleet.  Many of these every-day solutions become so incorporated into a unit’s routine that they are hardly thought of as innovations – they are rarely publicized, and when they do spread, it is almost always via PCS-Pollination.  These life-hacks allow us to operate more efficiently, but also ensure that we are often coloring slightly outside “the lines.”  How many of these mini-innovations have become standard issue, or have been deemed to be, “in accordance with?”  Everyone knows that these gems are out there. Yet, they stay at the unit level – effective little outlaws, getting the job done, but waiting to sabotage the checklists of your next INSURV. What is the Navy missing?

An AH-1W Cobra launches for a CAS mission in Afghanistan. Pilots routinely sorted through 30 pounds of charts in the cockpit to execute their missions.

 Have you ever heard of the Combat iPad?  Unless you are a regular reader of the Disruptive Thinkers blog or a Marine Corps Cobra pilot, you might have missed it.  This is the greatest innovation success story in recent years.  Imagine being confined in a tiny cockpit, racing around a mountainous combat zone, expected to differentiate between the guys in tan clothing from the guys in khaki clothing, holding numerous lives in your hands, and trying to find your way by sorting through ONE-THOUSAND pages of charts in your lap.  As a proud former navigator, this sounded ridiculous to me. This was the reality, though, for Cobra crews in Afghanistan – the folks we expect precision close air support out of every time.  A Marine Captain decided to change the game and proved that yes, there is an App for this.  From the article, 

 “Of his own initiative and without official Marine Corps support, Captain Carlson provided his aging aircraft with a navigational system as advanced any available in the civilian world.  This leap in capability cost less than $1000 per aircraft. Remarkably, an entire Marine Corps Cobra squadron can now be outfitted with iPads for less than the cost of fuel for one day of combat operations in Afghanistan.”

 Here is battlefield innovation – no campaign required.  This meets most of the wickets laid out earlier: the Marine Corps listened and they implemented, but how well did they highlight this successful innovation?  The target audience is the entire Corps; they need to know that their leadership will listen and take action when sensible solutions rise to the surface.  

Another mark in the win-column is the improved watch bill and daily routine spearheaded by the Captain and crew of SAN JACINTO.  One of the most well-known parts of being a surface Sailor is being constantly exhausted.  Exhausted to your core.  Scientifically drunk with exhaustion.  I myself have two friendly sets of binos KIA on my record from falling (asleep) from a standing position.  Whereas I was once expected to launch helicopters “drunk” in the middle of the night, as I return to sea, I will now be expected to potentially launch missiles “drunk” in the middle of the night. The folks aboard SAN JAC worked together to find a solution to this identified problem and came up with a 3-on, 9-off routine.  This approach meets the initial definition of innovation.  It was a new way of doing business, both safer and more effectively.  Community leadership liked it, and promulgated it – not as a mandate, but rather, as an innovative solution that could be implemented (with the underlying tone being, “We don’t want drunk watch standers”), and highlighted it through press releases, message traffic, and direct TYCOM action.  Bravo.  Innovation.

USS San Jacinto (CG 56)

 So innovation is out there.  Big Navy just has to listen.

 Where Do We Go from Here?

We need a receptive culture, not a fancy campaign.  We do not need hollow initiatives from on high, but rather, we need the Navy to let us do our jobs. When we come up with better ways to do our jobs, we need the Navy to have our back.  We do not have money to waste.  We must take an approach to our expenses that defers to operational forces – ships, subs, aircraft, and their associated operators – with a balanced approach to “investing in creativity.”  It would be irresponsible to ignore the future and the ideas of our more creative junior people, but it is also irresponsible to spend vast sums on them to sit around and think stuff up. This is where I think we need to differentiate between our approach to innovation, and our approach to fostering creativity.

 Innovation will continue to happen, no matter what I or anyone else thinks or does about it.  People are always going to find an easier way.  So what do we need from the Navy?  We need a culture that expects leaders to consider the insight of the doers.  This improved culture does not need to be whiz-bang or flashy.  As efforts such as ColabLab and MMOWGLI and RAD have sputtered over the past year, Sailors continued to innovate in the Fleet.  Our Marine pilot and ship Captain did not look to a website for “likes.”  They had a problem identified and they endeavored – they innovated – to fix it.  Innovation – the act of solving problems with new ideas – should have minimal organizational involvement until the implementation stage.  The culture, which will take time to establish, should provide a direct conduit from the operator to the command that makes the applicable decisions.  No middle man or think tank, but rather decision makers – like the TYCOMs – clearly demonstrating that they want to hear the innovative solutions coming from the Fleet and that they will personally take action to implement those that make our Navy better.

The CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell is a group of junior leaders tasked with being innovative and coming up with “disruptive solutions.”

 Investing in creativity is more complicated.  A rudimentary look at the budget shows us that, in general, new money is not budgeted, but rather, re-allocated.  In other words, if our budget is (for simple argument) $1 billion, it does not become $1 billion + x to help us fund our creative thinkers.  Rather, “x” is taken from Program Y to fund said creative thinkers.  The question, from The Girl Next Door, becomes, “Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze?”  Are the creative thinkers more important than Fleet Experimentation, or “pick your project/funding line?”  What is our tolerance for failure? How can we capture the operational experience of our junior-leaders unseen for the past 40 years? The Navy should encourage and facilitate creativity. The CRIC was a good start.  It commenced the tearing down of stovepipes amongst junior leaders and got free-radicals thinking of ideas that grey-beards would never come up with.  As a way ahead, we need to clarify the group’s mission and get them focused on creativity.  The group, which is currently disaggregated, would evolve into a directorate made up of young, seasoned “egg heads” who would be incorporated into an existing command.  With an infrastructure and existing budgets, as well as the requisite people to provide support and continuity with an assortment of know-how (all things they lack now), this organization – the Young Leaders Creativity Cell (Y-LCC) – will become the receptacle for new ideas still in need of development flowing in from around the Navy and an incubator for creativity in our service.  Creativity – tomorrow’s next “Post-It Note” – may help us win the next war.  It takes time, though, and requires a tolerance for failure, which necessitates a separate approach from innovation.

 In the end, I may be arguing over the semantics between the terms innovation and creativity. I want to see the Navy take a hands-off approach to innovation – letting it happen and then supporting and highlighting it. And instead of ill-defined movements, I would like to see young leaders brought into the fold of existing top-heavy organizations (ONR, NWDC, SSG, DARPA, WCOE’s), enabling them to affect their creative – and possibly innovative – ideas from within.  And most importantly, I would like to see creative and innovative minds continue to blossom outside of the Navy umbrella, where I think they will continue to make the greatest advances.  As the co-founder of the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum, LT Ben Kohlmann pointed out to me, 

 “…Skunk Works only worked because it broke every rule in the book regarding traditional R&D, only accountable to the CEO of Lockheed.  It could not have functioned within the standard (DOD) institutional structure.”

If we want the next Skunk Works or Post-It note or iPhone, we must encourage the participation in such extra-curricular groups as the ATHENA Project, Disruptive Thinkers, CRIC(x), and the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum – exposing our most fertile minds to different perspectives and making these junior officers more effective leaders and innovators in the Fleet, where it matters most.

LT Jon Paris is a 2005 graduate of The Citadel and a Surface Warfare Officer.  He has served aboard destroyers and cruisers, as a navigation instructor, and is currently a Flag Aide in Norfolk, Virginia.  His opinions are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or his current command.

Weekend Reading: 09 Nov 2013

For those who can’t get enough of our sometimes witty, sometimes prescient, sometimes just out-in-left-field writing there’s good news! Now you can spend the weekend reading more from our membership. Here’s what they’ve been up to:

Australia
Natalie Sambhi: Security Scholar: Two new round-ups on Indonesian defense and intelligence news stories

Canada
James Bridger: Foreign Policy: Rise and Fall of a Pirate King

Germany
Felix Seidlers: Seidlers Sicherheispolitik: Germany Needs a Permanent Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Poland
Przemyslaw Krajewski: Viribus Unitis: Corvettes and Steadfast Jazz

U.S.
LT Will Spears, USN: JO Rules: Talk Like a Spartan
CDR Chuck Hill, USCG: Chuck Hill’s CG Blog: Norway Buying New SAR Helos
LT Scott Cheney-Peters, USNR: War on the Rocks: How to Not Go to War with China
William Yale: The Diplomat: Air Sea Battle: A Dangerous Unaffordable Threat
Dave Majumdar: USNI News: SR-72 is Only a Plane on Paper
ADM John Harvey (Ret.) and Bryan McGrath: Panel Discussion: Inaugural event at Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower
ADM James Stavridis (Ret.): Foreign Policy: Pirate Droves
Raymond Pritchet: Information Dissemination: American Decline
CDR Chris Rawley, USNR: NavalDrones: RAND on USVs
Joseph Hammond: Today’s Zaman: Energy Wars on the Caspain Basin

If you’re a member and don’t see your outside efforts above, be sure to email me at director@cimsec.org.

If you’re not a member (and you can check here) and would like to be you can fill out the short, simple, free memberhip application, which gives you access to all sorts of great things, like digital tote bags.

SSBN(X): Sacred Cow for a Reason

This article is part of our “Sacred Cows Week.”

By Grant Greenwell

SSBNXIn May 2009, President Obama disclosed the inventory of America’s strategic nuclear arsenal: 5,113 weapons. This was done in an attempt to 1) bring attention to smaller states with developing nuclear agendas and 2) pressure Russia to disclose its own nuclear numbers.  While the first objective is not quantifiable, and the second is partially complete (such as Russia cooperating with a recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists study documenting worldwide nuclear arsenals), the startling revelation by President Obama brought to light one widely-known fact: the U.S. possesses a massive nuclear arsenal deployed in missile silos, bombers, and submarines around the world.

In the fiscally constrained environment the U.S. currently resides, many institutions are questioning the efficiency of not only the quantity of nuclear weapons, but also the delivery methods of such an arsenal. A recent Cato Institute white paper argued that the U.S. nuclear arsenal if deployed only in nuclear strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would save the US $20b annually. The argument is predicated on a rivalry between the services in the early days of the Cold War to develop dominance in the field of nuclear weapon delivery (not unlike the Ballistic Missile Defense competition). Each service developed its own delivery method that was robust, survivable, and flexible to deliver a second-strike capability.  Of the three delivery methods of the Nuclear Triad, the SSBN is the most advantageous when it comes to survivability and mobility.

While some parties contend that disassembling the triad into a dyad or even monad eliminates the amplitude of U.S. deterrent strategy, all agree that the SSBN is the cornerstone of that strategy. That being said, the U.S. SSBN fleet is tired, with the first of 14 due to be decommissioned in 2027. A replacement fleet needs to be designed, approved, constructed, and tested in the next 14 years if the strategic deterrence ability of the SSBN fleet is to be continued.

Mr. Maxwell Cooper’s recent Proceedings article “The Future of Deterrence?  Ballistic Missile Defense” correctly cites that the current SSBN replacement (SSBN(X)) estimates are staggering when compared with the rest of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget – roughly $5b per SSBN(X) while the entire budget is roughly $21b/year over the next 30 years. Mr. Cooper further speculates (perhaps correctly) that the cost alone calls for the truncation – if not complete elimination – of the SSBN(X) in favor of vast increases in the BMD realm built around the existing Arleigh Burke platform.  He could not make a more dangerous assertion.

SSBN(X) remains a vital portion of our national maritime strategy as well as our nuclear deterrence strategy. If the SSBN force were to retire without replacement, the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be down nearly 1600 warheads that cannot be easily translated to the other portions of the triad. Additionally, the leg of the triad that is most survivable and mobile would be arrested, forcing our strategic resources to rely solely on fixed sites and aging bombers. Neither of these prospects are ideal, nor appealing. The argument is akin to whether US naval forces should rely on hard-kill (kinetic munitions) or soft-kill (electronic warfare (i.e., chaff decoys, jamming)) for defense. The answer is both, as should be the nuclear deterrent forces.

The U.S. Navy has signaled it agrees with this argument in the form of its FY14 budget.  In an effort to keep forward movement for the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP – formally SSBN(X)), the Navy requested $1.1b for additional research and development with the end goal of procuring a replacement fleet of 12 SSBNs. The Navy has also reasserted its commitment to the SSBN force in a surprising tactic: compromise. As Mr. Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists pointed out, the U.S. SSBN force is doing more with less. While the number of boats has remained the same for years, the deployment numbers are less, yet the nuclear deterrence mission has remained unchanged. In a nod to this trend, the Navy – with guidance from STRATCOM – has agreed to a decrease of the current 24-tube count to a 16-tube count for the future SSBN.

In addition to U.S. commitment to the next-generation SSBN force, their closest ally Britain has also started procuring its next ballistic boat, aptly named Successor that will carry its deterrent capability well into the 2040s.

The need to continues the SSBN fleet is evident and has been appropriately addressed by institutes, politicians, the U.S. Navy, and allies alike. The replacement plan has been programmed for and is projected to be completed in time to start the on-time retirement of the venerable Ohio class. It continues to remain the strongest platform in the US strategic deterrence strategy and as such is privileged to remain a “sacred cow.”

Grant Greenwell is the Director of Operations for CIMSEC since May of 2013. He is also a Surface Warfare Officer for the U.S. Navy and an active participant in American Mensa, the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps, and the Surface Navy Association. His opinions do not represent the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, nor his aforementioned affiliates.

Featured Image: POULSBO, Wash. (Jan. 14, 2015) The ballistic-missile submarine USS Nevada (SSBN 733) transits the Puget Sound on its way to its homeport, Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Ahron Arendes)